Employer Held Liable for Worker’s Injury Due to Unsafe Work Environment

The Court of Appeal ruled that an employer must provide a safe system of work for its employees and is liable for any injuries sustained due to a failure to do so. The case involved a worker injured while on the job and the subsequent legal action.

OUTCOME: Allowed

Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: [COMPANY_1] v [NAME_3] (A Division of [NAME_4]) [COMPANY_2] [2018] NSWCA 140 Hearing dates: 11 April 2018 Decision date: 28 June 2018 Before: [NAME_5] at [1]; White JA at [2]; [NAME_6] at [111] Decision: (1) Grant leave to appeal. (2) Order that within seven days the appellant file a notice of appeal in the form of its draft notice of appeal. (3) Appeal allowed in part. (4) Order that order 1 entered on 15 August 2017 (that there be judgment for the first respondent in the sum of $37,495.01) be set aside. (5) In lieu thereof, order that judgment be entered for the appellant on the first respondent's claim. (6) Set aside order 3 entered on 15 August 2017. (7) In lieu thereof, order that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the trial, including the costs of the cross-claim. (8) Cross-appeal dismissed. (9) Order that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. (10) No order as to the second respondent's costs of the appeal or cross-appeal. Catchwords: WORKERS COMPENSATION – Indemnity of employer – Workers Compensation Act 1987 ([NAME_8]) s 151Z – Where primary judge made inconsistent findings as to the identity of the employer – Whether duty of care breached and causation established – Whether costs and expenses incurred in defending the litigation were a direct result of negligence – Appeal allowed Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 ([NAME_8]), ss 5B, 5C, 5D, 16 Civil Procedure Act 2005 ([NAME_8]), s 100 District Court Act 1973 ([NAME_8]), s 127 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 ([NAME_8]), s 5 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1 Workers Compensation Act 1926, s 64 Workers Compensation Act 1987 ([NAME_8]), ss 2, 20, 151H, 151Z, 159

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ([NAME_8]), r 51.40 Cases Cited: Cockatoo Docks & Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1939) 39 [NAME_8]) 295 Coghill v Indochine Resources Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 377 [NAME_9] v [COMPANY_10] (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 357 Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21 Howard Rotavator Pty Ltd v Wilson (1987) 8 NSWLR 498 I & J Foods Pty Ltd v Bergzam Pty Ltd (1997) 14 NSWCCR 486 J Blackwood & Son v Skilled Engineering [2008] NSWCA 142 Morgan v Kittochside Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 117 [NAME_11] 152 Public Transport Commission (NSW) v J Murray-Moore (NSW) Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 336 South West Helicopters Pty Ltd v Stephenson [2017] NSWCA 312 State Rail Authority of NSW v Sun Alliance & Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 561; [2003] NSWCA Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161 Toll Pty Ltd v Dakic [2006] NSWCA 58 Westpac Banking Corporation v Tomassion (1993) 32 NSWLR 207 Category: Principal judgment Parties: [COMPANY_1] (Applicant/Cross-Respondent) [NAME_3] (A Division of [NAME_4]) [COMPANY_2] (1st Respondent/Cross-Appellant) [COMPANY_4] (2nd Respondent) Representation: Counsel: [redacted] [NAME_13] (Respondents/Cross-Appellant)

Solicitors: [redacted] [NAME_15] (Respondents/Cross-Appellant) File Number(s): 2017/242343 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Civil Citation: n/a Date of Decision: 13 July 2017 Before: Sorby ADCJ File Number(s): 2015/18695

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.] [HEADNOTE] [NAME_3] (A Division of [NAME_4]) [COMPANY_2] (the respondent) claimed indemnity from [COMPANY_1] (the appellant) pursuant to s 151Z(1)(d) and (2)(e) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 ([NAME_8]) in respect of workers' compensation payments made by [NAME_3]'s insurer to [NAME_16]. She had been injured on 17 November 2011 while working at [NAME_1]' warehouse. The workers' compensation payments totalled $135,142.41. [NAME_3] alleged that [NAME_16] was its employee and that she was "lent on hire" to [NAME_1] pursuant to a labour hire contract entered into between [NAME_1] and [COMPANY_4], the parent company of [NAME_3]. It alleged that [NAME_1] owed [NAME_16] a duty of care, which had been breached by [NAME_1]' failing to provide a safe system of work which had caused [NAME_16]'s injury. [NAME_1] denied that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3], and contended that she was employed by [NAME_4]. It denied breaching its duty of care to [NAME_16]. Further, it alleged that the injury was sustained partly or in whole by [NAME_3]'s own negligence and accordingly that any indemnity was to be reduced. By its cross-appeal [NAME_3] contended that it was open to the primary judge to conclude that [NAME_16] had suffered a degree of whole person impairment of at least 15 per cent and therefore a claim against it would have failed. [NAME_1] brought a cross-claim against [NAME_4] for contribution and/or indemnity as a joint tortfeasor, and damages and an indemnity pursuant to its labour hire agreement. The primary judge found that [NAME_1] had breached its duty of care. If sued, [NAME_1] would have been liable for damages totalling $438,024.92. Responsibility for the injury could be apportioned 60 per cent to [NAME_1] and 40 per cent to [NAME_3]. The cross-claim was rejected. Judgment was given in the sum of $37,495.901. [NAME_1] appealed and [NAME_3] cross-appealed, contending that judgment should have been given for $135,142.41 plus interest. [ADDRESS] held (Per White JA, [NAME_5] and [NAME_6] agreeing) that leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal allowed in part, and the cross-appeal dismissed:

In relation to the appeal 1. Leave to appeal should be granted because all the issues arising on the appeal would be raised on the cross-appeal, and the cross-appeal lay as of right: [21]

2. The primary judge made inconsistent findings as to [NAME_16]'s employer. A consideration of the evidence including the structure of [NAME_4]'s subsidiaries established that the employer was [NAME_3]: [7], [53]

3. Even if [NAME_3] were not [NAME_16]'s employer, for the purposes of s 151Z(1)(d) of the Workers Compensation Act it was the person by whom the compensation was paid and would have standing to sue: [58]-[60]

4. The fact that [NAME_3], being the employer, was itself a tortfeasor did not disentitle it from an indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) of the Workers Compensation Act: [62]-[63]

5. The primary judge's finding that [NAME_1] was negligent should be set aside. The evidence did not support the findings of breach, nor was causation established: [83]-[91]. This meant that the cross-appeal failed [93]

6. The primary judge was right to have dismissed the cross-claim, but not for the reasons given. [NAME_1] is not entitled to costs on a solicitor and own client basis from [NAME_4] as the costs and expenses incurred by [NAME_1] in defending the litigation were incurred not as a direct result of [NAME_3]' negligence but as a result of [NAME_3]'s bringing a claim for indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d): [99]-[109]

Judgment 1. [NAME_5]: I agree with the orders proposed by White JA, for the reasons he gives.

2. WHITE JA: This is an application for leave to appeal and a cross-appeal from orders of the District Court made on 13 July and 15 August 2017 (Sorby ADCJ).

3. The claim in the District Court was brought by [NAME_3] (A Division of [NAME_4]) [COMPANY_2] ("[NAME_3]") against [COMPANY_1] ("[NAME_1]") for indemnity pursuant to s 151Z(1)(d) and (2)(e) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 ([NAME_8]) ("the WC Act") in respect of workers' compensation payments made by [NAME_3]'s insurer to a [NAME_16]. [NAME_16] was injured at work at a [NAME_1] warehouse in [NAME_17] at about 7:00 am on 17 November 2011. She received workers' compensation payments totalling $135,142.41. [NAME_3] alleged that [NAME_16] commenced employment with it on or about 20 July 2011 and that she was "lent on hire" to work with [NAME_1] at [NAME_1]' premises pursuant to a contract for the provision of temporary labour hire entered into between [NAME_3]'s parent company, [COMPANY_4] ("[NAME_4]") and [NAME_1]. It alleged that [NAME_1] owed [NAME_16] a duty of care and that her injuries were caused by [NAME_1]' negligence in, amongst other things, failing to provide a safe system of work. 4. [NAME_1] denied that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3]. It contends that she was employed by [NAME_4]. It denied owing [NAME_16] a duty of care as alleged in the further amended statement of claim. It alleged that [NAME_16] was contributorily negligent, but that claim was not pressed on appeal. [NAME_1] also alleged that [NAME_16]'s injury was sustained partly or in whole by [NAME_3]'s own fault. It alleged that: "13. The Defendant says that, pursuant to Section 151Z(2) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, any damages that may be recovered from the Defendant by the Plaintiff, which is not admitted, are to be reduced by the amount by which the contribution which the Defendant would but for Part 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, be entitled to recover from the Plaintiff's employer as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, exceeds the amount of the contribution recoverable." 1. [NAME_1] also brought a cross-claim against [NAME_4] claiming contribution or indemnity against it pursuant to s 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 ([NAME_8]) that provides for contribution between joint tortfeasors. It also claimed indemnity pursuant to its labour hire agreement with [NAME_4] or damages for breach of that agreement. 2. [NAME_1] contends that if [NAME_3] were not [NAME_16]'s employer, [NAME_3] is not entitled to recover from it any indemnity in respect of workers' compensation payments made by [NAME_3]'s insurer to [NAME_16].

3. The primary judge made inconsistent findings as to whether [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3] or by [NAME_4].

4. The primary judge found that [NAME_1] breached a duty of care it owed to [NAME_16]. The primary judge found that if sued, [NAME_1] would have been liable to [NAME_16] for damages totalling $438,024.92. He concluded that [NAME_16]'s whole of body impairment exceeded 15 per cent and concluded that [NAME_3] would also be liable to pay damages. As between [NAME_1] and [NAME_3] the judge apportioned fault as to 60 per cent to [NAME_1] and 40 per cent to [NAME_3].

5. The primary judge rejected [NAME_1]' cross-claim against [NAME_4] on the ground that the cross-claim alleged that any injuries occasioned to [NAME_16] were the result of negligence of the "subcontractor", being [NAME_3]. He said that [NAME_3] was not a subcontractor as defined and [NAME_1] did not engage it as a subcontractor. He therefore dismissed the cross-claim. [NAME_1] complains that the primary judge erred because it was admitted on the pleadings that [NAME_4] subcontracted performance of the work of providing temporary labour to [NAME_1] to [NAME_3].

6. Having found the amount of damages to which [NAME_16] would have been entitled if she had sued [NAME_1] for damages, and having determined the proportion of fault as between [NAME_1] and [NAME_3] the primary judge directed the parties to calculate the "damages" (sic) for which judgment should be given. [NAME_3]'s claim was a claim in debt for an indemnity, not a claim for damages (Westpac Banking Corporation v Tomassion (1993) 32 NSWLR 207 at 215, 220; Howard Rotavator Pty Ltd v Wilson (1987) 8 NSWLR 498). The parties agreed that judgment should be given for [NAME_3] against [NAME_1] in the sum of $37,495.01. That sum included pre-judgment interest.

7. By notice of cross-appeal filed on 26 October 2017 [NAME_3] seeks judgment in the sum of $135,142.41 plus interest pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 ([NAME_8]) in place of the judgment for $37,495.01.

8. By its cross-appeal [NAME_3] contends that it was not open to the primary judge to determine that [NAME_16]'s degree of whole person impairment was at least 15 per cent. Accordingly it says that had [NAME_16] brought a claim for work injury damages against [NAME_3] she would not have been entitled to recover any damages by reason of s 151H of the WC Act.

9. The second ground of cross-appeal was that the primary judge erred in his apportionment of the degree of negligence between [NAME_3] and [NAME_1].

10. The following issues arise: 1. whether [NAME_1] should be given leave to appeal given that the judgment against it was only for $37,495.01, the matter in issue on its appeal is substantially less than $100,000 and no appeal lies as of right (District Court Act 1973 ([NAME_8]), s 127); 2. whether [NAME_3] established that it was [NAME_16]'s employer; 3. if no to (b), whether [NAME_3] is nonetheless entitled to seek indemnity under s 151Z; 4. if yes to (b), whether [NAME_3] is precluded from claiming indemnity under s 151Z because it was itself a tortfeasor; 5. whether the primary judge erred in finding that [NAME_1] breached its duty of care to [NAME_16]; 6. if no to (e), whether the primary judge erred in finding that [NAME_16] had sustained a degree of permanent impairment of at least 15 per cent so as to entitle her to recover any damages against [NAME_3]; 7. if no to (e), whether the primary judge erred in his apportionment of responsibility between [NAME_3] and [NAME_1]; 8. if no to (e), whether [NAME_1] was entitled to indemnity from [NAME_4] under its labour hire agreement with [NAME_4] or was entitled to damages from [NAME_4] for the amount of its liability to [NAME_3] and its costs; and 9. if yes to (e) and [NAME_1] was not liable, whether it is entitled to an indemnity from [NAME_4] in respect of its costs of defending the claim.

1. Section 151Z of the WC Act provides: "151Z Recovery against both employer and stranger (1) If the injury for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a liability in some person other than the worker's employer to pay damages in respect of the injury, the following provisions have effect: (a) the worker may take proceedings both against that person to recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensation under this Act for payment of that compensation, but is not entitled to retain both damages and compensation, (b) if the worker recovers firstly compensation and secondly those damages, the worker is liable to repay out of those damages the amount of compensation which a person has paid in respect of the worker's injury under this Act, and the worker is not entitled to any further compensation, (c) if the worker firstly recovers those damages the worker is not entitled to recover compensation under this Act, (d) if the worker has recovered compensation under this Act, the person by whom the compensation was paid is entitled to be indemnified by the person so liable to pay those damages (being an indemnity limited to the amount of those damages), (e) if any payment is made under the indemnity and, at the time of the payment, the worker has not obtained judgment for damages against the person paying under the indemnity, the payment is, to the extent of its amount, a defence to proceedings by the worker against that person for damages, (e1) if any payment is made under the indemnity and, at the time of the payment, the worker has obtained judgment for damages against the person paying under the indemnity (but judgment has not been satisfied), the payment, to the extent of its amount, satisfies the judgment, (f) all questions relating to matters arising under this section are, in default of agreement, to be settled by action or, with the consent of the parties, by the Commission. (2) If, in respect of an injury to a worker for which compensation is payable under this Act: (a) the worker takes or is entitled to take proceedings independently of this Act to recover damages from a person other than the worker's employer, and (b) the worker also takes or is entitled to take proceedings independently of this Act to recover damages from that employer, the following provisions have effect: (c) the damages that may be recovered from the person by the worker in proceedings referred to in paragraph (a) are to be reduced by the amount by which the contribution which the person would (but for this Part) be entitled to recover from the employer as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise exceeds the amount of the contribution recoverable, (d) the amount of the contribution that the person is entitled to recover from the employer as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise is to be determined as if the whole of the damages were assessed in accordance with provisions of Division 3 as to the award of damages, (e) if the worker does not take proceedings against that employer or does not accept satisfaction of the judgment against that employer, subsection (1) applies as if the worker had not been entitled to recover damages from that employer, except that: (i) if the compensation paid by that employer exceeds the amount of the contribution that could be recovered from that employer as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise—the indemnity referred to in subsection (1) (d) is for the amount of the excess only, and (ii) if the compensation paid by that employer does not exceed the amount of that contribution—subsection (1) (d) does not apply and the employer has, to the extent of the compensation so paid, a defence to an action for such a contribution. (3) This section applies to proceedings taken independently of this Act by a person to whom compensation is payable under this Act in respect of the death of a worker as a result of an injury. (4) If a worker is liable under subsection (1) (b) to repay any money out of damages recovered by the worker, the worker is not liable to repay the money out of any damages payable after the date of recovery by way of periodic or other payments for loss of future earnings or earning capacity or for future expenses. (5) For the avoidance of doubt, this section applies and is taken always to have applied to the recovery of compensation or damages, whether or not the compensation or damages were paid under an award or judgment. For example, compensation or damages may be paid under an agreement."

1. Section 151H of the WC Act provides: "151H No damages unless permanent impairment of at least 15% (1) No damages may be awarded unless the injury results in the death of the worker or in a degree of permanent impairment of the injured worker that is at least 15%. Note. Section 322 of the 1998 Act provides that the assessment of the degree of permanent impairment is to be made in accordance with Workers Compensation Guidelines. That section also provides that impairments that result from the same injury are to be assessed together. (2) In assessing whether the 15% threshold has been met (that is, whether the degree of permanent impairment resulting from an injury is at least 15%): (a) impairment resulting from physical injury is to be assessed separately from impairment resulting from psychological injury, and (b) in assessing impairment resulting from psychological injury, no regard is to be had to impairment that results from a secondary psychological injury, and (c) the 15% threshold is not met unless the degree of permanent impairment resulting from physical injury is at least 15% or the degree of permanent impairment resulting from psychological injury is at least 15%. Note. This does not prevent an award of damages in respect of both psychological and physical injuries together once the 15% threshold has been met for one or the other. (3) In assessing the degree of permanent impairment that results from a physical injury, no regard is to be had to any impairment or symptoms resulting from a psychological injury. (4) The degree of permanent impairment that results from an injury is to be assessed as provided by this section and Part 7 (Medical assessment) of Chapter 7 of the 1998 Act. (5) In this section: psychological injury includes psychiatric injury. secondary psychological injury means a psychological injury to the extent that it arises as a consequence of, or secondary to, a physical injury."

1. The effect of these provisions, in a case where the injured worker does not sue either his or her employer or a [NAME_18] but has received compensation payments, is that "the person by whom compensation was paid" can recover indemnity in respect of those payments from a [NAME_18] (s 151Z(1)(d)). If the worker was entitled to take proceedings against both the employer and [NAME_18] but did not do so, the [NAME_18] can set off against its liability to provide indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) the amount it could recover by way of contribution from the employer had the worker sued (s 151Z(2)(e)). But the amount that can be recovered is to be determined as if the whole of the damages were assessed in accordance with Div 3 of Pt 5 of the WC Act (s 151Z(2)(d)). That means that if the worker could not recover any damages because the degree of permanent impairment was less than 15 per cent, the [NAME_18] cannot reduce its liability to provide indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) by any contribution from the employer. It also means that the amount of the employer's contribution that reduces the amount of indemnity is assessed by reference to the restrictions on recoverable work injury damages provided for by Pt 5.

2. Had the primary judge found that the 15 per cent permanent impairment threshold not been reached, no notional contribution from [NAME_3] as [NAME_16]'s employer could have applied in reduction of the indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) (J Blackwood & Son v Skilled Engineering [2008] NSWCA 142).

3. The basis for the calculation of indemnity in the sum of $37,495.01 was as follows. On the primary judge's finding [NAME_3] was responsible as to 40 per cent for [NAME_16]'s injury. Had it been sued [NAME_3] would only have been liable for damages for past economic loss due to loss of earnings and future economic loss due to impairment of earning capacity (s 151G). The primary judge assessed these at $259,118.52. Forty per cent of that figure is $103,647.41. The difference between the employer's contribution ($103,647.41) and the compensation payments ($135,142.41) was $31,495 (s 151Z(2)(e)) to which pre-judgment interest was added.

Leave to appeal 1. [NAME_3] opposed [NAME_1]' application for leave to appeal on the following grounds: 1. the amount in issue on the appeal; 2. at its heart the case was a routine slip and fall case which involved no question of principle; and 3. there was no evidence that the case had any wider significance to [NAME_1].

1. Were it not for the cross-appeal, I would refuse leave to appeal. The amount in dispute in the appeal is trivial for the parties concerned. The dispute is essentially one between [NAME_3]'s workers' compensation insurer and [NAME_1]' public liability insurer (or [NAME_1] if it is a self-insurer) which has no real social utility and no advantage to the injured person. The observations of Brownie AJA in Toll Pty Ltd v Dakic [2006] NSWCA 58 in relation to disputes between motor vehicle insurers and workers' compensation insurers (at [163]) are applicable to the present case.

2. But the amount in issue on [NAME_3]'s cross-appeal is more than $100,000. It brings its cross-appeal as of right (District Court Act 1973 s 127(3)). It accepts that each issue that is raised on the proposed notice of appeal can and would be raised in opposition to its cross-appeal. In those circumstances justice requires that leave to appeal be granted.

Who was [NAME_16]'s employer? 1. Mr G [NAME_12] SC who appeared for [NAME_1], submitted that the primary judge found that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_4]. He submitted that [NAME_3] was not entitled to dispute that finding in the absence of a notice of contention.

2. Whether a notice of contention need be filed when leave to appeal has not been granted but the application for leave is heard concurrently with the hearing of the appeal, need not be debated (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ([NAME_8]), r 51.40). In anticipation that leave to appeal might be granted [NAME_3] gave notice of proposed grounds of contention. These did not include a challenge to a finding that [NAME_4], and not [NAME_3], was [NAME_16]'s employer.

3. The primary judge did make a finding that [NAME_4] was [NAME_16]'s employer. He said (at [17]): "[NAME_4] conducted its own induction for workers working at the Defendant's warehouse and it assessed [NAME_1]' own protocols and procedures. The role of the Plaintiff on site was limited, but consistent with the role of an employer, the worker's actual employer being [NAME_4]."

1. But the primary judge also and inconsistently found that [NAME_3] was [NAME_16]'s employer. In para [2] of his Honour's reasons the primary judge said that s 151Z(1)(d) of the WC Act was engaged: "… in circumstances where a worker is entitled to take proceedings against a third party (in this case the Defendant) and is also entitled to take proceedings against an employer (here the Plaintiff)." 1. [NAME_19] submitted that in that paragraph the primary judge was not making a finding but was describing the nature of [NAME_3]'s claim. That is a possible construction of that paragraph. But the primary judge went on to find (at [15]) that the plaintiff carried out a limited role as an employer on site and that: "[NAME_4] through [NAME_3] of [sic] the Plaintiff had supplied a considerable number of labourers to the Defendant at the warehouse. [NAME_16] thought a 'couple of hundred' and [NAME_20] said at least 100 to 120."

1. This was describing employees whose services were supplied by [NAME_4] "through [NAME_3]", indicating that [NAME_3] was the employer, through whom [NAME_4] supplied services to [NAME_1].

2. In para [58] the primary judge said "… the Plaintiff [viz. [NAME_3]] had a significant role in ensuring the safety of its employees, such as [NAME_16] …", a clear finding that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3]. The primary judge's conclusion that [NAME_3] (not [NAME_4]) had a 40 per cent responsibility for [NAME_16]'s injury is only explicable on the basis that it and not [NAME_4] was [NAME_16]'s employer. 3. [NAME_1] said that the primary judge had found that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_4] (as he had), it did not challenge the primary judge's finding that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3]. The identity of [NAME_16]'s employer was in issue. As the primary judge made inconsistent findings, the question is one for this Court. [NAME_3] bore the onus of establishing that it was [NAME_16]'s employer. 4. [NAME_16] signed an agreement called a "Casual On-Hire Employment Agreement Terms and Conditions of Employment". She did so on 20 July 2011 by way of acceptance of those terms. Contrary to [NAME_1]' submission, the terms of that agreement do not identify [NAME_16]'s employer. The document states: "This Agreement is to be signed by all Casual On-Hire employees upon accepting employment with [COMPANY_4] (ABN 33 [PHONE]) or any of its related entities ('[NAME_4]'). … 1. My employment with [NAME_4] is as a casual on-hire employee, and as such I may from time to time be placed on assignment to provide services for the benefit of Clients of [NAME_4] (each an 'Assignment' with a 'Client'), with each Assignment constituting a discrete period of employment. Each Assignment is a fixed project or task, with no guaranteed term. I acknowledge given the nature of the work that I have no ongoing expectation of work beyond the cessation date of the Assignment.

2. I may accept or reject any offer of an Assignment from [NAME_4]. On completion of an Assignment, whether satisfactory or otherwise, [NAME_4] may terminate my employment and [NAME_4] may terminate my employment and [NAME_4] is under no obligation to offer me any further Assignment.

3. I understand that [NAME_4] does not control the length of any Assignment and I accept that, while [NAME_4] may indicate the potential length of an Assignment in good faith, the Client or [NAME_4] may vary the length of the Assignment or terminate my attendance at any Assignment at their absolute discretion, and I understand that cessation of an Assignment does not give rise to any entitlement to any payment beyond the cessation date. … 9. I accept that during each Assignment I will be subject to the care, control and supervision of the Client. This arrangement is limited to the scope of the Assignment, as agreed between me and [NAME_4] before me being placed with the Client. Should I be directed by the Client to ... [Balance of clause not tendered.] … 25. [NAME_4] may assign any of its rights under this Agreement.

26. I accept this Agreement and agree to abide by the [NAME_4] of Conduct, which is Annexure A to this Agreement or as varied from time to time. … I declare that the employment related information I have provided to [NAME_4] is true and correct. I have read, understand and accept the terms and conditions of my employment, the annexed Code of Conduct as varied from time to time (which I will abide by while employed by [NAME_4]) and will accept [NAME_4]'s and/or its Clients' rules covering medical requirements, safety regulations, drug and/or alcohol testing/ time of attendance at work, and any other conditions on the work site to which I am assigned from time to time." 1. [NAME_1] submitted that the references in the agreement to "[NAME_4]" was to [COMPANY_4]. That is not so. The term "[NAME_4]" refers to [COMPANY_4] or any of its related entities. The pro-forma agreement contemplates that employees may be employed not by [COMPANY_4], but by a related entity of that company. If the individual is employed by a related entity of [NAME_4], then the references in the agreement to [NAME_4] refer to the company with whom the employee accepted employment.

2. The code of conduct that is Annexure A to the terms and conditions of employment has the same indeterminacy.

3. The pro-forma agreement signed by [NAME_16] did not include a provision for it to be signed by the employer. On the face of the document, in the form in which it was tendered, the document would be equally consistent with the employer's being [NAME_3] or [NAME_4].

4. The document tendered was incomplete. It consisted of pages 1, 3 and 4 of four pages. Page 1 included clauses 1-8 and part of clause 9. Page 3 commenced with clause 23. It can be inferred that the balance of clause 9 and all of clauses 10-22 were on page 2. [NAME_3] did not lead evidence as to why page 2 was missing from the copy document that was tendered. Counsel for [NAME_3] attempted to lead evidence as to the contents of page 2 from a witness called by [NAME_3], a [NAME_20]. She gave her occupation as being a branch manager at [NAME_4]. She was asked to explain the relationship between [NAME_4] and [NAME_3]. She said: "[NAME_4] is the group, group name, so our - [NAME_3] is a division of [NAME_4], so [NAME_4] are the group company. Each division under that has its own types of roles that we supply to. So, for example, [NAME_3] is the division under [NAME_4] that supplies blue collar labour. We have [NAME_21] who supply health care professionals, [NAME_22] which provide hospitality staff and so on. So [NAME_3] is the blue collar division of [NAME_4]." 1. [NAME_20] was taken to the employment agreement and to the fact that page 2 was missing. She was asked whether she knew what page 2 dealt with. The primary judge rejected questions that attempted to elicit the contents of the missing page 2. He required the page to be produced. Counsel for [NAME_3] said that he did not know why the page was not reproduced and that it might be a photocopying error, or it might be lost, but that was a matter for speculation. [NAME_20] then gave the following evidence: "Q. When the blue collar workers were engaged by [NAME_4] was there a standard contract that was used, or were they tailored for each employee? A. A standard contract that would be used. Q. Was the contract standard across the different divisions of [NAME_4] that you've referred to? A. There's a [NAME_4] contract and in that contract you could select which group your employees would be employed under. So, for example, anyone employed for us, with this [NAME_4] contract, we would tick the selection that they're employed under [NAME_3]."

1. Page 2 was never produced. The agreement that was produced did not contain any provision for the selection of "which group your employees will be employed under". The document produced did not include any provision for ticking as a selection that [NAME_16] would be employed by [NAME_3].

2. No explanation was given as to why only part of the contract was produced. No-one gave evidence that it had been lost. [NAME_20] said that it "looks like the back of page 2 is missing". In fact, (as [NAME_20] agreed) all of page 2 was missing. She said that she had seen the document included in the tender bundle as part of [NAME_16]'s employment file. The original of the document in the employment file was not produced. The inference to be drawn is that the missing page 2 would not have assisted [NAME_3] in establishing that it was [NAME_16]'s employer. The true identity of her employer was an issue squarely raised on the pleadings. It should be inferred that although the standard form contract included a provision to enable the ticking of a selection as to the company by whom the employee was to be employed, [NAME_3] was not so selected. It cannot be inferred that some other company, such as [NAME_4], was selected. That would be to speculate that the selection had been completed so as to nominate [NAME_4] as the employer.

3. Counsel for [NAME_3] submitted that the contract of employment nominated [NAME_3] as the relevant employer for [NAME_16] as opposed to one of the other subsidiaries within the group. There is no evidence of that. 4. [NAME_16] was required to complete, and did complete, a "Pre-Employment Health Questionnaire". [NAME_1] contends that the questionnaire is a "[NAME_4]-Employment Health Questionnaire". It includes prominently the following trade mark:

1. The name "[NAME_4]" as distinct from the trade mark that appears above was not used. There is no identification of the particular corporate entity or entities that used the trade mark. It may well have been used by [NAME_4] and any of its subsidiaries. 2. [NAME_16]'s wages were paid by [NAME_4]. It withheld the tax payable by [NAME_16] on her wages and issued [NAME_16] with her PAYG payment summaries. Clause 12-35 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) provides: "12‑35 Payment to employee An entity must withhold an amount from salary, wages, commission, bonuses or allowances it pays to an individual as an employee (whether of that or another entity)."

1. Clause 12-60 provides: "12‑60 Payment under labour hire arrangement, or specified by regulations (1) An entity that *carries on an *enterprise must withhold an amount from a payment that it makes to an individual in the course or furtherance of the enterprise if: (a) the enterprise is a *business of arranging for persons to perform work or services directly for clients of the entity, or the enterprise includes a business of that kind that is not merely incidental to the main activities of the enterprise; and (b) the payment is made under an *arrangement the performance of which, in whole or in part, involves the performance of work or services by the individual directly for a client of the entity, or directly for a client of another entity."

1. The fact that [NAME_4] and not [NAME_3] paid [NAME_16]'s wages and withheld and presumably remitted to the Commissioner the tax referable to those wages is consistent with its being [NAME_16]'s employer, but it is not determinative of that question. The Taxation Administration Act allows for group remittances. 2. [NAME_3] did not adduce any evidence of any intra-group accounting whereby [NAME_3] was liable to its parent company for the wages paid by the parent company. Prima facie, the fact that [NAME_4], and not [NAME_3], paid [NAME_16]'s wages is a significant pointer to [NAME_4] being her employer, in the absence of evidence as to the accounting practice in the group. 3. [NAME_4] or its subsidiary provided labour for [NAME_1] at its warehouse in [NAME_17] a "client risk assessment (workforce)" form was completed and signed both by a Client Representative (viz. a representative of [NAME_1]) and a "CM Representative", an "OHS Co-ordinator", and a "CM Branch Manager". The form used the trade mark [NAME_4] (as appears at [40] above). It included matters to be documented including questions such as "Who will supervise and monitor [NAME_4] employees while on site?". "[NAME_4]" was not defined. The answer to that question was that "[NAME_4]'s" employees would be supervised and monitored by "[NAME_23] Manager". There was no evidence as to whether Mr [NAME_23] was an employee of [NAME_3], [NAME_4] or [NAME_1].

4. The reports generated after [NAME_16]'s injury are also equivocal as to the identity of her employer.

5. No argument was advanced that [NAME_16] had more than one employer. The question raised by Morgan v Kittochside Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 117 [NAME_11] 152 and Coghill v Indochine Resources Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 377 does not arise.

6. There was no direct evidence as to who had the right to control [NAME_16] in how she performed her tasks (Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16 at 24, 36; [1986] HCA 1). The question was complicated because to some extent [NAME_1] had the right to control [NAME_16] in how she performed her tasks. In so far as the right of control was reserved to [NAME_4] or its subsidiary, there was no evidence, whether the control was to be exercised by someone employed by [NAME_4] or by [NAME_3].

7. A relevant consideration for determining who was [NAME_16]'s employer was into whose enterprise [NAME_16] was integrated (Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21 at [47]-[52], [54]; [2001] HCA 44; Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161 at [31]-[33]; [2006] HCA 19).

8. By its cross-claim [NAME_1] accepted that [NAME_4] subcontracted to [NAME_3] the provision of labour to [NAME_1]. This is consistent with [NAME_20]'s evidence that [NAME_3] supplied blue-collar labour as a "division" under [NAME_4]. [NAME_3] was not a division of [NAME_4] as that expression is usually understood. It was [NAME_4]'s subsidiary. Its name is misleading. But that does not obscure the fact that according to [NAME_20] it supplied labour that [NAME_4], a labour hire company, agreed to supply to [NAME_1].

9. Importantly, the workers' compensation payments were made by [COMPANY_24] ("[NAME_24]") and its records disclosed that [NAME_16]'s employer was [NAME_3]. The WC Act requires a worker's employer to take out workers' compensation insurance. The fact that [NAME_24]'s records disclosed that [NAME_16] was [NAME_3]'s employee is a powerful pointer to [NAME_3] being [NAME_16]'s employer. 10. [NAME_20] described [NAME_3] as a division of [NAME_4]. It was a separate legal entity. But the effect of her evidence, when assessed with the terms of the employment agreement and [NAME_3]'s own name, is that different subsidiaries were described as divisions of the parent company and contributed labour of different types that the parent company contracted to supply. Although the evidence is far from ideal, in my view [NAME_3] discharged the onus that was on it to establish that it was [NAME_16]'s employer.

[NAME_3]'s standing to sue if it were not the employer 1. Under s 159(2)(a) of the WC Act the insurer as well as the employer is directly liable to the worker insured under the policy to pay compensation for which the employer is liable. In Cockatoo Docks & Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1939) 39 [NAME_8]) 295 the [ADDRESS] (Halse Rogers J with whom Bavin J and Barton AJ agreed) said that if the insurer made the payment of compensation to discharge its own liability, the insurer would be the proper plaintiff to seek an indemnity under s 64(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (that was in materially the same terms as the present s 151Z(1)(d) of the WC Act). However, if the insurer purported to act on behalf of the employer and to discharge the employer's liability at the employer's request, the employer could seek the indemnity (at 303-304).

2. In State Rail Authority of NSW v Sun Alliance & Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 561; [2003] NSWCA 288 Mason P with whom [NAME_25] and [NAME_25] agreed, noted (at 566): "The words 'the person by whom the compensation was paid' include any insurer that pays compensation as well as the employer on whose behalf and at whose request compensation is paid (cf Cockatoo Docks & Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1939) 39 [NAME_8]) 295 at 303–304; 56 WN ([NAME_8]) 146 at 148–149). This exception is justified by the language used, the long history of compulsory workers compensation insurance and the practice of insurers paying injured workers directly." 1. [NAME_1] argued that if [NAME_3] were not [NAME_16]'s employer it had no standing to claim indemnity. [NAME_1] did not contend that [NAME_3] had not demonstrated that [NAME_24] was not discharging its direct liability, in which case [NAME_24] would have been the appropriate plaintiff. It accepted that if [NAME_3] were [NAME_16]'s employer the payment made by [NAME_24] could be said to have been made on [NAME_3]'s behalf and at its request. There was no evidence of a direct request, but the request might be implied.

2. Because I have concluded that [NAME_3] was [NAME_16]'s employer, it follows that the basis for [NAME_1]' first ground of appeal fails. It is strictly not necessary to consider what the position would be if [NAME_4], and not [NAME_3], were [NAME_16]'s employer. In terms of s 151Z(1)(d) the question would be whether [NAME_3] was "the person by whom the compensation was paid". That would depend on whether the payments of compensation were made by [NAME_24] "on behalf of" [NAME_3], even though [NAME_3] was not the party liable to make the payments. Clearly it did make the payments on [NAME_3]'s behalf because [NAME_3] was its insured.

3. Section 151Z(1)(d) refers to the person by whom the compensation was paid, not the person who was liable to pay the compensation. In State Rail Authority of [NAME_8] v [COMPANY_27] P did not say that the words "the person by whom the compensation was paid" mean the insurer or the employer.

4. Section 151Z(2)(d) and (e) assume that the employer will be the party claiming indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d). That might imply that a non-employer could not claim indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d). But it is clear that an insurer can claim indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d). In such a case the indemnity the insurer can recover will be affected by the [NAME_18]'s right of contribution from the employer. Exactly the same issue would arise if a person who was neither the employer nor the employer's insurer paid the compensation for which the employer was liable.

5. If [NAME_3] were not [NAME_16]'s employer but [NAME_4] was, questions of restitution would arise between [NAME_24], [NAME_3], [NAME_4] and the workers' compensation insurer of [NAME_4] if that insurer were not [NAME_24]. (There was no evidence as to whether [NAME_24] was also [NAME_4]'s workers' compensation insurer.) But those questions would not affect [NAME_3]'s standing to sue for indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) as being the person by whom the compensation to [NAME_16] was paid.

[NAME_3] a tortfeasor 1. In its written submissions [NAME_1] submitted that s 151Z(1)(d) did not confer a right of indemnity in circumstances where the employer is itself a tortfeasor. This submission was made in support of an argument that because [NAME_3] was itself found to be a tortfeasor, it was not entitled to indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d) (Public Transport Commission (NSW) v J Murray-Moore (NSW) Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 336; South West Helicopters Pty Ltd v Stephenson [2017] NSWCA 312 at [170]-[172]).

2. I did not understand this argument to be ultimately pressed on appeal. [NAME_29], who appeared for [NAME_3] and [NAME_4], submitted that the decision in [COMPANY_30] v [NAME_31] did not inhibit reliance on s 151Z(1)(d) by an employer where a worker does not commence proceedings against the employer for damages. That should be accepted. In [COMPANY_30] v [NAME_32] JA, with whose reasons in this respect Leeming and Payne JJA agreed, said (at [173]): "[173] The second reason why the trial judge considered that the constraint in s 151Z(1) did not apply was that an employer which was itself a tortfeasor was now able to recover compensation payments under s 151Z(1)(d) pursuant to s 151Z(2)(e). That conclusion was correct; however, the entitlement arose under, and only under the terms of the latter provision; it was wrong to treat the later provision as amending the earlier provision.

Accordingly, if the Shire Council were to recover its compensation payments, on the assumption that it was a tortfeasor, it had to bring its claim within the terms of s 151Z(2)(e)." (See also [NAME_9] v [COMPANY_10] (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 357 at [48].) 1. [NAME_16] did not take proceedings against her employer. Therefore, s 151Z(2)(e) is engaged and the fact that [NAME_3] was itself negligent does not preclude its being entitled to claim an indemnity pursuant to s 151Z(1)(d) (I & J Foods Pty Ltd v Bergzam Pty Ltd (1997) 14 NSWCCR 486 at 496).

Negligence finding against [NAME_1] 1. [NAME_16] was employed at [NAME_1]' warehouse and distribution centre at [NAME_17] as a "picker/packer". Her job involved receiving an order of stock to be picked from pallets or racks in the warehouse, placing a label on the stock, putting it on a machine, driving it to a designated area where it would be packed by being wrapped for delivery by truck to a [NAME_1] store. [NAME_16]'s shift was from 5.00 am to 2.30pm, although she finished anywhere up to 3.00 pm.

2. On the morning of 17 November 2011 she arrived at the warehouse at about 4.30am. The warehouse commenced operations at the start of her shift at 5am. At the beginning of the shift she participated in a toolbox talk by a [NAME_1] manager. A toolbox talk is a talk addressed to occupational health and safety issues. [NAME_16] said that "it would have been like a health safety topic for the week, any [incidents] that may have happened over the previous shift before we started, things like that. …". She collected and scanned her order to be filled. She then moved to the machine that she would be using on the day called a DCP Personal and then used the machine to collect goods to fill the order. On the day in question she was filling orders for pet food which was dry kibble mix in sealed plastic bags. 3. [NAME_16] described the DCP Machine as a little car on the rear of which either two pallets or three roll cages could be carried. She described the process as follows: "… pull up on your machine in the aisle, go to your pick bay, check our label, check your order, put it on the stock, manually pick up the stock and either place it on your roll cage or your pallet. You drive your machine up, you go to the next pick bay and you continue to do the same thing."

1. The sealed bags of dry dog food were loaded manually onto the machine. At about 7am [NAME_16] was injured. She described the accident as follows: "I arrived at the pick bay, double-spotter pick bay. I got off my machine to the left. I put a label on a bag of dry dog kibble. I put - I turned around and I put it onto the roll cage. I peeled off another label and turned around to retrieve the second bag of dry pet food kibble and I slipped and fell and landed hard on the ground and hit the pallet that the stock was on." 1. [NAME_16] slipped on a fine layer of crushed dry kibble that was like dust. A [NAME_4] incident report form stated "when kibble is walked on or crushed by equipment it turns into a fine slippery powder which is hard to see". The same [NAME_4] incident report forms identified the root cause of the incident as being "failure by person unknown to clean up spillage from the floor of the aisle".

2. The floor where the slip occurred had been last cleaned at 9.15pm the previous night. There was no evidence as to when the warehouse closed. It did not operate 24 hours per day because the evidence established that operations commenced at 5.00 am. Evidently there were two shifts. It is a reasonable inference that the second shift finished at about 10.00 pm or up to half an hour later, consistently with the length of the first shift. [NAME_3] did not adduce evidence of any later operations. It is a reasonable inference that the cleaning was done within 45 minutes to one and a quarter hours before the conclusion of the second shift. 3. [NAME_29] who appeared for [NAME_3] and [NAME_4] accepted in his written submissions that "the next interval of cleaning was 9.15am (twelve hours after the previous interval)." This is a reasonable inference from the [NAME_1] incident report form that was evidently prepared later on 17 November 2011. It identified the time at which the floor was last cleaned as being 9.15am on that day. 4. [NAME_16] had been in the area where the kibble was that morning before her accident on more than one occasion. She agreed that she may have filled two or three orders. On those other occasions she had had no difficulty with slipping on the floor. She estimated that she was in the aisle for about ten minutes before the fall. She described the area as being very dusty. She also said she had not seen dust in the area before that day or any other day.

5. The sweeping machine went through the factory on a regular basis, at least once a day, but it seems to be accepted that the machine cleaning was done twice a day. There was a protocol for everyone working in the warehouse that if they observed any debris that was to be picked up, and if they observed any spillage, the spill was to be marked with appropriate safety signage or barricading until the spill was attended to. 6. [NAME_16]'s fall a cleaning machine was used to clean the area where she slipped. That was done by 8.30am.

7. The primary judge found that the fine powder of dog food on which [NAME_16] slipped, had probably: "emanated from the packets of dog food during the course of the morning during which packets of dog food was (sic) unpacked from the racks. [NAME_16] had picked and packed two or more orders that morning in the areas where the dog food packets were stored." (at [32]).

1. The primary judge observed that at the end of each aisle in the warehouse there was a telephone with numbers enabling contact to be made with cleaning staff in the event of a spillage or hazard requiring removal (at [40]). The primary judge referred to the [NAME_4] incident report that under the heading "Corrective Action Description" stated (at [43]): "Team meeting held with all employees on site in regard to the importance of maintaining good housekeeping and either cleaning up any spillage right away or isolating the area and notifying the cleaning crew. Review of cleaning schedule has also been conducted. Toolbox Talks to be held with [NAME_16] on Housekeeping and Hazard identification."

1. No evidence was adduced as to the outcome of the review of the cleaning schedule. It is in any event of limited significance (Civil Liability Act 2002 ([NAME_8]), s 5C(c)). Any amendment to the cleaning schedule would not constitute an admission of liability in connection with the risk of slipping.

2. The primary judge concluded: "44. The Defendant relies on the following as an adequate cleaning system of the warehouse: (a) Meetings between management (of both [NAME_4] and [NAME_1]) and workers dealing with hazard risks in the workplace, including spillages; and (b) 'At least once a day' but not specified in evidence, machine cleaning of the warehouse isles [sic] together with 'reactive cleaning' on notification of a hazard or spillage; and (c) Workers reporting spills and hazards in the workplace as they carry out their labouring duties in the warehouse.

45. Both (a) and (c) depend upon each worker, an individual action, in his or her interests as well as that of the employer to keep the working environment safe. It depends on each worker – up to 200 of the Plaintiff's workers in the warehouse – being able to identify risks and then report them. In the case of [NAME_16] she did not notice the crunched kibble powder on the [aisle] floor before she slipped but did notice the white powder on her clothes. The risk of [NAME_16] slipping could have been alleviated by more frequent machine cleaning of the [aisle] more than once per day thus alleviating the need for a worker such as [NAME_16] keeping her eye out for a 'hidden' danger such as the kibble powder and recognising it as dangerous [as] she goes about her designated work, work directed by the Defendant. … 47. … In this case the warehouse was a busy work place with many employees, including [NAME_16] carrying out manual work of picking and packing. There was a probable risk that adjacent to the rack with stocks of dry dog kibble dust would emanate and fall on the [aisle]. The dust was difficult to see and it was foreseeable that it was probable that a worker such as [NAME_16] packing and picking bags of kibble and loading them onto a DCP machine for delivery elsewhere in the warehouse might slip on ground dog food kibble dust that had settled on the [aisle] and was difficult to see.

48. The evidence is that the [aisle] in the warehouse was cleaned at 9.15pm the night before. [NAME_16] started work the next day at 5am. The next scheduled machine cleaning of the [aisle] was at 9.15am, four hours after [NAME_16] started work driving her DCP machine to the dog food bay and picking up bags of kibble. Given the busy nature of the warehouse of which several hundred workers picking and packing, in a very dusty environment as described by [NAME_16], more frequent machine cleaning of the [aisle] than once every 4 hours was a precaution that a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would have taken.

49. It was probable that [NAME_16] would slip on the kibble powder and suffer harm to her person and the burden of increasing the number of times the machine cleared this [aisle] to more than once a day would not be burdensome. I make this finding in the absence of any direct evidence of the Defendant's cleaning system other than the occasional references in the documents to which I have referred to [sic]."

1. Although there was evidence from [NAME_16] that the work was very dusty and dirty, her evidence of noticing white powder on her clothes (Judgment at [45]) was that the left side of her clothes were dusty after the fall. 2. [NAME_20]'s evidence included the following: "There's a sweeping machine and there was a telephone where people could be notified to come and clean up spillages. There were protocols in relation to housekeeping and spillages that she knew about in the photo and there was a general direction that, if material was found on the floor or something, it would be acted upon, either picked by the employee or the cleaning staff would come. That's your understanding of what the system was? A. Yes. Q. You regarded that as an adequate system for the warehouse? A. Yes." 1. [NAME_4] had made its own investigation of the workplace and [NAME_1]' systems. The review was carried out on 15 July 2011. [NAME_4] was satisfied with [NAME_1]' occupational health and safety procedures and that the floors were free of trip hazards. [NAME_20] said that [NAME_4] had assessed the [NAME_17] premises to be safe and appropriate and a place in which reasonable care for the safety of employees would be taken and that its systems were viewed as being adequate. That remained the position up to 17 November.

2. The warehouse complex was the size of a couple of football fields. [NAME_4] supplied anywhere up to 100 workers per day depending on what [NAME_1] requested. Another labour hire company called [NAME_33] supplied roughly the same number. [NAME_1] had about the same number of casual employees and another 300 or so permanent employees.

3. There was no expert evidence as to any industry standard or practice in relation to the cleaning of warehouses of the kind used by [NAME_1] or similar workplaces. [NAME_3] relied on a report of a [NAME_34], the managing director of a company described as a "multi-specialist consultancy operating in the building construction and property management industries [which] provides necessary guidance and risk minimisation strategies required by architects, construction companies and facility managers to ensure they mitigated their risk to property risk [sic]." He had qualifications in materials science and a Masters degree in occupational health and safety management. He inspected the warehouse on 17 March 2016 for the purpose of preparing a report for use in the litigation. He tested the slip resistance of the floors, but noted that the floor was similar to many other warehouse floors he had inspected, being of a smooth burnished type of concrete finish which promoted comfort, particularly for forklift and pallet drivers, and cleanability. He said that those types of surfaces were suitable in regards to slip-resistance when situated within clean and dry environments. Unsurprisingly, he found that testing with kibble powder on the surface of the floor showed a high to very high risk of slipping. He said that he had not been provided with information relating to the system of cleaning at the warehouse. He said that the most effective control would be to provide a slip-resistant surface with a degree of volumetric displacement for the particles of crushed kibble to be captured that prevented rolling between the foot and the floor. He said that in the meantime cleaning the surface and monitoring the effectiveness of the cleaning regime as to whether the frequency of cleaning was adequate would assist in reducing the overall risk of a person slipping. He said it was understood that the pallets on which kibble was placed were previously located on the warehouse floor, but they were since raised and that this assisted in cleaning dust and crushed kibble more effectively.

4. As appears from para [48] of the reasons of the primary judge his Honour was of the view that the precaution that a reasonable person in [NAME_1]' position would have taken was to clean the aisle in which [NAME_16] was working more frequently than once every four hours. His Honour did not find that [NAME_1] was negligent by not providing a more slip-resistant floor. Nor did [NAME_3] contend that such a finding should have been made.

5. There was no evidence to support the finding that a reasonable person in [NAME_1]' position would have cleaned the aisle more frequently than once every four hours. There was no evidence that the particular area in which [NAME_16] was working was dustier or more prone to spillages than any of the other aisles of the warehouse. It is to be borne in mind that the plastic bags of kibble were supposed to be sealed so that there must have been some failure of packaging that allowed the kibble or fine kibble powder to escape.

6. There was no evidence as to how long it would take to clean the whole of the warehouse premises or what number of machines would be required for that purpose. There was no evidence that slipping was a particular hazard of the job [NAME_16] was doing. [NAME_4]'s client risk assessment required the assessor to identify "what are the typical type/s of incidents/injuries sustained in the areas where [NAME_4] employees will be working?" The answer was "manual handling/cuts". 7. [NAME_4]'s client risk assessment form also asked the assessor to specify the frequency of occurrence of incidents or injuries sustained in the areas where [NAME_4] employees would be working and how many such injuries or incidents there were per year. The assessor's answer was "last LTI 70 days". I infer that "LTI" refers to Lost Time Injuries. The answer may mean that per year 70 days of workers' time was lost due to injury. That figure was not explained. In the absence of explanation, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether it has any significance in respect of the adequacy of the occupational health and safety systems in place. [NAME_4] did not consider that it indicated an inadequacy in [NAME_1]' systems.

8. Later in his reasons the primary judge said that the evidence was that a cleaning machine was used in the aisles at least once a shift (at [56]). He noted that [NAME_1] gave no evidence about its cleaning system. The only evidence as to its cleaning system came from documents tendered by [NAME_3] and the cross-examination of [NAME_16]. That did not relieve [NAME_3] of the onus of proving the facts by reason of which it said [NAME_1] breached its duty of care.

9. Although expert evidence would not necessarily be required to establish that [NAME_1]' system of cleaning was inadequate, or to establish what additional cleaning a reasonable person in [NAME_1]' position would undertake, or what other steps it would undertake as a precaution against the risk of injury by slipping, [NAME_3] did have to establish the facts by reference to which such an assessment could be made. It was in a position to do that, having carried out its own assessment of [NAME_1]' procedures and having its representatives on site. It did not do so. 10. [NAME_3] provided a draft notice of contention in anticipation that leave to appeal might be given. It contended that the primary judge had failed to address its contention independently of a failure to have an adequate system of cleaning, [NAME_1] had inadequate housekeeping. It contended that goods that had a propensity to create dust should have been segregated from other goods that did not, and that segregation of higher risk goods to one area in the warehouse would have facilitated more frequent inspection and cleaning of that area.

11. There was no evidence that the sealed packages of dry dog food were any more likely to leak so as to leave the fine layer of kibble dust than any other package which, if it leaked, would create a slip hazard.

12.

For these reasons, in my view, the primary judge's finding that [NAME_1] was negligent should be set aside.

13. Even if [NAME_1] owed a duty to machine clean the aisles more frequently than once every four hours, there was no evidence that but for [NAME_1]' failure to comply with such a duty the injury would not have occurred (Civil Liability Act, s 5D(1)(a)). As noted above, [NAME_3] did not establish when the previous night's shift finished. If the previous shift finished somewhere between 10.00 and 10.30 pm, [NAME_16] was injured somewhere between two and three-quarter hours and three and a quarter hours after the last cleaning. The primary judge did not find that machine cleaning of the aisle in question should have been carried out before 7.00 am and there was no evidence to require such a finding.

[NAME_3] cross-appeal – 15 per cent permanent impairment threshold 1. In light of my conclusion on the question of [NAME_1]' negligence, [NAME_3]'s cross-appeal does not arise. Had there been a real issue at trial as to whether or not [NAME_16] suffered at least a 15 degree of whole person impairment, the primary judge's reasons for finding that the 15 per cent impairment threshold was reached would have been inadequate. The primary judge did not say why or how he reached that conclusion. None of the medical evidence that was adduced directly addressed the degree of permanent impairment suffered by [NAME_16] as determined in accordance with the WorkCover Guidelines. The primary judge merely said that he had read the medical evidence tendered by the plaintiff and was satisfied that the threshold was reached (para [9]).

2. Prima facie, [NAME_3] is correct in its submission that the onus was on [NAME_1] to establish that had [NAME_16] sued [NAME_3], damages would have been recoverable from it and therefore [NAME_1] had the onus of establishing that [NAME_16]'s degree of permanent impairment exceeded the threshold. [NAME_1] submitted that at the trial [NAME_3] contended that the non-economic loss component for the award of notional damages, in accordance with s 16 of the Civil Liability Act, should be 30 per cent and had limited its submission in respect of s 151Z(2) to the issue of apportionment, thereby implicitly accepting that an assessment, if undertaken, would have resulted in a finding of whole person impairment of 15 per cent. 3. [NAME_3] did not take issue with that submission. In the course of oral submissions before the primary judge [NAME_36] who appeared for [NAME_1], referred his Honour to s 151H of the WC Act. He observed that the plaintiff contended that [NAME_16]'s notional non-economic loss claim was for 30 per cent of a most extreme case (Civil Liability Act 2002, s 16). He submitted that if [NAME_16] went to an approved medical specialist under the workers' compensation system she would achieve a 15 per cent whole person impairment assessment. There was the following exchange: "HIS HONOUR: But what the doctors say about the arm is what I'll have to take into account if I have to assess 15% of it. [NAME_12]: They don't say anything in terms of assessment as I understand it. HIS HONOUR: But they do say a thing about how serious it is and what-- [NAME_12]: Yes they do. HIS HONOUR: And that's the basis upon which I'll have to make my assessment. [NAME_12]: Indeed as [that is] so. HIS HONOUR: But you say on the basis of that it would be above15%? [NAME_12]: I do and so that there is an agreement as it were from the bar table that that assessment will be more than 15%. HIS HONOUR: It makes it easier for me thank you." (Emphasis added.) 1. [NAME_29], who appeared at trial, did not contradict that assertion.

2.

Accordingly, as the case was fought at trial, no issue was ultimately raised concerning s 151H of the WC Act. This ground of cross-appeal would fail in any event.

[NAME_3]-Appeal: Apportionment 1. In light of my conclusion that the finding that [NAME_1] was negligent should be set aside, the issue of apportionment does not arise.

Claim against [NAME_4]

1. Under an agreement called a Services Agreement between [NAME_1] and [NAME_4] in which [NAME_4] was called the "Service Provider" it was provided that: "13.1 The Service Provider … indemnifies [NAME_1] in respect of any loss … or expenses (including legal costs on a solicitor and own client basis) that may be suffered or incurred by [NAME_1], directly in connection with: a) the failure by the Service Provider and/or the Agency Personnel to perform any of its obligations under the terms of this Agreement; b) any breach by the Service Provider and/or the Agency Personnel of any provision of this Agreement; c) any breach of warranty or negligence or other claim with respect to goods and services sold or provided by Service Provider and/or the Agency Personnel; … f) any negligent act or omission or wilful misconduct of the Service Provider or its employees, agents or Subcontractors and/or the Agency Personnel in connection with this Agreement; … except to the extent that the loss is directly attributable to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of [NAME_1]."

1. Because I have concluded that [NAME_1] was not liable for [NAME_16]'s injury, the question whether it could have obtained indemnity under clause 13.1 from [NAME_4], notwithstanding the concluding words of the clause, does not arise.

2. The only remaining issue is whether [NAME_1] is entitled to its costs on a solicitor and own client basis from [NAME_4].

3. Clause 16 of the Services Agreement relevantly provided: "16. Subcontracting … (e) The Service Provider will be liable for any Services or other obligations under this agreement that are performed or discharged by its subcontractors or agents."

1. The primary judge found that [NAME_1] did not subcontract its obligations to [NAME_3]. However, it was admitted on the pleadings that [NAME_4] did so. [NAME_4] did not seek leave from the primary judge to withdraw its admission. The admission was entirely consistent with its case that [NAME_16] was employed by [NAME_3]. 2. [NAME_4] was therefore liable for the Services and other obligations that were performed by [NAME_3].

3. The obligations assumed by [NAME_4] under the Services Agreement included responsibility for maintaining a clean and tidy work site (Schedule 2, cl 13.2.1). Clause 1.1 of Schedule 2 required [NAME_4] to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, that it comply with all of its OH&S legal obligations. These included any obligation imposed under the common law relating to health and safety in the work environment. 4. [NAME_3] was found to have breached its duty to [NAME_16]. It has not disputed that finding in its draft notice of contention. By clause 16(e) [NAME_4] was liable for any services or other obligations that were performed or discharged by its subcontractors. It admitted that [NAME_3] was its subcontractor. Clause 13.1 provided that [NAME_4] indemnified [NAME_1] in respect of any loss or expense incurred by [NAME_1] directly in connection with any negligent act or omission of [NAME_4]'s subcontractor, "except to the extent that the loss was directly attributable to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of [NAME_1]".

5. Given my conclusion that [NAME_1] was not shown to be negligent, the exception can be put aside. The question is whether the costs of the proceedings incurred by [NAME_1] was a loss or expense incurred by it "directly in connection with" the negligence as found of [NAME_3]. 6. [NAME_1] did not seek an order that [NAME_4] pay its costs on a solicitor and own client basis. It simply sought an order that the respondents pay its costs. No submissions were made as to the significance of the requirement under cl 13.1 that the costs or expenses incurred by [NAME_1] be incurred "directly in connection with" the negligent act or omission of [NAME_4]'s subcontractor.

7. The costs and expenses incurred by [NAME_1] in defending the litigation were incurred not as a direct result of [NAME_3]'s negligence (as found) but as a result of [NAME_3]'s bringing a claim for indemnity under s 151Z(1)(d). Although during the course of submissions [NAME_19] said that costs were sought on a solicitor and own client basis from [NAME_4], he did not elaborate on that submission. In my view, the primary judge was right to have dismissed the cross-claim, although not for the reasons he gave.

Proposed orders 1.

For these reasons I propose the following orders:

1. Grant leave to appeal.

2. Order that within seven days the appellant file a notice of appeal in the form of its draft notice of appeal.

3. Appeal allowed in part.

4. Order that order 1 entered on 15 August 2017 (that there be judgment for the first respondent in the sum of $37,495.01) be set aside.

5. In lieu thereof, order that judgment be entered for the appellant on the first respondent's claim.

6. Set aside order 3 entered on 15 August 2017.

7. In lieu thereof, order that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the trial, including the costs of the cross-claim.

8. Cross-appeal dismissed.

9. Order that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, and cross-appeal.

10. No order as to the second respondent's costs of the appeal, or cross-appeal. 1. [NAME_6]: I agree with White JA.

********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 June 2018