Severe Penalties for Conspiracy and Bribery in NSW District Court

The NSW District Court imposed significant prison terms on two offenders for conspiracy to import pseudoephedrine and bribery of a Commonwealth public official, emphasising the severity of such offenses.

OUTCOME: Allowed

District Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v [NAME_1]; R v [NAME_2] [2015] NSWDC 276 Hearing dates: 25 September 2015 Date of orders: 20 November 2015 Decision date: 20 November 2015 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Judge Whitford SC Decision: [143]; [144] Catchwords: Criminal law – sentence - conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of border controlled precursor – pseudoephedrine – bribery of a Commonwealth Public Official Category: Sentence Parties: Regina (Crown) [NAME_1] (Offender) [NAME_2] (Offender) Representation: Counsel: [redacted] [NAME_4] – [NAME_1] [NAME_5] - [NAME_2]

Solicitors: [redacted] [NAME_2] Legal File Number(s): [NAME_1] – 2013/43707, [NAME_2] – 2013/310184

REMARKS ON SENTENCE 1. By an indictment dated 8 April 2015 the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Commonwealth of Australia charged that [NAME_1] committed two offences of conspiring with others to import pseudoephedrine in a commercial quantity. The conspiracy charged by count 1 was alleged to have existed in the period 1 September 2011 to 31 December 2011. The conspiracy charged in count 2 was alleged to have existed in the period 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2012. In addition, [NAME_1] was charged with three counts of dishonestly agreeing to receive or obtain a benefit for himself, namely money, with the intention that the exercise of his duties as a Commonwealth public official would be influenced. These were counts 3, 4 and 5 on the indictment.

2. By the same indictment the Director charged that [NAME_2], participated in the conspiracy the subject of count 2 on the indictment.

3. Following a trial, which commenced before a jury and me on 13 April 2015, on 9 June 2015 the jury found [NAME_1] not guilty of counts 1 and 3 and guilty of counts 2, 4 and 5. [NAME_2] was also found guilty of count 2.

4. Both those offenders appear today for sentence, following a sentence hearing on 25 September 2015.

5. Both offenders are to be sentenced in respect of one count of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of border controlled precursor, being pseudoephedrine, between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2012. The maximum penalty prescribed for this offence is 25 years imprisonment and/or 5,000 penalty units ($850,000).

6. In addition, [NAME_1] is to be sentenced in respect of the two counts of dishonestly agreeing to receive or obtain a benefit for himself, namely money, with the intention that the exercise of his duties as a Commonwealth public official would be influenced, one count relating to the period about 1 January 2012 to about 31 March 2012 and the other to the period about 1 April 2012 to about 30 June 2012. The maximum penalty prescribed for these offences, which are also known as the offence of bribery of a Commonwealth official, is 10 years imprisonment and/or 10,000 penalty units ($1,700,000).

7. The offences for which the offenders are to be sentenced arise out of criminal conduct engaged in by corrupt Customs officers and a corrupt baggage handler working at the Sydney International Airport ([NAME_6]), all of whom abused their positions and participated in importing into Australia substantial quantities of pseudoephedrine, some of which was intercepted, some of which was not.

8. The Customs officers involved in the count 2 combination were [NAME_7], [NAME_8] and [NAME_1]. Within Customs, [NAME_1] was the most senior of the three. The baggage handler who was a part of the combination was a friend of [NAME_7]'s, [NAME_9], who then worked for a baggage handling business operating at [NAME_6] called '[NAME_11]'. The other participants included [NAME_12], an associate of [NAME_7], and [NAME_2], who was an associate of [NAME_12]. There were also 7 couriers used to effect the importations.

9. The three Customs officers worked in various roles at [NAME_6] where their primary responsibilities included the detection and prevention of illegal cross border activity. For this purpose, each of the Customs officers, as required by their duties, had access to the various intelligence and investigative systems at [NAME_6] operated by what was then known as the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS).

10. Around the start of 2010, by which time he had been working for Customs for nearly 10 years, [NAME_1] became the team leader of the Air Border Security team (ABS team) at the airport. The role of the ABS team was to identify and investigate any airport staff suspected of being involved in criminal activity. Staff within the ABS team monitored closed circuit television footage of persons employed at the airport and all passengers arriving at [NAME_6]. When required, ABS team members would conduct aircraft and other searches, and staff within the team had access to information regarding ongoing investigations and planned law enforcement activity. The ABS team also assisted with joint operations conducted with other law enforcement agencies. 11. [NAME_1] became the team leader of the ABS, [NAME_8] was also transferred into the ABS team and continued to work in that area until late 2012.

12. In early 2012 , [NAME_1], [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] met several times, both at the airport and elsewhere, to discuss the prospect of facilitating an importation or importations of pseudoephedrine before [NAME_1] left the ABS team in March 2012 and before [NAME_8] was transferred out of the ABS team in August 2012. Discussions also canvassed the possibility of [NAME_7] being transferred into the ABS team.

13. These discussions occurred against the background of a failed importation attempt in late 2011 and prior discussions among the three customs officers concerning the prospect of illegal activity.

14. The failed importation, which had involved [NAME_7], [NAME_8], [NAME_9], [NAME_12] and others was the subject of the count 1 conspiracy charged against [NAME_1]. [NAME_1] was found not guilty of that count, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence adduced at trial that [NAME_1] was aware of the activities of the others in respect of that failed importation and the methodology proposed for effecting the importation and avoiding detection.

15. I am likewise satisfied that he had participated in earlier discussions with both [NAME_13] concerning the possibility of them all combining to undertake importations of illegal substances. Indeed, on the night of 22 December 2010, [NAME_7] and [NAME_1] met at a hotel room at the Star City Casino. [NAME_1] and [NAME_7] had a conversation then about becoming involved in the importation of illicit substances. [NAME_7] and [NAME_1] later informed [NAME_8] of what had occurred at the meeting.

16. In the immediate aftermath of the failed importation in December 2011, [NAME_7], [NAME_8], [NAME_1], [NAME_9], [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] entertained plans for future importations of pseudoephedrine through [NAME_6].

17. During December 2011, [NAME_7] was in contact with [NAME_12] and [NAME_2] regarding potential involvement in future importations. Between 27 and 31 December 2011, [NAME_7] and [NAME_2] exchanged a series of text messages in which [NAME_2] asked to meet as he had "good news".

18. In early January 2012, [NAME_2] informed [NAME_7] that he had sourced pseudoephedrine in Vietnam and [NAME_7] informed [NAME_9], [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] that "my mates are ready". 19. [NAME_7] was the hub around which the entire conspiracy revolved. He coordinated with the [NAME_6] personnel ([NAME_1], [NAME_8] and [NAME_9]) and with the external participants, [NAME_2] and [NAME_12], regarding prospective dates for the importations, the sourcing of the pseudoephedrine, the flights and airlines to be used and the couriers to be used for each importation.

20. The initial step in the methodology employed, which mirrored that which had been unsuccessfully employed in respect of the failed importation in late 2011, involved the exchange of shift rosters to identify dates and times when the Customs officers and [NAME_9] would be on duty. It was decided that the pseudoephedrine would be imported on a [NAME_14] flight travelling from Vietnam to Sydney, via Bangkok, arriving in Sydney on 9 March and which would be serviced by [NAME_9]'s employer, [NAME_11]. During this period there were also discussions among the conspirators regarding the amounts of money to be made. The other [NAME_6] personnel all informed [NAME_7] that they each expected to be paid $100,000.00 for participating in any importation. [NAME_7] subsequently informed [NAME_1], [NAME_8] and [NAME_9] that they would each receive $50,000.00 in total for an initial importation proposed for March and they would make up the shortfall (a further $50,000.00) from subsequent importations.

22. Throughout January 2012 [NAME_7], [NAME_12] and [NAME_2] regularly met, by arrangement primarily through [NAME_12], to discuss the planned importation. In an intercepted call between [NAME_2] and a Vietnamese male on 19 January 2012, the Vietnamese male referred to [NAME_2]'s ability to get things out of aeroplanes. [NAME_2] told the caller that he would buy another SIM card and call him back.

23. On 22 February 2012 [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] exchanged a series of coded text messages regarding the organisation of the importation. In the course of these exchanges [NAME_1] informed [NAME_8] of the need for them to stay "at arm's length" from [NAME_7] and the others involved in the importation; that they should let others do the hard work and take the risks; and, that they ([NAME_1] and [NAME_8]) would "reap the benefits".

24. On 23 February 2012 [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] engaged in a series of intercepted telephone calls in which they discussed ways of raising money.

25. During the planning of the importation, [NAME_7] met with [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] and discussed the organisation of the couriers. During one meeting, [NAME_12] stated that he would organise the couriers. At one of their meetings [NAME_7], [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] also agreed that each of the two couriers would have about 10 kilograms of "gear" in their bags. During the organisation of the March importation [NAME_7] discussed with [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] the type of people that should be used as couriers and how their tickets should be purchased in order to reduce the risk of detection.

26. On 2 March 2012, the two couriers [NAME_15] ([NAME_15]) and [NAME_16] (J [NAME_16])) paid cash for two return business class tickets travelling [NAME_14] to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, departing on 3 March 2012 and returning to Sydney, via Bangkok, on 9 March 2012. On 3 March 2012, the couriers departed Australia.

27. At some stage prior to this importation, [NAME_12] provided [NAME_7] with a suitcase identical to the suitcases being used by the couriers and a copy of the bio-data pages from the couriers' passports. [NAME_7] subsequently met with [NAME_9] and showed him the luggage that the couriers would be using and gave him the names of the couriers.

28. On 7 March 2012, [NAME_1] texted [NAME_8] to remind him that he was the acting ABS team leader for the shift commencing the following day. [NAME_1] was acting in higher duties at this stage and could decide who would act in his team leader role in the ABS team. On the same date, [NAME_9] called [NAME_7] and they discussed problems with the burn phones, which were subsequently used by them on the morning of the importation to communicate with each other.

29. On 8 March 2012, at 10.10am, [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] exchanged SMS text messages arranging to meet at work. At 11.01am, [NAME_8] sent [NAME_7] a text message in which he stated "Talk to the big fella. I gotta go home when I finish, he'll fill me in". That afternoon [NAME_7] called [NAME_1] in order to discuss the importation and they arranged to catch up and go for a walk.

30. After meeting with [NAME_1], [NAME_7] met with [NAME_9] to confirm that the importation was proceeding. [NAME_7] then met with [NAME_12] who, in turn, met with [NAME_2].

31. On 8 March 2012, [NAME_15] and [NAME_16] boarded a [NAME_14] flight in Ho Chi Minh City, and on checking in, each of their bags weighed 28kgs. It is estimated that [NAME_15] had 17kg of pseudoephedrine powder in his bag, and [NAME_16] had 15kg of pseudoephedrine powder in his bag - in total, 32kg (gross) of pseudoephedrine powder. The value of that pseudoephedrine, based on an estimate of $50,000 per kilogram (with a purity of approximately 70%) was about $1,600,000.00.

32. On 9 March 2012, [NAME_9], [NAME_1], [NAME_13] all commenced the morning shift at [NAME_6]. [NAME_1] was an acting ACS Level 3 officer, responsible for the management of a number of teams and [NAME_8] was the acting ACS Level 2 officer in the ABS team. [NAME_7] was rostered to work in the Secondary Examinations area in the "back of hall". 33. [NAME_8] was responsible for ensuring that the cameras in the ABS room were directed away from [NAME_9]. [NAME_1]'s duties enabled him to know whether other areas of the ACBPS (the Control Room and the Business Group) were investigating the couriers and the [NAME_14] flight. [NAME_7] was responsible for liaising between the [NAME_6] personnel and [NAME_12]. 34. [NAME_14] flight TG475 arrived at [NAME_6] at about 7.15am. [NAME_7] and [NAME_9] communicated via their burn phones. As planned, [NAME_9] located the couriers' bags, put them inside a baggage can and stored them in an out of the way area. 35. [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] communicated about the collection and delivery of the courier's bags. During these calls, [NAME_2] indicated that he would be communicating with a third person about the collection of the pseudoephedrine.

36. Between 8:21am and 8:28am, [NAME_1] called [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] and arranged to meet them for a coffee. When the three met, they discussed various topics relating to the importation, including whether it had gone well and when they would be getting paid. During that morning, both [NAME_8] and [NAME_1], at different times, had provided [NAME_7] with information about an ABS operation on a flight next to the [NAME_14] flight and [NAME_7] passed that information on to [NAME_9]. 37. [NAME_7] and [NAME_12] engaged in a series of coded text messages in which [NAME_7] let [NAME_12] know that [NAME_9] was on his way with the bags of "gear" and that everything was progressing well.

38. As planned, [NAME_9] met [NAME_12] in the [NAME_6] staff car park, [NAME_12] retrieved the two bags from the [NAME_11] vehicle, put them in the white Toyota Corolla Hatchback he was driving and drove away. [NAME_12] called [NAME_2], and confirmed that everything was good, and they then arranged to meet at [NAME_2]'s residence. Later in the morning of 9 March 2012, [NAME_12] and [NAME_7] exchanged coded text messages confirming that the importation had been successful.

39. Between 16 and 22 March 2012, [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] communicated with each other, and with [NAME_7], in code about their dissatisfaction with the delay in being paid. [NAME_7] in turn communicated with [NAME_12] regarding the progress of the payments and the increasing irritation of the other Customs Officers in not having been being paid.

40. On 23 March 2012 [NAME_12] attended [NAME_2]'s residence at Marrickville. Shortly after, [NAME_12] sent [NAME_7] a coded text message in which he indicated that he had the money. The pair then arranged to meet at the Sydney Marriott Hotel where [NAME_7] was staying for the weekend. [NAME_12] gave [NAME_7] a plastic bag with $150,000.00 cash in it and informed [NAME_7] that the money was the first half of the payment. 41. [NAME_7] subsequently divided up the cash so that there was $55,000 each for [NAME_1] and [NAME_8] and $20,000 for [NAME_9]. On the evening of 25 March 2012, [NAME_9] collected $20,000.00 from [NAME_7], being part of his payment for the importation. On the morning of 26 March 2012, [NAME_7] met with [NAME_1] and [NAME_8] at work and gave them each a plastic bag containing $55,000.00 in cash. A few days after paying [NAME_1] and [NAME_8], [NAME_7] received an additional $100,000.00 in cash from [NAME_12] which he divided between himself and [NAME_9]. On 30 March 2012, [NAME_1], [NAME_13] met at a cafe in Beverly Hills. During this meeting they discussed, in general terms, how well the importation had gone and [NAME_1] and [NAME_8] asked [NAME_7] not to forget that they were still owed $50,000.00. They also discussed organising the next importation as soon as possible, which was also a subject of discussion during subsequent meetings at the Terrace Bar at [NAME_6].

43. As both [NAME_1] and [NAME_8] were due to be transferred out of the ABS team in the months following the March importation, it was decided that they would try to do another importation as soon as possible. [NAME_8], [NAME_7] and [NAME_1] also discussed having [NAME_7] transferred into the ABS room so that they could maximise their chances of the importations being successful. In the meantime, [NAME_7] continued to meet with [NAME_9] to identify potential dates for future importations based on the various participants' respective rosters. [NAME_7] passed on the possible dates to [NAME_8], [NAME_1], [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] and also discussed with [NAME_9], [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] importing 3 bags per day, containing 20 kgs each, so that they could make as much money as possible. It was ultimately agreed that they would import about 120kg of pseudoephedrine split across three [NAME_14] flights arriving on the mornings of 4, 5 and 6 June 2012.

44. During the planning phase for the June importations, [NAME_7] met with [NAME_12] and also separately with [NAME_2] to check on their progress in organising couriers and [NAME_2]'s progress in sourcing the pseudoephedrine. During these meetings [NAME_7] provided advice about the methods of concealment, baggage screening processes in Australia and overseas and the courier profiles that were to be used. [NAME_7] also met with [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] at various locations (the Terrace Bar at [NAME_6]; Flower Power Nursery at Kingsgrove; Tempe Reserve; and [NAME_8]' home) to inform them of the progress of the plans.

45. Eventually, [NAME_12] informed [NAME_7] that [NAME_2] had been able to source pseudoephedrine for the importations and the conspirators discussed the amount of money that would be made from the importations. [NAME_1] and [NAME_8] informed [NAME_7] that they each wanted to be paid between $350,000.00 - $380,000.00 for the June importations. During their discussions about money, [NAME_1] informed [NAME_7] that he had been talking to people that he knew about the street price of pseudoephedrine and he thought that they were being underpaid.

46. Between 22 April 2012 and 9 May 2012, [NAME_2] travelled to Vietnam for the purpose of sourcing pseudoephedrine for the importations. Whilst he was in Hong Kong on 6 May 2012, [NAME_2] purchased a Blackberry mobile phone. By 9 May 2012, five couriers had been recruited in Queensland for the purpose of travelling to Vietnam and importing the pseudoephedrine. On 21 May 2012, [NAME_15] ([NAME_15]) booked 5 business class return tickets for the couriers to travel to Ho Chi Minh City, via Bangkok, with [NAME_14] - all departing on 28 May 2012.

47. On 22 May 2012, [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] exchanged a series of text messages in which [NAME_8] informed [NAME_1] that he had spoken to senior personnel about extending his stay in the ABS team. Around this time [NAME_1] told [NAME_8] that he would speak to a senior Customs Officer about getting [NAME_7] transferred into the ABS room to support him during the importations. [NAME_1] subsequently recommended to a supervisor, that [NAME_7] be transferred into the ABS room for a 5 week period, commencing in late May 2012 and finishing just prior to a planned overseas trip from 2 July 2012. Following that recommendation, [NAME_7] was rotated into the ABS team.

48. On about 26 May 2012, whilst working in the ABS room at [NAME_6], [NAME_8] became aware that a baggage handler named [NAME_17], who was often in the company of [NAME_9], was under investigation. [NAME_8] subsequently informed [NAME_7] of the investigation into [NAME_17], and [NAME_7] informed [NAME_1]. [NAME_7] and [NAME_1] agreed that [NAME_17] could be used as a distraction from their importations and as a diversion in any investigations.

49. On 28 May 2012, [NAME_2] departed Australia for Vietnam. The 5 couriers booked to travel to Vietnam from Sydney on this date did not present for their [NAME_14] flight as the psuedoephedrine to be imported between 4 and 6 June 2012 wasn't ready.

50. During late May/early June 2012, [NAME_7] met [NAME_12] on a number of occasions to communicate with [NAME_2] who was in Vietnam, and to coordinate the final details in relation to the planned importations. During these meetings: they discussed how much gear should be in the bags and how they should be packed; they confirmed the number of couriers who were travelling, the dates on which the importations would take place and the flights that would be used; they discussed where [NAME_12] would collect the couriers' bags from [NAME_9]; [NAME_12] provided [NAME_7] with the couriers' names and details; and, [NAME_12] provided [NAME_7] with a description of the suitcases that the couriers' would be using. [NAME_7] subsequently passed this information on to [NAME_9] and [NAME_8].

51. On 1 June 2012, the five couriers each purchased new [NAME_14] Business class tickets to Ho Chi Minh City. They were variously booked to return on three separate flights, arriving back in Australia on 4, 5 and 6 June 2012. Prior to departing Australia each of the couriers had been provided with a large silver hard sided suitcase to use for the importation.

52. On the morning of 4 June 2012, [NAME_13] were working in the ABS team. [NAME_1], who was the team leader of the floor area of the Arrivals Hall, was responsible for passenger targeting and assessment. [NAME_9] was working as a baggage handler. 53. [NAME_13] were operating the CCTV cameras in the ABS room from about 6.00am so that they were able to control the images appearing on the CCTV cameras, and (with the exception of some fixed cameras in the basement) keep the ABS cameras away from anything to do with the unloading of the [NAME_14] flight. 54. [NAME_14] flight (TG475) arrived with the couriers [NAME_18] and [NAME_18] on board. Both of them had packed their checked in luggage (the silver suitcases) in Ho Chi Minh City with packages containing pseudoephedrine powder designed to look like food. It is estimated that both couriers had about 17kg of pseudoephedrine powder in each of their bags - a total of about 34kg of pseudoephedrine powder. The value of that pseudoephedrine, based on an estimate of $50,000 per kilogram (with a purity of approximately 70%) was about $1,700,000.00. 55. [NAME_18] and [NAME_18] left [NAME_6] without collecting their checked in silver suitcases, which were retrieved from the flight by [NAME_9] and stored in an out of the way area. Later, [NAME_9] collected the couriers' suitcases and, using a work vehicle, drove out of [NAME_6] to the pre-arranged meeting point where he delivered the bags to [NAME_12]. During the morning, [NAME_7] and [NAME_12] and [NAME_7] and [NAME_9], had communicated with each other by phone regarding the delivery of the bags.

56. Whilst the [NAME_14] flight was being unloaded, [NAME_1] called [NAME_7] (who remained in the ABS room with [NAME_8]) to discuss the fact that the majority of the ABS team had been diverted away from the ABS room to deal with someone having stolen some property from a duty free shop. Later that morning, [NAME_1], [NAME_13] met for a coffee and while they were together [NAME_7] informed them that the importation had been successful. That night [NAME_7] and [NAME_12] met to discuss the importation that was to take place the following day.

57. On the morning of 5 June 2012, [NAME_13] were again working in the ABS team, [NAME_1], was again working as a supervisor in the Customs Arrivals Hall, and [NAME_9] was working as a baggage handler. 58. [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] were again both involved in monitoring the CCTV cameras in the ABS room between 6.00am - 8.00am. During this time they kept the cameras directed away from the unloading of [NAME_14] flight and focused on an unrelated investigation occurring simultaneously. 59. [NAME_14] flight TG475 arrived at [NAME_6] with the courier [NAME_19] on board. [NAME_19]'s silver suitcase contained a large number of packages of pseudoephedrine powder designed to look like food. It is estimated that [NAME_19] had 18kg of pseudophedrine powder in his bag. The value of that pseudoephedrine, based on an estimate of $50,000 per kilogram (with a purity of approximately 70%) was about $900,000.00. 60. [NAME_19] left [NAME_6] without collecting his checked luggage, which was retrieved from the flight by [NAME_9] and stored in a baggage can. [NAME_9] delivered [NAME_19]'s suitcase to [NAME_12] at Tempe. During the morning [NAME_7], [NAME_12] and [NAME_9] communicated with each other by phone regarding the delivery of the bags. At about 11:10am, [NAME_1], [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] had a coffee together, and when they met, [NAME_7] informed them that the importation had been a success.

61. On the morning of 6 June 2012 [NAME_13] each again commenced work in the ABS team. [NAME_1] was again working as a supervisor in the Customs Arrivals Hall. [NAME_9] was working as a baggage handler.

62. At 5.05am, [NAME_1] sent both [NAME_13] a text message asking them to meet for a coffee. When [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] met [NAME_1], there was another Customs officer present who informed them about a Customs investigation that was underway in relation to two passengers who had not collected their luggage from a flight on 4 June, and a baggage handler who had been removing luggage from flights.

63. On returning to the ABS room, [NAME_7] were informed by their supervisor that the ABS team would be conducting a containment exercise in relation to the [NAME_14] flight which was arriving that morning. This involved retrieving any luggage that matched the appearance of the luggage that had not been collected by the first two couriers on 4 June 2012. [NAME_13] volunteered to find the luggage.

64. Between 5:56am and 5:59am [NAME_1] and [NAME_7] exchanged a number of SMS messages about meeting up. [NAME_7] does not recall meeting [NAME_1] at this time. However, [NAME_8] recalls that at about this time, he and [NAME_1] met either outside the Customs Secure Work Area or in one of the corridors at [NAME_6], and [NAME_1] told him that he and [NAME_7] needed to take care of the situation in "any shape or way possible".

65. The [NAME_14] flight from Ho Chi Minh City (TG475) arrived at [NAME_6] at about 7.15am. [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] attended the baggage area, located the courier's two silver suitcases and [NAME_8] removed the airline bag tags from each of the bags in an unsuccessful attempt to remove identifying material from the bags. [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] then placed the suitcases on the conveyer belt to be sent to the baggage hall where the couriers had been detained.

66. The two couriers, [NAME_20], disembarked from the flight and were subsequently detained and arrested. Forensic examination of their suitcases revealed that they contained a total of 28.29 kilograms of pure pseudoephedrine (40.7kg gross) concealed within a total of 24 packages designed to look like food. The value of that pseudoephedrine, based on an estimate of $50,000 per kilogram (with a purity of approximately 70%) was about $2,000,000.00.

67. It is estimated that 28.29 kilograms of pure pseudoephedrine is capable of producing at least 19 kilograms of high grade methylamphetamine hydrochloride. It is further estimated that the wholesale value of that amount of methylamphetamine would be about $4,750,000.00 (based on $250,000.00 per kg) and the street value would be about $15,200,000.00 (based on $800.00 per gram).

68. That afternoon [NAME_8], [NAME_1] and [NAME_7] met at the Flower Power Nursery, Kingsgrove. At this meeting they discussed the fallout from the detection of the importation. [NAME_7] indicated to [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] that they may have to "take a bit of a hit" on the amounts they would be paid as about 40kg of "gear" had been seized, but both [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] indicated that they still expected to be paid the agreed amount.

69. Through cross-examination of [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] by his counsel, [NAME_1] attempted to advance a thoroughly incredible version of what occurred at that meeting designed to suggest that [NAME_1] had no prior knowledge or involvement in the activities of the combination.

70. Between about 7 June 2012 and 28 June 2012 , [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] communicated with each other, and [NAME_7], again in code about being paid. [NAME_7] in turn communicated with [NAME_12] regarding payment. During this time the Customs Officers met and communicated about when and how much they would be paid, and [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] pressured [NAME_7] for payment.

71. Eventually on the evening of 28 June 2012, [NAME_12] transferred a plastic bag containing a large amount of cash into [NAME_7]'s vehicle in [NAME_7]'s street. [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] sat in [NAME_7]'s car and divided up the cash. They had agreed to short change [NAME_1] by taking an extra $5,000 each, which would result in [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] each receiving $100,000.00 and [NAME_1] only $85,000.00. After splitting the money, [NAME_8] left with his $100,000.00. [NAME_9] then collected his payment of about $70,000.00 from [NAME_7].

72. After communicating via mobile phone, [NAME_1] drove to [NAME_7]'s home, met with [NAME_7] outside in the street and received a plastic bag containing $85,000.00 in cash. [NAME_1] subsequently delivered the bag of cash to his brother at a pre-arranged location in western Sydney.

73. On 30 June 2012, at 10:39am, [NAME_1] called the [NAME_21] and paid his health insurance 12 months in advance at a cost of $1,169.04. At 3.15pm, [NAME_1] paid $3,000.00 ($2,600.00 being paid in cash) for a new TV, dishwasher and refrigerator at a retailer in [ADDRESS]. Analysis of [NAME_1]'s financial records reveals that he had access to cash amounts from unknown sources between 1 January 2012 and 30 March 2012, and from 1 June 2012 to 30 December 2012. Most notably, for the month of June 2012 he had access to unknown source funds of $8,820.50, for July 2012 $6,300.00 and for August 2012 $2,882.25.

74. After arriving back in Australia on 8 June 2012, two days after the failed importation, [NAME_2] departed Australia again on 2 July 2012 and did not return until 28 August 2012. During this period, large amounts of cash were deposited into his bank accounts.

75. Between early July 2012 and [NAME_7]'s arrest on 17 December 2012, [NAME_1], [NAME_13] communicated and met to discuss the ongoing police investigation that was being undertaken in relation to their importations; the arrest of [NAME_22] and [NAME_10] in relation to another importation conducted on 18 August 2012; and, the outstanding money for the June importations. During the course of these discussions, [NAME_1] indicated to [NAME_8] that he was unhappy about being underpaid and that he expected it to be rectified; [NAME_1] warned [NAME_7] that a colleague was going to speak to him about the relationship between [NAME_10] and [NAME_9]; and, [NAME_1] raised with [NAME_8] the prospect of doing another importation when [NAME_8] returned from leave.

76. On 17 December 2012, [NAME_7] was arrested and charged in relation to his involvement in importations conducted with [NAME_10] in 2009 and 2010. On 7 February 2013, [NAME_7] provided an induced statement to the police that detailed his involvement variously with [NAME_8], [NAME_1], [NAME_9], [NAME_2] and [NAME_12] in the importations of pseudoephedrine into Australia conducted between December 2011 and 6 June 2012. [NAME_7] subsequently surrendered a total of $39,244.00 in cash seized by the AFP during searches of his residence and the residence of his cousin.

77. On 12 February 2013, [NAME_8] was arrested by the AFP. He voluntarily participated in a recorded interview in which he made substantial admissions regarding his involvement, and the involvement of [NAME_1], [NAME_7] and [NAME_9] in the importation of commercial quantities of pseudoephedrine into Australia between December 2011 and June 2012. On 14 and 21 February 2013, [NAME_8] voluntarily surrendered a total of $110,400.00 in cash to the AFP. On 7 May 2013, [NAME_8] provided a sworn statement to the police that detailed his involvement with [NAME_7] and [NAME_1] in the importations of pseudoephedrine into Australia conducted between December 2011 and 6 June 2012.

78. On 12 February 2013, [NAME_1], [NAME_9] and [NAME_12] were also arrested by the AFP. [NAME_1] declined to be interviewed and at no stage has he provided any assistance to the authorities in the investigation of this or any other matter. No cash has been surrendered by or seized from [NAME_1].

79. On 14 October 2013 [NAME_2] was arrested by the AFP. He declined to be interviewed and at no stage has he provided any assistance to the authorities. No cash has been surrendered by or seized from [NAME_2].

80. The offence of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled precursor is a very serious offence as indicated by the maximum penalty which Parliament has prescribed. The substance involved here, pseudoephedrine is a precursor to the production of the drug methylamphetamine, more commonly known as "ice". This was well known to both offenders and I have no doubt that they both believed that the substance was being imported for the purpose of others manufacturing that drug for eventual sale in the community. A substantial percentage of the substance imported was not intercepted and there is no reason to expect other than that it was eventually used as intended and has ultimately made its way into the community.

81. Any involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled precursors into Australia is by its nature serious. When the amounts involved are as large as they are in the present case, and where the offenders were generally aware of the quantities involved, as they were here, the conduct amounts to extremely serious criminality. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both offenders knew that the quantities being imported were substantial and in the order of many tens of kilograms. Their expectations concerning payment is indicative of this knowledge.

82. The present conspiracy involved a substantial degree of planning and coordination of a number of individuals. It was far from unsophisticated in its conception and execution.

83. Both offenders are to be sentenced for the conspiracy offence. With their co-conspirators, they each performed vital roles in seeking to achieve the criminal objects of the combination and each is to some degree responsible for the other's actions in pursuing that object. There appears to have been no strict hierarchy among the primary conspirators (by that description I exclude the couriers). They appeared to have conducted themselves on the basis of a degree of equality, despite their different roles. This is reflected not only in the ways they conducted themselves but to some extent also in the reasonable correspondence in the amounts the conspirators were paid, were that can be ascertained. 84. [NAME_7] was obviously central to the conception and execution of the conspiracy, in that he was the person with contacts within and outside the airport. His role was critical to the success of the operation. 85. [NAME_2] too, as the person responsible for sourcing the product, played a role critical to the successful execution of the agreement.

86. It seems to me that the roles of [NAME_8] and [NAME_1] were substantially indistinguishable and, save for one not insignificant distinction, their objective criminality was very similar in my view. The distinction lies in their respective positions within the hierarchy of the Customs service.

87. In the course of sentencing [NAME_8], Judge Hanley SC noted that the fact the offending occurred whilst employed as an ACBPS officer in dereliction of the public duties he was entrusted to discharge and in circumstances where he used knowledge and information that he had gained from his position as an ACBPS officer were serious aggravating factors and that his conduct involved a gross breach of trust. Those remarks apply with even greater force in the case of [NAME_1] on account of his more senior rank within that service.

88. I am satisfied that [NAME_1] was deliberately and enthusiastically involved in all four of the importations carried out in pursuit of the conspiracy. He acted together with his two colleagues to circumvent the screening and investigative systems in place at [NAME_6] to ensure, so far as possible, that the couriers were able to pass through the airport without being detected. In doing so, he participated in the active subversion of the screening and detection systems designed to prevent such importations.

89. It was the Crown submission at trial that if the jury were satisfied as to the count 1 conspiracy, they could move with a degree of expediency to conviction in respect of count 2. I do not accept the submission put on behalf of [NAME_1] on sentence that because the jury returned a verdict of not guilty to count 1 (and, correspondingly, count 3) the facts which can be found to the requisite standard in respect of count 2 are uncertain. There were perfectly well explicable reasons for the verdict on count 1 that neither undermine the reliability of the verdict on count 2 nor give rise to any particular consequent uncertainty concerning his involvement in all four importations the subject of that count. The case for conviction on count 2 was compelling in my view. Contrary to the submissions put on behalf of [NAME_1] on sentence, I do not consider that there exists any difficulty in identifying the circumstances that led to [NAME_1] becoming involved in the count 2 conspiracy. The genesis of his involvement resides in the earlier conversations he had with both [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] in respect of the prospect of them all combining to participate in the future in criminal conduct. One of the earliest of those conversations appears to have been the casino conversation in late 2010 to which I have already made reference. The finding of not guilty in respect of count 1 does not have the inevitable consequence that one must disregard the evidence of prior conversations among the three customs officers, including the casino conversation in 2010. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that conversations to that effect occurred and that they represent the context against which [NAME_1]'s involvement in the 2012 conspiracy is sensibly explained.

90. Between about January 2012 and June 2012 (that is, over a period of about 6 months) [NAME_1] engaged in the following conduct.

91. He assisted in planning each of the importations with [NAME_13], including co-ordinating rosters and discussing the methodology to be employed for each importation to minimise the risk of the couriers and consignments of pseudoephedrine being intercepted.

92. He engaged in discussions with [NAME_13] regarding the status of the planned importations; [NAME_7]'s progress in liaising with the co-conspirators who were sourcing the pseudoephedrine and organising the couriers; the amounts of money that they expected to be paid for participating in each of the importations, and when they expected to be paid; and, after each importation, discussed with [NAME_13] whether the importations had succeeded.

93. In respect of the March and June importations, he used or stood ready to use his more senior position to try and facilitate the most effective deployment of resources, including the roles of [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] within the ABS team, to minimise the risk of the couriers being intercepted.

94. He conveyed information to [NAME_7] regarding the status of another unrelated customs investigation so that the information could be passed on to [NAME_9] who may otherwise have been concerned that he was the subject of the investigation, which might have resulted in some compromise of the 9 March importation.

95. He monitored the Control Room, the Business Group area and the ABS room to ensure that the CCTV cameras in each of these areas were not monitoring the relevant flight on 9 March.

96. Following the March importation, he received a large quantity of cash as payment for his participation in the planning and conduct of the importation. In the period between the importation and receipt of payment, he pressured [NAME_7] to obtain payment.

97. During the conduct of the June importations, he communicated with [NAME_7] regarding the diversion of customs resources away from the ABS team onto other unrelated investigations.

98. When the couriers were detected on 6 June 2012, he instructed [NAME_8], relevantly a subordinate within the customs service, to disrupt and divert the investigation to avoid the participants in the importation (including himself) being discovered.

99. On 28 June 2012, he attended [NAME_7]'s residence to receive a large quantity of cash as payment for his participation in the planning and conduct of the June importations. In the period between those importations and receipt of payment, he was again instrumental in putting pressure on [NAME_7] to obtain payment. 100. Throughout the period of the conspiracy [NAME_1] occupied relatively senior, supervisory roles within the customs service that encompassed the supervision at different times of different areas of the airport including the ABS room, the control room and client services. His position gave him the capacity to monitor what was occurring in other areas of the airport and to allocate staff, in particular, on some of the days of the four importations. The fact that he might be described as being less 'hands on' than either [NAME_7] or [NAME_8] on the days of the importations does not reduce his criminal culpability. He had expressed a calculated intention to remain "at arms length". Rather, the senior positions that he occupied permitted him to misuse his authority to facilitate the objects of the conspiracy. I am satisfied that he was standing by, ready to do anything within the scope of the capacity afforded him by his seniority to assist the successful execution of the importations. This misuse of his position, and his seniority, increases his criminal culpability in my assessment. 101. The evidence establishes that over an extended period [NAME_1], motivated solely by personal gain, used his position as a senior Customs officer of 11 or more years standing to actively corrupt a central and frontline investigative unit at [NAME_6]. He did so in order to minimise the risk of the couriers, and by extension himself and the other conspirators, being detected and apprehended, and to ensure, insofar as he was able to, the successful importation of substantial quantities of pseudoephedrine into Australia. Given that his official duties were primarily concerned with the prevention of such importations, his conduct involved a gross breach of trust. 102. Ultimately, [NAME_1] received about $55,000.00 for the 9 March 2012 importation and $85,000.00 for the June 2012 importations - a total of $140,000.00. 103. Throughout the period of the conspiracy, he blatantly abused his privileged position and access to sensitive information and he ignored his specific responsibilities, which included counteracting "threats to the border posed by illegal activity involving persons travelling through or employed in the environs of the airport". This conduct was considered and pre-meditated, and was not committed in a sudden lapse of judgment. 104. The evidence compels the conclusion that [NAME_2] played a significant role in the execution of the conspiracy. [NAME_1], he was a deliberate and active participant in the conspiracy over an extended period. I reject the submission put on [NAME_2]'s behalf on sentence that the Court should conclude that he was involved only in the March importation. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in all four importations undertaken in pursuit of the conspiracy. He was certainly motivated by, and appears also to have achieved, personal financial benefit. Whilst bearing in mind that like [NAME_1], [NAME_2] is to be sentenced for a conspiracy offence, and not simply for committing the identifiable physical acts that were committed by him in furthering that conspiracy, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his active participation in the realization of the conspiracy involved at least the following matters. 105. In or about late December 2011 or early January 2012 he identified a source of pseudoephedrine in Vietnam. 106. In late December 2011 and January 2012 he engaged in coded communications with [NAME_7], whom he knew was working as a Customs officer at [NAME_6] regarding a potential importation. 107. Throughout January to June 2012 met regularly with [NAME_12] and [NAME_7] (together and separately) regarding the sourcing of pseudoephedrine in Vietnam; the dates for the importations; the organisation of the couriers for the March and June 2012 importations; the bags and methodology to be employed for the March and June 2012 importations, including the amounts of pre-cursor to be packed in the couriers bags and the amounts of money to be paid to the Customs officers and [NAME_9]. 108. Throughout January to June 2012 he used numerous mobile phones in false names to communicate with, at first [NAME_7] and [NAME_12], and later only [NAME_12] in order to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. 109. On 19 January 2012, in a telephone conversation with an overseas Vietnamese contact, discussed his ability to engage in clandestine importations involving aircraft. 110. Took steps to raise about $10,000.00 in funds in February 2012 to be used to cover costs associated with the importation. 111. For the purpose of the 9 March 2012 importation he hired a car to be used for the collection of the courier's bags by [NAME_12] from the airport. 112. On 9 March 2012 communicated with [NAME_12], passing on instructions regarding where to put the bags and coordinating the delivery of the bags by [NAME_12] to another person that [NAME_2] was in contact with. 113. Met regularly with [NAME_12] between 10 March and 23 March 2012, at a time when payment for the March importation was being discussed between [NAME_12] and [NAME_7]. 114. Between 22 April and 9 May 2012 travelled to Vietnam, via Hong Kong and Singapore, for the purpose of sourcing pseudoephedrine and organising the June importations. 115. On 28 May 2012 returned to Vietnam to continue organising the June importations and to resolve issues that had apparently arisen with sourcing the pseudoephedrine. He did not return to Australia until 8 June 2012, after the arrest of [NAME_20]. Whilst in Vietnam, he communicated with [NAME_12] and [NAME_7] via a Blackberry phone to co-ordinate and confirm the plans for the importations, including the number of couriers to be used and the amount of pseudoephedrine to be placed in their bags. 116. I agree with the Crown's submission that [NAME_2]'s role was more critical than that of [NAME_12]'s to the overall criminal enterprise. I reject the submission, made upon the basis of [NAME_2]'s evidence at trial, which I do not accept, that he only became involved in order to assist [NAME_12] in the repayment of a debt owed to [NAME_25]. 117. [NAME_2] performed a critical role sourcing the large amounts of pseudoephedrine powder of a relatively high purity in Vietnam and travelled to Vietnam twice within five weeks in April and May 2012 for this purpose. 118. Given his role in sourcing the pseudoephedrine, I infer that he was well aware of the quantities of pseudoephedrine being imported on each of the four occasions. 119. On the day of the 9 March 2012 importation, [NAME_2] gave instructions to [NAME_12] via phone regarding, in particular, what was to be done with the courier's bags. [NAME_12], [NAME_2] distanced himself from the collection of the courier's bags containing the pseudoephedrine for the March importation. For the June importations [NAME_2] remained in Vietnam. 120. Evidence at trial showed significant cash deposits into accounts held by [NAME_2] in the periods following the March and June 2012 importations. It is impossible to discern precisely how much [NAME_2] received for participating in each of the importations, however I am satisfied beyond doubt that his participation was financially motivated and that his reward was far from insubstantial. 121. [NAME_1] is 41 years of age and has no relevant criminal antecedents. In fact, as the Crown's submissions record, [NAME_1]'s prior good character was a necessary pre-requisite to his employment as a Customs Officer. 122. He enjoyed an apparently happy, supportive and relevantly unremarkable upbringing. He finished his education to Year 12, but reports being more sporty in his interests than academic. He is assessed as having an intellect within the average range. 123. At school [NAME_1] played representative basketball and rugby league. He went on to play senior rugby league for the Parramatta club, including some NRL games, and he played for a time in the reserves for St George. His football career was cut short on account of injury, which has resulted in some ongoing issues with arthritis, which is treated with analgesics for pain and may ultimately require knee replacements. 124. [NAME_1] has a daughter now aged 23 from a relationship he had when he was very young. That daughter is now studying at University interstate and he has a good relationship with her. In 1995 [NAME_1] met his future wife and they married in 2001. By then [NAME_1] was employed at Customs, which meant being away from home for long hours. This may have been a contributing factor in the eventual demise of the marriage, along with some very significant health and family issues his wife had to deal with and which had significant implications across the extended family. Before they divorced in 2008 the couple had two children, a boy now aged thirteen and a girl aged ten. [NAME_1] enjoys the continuing strong support of his family, including his parents, his children and his brother. His parents visit him regularly in custody and take their grandchildren with them as well. 125. A psychological assessment done for the purposes of sentencing revealed no marked elevations indicating clinical psychopathology. There was no evidence of unusual thoughts, anti-social behavior, undue paranoia or hostility, extreme moodiness or impulsivity. Whilst he is evidencing some signs of depression and anxiety, these were considered to be commensurate with his circumstances pre-sentence and not clinical in their manifestation. The psychologist considered that [NAME_1] had a tendency to portray himself in a positive manner and may have a slight difficulty acknowledging negative aspects of his personality. He was assessed as being generally positive in his self-concept with a clear sense of purpose and clear beliefs. He has positive interests in fishing, reading and sports in general. He exhibits a strong need for affiliation with, and positive regard from, others. In this respect, family is very important to him. He reported that perceived stressors are buffered by people to whom he can turn for support when necessary. The psychologist's view was that this is a favourable prognostic sign for future adjustment. 126. [NAME_1] is assessed by the psychologist as having good prospects for rehabilitation and as being at a low risk of re-offending in a like manner. 127. Two matters potentially undermine that assessment. The first is that [NAME_1] apparently continues to dispute aspects of his involvement in the offending. It appears that he maintains the version that was reflected in his counsel's cross-examination of [NAME_13], which, as I recorded earlier, is frankly incredible. Secondly, whilst he has expressed remorse in the sense of regret for the consequences on his family of his present situation, he has expressed no remorse for or insight into the broader consequences of his conduct or the failings which it represented by his abuse of the trust and authority which was reposed in him as a customs officer responsible also for the conduct of more junior officers. 128. Apart from those matters, I do think there are a number of positive matters which point favourably to the prospect of [NAME_1] in the future making a law abiding contribution to the life of his family and his community. Primary among those matters is the strong family support he enjoys. He also has a strong reciprocal concern for family and his future goals are focused on looking after and being a good parent to his children. He is also reasonably intelligent and this likely has substantial positive consequences for his prospects of re-engagement with meaningful employment. He already has an Advanced Diploma in Accounting and a Certificate in injection moulding. He appears well equipped to engage in whatever educational and vocational programs that may be available to him in custody and in the psychologist's opinion he would benefit from such involvement to keep his mind active and as a means of stress management. In addition to the foregoing matters, [NAME_1] does not have any substance abuse problems of the kind that so frequently undermine prospects of successful rehabilitation. He has also been assessed as demonstrating no diagnosable psychopathology or criminogenic traits, matters which also frequently operate to undermine rehabilitative prospects. Finally, [NAME_1] has no prior convictions which would point against the prospect of his rehabilitation. Aside from the impact of that factor on an assessment of his prospects for rehabilitation, it is something on account of which I will accord him some leniency in this exercise. 129. Naturally it is ultimately in the best interests of the community if [NAME_1]'s rehabilitation can be achieved, and given what I believe are his good prospects in that regard weight must be given to that object in the present exercise. Tending in different directions, however, are other objects which must also be accorded significance in sentencing for the present offending. 130. Australia's borders are far more than a mere notional delimitation of its sovereignty. There is a significant practical dimension to the recognition of national borders and maintenance of their security. Some items and substances are considered by Parliament to be sufficiently detrimental to the safety and well-being of the community as to warrant prohibition or restriction on their importation. The interception and seizure of such contraband is an important executive function. That function depends for its efficacy upon the diligent and honest commitment to their duty of the officers charged with responsibility for maintaining the integrity of our borders. A customs officer is in a position of authority and trust. As the Court of Criminal Appeal observed in connection with [NAME_7] [R v [NAME_7] [2014] NSWCCA 123, Price J stated (Garling J and Bellew J agreeing), at [57]]; "The abuse by a Customs officer of the trust reposed in him by misusing his knowledge to facilitate the importation into Australia of border-controlled precursors and prohibited drugs is a very serious crime, as is the bribery of a Customs officer. These offences undermine the very core of our Nation's border protection and other Customs officers must be deterred from engaging in similar conduct."

1. The evidence in the present case pointed to the existence of a disturbing culture within parts at least of the Customs Service. That evidence suggested that illegal activity among people charged with the responsibility of protecting the integrity of our borders has been far more extensive than merely the matters the subject of the present offending. It is encouraging that there are apparently systems in place which enabled detection of this and some of that other offending. Nonetheless, it is important that the Courts make clear to others tempted to engage in similar criminal conduct that this type of offending will attract penalties appropriately reflecting the community's abhorrence of such a breach of trust. [NAME_1]'s offending involved a significant and cynical compromise of the authority and trust which was reposed in him, in an expectation of substantial financial reward.

2. The community is entitled to expect that any sentence will carry an element of denunciation and punishment so as to reflect appropriate proportionality between the circumstances of the crime committed and the sentence imposed, taking account, of course, of the subjective circumstances so as to properly reflect the fundamental notion of individualized justice that underpins the exercise of the sentencing discretion. 3. [NAME_2] is 38 years of age and has an extensive criminal history involving drug related offences. The conduct the subject of the present offence, against the backdrop of his prior criminal record, demonstrates a continuing disregard for the law, particularly in relation to dealing in prohibited illicit drugs. [NAME_2] has served a number of terms of imprisonment for drug related offences, the most recent being from 28 November 2006 to 27 May 2009 relating to the supply of a prohibited drug.

Accordingly, the object of specific deterrence assumes some significance in the present synthesis.

4. There is evidence which suggests that [NAME_2] was raised in a dysfunctional and emotionally and physically abusive environment. At the age of 14 and a half, he ran away from home and lived on the streets for 6 to 9 months, during which time a now long history of abusing alcohol and illicit drugs began and escalated over time. At that time he supported himself and his escalating substance use by resort to criminal activity including, but not confined to, car theft. 5. [NAME_2] claims to have begun to cut back his drug use in 2012 in response to auditory hallucinations and paranoia. He claims that by the time of his arrest he was only using cocaine and MDMA now and again and was drinking alcohol only socially. 6. [NAME_2] has never been married and has no children. He has no vocational qualifications and claims to have supported himself primarily on income derived from gambling. There is some indication that he has from time to time had unskilled work of different kinds.

7. The psychologist who assessed [NAME_2] for the purposes of sentencing diagnosed Alcohol misuse disorder in partial remission since 2011, poly substance use disorders of varying severity, all reportedly in remission in controlled environments, and a personality disorder with noteworthy features of antisocial personality, secondary to his life circumstances.

8. The psychologist concluded that [NAME_2] is an emotionally damaged individual in need of long term psychological treatment and a high level of rehabilitation focused support in the community. It is feared that without treatment of that kind, he will be incapable of controlling his level of substance and alcohol abuse. Without that treatment he is assessed as a high probability of resuming heavy drug and alcohol use with the inevitable consequences for his physical and psychological health. It was suggested by the psychologist that [NAME_2] would benefit from extended supervision upon his eventual release, with a condition of a highly structured substance abuse rehabilitation program of no less than 6 to 12 months, possibly residential. Without intervention of that kind, it appears that [NAME_2]'s prospects are slim of him ever abandoning the criminal lifestyle he has apparently maintained for the past 25 or so years.

9. In that context, I consider that in fixing a sentence in the case of [NAME_2] it is appropriate to take account of the social, educational, psychological and other disadvantages that his history reflects and which doubtless endure to a significant extent. That history, and the need to try and avoid institutionalization, both justify the conclusion that he will need substantial assistance reintegrating into the community when he is eventually released. That assistance, and attendant supervision, will be an important component in attempting to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to address his rehabilitation and thus ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that the community is protected from future offending by this offender. There has been no particular indication on the part of [NAME_2] of a willingness to engage with treatment of the kind indicated. That and the absence of any expression of remorse leave little scope for any optimism about his prospects of rehabilitation.

10. It seems to me that, in the case of both offenders, there is no appropriate alternative to a sentence of full-time imprisonment. I didn't understand there to be any issue about that on behalf of either offender. I will take into account in the case of both offenders, the time already spent in custody on remand. I will also take into account, in their favour, that whilst on bail both men were subject to quite stringent conditions inhibiting their liberty for a reasonably lengthy period of time. Also in their favour, I have taken account of the preparedness of both of them to facilitate the course of justice. In both cases the defence manifested a preparedness to make concessions, and adopt positions in respect of particular matters and issues, that almost certainly shortened the proceedings.

11. The Commonwealth Director provided a table of what were described as co-offender and comparative cases. Whilst useful from the point of view of parity, a genuine regard for consistency in Commonwealth sentencing, as distinct from promoting the most punitive response, might have resulted in provision of a broader comparative range. The only case referred to in the table which did not involve co-offenders or their associates was the notorious case of a former Assistant Director of the New South Wales Crime Commission, Standen. The table made no reference, for example, to a recent decision of another judge of this Court, sitting as an Acting Supreme Court judge, in the matter of Spadina. I was referred to that case by counsel for [NAME_2], not so much in respect of penalty, but on another point. As Blackmore AJ noted in that case, the sentence imposed in Standen rather stands as an outlier, having regard to the position held by that offender at the time of the offending and the consequent extremity of his breach of trust and authority. Standen's position within the relevant organisation was substantially more senior than was [NAME_1]'s within the Customs service. Together with all the other matters I have outlined, I have taken into account the various cases I have been referred to, including the starting points before discounts of comparable co-offenders and the points of distinction in the various objective and subjective cases of each, in determining what I consider to be the appropriate sentences in respect of these offenders.

12. In the case of [NAME_1], I will, as the Crown submitted I might, impose sentences in respect of the bribery offences which are wholly concurrent with the sentence for the conspiracy offence. This is done to reflect the fact that the bribery offences are for all intents and purposes coincident with the conspiracy offence and, also, because the abuse of a position of trust is treated as an aggravating feature of the conspiracy offence.

Orders 1. [NAME_1]: For the offence of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled precursor the offender is convicted. I impose a term of imprisonment of 14 years commencing 12 May 2014. For the first offence of receiving a bribe the offender is convicted. For the first offence of receiving a bribe I impose a term of imprisonment of 4 years and six months commencing 12 May 2014. For the second offence of receiving a bribe the offender is convicted. For the second offence of receiving a bribe I impose a term of imprisonment of 5 years commencing 12 May 2014. I fix a non-parole period of 8 years and nine months commencing 12 May 2014 and expiring 11 February 2023. I recommend release to parole on that day. There will be a period of 5 years and 3 months on parole. The sentence will be completed on 11 May 2028. On parole the offender is to accept such supervision as Community Corrections NSW determine for so long as that service considers necessary. For clarity, I repeat that the total term is 14 years dating from 12 May 2014, which takes into account all the time spent in custody prior to today. The non-parole period is 8 years and 9 months. 1. [NAME_2]: For the offence of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled precursor the offender is convicted. I impose a term of imprisonment of 12 years commencing 1 August 2014. I fix a non-parole period of 8 years commencing 1 August 2014 and expiring 31 July 2022. I recommend release to parole on that day. There will be a period of 4 years on parole. The sentence will be completed on 31 July 2026. On parole the offender is to accept such supervision as Community Corrections NSW determines for so long as that service considers necessary. For clarity, I repeat that the total term is 12 years dating from 1 August 2014, which takes into account all the time spent in custody prior to today. The non-parole period is 8 years.

********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 November 2015