Conviction for Manslaughter by Criminal Negligence in NSWDC

The claimant was convicted of manslaughter by criminal negligence after causing the death of another through reckless behavior involving drug use. The court sentenced the claimant to 7 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 9 months.

District Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v [NAME] (No 2) [2019] NSWDC 155 Hearing dates: 27 March 2019 Date of orders: 06 May 2019 Decision date: 06 May 2019 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Lerve DCJ Decision: Convicted and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment with 4 years 9 months non-parole period. Catchwords: CRIME – manslaughter by criminal negligence [NAME] – penalties – imprisonment - relevant factors on sentence Legislation Cited: Crimes Act, 1900 Crimes ([NAME]) Act, 1999 Cases Cited: R v Tristan Lee [2019] NSWDC 59 R v Barnett [2016] NSWDC 302 R v Magro [2019] NSWSC 343 R v [NAME] [2018] NSWDC 367 Dipangkear v R [2010] NSWCCA 156 R v Byrne (1998) 104 A Crim R. 456 R v Hopley [2008] NSWCCA 105 Hoskins v R [2016] NSWCCA 57 Mead v Mead [2007] HCA 25 DPP v Pinn [2015] NSWSC 1684 R v Anderson [2012] NSWCCA 175 R v Donald [2013] NSWCCA 238 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina (Crown) [NAME] ([NAME]) Representation: Counsel: [redacted] Mr P [NAME] ([NAME])

Solicitors: [redacted] Publication restriction: No

REMARKS ON SENTENCE 1. [NAME] is to be sentenced for the manslaughter of [NAME]. On 6 December 2018 I gave reasons for finding [NAME] guilty of the charge that (she) on 13 March 2012 at [NAME] in the State of New South Wales did unlawfully kill [NAME], contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act, 1900. The trial was heard over four weeks from 17 October 2018 to 13 November 2018.

2. As [NAME] pleaded not guilty and went to trial there can be no discount or consideration for any plea of guilty. That is not to say that the penalty is in any way increased because [NAME] put the Crown to proof, merely that there can be no discount or consideration for any plea of guilty.

3. The maximum penalty for the offence of manslaughter is 25 years imprisonment. Parliament has not specified a standard non-parole period in respect of that offence.

4. Although the matter concerned an offence contrary to s 52A of the Crimes Act, the comments of her [NAME] Judge Yehia in R v Barnett [2016] NSWDC 302 are apposite to this matter. At [3]-[4] her [NAME] said: "In matters such as this Judges are asked to perform an impossible equation. No human life can ever be equated with a period of imprisonment. No gaol term can return a loved one and a life should never be measured simply by the punishment meted out to an [NAME]: R v Jarad Smith [2016] NSWCCA 75 per R A Hulme J at [18] endorsing the remarks made in R v Melissa McKeown [2013] NSWDC 22. The sentence I impose does not and cannot measure the value of BS's life. Instead it reflects the [NAME] discretion informed by proper principle. It must reflect an adequate punishment, recognising the harm done and denouncing the conduct of [NAME]. The sentence must also reflect the objective seriousness of the offence, [NAME]'s moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood or unlikelihood of future offending."

1. In the same vein, Wilson J in her remarks on sentence in R v Magro [2019] NSWSC 343 said at [6]: "No court could reflect the value of his life, or the depth of grief his death has caused, by a sentence of so many years and months of imprisonment for his killer."

1. Likewise, the sentence imposed on [NAME] does not and cannot measure the life of the late [NAME].

Facts 1. Consistent with reasons delivered on 6 December 2018 in R v [NAME] [2018] NSWDC 367, for the purpose of proceeding to sentence I find the following established beyond reasonable doubt. 2. [NAME] and [NAME] were known to each other and had been known to each other for some time before the death of [NAME]. [NAME]'s parents separated when he was approximately 12 months old and from the separation until he was 15 lived with his mother on the central coast of New South Wales. When he was 15 he returned to Cootamundra to live with his father. Sometime after returning to Cootamundra he sustained a shoulder injury while playing football and was prescribed [NAME], the brand name of the drug oxycodone.

3. When [NAME] was about 17 or 18 he commenced a relationship with [NAME]. That relationship was marked by persistent use of illicit substances and the abuse of prescription drugs, particularly [NAME], by both [NAME] and [NAME]. That relationship ended when [NAME] entered rehabilitation after she was dealt with for the offence of Aggravated Break Enter and Steal at a pharmacy at Cootamundra. [NAME] moved back to the central coast and lived with his mother.

4. There was an incident in August 2011 at [NAME]'s workplace that resulted in [NAME] being taken to the Wagga Wagga Base Hospital for injuries and being charged with criminal offences for which he was required to attend the [ADDRESS] at Cootamundra on 19 March 2012. [NAME] was apparently mistaken about the date he was required to appear and came back to Cootamundra a week early. 5. [NAME] and [NAME] were associates of each other and would meet from time to time to obtain and use drugs including prescription drugs. During the weekend of 10 and 11 March 2012 they spent time in each other's company. [NAME] and the accused shared a 60mg [NAME] tablet in [NAME] on 11 March 2012. [NAME] went back to Cootamundra but returned to [NAME] on 12 March 2012. The three of them later that [NAME] went to the flat occupied by a [NAME], who has since died, and obtained some Xanax tablets. Each of them ingested some of the Xanax tablets. In the evening of 12 March 2012 the three of them went to the a liquor store in [NAME] and each stole a bottle of alcohol with the intention or at least the hope of being able to swap that alcohol for [NAME].

6. In the afternoon or evening of 12 March 2012 [NAME] and [NAME] went to the home of [NAME] at [ADDRESS], [NAME]. The three of them were hopeful of sourcing [NAME] either directly or indirectly from [NAME]. [NAME] was prescribed [NAME] and it was his drug of choice. He had an arrangement with [NAME] who lived nearby whereby he would obtain from [NAME], usually for cash but occasionally for other goods.

7. At the request of [NAME] and [NAME] went to [NAME] and eventually there was an agreement reached where [NAME] supplied [NAME] to [NAME] for the alcohol that [NAME] and [NAME] had previously stolen. The [NAME] was ingested at [NAME]' home. [NAME] and [NAME] attended the [NAME] Hospital at about 10.30pm on 12 March 2012 to obtain "Fitpacks", which are apparently packages of syringes and other paraphernalia used in intravenous drug use. 8. [NAME] vomited by reason of an adverse reaction to something he had ingested, which I am satisfied were the substances he had taken. He also became very somnolent at [NAME]' home. As I set out at paragraph [125] of my decision on the verdict in the trial, it was decided between [NAME] and [NAME] that they would take [NAME] to the Nissan utility that belonged to [NAME] and take him to hospital. They got him outside. Trent Lovegrove, who had been staying at nearby premises, came upon the scene and assisted [NAME] and [NAME] in getting [NAME] into the utility. 9. [NAME] drove [NAME] from [NAME]' house to her own house at [ADDRESS] in [NAME]. There was a dispute at the trial as to when it was that [NAME] left [NAME]' premises. However, given my findings on 6 December 2016 that [NAME] was alive when he got to [NAME]'s home, when it was that she left [NAME]' home is ultimately of little consequence.

10. The body of the late [NAME] was found by [NAME]'s mother adjacent to the red utility when she came home from work at about 7.30am on 13 March 2012. Life was pronounced extinct on 13 March 2012, the cause of death being multi-drug toxicity. [NAME] had in fact gone to bed. When confronted by her mother [NAME]'s reaction was that [NAME] was drunk, not dead.

11. As I explained at [270] of my reasons for the verdict: "By taking [NAME] from [ADDRESS] to her home at [ADDRESS] the accused secluded [NAME] from others who were intending to assist him by getting him to hospital. By taking him to her home she effectively prevented any other person from assisting [NAME]. She failed to notify anyone or tell anyone about [NAME] and as I have already concluded she made no effort to contact medical or other assistance, or for that matter anyone."

1. As I went on to say at [273]-[275]: "The accused omitted to do anything by way of seeking or obtaining medical or other assistance for [NAME] who was helpless and who as I have said was in such a position that it would have been blatantly obvious to anyone that he was in urgent need of medical assistance. I am satisfied therefore beyond reasonable doubt that she was grossly negligent. [274] I am satisfied to the criminal standard in the circumstances that that omission significantly or substantially caused or accelerated the death of [NAME]. Leaving a helpless person in the driveway as the accused left [NAME] in all of the circumstances noting the need for urgent medical attention would have significantly or substantially caused or accelerated the death. [275] I am also satisfied to the criminal standard that the omission of the accused amounted to gross criminal negligence and merited criminal punishment because to use the expression from Nydam as adopted by the Chief Justice in Burns at [19] it 'involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man (read person) would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow'."

Assessment 1. Going initially to matters of general principle in assessing the seriousness of a crime of manslaughter I repeat what I said at [21]-[26] in my remarks on sentence in R v Tristan Lee [2019] NSWDC 59 namely: "Gleeson CJ (Grove & Ireland JJ agreeing) said in R v [NAME] unrep NSWCCA 12 December 1994: 'It has long been recognised that the circumstances which may give rise to a conviction for manslaughter are so various, and the range of degrees of culpability is so wide, that it is not possible to point to any established [NAME] tariff which can be applied to such cases. Of all crimes, manslaughter throws up the greatest variety of circumstances affecting culpability.' [22] However, the Chief Justice went on to say: "At the same time, the courts have repeatedly stressed that what is involved in every case of manslaughter is the felonious taking of a human life. That is the starting point for a consideration of the appropriate penalty, and a key element in the assessment of the gravity of the objective circumstances of the case. (R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349; R v Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397 at 402.)" [23] In the decision of R v MD, [NAME] & [NAME] (2005) 156 A Crim R 372; [2005] NSWCCA 342 the court (Spigelman CJ, Simpson J (as her [NAME] then was) and [NAME]) said at [61]: 'The felonious taking of human life has always been regarded by the law as a most serious crime. It could never be otherwise for the protection of human life must be a fundamental objective of any criminal law system in a civilised society R v Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510.' [24] Spigelman CJ (Hulme & Adams JJ agreeing) said in R v Hoerler (2004) 147 A Crim R 520; [2004] NSWCCA 184, which like [NAME] was also a Crown appeal said at [44]: '…When [NAME] for the offence of manslaughter, a court must always have regard to the full context in which death was caused. That includes consideration of the extent of violence and the risk of death or serious injury which accompany it. It also includes consideration of any matter impinging on the moral culpability of [NAME] where there was no intention to inflict such injury, which can vary significantly. Where there was such an intention, but murder was reduced to manslaughter by provocation or mental impairment, the degree of provocation or of impairment, also bearing on moral culpability, can also vary significantly.' [25] In the course of submissions the Crown referred to the decision of R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 (co-incidentally another Crown appeal) where the court (Bathurst CJ, Johnson & Hulme JJ) said at [229]: 'When [NAME] for manslaughter, a court must always have regard to the full context in which death was caused: R v Hoerler at 531 [44]. The surrounding circumstances may bear upon the objective gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of [NAME]: R v Hoerler at 531 [44]; R v [NAME] (No. 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61].' [26] Going to another matter of general principle,…in R v MD, [NAME] & [NAME] the Court said at [65]: 'In many cases where an [NAME] is convicted of manslaughter there will be exculpatory matters and personal circumstances that can lead the court to significantly ameliorate the sentence which might otherwise be imposed. However, as this Court pointed out in R v [NAME] (unreported, CCA 16 July 1991) it is important for the court to ensure that the subjective circumstances of an individual [NAME] do not divert the court from imposing a sentence which adequately reflects the part which the law must play in upholding the protection of human life and in punishing those who take it.'

1. The Crown submits at paragraph 11 of the written submissions, MFI 1 on sentence, that [NAME]'s moral culpability is high and that a sentence of full time custody is the only appropriate sentence in the matter. In oral submissions the Crown put that the present matter was "at the higher end of the spectrum of manslaughter by criminal negligence". Later in oral submissions the Crown put that the matter is more serious than the matter of R v Tristan Lee.

2. Lee was an example of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. The facts in the decision of Magro to which I referred earlier are an example of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act where the moral culpability of [NAME] is high. 3. [NAME] in his submissions concentrated on matters in mitigation to which I will refer when dealing with [NAME]'s subjective case. However, he did submit that there was an ambiguity in the evidence as to when it was [NAME] became aware of the serious condition of [NAME]. I understood [NAME] to submit that there was only a short period of time during which [NAME] was aware of the serious condition and accordingly, the matter was less serious. [NAME] put in submissions in reply that the matter presently under consideration was less serious than the matter of R v Tristan Lee as that matter involved [NAME] chasing [NAME] with a knife.

4. To my mind, the matter presently under consideration and the matter of Lee are incommensurable. The two matters starkly illustrate the broad range of conduct that will constitute manslaughter. Neither counsel provided any decisions on the issue of assessment of this matter, which given the nature of the matter is hardly surprising. I am to a very large extent in uncharted waters in determining this matter. 5. [NAME] and others had been ingesting prescription substances unlawfully obtained over a couple of days. It is clear from the evidence that all were affected by the substances that they had ingested. However, self-induced intoxication cannot be a matter in mitigation – see s 21A(5AA) of the Crimes ([NAME]) Act, 1999. All the facts and circumstances must be taken into account. 6. [NAME] must have realised that [NAME] was in a very serious condition when she got into the driver's seat of the utility. Likewise, she must have been very well aware of his condition when she arrived at her home. As I observed in my reasons for the verdict it would have been blatantly obvious to anyone that [NAME] was in dire need of medical attention. He was left in the driveway and [NAME] went to bed. The conduct was limited to driving away from [NAME]' home, not taking [NAME] to where he could obtain the obviously necessary medical attention and taking him to her home and leaving him in the driveway.

7. This matter can be contrasted to those involving parents who over a significant period of time fail to provide food and or medical attention to a helpless [NAME] infant.

8. I do not accept the Crown's submission that [NAME]'s moral culpability is at the higher end of manslaughter by criminal negligence. However, neither is it at the lower end of the scale. Another way of expressing what I have said is that the matter is only slightly below mid-range. This assessment is in the context of matters of manslaughter by criminal negligence.

Victim Impact Statements 1. The court received victim impact statements from [NAME]'s parents [NAME] and [NAME] and his sisters [NAME] and [NAME]. [NAME]'s statement has annexed to it a number of family photographs. 2. [NAME] was obviously a well-loved and sorely-missed member of the family. The contents of the victim impact statements are a stark reminder of why the felonious taking of a human life has always been regarded by the law as a most serious crime. The statements speak eloquently of the tragic effects the death of the late [NAME] has had on his family. Many tears have been shed already and many more are yet to be shed for the death of [NAME].

3. The victim impact statements also serve to add a human element to the [NAME] process. This is why I extracted from the decisions from R v Barnett and R v Magro earlier in these remarks. No sentence can ever measure the life of a loved one. For what it is worth the court extends its sincere condolences to the family and friends of the late [NAME] 1. [NAME] was born on [DATE] and accordingly is now 41 years of age and was 34 at the time of offending. She has been convicted on many occasions for serious driving offences including drive while disqualified, PCA, drive while licence cancelled and refuse to submit to breath analysis. Further, she has also been convicted of obtain or attempt to obtain drug by false prescription, receiving, take and drive conveyance without the consent of the owner, shoplifting, damage to property, assault police, intimidate police as well as a record for dishonesty and minor drug matters in the ACT. [NAME] has a record that does not entitle her to any particular leniency. 2. [NAME] has been sentenced to imprisonment before, however this is clearly the most serious matter that has brought her before a court.

3. On 17 May 2011 [NAME] was convicted of Drive While Disqualified and released on a bond pursuant to s 9 of the Crimes ([NAME]) Act 1999 for a period of two years. The offence for which [NAME] now appears for sentence was committed while [NAME] was subject to that bond. The factor of statutory aggravation pursuant to s 21A(2)(j) of the Crimes ([NAME]) Act is made out. While it is made out, the practical impact on the sentence will not be significant. It is to be noted however that [NAME] in breach of that bond drove [NAME] from [NAME]' home on 12 March 2012.

Subjective case for [NAME] 1. [NAME] did not give evidence at the sentence hearing however her mother did give evidence. Most of that evidence was directed towards the hardship of a third party, namely [NAME], a [NAME] nephew of [NAME]. 2. [NAME]'s mother, gave evidence that [NAME] was the son of her son [NAME] and [NAME], who had a long term problem with drugs and alcohol. [NAME] has been with her and [NAME] for the past three years. She and [NAME] look after [NAME], with [NAME] looking after [NAME] when [NAME] is working night shift at a local aged care facility in [NAME]. [NAME] assessed the relationship between [NAME] and [NAME] to be very close.

3. The evidence continued that since the verdict of guilty was returned on 6 December 2018 and [NAME] has since been on very restrictive bail conditions she, i.e. [NAME], has taken [NAME] to the doctor. 4. [NAME] has behavioural issues. This is supported by documents in exhibit 2 on sentence, being a series of medical reports in respect of [NAME]. There is a letter dated 11 March 2019 under the hand of [NAME], Paediatrician that sets out that [NAME] has the genetic abnormality of Xq28 duplication syndrome, mild intellectual difficulty and severe expressive language disorder. The letter goes on to say that this has "significant consequences for his learning and behaviour". Included in the exhibit is a pamphlet explaining Xq28 duplication syndrome. The other documents within exhibit 2 are comprehensive medical reports that support the statement contained in the letter of 11 March 2019. There is no reason to doubt the diagnosis or anything else contained in those reports.

5. Returning to the evidence of [NAME], she explains that the behavioural difficulties manifest themselves by [NAME] getting really cranky, banging walls and being abusive. [NAME]'s father apparently has little to do with [NAME]. A little later in her evidence she said [NAME] takes her role as [NAME]'s guardian seriously and that it was her opinion that [NAME] would suffer if [NAME] were to receive a lengthy custodial sentence. Towards the end of her evidence in chief [NAME] said that if [NAME] did receive a custodial sentence she would resign from her work in order that she could look after [NAME]. She would want him to remain with her. 6. [NAME] also said in evidence that soon after the death of [NAME] consulted a rehabilitation counsellor and she has been abstinent from drugs and alcohol for 4 years.

7. Under cross-examination [NAME] said that her son [NAME] did not have a drug problem but that he worked from 10pm to 6 am at a rendering plant (I understood this to be a meat works) and that her son had no input into his son's life on an ongoing basis. There was further cross-examination directed to the ultimate submission that the case was not in that category of truly wholly or highly exceptional.

8. On the issue of hardship to a third party [NAME], counsel for [NAME], referred the court to the decision of Dipangkear v R [2010] NSWCCA 156 in particular at [30]-[36]. I accept that there is a particular bond between [NAME] and [NAME] and that they are close. Further, I accept that [NAME] plays a significant role in the [NAME] to [NAME] care of [NAME]. I have no doubt that the absence of [NAME] will have an adverse effect on [NAME].

9. However, the principles are quite clear. Dunford J. reviewed the principles and authorities in his judgment in R v Byrne (1998) 104 A Crim R 456. His [NAME] said at p 463: "The general rule is that hardship to members of an [NAME]'s family is generally irrelevant and can only be taken into account in mitigation of sentence in highly exceptional circumstances. The care of [NAME] children is not normally an exceptional circumstance. In Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510 at 516 Gleeson CJ said: 'The real difficulty about a case such as the present, and many other cases in which imprisonment of an [NAME] causes hardship to a third party, is to identify a ground upon which they can properly and relevantly be regarded as exceptional; regrettably, causing hardship to third parties by the imprisonment of [NAME] is only too common…' Justice will not be seen to be administered even handedly if exceptions are made in cases which are not truly exceptional."

1. More recently, the authorities relating to hardship to an [NAME]'s family were reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Hopley [2008] NSWCCA 105 at [39]-[41]. At [39] Johnson J. (Beazley JA, McCallum J (as her [NAME] then was). agreeing) said: "The fact of imprisonment almost inevitably leads to hardship, sometimes very serious hardship to third parties. Justice will not have been seen to be administered even-handedly if exceptions are made (on this account) in cases which are not truly, wholly or highly exceptional: R v Edwards at 516; R v [NAME] at 277; R v [NAME]; R v Ly at 179 [29]".

1. I am not aware of any authority, nor have I been referred to any more recent authority, that places any doubt or qualification on the authorities to which I have referred. I accept the Crown's submission that the situation with [NAME] in the matter presently under consideration does not meet the test of "truly, wholly or highly exceptional" but the issue relating to [NAME] is all part of the subjective mix and makes a small contribution to the justification for a finding of special circumstances. 2. [NAME] agreed with the author of Exhibit 1 (psychologist's report) that her daughter has shown poor decision making. She also said that her daughter had a naïve view of the world but she has now come to realise what life is really about.

3. Exhibit 1 on sentence is a report of [NAME], clinical neuropsychologist of [NAME]. The Crown at paragraphs 34 and continuing of the written submissions (MFI 1 on sentence) puts that the author of the report was not provided with the two police records of interview and had those interviews been provided the author would have been able to make "a more informed and perhaps more accurate" assessment. The Crown goes on to submit that the results of the tests at pp 5 to 7 of the report are inconsistent with the intellect and cognitive functioning of [NAME] demonstrated in the ERISPS. The Crown did not object to that report nor was the author required for cross-examination. I am not prepared to reject the report. 4. [NAME] apparently had a good and happy upbringing in [NAME] and she enjoyed an extended family in the area. The report sets out [NAME]'s current living arrangements, namely that she lives with her mother and [NAME]. She enjoyed school and had lots of friends (p 3). She attended pony club as a child. She has had various employment including at a disability employment service.

5. The report goes on (p 3) to explain that [NAME] has been involved in a number of motor vehicle accidents and in particular one in 2007 which caused an injury to her back for which she was prescribed [NAME], to which she became addicted. [NAME] told the author of the report that she no longer takes opiates because of her high tendency to become addicted.

6. At p 4 of the report it is set out that [NAME] commenced using cannabis at 19 and began to drink alcohol socially but that she would drink until she was drunk. She has been abstinent from alcohol and substances since 2014. She has previously tried residential rehabilitation on a number of occasions. [NAME] described becoming paranoid and delusional at various times in her drug taking.

7. The report records (p 4) that [NAME] has frequent flashbacks to the death of [NAME]. He mother and family were very supportive of her and helped her. She is very concerned about her nephew [NAME].

8. Various tests were administered in the course of the preparation of the report. [NAME]'s overall level of intellectual functioning fell within the borderline to low ranges, with her results being at or better than 8 per cent of the population. The author opines (p 6) that low average is a reasonable estimate of overall abilities.

9. At p 8 of the report the following appears: "[NAME] has shown poor judgment and poor decision making throughout her adult life, including a naïve view of the world and a careless and impulsive attitude to illicit drug use. Impaired executive function caused by frontal lobe dysfunction is known to play an integral part in poor judgment and decision making and in addictive behaviour. In terms of the contribution her impaired executive function may have made to the offending behaviour, it is difficult to separate the relative contribution of her impaired decision making capacities due to executive dysfunction compared with the impaired decision making caused by the significant cocktail of drugs she had taken on the night of [NAME]'s death".

1. I have no note or memory of any submission on behalf of [NAME] that the sentence be mitigated because of the issue of impaired executive function. Given what the author of the report writes about the difficulty in separating impaired decision making because of that and impaired decision making because of the cocktail of drugs ingested that is not surprising.

2. The author of the report opines (pp 8-9) that for a successful rehabilitation a number of detailed aspects of her mental health need to be addressed. The Crown opposes a finding of special circumstances. It is submitted on behalf of [NAME] that there be a finding of special circumstances. The issues relating to mental health and the need for supervision to ensure that [NAME] receives the appropriate treatment for those issues, taken with the need for assistance to effectively re-integrate into society, justifies to my mind a modest finding of special circumstances.

3. The sentence assessment report (SAR) (tab 4, exhibit A on sentence) (p 3) assesses [NAME] at being a medium risk of reoffending. However, the author of that report also notes that [NAME] is willing to undergo supervision and to undertake interventions to address her risks of reoffending. 4. [NAME] has not offended since 2013. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of [NAME]'s mother that [NAME] has been abstinent from drugs for four years. [NAME] has been making a very valuable contribution to the upbringing of her nephew [NAME]. Given these factors I am prepared to find on the balance of probabilities that [NAME] has good prospects of rehabilitation and further that she is unlikely to re-offend.

5. Returning to the SAR, the author under the heading "Insight into impact of offending" recorded that [NAME] refused to discuss the offence as she stated that it caused her distress and that she became highly distraught when discussing the events that surrounded that period of time. Further that while she continued to deny full culpability she did express regret for being part of the events and that she expressed empathy for the victim and his family.

6. There is no evidence that would entitle a court to find on balance that [NAME] is remorseful. Be that as it may, it seems that [NAME] does indicate some degree of empathy and that she has some insight into the effect of her offending. 7. [NAME] on behalf of [NAME] submitted that the onerous bail conditions to which [NAME] has been subject since she was charged with this offence, namely 18 October 2016 entitle her to have the sentence back-dated in accordance with the principles enunciated by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Anderson [2012] NSWCCA 175.

8. Davies J (Allsop P (as his [NAME] then was) with additional comments, Campbell J agreeing and with the additional comments of the President) said at [41-[45] of Anderson: "The Crown accepted that in appropriate circumstances an allowance can be made for periods on bail. Most of the cases which have dealt with this have involved rehabilitation "custody" by virtue of [NAME] being within a residential rehabilitation program: R v McHugh (1985) 1 NSWLR 588; R v [NAME] (unreported, NSWCCA, 4 March 1997); R v [NAME] (unreported, NSWCCA, 19 May 1992); Hughes v R [2008] NSWCCA 48; (2008) 185 A Crim R 155; BJT v R [2011] NSWCCA 12; R v Delaney [2003] NSWCCA 342, (2003) 59 NSWLR 1. [42] [ADDRESS] J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreed) said: [38] It is appropriate for an [NAME] to receive recognition and credit for time spent in rehabilitation which has been productive: R v [NAME] (unreported, NSWCCA 19 May 1992). An allowance of approximately 50% of the credit that would be given in respect of pre-sentence custody has been endorsed: R v [NAME] (unreported, NSWCCA 4 March 1997). Pre-sentence custody and the similar concept of rehabilitation "custody" is preferably catered for by backdating of the commencement date of sentence: R v McHugh (1985) 1 NSWLR 588. [43] Once it is accepted that it may be appropriate in some circumstances to give a discount of 50% in respect of bail conditions the determination of what an appropriate discount might be in a given case is a discretionary judgment for the [NAME] judge.

Accordingly, an error of the type referred to in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 must be shown. [44] Although the Respondent was not in what has been called rehabilitation custody the practical effects of her bail conditions were onerous. She was required to reside in a small town, was unable to leave it (except to attend court or legal conferences) and was subject to a curfew. Those conditions meant that she was unable to find employment (because of the limited job opportunities in such a small town) and was unable to further her rehabilitation because no facilities were available. [45] Her [NAME]'s approach to the Respondent's bail conditions was a lenient one. She did not, however, make any error of fact or law, she did not take account of irrelevant matters and she considered relevant matters. The result, whilst generous, was not plainly unjust nor unreasonable in the sense that it reduced the sentence to a level insufficient to reflect the objective seriousness of the offending: Delaney at [35]; Truss v R [2008] NSWCCA 325 at [21]."

1. At paragraph 48 of the Crown's written submissions on sentence (MFI 1 on sentence) the Crown refers to the decision of Hoskins v R [2016] NSWCCA 57. In that decision the Court (Payne JA, [NAME] (as her [NAME] then was) and Wilson J) said at [36]-[37]: "The fact that an [NAME] was subject to strict conditions of bail during the period awaiting trial or sentence is a matter that may be taken into account by a [NAME] judge, but there is no obligation to do so. Much will depend upon the facts of the particular case. Certainly, there is no principle that dictates a reduction in sentence as a direct equivalent of a period of time spent subject to strict conditions of bail. It is a matter for the [NAME] judge to assess the facts of the particular case and determine whether bail conditions to which an [NAME] was subject amount to quasi-custody: R v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243, at 258; R v Webb [2004] NSWCCA 330 at [18]."

1. The Crown opposes any credit being extended to [NAME] because of the onerous bail conditions. The Crown also submitted that "house arrest" is nothing like being in prison. Issues arise as to whether the bail conditions to which [NAME] was subject were onerous to the extent that the principles as described in Anderson are enlivened and, if so, what is the extent of any consideration that should be extended to [NAME] - noting that she was facing one of the most serious charges on the criminal calendar.

2. After I returned the verdict of guilty on 6 December 2018 the Crown made a Detention Application. That was refused, however [NAME] was placed on very strict bail conditions essentially that amounted to house arrest. I would not allow any credit for the period from 6 December 2018 up until the time of sentence, given that [NAME] had been found guilty of manslaughter and was awaiting sentence that would inevitably involve a sentence of full time custody which was made very plain to [NAME].

3. Both counsel made reference to the bail conditions however no attempt was made to place a copy of the bail undertaking before the court. The court therefore has to resort to checking its own records, as it is entitled to do – see for example Mead v Mead [2007] HCA 25 and DPP v Pinn [2015] NSWSC 1684 per [NAME]. That check with the JusticeLink records indicates that the bail order was acknowledged on 18 October 2016 and that the conditions were reporting to [NAME] three times per week, a residential condition, not to contact prosecution witnesses and not to commit any further offences. My note of counsel's submissions was imperfect and accordingly I had my Associate contact counsel for [NAME] who advised by email that he was relying on these as being onerous bail conditions justifying some consideration.

4. Accepting that my notes of the submissions were imperfect and in the absence of any document tendered I checked with counsel today before commencing the delivering of these remarks on sentence. It was as well I did so. [NAME] submitted that his client was reporting daily up until the trial commenced at which time the reporting conditions were suspended and that she reported on the weekends. As part of the submission it was put without apparent opposition or objection from the Crown that a check with the police officer in charge of the case indicated that [NAME] was reporting on a daily basis until the trial commenced. A physical check by my Associate with the actual Bail Acknowledgement on the Court file also indicates that [NAME] was reporting daily.

5. Even allowing for the fact that [NAME] was reporting daily from her arrest in October 20I6 I do not regard these bail conditions as being onerous to the point where any credit would be allowed conformably with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Anderson [2012] NSWCCA 175. Indeed, the bail conditions are no more onerous than would ordinarily be expected with a charge of manslaughter, noting the maximum penalty prescribed for that offence.

6. Delay is the only other issue that has to be addressed. [NAME] was arrested and charged with the offence on 18 October 2016 and the trial commenced on 15 October 2018. The trial was originally scheduled to commence on 9 April 2018 however that date was vacated to accommodate what became known as the "Special Call Over". As the Crown submits at paragraph 51 MFI 1 on sentence, I observed at [22] of the decision on guilt that the delay between committal for trial and the trial commencing is not particularly significant.

7. Latham J ([NAME] JJ agreeing) reviewed a number of authorities relating to the issue of delay in R v Donald [2013] NSWCCA 238 at [28]-[57]. Her [NAME] went on to say at [49]: "There is nothing in this Court's consideration of the issue of delay in [NAME], Khoury, Blanco, Barker & Gibson, [NAME] v R [2009] NSWCCA 99, Tourni v R [2010] NSWCCA 317 or Giourtalis v R [2013] NSWCCA 216 that departs from the summary set out above in [NAME], with the exception of the last factor (a mitigated penalty as a mark of disapproval of tardy prosecutorial conduct) in Buss JA's judgment. I am not aware of any authority in this State that has endorsed such an approach to the [NAME] of an [NAME], where the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay leads to the conclusion that the prosecution has been 'dilatory or neglectful'. Overwhelmingly, the focus is on the consequences of the delay to [NAME], no matter what the explanation for it.' 1. [NAME] has had the matter "hanging over her head", the effect of the delay has been to a large extent positive in that she has been able to demonstrate an ability to rehabilitate herself and to remain abstinent from substances. I am not persuaded that [NAME] should be extended any consideration because of the effect of delay.

General Remarks 1. I must give proper regard and effect to sections 3A and 5 of the Crimes ([NAME]) Act 1999. Section 5 provides in effect that a court should not impose any sentence of imprisonment unless it comes to the conclusion that no other penalty is appropriate. Given the maximum penalty and that the offending involves the death of a human being, no other sentence is appropriate.

2. I understood [NAME] initially to pitch his ultimate submission that any sentence be served by way of Intensive Correction Order. As the Crown correctly submits that [NAME] option is not available for the offence of manslaughter. In any event, given the criminality the total sentence must be in excess of two years which means that an Intensive Correction Order would not have been available in any event. I am of the opinion that there should be a modest finding of special circumstances for reasons earlier enunciated in these reasons.

3. Section 3A sets out the purposes of punishment, namely: (a) to ensure that [NAME] is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring [NAME] and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from [NAME], (d) to promote the rehabilitation of [NAME], (e) to make [NAME] accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of [NAME], and (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

Orders 1. In respect of the charge that (she) on 13 March 2012 at [NAME] in the State of New South Wales did unlawfully kill [NAME], contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act, 1900 [NAME] is convicted.

2. Consequent upon that conviction [NAME] is sentenced to a non-parole period of 4 years and 9 months from 6 May 2019 and which will expire on 5 February 2024. Thereafter there will be a balance of term on parole of 2 years and 3 months, which will commence on 6 February 2024 and expire on 5 May 2026.

3. The total sentence is one of seven years imprisonment. The non-parole period is approximately 67.5% of the total sentence. 4. [NAME] will be eligible for release to parole at the expiration of the non-parole period and I recommend that release.

********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 06 May 2019