Appeal Against Sentence for Sexual Offences Against Child Dismissed

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an appeal challenging the sentence imposed for serious sexual offences against a child. The appeal argued that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust but was rejected as the sentence was not manifestly excessive.

Court of Criminal Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: [NAME] v R [2022] NSWCCA 62 Hearing dates: 21 March 2022 Date of orders: 25 March 2022 Decision date: 25 March 2022 Before: Beech-[NAME] CJ at CL at [1] Price J at [14] N Adams J at [15} Decision: (1) The Applicant be granted leave to appeal. (2) The Appeal be dismissed. Catchwords: CRIME – appeal – sexual offences against a child – no question of principle Legislation Cited: Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Crimes Act 1900 Cases Cited: [NAME] v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 420; [2016] HCA 25 [NAME] v The Queen; [NAME] v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 R v [NAME] [2020] NSWDC 521 R v [NAME] [2019] NSWCCA 148 R v [NAME] [2016] NSWCCA 103 Scott v R [2020] NSWCCA 81 Category: Principal judgment Parties: [NAME] (Applicant) Regina (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: [redacted] [NAME] ([NAME])

Solicitors: [redacted] Solicitor for Public Prosecutions ([NAME]) File Number(s): 2019/190213 Publication restriction: Non Publication Order with respect to the name of the complainant or any information that may identify her Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court Jurisdiction: Criminal Citation: R v [NAME] [2020] NSWDC 521 Date of Decision: 11 September 2020 Before: [NAME](s): 2019/190213

Judgment 1. BEECH-[NAME] CJ at CL: This is an application for leave to appeal from an aggregate sentence imposed for the commission of three serious sex offences against a [NAME].

2. On 11 September 2020, the applicant was sentenced by his Honour Judge Weinsten SC in respect of three offences namely an offence of having sexual intercourse with child under the age of 10 years contrary to s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900, grooming a child under 14 years for unlawful sexual activity contrary to s 66EB(3) of the Crimes Act and intentionally carrying out a sexual act with child under 10 years of age contrary to s 66DC(a) of the Crimes Act.

3. The maximum penalty for an offence under s 66A(1) is life imprisonment and the standard non-parole period is 15 years. The maximum penalty for an offence under s 66EB(3) is 12 years imprisonment and the standard non-parole period is 5 years. The maximum penalty for an offence under s 66DC(a) is 7 years. There is no standard non-parole period for that offence.

4. Included in a notice filed by the prosecutor under s 32(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (the "Sentencing Act") and associated with the offence under s 66A(1) were two further offences, namely an offence of incite a victim under the age of 10 years to commit an indecent act contrary to former s 61O(2) of the Crimes Act and indecently assaulting a person under the age of 16 years contrary to former s 61M(2).

5. His Honour imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 5 years and 8 months. Pursuant to s 53A(2) of the Sentencing Act His Honour specified an indicative sentence of imprisonment for 5 years and 7 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months for the offence under s 66A, three years with a non-parole period of two years for the offence under s 66EB(3) and two years and 3 months for the offence under s 66DC(a).

6. The offences were committed between 2016 and 2019. The victim of the offence was the daughter of the women the applicant was living with. The offending took place when the victim was aged between 5 and 8 years old. The facts and circumstances of the offending and the primary judge's findings on all matters relevant to sentencing were comprehensively set out in his Honour's sentencing judgment which should be read with this judgment (R v [NAME] [2020] NSWDC 521).

7. None of his Honour's findings are the subject of challenge. Instead, the sole ground of appeal is that the aggregate sentence imposed is "unreasonable or plainly unjust". The relevant principle governing a complaint that a sentence is manifestly excessive was stated in [NAME] v The Queen; [NAME] v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [59] (per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, [NAME]): "As was said in [NAME] v The Queen [(2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54 at [6]], '[m]anifest inadequacy of sentence, like manifest excess, is a conclusion'. And, as the plurality pointed out … in [NAME] v The Queen [(2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64; at [58]; "[NAME]"], appellate intervention on the ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate 'is not justified simply because the result arrived at below is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases'. Rather, as the plurality went on to say … in [NAME] [at [58]], '[i]ntervention is warranted only where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons'. But, by its very nature, that is a conclusion that does not admit of lengthy exposition."

1. The detailed submissions in support of this ground reduced to the proposition that, although the indicative sentences could not be said to be excessive, the aggregate sentence was too high having regard to his Honour's finding that the objective seriousness of each offence was just below the range of objective seriousness (at [18], [22] and 26]) and what could be gained from considering sentencing statistics and the supposedly comparable cases of R v [NAME] [2016] NSWCCA 103 ("[NAME]"), R v [NAME] [2019] NSWCCA 148 ("[NAME]") and Scott v R [2020] NSWCCA 81 ("Scott").

2. Neither the statistics nor the cases provided any support for the ground of appeal. [NAME] and [NAME] were both [NAME] appeals. [NAME] involved a single offence under s 66A when the maximum penalty for the offence was 25 years and not life imprisonment as it is now. [ADDRESS] imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. [NAME] involved two offences under s 66A committed after the maximum penalty was increased to life. [ADDRESS] sentenced [NAME] to an aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years without any allowance for a discount for the plea of guilty. The applicant's offending is worse than [NAME] in [NAME]. The applicant has been convicted of 3 offences with another two offences included on a Form 1.

3. In Scott this Court allowed an appeal against sentence and re‑sentenced [NAME] to an aggregate sentence of 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months. [NAME] committed one offence under s 66A(1) and three offences under former s 61M(2) of assault with an act of indecency on a child under 16 years. The latter offence carried a maximum penalty of 10 years and a standard non-parole period of 8 years. However, the Court in Scott found that it was an "exceptional case" with the offences said to be "almost fleeting" (at [174]) and an "extraordinary and inexplicable aberration, late in the life of a man of unblemished good character" (at [176]). That is not the case with the applicant in this matter.

4. Having regard to the trial judge's findings especially concerning the objective seriousness of the three offences, nether the indicative sentences or the aggregate sentence were manifestly excessive. I would reject the sole ground of appeal. In light of that conclusion, it is not necessary to consider a dispute that arose at the appeal as to whether certain evidence could be read on the "usual basis" ([NAME] v The Queen (2016) 258 CLR 420; [2016] HCA 25 at [2]).

5. Lastly, I note that under s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 and s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 any publication of the name of the victim or any matter which would identify her is prohibited. It was common ground that this extended to the applicant's name as that would be likely to identify the victim. Hence, he is referred to as "[NAME]".

6. I propose the following orders: (1) The Applicant be granted leave to appeal; (2) The Appeal be dismissed.

1. PRICE J: I agree with Beech-[NAME] CJ at CL.

2. N ADAMS J: I agree with Beech-[NAME] CJ at CL.

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