Immigration Appeal Dismissed: Sponsorship Concerns Upheld

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 207491 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 19 May 2026 ___________________________________________________________________ RESIDENCE

DECISION ___________________________________________________________________ [1] The appellant is a 68-[NAME]-old citizen of Vietnam whose application for residence under the Family ([APPELLANT]) category was declined by Immigration New Zealand. The application included his [NAME], also a Vietnamese citizen. THE ISSUE [2] Immigration New Zealand declined the appellant’s residence application because it deemed his [NAME] unacceptable. [3] The principal issues for the Tribunal are whether Immigration New Zealand’s decision was correct, and if so whether the appellant’s circumstances are special. [4] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that Immigration New Zealand correctly declined the application and that the appellant does not have special circumstances such as to warrant a recommendation that the Minister of Immigration consider an exception to Government residence instructions.

2

BACKGROUND [5] The appellant and his wife have two [NAME] who are both New Zealand citizens. Their [NAME] have been living in New Zealand since 2000, and both obtained resident visas in 2006. The [NAME] son is married with three children and the younger son is married with one child. [6] The appellant has visited New Zealand 30 times for short periods holding visitor visas since June 2000. His wife has visited 17 times, also for short periods, since June 2004. Their most recent departure from New Zealand was in 2019 and they are currently offshore. Residence Application [7] On 16 August 2023, the appellant made an application under the Family ([APPELLANT]) category of residence instructions sponsored by [NAME]. The applicable instructions require that an applicant has an acceptable [NAME]. Immigration New Zealand’s Concerns [8] Through its verification process, Immigration New Zealand identified that the appellant’s son is or was involved with various companies from which accredited employer status had been revoked or declined; there was a [NAME] exploitation warning on the son’s notes; and he was facing active charges. It therefore conducted a further in-depth [NAME] of the potential risks associated with the application. [9] By letter dated 27 January 2025, Immigration New Zealand expressed its concern that the son was not an acceptable [NAME]. It had identified 60 fund transfers made to [NAME]’s bank account in Vietnam in 2023 and 2024 which appeared to have been made by 11 employees of two companies. The son was sole director and major shareholder of one company and a shareholder of the other at the relevant time. The employees had all obtained their accredited employer work visas on the basis of their employment by the son’s affiliated companies during the same period (2023 and 2024). [10] Immigration New Zealand listed the payments made to [NAME] including the names of the employees paying, dates and amounts. It questioned why migrant work visa holders, whose visas were granted on the basis of their

3 employment by companies of which the son was a director and/or shareholder, would transfer funds to his mother’s bank account. [11] Immigration New Zealand had additionally identified that funds were transferred to the son’s account from the appellant’s account that appeared to be derived in whole or part from the money transfers made by the employees to [NAME]. The fund transfers raised concerns that the son may be involved in migrant exploitation activities and that the son’s proposed funds to [NAME] his parents may not have been earned or acquired legally. It sought the appellant’s (and implicitly his family’s) explanation for the transactions, including as to why employees of companies the son was involved in were making payments to his mother. Appellant’s Response to Immigration New Zealand’s Concerns [12] The [NAME] responded on 21 February 2025. She provided the wife’s bank account statements with explanations for each transaction that had been identified as concerning. It was explained that the relevant employees were friends of the wife as she had introduced them to her son prior to their employment. [13] All transactions were attributed to one of the following: (a) [NAME] contributions made by the wife as evidenced by statements from the church recipients. Two employees provided statements confirming they had made [NAME] contributions through the wife. (b) Property investment arranged by the wife. She was renovating a property for sale and several employees/her friends invested by providing funds for the renovation which would be recouped upon the sale. Evidence of ownership of the property and explanations from the employees/friends were provided in support. (c) Living expense assistance. The employees sent Vietnamese dong to the wife, and the son would provide the employee with the New Zealand dollar equivalent with no fee and at a premium exchange rate. The wife’s account was used because the son did not have a Vietnamese bank account, having lived in New Zealand since 2000.

4 (d) Other financial aid such as to assist in the payment of immigration adviser costs or purchasing a car. [14] It was explained that the son regularly made cash withdrawals from the companies’ bank accounts for his employees. Furthermore, the large fund transfers from the appellant to his son were the proceeds of the sale of shares the son held. Share documents were provided in evidence. Immigration New Zealand’s Decision [15] By letter of 2 July 2025, Immigration New Zealand declined the appellant’s application on the basis that his son had not been deemed to be an acceptable [NAME] (instructions R4.5.a and F4.15.d.ii). STATUTORY GROUNDS [16] The appellant’s right of appeal arises from section 187(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act). Section 187(4) of the Act provides: (4) The grounds for an appeal under this section are that— (a) the relevant decision was not correct in terms of the residence instructions applicable at the time the relevant application for the visa was made; or (b) the special circumstances of the appellant are such that consideration of an exception to those residence instructions should be recommended. [17] The residence instructions referred to in section 187(4) are the Government residence instructions contained in Immigration New Zealand’s Operational Manual; see www.immigration.govt.nz. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [18] On 4 August 2025, the appellant lodged this appeal on both grounds in section 187(4). His counsel submits that Immigration New Zealand’s decision- making process was unfair and it misinterpreted section 11 of the Act. [19] In support of his appeal, the appellant provided the following documents: (a) A statement from the appellant (18 September 2025).

5 (b) An affidavit from the son (3 September 2025) which exhibited a number of documents already provided to Immigration New Zealand. It also exhibited an affidavit (1 September 2025) of a translator proffering evidence in an expert capacity regarding name associations used in the fund transfers, specifically stating that one large transaction could not be attributed to an employee. (c) H [APPELLANT] et al “[NAME] in Vietnam – Issues and Recommendations” (2023) 7(4) VNUHCM Journal of Economics, Business and Law 4772. Further information provided on appeal [20] The Tribunal cannot consider further information provided by an appellant (being the research article and translator’s affidavit) that was not before Immigration New Zealand at the time that it made its decision to decline the application (section 189(1) of the Act). It can however, and does, consider it in its assessment of the appellant’s special circumstances (see section 189(3)(b)). ASSESSMENT [21] The Tribunal has considered the submissions provided on appeal and the file provided by Immigration New Zealand in relation to the appellant’s residence application, and Immigration New Zealand’s relevant electronic records. [22] An assessment as to whether the Immigration New Zealand decision to decline the appellant’s application was correct in terms of the applicable residence instructions is set out below. This is followed by an assessment of whether the appellant has special circumstances which warrant consideration of an exception by the Minister of Immigration. Whether the Decision is Correct [23] The application was made on 16 August 2023, and the relevant criteria are those in residence instructions as at that time. Immigration New Zealand declined the application because the appellant’s son was not deemed an acceptable [NAME].

6 [24] The relevant instructions in this case are: F4.15 [APPELLANT] (12/10/2022) F4.15.1 Applicant requirements Applicants under the [APPELLANT] must: … d. have at least one sponsoring adult child who: i. … ii. meets the sponsorship requirements set out at F4.35, including the minimum income threshold requirements; and … Effective 12/10/2022 F4.35 Sponsorship Requirements (01/05/23) F4.35.1 General Requirements … b. [NAME] must: i. meet the requirements to be an acceptable [NAME] as set out at R4.5; and … Effective 01/05/2023 R4.5 Acceptable sponsors See also Immigration Act 2009, s 48 a. In order to [NAME] an applicant for a residence class visa, a [NAME] must be i. deemed acceptable by the Minister of Immigration or an immigration officer; and ii. meet the relevant eligibility criteria for acceptable sponsors set out in this chapter; and iii. meet any further criteria imposed by the specific residence category the applicant is applying under. b. It is a matter for the absolute discretion of the Minister of Immigration or an immigration officer whether a person is acceptable as a [NAME]. … Effective 29/05/2017

7 [25] The relevant sections of the Act are: 11 Meaning of absolute discretion of the decision maker (1) If a provision of this Act provides that a matter or decision is in the absolute discretion of the decision maker concerned, it means that— (a) the matter or decision may not be applied for; and (b) if a person purports to apply for the matter or decision, there is no obligation on the decision maker to— (i) consider the purported application; or (ii) inquire into the circumstances of the person or any other person; or (iii) make any further inquiries in respect of any information provided by, or in respect of, the person or any other person; and (c) whether the purported application is considered or not,— (i) the decision maker is not obliged to give reasons for any decision relating to the purported application, other than the reason that this section applies; and (ia) privacy principle 6 (which relates to access to personal information and is set out in section 22 of the Privacy Act 2020) does not apply to any reasons for any decision relating to the purported application; and (ii) section 27 of this Act and section 23 of the Official Information Act 1982 do not apply in respect of the purported application. (2) Subsection (1)(c)(ia) applies to any decision made in relation to a purported application, whether the decision was made before or after the commencement of that subsection. 48 Grant of visa may be conditional on sponsorship … (6) A [NAME] must also be acceptable to the Minister or the immigration officer, or meet any other criteria required by the relevant immigration instructions, or both, as the case may be. (7) It is a matter for the absolute discretion of the Minister or the immigration officer whether a person is acceptable as a [NAME], and no appeal lies against his or her decision, whether to any court, the Tribunal, the Minister, or otherwise. [26] When deciding an application, Immigration New Zealand must act in accordance with the principles of fairness and natural justice (A1.1.c, effective 29 August 2012). Relevant factors relating to fairness include whether an application is given proper consideration, whether appropriate reasons are given for declining an application, whether only relevant information is considered, and

8 whether all known relevant information is considered (A1.5.a, effective 29 November 2010). [27] Instruction A1.15 states that an immigration officer should: … b. consider all the facts, keeping an open mind towards all relevant forms of evidence; and c. distinguish fact from opinion, rumour, allegation, assumption or report; and … Effective 29/11/2010 [28] A breach of A1.5 by Immigration New Zealand may render a decision incorrect if it has caused prejudice to the applicant (AB (Victims of People Trafficking) [2018] NZIPT 204216 at [60]). The decision [29] Immigration New Zealand declined the appellant’s application because the [NAME] ([NAME]) was not deemed acceptable (R4.5.a, F4.15.1.d.ii and F4.35). It did not accept the explanations provided for the identified fund transfers from the son’s employees to his mother, finding that there was a lack of credible evidence given the nature of the transactions. As such, its concerns remained regarding the son’s potential involvement in migrant exploitation activities. It was also not satisfied that the proposed sponsorship funds had been lawfully acquired. [30] Immigration New Zealand’s conclusion was based on its interpretation of the appellant’s evidence, as follows (summarised): (a) [NAME] contributions: (i) There was insufficient evidentiary documentation to establish the alleged charitable transfers which was contrary to Immigration New Zealand’s understanding of the recognised processes in Vietnam for charities and not-for-profit organisations with regard to genuine donations. Put another way, if charitable donations had been made, given the extent of the donations, further substantiating evidence would be available. The fact that scant evidence had been provided diminished the credibility of the explanation.

9 (ii) The documentation regarding the payments to the [NAME] additionally lacked credibility and specificity because they did not include amounts or dates. (iii) Specifically, there was no evidence of the employees’ transfers (VD45,000,000 (approximately NZ$2,883) on 15 March 2024, VD23,400,00 (approximately NZ$2,883) on 15 January 2024; and VD53,400,000 (approximately NZ$3,421) on 12 March 2024) to the [NAME] “for charitable works/contributions” being subsequently transferred to a [NAME]. (b) Living expense assistance: (i) Documentary evidence had not been provided to confirm that the funds that were purported to be transferred for living expenses had been dispersed to all the employees or their families as alleged by the son. (ii) Complete evidence of money exchanges for only two employees were provided which was insufficient given the number of alleged transactions. (iii) That the son had paid the employees in cash was not substantiated by the bank accounts. (c) Property investment: (i) There were no formal agreements or records provided substantiating the alleged property investment agreements which totalled approximately NZ$84,721.49. One employee stated she had invested approximately NZ$48,236.45 in the renovations and another approximately NZ$19,226.51. (ii) Documentation was not provided to confirm the following: a. the predicted cost of the renovation; b. the timeframe of the renovation; c. that a renovation had or was intended to occur;

10 d. that the funds were applied to the renovation; or e. the way the profits would be or had been dispersed. (iii) Vietnam has investment laws that would be applicable in such a situation but there is no evidence they had been complied with. (d) Share sale: (i) The timing and documentation regarding the share sale (2020) did not unequivocally link it to the November 2023 fund transfer to the son. (ii) The amounts transferred exceeded that obtained from the share transfers. (e) The imbalance of power between the employees and the appellant’s son as employer was such that it undermined the credibility of the employees’ statements. [COUNSEL] submissions [31] [COUNSEL] submits that the evidence was interpreted unfairly and prejudicially resulting in an incorrect decision. He referred in his submissions to the assurance [NAME] of the accredited employer work visa scheme by Te Kawa Mataaho Public Service Commission [NAME] of the Operation of the Accredited Employer Work Visa Scheme (2 February 2024) ([NAME]) which defined migrant exploitation. ― Fairness [32] [COUNSEL] submits that Immigration New Zealand did not clearly consider all the relevant information, instead relying on “evidence with no probative value”. He noted that [NAME] found (at para 47.b) that exploited migrant workers paid between NZ$14,000 and $50,000 for their positions. Only three of the alleged transactions were within this range. Furthermore, the fund amounts differed considerably, which was inconsistent with the allegation that they were payments for job offers, particularly as the employees knew of each other and many held the same position.

11 [33] Counsel noted that there was no substantive correlation between the transaction dates and the visa approval dates and that two people who had made payments had never travelled to New Zealand; these facts further disproving the contention that the payments were for job offers. [34] [NAME] at para 47 explains how migrant exploitation manifests in New Zealand. Counsel noted that the letters from the employees and the son demonstrate that none of the recorded migrant exploitation activities in [NAME] have occurred here. All employees are either contentedly employed by the son or have moved on to other pursuits. [35] Counsel referred to the included research paper regarding [NAME] activities in Vietnam which records that the law regarding charitable organisations was, in reality, largely unregulated. He submits that the letters from the relevant [NAME], the employees and the son all establish that the wife regularly made charitable donations to the [NAME]. She did not seek receipts as the payments were made for religious reasons. [36] With respect to the transfer of the share proceeds, counsel submits that the documentation established that the shares were sold on 22 October 2020 and the appellant had transferred the proceeds to the son on 8, 9 and 10 November 2023. The son stated that the transfers “had to pass intensive legal checks” by the Vietnamese and New Zealand banks “including the legitimacy of the source of funds”. [37] Counsel referred to the following Privy Council comments in Re Erebus Royal Commission; [COMPANY] v Mahon [1983] NZLR 662 (PC) at p671: … The first rule is that the person making a finding in the exercise of such a jurisdiction must base his decision upon evidence that has some probative value in the sense described below. The second rule is that he must listen fairly to any relevant evidence conflicting with the finding any rational argument against the finding that a person represented at the inquiry, whose interests (including in that term career or reputation) may be adversely affected by it, may wish to place before him or would have so wished if he had been aware of the finding being made. The technical rules of evidence applicable to civil or criminal litigation form no part of the rules of natural justice. What is required by the first rule is that the decision to make the finding must be based upon some material that tends logically to show the existence of facts consistent with the finding and that the reasoning supportive of the finding, if it be disclosed, is not logically self-contradictory. [38] Counsel submits that Immigration New Zealand relied on evidence with no probative value and placed no weight on the relevant evidence. As such, the sponsorship assessment did not follow the requirements of instruction A1.15.b and

12 .c which resulted in an unfair assessment of the son’s sponsorship.

For these reasons the decision was wrong. ― Section 11 [39] Counsel refers to instruction R4.5.b which states that it is matter of absolute discretion for the immigration officer to determine whether a person is acceptable as a [NAME]. He submits that section 11(1)(a) of the Act does not apply to the appellant because the assessment of the son’s eligibility as a [NAME] under instruction R4.5 was a part of the resident visa application. Furthermore section 11(1)(b) does not apply because Immigration New Zealand did not consider the [NAME]’s eligibility and asked for more information to do so. Section 11(1)(c)(i) does not apply because Immigration New Zealand did give reasons for its decision, and section 11(1)(c)(ia) does not apply because Immigration New Zealand has released its immigration files. [40] Counsel submits that the exercise of section 11 by the immigration officer was made arbitrarily which is unlawful, relying on Wellington City Council v [COMPANY] [2017] NZCA 302 at [54]: No matter how broadly a statutory discretion is scribed in legislation, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. [41] Counsel argues that the [NAME] can only be considered unacceptable if he is caught by instruction R4.5.a.v (convicted of an offence under immigration law). As the [NAME] (the son) has never been charged or fined for any offences under the Act, he is not caught by this instruction, and as such he is an acceptable [NAME].

For these reasons, the decision regarding the [NAME]’s eligibility was wrong. Discussion [42] As observed in JB ([APPELLANT]) [2015] NZIPT 202467 at [22], instructions R4.5.a.i and R4.5.b (which reflect sections 48(6) and 48(7) of the Act) combine to allow the Minister of Immigration or an immigration officer to determine, in their absolute discretion, whether a person is acceptable as a [NAME]. As such the Tribunal noted, at [23]: Given that the acceptability of a [NAME] turns ultimately on the absolute discretion of Immigration New Zealand, the merits of its decision cannot be formally reviewed by the Tribunal.

13 [43] Whilst the Tribunal cannot [NAME] the decision regarding the son’s eligibility as a [NAME], it is entitled, and here required, to assess whether the process in which the discretion was exercised was a fair and reasonable one. Furthermore, whilst Immigration New Zealand holds absolute discretion, any such decision cannot be “irrational”, or based on incorrect facts: [NAME] (Sibling and Adult Child) [2017] NZIPT 203614 at [38]. As the Court of Appeal stated in [NAME] v Associate Minister of Immigration [2016] NZCA 361 at [23], an absolute discretion is open to [NAME] if Wednesbury unreasonableness is identified. This refers to the decision of the [ADDRESS] of Appeal in [COMPANY] v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) which noted that such a decision is reviewable if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker, properly appraised of the facts, could have made it. [44] Accordingly, the Tribunal considers whether the decision was arrived at following an unfair process or was “irrational”. For clarity, it is not the Tribunal’s role to reassess the son as a [NAME] and supplant Immigration New Zealand’s decision with its own. It is rather to assess whether or not Immigration New Zealand’s assessment was undertaken using a fair process, and the decision was one that could properly be arrived at given the facts. [45] Immigration New Zealand’s letter of concern (27 January 2025) is lengthy and detailed. It tables all relevant payments and details all the specific concerns that the fund transfers raised. It was clearly written and understandable. Two extensions to the response deadline were afforded to the appellant upon request. Given this process, the Tribunal is satisfied that Immigration New Zealand informed the appellant of information that might harm his case and afforded him a reasonable opportunity to respond to the information (A1.5.a). [46] Immigration New Zealand’s letter of decline (2 July 2025) is additionally comprehensive. It reiterates its concerns, discusses the evidence which the appellant had provided in response, and explains its adverse credibility findings. In consideration of this, the Tribunal is satisfied that Immigration New Zealand gave appropriate reasons for declining the application (A1.5.a). [47] Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records indicate that it took internal legal advice and sought verification of documents. It took five months to assess the appellant’s response to the letter of concern, even noting that although not all evidence was provided in the required format, (for example original, signed statements), it was all assessed.

For these reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that

14 Immigration New Zealand considered the appellant’s response to its concerns appropriately. [48] There is no evidence that Immigration New Zealand approached the assessment with a closed mind and the Tribunal notes the assessments were verified by at least one additional immigration officer. There is likewise no evidence of reliance being placed on opinions, rumours or assumptions. In all these circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that Immigration New Zealand conducted a fair process, and the conclusion it arrived at was one available to it based on the evidence it had. [49] The Tribunal notes that section 11 is a technical section of the Act detailing what can occur in a situation where instruction or statute allows for the decision- maker to exercise their absolute discretion. It is not necessary, as counsel asserts, that each provision of section 11 be met by an absolute discretion decision-maker in order for the absolute discretion to apply. The section lists what may occur without challenge; however the alternatives are not mandatory. For example, Immigration New Zealand giving reasons for its decision does not diminish its absolute discretion; it was not obliged to provide reasons, but did. Conclusion on correctness [50] For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that Immigration New Zealand’s decision to decline the appellant’s application for residence was correct. Given the size, nature and extent of the payments the son’s employees had made to his mother and the fact that it had clearly warned the appellant of its concerns and afforded him adequate opportunity to respond, it was then entitled, after full consideration of the response, to exercise its discretion (R4.5.b) to deem the son an unacceptable [NAME] (F4.15.1.d.ii and F4.35). [51] Accordingly, without an acceptable [NAME], the appellant’s application could not succeed. Immigration New Zealand’s decision to decline the application was correct. Whether there are Special Circumstances [52] Where the Tribunal found the decision of Immigration New Zealand to be correct, it has the power to consider whether the circumstances of the appellant are special, such that they warrant consideration by the Minister of Immigration of an exception to the residence instructions.

15 [53] Whether an appellant has special circumstances will depend on the particular facts of each case. The Tribunal balances all relevant factors in each case to determine whether the appellant's circumstances, when considered cumulatively, are special. Personal and family circumstances [54] The 68-[NAME]-old appellant and his [NAME] reside in Vietnam. They have two [NAME] who are both citizens of New Zealand, having lived in New Zealand since 2000 when they came to study. They both have families and live in the same New Zealand city. The Tribunal has not been provided with further information regarding the family’s settlement in New Zealand other than its longevity and that they are raising their families here. [55] The appellant has visited New Zealand 30 times since June 2000 for short periods, each time holding a visitor visa. Some trips were for business purposes, given he has held several business visitor visas. [NAME] has visited New Zealand 17 times, also for short periods, since June 2004. Their last departure from New Zealand was in 2019 and they are currently offshore. [56] The appellant stated (30 May 2024) that he retired in 2023 from his occupation as a company owner but retained an income from “the companies”. In contrast, he stated (1 September 2025) that he was still working as a chairman of a [COMPANY] and is approaching retirement. The appellant stated that, following his retirement, he and his wife wish to live near their children and grandchildren. [57] The appellant has a familial nexus to New Zealand through his two citizen [NAME], their wives and children. Immigration New Zealand documents do however record that the appellant retains a mother, four brothers and three sisters in Vietnam. He therefore also has a strong familial nexus to Vietnam. [58] The appellant has never spent a significant portion of time in New Zealand and has not been in the country since 2019. Conversely, his life has been in Vietnam, other than short visits to other countries for work purposes. His ties to Vietnam, where he remains living and working, are therefore significant, and his only ties to New Zealand are through his [NAME] who have chosen to settle here rather than in their home country.

16 Health, character and English language requirements [59] Immigration New Zealand was satisfied that the appellant and his wife met health, character and English language requirements of its instructions. It did note however that [NAME] had remained unlawfully in New Zealand following the expiry of her visa in 2012 for 11 days. Despite this, she was issued a further visitor visa in 2013. Best interests of the grandchildren [60] The Tribunal has an obligation to have regard to the best interests of any children affected by the outcome of the appeal, under Article 3(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this case the relevant children are the appellant’s four grandchildren aged 13, 10, 8 and 0 years. The best interests of the grandchildren are therefore a primary consideration for the Tribunal and must be afforded substantial weight; [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 377, [2009] 2 NZLR 700 at [49]. It is noted however that the best interests of the children cannot be the paramount consideration, as per [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [24] per Tipping J. [61] Little information is available regarding the appellant’s grandchildren. Given that the appellant and his wife have not been in New Zealand since 2019, they may not have met the youngest grandchild, and they have lived at a distance from their other grandchildren for seven years. The appellant states that they keep in touch by Skype and likely the [NAME] have visited their parents with their children over the years.

Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts that there will be a level of relationship between the grandchildren and their grandparents. It finds, however, that because of the distance between their residences, it may not be a significant relationship to the children. [62] There is no information that demonstrates the necessity to the best interests of the grandchildren that their grandparents be granted residence class visas. They have been able to visit regularly, and likely the children, with their parents, will be able to visit their grandparents in Vietnam as they grow. Discussion on special circumstances [63] Special circumstances are “circumstances that are uncommon, not commonplace, out of the ordinary, abnormal”; [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2004] NZAR 615 (CA) at [24] per Glazebrook J.

17 [64] The appellant and his wife have spent their lives primarily in Vietnam. They now wish to relocate to New Zealand where their [NAME] and their families permanently reside. Whilst this desire is understandable, it is not an uncommon situation for the many parents of migrants to New Zealand who wish to retire close to their families. [65] [NAME] have not been to New Zealand for seven years and there is no evidence that they have a significantly close relationship with their grandchildren. The appellant remains working in Vietnam where he and his wife have always resided. [NAME] have no level of settlement in New Zealand, and no ties other than the presence of their [NAME] who chose to settle here away from their parents and their home country, and their son’s families. Ultimately, there is no evidence that the appellant and his wife’s level of connection to New Zealand is out of the ordinary. Conclusion on special circumstances [66] Having regard to circumstances of the appellant and his family, the Tribunal finds that considered cumulatively, the appellant does not have special circumstances that warrant a recommendation that the Minister of Immigration consider an exception to residence instructions. DETERMINATION [67] This appeal is determined pursuant to section 188(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 2009. The Tribunal confirms the decision of Immigration New Zealand to decline the appellant's application for residence as correct in terms of the applicable residence instructions. The Tribunal does not consider that the appellant has special circumstances which warrant consideration by the Minister of Immigration as an exception to those instructions under section 188(1)(f) of the Act. [68] The appeal is unsuccessful.

18 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] as to Depersonalised Research Copy [69] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant or his family members. “[NAME]” [NAME]