Employment Tribunal Rejects Claimant's Preparation Time Order Application

OUTCOME: Refused

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND) Case No: 8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Consideration of Written Submissions in [NAME_1] on 21 August 2025 Employment Judge Sangster Mrs MDM Val

Claimant

In Person

[COMPANY_2] & 4 others

Respondents

Represented by

[NAME_197]

JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL The judgment of the Tribunal is that:

1. The claimant’s application, dated 14 July 2025, for a preparation time order, is refused; and 2. The respondents’ application, dated 19 November 2024, for strike out failing which a deposit order, is refused.

REASONS Introduction 1. This Judgment is issued following consideration of the claimant’s application for a preparation time order and the respondents’ application for strike out, failing which deposit orders. The parties consented to the consideration of the applications on the papers. Each application is addressed in turn below. Background 2. The claimant is a solicitor, who was previously employed by the First Respondent ([NAME_6]) as a Contracts Manager.

3. She presented a claim form on 15 October 2024 (the First Claim), while still employed by the [NAME_6], in which she asserted complaints of: 3.1. Direct race and sex discrimination;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 2 3.2. Harassment related to race, sex and disability; 3.3. Victimisation; and 3.4. Detriments as a result of making protected disclosures.

4. The claimant presented a second claim on 2 May 2025 (the Second Claim), which included complaints of: 4.1. Unfair dismissal; 4.2. That her dismissal by [NAME_6] was automatically unfair, contrary to section 103A ERA; 4.3. That her dismissal was an act of victimisation by [NAME_6]; and 4.4. That, in deciding to dismiss her, [NAME_7]-R5 subjected her to a detriment contrary to s47B ERA, or victimised her, contrary to s27 EqA.

5. An order that both claims be considered together was made on 17 June 2025, with the consent of the parties.

6. Case management preliminary hearings ([NAME_8]) took place on 16 January, 28 April 2025 and 3 July 2025. A list of the issues was prepared following discussion at the second CMPH. It was updated following discussion at the third CMPH, and appended to the note of that CMPH (the [NAME_9]). An open preliminary hearing, in relation to disability status took place on 5 June 2025. Preparation Time Order Claimant’s Application 7. The claimant’s application for a preparation time order, dated 14 July 2025, was made under Rule 74(2)(a) and (b). She set out the basis for her application in her written application, which extended to just over 7 typed pages. She sought the sum of £10,260 in respect of 228 hours spent in preparation for the judicial adjudication of disability status. She asserted, in summary, that: 7.1. The respondents acted unreasonably and vexatiously in disputing disability status in the proceedings; and 7.2. The respondents knew, or ought to have known, from the outset of the proceedings that their position, in disputing disability status, had no reasonable prospects of success.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 3 Respondents’ Reply 8. The respondents objected to the claimant’s application in a letter dated 28 July 2025, extending to 3 typed pages. They asserted that the respondents were entitled to test whether the claimant met the statutory definition of disability under section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), the burden of proof being on the claimant to demonstrate this, and that they acted reasonably in doing so. They were entitled to defend their position and had legitimate arguments, which were advanced at the hearing. The fact they did not succeed on a particular issue does not mean that there were no reasonable prospects of success. It would not be appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion, even if it finds one of the threshold tests are met. Relevant Law 9. Rule 73(2) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the Rules) states: ‘A preparation time order is an order that the paying party make a payment to the receiving party in respect of the receiving party's preparation time while not represented by a legal representative.

10. Rule 72 defines ‘preparation time’ as time spent by the receiving party (including by any of the receiving party’s employees or advisers) in working on the case, except for time spent at any final hearing.

11. Rule 74 states that: ‘(2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that— (a) a party (or that party's representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it have been conducted; or (b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success; or (c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins.

12. The Rules accordingly impose a three-stage test: 12.1. the Tribunal must ask itself whether a party’s conduct falls within rule 74(2)— in other words, is the costs/PTO jurisdiction engaged?;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 4 12.2. if so, it must go on to ask itself whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of awarding costs/PTO against that party; and 12.3. if so, the Tribunal must make a determination of the amount of any award.

13. As the Court of Appeal reiterated in [NAME_10] v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 2012 ICR 420, CA, costs in the Employment Tribunal are still the exception rather than the rule. It commented that the Tribunal’s power to order costs is more sparingly exercised and is more circumscribed than that of the ordinary courts. In most cases the Employment Tribunal does not make any order for costs against the unsuccessful party. In [NAME_11] v [COMPANY_14] 2005 ICR 1117, EAT, Mr Justice Burton, then President of the EAT, expressed the view that the reason why costs orders are not made in the substantial majority of Tribunal cases is that the Rules of Procedure contain a high hurdle to be surmounted before such an order will be considered. Discussion and Decision 14. In Opalkova v Acquire Care Ltd [2021] 8 WLUK 265, HHJ Tayler noted (with reference to Radia v Jefferies International [2020] IRLR 431) that there was an overlap between a claim or response having no reasonable prospect of success and unreasonable conduct in the conduct of proceedings and concluded, at paragraphs 24-5, that there are 3 key questions to be asked in such cases: ‘First, objectively analysed when the response was submitted did it have no reasonable prospects of success; or alternatively at some later stage as more evidence became available was a stage reached at which the response ceased to have reasonable prospects of success? Second, at the stage that the response had no reasonable prospects of success did the respondent know that was the case? Third, if not, should the respondent have known that the response had no reasonable prospect of success? These questions are relevant whether the matter is analysed on the basis that the response had no reasonable prospects of success or that the respondent was guilty of unreasonable conduct in defending or maintaining the defence to the claims.’ 15. The Tribunal considered whether, objectively analysed, when the response was submitted did it have no reasonable prospects of success. The Tribunal concluded that this was not the case. At that stage, it was not clear what impairments the claimant was relying on – she mentioned PTSD and anxiety in her claim form. She clarified at the first preliminary hearing that she was relying on PTSD and would confirm whether she also wished to rely on

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 5 anxiety as a separate impairment constituting a disability. She later confirmed that she did, on the provision of the claimant’s impact statement and supporting evidence. The claimant’s position, in her application for PTO, is that she spent 180 hours (equivalent to 22.5 days, working 8 hours per day) ‘drafting the disability impact statement and the letters, and searching, obtaining and organising evidence’. (This was separate to the time which she spent in preparation for the preliminary hearing – researching relevant legislation and case law and drafting submissions, as well as other preparatory work and correspondence, which had separate time allocations.) That alone suggests that the respondent could not have been in a position to assess whether the claimant was a disabled person at the time the response was submitted. If the information was not readily available and apparent to the claimant, it could not have been to the respondents.

16. The medical evidence which accompanied the impact statement was, as noted in the Judgment regarding disability status, limited and redacted. No medical evidence was produced in relation to the claimant having a separate impairment of anxiety, and indeed the claimant’s assertion that she was a disabled person as a result of anxiety, as a separate impairment, was not accepted by the Tribunal. It cannot be said, in light of this, that the respondents’ position, that the claimant was not a disabled person for the purposes of the EqA as a result of the impairments relied on, had no reasonable prospect of success following the receipt of the impact statement and related evidence.

17. In light of these findings, the Tribunal concluded that the threshold tests have not been satisfied. The respondents’ conduct did not fall within Rule 74(2)(a) or (b), so there is no basis upon which the Tribunal can consider whether it is appropriate to exercise discretion to make a PTO. Even if the threshold had been met however, the Tribunal would have determined that it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of awarding PTO against the respondents, taking into account the following: 17.1. The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability status ([NAME_13] v London Borough of Lambeth [2000] IRLR 69); 17.2. A significant amount of the evidence of the effect of the impairment came from the claimant’s oral evidence at the preliminary hearing, rather than the medical evidence produced in advance; 17.3. Costs/PTOs in the Employment Tribunal are still the exception rather than the rule ([NAME_10] v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 2012 ICR 420, CA); and

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 6 17.4. The Rules contain a high hurdle to be surmounted before such an order will be considered ([NAME_11] v [COMPANY_14] 2005 ICR 1117, EAT). Conclusions 18.

For these reasons, the claimant’s application for a preparation time order is refused. Strike out/Deposit Order Respondents’ application 19. By letter dated 26 June 2025, extending to 6 typed pages, the respondent applied for strike out in respect of the following complaints: 19.1. Whistleblowing detriment and dismissal; 19.2. That the claimant’s dismissal was an act of victimisation.

20. The claimant objected to that application on the same date, in an email also extending to 6 typed pages.

21. The procedure for considering the application was discussed at the CMPH held on 3 July 2025. It was agreed that parties would lodge any comments by way of written submissions in support of their application, and these would then be considered. The respondent submissions, extending to 20 typed pages, and the claimant’s submissions, extending to 32 typed pages, were then considered in chambers. Respondents’ submissions 22. The respondents provided an overview of the relevant legislation and case law and, in summary, submitted that: 22.1. Despite being afforded the opportunity to do so on numerous occasions, the claimant has not identified the protected disclosures she relies upon, and the respondent does not have fair notice of those disclosures. 22.2. Without fair notice, the respondents cannot respond, and the Tribunal cannot determine whether protected disclosures have been made. The complaints accordingly have no reasonable prospect of success. 22.3. In the alternative, the complaints have little or no prospect of success, as the claimant will not be able to satisfy the tests set out in [NAME_16] v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 1850.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 7 Claimant’s Submissions 23. The claimant summarised the procedural background and asserted that the complaints were clearly and carefully particularised. She provided an overview of the relevant legislation and case law and, in summary, asserted that the application for strike out was without foundation and there was no proper basis upon which a deposit should be ordered. Relevant Law – Pleadings 24. In [NAME_17] v [NAME_18] 2015 ICR 527, EAT, Mr Justice Langstaff (then President of the EAT) stated ‘[A] system of justice involves more than allowing parties at any time to raise the case which best seems to suit the moment from their perspective. It requires each party to know in essence what the other is saying, so they can properly meet it; so that they can tell if a tribunal may have lost jurisdiction on time grounds; so that the costs incurred can be kept to those which are proportionate; so that the time needed for a case, and the expenditure which goes hand in hand with it, can be provided for both by the parties and by the tribunal itself, and enable care to be taken that any one case does not deprive others of their fair share of the resources of the system. It should provide for focus on the central issues. That is why there is a system of claim and response, and why an employment tribunal should take very great care not to be diverted into thinking that the essential case is to be found elsewhere than in the pleadings.’ 25. In [NAME_19] v [COMPANY_20] and ors EAT 0068/15 Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing observed: ‘In my judgment the construction of an ET1 is influenced by two factors: the readers for whom the ET1 is produced, and whether the drafter is legally qualified or not. The ET1, whether it is drafted by a legal representative, or by a lay person, must be readily understood, at its first reading, by the other party to the proceedings (who may or may not be legally represented), and by the [employment judge (EJ)]. The EJ is, of course, an expert, but (as this litigation shows) should not be burdened by, or expected by the parties to engage in, a disproportionately complex exercise of interpretation. The EJ has the difficult job of managing a case like this, and the EJ’s task will not be made any easier if this Tribunal imposes unrealistic standards of interpretation on him or on her.’ Relevant Law - Strike Out 26. The Tribunal has power to strike-out the whole or part of claim under Rule 38(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 on various grounds, including: (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 8 27. Having regard to the legal authorities referred to below, the following is noted: strike-out on grounds of no reasonable prospects is considered by means of a summary determination; where there is a serious dispute on the crucial facts, it is not for the Tribunal to conduct an impromptu trial of the facts; exceptional circumstances may arise where disputed facts are totally and inexplicably inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documentation; discrimination and unfair dismissal cases are generally fact sensitive and therefore strike out on this ground is exceptional; where there are no reasonable prospects, the Tribunal must decide whether to exercise its discretion mindful that full evidence has not been heard, although the Tribunal should not be deterred in the most obvious of cases.

28. The House of Lords in Anyanwu and anor v South Bank Students’ Union and anor [2001] IRLR 305 emphasised the importance of not striking out discrimination claims, other than in the most obvious of cases. Lord Steyn stated, at paragraph 24: ‘such vagaries in discrimination jurisprudence underline the importance of not striking out such claims as an abuse of the process except in the most obvious and plainest cases. Discrimination cases are generally fact-sensitive, and their proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias in favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits of its particular facts is a matter of high public interest.’ And Lord Hope stated, at paragraph 37: ‘I would have been reluctant to strike out these claims, on the view that discrimination issues of the kind which have been raised in this case should as a general rule be decided only after hearing the evidence. The questions of law that have to be determined are often highly fact-sensitive. The risk of injustice is minimised if the answers to these questions are deferred until all the facts are out. The tribunal can then base its decision on its findings of fact rather than on assumptions as to what the claimant may be able to establish if given an opportunity to lead evidence.’ 29. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] ICR 1126, held that the same or similar approach should be followed in whistleblowing cases. Maurice Kay LJ stated, at paragraph 29: ‘…there is a crucial core of disputed facts in this case that is not susceptible to determination otherwise than by hearing and evaluating the evidence. It was an error of law for the Employment Tribunal to decide otherwise…It would only be in an exceptional case that an application to an employment tribunal will be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success when the central facts are in dispute. An example might be where the facts sought to

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 9 be established by the claimant were totally and inexplicably inconsistent with the undisputed contemporaneous documentation.’ 30. The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Balls v Downham Market High School & College UKEAT/0343/10/DM, stated that in considering strike out, Tribunals must carefully consider all of the available material. Lady Smith stated, at paragraph 6 ‘..the test is not whether the claimant’s claim is likely to fail nor is it a matter of asking whether it is possible that his claim will fail. Nor is it a test which can be satisfied by considering what is put forward by the respondent either in the ET3 or in submissions and deciding whether their written or oral assertions regarding disputed matters are likely to be established as facts. It is, in short, a high test. There must be no reasonable prospects.’ 31. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in Ahir v British Airways Plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1392 per Underhill LJ (para16): ‘Employment tribunals should not be deterred from striking out claims, including discrimination claims, which involve a dispute of fact if they are satisfied that there is indeed no reasonable prospect of the facts necessary to liability being established, and also provided they are keenly aware of the danger of reaching such a conclusion in circumstances where the full evidence has not been heard and explored, perhaps particularly in a discrimination context. Whether the necessary test is met in a particular case depends on an exercise of judgment…it remains the case that the hurdle is high…’ 32. More recently in [NAME_22] v [COMPANY_23] and others 2021 ICR 1307, EAT, HHJ Tayler in the Employment Appeal Tribunal conducted a review of the authorities and considered the position where the claimant is a litigant in person. Having done so, he stated, at paragraph 28: ‘From these cases a number of general propositions emerge, some generally well understood, some not so much. (1) No one gains by truly hopeless cases being pursued to a hearing. (2) Strike out is not prohibited in discrimination or whistleblowing cases; but especial care must be taken in such cases as it is very rarely appropriate. (3) If the question of whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success turns on factual issues that are disputed, it is highly unlikely that strike out will be appropriate. (4) The claimant’s case must ordinarily be taken at its highest.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 10 (5) It is necessary to consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are. Put bluntly, you can’t decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you don’t know what it is. (6) This does not necessarily require the agreement of a formal [NAME_9], although that may assist greatly, but does require a fair assessment of the claims and issues on the basis of the pleadings and any other documents in which the claimant seeks to set out the claim. (7) In the case of a litigant in person, the claim should not be ascertained only by requiring the claimant to explain it while under the stresses of a hearing; reasonable care must be taken to read the pleadings (including additional information) and any key documents in which the claimant sets out the case. When pushed by a judge to explain the claim, a litigant in person may become like a rabbit in the headlights and fail to explain the case they have set out in writing. (8) Respondents, particularly if legally represented, in accordance with their duties to assist the tribunal to comply with the overriding objective and not to take procedural advantage of litigants in person, should assist the tribunal to identify the documents in which the claim is set out, even if it may not be explicitly pleaded in a manner that would be expected of a lawyer. (9) If the claim would have reasonable prospects of success had it been properly pleaded, consideration should be given to the possibility of an amendment, subject to the usual test of balancing the justice of permitting or refusing the amendment, taking account of the relevant circumstances.’ Relevant Law - Deposit Orders 33. Under Rule 40(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, where the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument has little reasonable prospects of success, it may order the party (‘[NAME_25]’) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument.

34. Whilst this is a lower hurdle than having no reasonable prospects of success (under Rule 38 on strike out), there must be a reasonable basis upon which to doubt that the legal arguments are valid, or that the material facts necessary to support the allegation will be established.

35. Under Rule 40(2), when deciding the amount of each deposit, the Tribunal must make reasonable enquiries into [NAME_25]’s ability to pay the deposit, and have regard to such information when deciding the amount of the deposit. Where multiple allegations or arguments are advanced (as is the case here) there may be multiple deposits ordered, not exceeding £1,000 each.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 11 However, the Tribunal should stand back and consider whether the total deposit awarded is proportionate 36. Under Rule 40(4), if a deposit is ordered and [NAME_25] fails to pay the deposit, the specific allegation or argument will be struck out.

37. Under Rule 40(7), if a deposit is ordered and paid, the deposit shall be refunded to [NAME_25], unless Tribunal ultimately decide to reject the specific allegation or argument for substantially the same reasons. If the Tribunal does reject the specific allegation or argument for substantially the same reason, [NAME_25] must (unless the contrary is shown), be treated as having acted unreasonably when considering an award of expenses (costs) and the deposit must be paid to the other party.

38. In Hemdan v Ishmail [2017] IRLR 228, it was confirmed that the purpose of the rule was to identify claims with little prospect of success at an early stage and discourage those, but was not intended to act as a barrier to access to justice or to “strike-out by the back door”. In that case, it was stated: ‘10. A deposit order has two consequences. First, a sum of money must be paid by the paying party as a condition of pursing or defending a claim. Secondly, if the money is paid and the claim pursued, it operates as a warning, rather like a sword of Damocles hanging over the paying party that costs might be ordered against that paying party (with a presumption in particular circumstances that costs will be ordered) where the allegation is pursued and the party loses. There can accordingly be little doubt in our collective minds that the purpose of a deposit order is to identify at an early stage claims with little prospect of success and to discourage the pursuit of those claims by requiring a sum to be paid and by creating a risk of costs ultimately if the claim fails. That, in our judgment, is legitimate, because claims or defences with little prospect cause costs to be incurred and time to be spent by the opposing party which is unlikely to be necessary. They are likely to cause both wasted time and resource, and unnecessary anxiety. They also occupy the limited time and resource of courts and tribunals that would otherwise be available to other litigants and do so for limited purpose of benefit.

11. The purpose is emphatically not, in our view, and as both parties agree, to make it difficult to access justice or to effect a strike out through the back door… 12. … The test, therefore, is less rigorous in that sense, but nevertheless there must be a proper basis for doubting the likelihood of a party being able to establish facts essential to the claim or the defence. The fact that a tribunal is required to give reasons for reaching such a conclusion serves to emphasise the fact that there must be such a proper basis.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 12 13. The assessment of the likelihood of a party being able to establish facts essential to his or her case is a summary assessment intended to avoid cost and delay. Having regard to the purpose of a deposit order, namely to avoid the opposing party incurring cost, time and anxiety in dealing with a point on its merits that has little reasonable prospect of success, a mini-trial of the facts is to be avoided, just as it is to be avoided on a strike out application, because it defeats the object of the exercise. Where, for example as in this case, the Preliminary Hearing to consider whether deposit orders should be made was listed for three days, we question how consistent that is with the overriding objective. If there is a core factual conflict it should properly be resolved at a Full Merits Hearing where evidence is heard and tested.’ 39. In determining an application for a deposit order, the Tribunal is accordingly entitled to have regard to the prospects of any party making out any factual assertion on which the claim is based as well as purely legal issues ([NAME_28] v Royal Borough of Kingston-upon-Thames UKEAT/0095/07). However, the Tribunal ‘must have a proper basis for doubting the likelihood of the party being able to establish the facts essential to the claim or response’ ([NAME_28] para 27) although this should not involve a trial of the facts as this would defeat the purpose of the rule ([NAME_29]). Discussion and Decision Protected Disclosures 40. The claimant provided some specification of the protected disclosures relied upon following the first CMPH. She did so by completing a table which directed her to provide the following details, in relation to each protected disclosure relied upon: 40.1. The paragraph number in the Particulars of Claim; 40.2. The date of the disclosure; 40.3. Method of disclosure (oral or written in email, letter etc); 40.4. The name of the recipient of the disclosure; 40.5. The information disclosed; 40.6. The relevant wrongdoing (criminal offence, legal obligation (if so, what is that legal obligation), miscarriage of justice, health and safety, environment, or concealment thereof); and 40.7. The basis upon which claimant asserts she held a reasonable belief that the disclosure was made in the public interest.

41. The table produced by the claimant contained 8 rows/sections and was discussed at the second CMPH. In relation to each row/section, and therefore each asserted protected disclosure, the claimant relied upon paragraph 7.78 of her amended Particulars of Claim (the Particulars of Claim, including

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 13 paragraph 7.78 having been amended on two occasions, following applications to amend from the claimant dated 23 January and 16 May 2025). In relation to the first row/section, she also referred to 21 additional paragraphs of her amended Particulars of Claim 42. In advance of the second CMPH, the respondents had highlighted sections of the table where it believed that further specification was required. Of the 8 rows/sections related to the protected disclosures relied upon, 4 were highlighted by the respondent, 4 were not. The claimant was, at the second CMPH, ordered to provide further specification in relation to the 4 highlighted sections, but not the remaining 4, as they had not been highlighted by the respondent as requiring further specification.

43. The claimant provided an updated table in relation to the protected disclosures relied upon in advance of the third CMPH. The respondent then applied for strike out, failing which a deposit order. Their position is that, other than in respect of one of the rows/sections of the completed table (row/section 5), the claimant has not provided the necessary specification in relation to the asserted protected disclosures in relation to the First Claim. In addition, the necessary specification in relation to asserted protected disclosures relied upon for the Second Claim has not been provided.

44. The Tribunal considered the terms of paragraph 7.78 of the amended Particulars of Claim in respect of the First Claim, the terms of the Second Claim and the further specification provided by the claimant. Having done so, the Tribunal have concluded as follows (following the table produced by the claimant, which is how the respondent structured their submissions): 44.1. Row/section 1 – In the note issued following the second CMPH, it was noted that further specification regarding some of the protected disclosures relied upon was required. In particular, it was stated that ‘Rather than detailing each occasion when she asserts she made a protected disclosure, and setting out the information disclosed on that occasion, the claimant grouped asserted disclosures together and stated, broadly, that the information disclosed was a protected disclosure, or related to a relevant failure. The first entry in the table, for example, covered 26 different emails/statements, which were sent to different people, and did not provide any specification of what the ‘Information Disclosed’ was in those emails/statements. The claimant agreed to provide the specification originally requested, in respect of each protected disclosure relied on’. The claimant did not however do so in relation to this section – the first entry in the table. Instead, she simply added a sentence to this section, under the heading ‘Information Disclosed’, again asserting that she had made protected disclosures. As it stands, within this section, the claimant refers to 44

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 14 separate dates and 22 paragraphs of the amended Particulars of Claim. 44.2. As the claimant did not provide the further particulars required, the Tribunal considered each the paragraphs of the amended Particulars of Claim referenced in this section, the Tribunal concluded that many of the paragraphs referenced contain no assertion of any protected disclosure. Others contain an assertion of protected disclosures being made with reference to very broad allegations, but no detail of any information disclosed. Without that, the claim does not include particulars of asserted protected disclosures, and the respondent does not have fair notice of the complaint which it requires to meet. The claimant has been given the opportunity to provide further particulars/specification of this element of her claim, but has repeatedly failed to provide this. There is no reason to believe that allowing her a further period to do so will result in adequate specification of this element of her claim. In these circumstances, based on the pleadings as they exist at present, the Tribunal have concluded that the paragraphs of the amended Particulars of Claim referenced in row/section 1 in the table, other than in relation to paragraph 7.26, 7.78, 7.99, 7.101, but only in so far as set out below, do not contain specification of any protected disclosures. They accordingly do not form part of the claimant’s claim, as currently pled. 44.3. In paragraph 7.26 of the amended Particulars of Claim, the claimant asserts that in a discussion with [NAME_30] on 17 January 2024, she expressly stated that she was feeling intimidated, threatened and distressed and that behaviours which they had been discussing amounted to victimisation. She sets out in row/section 1 of the table the basis upon which she asserts that she reasonably believed this tended to show a relevant wrongdoing and was in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this being an asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.4. In paragraph 7.99 of the amended Particulars of Claim, the claimant asserts that in a statement submitted on 26 March 2025 she referenced the respondent failing to deal with grievances and follow proper procedures asserting that this constituted unlawful detriment, victimisation and was unlawful. She sets out in row/section 1 of the table the basis upon which she asserts that she reasonably believed this tended to show a relevant wrongdoing and was in the public

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 15 interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this being an asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.5. In paragraph 7.101 of the amended Particulars of Claim, the claimant asserts that in correspondence of 18 March 2025 she made complaints in relation to the handling of the grievance and disciplinary process, quoting sections from that correspondence referencing the conduct amounting to victimisation and this being unlawful. She sets out in row/section 1 of the table the basis upon which she asserts that she reasonably believed this tended to show a relevant wrongdoing and was in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this being an asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.6. In paragraph 7.78 of the amended Particulars of Claim, the claimant asserts that within her [NAME_31] she made disclosures relating to failure to exercise duty of care and ensuring a safe working environment including by adequately addressing psychosocial hazards and poor behaviour. Elsewhere in the amended Particulars of Claim she confirms that she made [NAME_31] on 11 February 2024, 30 October 2024 and 18 April 2024. She sets out in row/section 1 of the table the basis upon which she asserts that she reasonably believed this tended to show a relevant wrongdoing and was in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this being an asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.7. As indicated above, other than in row/section 1, each of the asserted protected disclosures rely solely on the remainder of paragraph 7.78. The asserted disclosures made in that section are addressed below. 44.8. Row/section 2 - The claimant asserts that she made a protected disclosure in an email to HR dated 30 March 2024, and in the investigation meeting held on 12 June 2024. She quotes the text from her email which she relies upon as a protected disclosure, and states this was reiterated in the investigation meeting. She asserts that she reasonably believed the information disclosed tended to show that the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 16 health and safety of an individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered, which was in the public interest. She provides further details, in paragraph 7.78 of the context of this asserted disclosure. The respondents did not highlight this section to indicate that they believed further specification was required, in advance of the second CMPH. In light of these points, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.9. Row/section 3 - The claimant asserts that her email to HR dated 7 August 2024 ‘included reference to behaviours being contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act’. She relies on that as being a protected disclosure. She asserts that she reasonably believed the information disclosed tended to show that a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be endangered, which was in the public interest. The respondents can readily identify that email. The respondents did not highlight this section to indicate that they believed further specification was required, in advance of the second CMPH. In light of these points, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.10. Row/section 4 - The claimant asserts that in her email to HR dated 2 August 2024 she reported the incident referenced in paragraph 7.72 of her amended particulars of claim, namely that [NAME_30] had, on 24 July 2024, acted aggressively towards her, while under the influence of alcohol, ‘in an unprovoked outburst, slurring taunting remarks, pointing at me with his finger and showing a hostile expression and aggressive body language’. She relies on her report of this incident as being a protected disclosure. She asserts that she reasonably believed the information disclosed tended to show that a criminal offence had been committed, which was in the public interest. The respondents did not highlight this section to indicate that they believed further specification was required, in advance of the second CMPH. In light of these points, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 17 44.11. Row/section 5 – The respondent now accepts necessary specification has been provided regarding this asserted protected disclosure. 44.12. Row/section 6 – The claimant asserts that on 6 June, 12 & 14 July and 25 August 2025, she raised concerns with [NAME_33] and [NAME_7], verbally and by email, that there would be a likely breach of clinical trials regulations and research governance frameworks in relation to a material transfer where there was a requirement to ensure that ethics and governance approvals were met, and, linked to this, also flagged legal risks re breach of export control regulations. In light of these points, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.13. Row/section 7 - The claimant asserts that she raised concerns that there would likely be a breach of data protection obligations in relation to data subjects, who were vulnerable children, if the First Respondent authorised a document. She states that she did so on the following occasions: 44.13.1. Verbally to [NAME_33] on 4 July 2024, and in a recap email of the same date; 44.13.2. In an email dated 2 May 2024 to the portfolio manager and [NAME_7]; 44.13.3. Verbally in a team meeting on 15 May 2024; and 44.13.4. In an email to [NAME_7] dated 28 May 2024 44.13.5. In the investigation meeting held on 1 October 2024, 44.14. She relies on these as being protected disclosures. She asserts that she reasonably believed the information disclosed tended to show that there would likely be a breach of legal obligations, namely those under the Data Protection legislation. The respondents did not highlight this row/section to indicate that they believed further specification was required, in advance of the second CMPH. In light of these points, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents have fair notice in respect of this asserted protected disclosure. There is sufficient specification in relation to this for the respondents to understand what the claimant relies upon as a protected disclosure, and to enable them to respond. 44.15. Row/section 8 – At the end of paragraph 7.78 of the Particulars of Claim, the claimant states ‘Also, external disclosures have been made

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 18 to the prescribed bodies on 5th September 2024.’ This sentence has not been amended. Within that paragraph, there is no specification of who the prescribed bodies are, or what was disclosed. In the table initially produced by the claimant, she stated that the ‘Recipient’ was ‘Prescribed body’. In relation to both the sections entitled ‘Information Disclosed’ and ‘Relevant Wrongdoing’ she stated ‘Breach of EqA and of Human Rights’. This row/section was highlighted by the respondents, to indicate that they believed further specification was required, in advance of the second CMPH. The claimant was, at the second CMPH, ordered to provide further specification in relation to this section. Other than to allude to a further potential disclosure dated 21 October 2024, again to a prescribed body but with no details of what was disclosed, and which is not referred to in the pleadings, the claimant provided no further specification. 44.16. Whilst the claimant did not provide any additional specification, it is noted that, at paragraphs 25-28 inclusive of the amended Particulars of Claim, the claimant details a disclosure made to the Equality & Human Rights Commission on 5 September 2025. She states that she informed them of breaches of equality and human rights laws, disclosing that the First Respondent was failing to comply with legal obligations, including in relation to the public sector equality, health and safety of employees. 44.17. On balance, the Tribunal concluded that there is fair notice in the pleadings that the claimant asserts that her disclosure to [NAME_36] on 5 September 2024 was a qualifying and protected disclosure. The Tribunal is conscious however that the respondents were not the recipient of that. The claimant must produce to the respondents a copy of her disclosure to [NAME_36], dated 5 September 2024, highlighting the information disclosed in that which she relies upon as being a qualifying disclosure. An order requiring her to do so will be made at the next CMPH. 44.18. As stated in Chandhok v Tirkey [2015] IRLR 195, ‘The claim, as set out in the ET1, is not something just to set the ball rolling, as an initial document necessary to comply with time limits but which is otherwise free to be augmented by whatever the parties choose to add or subtract merely upon their say so. Instead, it serves not only a useful but a necessary function. It sets out the essential case. It is that to which a respondent is required to respond.’ There is no specification in the pleadings, as amended, of disclosures to other prescribed bodies – either on 5 September 2024 or any other date.

Accordingly, if the claimant wishes to rely on disclosures to any further prescribed

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 19 bodies on 5 September 2024, or any disclosures to prescribed bodies on any other dates, she will require to apply to amend her claim.

45. The respondent also makes reference to protected disclosures referenced in the claimant’s Second Claim in their submissions. However, as confirmed at the third CMPH, the claimant does not, in the Second Claim, assert any further protected disclosures. The disclosures she relies upon are referenced in the First Claim. The Second Claim simply introduces complaints related to her dismissal, albeit that she asserts that this was on the grounds of the protected disclosures made, and protected acts done, as referenced in the First Claim.

46. Any assessment of whether the asserted protected disclosures in fact amount to qualifying and protected disclosures, taking into account the terms of sections 43A-H ERA, and the relevant case law, cannot be determined on a summary assessment without reference to copies of the correspondence relied upon as protected disclosures, oral evidence regarding oral discussions relied upon as protected disclosures and the claimant’s evidence of her belief at the time. It accordingly cannot be said, at this stage and on a preliminary assessment, that the claimant has little or no prospect of establishing that she made protected disclosures. Protected Disclosure Detriments 47. The respondents assert that the complaints of detriment as a result of making protected disclosures should be struck out as the claimant has not provided fair specification and notice of the detriments suffered. However, that submission ignores the fact that a great deal of time was spent at the second and third [NAME_8] identifying each detriment relied upon, as recorded in the notes of those [NAME_8] and the [NAME_9]. There are 39 asserted detriments recorded in section 6.2 of the [NAME_9]. The claimant’s position is that she was subjected to those detriments on the grounds that she made protected disclosures and/or did protected acts (as recorded in sections 6.3 & 9.1 of the [NAME_9]). While the respondents dispute this, for the purposes of this application the claimant’s claim must be taken at its highest and the Tribunal must assume the claimant will make out the facts she offers to prove, unless those facts are conclusively disproved or totally and inexplicably inconsistent with contemporaneous documents. That has not been demonstrated. It cannot therefore be said, on a preliminary assessment, that these complaints have no or little prospects of success. There is a factual dispute as to whether the claimant made protected disclosures and whether the claimant was subjected to detriments. If those issues are established the Tribunal will require to determine causation. That will require evidence from the decision makers and consideration of what, if any, inferences should be drawn from the established facts and circumstances. It cannot be said,

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 20 without hearing that evidence, that the complaints have little or no reasonable prospect of success.

48. Similarly, in relation to the detriment of dismissal referred to in the Second Claim, the respondents’ position is that the claimant’s claim cannot succeed because none of the named individuals took the decision to dismiss the claimant. Evidence will require to be led to establish who took the decision to dismiss and why. Whilst the respondent asserts that the named individuals were not involved, this relates to what the respondent is offering to prove. The focus in relation to this application is on the claimant’s pleadings and what she, taking her claim at its highest, is offering to prove. She states that the named individuals were involved. Whether they were or not cannot be determined on a summary application. Evidence will require to be led to determine this. Victimisation – Second Claim 49. The respondents assert that the victimisation complaints in the Second Claim should be struck out as the claimant stated, in paragraph 25 of the Second Claim, that she was victimised on the grounds that she made protected disclosures. That is not however what is stated in that paragraph. Rather, the claimant states, at paragraph 25 of the Second Claim: ‘Alternatively, one material and significant reason for the decision to dismiss me, pleaded as a detriment contrary to section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) alongside victimisation contrary to s.27 EqA, and on which I am relying as against [the individual respondents] personally, was that I had made protected disclosures at para 5. to para. 7 and para. 9 to para.16. I have indeed been victimised; I have been dismissed because of having made discrimination allegations from 12th and 21st September 2023, for having lodged my grievances of discrimination and victimisation from 24th May 2024, for having submitted my Acas early-conciliation application on 15th August 2024 and for having presented my ET1 on 15th October.’ (emphasis added)

50. It is clear from this that, in the first part, the claimant is merely asserting that she pleads that she was subjected to a detriment as a result of making protected disclosures, alongside victimisation. She does not assert that she was victimised on the grounds of making disclosures. In the second part she sets out the basis for her complaint of victimisation.

51. In the alternative, the respondent asserts that there is no fair notice of the protected acts relied upon. The Tribunal does not accept that assertion. It is clear from the second part of the numbered paragraph, quoted above, that

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 21 the claimant asserts that she was dismissed as a result of having made discrimination allegations, as stated. For the purposes of her complaint that her dismissal was an act of victimisation, she clearly states his was due to making discrimination allegations on 12 & 21 September 2023, for raising grievances asserting discrimination and victimisation, for engaging in early conciliation and presenting her First Claim. Those are the protected acts relied upon in relation to the complaint that her dismissal was an act of victimisation. They have already been identified in the [NAME_9], namely at sections 6.1.3-6.1.6, 6.1.34, 6.1.44 and 6.1.45 (although it is noted that reference to the third grievance is not, currently, included in the [NAME_9] and that the [NAME_9] will require to be updated to reflect this. This matter will be discussed at the next CMPH).

52. The respondent also asserts that ‘there was no assertion that the claimant’s sex, race or disability influenced the disciplinary chair’s decision to dismiss’. That is, however, not her case. Rather, she asserts that her dismissal was on the grounds that she made protected disclosures and/or did protected acts, and was unfairly dismissed. Conclusions re Strike Out/Deposit Order 53.

For these reasons, the respondent’s application for strike out, failing which a deposit order, is refused.

Entered in register: 29 August 2025 and copied to parties

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND) Case No: 8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Consideration of Written Submissions in [NAME_1] on 26 March 2026 Employment Judge Sangster

Mrs MDM Val

Claimant

In Person

[COMPANY_2] & 4 others

Respondents

Represented by

[NAME_197]

1. The respondents’ application for expenses, dated 29 December 2025, is refused; and 2. The claimant’s application for a preparation time order, dated 7 January 2026, is refused.

REASONS Introduction 1. This Judgment is issued following consideration of the respondents’ application for expenses and the claimant’s application for a preparation time order. Background 2. The claimant is a solicitor, who was previously employed by the First Respondent ([NAME_6]) as a Contracts Manager.

3. She presented a claim form on 15 October 2024 (the First Claim), while still employed by the [NAME_6], in which she asserted complaints of: 3.1. Direct race and sex discrimination; 3.2. Harassment related to race, sex and disability;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 2 3.3. Victimisation; and 3.4. Detriments as a result of making protected disclosures.

4. She presented a second claim on 2 May 2025 (the Second Claim), which included complaints of: 4.1. Unfair dismissal; 4.2. That her dismissal by [NAME_6] was automatically unfair, contrary to section 103A ERA; 4.3. That her dismissal was an act of victimisation by [NAME_6]; and 4.4. That, in deciding to dismiss her, [NAME_7]-R5 subjected her to a detriment contrary to s47B ERA, or victimised her, contrary to s27 EqA.

6. The claims have a complex and contentious procedural history. Prior to the final hearing, there was a hearing in relation to [NAME_37], 4 case management preliminary hearings ([NAME_8]) and an open preliminary hearing in relation to disability status. In addition, the Tribunal have addressed numerous disputed applications, including a previous application from the claimant for preparation time order and a strike out/deposit order from the respondents. The Tribunal’s digital case files extend to over 3,500 pages.

7. On 29 December 2025 the respondents made a number of applications, including an application for an award of expenses against the claimant, on the grounds of unreasonable conduct, in relation to preparation of the [NAME_38] for the hearing (the Expenses Application). They sought the sum of £24,476.50 in respect of their application. On 29 December 2025, the claimant objected to that application.

8. On 7 January 2026, the claimant made an application for a preparation time order in respect of preparation of the [NAME_38] final hearing (the PTO Application). The claimant sought the sum of £18,483.89 in respect of her application. The respondents objected to that application.

9. The final hearing took place, over 13 days, commencing on 19 January 2026.

10. It was agreed, at the start of the final hearing, that the Expenses Application and the PTO Application could, and should, be addressed separately. Parties indicated that they wished to make further submissions, in writing, in relation to their applications. A timetable for them to do so, following the hearing, was agreed. The parties were content for their applications to then be considered on the papers.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 3 11. The respondents have lodged the following in relation to their application, and in response to the claimant’s: 11.1. Their initial application, dated 29 December 2025, extending to 5 pages; 11.2. On 6 March 2026, written submissions, in support of the Expenses Application and responding to the PTO Application, extending to 10 pages, together with an updated schedule of expenses (increasing the sum sought to £26,196.50); and 11.3. On 19 March 2026, a further submission extending to 4 pages.

12. The claimant has lodged the following in relation to her application, and in response to the respondents’: 12.1. Her initial application, dated 7 January 2026, extending to 10 pages; 12.2. On 6 March 2026, a written submission in support of her PTO Application, extending to 4 pages (in which she stated that the sum sought was now £18,893.89); 12.3. On 16 March 2026, a further submission in support of her application and in response to the Expenses Application, extending to 8 pages (in which she stated that the sum sought was now £19,298.89), and a bundle of documents, extending to 246 pages; 12.4. On 19 March 2026, a short email with further comment, in response to the respondents’ submission of that date. Parties’ Applications/Submissions Respondents’ Application & Submissions 13. In the Expenses Application, and their submission supporting this, the respondents stated, in summary, that the claimant had acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in relation to preparation of the [NAME_38]. They stated that her conduct had materially delayed the agreement of the [NAME_38], increased costs, and prejudiced the respondents’ ability to prepare for the final hearing. They referenced the following in support of their application, stating that these occurred in November/December 2025: 13.1. There being a high volume and frequency of emails from the claimant; 13.2. The Tribunal being unnecessarily copied into routine correspondence between the parties;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 4 13.3. The claimant seeking to insist that the respondents use her draft index as the basis for the [NAME_38], refusing to agree to the drafts they produced and making what they felt were unclear and at times contradictory objections to the drafts produced; 13.4. The claimant stating that she would not be able to review the draft index to the [NAME_38] until the respondents complied with some of her requests; 13.5. The claimant objecting to receiving communications from multiple individuals in [NAME_39]; 13.6. The claimant making unsubstantiated allegations that the respondents were acting “unreasonably”, “vexatiously”, “scandalously”, “abusively”, in a way “objectively capable of causing deceit”, which caused “distress, alarm and harm” and that the respondents were “wilfully hindering the progress of the case”; 13.7. The claimant applying for an ‘unless order’ on 5 December 2025, seeking to have the respondents’ response struck out unless the [NAME_38] was prepared to her satisfaction, 13.8. Making, on 18 & 22 December 2025, requests for written answers to questions and disclosure of documents.

14. In response to the PTO Application, the respondents stated, in summary, that they had acted reasonably in their conduct of the proceedings. That it was not appropriate to use the claimant’s index, as it relied on complex and confusing cross-referencing, and departed from standard chronological structure. They stated that they provided the following to the claimant: [redacted] 14.2. The final [NAME_38] on 18 December 2025; 14.3. Confirmation, on 22 December 2025, that all the documents she had disclosed to date were included in the final [NAME_38] on 18 December 2025.

15. In relation to the sum sought by the claimant in the PTO Application, they stated that no breakdown had been provided by the claimant in relation to how the stated hours were spent.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 5 Claimant’s Application & Submissions 16. The claimant stated, in her PTO Application and her submission supporting that, that she was seeking the order to compensate her for the time she spent liaising with the respondents regarding the bundle, and then on the preparation of her own bundle. She stated that her application was made on the basis that the respondents had ‘acted unreasonably, vexatiously, abusively and disruptively in the conduct of this step of the proceedings, which resulted and caused [her] to incur, as a self-represented litigant, significant additional, unplanned and urgent preparation time.’ She listed the requests for specification/answers to questions/disclosure of documents, which she made to the respondents in the period from 19 November 2024 to 14 October 2025, and then listed the dates she had sent emails to the respondents’ representative regarding the preparation of a [NAME_38].

17. She stated that she was not in possession of any [NAME_38] from the respondents, as of 7 January 2026, and had collated her own bundle, which she had shared with the respondents. She stated that the PTO Application was limited to the time she had directly dedicated to doing so, given the respondents’ unjustifiable failure to comply with the orders regarding the preparation of a [NAME_38], as the respondents and/or their representative’s ‘unequivocal unreasonable, vexatious, abuse and disruptive conduct’.

18. In response to the Expenses Application, the claimant stated, in summary, that she objected to the application, it was made with no basis or foundation, and the respondents’ characterisations of her conduct were inaccurate and denied. She stated that the respondents had refused to disclose documents to her and had breached the Tribunal’s orders. She made no submission regarding ability to pay, despite the Tribunal directing that the claimant must include this and the respondents highlighting that she had not done so. Relevant Chronology 19. On 5 September 2025, and as discussed at the CMPH held on 2 September 2025, case management orders were made that ‘on or before 14 October 2025, the parties shall provide copies to each other of: a. Any documents they intend to rely on at the final hearing; b. Any documents properly requested by the other party, which are relevant to the issues to be determined at the final hearing; and c. In the claimant’s case, any documents relevant to remedy…’ and that ‘the respondents have agreed to collate the productions into a [NAME_38], which should be in chronological order, be indexed and have numbered pages. It should incorporate all documentary productions intended to be referred to at the hearing by either party. They will provide a copy to the claimant, no later than 2 December 2025.’

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 6 20. The claimant requested a substantial number of documents from the respondents, from November 2024 onwards. On 6 October 2025, the respondents wrote to the claimant confirming that they had reviewed her requests and would provide documents relevant to the issues. They highlighted where they felt that requests were not clear, or documents were not relevant, requesting further detail from the claimant. On 14 October 2025, both parties exchanged disclosure documents. The respondents included in their bundle documents requested by the claimant that were relevant to the issues to be determined, and which could be collated at that time. They indicated that, given the scope and number of the claimant’s requests, they had not yet been able to collate all of the documents requested, but they would continue with that exercise. On 27 November 2025, a revised index was sent to the claimant containing further documents identified. In relation to any outstanding requests, the respondents indicated that they either required further specification of the request to locate the document, or they required clarification of the relevance.

21. On 5 December 2025, the claimant applied for an unless order. The respondents were not asked for, and did not provide, comments in relation to that application.

22. On 12 December 2025, following consideration of extensive correspondence from the parties, the Tribunal wrote to the parties stating as follows: 22.1. That the claimant’s request for an unless order was refused as being inappropriate. Reasons for that conclusion were provided. 22.2. That if the claimant remained of the view that further documentation was required, she must provide the clarification sought by the respondents in the first instance, and give them the opportunity to then locate the documents requested. She could then make an application to the Tribunal in relation to any particular documents which have not been produced. She was informed that any such application must identify precisely the documents which remain outstanding, and, in relation to each: when they were requested; the respondents’ reason for not producing them (where a reason had been provided); and why the claimant believed the documentation were relevant to the issues to be determined by the Tribunal at the final hearing (with reference to the [NAME_9]). 22.3. That it appeared, from the parties’ extensive correspondence, that a [NAME_38] had not yet been finalised, as there remained some dispute between the parties regarding the documents to be included in that. The following direction was issued in relation to that, varying the order previously issued:

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 7 ‘1. The respondents must collate the [NAME_38], including all of the information which they wish to rely on at the final hearing, as well as that which the claimant has disclosed to date as being the documentation she wishes to rely on. This must be done as soon as possible and a copy provided to the claimant, in electronic format, by no later than 4pm on 19 December 2025.

2. Any further documents subsequently identified should be included in a supplementary bundle.’ 23. The respondents provided the bundle to the claimant, in compliance with that case management order, on 18 December 2025.

24. There followed further extensive correspondence from the parties. Within correspondence on 29 December 2025, the respondents stated that ‘the parties have not yet agreed a [NAME_38], and given their respective positions, are unlikely to be able to do so’. They indicated that they had provided disclosure documents on 14 October 2025, a [NAME_38] on 2 December 2025, and two updated versions of that on 18 December 2025 (including additional documents disclosed by the claimant on 12 December 2025). They stated that ‘despite this, we remain no closer to agreeing a [NAME_38]’. They set out the objections which the claimant had to the bundle, which included objections to the bundle being structured in chronological order. They stated that, without an agreed [NAME_38], they could not prepare effectively for the final hearing. They requested that a further CMPH take place prior to the commencement of the final hearing (scheduled to commence on 19 January 2026), and their correspondence included the Expenses Application.

25. The claimant responded on the same date. She stated that ‘agreeing the [NAME_38] is a pre-condition or precedes the provision of the copy to the Claimant.’ She set out the basis upon which she asserted the respondents were acting unreasonably in failing to take steps to reach agreement with her in relation to the [NAME_38], and that they were disregarding her role in the process.

26. In correspondence from the Tribunal, dated 5 January 2026, the Tribunal confirmed that there was insufficient time to list a further CMPH, prior to the commencement of the final hearing. The Tribunal’s letter included a section as follows: ‘[NAME_38] EJ Sangster notes that a significant proportion of the correspondence from each party dated 29 December 2025 relates to the [NAME_38]. For the avoidance of doubt, she confirms as follows:

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 8  The orders issued (following the CMPH on 2 September 2025, and on 12 December 2025) do not require agreement between the parties on the [NAME_38]. They simply require the respondents to collate, in chronological order, the documents disclosed into a bundle, and provide a copy to the claimant.  The orders issued on 12 December 2025 confirmed that any further documents, subsequently identified, should be included in a supplementary bundle. It appears that the respondents complied with the direction and sent a bundle to the claimant on 18 December 2025. That bundle will be used as the [NAME_38] for the final hearing. An electronic copy must be provided to the Tribunal by return. As previously indicated, any additional documents identified should be collated into a supplementary bundle. This can either be a joint supplementary bundle or, if agreement cannot be reached in relation to the collation of that, parties should produce separate supplementary bundles. Any such bundle(s) must be in chronological order, paginated and indexed. A copy must be provided to the other party, and 4 paper copies, as well as an electronic version, provided to the Tribunal.’ 27. The final hearing proceeded in the period from 19 January to 6 February 2026. Parties lodged productions as follows: 27.1. A joint bundle extending to 2,662 pages (which was also referred to as the respondents’ bundle), which was structured in chronological order; 27.2. The claimant’s bundle, extending to 3,746 pages (lodged on 4 & 6 January 2025, in electronic and hard copy respectively). This was structured by reference to particular topics, rather than being in a strictly chronological order. 27.3. A supplementary bundle for the respondent, extending to 236 pages; and 27.4. A supplementary bundle for the claimant, extending to 256 pages.

28. There was a very significant overlap in the documents contained in the joint/respondents’ bundle and the claimant’s bundle. They were however structured differently. Parties were not constrained, in any way, in the set of productions which they referenced during the course of the hearing. Relevant Law 29. Under Rule 75 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the Rules) a party may apply for an expenses order or a preparation time order at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which the judgement finally determining the proceedings was sent to the parties.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 9 30. Rule 73(1) states that an expenses order is an order that a party make a payment to the other party in respect of expenses incurred while legally represented. Expenses are defined, in Rule 2, as being fees, charges, disbursements or expenses incurred by or on behalf of a party.

31. Rule 73(2) states that a preparation time order is an order that a party make a payment to the other party in respect of preparation time while not legally represented. Preparation time is defined in Rule 72 as time spent by a party working on the case, except for time spent at any final hearing.

32. As the Court of Appeal reiterated in [NAME_10] v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 2012 ICR 420, CA, costs (referred to as expenses in Scotland) in the Employment Tribunal are still the exception rather than the rule. It commented that the Tribunal’s power to order costs is more sparingly exercised and is more circumscribed than that of the ordinary courts. In most cases the Employment Tribunal does not make any order for costs against the unsuccessful party. In [NAME_11] v [COMPANY_14] 2005 ICR 1117, EAT, Mr Justice Burton, then President of the EAT, expressed the view that the reason why costs orders are not made in the substantial majority of Tribunal cases is that the Rules contain a high hurdle to be surmounted before such an order will be considered.

33. Under Rule 74, a Tribunal may make an expenses order or a preparation time order on its own initiative or on the application of a party, and must consider whether to do so in specified circumstances, including where it considers that (a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in the bringing or conducting of proceedings (or part thereof).

34. The Rules accordingly impose a three-stage test: 34.1. The Tribunal must ask itself whether a party’s conduct falls within rule 74(2)— in other words, is the expenses/PTO jurisdiction engaged; 34.2. If so, it must go on to ask itself whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of awarding expenses/PTO against that party; and 34.3. If so, the Tribunal must make a determination of the amount of any award. Stage 1. Is the ground established? 35. First the Tribunal must consider whether the ground asserted is established, for example unreasonable conduct.

36. In determining whether a party has acted unreasonably in the bringing or conducting of proceedings (or part thereof) allowance should be made for the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 10 lack of experience and objectivity of a litigant in person. In assessing whether there has been unreasonable conduct the Tribunal should take into account the nature, gravity and effect of the conduct ([NAME_40] v [NAME_41] (London Branch) 2004 ICR 1398, Court of Appeal). Stage 2 – Should the discretion be exercised? 37. If the Tribunal considers that one of the grounds is established, it must then consider whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of making an expenses or preparation time order. That discretion should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances.

38. The following factors may be relevant to, but not solely determinative of, that exercise of discretion: the awards are exceptional – expenses and preparation time orders do not automatically follow the outcome, and are not made in the substantial majority of Tribunal cases; their purpose is to compensate the party who incurred the costs and not to punish the paying party; whether or not a party had professional representation; and ability to pay.

39. The vital point in exercising the discretion is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it, and what effects it had. ([NAME_10]). Stage 3 - The amount of the expenses or preparation time order? 40. If one of the grounds is established, and if the Tribunal consider it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of making an expenses or preparation time order, the Tribunal must consider the amount of that order. Under Rule 76, a Tribunal may order payment of unassessed expenses of up to £20,000; taxed (i.e. assessed) expenses; or agreed expenses.

41. Under Rule 82 in deciding whether to make an expenses or preparation time order, and if so, in what amount, the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s ability to pay.

42. Expenses should not exceed those reasonably and necessarily incurred, having regard to the effect of the unreasonable conduct and the expenses attributable to the unreasonable conduct identified ([NAME_10]). Discussion and Decision 43. Given that the parties expressly indicated that their applications related only to the preparation of productions for use at the final hearing, the Tribunal confined its consideration to that matter. Where submissions strayed into other areas, for example, parties’ attempts to prepare an agreed statement of facts, these have not been addressed.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 11 Expenses Application 44. As set out in paragraph 35, parties complied with the order for disclosure on 14 October 2025. While there was a delay in the provision of some of the documents requested by the claimant, given that the claimant had requested a significant number of documents, the Tribunal concluded that the respondents acted reasonably in the approach they adopted.

45. The date for provision of the collated joint set of the productions to the claimant was then varied, by the Tribunal, to 19 December 2025 (see paragraph 37.3). The respondents complied, and produced the collated bundle to the claimant on 18 December 2025 (see paragraph 23).

46. As stated in the Tribunal’s correspondence of 5 January 2026, the orders issued (following the CMPH on 2 September 2025, and on 12 December 2025) did not require agreement between the parties on the [NAME_38]. They simply require the respondents to ‘collate, in chronological order,’ the documents disclosed into a bundle, and provide a copy to the claimant. There was accordingly no requirement for the respondents to engage with the claimant in an effort to agree the [NAME_38], nor to continue with that process when it became clear that parties were unlikely to be able to do so. They could simply have collated the documents into a [NAME_38] and provided this to the claimant without discussion/engagement. Taking into account the claimant’s lack of experience in Employment Tribunal litigation, her lack of objectivity as a litigant in person and the fact that the respondents were engaging with her in an apparent effort to seek agreement on the [NAME_38], the Tribunal did not consider that it had been established that the claimant’s conduct was vexatious, abusive, disruptive or otherwise unreasonable. Even if the Tribunal had not reached this conclusion however, it would have determined that it was not appropriate, in all the circumstances, to exercise discretion to make any award of expenses: it was open to the respondents to simply collate the [NAME_38], as per the orders. It is not appropriate to make any award in relation to expenses incurred through their decision to engage with the claimant on this topic, or any expenses incurred as a result of any delay in the [NAME_38] being finalised, as a result of them doing so.

47. In relation to the remaining points relied upon by the respondents in support of their application, the Tribunal accept that the claimant made a number of requests for documentation. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in her doing so, and, as indicated above, the Tribunal found that the respondents adopted a reasonable approach in response to those requests. Whilst the respondents also rely upon further requests made by the claimant on 18 & 22 December 2025, given the orders issued on 12 December 2025, any

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 12 response to those requests would not have impacted on the preparation of the [NAME_38].

48. The Tribunal concluded that no additional expenses were incurred by the respondents in the Tribunal being copied into correspondence, the claimant objecting to receiving communications from multiple sources in [NAME_39] and the claimant making allegations in relation to the conduct of the respondents in the proceedings (in relation to which, it is noted that selective comments were extracted and replicated in the Expenses Application, but no context was provided, which would be required to reach any express conclusion that these comments constituted unreasonable (or vexatious etc) conduct on the claimant’s part). The Tribunal concluded that, whilst the claimant may have lacked objectivity, as a litigant in person, the respondents did not require to engage in communication regarding these issues. Further, as noted above, no input was sought from the respondents prior to the claimant’s request for an unless order being refused by the Tribunal, so the Tribunal does not accept that expenses were incurred in relation to that point. The Tribunal concluded therefore that even if there was unreasonable (or vexatious etc) conduct (which the Tribunal concluded was not in fact established), it would not be appropriate to make any award in relation to expenses in relation to these issues, as no expenses were, or required to be, incurred in response to the claimant’s conduct (however that is categorised). PTO Application 49. In relation to the claimant’s application, the Tribunal accepted that the parties had different opinions as to how the [NAME_38] should be structured. That caused a dispute between the parties, which they were unable to resolve. As indicated above however, the Tribunal’s orders did not require, or envisage, agreement. The only requirement was for the respondents to ‘collate, in chronological order,’ the documents disclosed into a [NAME_38], and provide a copy to the claimant. The fact that the respondents ultimately did so cannot amount to unreasonable, vexatious, abusive or disruptive conduct. The claimant was in possession of a [NAME_38], provided by the respondents, from 18 December 2025, in compliance with the Tribunal’s order (as amended). It is clear that she disagreed with how that was structured, but the respondents structured the bundle in accordance with the Tribunal’s instructions. The fact that the respondents did so cannot amount to unreasonable, vexatious, abusive or disruptive conduct. The claimant submitted her own bundle on 4 January 2026, structured in the manner which she had been asking the respondents to structure the [NAME_38] in. There was no requirement for her to do so. Any costs which she incurred as a result of doing so were not

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 13 necessary. She could have spent time instead considering what documents were already included in the productions prepared by the respondent, and simply highlighting to them any additional documents which she wished to be included in a supplementary bundle. Given these conclusions, the Tribunal determined that the PTO jurisdiction was not engaged. Even if it had been, the Tribunal would have concluded that it was not appropriate, in all the circumstances, to exercise discretion to make any award. Conclusions 50.

For these reasons, the Expenses Application and the PTO Application are refused.

Date sent to parties

____________________________

31 March 2026

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND) Case No: 8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Held in [NAME_1] on 19, 21-23, 26-30 January, 2-4 & 6 February 2026 Members Meetings 11 February & 19 March 2026 Employment Judge Sangster Tribunal Member Cardownie Tribunal Member Watt Mrs MDM Val Claimant In Person [COMPANY_2] & 4 others Respondents Represented by [NAME_198]

JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL The unanimous judgment of the Tribunal is that:  The claimant was unfairly dismissed, contrary to section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996;  It is not just and equitable to make any basic or compensatory award for unfair dismissal;  The claimant’s remaining complaints do not succeed and are dismissed.

REASONS Introduction 1. The claimant is a solicitor, who was previously employed by the First Respondent ([NAME_6]) as a Contracts Manager.

2. She presented a claim form on 15 October 2024 (the First Claim), while still employed by the [NAME_6], in which she asserted complaints, against the [NAME_204], of:

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 2 2.1. Direct race and sex discrimination; 2.2. Harassment related to race, sex and disability; 2.3. Victimisation; and 2.4. Detriments as a result of making protected disclosures.

3. She presented a second claim on 2 May 2025 (the Second Claim), which included complaints of: 3.1. Unfair dismissal; 3.2. That her dismissal by [NAME_6] was automatically unfair, contrary to section 103A ERA; 3.3. That her dismissal was an act of victimisation by [NAME_6]; and 3.4. That, in deciding to dismiss her, Second to Fifth Respondents had subjected her to a detriment contrary to s47B ERA, or victimised her, contrary to s27 EqA.

4. Prior to the final hearing, there was a hearing in relation to [NAME_37], 4 case management preliminary hearings ([NAME_8]) and an open preliminary hearing in relation to disability status. The claimant was found to be a disabled person as a result of PTSD, at the relevant times.

5. Despite orders for the collation of a joint bundle, parties lodged productions as follows: 5.1. A joint bundle extending to 2,662 pages (which was also referred to as the respondents’ bundle); 5.2. The claimant’s bundle, extending to 3,746 pages; 5.3. A supplementary bundle for the respondent, extending to 236 pages; and 5.4. A supplementary bundle for the claimant, extending to 256 pages.

6. Outstanding preliminary issues were discussed up to 13:15 on the first day of the hearing. Decisions, and the reasons for those decisions, were intimated orally in relation to those issues (as well as in response to further applications made during the course of the hearing).

7. One of the issues discussed was how the claimant would give evidence. Notes of the CMPH’s held on 28 April and 2 September 2025, had both highlighted that if adjustments were required for any hearings, the Tribunal required to be informed well in advance, so that appropriate arrangements could be made. No particular adjustments were required for the open preliminary hearing in

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 3 relation to disability status, where the claimant gave evidence. On the afternoon of Monday 12 January 2026 however, the claimant submitted an application requesting that she be permitted to give her evidence with reference to a written witness statement. The respondents indicated, that evening, that they would not object to her doing so, if it were provided to them by 5pm on 14 January 2026, so they had time to review it in advance of the final hearing commencing on Monday 19 January 2026. The claimant did not produce a statement to the respondents in advance of the hearing commencing.

8. At the commencement of the hearing, the claimant indicated that she would not be able to give oral evidence on all of the issues, with reference to the appropriate documentation, given that she was representing herself, the extent of the issues and the documentation, and her medical conditions. She indicated that she had only realised this when preparing for the hearing. She indicated that the only way she felt she would be able to give full and complete evidence was by way of a written statement. She indicated, however, that she had not yet completed this. She stated it would take a further 8-16 hours to do so and requested that the commencement of the hearing be delayed, to enable her to prepare this. The respondents did not object to the claimant giving evidence with reference to a written statement, and to her being permitted further time to complete this, provided that they were afforded time to read this. It was accordingly agreed that the claimant would provide her statement in two instalments, to arrive at 8am and 2pm on 21 January 2026 (essentially giving the claimant 48 hours to complete her statement). It was noted that statement must include all of the claimant’s evidence in chief and refer to any documents, within the existing bundles, which she wished to rely on - identifying the bundle & page number reference, as well as the particular section of text on that page to be relied upon (i.e. where this can be found on the page referenced). She was informed that she must have regard to the Presidential Guidance regarding witness statements when preparing her statement, particularly section 7. (Detailed instructions confirming this were issued in writing by the Tribunal later that day). It was agreed that the hearing would then resume on 23 January 2026, and the claimant’s statement would be taken as read. The claimant’s witness statement arrived as directed and the Tribunal spent 21 and 22 January 2026 reading that, and the significant volume of documentation referred to in the statement.

9. When the hearing resumed on Friday 23 January 2026, [NAME_44] for the respondents indicated that he was not in a position to proceed as, whilst he had read the claimant’s witness statement, he had not yet been able to read all of the documents referenced within the statement. The Tribunal had some sympathy for that position, as they had not themselves been able to read every document referenced. Following discussion, [NAME_44] indicated that he

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 4 would be in a position to proceed on Monday 26 January 2026. The Tribunal was satisfied that the hearing could be completed in the remaining listing period, as the number of witnesses had been significantly reduced from previous estimates.

Accordingly, following discussion on further preliminary issues which had arisen, the hearing was again adjourned, until 26 January 2026.

10. The Tribunal commenced hearing the evidence on 26 January 2026. The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf. Her witness statement extended to 93 pages, and incorporated by reference a previous witness statement, produced for the [NAME_37] hearing, extending to 36 pages. Her witness statement was taken as read. She did not call any further witnesses.

11. The respondents led evidence from the following individuals, in the following order: 11.1. [NAME_33] ([NAME_45]), formerly employed by [NAME_6] as Senior Contracts Manager; 11.2. [NAME_46] ([NAME_46]), formerly employed by [NAME_6] as Head of Research Contracts, and Second Respondent; 11.3. [NAME_49] ([NAME_52]), formerly employed by [NAME_6] as Senior Contracts Manager, and Third Respondent; 11.4. [NAME_53] ([NAME_56]), currently employed by [NAME_6] as Director, [NAME_92], and Fourth Respondent; 11.5. [NAME_57] ([NAME_60]), currently employed by [NAME_6] as Senior HR Partner and Fifth Respondent; 11.6. [NAME_61] ([NAME_64]), currently employed by [NAME_6] as Director of Operations for [COMPANY_65].

12. Other individuals referenced in this judgment are: 12.1. [NAME_66] ([NAME_67]), Senior HR Case Manager; 12.2. [NAME_68] ([NAME_71]), BVS Deputy Director (Facilities), and Investigating officer; 12.3. [NAME_72] ([NAME_74]), Senior Contracts Manager; 12.4. [NAME_75] ([NAME_78]), HR Case Manager assigned to manage the claimant’s formal grievance; 12.5. [NAME_79] ([NAME_82]), Head of HR; 12.6. [NAME_83] ([NAME_85]), Director of HR Partnering; and

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 5 12.7. [NAME_86] ([NAME_89]) – former Head of Research Contracts. Issues to be determined 13. The issues to be determined were discussed and identified at the [NAME_8]. The [NAME_9] was further discussed at the start of the hearing. Minor amendments were identified, but it was otherwise agreed that the [NAME_9] reflected the issues to be determined at the hearing.

14. The final [NAME_9] is contained in the schedule to this judgment. Findings in fact 15. This judgment does not seek to address every point about which the parties have disagreed. It only deals with the points which are relevant to the issues which the Tribunal must consider to decide if the complaints made succeed or fail. If a particular point is not mentioned, it does not mean that it has been overlooked, it simply means that it is not relevant to the issues. The relevant facts, which the Tribunal found to be admitted or proven, are set out below. Background and Employment Context 16. [NAME_6] is a higher education establishment. The individual respondents ([NAME_46], [NAME_52], [NAME_90]) are current/former employees of [NAME_6]. 17. [NAME_6] has a number of policies/procedures/guidance documents applicable to staff, including the following: 17.1. A Behaviours Charter, setting out the 5 behaviours that [NAME_6] expects all staff to adhere to (Excellence, Principled, Accessible & Inclusive, Relevant and Ambitious), and what staff should/should not do to demonstrate those behaviours. 17.2. A Grievance Policy and Procedure. 17.3. A Disciplinary Policy & Procedure, containing standard provisions, including a right of appeal against any disciplinary action taken. 17.4. A Dignity and Respect Policy, which sets out [NAME_6]’s expectations, what amounts to unacceptable behaviour, the processes for making formal complaints and legal definitions of discrimination and harassment, as well as a definition, for the purposes of the policy, of bullying. 17.5. A Contribution Reward Policy, providing a process to recognise and reward employees who make a sustained excellent contribution, and are expected to continue to do so, by way of an additional increment on salary. The policy states that applications are normally made by

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 6 managers, but self-nomination is permitted. Applications are considered annually, by a panel. 17.6. Annual Review Guidance setting out that, in advance of Performance & Development Review (PDR) meetings, the [NAME_91] should complete their Self Review Form and gather relevant information. After the meeting, either the reviewer or the [NAME_91] should complete the first draft of the outcomes document, for review by the other. When both are satisfied the document is complete, it is signed off and passed to the next level manager for their comments.

18. The claimant is Spanish. She is a dual qualified solicitor (Spanish and Scots law). She first qualified as a lawyer in around 1998 (Spanish Law) and became a Scottish solicitor in 2019. She commenced employment with [NAME_6], as a Contracts Manager within the [NAME_92] ([NAME_93]), from 23 March 2020. [NAME_46] was on the interview panel when the claimant was recruited.

19. The [NAME_93] assists academics within [NAME_6] with all research related requirements. This could, for example, cover contracts with funders and collaborations with other universities, addressing issues such as IP, data processing/sharing, material transfers etc.

20. The [NAME_93] is headed up the Director of [NAME_93]. Reporting to them are 11 Heads of Service, one of which is the Head of Research Contracts ([NAME_94]). The [NAME_94] manages a team of around 20. There are normally around 5 Senior Contracts Managers (SCMs), who report directly to [NAME_94]. The SCMs then each have teams consisting of Contracts Managers ([NAME_95]), Contracts Officers (COs) and/or Contracts Support Officers ([NAME_96]).

21. The Research Contracts Team deals with a high volume of work, and often has a backlog of outstanding work. The work can be complex. Contract requests are sent to the team via a shared inbox. Those requests are triaged and placed in an appropriate queue. [NAME_95] would look at the [NAME_97] queue, and pick up work from there. Where work was (or became) urgent, it was allocated to [NAME_95] by the SCMs/[NAME_94] in an even-handed manner, subject to capacity. The majority of the Research Contract Team are female. 75-80% are not British.

22. During 2022, [NAME_45] became the claimant’s line manager. [NAME_45] was a US attorney, in the process of applying to become a Scots qualified solicitor. He reported to [NAME_89], who was the [NAME_94] at that time (she had previously been a [NAME_98], and the claimant’s line manager). Early 2023 23. At the start of 2023, [NAME_89] left [NAME_6]. [NAME_46] was successful in securing promotion to her role and became [NAME_94]. He had previously been a [NAME_98]. [NAME_46] is a solicitor.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 7 His promotion created a vacancy at [NAME_98] level. The claimant applied for that position and attended an interview with a panel, which [NAME_46] formed part of. She was unsuccessful. She was informed of that in February 2023. She was unhappy that she had not been appointed to the role: she felt that she had more experience and better qualifications than the successful candidate. She expressed her dissatisfaction and frustration, at the decision not to appoint her, to [NAME_45]. From that point onward, [NAME_45] found the claimant to be increasingly confrontational, and that she would react negatively to even minor suggestions that there were areas where she could improve her performance, or do things differently.

24. On 16 March 2023, [NAME_45] held a Teams call with the claimant where he expressed concerns to the claimant regarding her behaviours, particularly his view that she appeared to be unable to deal with disagreements with him in a professional way, accept his decision on points following discussion, and move on. The discussion became heated, with the claimant raising her voice and pointing at [NAME_45]. The claimant asserted that [NAME_45] was undermining her and was not supportive. She repeatedly stated that she would be making a report in relation to him to the HR team. [NAME_45] felt the meeting was no longer productive. He tried to end the discussion, but the claimant did not wish him to do so. In the end he hung up. Immediately after the Teams discussion, [NAME_45] called [NAME_46], who was on holiday at the time, expressing his concern and distress at what had happened on the call, and the manner in which the claimant had spoken to him. He reported that she had continually talked over him and raised her voice. [NAME_46] suggested that, despite that, [NAME_45] should not have terminated the call. On his return from annual leave [NAME_46] spoke to the claimant and [NAME_45] individually.

25. Matters did not improve between the claimant and [NAME_45]. By June 2023, both the claimant and [NAME_45] were intimating informally to [NAME_46] that they intended to raise grievances against the other. [NAME_46] facilitated meetings on 15 and 28 June 2023, to try to find a resolution informally. At the first of these meetings, the claimant indicated that she expected to be supported fairly and professionally. The conclusion of the meetings was that both the claimant and [NAME_45] agreed that they could perhaps have approached matters differently, but they would now put matters behind them and move on. There was a discussion regarding ways for working effectively together, moving forward. [NAME_45] had indicated to [NAME_46] that he no longer wished to line manage the claimant, [NAME_46] felt he should continue to do so, so declined his request. Delegated Authority Schedule Issues 26. On 19 May 2023, the claimant sent an email to the [NAME_99] mailbox, copied to [NAME_46], regarding a piece of work, stating ‘I have spotted this in the queue and thought it might be appropriate to double check this request on the basis of the following:’ She went on to state that ‘upon a quick look, pending further

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 8 analysis’, it seemed to relate to the provision of services, rather than a research grant. She went on to state ‘If so…redirecting this request at an earlier stage might be most helpful as it would be outwith our remit as RCGI would not have a clear delegated authority to review or sign off on this.’ She raised the same query with [NAME_45] during her 121 that day. He agreed the work should be reallocated.

27. On 31 August 2023, one of the CSO’s flagged to the claimant that no action had been taken following the claimant’s email above. She forwarded that email to [NAME_45], highlighting that he had agreed in a 121 with her that it was not research and needed to be sent on to a different queue, but that had not been actioned. She ultimately took some steps in relation to the work on 19 September 2023.

28. On 9 June 2023, in relation to a separate piece of work, the claimant stated in an email to [NAME_45] ‘I am not satisfied that the delegated authority to sign off on this contractual arrangement lies with [NAME_93] as matters stand. Forgive my imperfect understanding of how this policy may be implemented in practice as I do not have any insight into acting in this capacity for the University, but the Governance policy and information available to me disallow [NAME_93] committing the University to this agreement, since the delegated authority lies with El and not [NAME_93], and does not appear obvious to me that this is open to discretionary adherence (please refer to Section 5, Appendix 5 and Principles of the U. Court delegation)’. On the same date, in a separate email, she also stated to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46] ‘If it is expected that [NAME_93] will arrange for commercial services contractual arrangements, my view is that it would be appropriate to have a think on SOPs and relevant considerations as per the attached.’ Material Transfer Agreement Issues 29. On 5 July 2023, the claimant asked [COMPANY_100] for some advice regarding how to proceed with a particular request for a material transfer agreement. They asked why [NAME_6] was arranging, and not the [NAME_101], but gave advice as to how she should proceed, if [NAME_6] was to do so. She provided some further context as to the situation, and they responded stating: ‘There is nothing to stop the [NAME_101] arranging this by the sounds of things even though we send on. It exposes us to risk if we arrange.’ The claimant then sent an email to [NAME_46] on 12 July 2023, stating ‘A quick note to let you know about the latest advice from [COMPANY_100]: There is nothing to stop the [NAME_101] arranging this by the sounds of things even though we send on. It exposes us to risk if we arrange.’ Data Protection Issues 30. On 4 July 2023 at 09:57, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_45], in advance of their 121, setting out 2 files she would like advice on during their discussion. He asked her to provide some clarification as to what questions she would like his opinion on, so he could try to offer guidance on those specific issues during

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 9 their 121. She responded by stating that, in relation to one of the files she had been asked to draft a data sharing agreement, but had discovered that there was no project legal agreement. She stated that she intended, subject to his opinion, to insist that the Lead is responsible for drafting the project agreement first. [NAME_45] asked for further clarification, in the form of a short summary of the file and the specific question the claimant wanted to ask him about. She responded, at 11:18, stating ‘As commented during the 1:2:1, I trust that the below duly provides the overview of my thought process re. these two files by using best judgement, particularly where bridging the gap in terms of policy and best practice triggers the need for risk-assessment input where relevant, subject to senior opinion. In any event, I'll make sure to identify these again at signature stage for clarity and facilitating appropriate decision-making. As requested, if I require guidance re. any specific drafting point I'll make sure to specify it. Thank you for entrusting complex matters to my capabilities. I hope that working on these and other responsibilities will enable me to further contribute them to the team.’ 2023 PDR Process 31. The claimant and [NAME_45] had a discussion regarding her PDR for 2022/23, on 15 August 2023, lasting around an hour. As requested by [NAME_45], the claimant had completed sections 2 (reflection on the previous year) & 4 (L&D goals for the coming year) of the form, in draft, in advance of the meeting. The claimant’s performance over the course of the year was discussed, as were the parts of the form which the claimant had completed in advance of the meeting. While 4, relatively standard, objectives were discussed at the meeting, it was noted that section 3 (SMART objectives for the coming year) would require to be completed later, once the SCMs had had their objectives for the coming year finalised (so team objectives could then be cascaded to individuals, where appropriate). [NAME_45] asked the claimant to email him with any proposed additional objectives, which she would like included.

32. On 5 September 2023, [NAME_45] sent an updated PDR form to the claimant, with proposed objectives included in section 3 and his comments in section 6, under the heading ‘Line Manager’s summary: to be completed following the P&DR meeting’. [NAME_45] had inserted 6 paragraphs in section 6, reflecting the discussion [NAME_45] had with the claimant on 15 August 2023. Within that section, he noted that the claimant had met her goals for the previous year, and stated ‘A notable accomplishment was [NAME_102]’s presentation to the team regarding [NAME_103] agreements. [NAME_102] was one of the first members of the team to give a case study/issue presentation. This was done as an alternative to the ‘blog post’ annual goal. [NAME_102]’s passion for [NAME_103] related work and her expertise as a [NAME_104] are appreciated by the team.’ [NAME_45] understood that the claimant had a passion for [NAME_103] law from her choice of presentation, and the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 10 fact that they had many conversations about [NAME_103] law, as he was in the process of taking his [NAME_103] law exam for his Scots Law qualification (a process the claimant had also undertaken in 2019). In his cover email he asked if she could review this ‘with an eye towards signing this off when I return from leave.’ 33. On 8 September 2023 the claimant sent [NAME_45] an email asking to ‘schedule dedicated time for the complete (or the focus on the remaining sections) pdr.’ She concluded by stating ‘I look forward to making the most of a meaningful yearly pdr’.

34. On 11 September 2023, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_60] introducing herself and asking if it was possible for an HR representative to attend a PDR meeting. [NAME_60] responded that this was not appropriate, as the meetings are informal. 35. [NAME_45] returned from holiday on 11 September 2023. On the morning of 12 September 2023, [NAME_45] and the claimant discussed the PDR, as part of their scheduled 121. The claimant indicated that she disagreed with the comments inserted in section 6. She stated that they were not reflective of the discussion they had had on 15 August 2023, which she felt had been more positive. She was concerned that content of the Line Manager’s Summary on the form did not fully reflect her achievements, successes and contribution during the year, but did not specify any particular concerns regarding the words used. She stated that she would not sign the PDR unless section 6 was altered by [NAME_45]. [NAME_45] highlighted that section 6 included a section for the claimant to insert her own comments, and she could include within her comments, as suggested on the form itself, ‘any points of disagreement’. The claimant also indicated that she was unhappy that objectives had been included without discussion with her, as was required. She highlighted that the form stated that ‘Objectives should be agreed during the meeting and this section completed by you during and/or after the meeting.’ She indicated that she had not completed the objectives herself, as the form stated that she should, and that this was unfair and against procedure. [NAME_45] reminded her that they had discussed some standard objectives on 15 August 2023, but that he had informed her that everyone required to wait for team objectives to be cascaded, before these could be finalised. The objectives now included reflected those which they had discussed on 15 August 2023. He also reminded her that he had indicated at that meeting that she could email him additional proposed objectives, if she wished, but she had not done so. The claimant became upset, raising her voice and repeatedly interrupting [NAME_45]. Mindful of [NAME_46]’s guidance not to terminate calls, [NAME_45] dialled [NAME_46] into the discussion, as he was not comfortable continuing without another individual present. During discussion, after [NAME_46] joined, [NAME_46] stated that ‘on the whole, he thought it was quite a positive review’, that ‘this is about how we progress as individuals and members of the team’. He stated that he thought that the expectation that the claimant insert her own comments, or

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 11 disagreement, before finalising the review, was fair in the circumstances. The claimant reiterated the points she had raised with [NAME_45] before [NAME_46] joined the meeting, stating that she felt the process had not been followed 36. During a separate teams call between the claimant and [NAME_46] that afternoon, the claimant reiterated her position, as stated during the discussion that morning. She remained upset and unhappy. [NAME_46] indicated that he felt the claimant’s tone, and the fact that she was raising her voice to him, was inappropriate. The claimant stated that she felt there was an unnecessary level of acrimony and she was alarmed by what was happening. The call was then terminated, due to IT issues.

37. That afternoon, [NAME_45] sent an email to the claimant referring to their meeting that morning, and summarising the discussion. He stated ‘I encourage you to focus on the many positive comments, and to take a constructive view of the suggested areas for continued learning and development.’ In relation to the claimant’s stated intention not to sign unless the manager comments were changed, he stated that if that was the claimant’s decision, he could submit the PDR with a note that she had declined to do so, but that his hope was that they could agree and conclude matters.

38. The claimant responded to [NAME_45], with a lengthy email, that evening. She stated that it was factually inaccurate that she had stated that she was not willing to sign the PDR unless he revised section 6. She went on to state however that she was sending comments and question on section 6, and stated that she expected objective recognition of her contribution, achievements and successes. She did not feel that the form properly reflected this. She referred back to the dispute there had been between the two of them, and to the agreement reached in June 2023. In the attachment, she indicated, with reference to the sentence ‘[NAME_102]’s passion for [NAME_103] related work and her expertise as a [NAME_104] are appreciated by the team’, that she did not recall having expressed or implied any supposed passion for [NAME_103] related work, and that seasoned or experienced may be more relevant than her national origin in terms of contribution. This was the first occasion on which she had raised any concern regarding that particular sentence. 39. [NAME_45] responded on 13 September 2023. He stated in his cover email ‘I appreciate that you are upset. Many of the statements below are not accurate, and I am surprised by the tone you have adopted in communicating with me, both as your manager and a colleague. As set out below, you have been provided with a number of opportunities to discuss/progress your PDR.’ He then summarised the steps taken, and attached a further updated PDR form, tracked against the version he sent her on 5 September 2023. He asked her to review and confirm if she would like to now finalise and sign. In his comments in the attachment, he stated ‘I highlighted your expertise as a lawyer qualified

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 12 in an [NAME_103] jurisdiction in the context of a statement about your contributions to the team’s [NAME_103] work. The intent was to celebrate your knowledge of [NAME_103] law, something we have discussed together many times. If you would prefer, I am happy to remove the sentence in its entirety.’ In the version [NAME_45] attached to his email, that sentence, ‘[NAME_102]’s passion for [NAME_103] related work and her expertise as a [NAME_104] are appreciated by the team’, was indeed removed.

40. The claimant responded on 15 September 2023, providing further comments on the process, objecting to comments made by [NAME_45], stating that the objectives had been included without her input. She stated that she would review the revised PDR and respond as soon as she could. In further correspondence that day, [NAME_45] indicated ‘I am surprised that you find the goals objectionable. I believe they are attainable and consistent with your role and team business needs. I am confident you can meet (and exceed) them. However, if you feel they are problematic, or that you cannot meet them, then I am happy for you to e-mail me a short written summary of your specific concerns regarding the substance of the goal(s).’ 41. The claimant responded, around 20 minutes later, addressing her email to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46]. She stated that his statements were factually inaccurate and that she was concerned about his ‘apparent or possible adversarial approach, and again potentially unreasonable pressure’. Within her response she stated ‘I do not deem that your request to email you a short written summary of specific concerns, further than the ones I have already conveyed so far, is a reasonable instruction within this process…’ 42. In response, [NAME_46] sent an email, on 15 September 2023 at 16:54, as follows (bold emphasis added, for the reasons set out in paragraph 43 below): ‘[NAME_102] you for your email. While I would typically wish to communicate directly with you re. such a matter, I note you have copied me to your last email to [NAME_34] so think it only right that I respond copying [NAME_34]. I have observed how you have engaged with [NAME_34] and, to some extent, myself re this matter over recent weeks and I am increasingly concerned as to how you are approaching this and how this is escalating. In the circumstances, I also do not think it is helpful or necessarily appropriate to continually make these various allegations to and about your line manager in this particular way. I do not think it reflects our shared values and in particular, our obligation to show integrity and treat each other with professional respect.

Accordingly, I would ask that you

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 13 refrain from doing so in this way. If you have any specific concerns about your work/colleagues then I am happy to speak separately with you. As you are aware, I discussed your PDR concerns with you (when you raised it directly with me last week). As I stated at that time, from the draft you showed me and after having listened to your comments, I had no reason to think that [NAME_34] had not carried out your review in a reasonable way. Indeed, I thought the review reflected on your performance for last year in a fair and objective manner in the circumstances. As I understand matters now, [NAME_34] has asked you to complete the few remaining outstanding sections of the PDR form and send these to him next week. I would be grateful if you would do so and which will hopefully enable the review to conclude.’ 43. On 20 September 2023 at 09:41, the claimant responded to the revised PDR which [NAME_45] had sent her on 13 September 2023, attaching a further version of the PDR form. This showed some tracked changes, but [NAME_45] noticed that there were a number of differences between the version he had sent on 13 September 2023, and the version sent by the claimant, which were not shown as tracked changes. He responded, at 15:04, with the version he had sent her on 13 September 2023, asking her to mark-up that version, with all of her changes marked as tracked changes, so he could clearly see the changes she had made, and respond to each. He also asked that she complete the section for her comments, as she had not yet done so. He indicated that he would review her proposed changes, once she had done so. In his email, he also stated ‘Separately, I note that when you emailed me below you altered [NAME_47]'s down-chain email from 15 September 2023 16:54 by removing the middle three paragraphs. The paragraphs you 'redacted' are part of the ongoing discussion. For clarity, I have restored [NAME_47]'s email to its original form in the chain below. Please refrain from editing existing email chains like this in the future.’ The paragraphs deleted were those shown in bold in paragraph 42 above.

44. On 21 September 2023 at 17:43, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_60]. In her email she stated that she was asking for ‘guidance on the options available to raise my concerns about issues at work’. She referenced the incident in March 2023, and the informal resolution agreed on 28 June 2023, stating that [NAME_45] was not abiding by the verbal undertakings given that day. She stated: ‘My line manager seems to be adamant to act in breach of processes and procedures, moving away from equitable practice and fair treatment (with no reasonable explanation), disregarding the behaviours charter and demonstrating an apparent adversarial approach and potential unreasonable pressure, in a context of apparent or possible abuse of power position as a line manager, putting me at unfair disadvantage and directly causing adverse impact. I am also seriously concerned that his responses in line with the above are

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 14 inconsistent throughout (with the procedure, with the key points of the conversation, and even conflicting with each other). I deem these behaviours to be unreasonable and unacceptable, contrary to the Dignity and Respect Policy, and even some of them potentially unlawful. They concern me greatly. I am logically very concerned about the persistence of these behaviours, and I deem it to be appropriate and reasonable to expect the behaviours in concern to stop.’ She provided no specification as to the basis upon which she considered the behaviours may be ‘potentially unlawful’.

45. The claimant sent a further email to [NAME_45] on 21 September 2023 at 17:59, stating simply ‘is there any specific reasons why you refuse to review the P&DR form I sent you as per the procedure?’. He responded on 22 September 2023, stating that ‘I am disappointed by the way that you continue to engage with both me, and the PDR process. I have not 'refused' to review the PDR Form. I asked you to track your proposed changes/additions to facilitate that review.’ He reattached his version of 13 September 2023, and asked that she provide tracked changes to that, so that he could review her proposed changes. He reiterated that if she had specific concerns about the objectives proposed, he would consider those, if she set out what her concerns were.

46. Later that day, the claimant sent [NAME_45]’s email on to [NAME_60]. In her lengthy cover email, she stated that that [NAME_45] was refusing to review the PDR form and ‘appears to suggest that there is no room for any open conversation in this, as it has happened to be the case from the get-go.’ She requested that [NAME_105] with [NAME_45] be suspended. [NAME_60] responded that [NAME_46] would arrange to discuss this with the claimant, when he was back at work.

47. On 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] held a Teams discussion with the claimant and [NAME_45], with a view to trying to resolve matters. He noted that [NAME_45] had asked the claimant to mark up the version of the PDR which was sent to her on 13 & 22 September 2023. He stated that he considered this to be a reasonable request, which was not onerous, and asked if she would do this. There was extensive discussion, as the claimant would not agree to do so. [NAME_46] listened to her concerns, but could find no substance to them, nor a rationale as to why she would not simply mark up the version of the PDR which had been sent to her, in accordance with her line manager’s request. It was a difficult discussion. The call ran on beyond the scheduled time, and [NAME_46] required to leave to attend another meeting. He left the call thinking that agreement may have been reached, and that the claimant would indeed mark up the document. Later that afternoon, he met the claimant on a 121 basis to check whether this was indeed the case. She would not, however, expressly confirm to him that she would do so. He asked if she was saying yes, she would do so, but she would not commit to this. He indicated that he felt the request was a reasonable one, and asked

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 15 if she was refusing to follow that request. The claimant would not provide a direct or clear response.

48. At 16:55 [NAME_46] sent an email to the claimant summarising their discussion. In his email, he also stated: ‘I also noted that I found the tone you have adopted during this process both in meetings and in writing, to be inappropriate and lacking the professionalism I expect in the team. You appear to have challenged almost everything your line manager has attempted to do during this process and made a number of unsubstantiated allegations which does not reflect how we should treat each other with dignity and respect. Also, during our meeting today, you continued to talk over me challenging everything I stated or requested with another unrelated question. It gave the appearance of simply not listening. Indeed, despite me having a meeting to attend you still would not allow the conversation to close until I requested for a 3rd time. It has been reported to me that other colleagues have found themselves in a similar situation of being unable to close a meeting with you… As noted above, these are not acceptable behaviours and I need you to reflect on how you engage with colleagues, and in particular senior managers in the team, and the tone and behaviours you adopt in such meetings/conversations. I will monitor this over the coming months and will expect to see a significant improvement.’ 49. The claimant responded to [NAME_46] at 17:35, with a lengthy email in which she: disputed the content of his email; stated that [NAME_45]’s instruction, and the way he was handling the PDR process, was not reasonable; stated that she would be awaiting [NAME_45]’s response to her email of 20 September 2023, and the draft PDR form she had attached to that email. 50. [NAME_46] responded at 18:30, stating that the issues she raised in her email had been discussed numerous times. He stated that he had considered her allegations in relation to [NAME_45]’s handling of her review, but found no substantive basis for them. He stated that his position remained that he had requested that she follow [NAME_45]’s reasonable request to mark up the document [NAME_45] had sent to her on 13 & 22 September 2023 with tracked changes. While he noted her further refusal to do so, he again encouraged her to follow the reasonable request made. He stated that it appeared she was neither listening to, nor taking advice from, senior colleagues about how to resolve the matter, but instead appeared to be wilfully trying to frustrate the process through a disruptive pattern of behaviour.

51. At 18:37 the claimant sent a lengthy email to [NAME_60] (extending to 1.5 pages when printed), largely reiterating what she had stated to [NAME_46] at 17:35, and stating that in [NAME_46]’s email to her facts were inaccurately presented. She stated ‘I deem these behaviours to be unreasonable and unacceptable, contrary to the Dignity and Respect Policy, and even some of them potentially unlawful. They concern

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 16 me greatly.’ She provided no specification as to the basis upon which she considered the behaviours may be ‘potentially unlawful’.

52. The claimant did not update the version of the PDR form sent to her on 13 & 22 September 2023, as requested. Instead, on 8 October 2023 at 15:43, the claimant sent a lengthy email to [NAME_45] (extending to 2.5 pages when printed). In her email, she raised further queries and concerns regarding the Line Manager’s Summary section of the form, including that the comments did not ‘objectively reflect the impact and sustained excellent contribution made’. She stated that there was no basis for [NAME_45] to highlight [NAME_103] as a passion or preference on her behalf: she had simply presented to the team on a legal problem in a subject they routinely cover. With reference to the explanation [NAME_45] had previously provided for making this comment in the PDR Form, and his offer to remove that sentence, (see paragraph 39), she stated ‘if I understand your words correctly, they would be matched with a correlated intentional opinion: "[NAME_102]'s knowledge of [NAME_103] and her expertise as an experienced Contracts Manager and dual-qualified solicitor (...)" as more relevant to my professional performance than my national origin, surely not?’ She stated ‘I reasonably deem my expectations to be fully realistic and sensible in that the due process is followed consistently, professionally and equitably, among all colleagues with no unfair/unfavourable treatment and in line with University policy and procedure.’ 53. Later that day, at 16:04, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_60], extending to 1 page when printed. The email referred to the PDR process. She informed him that she had sent a further version of the PDR to [NAME_45] with comments. She went on to reference concerns which she had raised in March 2023, and the informal agreement of 28 June 2023, stating that [NAME_46] has not summarised in writing the resolution to the concerns she had raised. She then stated ‘I would think that what has been happening might perhaps warrant some investigation and hopefully alleviation by drawing a line…The same is true particularly for considering any appropriate and timely action to firmly and seriously resolve, stop and prevent any and all unfair, discriminatory, retaliatory and/ or generally unlawful behaviour I should have been, and I believe I am entitled to be, protected from in the face of the circumstances, now and irrevocably.’ 54. [NAME_60] responded on 10 October 2023 stating that, if agreement could not be reached, two versions of the PDR would be saved. In response to the claimant’s suggestion that an investigation may be warranted, he stated that he could arrange a meeting with the claimant and [NAME_46], but highlighted that he was not sure what further advice he could give at that point. Alternatively, he stated that she could raise the matter formally as a grievance, in which case she would need to state her full grounds for grievance and the outcome she was seeking.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 17 55. On 17 October 2023, [NAME_45] sent an email to the claimant highlighting that she had not followed his instructions to mark up the PDR sent to her on 13 September 2023. He indicated that he had created a final version of the PDR, based on the 13 September version, which was attached. He asked her to sign and return that document by 5pm on 19 October 2023, failing which he would send it to [NAME_46] with a note that she had declined to sign, and the PDR would be uploaded to the [NAME_106]. The claimant responded restating her concerns regarding the process followed, and indicated that she would not sign.

56. On 19 October 2023, [NAME_45] sent an email to the claimant noting her position and stating that he had signed the PDR and submitted it to [NAME_46]. He concluded by stating that if the claimant had any further concerns regarding him or his conduct of the PDR process, she should raise them with [NAME_46] directly. He attached the finalised form, which noted that the claimant had declined to sign and that she had been provided with repeated opportunities to participate in the PDR process in an appropriate manner. The email chains were appended for context. It stated that the claimant’s conduct in the PDR process had not been considered as part of the Manager’s Summary, as that post-dated the annual review period. In relation to the L&D goals, it was noted that ‘All opportunities subject to appropriate approvals and business needs’. The section for the [NAME_91]’s comments was blank. Sept 2023 - Change in Line Management 57. [NAME_46] became the claimant’s line manager from 26 September 2023, on an interim basis. [NAME_45] had resigned from his employment in August 2023 and was working his notice period. [NAME_45] took the decision to look for alternative employment in mid-June 2023, principally as he believed that the claimant’s conduct was unacceptable and he could not continue to line manage her. He was worried for his professional reputation, believing the claimant would continue to make unsubstantiated allegations against him. [NAME_45] left [NAME_6]’s employment in November 2023. Oct-Dec 2023 - Informal Disciplinary Process & [NAME_107]

58. On 17 October 2023, [NAME_46] sent a meeting invite to the claimant for 19 October 2023, with the subject heading ‘PDR follow-up and Communications Meeting’. The claimant forwarded the meeting invite to [NAME_60], asking him ‘would you be able to attend along, please?’ [NAME_46] responded stating ‘I understood that this was an informal meeting.

Accordingly, it is not expected that a companion attends in these circumstances. Also, it may add a degree of formality to the meeting that you had not anticipated.

Accordingly, I would suggest you try and engage in a way that enables us to resolve this informally. Please let me know how you wish to proceed.’ The claimant responded, indicating that she had requested that [NAME_60] be present as she felt that this ‘will help me comfortably share my

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 18 views and that the presence of a third person may, I anticipate, have some influence in the communication pattern, avoid to continue adding even more load to this issue and, hopefully, aid and informal and sensible resolution where everyone is respected.’ It was subsequently agreed that [NAME_60] would attend.

59. At the meeting on 19 October 2023, a number of matters were discussed, with the claimant being given the opportunity to state her position, as follows: 59.1. The PDR process. [NAME_46] reiterated again that he had considered the concerns the claimant had raised regarding the process, but felt that the process was fair. It was agreed that the claimant could provide a copy of her version of the PDR, to be retained on file. [NAME_60] indicated that if she remained unhappy, she could raise a formal grievance in relation to the matter. 59.2. [NAME_46] indicated that he had some concerns regarding the claimant’s behaviours throughout the process, for example listening to feedback from others and reacting to it where appropriate. 59.3. [NAME_46] raised concerns that the claimant was modifying/changing email chains. 59.4. [NAME_46] raised a particular example where the claimant had not followed reasonable instructions, regarding the approach to a file. 59.5. The claimant raised concerns regarding [NAME_45]’s conduct at a meeting on 1 March 2023. 59.6. [NAME_46] raised that he had received a complaint from a Research and Operations Manager, who stated that the claimant had been very rude and not willing to have a conversation with her, or advise her who could assist her.

60. The meeting concluded with [NAME_46] stating that he would reflect on the issues discussed, and provide a summary of the meeting in due course.

61. On 24 October 2023, the claimant attended an interview for the role of [NAME_98]. There were 4 vacancies. [NAME_46] was one of three people on the interview panel. The claimant did not score as highly as the other candidates and was not selected. [NAME_46] informed her of this on 30 October 2023. At 15:15 that day the claimant sent an email to [NAME_60] stating [NAME_46] had informed her that she had not been successful in her application, and setting out some further points she asserted had been discussed with [NAME_46], in relation to the PDR process. She stated that she was expecting to receive an email from [NAME_46] in relation to the meeting held on 19 October 2023, and asked to speak to [NAME_60] about that.

62. On 1 November 2023, [NAME_46] wrote to the claimant summarising the points discussed at their meeting on 19 October 2023. [NAME_60] had reviewed that summary, and provided his comments/amendments, prior to it being sent to

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 19 the claimant. [NAME_46] then set out that he would like the claimant to make improvements in a number of specified areas, that he would review matters over the course of the next two months and, if there were no further concerns, the matter would be closed. The areas specified were as follows: 62.1. ‘To adopt and demonstrate professional and appropriate forms of communications with colleagues and managers showing dignity and respect at all times. 62.2. Demonstrate an ability to listen to feedback on certain negative behaviours and adopt and develop positive professional behaviours in such conversations. 62.3. To ensure that you act with honesty and integrity at all times when engaging in communications with colleagues and in a way that matches our commitment to our University/[NAME_92] values. For example, acknowledging and respecting that where a manager is required to make a business decision, then that decision is respected in a professional way and which does not undermine the service. 62.4. Adopt and demonstrate positive, solution-focused and customer- orientated behaviours when engaging with our customers at all times. 62.5. Refrain from making unfounded and inappropriate allegations about colleagues where no evidence supports such allegations. 62.6. Ensure that University and [NAME_92] values are maintained at all times ensuring that the work of the Team is not negatively impacted by any of the behaviour issues discussed above.’ 63. On 16 November 2023, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_60], which extended to 4 pages when printed. She thanked [NAME_60] for his attendance at the meeting, stating it was reassuring for her. She raised concerns in relation to the content of [NAME_46]’s email to her of 1 November 2023, which stated she found ‘unjustifiable and unacceptable’. She stated ‘I cant think of any good reason for the line management’s headlong responses and persistent victimising approach’. In relation to her unsuccessful application for the [NAME_98] roles, she stated ‘it is arguably more likely than not that I am denied any progress and career advancement opportunities…on retaliatory grounds.’ She stated ‘What is happening is, in my view, a shocking, disordered, capricious and unjustified ad-hominem affront to my character and to myself as a member of the community in the team and the University, as such, it causes deep offence to me and I have no other option than to call it out. It potentially implies a conscious choice for sheer undermining and lack of support; persistent, unwarranted, vague but serious allegations and inflammatory accusations, which I consider degrading and offensive, as well as, in conjunction with the above, failure to observe the behaviours charter, professionalism, dignity and respect, and which - I believe can now be inferred beyond reasonable doubt -

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 20 is an entirely deliberate course of action. These seem to be directed at tarnishing my track record of both performance (to high standard and at times above my job grade) and of conduct, through abuse and misuse of a power position over my career prospects and even over my job security…’ She stated that she did not wish to bear the burden of having to initiate a formal grievance procedure, but her ‘proposed resolution involves a written acknowledgment, responsible rectification and apology for the inappropriate behaviours incurred and their detrimental and damaging impact, professionally and personally, taking responsibility of the same accordingly; assurance that no further instances of such unprofessional attitudes and events will occur and of a preventative approach including a safe working environment where there is no place for intimidation, retaliation, victimisation and wrongdoing of the like; ensuring adherence to policies, guidelines and behaviours charters, values, respect and dignity at all times, individually and in collective settings; ensuring professional, fair, consistent and non-differential/no-unfavourable treatment; due recognition of good work, fair development and advancement opportunities…’ 64. On 1 December 2023, the claimant submitted an email to [NAME_108] stating that she attached her PDR form, asking for it to be uploaded to her personnel file. She had reinstated the sentence ‘[NAME_102]’s passion for [NAME_103] related work and her expertise as a [NAME_104] are appreciated by the team’, but deleted via tracked changes, so it showed in the manger’s comments with a line through it. She had, for the first time, completed the section for her comments. In that, she stated ‘The reviewer's remark about my supposed passion for [NAME_103] related work is not true. Since my qualifications and experience are undoubtedly more relevant to my professional performance than my national origin, if I understand the reviewer's comment correctly ("I highlighted your expertise as a lawyer qualified in an [NAME_103] jurisdiction in the context of a statement about your contributions to the team's [NAME_103] work. The intent was to celebrate your knowledge of [NAME_103] law (…)”), then it can easily be inferred that the reviewer's intentionality would match instead the following preferable wording from a professional standpoint: "[NAME_102]'s knowledge of [NAME_103] and her expertise as an experienced 'dual-qualified solicitor' (...)". November 2023 - [NAME_109] - Application 65. On 9 November 2023, the claimant applied to participate in the [NAME_109] ([NAME_110]), commencing from January 2024, for 6 months. The programme involved facilitated group discussions on Wednesdays from 2- 4pm, as well as additional catch up discussions. In her application, the claimant stated that [NAME_46] was her line manager. She did not discuss this with him prior to submitting her application. The application contained a statement as follows ‘Please note that your supporting manager must also complete a nomination

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 21 form. Submitting this form does not automatically send them a request to do this.’ The claimant did not ask [NAME_46] to complete a nomination form. On 1 December 2023, the claimant received an email confirming that her application had been accepted. The first sentence of the email confirmed acceptance. The second stated ‘Please ensure your nominating manager is aware that your application was successful and discuss with them how they will support you during and beyond the programme. They will receive further communication and direction from us in a few weeks.’ The claimant put the relevant dates in her diary, but did not discuss her attendance on the programme with [NAME_46]. Dec 2023-Jan 2024 - [NAME_52] becomes Claimant’s Line Manager 66. [NAME_52] commenced employment with [NAME_6] on 1 December 2023, as an [NAME_98]. He was appointed following interview in October 2023. He was not a solicitor. He became the claimant’s line manager on 11 December 2023. 67. [NAME_52] held a 121 meeting with the claimant on 17 January 2024. At the meeting, the claimant explained, from her perspective, the issues which had arisen in relation to the previous year’s PDR, and that she felt she had been treated badly and victimised in the process. [NAME_52] indicated that he understood that the matter had now been resolved, and there were two separate PDRs on file. Through discussion, [NAME_52] indicated that he understood, from [NAME_46], that concerns had recently been raised informally with the claimant, in relation to her conduct. The claimant indicated that she disagreed with [NAME_46] indicating that there were concerns with her performance, and that she felt intimidated by the threat of disciplinary action and the previous PDR process. [NAME_52] indicated that he could not comment on what had occurred in the past, but he would not permit any of his team members to be intimidated: he would take steps to address any issues of that nature. The claimant raised that she wished to be nominated for a Sustained Excellence Contribution Reward (SECR) that year. [NAME_52] informed her that he understood that [NAME_46] would not support the claimant’s application for that. She would therefore not be nominated for this by management.

68. The claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] following the 121 meeting, copied to [NAME_60] and ‘[NAME_108]’. She thanked him for the time he had dedicated that day. She did not raise any concerns regarding [NAME_52]’s conduct during the meeting in her email. Instead, she: narrated her position in relation to the previous PDR process; indicated that [NAME_46]’s indication, that formal disciplinary action could be taken, amounted to ‘yet a further instance of intimidation and victimisation’; and stated that she understood that she would not be nominated by management for the SECR, but believed the supporting evidence placed her performance over and above the normal and average expectations for her job grade, so would be proceeding with a self-nomination.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 22 69. During a call on 18 January 2024, the claimant mentioned to [NAME_52] that the situation with her PDR was causing her a lot of distress, and was deeply affecting her emotional state. [NAME_52] subsequently spoke to [NAME_82] regarding this and sent an email to the claimant that evening, recommending that she speak to her GP, and providing a link to [NAME_6]’s staff counselling and crisis support website. January-February 2024 - [NAME_109]

70. The claimant mentioned to [NAME_52] on Thursday 18 January 2024 that she would be attending the [NAME_110], commencing that month. [NAME_52] was not aware of this, and asked the claimant to send confirmation of that to him. The following day, she sent him the acceptance she had received on 1 December 2023, indicating that his ignorance of this must be due to a handover issue from her previous manager. [NAME_52] checked with [NAME_46], who was the claimant’s previous manager. [NAME_46] was extremely surprised to hear that the claimant would be attending the [NAME_110]. It was a matter which he required to be consulted on, and required to approve, prior to an application being submitted, as it involves a significant time commitment, which would have a significant impact on resourcing in an already overstretched team. 71. [NAME_52] responded to the claimant the following day, indicating that it did not appear that her application had been approved by her previous manager. He stated ‘Please be aware that there are questions around the approval/nomination for the course and the Head of Contracts might ask for your participation in the course to be withdrawn. If you have any documents/emails regarding the approval/nomination for your participation in the course, it will be helpful if you can share them with me.’ She responded, later that day, indicating that she did not have any documents confirming that her nomination was supported, but agreed that she probably stated that [NAME_46] was her nominating manager in her application form. [NAME_52] forwarded her email to [NAME_46]. [NAME_46] responded to the claimant and [NAME_52], at 09:46 on Monday 22 January 2024, stating that, as far as he was aware, he had not acted as ‘nominating manager’, and he had not had any discussions with the claimant regarding her participation/attendance on the programme. He stated that he first became aware of this the previous Thursday, that he was looking into it and would discuss it further with the claimant later that week.

72. On 25 January 2024, at 09:00, [NAME_46] sent a meeting invite to the claimant, headed ‘[NAME_109]’ for the following day at 16:00. The claimant replied at 09:26 declining the invite, but without providing any reason as to why she could not attend. He responded asking why she could not attend the meeting. He stated that he could meet her at 4pm that day instead, which he stated appeared, from her diary, to be free. The claimant responded and indicated that she was not feeling very well. He asked if she was taking sick

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 23 leave and stated that, if not, it was reasonable to ask her to attend a meeting. She responded stating that she was working, but was engaged on urgent files – highlighting that she had 22 active files, many of which required urgent, or very urgent, action. She stated that she was ‘confused’ about his request to meet, and questioned how it would be a good use of time ‘given the current state of matters’. She indicated that if he had any instructions for her, he should provide them to her by email. She did not accept the meeting invite for the meeting that day.

73. At 11:14 that day, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] and [NAME_82]. She highlighted that [NAME_46] had asked to meet with her, but stated that it was ‘objectively not urgent’ that he do so. She stated that she was ‘somewhat impacted’ by [NAME_46]’s hasty request to speak with her about non-operational matters, that this was disruptive and was causing her anxiety. She stated that ‘it might seem not necessarily reasonable to me to insist on having that conversation alone with him now in the context of prolonged issue currently escalated.’ She provided a copy of the response she had sent to [NAME_46]. She ended by stating ‘Also, I am feeling not well and I expect a healthcare call tomorrow midday. I am making all efforts to avoid to have to call in sick but I am feeling poorly.’ 74. At 16.01 that day, [NAME_46] sent an email to the claimant stating that, despite reasonable requests, and despite the fact that she had confirmed that she was working, she was unwilling to meet him that day or the next. He instructed her to withdraw from the [NAME_110], stating that she had not been nominated for the programme, had not discussed it with him at any point and, given resourcing issues, it was not approved. He indicated that he had wanted to discuss this with her in person, and remained open to doing so, but required to inform her of this in the absence of a meeting, as soon as possible, as it would impact those running the programme. He indicated that he would now inform them of this.

75. The claimant responded, at 16:16 stating that his withdrawal of approval, with retrospective effect, was not reasonable. [NAME_46] responded stating that he had made his position clear, and would discuss with HR ‘how we proceed in light of this situation and the matters addressed with you last year.’ 76. The claimant responded at 18:18, with a lengthy email, which she copied to [NAME_82]. She referred back to [NAME_46]’s email to her dated 1 November 2023, stating that the content of this was inaccurate and contained ‘remarks and arbitrary suggestions which describe an unjustified ad-hominem attack to my character in terms of ethics and integrity; unwarranted, arbitrary and vague but seriously offensive attributions which I feel degrading and intimidatory and which I can't accept.’ She set out her position in relation to the meeting held on 16 October 2023, and the PDR process. She stated that she believed ‘that what has been happening is indefensible and untenable’, that she had had three line

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 24 managers throughout the current year and that all colleagues have ‘a legitimate expectation of being treated with dignity and respect, and fairly.’ 77. On 26 January 2024, [NAME_46] sent a response to the claimant stating that he disagreed with the accuracy of her email. He raised concerns in relation to the approach she was taking, stating he found it to be extremely unprofessional, that it was affecting business operations and services and could not continue. He stated that ‘in light of recent issues coming to light, I am not of the view that matters have improved sufficiently since October for me to close that informal part of the disciplinary process.

Accordingly, I will reflect on matters further and consider how best to proceed.’ 78. On 1 February 2024, the claimant sent an email to two organisers of the [NAME_110] stating ‘Sorry to ask, I was trying to communicate now with my peers in the programme but I can’t find the access in Teams. Could you please help me with this?’ A few hours later, she forwarded that email to one of the same recipients, and two additional recipients, with a further email stating that she had been instructed by a senior manager to withdraw from the programme with immediate effect, but she had responded that ‘respectfully, I did not agree that was reasonable on unclear bases and without my agreement’. She stated [NAME_82] had confirmed by phone that she had been excluded from the programme, but asked them to ‘advise on any further steps I can take to get this rectified, if any?’. She was informed by one of the recipients, who copied [NAME_46] into the email trail when she did so, that [NAME_46] had notified them that attendance on the programme for this intake was not discussed or supported, that it was a requirement of the programme that individuals have the support of their line manager to attend, and that this would be required to reinstate her into the programme.

79. The claimant responded to all recipients, but also now copying in [NAME_52] and [NAME_82]. In her response, she stated that she had had 3 line managers in the course of the current year and her current manager, [NAME_52], ‘has been supportive of my attendance to the programme so far.’ 80. [NAME_52] responded to all, later that day, but started his email with ‘Hi [NAME_102]’. He highlighted that he had taken over as her line manager on 11 December 2023, and, when she mentioned her attendance on the programme, he assumed it had already been approved by her previous line manager. He attached his email of 19 January 2024, stating that he sent his to her as soon as he discovered that there were questions around approval/support for her attendance on the programme, and understood that the [NAME_94] ([NAME_46]) had subsequently instructed her to withdraw from the programme. He stated he did not intend to override that decision.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 25 81. The claimant responded to [NAME_52] that evening. Within her email she stated ‘I don’t feel that the terms and tone of your response is as thoughtful as it could have been, and it causes me offence…I appreciate that you report to [[NAME_46]], however, within due respect to you as a line manager and colleague, I feel that you have not made appropriate judgment re the unjustly adverse impact of your email.’ February 2024 – Work floor Interaction/[NAME_110]

82. On 13 February 2024, [NAME_52] interacted with the claimant in relation to a piece of work she had been engaged with, which was not progressing as it should be and which had been escalated to him, as her line manager, by a third party. The claimant felt that a meeting with the legal team from another university was required, but [NAME_52] felt that may be difficult to arrange, and may not be necessary. He provided her with some draft wording, for her to send on to the other University, which would remove the requirement for a meeting, asking her to review and respond with any comments that day, if possible. She responded stating that she would address this as soon as she could, but it was unlikely that she would be able to do so that day.

83. On the morning of 14 February 2024, [NAME_52] approached the claimant on the work floor regarding the matter he had emailed her about the previous day. He indicated that the matter required to be resolved that day, given the concerns which had been raised with him about the progress of the matter. The claimant maintained that she wanted to arrange a meeting. He indicated that she could continue to try and arrange that, but he wanted to be clear that, if she had not been able to secure a meeting by 3pm that day, she send the email he had drafted and forwarded to her the previous day, so that progress could be made. The claimant would not commit to this, so he reiterated his position.

84. Following their discussion the claimant sent an email stating that she would try to fully resolve the matter by 3pm. [NAME_52] responded stating that he was not suggesting that the matter should be fully resolved by 3pm, simply that if she had not been able to secure a meeting by then, she should send the email. He reiterated that he felt securing a meeting with the legal team at the other university would be difficult, and the email would remove the requirement for any such meeting. The claimant responded confirming she would do so and thanked him for working together with her on the matter.

85. During a discussion between the claimant and [NAME_52] on 15 February 2024, the claimant raised the [NAME_110]. She maintained that she was still enrolled in the programme and therefore simply needed his approval to continue attending, which she hoped to do when the sessions resumed on 28 February 2024. [NAME_52] indicated that he would not override [NAME_46]’s decision, but would pass on her view re enrolment/attendance, and that she still wished to be reinstated to the programme, to [NAME_46]. The discussion turned to her wellbeing and [NAME_52] indicated

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 26 that if she needed time off, she could discuss that with her GP. The claimant responded stating that she just needed the unacceptable behaviour to stop. March 2024 86. On 4 March 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_52] stating that it had come to her attention that [COMPANY_100] had circulated details of a training session later that month. She noted that he was attending, and asked why he had not circulated the invite to her. [NAME_52] was unaware the claimant had not received the invite directly from [COMPANY_100]. He responded, on 6 March 2024, stating that the claimant could take his spot on the training and he would forward her the invite. She responded 5 minutes later, coping her email to [NAME_60], stating that she now had the invite directly from [COMPANY_100]. She stated that ‘these difficulties add on to my concerns around a pattern of treatment and communication falling short of standards.’ 87. On 6 March 2024, the claimant overheard [NAME_46] stating that it was odd that the claimant did not want to leave [NAME_6], or words to that effect.

88. On 7 March 2024, the claimant attended a meeting with [NAME_56]. The claimant was accompanied by her trade union representative. [NAME_60] was also present. [NAME_56] was aware that a number of issues had arisen in the workplace, and that an impasse had been reached. She wished to see if she could resolve, or at least offer a different perspective, as she had not been involved to date. During the meeting, three principal issues were discussed: the PDR process, the objectives set by [NAME_45] and those proposed by the claimant, and the [NAME_110].

89. On 12 March 2024, [NAME_56] sent an email to the claimant, copied to the claimant’s trade union representative. In her email she set out that she had looked into a number of matters following their meeting. These related back to the PDR process, the objectives set by [NAME_45] and those proposed by the claimant and the [NAME_110]. [NAME_56] set out her conclusions regarding the first two points and stated, regarding the third, that the claimant should not have enrolled in the [NAME_110] without discussion and prior agreement with her line manager. She stated that she could not agree that the claimant be reinstated into the programme in the circumstances, that she would inform the learning and development team of this, and that the claimant should not attend any further [NAME_110] sessions. [NAME_56] stated that, if the claimant remained unhappy, she could raise a formal grievance. The claimant responded the following day, with a lengthy email (extending to over 3 pages when printed), setting out why she disagreed with [NAME_56]’s conclusions. She made no reference to harassment, or any facts which could be construed as constituting harassment, in her email.

90. At 13:02 on 18 March 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_52] stating that she was, that day, submitting an expression of interest to join the [NAME_111] for

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 27 the working group around [NAME_112]. [NAME_52] responded stating that ‘This is a very late notice. It would have been great if you emailed me much earlier to initiate this conversation.’ He asked what the required time commitment was. The claimant replied that her understanding was that the time commitment was ‘around a day a month’. [NAME_52] responded at 16:54 stating ‘If I understand you correctly, the required time commitment is 7 hours a month? In the light of the workloads we are dealing with, the level of urgency around most files we are working on and the other training courses you might wish to participate in along the way, I’m concerned that you are looking to commit 7 hours a month for the rest of the year towards one group/activity.’ He sent a further email at 17:06, stating that ‘I think you should hold off committing this amount of time to this activity and find out from the convenors if there are other ways you could participate with much less time commitments. As it is the time required is too high, unless I have misunderstood what you mean by 1 day a month.’ 91. The claimant had a 121 with [NAME_52] on 20 March 2024. It was a difficult discussion. The claimant remained unhappy at decisions regarding [NAME_110] and [NAME_111] for the working group around [NAME_112]. [NAME_52] tried to discuss work issues, but the claimant interrupted him and talked over him, stating at one point that he should leave her to do work the way she wanted to do it. He asked her about numerous private appointments showing in her calendar, during her working hours. He asked her what these related to, but she would not provide a clear answer. During the discussion, when [NAME_52] tried to discuss a contract the claimant had been working on, the claimant indicated that she would be emailing HR in relation to that. [NAME_52] indicated that this was a discussion regarding a work matter, which it was appropriate for him, as the claimant’s line manager, to discuss with her and there was no need for her to contact HR in relation to this. He found this intimidating. Towards the end of the meeting, the claimant mentioned, in passing, that she would be attending training the following Tuesday, but would not clarify, when [NAME_52] asked, what this related to. Later that day, [NAME_52] discovered that the training the claimant indicated that she was attending the following week was in fact the [NAME_110]. He felt that the claimant was acting in an underhand manner by mentioning this, in passing, to him, and that this was an attempt to get tacit approval from him, despite having been instructed, by [NAME_46] and [NAME_56], to withdraw from the programme.

92. On 20 March 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_52], copying in [NAME_60]. The subject of the email was ‘121 today’. She stated in her email, ‘I have also let you know that I feel very uncomfortable with the generally dismissive and, at times, marginalising approach you keep taking, on occasions in emails related to files or otherwise, and verbally, included unfair unsubstantiated criticism formulated in a generic way which contrasts with my level and standards of performance,

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 28 and personal judgment; you have actually denied examples of this you are actually aware of, and I have offered my availability to put them in writing with referrals to the actual information on files - which would mean having to waste my time and I would be inclined to avoid this unless it is really necessary. It is known that I have raised serious concerns you are aware of (as serious as harassment and bullying) and I feel that the issues I have been suffering unavoidably seem to contribute to set the tone here.’ She stated ‘I would like to let you know that I am not prepared to hold these [NAME_105] in the current climate for many reasons including health and wellbeing, and I kindly ask you, while a complete change of direction is not effected here, to please be mindful of this.’ 93. [NAME_60] responded to the claimant stating he had explained to her, on several occasions, how she may address any perceived concerns relating to bullying and harassment via the grievance procedure. He stated that [NAME_6] takes these allegations very seriously. He highlighted however that despite being prompted to provide specifics of concerns, for example during the meeting on 7 March 2024, the claimant had not done so.

94. On 22 March 2024, at 12:45, [NAME_52] emailed the claimant, coping in [NAME_46], stating that he noted that she had [NAME_110] appointments in her diary, some of which are recurring and including one for that afternoon. He referred to the meeting with [NAME_56] on 7 March 2024, and the subsequent instruction from [NAME_56]. He stated that she should not attend any [NAME_110] sessions and failure to follow that reasonable instruction would lead to action being taken. He stated that she should remove the [NAME_110] appointments from her diary.

95. The claimant responded to [NAME_52] at 13:11 on 22 March 2024, copying in [NAME_46], [NAME_60] and [NAME_85]. She stated that she would not take part in the [NAME_110] sessions. She stated that ‘any instructions to withdraw intimated to me were unreasonable instructions’ and set out, at length, why she considered that to be the case. She concluded by stating ‘This adds on to the broader and pervading concerns I have had to report so far in the prolonged situation and treatment I am being subjected to, including harassment and bullying, and repeated threats of unfounded and unwarranted disciplinary action.’ 96. On 25 March 2024 at 10:52, [NAME_60] sent an email to the claimant stating that ‘I wrote to you separately last week to reiterate the process for raising a formal grievance in relation to the allegations you report around bullying and harassment. You have now referenced bullying and harassment in several communications you have sent to a wide audience but have not yet expanded on the specifics or elaborated on the basis for these serious allegations, despite being given a fair opportunity to do so… the University views such allegations as serious in nature and therefore, I, along with others, have suggested you may wish to follow the next step in our grievance process, which would be the formal stage…Given we have now written to you on a few

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 29 occasions to confirm the 'informal' stage of dealing with your complaint is now considered 'concluded', can you please take the time to carefully consider whether you wish to proceed to the next stage of our grievance process.’ He indicated that an independent and impartial manager would be appointed to investigate any such grievance, but if she chose not to proceed with a grievance, they would not expect to discuss matters further with her.

97. At 15:38 the claimant sent a lengthy email to [NAME_60] and [NAME_52], copied to [NAME_46] and [NAME_85], setting out, again, her position regarding the instructions to withdraw from the [NAME_110] and her concerns regarding unfair previous treatment. She stated ‘My understanding is that, irrespective of when, or whether or not, I formalise and/ or actively embark, through the formal stage of the grievance process, on expanding further on everything I have been reporting for months in ample detail, there is now undeniably sufficient indication, from initial fact-finding, which supports the due exercise of responsibilities and duties to do all it can be done to stop and prevent these relentless and harmful behaviours happening further, for instance and notably on the basis of zero tolerance of bullying, harassment and discrimination’.

98. At 17:50 that day, the claimant sent a further lengthy email to [NAME_60], referring back to meetings he attended on 19 October 2023 and 7 March 2024. She stated ‘I am positive to the best of my knowledge I am being harassed, discriminated against, bullied, feel abused and unfairly treated…through a pervading, prolonged, deliberate and serious pattern and commitment to such course of action. Its impact is undeniably, and understandably, huge on a number of levels. I appreciate, and do respect, the signposting and your role, nonetheless believe that HR, and even senior leaders, have had for long/can access sufficient evidence, as well as indicative evidence, presented in the initial fact-finding to make appropriate judgment re. investigating and taking all appropriate action possible on the basis of the law, zero tolerance of bullying, harassment and discrimination and any relevant disciplinary rules as appropriate, and to reasonably prevent any further instances of it.’ 99. On 28 March 2024, at 09:22, [NAME_46] responded to the email sent by the claimant on 25 March 2024. He stated that he disagreed with the assertions made in her email. He referred to his email of 1 November 2023 and the concerns he raised about her behaviours in that. He stated that he was concerned about the negative impact of her behaviours on the team, their reputation and their ability to deliver professional services. He highlighted his concerns at the claimant continuing ‘to make what seeks like ad hoc references to ‘bullying, harassment and discrimination’, and other allegations despite at no point specifying the detail of any particular allegation nor any evidence’ and to copy those emails to various colleagues. He stated that her communications lacked specificity and were potentially misleading and, in his opinion damaging to the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 30 those directly and indirectly referred to. He stated ‘I am leading a team with a significant and challenging remit and the tone and substance of your communications is not only disappointing, it falls significantly short of the standard I would expect from a colleague or indeed a solicitor. Further, it is critical that such behaviours do not continue to distract from our ability to deliver our professional services. Both myself and colleagues have advised you how to proceed with a formal grievance, should you choose to do so. This was referred to in my email to you dated 1 November 2023 and you have subsequently been advised in similar terms…I have spent significant time investigating and discussing the issues you have raised. In light of the various clarifications provided to you re your options I will not be discussing this further with you.’ 100. On 28 March 2024, at 11:18, the claimant emailed [NAME_46], copying in [NAME_52] and [NAME_60]. The email was headed ‘Grievance process and duty of care’. In her email she set out that she disagreed with [NAME_46]’s position. Within her lengthy email, she included the following ‘Indeed, this approach of yours is in fact relentless and escalating since I had to speak up, particularly from September in regards with the refusal to adhere to the University annual-review policy and process to my detriment; a pattern of behaviours, series of events and commitment to what I have decidedly pointed at on numerous occasions as inappropriate, unacceptable, unreasonable, unprofessional and adverse behaviours, potentially contrary to law, University policy, behaviours charters and standards for Solicitors…I am of the view that we are all worthy to be heard, respected, included in consistent communication and treatment aligned with standards and integrity; and matters to be considered on their merits on such bases, where the zero tolerance of bullying, harassment and discrimination applies…As reported on numerous occasions now from my perspective, all of this is, clearly, definitely susceptible to be factually expanded on, from the initial fact-finding, as required in being appropriately heard by the relevant instances, free from intimidation, retaliation, such as threat of unfounded and unwarranted disciplinary action, and/or any of the mentioned above. Within all due respect to your authority I had previously appealed to, I for one am positive you are fully aware of my strenuous attempts to resolve matters in good faith, and on the basis of the behaviours charter, respect and inclusiveness as a guiding principle, despite which you have invariably and relentlessly demonstrated your unwillingness to cooperate, while clearly amplifying and intensifying such approach (including, but not limited to, top- down), which undeniably results in a prolonged and pervading damaging impact to myself, as well as unhealthy and unsafe working environment festering, plus, in my humble view, further adverse impact to our service, our team and the business as well. Again within all due respect to your position, I do not wish or expect any further exposure to conversations alone with you around this, or what you refer to as you "investigating" around these matters

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 31 for obvious reasons; from experience I am of the view that it is not feasible, also considering the time and focus you have actually demonstrated to inflexibly persist in such concerning approach, and that they would effect further undue distraction and harm but also that I've had to raise concerns about the treatment I have been subjected to. If I may, from my humble perspective I would suggest reflection is necessary.’ 101. On 29 March 2024 at 11:44, [NAME_52] sent an email to the claimant, in response to her email of 20 March 2024. He set out in his email a number of concerns, regarding: inaccuracies and misrepresentations in the claimant’s email, as well as previous emails; her conduct during their 121 on 20 March 2024, which he stated he found to be intimidatory (pointing at him with her pen and finger during the meeting, threats to contact HR in relation to his conduct in discussing work related matters) and disrespectful (asking, in a condescending manner if he knows what feedback is, interrupting him and stating that he should leave her to do the work the way she wants to do it); disrespectful conduct in copying others into emails re management issues, and stating to him during their 121. He stated (in the second sentence, paraphrasing an earlier part of his email where he stated essentially the same thing) ‘I have treated you with respect, fairness and dignity throughout our interactions on these matters but I do not feel you have done the same. When you mentioned that you were under a lot of stress and needed to look after your mental health, I made an effort of getting in touch with Head of HR and shared her recommendations with you…I tried to limit my responses to your emails as much as I could, taking your stated mental strain into consideration, which has been very difficult in the light of the inaccuracies contained in most of the emails…you find a way to bring the training ([NAME_109] in particular), PDR and other matters into our 1-to-1 meetings and follow up emails you send afterwards, even if you have indicated that they are affecting your mental health.’ 102. At 12:00 that day the claimant forwarded [NAME_52]’s email to [NAME_60] and [NAME_85]. She stated ‘I have just received the below and have not read it yet, however I refer to my recent emails dated on Thu 28/03/2024 11:08 (Grievance process and duty of care) and on 25 March 2024 17:50. I wonder whether you might be able to please help definitely bring these continued misleading, overwhelming and persistently harassing email contacts and behaviours to a stop with immediate effect, please, or advise who might?’ 103. At 16:37 that day, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_6]’s Equality Diversity and Inclusion Team, headed ‘Zero tolerance stance and policy on bullying, harassment and discrimination’. She stated ‘I am contacting you in relation to a serious, prolonged, pervading, persistent and escalating issue as referenced in the subject, although it is non-exhaustive and intends to serve as indicative

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 32 summary for the purposes of continuing to try a resolution in good faith. I have made HR aware and I understand they… have had for long (since September) and/or can access evidence as well as indicative evidence as relevant to making appropriate judgement and decisions for appropriate resolution, with or without the cooperation of the persons involved. I keep being signposted to the formal stage of the grievance process while the cycle of occurrences and instances of this (and their harmful impact on me and on the business) overwhelmingly persist in spite of my requests to HR (latest one so far was today), however there seems to be no ownership of the options under the zero tolerance stance and policy on bullying, harassment and discrimination. I feel I am not being heard. My request does not require, I think, any meeting with yourselves. My hopes are that you can support me in seeking effective exercise of the University duty of care, including clear action in terms of investigation/action and, crucially, protection of safety and wellbeing for everyone's interest…Could you please help in any way?’. 104. On 30 March 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_60]. Within her email she stated ‘I thought it relevant to let you know that, on 6th March 2024, a colleague of mine confided in me that she had brought herself to raise her own concerns on 15th February 2024 after she had heard from others about an incident arising from an inappropriate verbal interaction I had to respond to in the work floor on 14th February 2024, witnessed by them.’ This statement was repeated (almost verbatim) during a meeting with [NAME_71] on 12 June 2024. Sustained Excellence Contribution Reward – Application – March 2024 105. Despite what she was informed at the meeting on 17 January 2024 (see paragraph 67), the claimant repeatedly requested that [NAME_52] support her application for a SECR. He repeatedly declined to do so, on the basis that he was not in a position to assess her past contribution. He deferred to [NAME_46] in relation to that. [NAME_46] confirmed his decision, that he would not nominate the claimant for this. The claimant repeatedly contacted [NAME_56] to ascertain when the application process would open, and proceeded with self-nomination, when it did. On 28 March 2024 [NAME_56] informed the claimant that the senior leadership team had conducted a sift of all of the applications and determined that hers did not meet the criteria to be supported to the next stage, as her application demonstrated performance commensurate with her role, not sustained excellence. She was asked if she wished to proceed to the next stage, which was consideration by the panel, without a supporting statement from the senior leadership team. She confirmed that she did. Her application was subsequently considered by the panel, but was unsuccessful.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 33 April 2024 106. On 2 April 2024 at 17:49, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] stating that in her judgment it was appropriate to agree that [NAME_105] be suspended. 107. [NAME_52] responded, on 4 April 2024, stating that he was disappointed she had requested that [NAME_105] were suspended and he could not agree to that, as [NAME_105] were required with line managers and that is how the team operates. In response to some of the other comments in the claimant’s email of 2 April 2024, he stated ‘I'm also alarmed by your comment stating that "... please cease with immediate effect engaging and/or enabling the flagged and related type of communications and behaviours" which is actually again distorting the facts. I'm also extremely concerned by your serious assertion that "...as a necessity that protection of my safety and wellbeing is now prioritised....". These statements amount to serious allegations and you have not provided any evidence to support them either now or previously despite being advised of the proper channel to do so. As I have intimated, your conduct continues to be unacceptable. It is disruptive and is damaging working relationships. You have been informed of our concerns with this type of conduct and we are now addressing this as a serious issue.’ 108. On 4 April 2024 at 15:50 (resent on 5 April 2024 at 09:50, with corrections), the claimant forwarded [NAME_114] email to [NAME_60]. In her cover email she stated that she deemed it to be a ‘persistently relentless harassing email…potentially defamatory…serious and unacceptable’. She set out a detailed account of what she stated occurred at her 121 with [NAME_52] on 20 March 2024. She did not state, within that detailed account, that she considered [NAME_52]’s conduct was because of, or related to, her sex. 109. On 4 April 2024 at 17:10 the claimant responded to [NAME_52], stating that his email of 29 March 2024 was defamatory to her, and she found his email of 4 April 2024 denigrating. She stated ‘As I have requested on numerous occasions so far, please do break the cycle and accede to my requests to cease this type of communications and what I deem unacceptable conduct which is harmful, disruptive, unhealthy and persistently abusive to me. I will uphold my duty to take reasonable care of my health and safety at work including through reasonable requests. This is not justifiable and can't continue. Please stop this, allow me to focus on my professional performance and please be mindful of the behaviours charter.’ 110. In an exchange of emails on 17 & 18 April 2024, [NAME_52] indicated that the claimant had not been at her desk from 10-11am on 17 April 2024, her workspace was totally empty with nothing to indicate that she was still in the building and her outlook calendar showed a ‘Private Appointment’. He indicated that he had raised concerns with her previously regarding her use of private appointments

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 34 in her calendar and stated that one of the concerns was that, if there was an emergency evacuation, he would not know if she was in the building or not. The claimant stated, at 12:15 on 17 April 2024, that ‘I am at work and can't quite understand your motivation to send me the below but it sounds quite overbearing and it makes me uncomfortable since, crucially, I believe you are aware that the meeting at 10 had been cancelled, at least I received that notification.’ March-May 2024 - Annual Leave Requests 111. On Friday 8 March 2024, [NAME_52] sent an email to the claimant stating that he had received her, short notice, request to take annual leave on 11 & 14 March. It was noted that, with annual leave already approved, she would be out of the office for the whole of the following week. He asked what her workload looked like and if there were any matters requiring urgent attention, so he could consider the request. She responded stating that she would work remotely instead, so was cancelling the requests. 112. On 22 March 2024, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] stating that she was providing a ‘heads-up’ in relation to her annual leave in July. She stated that ‘if that’s ok I will have to work remotely from the travel destination on certain days’ but would ‘follow up as the arrangements take shape’. [NAME_52] responded stating that he was unsure what she was requesting, and that it would be helpful if she could illustrate which additional days (if any) she was proposing to take as annual leave, and how many days she would be working remotely. She responded stating that she would update as soon as she was in a position to advise on her exact requirements. She did not do so. 113. On 10 May 2024, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] stating that she had requested one day’s annual leave in August a few weeks before, but he had not yet responded. She stated ‘I wonder if there is any issue e.g. you received it on your side?’ May 2024 - [NAME_112] Group 114. On 1 May 2024, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_46], stating that she had been invited to collaborate with the legislation workstream of the [NAME_112] Group over the course of the next year. She made reference to contacting [NAME_52] in relation to this on 18 March 2024 (see paragraph 90 above). She indicated that she intended to participate in that work. 115. [NAME_46] responded to the claimant’s email on 2 May 2024, at 17:33. He stated that [NAME_52] had previously confirmed that ‘due to a variety of reasons, and which have been intimated to you on a number of occasions, that we cannot support your participation in this particular working group at this particular time.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 35 Subsequently, I understand that your line manager had a further conversation with you re. the time commitment involved here to enable them to potentially consider further. You offered to provide this information. However, I understand that no further detailed information re. this was provided by you.

Accordingly, your line manager was unable to consider further and their decision remains unchanged. As has been explained to you, this is primarily due to operational considerations within the team. In light of the above, and while it is unclear from your email as to what you wish me to do, it strikes me that your line manager has made the position and the rationale re. their decision clear.

Accordingly, and for the reasons your line manager has explained to you, this activity, and the associated time attached to it, is not approved... It has also been brought to my attention that you have a high volume of files in your portfolio which have yet to commence. Given that you have stated that you have limited capacity it is reasonable that you focus on your core role rather than activities not directly related to your role.’ He also raised concerns regarding the claimant not sending her email to [NAME_52], and instead copying her email to him to senior HR colleagues. 116. At 23:02 that day, the claimant sent a lengthy email to [NAME_46] (2 pages when printed), copied to [NAME_60] and [NAME_85]. She set out why she disagreed with his position that she should not be permitted to participate in the work stream and stated ‘By assessing matters contextually, there are reasonable grounds to believe these responses are not primarily on business reasons but rather unfair, and the tone invariably adversarial for some reason…the lack of safe and harmonious environment is what has led me to make HR aware primarily on that basis. I am not receiving normal treatment, and it dates back to the moment I had to speak up in 2023, and counting. Namely, with all due respect I can't accept your renewed subjective accusations and unfair criticism which does not correspond at all with my hard work and long demonstrated performance standards, which as a matter of fact include work typically above my job grade. Your remarks are unreasonably demeaning - they follow the pattern of reaction exemplified on your side on 19th October last year.’ She stated that she should be supported ‘someone with appropriate depth of knowledge and experience’ and suggested that [NAME_74], solicitor and [NAME_98], should be considered as ‘Head of team’, in the event that [NAME_74] was agreeable to doing so. 117. On 3 May 2024, the claimant submitted a complaint to [NAME_56], copied to [NAME_60] and [NAME_85], regarding the refusal to permit her to participate in the legislation workstream of the [NAME_112] Group. She set out why she believed her request was reasonable, stating that she had ‘received a hard line negative, even unreasonably hostile response’. [NAME_56] responded, following her return from annual leave, stating that she had investigated and understood that it was not possible for the claimant to attend, at present, due to current business priorities, as communicated to her.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 36 118. The claimant, in turn, responded on 9 May 2024, at 14:50. She acknowledged the decision and stated that since their meeting on 7 March 2024 she had ‘continued to be subjected to further instances of the type of misconduct I have been reporting so far.’ She reiterated her request that [NAME_74] be considered for the role of ‘Head of team’, if she was agreeable to doing so. May 2024 – Data Protection Issues 119. On 2 May 2024, a Portfolio Manager sent the claimant emails in relation to a particular piece of work. The Portfolio Manager had sent an updated Data Sharing Agreement to the claimant in February 2024, asking for her to provide input on the latest comments, or a version for signature. Despite a number of chasers, the claimant had not yet provided any substantive response, or a version for signature. The Portfolio Manager indicated that the work was now urgent, the delay was causing significant problems and parties were now ‘highly frustrated in a situation which has been dragging on for 14 months and does not seem to be solutions orientated.’ The claimant responded on 2 May 2024, at 11.11, copying in [NAME_46]. Within the body of her email she stated ‘It takes a consistent and thorough approach to meet our responsibilities, from our perspective, in such context. And legal and compliance considerations are indeed mandatory in my remit’. On 8 May 2024, the Portfolio Manager raised concerns directly with [NAME_46]. She forwarded an email the claimant had sent the day before, stating that this had ‘aggravated further collaborative challenges.’ She went on to state ‘The case has been ongoing for 14 months and seems no closer to any positive outcome. The PI, the partner and the [COMPANY_115] have all lost confidence in [the claimant] being able to work collaboratively and to satisfactorily conclude the case within the timescales needed. The approach to contracting has resulted in reputational damage and is now impacting on further collaborations with the partner who is considering key methodological and budget changes to avoid any engagements in data sharing with [NAME_1]. This decision will have significant impact on the body of work as well as the ongoing partnership.’ 120. The claimant mentioned the file and its background in the team meeting held on 15 May 2024. 121. On 27 May 2024, the Head of [COMPANY_115] raised concerns with [NAME_46] regarding delays in relation to the matter set out in paragraph 119 above. The following morning, [NAME_46] raised with the claimant that the Head of [COMPANY_115], and colleagues, had raised concerns with him about the approach being taken by her. He asked that she provide a summary of the background and detail and specific outstanding issues that required to be addressed. He indicated that [NAME_52] would support her in that, and the [COMPANY_115] required the matter to be concluded that week, if possible. In an email at 10:43, she stated, in relation to one aspect of the file, that ‘This is a collaboration agreement with a Data schedule fully

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 37 signed.’ In an email at 14:18, she stated that she was ‘somewhat confused and distressed’ by his approach. She asked for specifics as to the concerns. May 2024 – Instigation of Disciplinary Investigation/Other 122. On 2 May 2024 at 08:34, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] in relation to a work matter. She stated ‘You will recall various previous communications around the above file…some of which appear to keep generating some confusion which I think could have been easily avoided…It is not normal process that I am asked to field intake queries and requests, as this is within the [NAME_96]' and not [NAME_97] remit… Of course, as you are aware and for the avoidance of doubt, I am happy to step in as required in support of the team and of our colleagues, but it is important to bear in mind that workflow and communication needs to follow an orderly route per process, for the sake of our service and for the benefit of all.’ 123. On 14 May 2024, the claimant was informed, by letter from [NAME_46], that [NAME_6] would be undertaking a formal investigation into her conduct from May 2023 to date. He referred back to his letter of 1 November 2023, summarising the areas he had highlighted as requiring improvement, and his email of 26 January 2024. He indicated that there had been no improvement in behaviours, so a formal investigation would be conducted into 7 specified areas. [NAME_46] stated, that an independent manager would be appointed to conduct the investigation, and she would be notified of who that would be in due course. The 7 allegations listed were as follows: 123.1. The manner in which you conducted yourself during The Professional Development Review 2023, you refusal to follow reasonable management instructions and the negative impact that had on your line manager and other senior colleagues, and the work of the team. Despite repeated requests you failed to comply with such reasonable instructions during this process. 123.2. Your refusal to follow reasonable instructions from various line managers and other senior colleagues around a range of matters on a continued basis. On occasions acting aggressively and intimidating/disrespectful manner. This has been communicated to you separately on or around 28 March 2024. 123.3. Acting disrespectfully towards your line manager and other senior managers both in person and in writing, copying other senior colleagues to correspondence inappropriately, potentially undermining their integrity, reputation and role, and causing significant distress. 123.4. Your unauthorised engagement with the [NAME_109] and subsequent communications to senior colleagues across the University surrounding this.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 38 123.5. Your sending of emails containing inaccuracies, omissions and misrepresentations and on occasion copying senior colleagues across the University where it was not appropriate to do so and therefore damaging the reputation of the team. 123.6. Your sustained written attacks where you have made numerous unsubstantiated, damaging and vexatious allegations about your line managers and other senior colleagues. Despite being asked on a number of occasions to refrain from doing so or to provide evidence for such allegations you have failed to do so. 123.7. Your behaviour and communications to academic members of staff. For example, and as previously intimated to you, a colleague escalated a matter whereby you were described as being 'very rude'. 124. In the cover email, attaching the letter dated 14 May 2024, [NAME_46] stated ‘We recognise that this may be a difficult time for you so would draw attention to the wellbeing support and counselling options available’, which he then did in his email. 125. A team meeting was held on 15 May 2024. This was attended by everyone who works in [NAME_93] (12-14 people), other than [NAME_46]. During the meeting [NAME_52] asked a question regarding how files are captured on [NAME_6]’s electronic system and the detail of what gets captured, particularly why advisory queries, where no contract is being negotiated, would be closed stating ‘fully signed’, rather than ‘completed’. He asked this as he was looking at ways he could improve reporting. In the course of discussion regarding that, the claimant stated that it had been done that way for years. [NAME_52] felt that she did so in an abrupt manner, implying that he should not have asked the question in the first place. He stated that it may have been done that way for years, but improvements could still be considered, so she did not need to say that. 126. On 16 May 2024, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52], stating that he had reacted abruptly in the meeting and that she had calmly responded to that, saying that it does not mean it can’t be changed. She stated that the way he reacted made her feel ‘somewhat uncomfortable’ and that his ‘defensive reaction was unnecessary’. [NAME_52] responded stating that he felt the claimant’s email contained ‘inaccuracies and misrepresentations of what transpired at the meeting’. He set out his position as to what transpired, namely that the claimant had been abrupt, not him. The claimant responded, restating her position and stating ‘I was not going to send the email as I would consider this a minor thing if it was in fact a one off, but it is not.’ 127. On 20 May 2024, [NAME_52] sent an email to the claimant asking her what her workload looked like and whether she had capacity to take on more files. The

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 39 claimant responded, at 17:19 claimant noting that [NAME_52] had already made an urgent allocation of work to her. She referred to her not being permitted to participate in the legislation workstream of the [NAME_112] Group, stating that his comments regarding this had been ‘snide and disrespectful’. She concluded by stating ‘the theme of inappropriate and unacceptable behaviour, with all due respect it is, in my view, such quite an injudicious, unnecessarily convoluted and damaging way, in its full meaning, of handling such matter, very distressing to me in addition to those so far.’ May 2024 - First Formal Grievance 128. On 24 May 2024, the claimant lodged a completed form, raising a formal grievance. She stated that this related to issues from March 2023 to date. In response to the question asking which policy, procedure or employment term do you believe has been breached, she stated ‘Zero tolerance stance and policy on bullying, harassment and discrimination. Respect and Dignity policy. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion. Annual Review policy and process. Access to training and development opportunities. Contribution reward policy and process (eligibility/access to information). Behaviours charter. Hybrid working policy. Behaviours charter. Implied term of trust and confidence. Statutes and Law.’ In the description of her grievance, she stated ‘Breach of policies and processes to my detriment (including annual review and contribution reward among other), Systematic and relentless engagement in behaviours in breach of zero tolerance to bullying, harassment and discrimination. Deliberate and systematic unfair/unfavourable treatment to my detriment, such as, not limited to, exclusion from equal opportunities (both career progression and development), isolation, misrepresentation, inaccurate accounts, unfair and inconsistent pervasive criticism, threats of unwarranted disciplinary action, unjustified and sustained ad-hominem attacks to my character. Defamation, disruptive and adverse narrative, degrading and abusive communications. Undue pressure and coercion, invalidation, intimidation, retaliation and victimisation. Hostile, inappropriate and unacceptable interactions and behavious. Breach of law and of implied contractual term of trust and confidence among other.’ June 2024 – Disciplinary Investigation 129. [NAME_71] was appointed as disciplinary investigation manager. He held investigation meetings with the claimant on 7 and 12 June 2024. The claimant was accompanied by her trade union representative at each meeting. An HR representative and a note taker were also present. At the first meeting, the claimant summarised the PDR process, from her perspective, and explained that she felt the PDR process had not been followed, which was unfair. She explained her position in relation to the [NAME_110]. She stated that the 19 October

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 40 2023 meeting left her feeling ‘unsupported, accused, anxious and harassed.’ She referred, in the meeting on 12 June 2024, to ‘bullying and harassing behaviour’ and ‘harassing emails’ but did not suggest this was related to any protected characteristics (indeed, there was no mention of any protected characteristics whatsoever). Following these meetings, at the request of the claimant and her trade union representative, the disciplinary process was paused, pending the conclusion of the grievance investigation. June 2024 - CPD 130. On 5 June 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_52] stating that she had submitted a request to attend the Legal Tech Conference 2024, on 25 June 2024 (6 hours CPD), organised by the [COMPANY_116]. [NAME_52] responded that this was approved. He responded, on 14 June 2024, stating that ‘Just to mention, although [[NAME_46]] approved your attendance in this occasion, it was not without concerns around how the training will directly benefit your work and the time required. However, we are looking forward to your learnings.’ 131. On 26 June 2024, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_52] stating that she was not clear on what basis the authorisation would to attend CPD would be ‘not without concerns’ and indicating that she saw [NAME_46] while attending the event. June–August 2024 - Grievance Investigation 132. On 13 June 2024, [NAME_78] contacted the claimant in relation to her grievance. She noted that the grievance form did not provide any detail about the incidents complained of, the specific allegations, or who they were against. She asked for further details to be provided by the claimant in writing. The claimant provided written responses as follows: 132.1. A 21 page document on 5 July 2024; 132.2. Written responses to questions posed by [NAME_78], on 14 July 2024; 132.3. A supplementary grievance form, extending to 12 pages, on 22 July 2024; and 132.4. An 8 page document on 7 August 2024. July 2024 133. On 11 July 2024, an email was sent to the claimant indicating that following a review of outstanding work, a decision had been taken to directly allocate 3 files to each [NAME_97]. Her 3 files were listed. The claimant responded, indicating that she had other urgent files and asking for these to be reallocated. [NAME_52] responded, stating that he was surprised that she was pushing back on reasonable instructions. He indicated that he could not see what was in her diary, as she still had numerous private appointments showing, which he had

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 41 asked her to remedy. He asked her to let him know what files she had picked up from triage in the last 3 weeks, and the urgent files she was currently working on. She responded to his email, but did not provide the information he requested, so he asked again for her to confirm the files she had picked up from triage, urgent files she was working on and expected timelines for completion. On 18 July 2024 at 16:41, the claimant forwarded [NAME_52]’s email to [NAME_60], copied to her trade union representative, stating that [NAME_52] had made spurious accusations in an email, deliberately committing misconduct. She stated that ‘it is described as misconduct to provide inaccurate information and to make false accusations, such as the ones [[NAME_52]], alongside [[NAME_46]], have continuedly made against myself…to deliberately create an intimidating, hostile, demeaning, humiliating work environment for me…I am feeling logically, and legitimately, alarmed and distressed in light of such firm and long commitment, alone and/or directed by others, to such a course of misconduct.’ In her response to [NAME_52], sent that night, the claimant stated ‘regarding your request - have you had a look at [NAME_117], by any chance?’ and indicated that she received no support in her role. 134. On 19 July 2024, the claimant sent three emails, as follows: 134.1. At 12:02, to [NAME_60], copied to her trade union representative. Her email related to email correspondence she had had with [NAME_52] the day before. She included a statement ‘I am entitled to be treated with dignity and respect as much as [[NAME_52]] and [[NAME_46]] are, to not be excluded from equal opportunities or equal access to fair and proper activities, nor put at unfair disadvantage in any way. They are also aware I have raised concerns about this ongoing serious matter. Discrimination and harassment at work, including victimisation, is unlawful’, 134.2. At 12:09 to [NAME_52], copied to [NAME_60], which included a statement ‘I have asked on numerous occasions for this type of treatment and false allegations in regards with my performance and/or my behaviour, to stop’, 134.3. At 12:18 to [NAME_78] and [NAME_67], copied to [NAME_52] and the claimant’s trade union representative, which included a statement ‘I would be very grateful for assurance of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy being enforced and all reasonable steps for any further occurrences to be prevented, in line with duty of care and other.’ 135. On Wednesday 24 July 2024, an event was held for a colleague who was leaving. It commenced at about 16:30. Food and alcohol were served. [NAME_52] and the claimant attended. [NAME_52] had two glasses of wine. At around 18:00, they both left: the claimant with two others; and [NAME_52] with one other. [NAME_52] walked with his colleague to Waverley station. On the way there, at the corner of Princes

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 42 Street, he saw the claimant, standing with two colleagues. He continued past them, with his colleague. 136. On 25 July 2024 at 11:06, [NAME_52] responded to an email he had received from the claimant (prior to that date) about file allocation, stating ‘I find your email below very disrespectful. Not only is the tone very condescending, but you continue to make inaccurate statements and perpetuate unsubstantiated allegations. I will not respond any further to this chain of emails.’ The claimant responded to [NAME_52] at 11:19, copying in [NAME_60], stating ‘Attached the real status of correspondence in this trail…for clarity. As I am sure you will understand, your email below (in itself and in disregarding my reasoned request in email above), and behaviour yesterday, will be added to my reported concerns so far in clear terms known to [[NAME_60]]. To note, harassment at work, including victimisation, is unlawful. Please refrain from it further.’ 137. On 30 July 2024, a discussion took place among members of [NAME_6]’s HR team in relation to the claimant. This was prompted by [NAME_46] and [NAME_56], who had indicated that they felt that the claimant’s behaviours were becoming worse, the situation was escalating and working relationships were deteriorating, to the point of complete breakdown. It was agreed, as a result of that discussion, that: 137.1. the disciplinary process would be reinstated (it had initially been paused, pending determination of the grievance, but it had not yet been possible to obtain appropriate clarification of the details of the grievance from the claimant, to allow an investigation to commence, so very little progress had been made); 137.2. the grievance and disciplinary processes would run in tandem; and 137.3. [NAME_60] would prepare a case for suspending the claimant, to be considered and approved by [NAME_85] and senior management. August 2024 138. On 5 August 2024, the claimant emailed [NAME_46] attaching a training request form and a completed application for the January 2025 intake of the [NAME_110], asking for him to approve these. [NAME_46] responded, at 09:25 on 7 August 2024, stating that he would not approve these. He stated that he did not consider it appropriate for her to attend either course, in circumstances where there were serious concerns in relation to her behaviours (which were being investigated). 139. Later that day, the claimant sent a complaint, extending to 7.5 pages when printed, in relation to this refusal. She asked for her complaint in relation to that to be added to the matters to be investigated as part of her grievance. She stated ‘I'm afraid I need to add further incidents in line with the ongoing serious, prolonged and pervading problem reported in breach of 'zero tolerance policy',

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 43 Dignity and Respect and other policies, and of my legitimate rights as in previous documentation (including, but not limited to, with reference to the Equality Act 2010, to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 among other) …to the reported incidents so far within the overarching issues raised, for clarity harassing and discriminating against me, including through victimisation, as a matter of fact.’ She copied [NAME_46]’s email into her complaint and stated ‘I do flag this communication as demonstrative of the root-cause of the escalating issues I have been suffering…’ The remainder of her communication addressed other issues raised in the grievance, and the procedure being followed to investigate those issues. 140. On the morning of 13 August 2024, the claimant withdrew a request for annual leave for the following day, which she had submitted the previous week. [NAME_52] had been on holiday the previous week, and had been engaged on-boarding a new employee on 12 August 2024, so had not yet responded. Whilst the claimant had the option of sending the holiday request on to [NAME_46], in [NAME_52]’s absence, she did not do so. Having withdrawn her request for annual leave, she asked to work from home instead, but then saw an email from [NAME_46] stating that there would be no Teams link for the teams’ Wednesday meeting, the following day. She sent an email to [NAME_46], at 12:56, asking if he could reconsider that decision. [NAME_46] responded, at 14:27, stating that he understood that she had superseded her previous email with a further request for annual leave the following day. He stated that he would approve that request. He also stated however that she was fully aware that [NAME_52] was on annual leave when she submitted her original request, and that he was engaged the previous day. He stated that the points she had made in various correspondence (he was aware she had raised issues regarding this with [NAME_60]), and on [NAME_6]’s system in relation to the request not being approved, were not reasonable, arguably misleading and did not reflect all the facts. He also highlighted that she could have redirected the request to him for approval, given that she knew her line manager was on annual leave. 141. At 11:04, 14:04 and 14:31 that day, the claimant sent 3 emails to [NAME_60]. In the last, she attached the email she had received from [NAME_46] at 14:27 stating ‘from my perspective, it does amount in itself and in the assertions made to a further incident of harassment (and bullying) and discrimination (through victimisation).’ 142. On 15 August 2024, the claimant commenced early conciliation. 143. On 16 August 2024, the claimant was suspended. It had been envisaged that the claimant would be suspended when she attended the office on 14 August 2024, but she took that day off as annual leave, at short notice, as indicated above. The claimant’s suspension was formally confirmed via a letter dated 15

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 44 August 2024. Within the letter it was noted that a disciplinary investigation had commenced, but the investigation was placed on hold when the claimant then raised a grievance. The letter stated that, since that decision was made, there had been further reports of misconduct, and it was determined that the disciplinary investigation required to be reinstated, to run concurrently with the grievance procedure. The letter confirmed that [NAME_71] would continue as investigating manager, and detailed three additional allegations as follows: 143.1. Continual and persistent failure to follow reasonable instructions from management in the workplace which is having a serious and disruptive impact on the team and wider business area, 143.2. Making serious and unsubstantiated allegations against your line manager and others, on a continuing basis, with the primary goal of undermining their authority and damaging their credibility/professional reputation, 143.3. Refusing to listen to important management feedback regarding your behaviour in the workplace and reacting to that feedback in a combative, unprofessional and defiant manner. September 2024 - Disclosure to [NAME_36] 144. On 5 September 2024, the claimant contacted the [NAME_36] via their website. She completed and submitted a questionnaire form to raise a whistleblowing complaint. In the section requesting ‘Details’ she stated ‘Unlawful discrimination in various forms (multiple or additive as a product of the person having more than one protected characteristic), including but not limited to harassment and including but not limited to subsequent victimisation. Breach of EqA 2010 and human rights act. Unlawful unfair detriment on the grounds of having made qualifying protected disclosures internally, while primarily taking appropriate steps when facing the aforementioned described matters and making it crystal clear that the whistle was being blown on the legal basis on the matter and in the public interest and in relation to the governance priorities and charitable purposes. Further re-victimisation. This is unreasonably expanding more than one year now. In addition, more targets have been affected by this on-going breaches and malpractices, and their concealment.’ She indicated, within the form, that she wanted [NAME_36] to contact her to request specific consent, before disclosing or discussing the information she had provided to them to [NAME_6]. She was not contacted by [NAME_36], following her submission. Neither the respondents, nor any of [NAME_118] employees, were contacted by [NAME_36]. They were not aware of the submission, or its contents.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 45 September 2024 – Grievance Investigation 145. On 2 September 2024, the claimant submitted a 24 page document to [NAME_78] in relation to her grievance, providing further detail and allegations. On page 23 of that document, in a list of examples under the heading ‘Oher incidents within the reported course of conduct and adversarial agenda apparently aimed towards forcing my termination if I do not resign out of the treatment I am subjected to, and which cannot be realistically hidden any longer’ she stated: ‘On 24th July 2024 an episode took place out of working hours just after a colleague’s send-off and was a cause in itself of very serious concern, and fear, as [NAME_52] who had reportedly ingested some alcohol, came across myself, the departing colleague and another colleague, who were chatting together, in the early evening; while coming closer to where we were and with no previous interaction at all, [NAME_52], who walked alongside another colleague from the team, came at me, in an unprovoked outburst, slurring taunting remarks, pointing at me with his finger and showing a hostile expression and aggressive body language, then turning to walk away, before again turning back towards me to continue with some slur or remarks from a farther point (and which I was not able to hear due to the distance), still using aggressive body language and a distinctly sly look at me. That was indeed frightening and potentially falls within a hate incident and/or criminally relevant.’ 146. On 12 September 2024, the claimant submitted a further written statement in relation to her grievance. In that she raised concerns that she was being asked to complete a spreadsheet to provide detail of her allegations, which was not envisaged in the grievance procedure. 147. On 17 September 2024, in a communication spanning 4.5 pages, the claimant summarised the grievance investigation process to date, stated that there had been unreasonable delays in investigating her grievance, allowing ‘the perpetrators…to engage in accelerated misconduct, harm and false, unwarranted, reporting against me’, with no action being taken to prevent or stop that. She stated that ‘it is indeed my clear view that there is a continuing serious failure to handle my grievance properly which amounts to discriminatory handling of such grievance and unfair detriment of itself.’ 148. A grievance investigation meeting took place on 19 September 2024. 149. On 15 October 2024, the claimant provided further information in relation to her grievance, in a 4 page letter with 12 attachments, in response to queries raised by [NAME_78] in the grievance investigation meeting. She asked for the grievance to be dealt with in writing only, if possible, and reiterated concerns about the length of time the grievance process was taking.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 46 1 October 2024 - Disciplinary Investigation Meeting 150. A disciplinary investigation meeting took place with the claimant on 1 October 2024. In the investigation meeting the claimant was asked about the delays in dealing with data sharing agreements (see paragraph 119). She stated, when discussing this ‘she would need to refer back to correspondence’ but her recollection was that there was an additional draft produced which she was surprised to receive. She stated that ‘this was not something that could be done without putting the University at serious risk or exposure of lack of compliance with data protection regulations.’ She stated that she had gone on to complete the work in this complex project and resolve the matter ‘in an optimal way in order to ensure compliance and enable the project to share the data they wanted to share to do the work’. She went on to say that ‘It was work which was important to do properly rather than sending anything to be signed without considering how the University would meet regulatory requirements and obligations regarding sharing with no legal basis personal data of vulnerable children. This is not something that the University can do, so there in an inception problem there and all we can do is our best if not meet the expectations of the multiparty at least having our PI doing the work they intend to do in a compliant manner.’ The other allegations against the claimant were discussed. She repeatedly described [NAME_52]’s demeanour and behaviour towards her as ‘hostile’. She stated that there was ‘permanent engagement in predatory misconduct, which was conscious and deliberate’ and that she was entitled to be treated with dignity and respect. She made reference to an email he had sent as demonstrating a ‘hostile, intimidating…victimising and distressing approach’, and stated that there had been ‘fabricated accusations, victimisation, there is an approach of trying to gaslight her’. She stated that she is ‘very aware of what the underlying dysfunctional and very serious situation is actually happening and she firmly believes it is unlawful.’ She stated there was a ‘adversarial agenda’ and, regarding desk booking emails from [NAME_52], that she did not ‘see any other colleagues receiving similar communications about this and she is unclear on why unless for an undetermined motivation’. Employment Tribunal Proceedings 151. On 15 October 2024, the claimant presented her ET1 form to the Employment Tribunal. The complaints asserted within that included direct race and sex discrimination, harassment related to race, sex and disability and victimisation. In her ET1 claim form the claimant stated that she had PTSD. The respondents were unaware of this prior to receipt of that document. The ET1 form was sent to [NAME_6]-[NAME_30], with the notice of claim, on 18 October 2024.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 47 November 2024 152. On 1 November 2024 the claimant raised a second grievance. In that she asserted that: inappropriate and prejudicial comments had been made by an HR Case Manager; there had been wrongful interference in the process through what appeared to be representations by or on behalf of the respondents in the Tribunal claim; the delay in addressing her previous grievance; and failing to put in place alleviating measures, for example changing her line manager; failure to acknowledge and accommodate a request for reasonable adjustments in the grievance process, namely handling the grievance in writing. 153. In an email trail commencing on 28 November 2024, entitled Request (duty of care), the claimant stated to [NAME_60] that she felt a suitable ‘liaison manager’ should be appointed to undertake wellbeing checks with her during her period of suspension. [NAME_60] responded that [NAME_56] was undertaking that role, and he had also previously offered to have a Teams call with her to check on her welfare. She had not responded to that offer, but he remained open to doing so. He also reminded her of support through the EAP. In the period from 3 December 2024 to 10 January 2025, the claimant raised concerns in this email trail that she felt [NAME_6] was failing to make reasonable adjustments she had requested, following on from her discussion with [NAME_119]. [NAME_60] responded that he was not aware of any recommendations from [NAME_119], stating that he had not received any information from [NAME_119] and he would not be provided with this unless it was a management referral and the claimant consented to this. She indicated that this related to a request, made on 12 September 2024, not to be required to work with certain individuals. [NAME_60] indicated that, as the claimant was currently absent from work, there were no steps to be taken at that time. January 2025 154. On 17 January 2025, the claimant sent an email to [NAME_67]. In her email she raised concerns regarding her ongoing suspension, the delays in the grievance process and the decision to arrange legal representation for the individuals named as respondents in the ET1 presented on 15 October 2024. She stated ‘For clarity, I have reason to genuinely believe that the decision(s) outlined above, taking into consideration the relevant circumstances, potentially amount to victimisation contrary to the Equality Act and other contraventions of same, which I hereby convey at all relevant effects.’ Disciplinary Investigation Outcome 155. On 10 February 2025, [NAME_71] concluded his investigation into the disciplinary allegations. [NAME_71] had conducted a thorough, comprehensive and fair investigation. He produced a detailed, and extremely comprehensive and well structured, Investigation Report, extending to 39 pages. Attached to the report

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 48 were: notes of meetings with each individual interviewed; additional statements obtained; and 102 supporting documents. 156. In the course of his investigation, [NAME_71] met with the following individuals, on the following dates: 156.1. The claimant on 7 & 12 June and 1 October 2024; 156.2. [NAME_82] on 22 May 2024; 156.3. [NAME_56] on 22 May 2024; 156.4. [NAME_52] on 23 May & 9 October 2024; 156.5. [NAME_60] on 23 May 2024; 156.6. [NAME_46] on 27 May & 9 October 2024; and 156.7. [NAME_74] on 9 October 2024. He then collated and reviewed relevant documents/evidence, considered his conclusions and prepared his report. 157. The Investigation Report was structured as follows: 157.1. Introduction. 157.2. Employee details. 157.3. Purpose of the investigation. In this, the 10 allegations were listed (7 intimated in May 2024 and a further 3 intimated in August 2024). 157.4. Initial facts/background. Where a short summary was provided. 157.5. Investigatory meeting with employee. Where the claimant’s response to each allegation was summarised. In relation to each allegation, reference was made, where appropriate, to relevant supporting documents (by appendix number, with a short description of why it was asserted they were relevant to that particular allegation) and meeting minutes (by date and paragraph number). 157.6. Further investigation. Which summarised the further steps taken to investigate the allegations and then, with reference to each allegation in turn, summarised the further evidence obtained. In relation to each allegation, reference was made, where appropriate, to relevant supporting documents (by appendix number, with a short description of why it was asserted they were relevant to that particular allegation) and meeting minutes (by date and paragraph number).

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 49 157.7. Findings. In this section, in relation to each allegation, [NAME_71] indicated that the evidence he had reviewed supported the allegation and set out the basis for that conclusion, identifying the relevant evidence by appendix number and a summary of its relevance. His findings, rationale and evidence relied on were clearly stated. After setting out his conclusion in relation to each allegation in turn, he stated ‘Overall it is clear that relationships between [the claimant] and their line management and senior line management have been irretrievably broken, communications have more or less ceased and the trust has been lost.’ He referred to the documents which he felt demonstrated this and went on to state ‘[the claimant] is described as someone who is very difficult to manage with managers also expressing a feeling of not being safe during their interactions with [her]. The evidence given from witness collaborates the behaviours they have experienced from [the claimant]. Individually each allegation may have a moderate impact, however when considered as a group the overall impact is substantial. With the exception of [NAME_74] all who were interviewed have had a strong response to this case, there has been an out pouring of words spoken, in some cases additional interviews were required. The volume of minutes gathered and documents received has been significant in size. Those most affected within [NAME_93] have been negatively affected, all give a feeling of exhaustion and not knowing how to resolve the challenges that are described around managing [the claimant]. Additionally, there a collective sense from [the claimant]'s line management that [she] has wilfully and intentional behaved in a way to actively disrespect and challenge them.’ 157.8. Is there a case to answer? In this section, [NAME_71] indicated that he had reached the conclusion, based on the evidence gathered, that there was a case to answer in respect of each of the allegations, and his view that it would be appropriate to hold a disciplinary hearing in relation to these. He provided links to policies which he felt were relevant to his conclusions. 158. [NAME_71] wrote to the claimant on 13 February 2025, confirming that he had concluded his investigation, had determined that there was a case to answer. He stated that she would be invited to a disciplinary hearing, and provided with the investigation report, in due course. He indicated that he anticipated the disciplinary hearing would take place around 1 April 2025. March-April 2025 – Disciplinary Hearing & Grievance Process Paused 159. On 12 March 2025, [NAME_64] sent a letter to the claimant inviting her to a disciplinary hearing on 1 April 2025. The letter stated that the purpose of the hearing was to consider her behaviour and conduct, as well as whether there had been an

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 50 irreparable and irretrievable breakdown in the employment relationship. It listed the 10 specific allegations to be considered at the disciplinary hearing. It confirmed [NAME_64] would chair the disciplinary panel and identified the other two panel members. It stated that an HR Case Manager and note taker would be in attendance, and the claimant could be accompanied. It was confirmed that [NAME_71] would also be present to present the investigation findings. It was noted that a potential outcome could be dismissal for misconduct, or SOSR and that dismissal would be with immediate effect if gross misconduct was established. The letter also stated ‘I understand that you have been suspended since 16th August 2024 and your continued suspension from work has been regularly reviewed. As part of the ongoing review of your suspension investigative interviews were carried out on 5th and 7th February 2025 to measure the impact and to consider whether it was appropriate for your potential return to work. The most recent review of your suspension and investigative interviews were conducted before the disciplinary investigation was concluded and in the spirit of openness and transparency, I include copies of the minutes from these meetings for your information.’ The minutes were of meetings conducted by [NAME_60], with [NAME_46], [NAME_52] and [NAME_56]. They were dated 5 & 7 February 2025. 160. The Investigation Report was also enclosed with the invitation to the disciplinary hearing, and it was confirmed that all of the appendices (meeting minutes/statements and documents) had been shared via MS Teams. [NAME_6]’s Disciplinary Policy, Dignity & Respect Policy and Behaviours Charter were also enclosed. 161. On 14 March 2025, the claimant was informed, by letter from [NAME_67], that the grievance process would be paused, pending the outcome of the disciplinary process. [NAME_67] explained in her letter that she had reviewed the disciplinary investigation report and the grievance allegations, as collated in the spreadsheet, and, from a preliminary view of both of those, she believed there was commonality in both sets of allegations, such that it was appropriate to pause the grievance process, pending the conclusion of the disciplinary process. She stated that, once the disciplinary process had concluded, a review would be conducted to ascertain which grievance allegations had not been addressed through the disciplinary process and those, if any, would be taken forward to be investigated under the grievance procedure. 162. On 18 March 2025, the claimant sent correspondence to [NAME_67] in response to her letter of 14 March 2025. In her letter she stated that her grievance had not been addressed for 10 months. She stated ‘your letter…seems to now imply…that the disciplinary process is being operated in respect of my grievances. In fact, I have grounds to believe that I am being victimised, and re-victimised, through it. With all due respect, victimisation through a misuse and weaponisation of

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 51 procedure is not “duplication of allegations”…It is my clear view that this is unlawful, and builds on the unlawful treatment I have been receiving.’ 163. On 25 March 2025, the claimant raised a third formal grievance. In this she raised concerns that named individuals had deliberately/negligently provided misleading and false information in the disciplinary investigation, as well as [NAME_60] conducting additional interviews, ‘capturing hostile animus towards me and setting out and contrived to committing to an on-going (long-held), ceaseless unlawful and discriminatory confected agenda (in various forms) fundamentally contrary to law… For clarity, I complain about this issue as forming part of a prolonged and severe discriminatory course of conduct.’ 164. On 26 March 2025, the claimant submitted a ‘Statement of Rebuttal’ to the disciplinary panel, in advance of the disciplinary hearing, which was scheduled for 1 April 2025. The statement extended to 32 pages, and there were attachments extending to around 380 pages. Within her statement, the claimant responded to the investigation report, setting out why she disagreed with the content of it, the conclusions reached and the process adopted, and summarising relevant events, from her perspective. While, within the document, the claimant repeatedly stated that she had been discriminated against and harassed, she made no reference to any protected characteristics and accordingly did not assert that they were the cause of that treatment, or the treatment was related to them. Whilst she mentioned being subjected to victimisation, she did not assert that this was due to having made a complaint of discrimination or harassment related to protected characteristics. She referenced having made qualifying/protected disclosures and whistleblowing, but did not assert that she had been subjected to a detriment for doing so. Vague assertions of ‘retaliation’ were made, but not linked to whistleblowing nor to any complaints of discrimination/harassment related to protected characteristics. 165. The disciplinary hearing was postponed to 24 April 2025, to enable the panel to read the rebuttal statement, and attachments, in advance of the disciplinary hearing. 166. On 21 April 2025, the claimant requested that the disciplinary hearing be limited to 30 minutes. (It had been scheduled for 2.5 hours). [NAME_64] responded, on 23 April 2025, that she did not feel that would be adequate, given the extent of the issues to be discussed. A referral was offered to [NAME_119] to ascertain the claimant’s fitness to attend, which she had declined. [NAME_64] indicated that, as an alternative, it may be possible to hold the hearing in the claimant’s absence, if she agreed to respond to the panel’s questions in writing. The questions were attached to [NAME_64]’s letter. The claimant agreed did so, with the answers extending to 22 pages.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 52 167. The disciplinary hearing proceeded on 24 April 2025. Neither the claimant, nor her trade union representative, attended. 168. On 25 April 2025, the panel asked the claimant for further information in relation to 2 of her responses and asked 2 further questions. They asked that the claimant respond by 28 April 2025. The claimant did so in a document extending to a further 16 pages, with attachments. 169. The panel met again on 30 April 2025, to review the further information received and reach a final decision. The panel unanimously concluded as follows: 169.1. That there was evidence to substantiate all of the allegations. They considered each in turn, reaching the following conclusions: Allegation 1 - Conduct during PDR. That the evidence demonstrated obstructive behaviours by the claimant, to impede the review process from being concluded, and that she had limited acknowledgement, understanding or acceptance of how her behaviours had adversely impacted her colleagues. In reaching this conclusion, they relied on the statements from witnesses and identified 8 of the 102 supporting documents appended to the Investigation Report (the Appendix Items) which supported their conclusion. Allegations 2 & 8 – Refusal to follow reasonable instructions and, on occasion acting aggressively/in an intimidating and disrespectful manner. The panel concluded that there was clear evidence that the claimant went against instructions of senior colleagues to persistently pursue engagement with the [NAME_110]. They relied on 8 specified Appendix Items in reaching that conclusion. They also identified evidence which supported their conclusion that the claimant had failed to follow reasonable instructions in relation to other matters (specifying 7 Appendix Items), and concluded that the evidence demonstrated a number of unconnected occasions of aggressive behaviours (supported by 3 witnesses and a further Appendix Item), which fell short of the expectations set out in the Behaviours Charter. Allegation 3 – Inappropriate conduct towards line/senior managers. The panel concluded that there was documentary evidence to support this allegation, demonstrating that it was not isolated in nature and reflected interactions across a number of situations, involving a range of colleagues. They relied on 9 of the Appendix Items in reaching that conclusion.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 53 Allegation 4 – Unauthorised engagement with [NAME_110] and subsequent communications. The panel concluded that the claimant’s engagement with [NAME_110] was not authorised. They relied upon 11 Appendix Items in reaching that conclusion. They concluded that the claimant’s subsequent persistence in pursuing the [NAME_110] was disruptive, undermined the authority of the [NAME_94], showed a lack of respect to colleagues, and was not in line with the Behaviours Charter or Dignity & Respect Policy. Allegation 5 – Sending emails containing inaccuracies, omissions and misrepresentations. The panel concluded that there was evidence which clearly and objectively showed that email exchanges had been altered by the claimant. They relied upon 3 specified Appendix Items in reaching that conclusion. The panel considered the claimant’s actions, in deliberately falsifying email exchanges, for example by removing paragraphs from an email, demonstrated a complete lack of integrity. In the context of a University environment, and given the claimant’s role, the panel considered this to be entirely unacceptable conduct. Allegations 6 & 9 – Sustained written attacks making numerous unsubstantiated, damaging and vexatious allegations. The panel concluded that that these allegations were established by the evidence. They relied upon 14 of the Appendix Items, as well as witness evidence, in reaching that conclusion. Allegation 7 - Behaviour and communications to academic members of staff. The panel concluded that there was clear evidence to support this allegation (they relied upon 8 Appendix Items). They noted, in relation to this, that there had been complaints from academic members of staff in relation to the claimant. These included: that one academic member of staff had been ‘very confused and seriously distressed’ with emails sent by the claimant, and that the claimant had been ‘very rude and not willing to have a conversation, nor able to advise who else can advise’ during an interaction with her; that there had been numerous complaints about unexplained and significant delays in the claimant progressing work, which was frustrating collaborators; and that a Head of [COMPANY_115] had required to escalate concerns in relation to significant delays regarding work the claimant was doing, as those delays were impacting external relationships, causing reputational damage and impacting further collaborations with the partner, who was actively taking steps to avoid collaborating with [NAME_6] going forward, as a result, which would have a significant impact on the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 54 body of work that [NAME_6] was undertaking. The panel considered this matter to be extremely serious, taking into account the University context, were the research conducted by academic members of staff is at the heart of their mission. Actions which hinder the University’s ability to conduct that research are, the panel concluded, entirely unacceptable in that context. Allegation 10 – Refusing to listen to feedback and reacting in a combative, unprofessional and defiant manner to that. The panel concluded that that this allegation was established by the evidence and relied upon 4 Appendix Items when reaching that conclusion. They also considered that their findings, in relation to the other allegations, supported the substance of this one. 169.2. That allegations 1-4, 6 & 8-10 amounted to misconduct and allegations 5 & 7 amounted to gross misconduct. 169.3. That the claimant’s repeated failure to follow reasonable management instructions, her disrespectful communications and behaviours towards colleagues, her persistent disregard for feedback, and her dissemination of unsubstantiated and damaging allegations had cumulatively, and fundamentally, undermined the employment relationship, such that there was an irreparable and irretrievable breakdown. 169.4. That the claimant’s employment should be terminated, with notice, as a result of her behaviours, as they had caused an irretrievable breakdown. The panel concluded that there could be no other outcome in the circumstances. They observed that the claimant had not accepted any personal responsibility for her actions or conduct, or how her behaviours had impacted working relationships with colleagues in her own team and others across the University. She had persistently failed to demonstrate any reflection, insight, or contrition. Instead, she repeatedly deflected from the substance of the allegations by referring to grievances and unrelated matters, without offering new evidence to address the core issues under review. That consistent lack of accountability reinforced the panel's conclusion that the employment relationship has broken down irreparably such that she could not continue in any role within the University. 169.5. That the claimant should not be permitted to appeal against that decision. In reaching that decision, they were guided by HR, who stated that there was no requirement to do so. They accepted that advice, as they felt that there was clear evidence of misconduct.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 55 170. On 1 May 2025, [NAME_64] wrote to the claimant, to inform her of the disciplinary outcome. She stated that ‘After careful consideration informed by the investigation and all of the evidence which was reviewed including your responses referred to above, the panel has unanimously concluded that there are findings of misconduct which significantly damages the employment relationship and that there is an irreparable and irretrievable breakdown in the employment relationship between you and the University. This breakdown is substantial to the extent it is irrecoverable and significantly undermines the trust and confidence inherent in an effective employment relationship’. She stated that the claimant’s employment would terminate that day, that she would be paid in lieu of notice and that the decision was final: there was no right of appeal. She stated that a full explanation of the rationale would be provided in due course. 171. On 9 May 2025, [NAME_64] wrote to the claimant providing detailed reasons for the panel's decision. The letter extended to 7 pages. It confirmed that the panel found that there was evidence to substantiate all of the allegations, that two of the allegations (5&7) amounted to gross misconduct, and the basis for their conclusion in relation to each allegation. It confirmed that the panel concluded that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in working relationships and the basis for that conclusion. It confirmed that the panel had reached the conclusion that the appropriate sanction was dismissal, and the basis for that conclusion. It confirmed that the decision was final, and there was no right of appeal. [NAME_31] 172. The claimant made a number of [NAME_31] during her employment, namely on 11 February 2024, 30 October 2024 & 18 April 2025. 173. She attended for consultations with [NAME_32] on 20 March & 7 November 2024, triggered by the first two of those self-referrals. 174. As these were self-referrals, what she stated on her self-referral form, and in any subsequent consultation, was confidential between her and the medical professionals within the [NAME_32] department. The medical professionals within the [NAME_32] department did not disclose any information provided to them by the claimant to anyone else, and did not provide any reports to anyone outside of the [NAME_32] department. 175. In her self-referral to [NAME_119] in February 2024, the claimant stated that she was ‘a PTSD sufferer since 2022.’ Other than within this confidential referral, she did not ever disclose this to the respondents, or any of their employees.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 56 [NAME_52] and [NAME_46] Resignations 176. [NAME_52] resigned from his role at the end of 2024 and left in March 2025. He cited the impact of the claimant’s behaviours on his health as the reason for him doing so. [NAME_46] left his employment with [NAME_6] at the end of May 2025, also citing the claimant’s behaviours, and the effect those had on him and his health as a significant factor in his decision to leave his employment with [NAME_6]. Submissions 177. The claimant lodged a written skeleton submission (extending to 10 pages), as well as a chronology graphic, a summary of the relevant law (extending to 20 pages) and a list of 71 authorities (only 6 of which were referred to in her submission). The respondents also lodged a written skeleton submission (extending to 19 pages), consisting of comments inserted onto the [NAME_9], as well as a list of 7 authorities. As they were set out in writing, the parties’ respective written arguments are not replicated in this judgment, but were fully considered. The parties each also supplemented their written submission with brief oral submissions, which are summarised below. 177.1. In summary, the respondents submitted orally that:  It was implausible/inherently unlikely that: so many individuals in [NAME_6] would discriminate against the claimant over such a long period of time, by doing so many things, under so many actionable wrongs and in relation to unrelated protected characteristics; the claimant would wait for 6 weeks before complaining about the [NAME_120] incident on 24 July 2024, while complaining about so many other things; and so many actionable wrongs would occur without the claimant raising a formal grievance (which she did not do until 23 May 2024).  The claimant’s conduct during the hearing was consistent with the issues the respondents experienced when managing her (speaking over others, repeatedly questioning/revisiting issues discussed previously and making exaggerated or unfounded allegations).  The claimant has not established her complaints of direct discrimination.  There is no evidential link between the asserted protected acts/disclosures and the 54 asserted detriments.  The claimant was fairly dismissed as a result of the established allegations of misconduct. She was not dismissed because of protected acts/disclosures.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 57  Re-engagement is not practicable, and the claimant’s evidence in relation to remedy was limited. 177.2. In summary, the claimant submitted orally that:  Sufficient evidence had been led to establish a prima facie case.  The course of conduct and events should be considered in the round. They are absolutely linked.  The case of [NAME_121] is applicable in relation to the detriments asserted as a result of protected disclosures.  The allegation of falsifying records is defamatory. The prejudiced approach tainted the panel’s decision. Relevant Law Direct Discrimination 178. Section 13(1) EqA states: ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.’ 179. The basic question in a direct discrimination case is: what are the grounds or reasons for treatment complained of? In Amnesty International v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884 the EAT recognised two different approaches from two House of Lords authorities - (i) in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] IRLR 288 and (ii) in Nagaragan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572. In some cases, such as [NAME_122], the grounds or reason for the treatment complained of is inherent in the act itself. In other cases, such as [NAME_123], the act complained of is not inherently discriminatory but is rendered so by discriminatory motivation, being the mental processes (whether conscious or unconscious) which led the [NAME_120] discriminator to act in the way that he or she did. The intention is irrelevant once unlawful discrimination is made out. That approach was endorsed in R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of the [COMPANY_115] and another [2009] UKSC 15. 180. For direct discrimination to occur, the relevant protected characteristic needs to be a cause of the less favourable treatment ‘but does not need to be the only or even the main cause’ (paragraph 3.11, [NAME_36]: Code of Practice on Employment (2011)). The protected characteristic does however require to have a ‘significant influence on the outcome’ ([NAME_124] v [NAME_200] 1999 ICR 877).

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 58 Harassment 181. Section 26(1) EqA states that: ‘(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.’ 182. There are accordingly 3 essential elements of harassment claim under section 26(1), namely (i) unwanted conduct, (ii) that has the proscribed purpose or effect and (iii) which relates to a relevant protected characteristic. 183. Section 26(4) EqA states that: ‘(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.’ 184. The [NAME_36]: Code of Practice on Employment (2011) explains, at paragraphs 7.9-7.11, that ‘related to’ has a broad meaning. It occurs where there is a connection with the protected characteristic. Conduct does not have to be ‘because of’ the protected characteristic. 185. In [NAME_125] v [NAME_126] & others [2025] EAT 95, HHJ Tayler reviewed the requirements for a complaint of harassment, setting out, in paragraphs 8-23 of his judgment, a useful summary of the constituent parts of a complaint of this nature, and the case law/established principles relating to each. 186. In Pemberton v Inwood [2018] IRLR 542, CA, Lord Justice Underhill stated: ‘In order to decide whether any conduct falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a) has either of the proscribed effects under sub-paragraph (1)(b), a tribunal must consider both (by reason of sub-section (4)(a)) whether the putative victim perceives themselves to have suffered the effect in question (the subjective question) and (by reason of sub-section (4)(c)) whether it was reasonable for the conduct to be regarded as having that effect (the objective question). It must also, of course, take into account all the other circumstances — sub- section (4)(b). The relevance of the subjective question is that if the claimant does not perceive their dignity to have been violated, or an adverse

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 59 environment created, then the conduct should not be found to have had that effect. The relevance of the objective question is that if it was not reasonable for the conduct to be regarded as violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for him or her, then it should not be found to have done so.’ 187. Not all unwanted conduct will be deemed to have the proscribed effect. In Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336, Mr Justice Underhill, in the EAT, stated ‘not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person's dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.’ Mr Justice Langstaff affirmed this view in Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v [NAME_127] and ors UKEAT/0179/13, stating ‘The word “violating” is a strong word. Offending against dignity, hurting it, is insufficient. “Violating” may be a word the strength of which is sometimes overlooked. The same might be said of the words “intimidating” etc. All look for effects which are serious and marked, and not those which are, though real, truly of lesser consequence.’ Victimisation 188. Section 27 EqA states: ‘(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because- (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. (2) Each of the following is a protected act- (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. (3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.’

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 60 189. There is no requirement for a complaint to explicitly reference the EqA for it to constitute a protected act. In order for a complaint to be a protected act it must be a complaint about something which, if proven, would be a contravention of the EqA. Where there is no explicit reference to the EqA, the Tribunal should consider the context in determining whether there was a protected act or not. 190. In Waters v Metropolitan Police Comr [1997] IRLR 589, the Court of Appeal considered a scenario where the claimant made allegations that things had been done which would be a breach of the Act, but did not say that those things were contrary to the Act. Waite LJ said (considering the wording which is now contained in s27(2)(d) EqA): 'The allegation relied on need not state explicitly that an act of discrimination has occurred – that is clear from the words in brackets in s 4(1)(d). All that is required is that the allegation relied on should have asserted facts capable of amounting in law to an act of discrimination by an employer…' 191. [NAME_128] v London Borough of Ealing UKEAT/0454/2012 considered a scenario where the claimant repeatedly asserted that they had been ‘discriminated against’ and suffered detriments, but did not say that the allegation was of discrimination in relation to one of the protected characteristics. Langstaff P said ‘The complaint must be of conduct which interferes with a characteristic protected by the Act, such as race, not to a matter not protected by the Act…I would accept that it is not necessary that the complaint referred to race using that very word. But there must be something sufficient about the complaint to show that it is a complaint to which at least potentially the Act applies…the Claimant did not attribute any treatment (at the time) to the fact that he is British of Pakistani origin… The tribunal here thus expressly recognised that the word “discrimination” was used not in the general sense familiar to Employment Tribunals of being subject to detrimental action upon the basis of a protected personal characteristic, but that of being subject to detrimental action which was simply unfair.’ He went on to state, ‘This case should not be taken as any general endorsement for the view that where an employee complains of “discrimination” he has not yet said enough to bring himself within the scope of s 27 of the Equality Act. All is likely to depend on the circumstances…’ 192. In Kokomane v Boots Management Services Ltd [2025] EAT 38, HHJ Beard considered the previous authorities and stated ‘It appears to me the law could be summed up in this way: what is necessary is that the ET should take account of all of the factors that are provided in the information given by the employee to the employer. In addition the ET needs to consider that information on the basis of how it would be understood by the employer in context…When the employee makes the complaint explicit that will be an easy task. When the complaint is oblique the context becomes important.’

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 61 193. Factors which may be taken into account when assessing context could include the claimant’s background, qualifications and experience ([NAME_129] v Medical Research Council and anor EAT 0586/12 and Chalmers v Airpoint Ltd EAT 0031/19). 194. For the purposes of a victimisation complaint ‘Generally, a detriment is anything which the individual concerned might reasonably consider changed their position for the worse or put them at a disadvantage’ (paragraph 9.8, [NAME_36]: Code of Practice on Employment (2011)). In [NAME_130] v [NAME_131] of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285 confirms that a worker suffers a detriment if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that they have been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had to work. An ‘unjustified sense of grievance’ is not enough. 195. The meaning of ‘because of’ is discussed above, in relation to direct discrimination. Burden of proof 196. Section 136 EqA provides: ‘If there are facts from which the tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned the tribunal must hold that the contravention occurred. But this provision does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.’ 197. There is accordingly a two-stage process in applying the burden of proof provisions in discrimination cases, explained in the authorities of Igen v Wong [2005] IRLR 258, and Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007] IRLR 246, both from the Court of Appeal. The claimant must first establish a first base or prima facie case of direct discrimination or harassment by reference to the facts made out. If the claimant does so, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent at the second stage to prove that they did not commit those unlawful acts. If the second stage is reached and the respondent’s explanation is inadequate, it is necessary for the Tribunal to conclude that the complaint should be upheld. If the explanation is adequate, that conclusion is not reached. 198. In Madarassy, it was held that the burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply by a claimant establishing that they have a protected characteristic and that there was a difference in treatment. Those facts only indicate the possibility of discrimination. They are not, of themselves, sufficient material on which the tribunal ‘could conclude’ that, on a balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination. The Tribunal has, at the first stage, no regard to evidence as to the respondent’s explanation for its conduct, but the Tribunal must have regard to

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 62 all other evidence relevant to the question of whether the [NAME_120] unlawful act occurred, it being immaterial whether the evidence is adduced by the claimant or the respondent, or whether it supports or contradicts the claimant’s case, as explained in Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] IRLR 748, an EAT authority approved by the Court of Appeal in Madarassy. Protected Disclosures 199. Section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) provides: ‘In this Act a ‘protected disclosure’ means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.’ 200. A qualifying disclosure is defined in section 43B ERA as ‘any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following: a. That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed; b. That a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject; c. That a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur; d. That the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered; e. That the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; or f. That information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed.’ 201. Section 43C ERA states that ‘a qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure to his employer…’ 202. In Williams v Brown UKEAT/0044/19, His Honour Judge Auerbach stated: ‘9. It is worth restating, as the authorities have done many times, that this definition breaks down into a number of elements. First, there must be a disclosure of information. Secondly, the worker must believe that the disclosure is made in the public interest. Thirdly, if the worker does hold such a belief, it must be reasonably held. Fourthly, the worker must believe that the disclosure tends to show one or more of the matters listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f). Fifthly, if the worker does hold such a belief, it must be reasonably held.

10. Unless all five conditions are satisfied there will be not be a qualifying disclosure. In a given case any one or more of them may be in dispute, but in every case, it is a good idea for the Tribunal to work through all five. That is for two reasons. First, it will identify to the reader unambiguously which, if any, of

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 63 the five conditions are accepted as having been fulfilled in the given case, and which of them are in dispute. Secondly, it may assist the Tribunal to ensure, and to demonstrate, that it has not confused or elided any of the elements, by addressing each in turn, setting out in turn its reasoning and conclusions in relation to those which are in dispute.’ 203. In [NAME_16] v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 846, at paragraphs 35 and 36, the Court of Appeal set out guidance on whether a particular statement should be regarded as a disclosure of information: ‘35. The question in each case in relation to section 43B(1) (as it stood prior to amendment in 2013) is whether a particular statement or disclosure is a ‘disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f).’ Grammatically, the word ‘information’ has to be read with the qualifying phrase ‘which tends to show [etc]’ (as, for example, in the present case, information which tends to show ‘that a person has failed or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject’). In order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1).

36. Whether an identified statement or disclosure in any particular case does meet that standard will be a matter for evaluative judgment by a tribunal in light of all the facts of the case. It is a question which is likely to be closely aligned with the other requirement set out in section 43B(1), namely that the worker making the disclosure should have the reasonable belief that the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters. As explained by Underhill J in [NAME_132] at [8], this has both a subjective and an objective element. If the worker subjectively believes that the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters, and the statement or disclosure he makes has a sufficient factual content and specificity such that it is capable of tending to show that listed matter, it is likely that his belief will be a reasonable belief.’ 204. In Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2020] ICR 236, the EAT stated: ‘43... As the Court of Appeal in Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2018] ICR 1850 made abundantly clear, in order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, it has to have sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show breach of a legal obligation… 69. The tribunal is thus bound to consider the content of the disclosure to see if it meets the threshold level of sufficiency in terms of factual content and specificity before it could conclude that the belief was a reasonable one. That is another way of stating that the belief must be based on reasonable grounds. As already stated above, it is not enough merely for the employee to rely upon an assertion of his subjective belief that the information tends to show a breach.’

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 64 Detriment Claim – Protected Disclosures 205. Section 47B ERA states that: ‘A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.’ 206. In [NAME_130] v [NAME_131] of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285 confirms that a worker suffers a detriment if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that they have been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had to work. An ‘unjustified sense of grievance’ is not enough. 207. Whether a detriment is ‘on the ground’ that a worker has made a protected disclosure involves consideration of the mental processes (conscious or unconscious) of the employer acting as it did. It is not sufficient for the Tribunal to simply find that ‘but for’ the disclosure, the employer’s act or omission would not have taken place, or that the detriment is related to the disclosure. Rather, the protected disclosure must materially influence (in the sense of it being more than a trivial influence) the employer’s treatment of the whistleblower ([NAME_135] v NHS Manchester [2012] IRLR 64). 208. Helpful guidance on the approach to be taken by a Tribunal when considering claims of this nature is provided in the decision of [COMPANY_134] (t/a Chemistree) v Gahir [2014] IRLR 416 at paragraph 98. Automatically Unfair Dismissal – Protected Disclosures 209. Section 103A ERA states that: ‘An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.’ 210. In [NAME_135] v NHS Manchester, the Court of Appeal held that the causation test for unfair dismissal is stricter than that for unlawful detriment under s47B ERA: s103A ERA requires the disclosure to be the primary motivation for a dismissal. Unfair Dismissal – s94-98 ERA 211. S94 ERA provides that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. 212. In cases where the fact of dismissal is admitted, as it is in the present case, the first task of the Tribunal is to consider whether it has been satisfied by the respondent (the burden of proof being upon them in this regard) as to the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 65 reason for the dismissal and that it is a potentially fair reason falling within s98(1) or (2) ERA. 213. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, it should proceed to determine whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, applying the test within s98(4) ERA. The determination of that question (having regard to the reason shown by the employer): “(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking), the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.” 214. Where an employee has been dismissed for misconduct, British Home Stores v Burchell [1978] IRLR 379 sets out the questions to be addressed by the Tribunal when considering reasonableness. They are as follows: 214.1. whether the respondent genuinely believed the individual to be guilty of misconduct; 214.2. whether the respondent had reasonable grounds for believing the individual was guilty of that misconduct; and 214.3. whether, when it formed that belief on those grounds, the respondent had carried out as much investigation as was reasonable in the circumstances. 215. The Tribunal then requires to consider whether the decision to dismiss fell within the range of reasonable responses available to a reasonable employer in the circumstances. In determining this, it is not for the Tribunal to decide whether it would have dismissed for that reason. That would be an error of law as the Tribunal would have ‘substituted its own view’ for that of the employer. Rather, the Tribunal must consider the objective standards of a reasonable employer and bear in mind that there is a range of responses to any given situation available to a reasonable employer. It is only if, applying that objective standard, the decision to dismiss (and the procedure adopted) is found to be outside that range of reasonable responses, that the dismissal should be found to be unfair (Iceland Frozen Foods Limited v Jones [1982] IRLR 439). Discussion & Decision Observations on Evidence 216. The claimant’s witness statement referenced the majority of the pages of her bundle, often doing so by referencing hundreds of pages at a time at the end

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 66 of a section of evidence, without highlighting the particular sections within those pages, which she relied upon, as discussed and agreed (see paragraph 8 above). In relation to the period of time from the claimant’s suspension from work (16 August 2024) onward, no detail was provided in the statement whatsoever, only references to around 836 pages in the bundle (in the form of 8 lines stating ‘Please see claimant’s bundle/supplementary bundle: pages X’). Knowledge of Asserted Protected Disclosures/Protected Act 217. While the claimant relied upon the contents of her self-referral forms to [NAME_32], as well as the matters discussed with [NAME_32], as constituting both protected disclosures and protected acts, she also accepted that the content of those self-referral forms, and all matters discussed during [NAME_32] consultations, were entirely confidential, and were not disclosed beyond the [NAME_32] department (see paragraph 174). This was due to the fact that they were self-referrals, rather than management referrals. Given that concession, even if these were established to be protected acts/protected disclosures, the claimant could not have been subjected to detriments because/on the grounds of these, nor could these be the reason for her dismissal (as it was not asserted that the medical professionals within [NAME_32] were responsible for any of the asserted detriments or the dismissal). Those particular items on the [NAME_9] were accordingly not considered further. There was no merit in determining whether they did in fact constitute protected disclosures or protected acts, as any complaints related to those asserted protected acts and protected disclosures could not succeed. 218. The claimant also relied upon the content of a disclosure to the [NAME_36] on 5 September 2024 as constituting a protected disclosure. As stated at paragraph 144 however, she accepted that she requested that [NAME_36] contact her to request specific consent, before disclosing or discussing the information she had provided to them to [NAME_6]. She was not contacted by [NAME_36], following her submission and she did not suggest that the respondents, or any of [NAME_6]’s employees, were contacted by [NAME_36], or were otherwise aware of the content of what she submitted to [NAME_36].

Accordingly, even if the disclosure was found to be a protected disclosure, there was no evidence that the respondents, or any of [NAME_6]’s employees were aware of this. The claimant could not, therefore, have been subjected to detriments on the grounds of this, nor could this be the reason for her dismissal. There was accordingly no merit in considering this further. Direct Race Discrimination 219. The Tribunal considered each asserted act of direct race discrimination, considering whether the [NAME_120] treatment occurred, whether it amounted to less favourable treatment (the claimant relies upon hypothetical comparators)

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 67 and, if so, what the reason for that treatment was: was it because the claimant is of Spanish national origin and nationality? 219.1. From 1 March 2023 onwards, allocating complex and time sensitive work to the claimant. The Tribunal’s findings regarding this are set out in paragraph 21. The Tribunal accepted that this treatment occurred. The Tribunal concluded however that all employees working in the [NAME_93] required to undertake complex and time sensitive work. Work was generally taken from a queue by employees themselves. Where it was allocated, it was done in an even-handed manner. The claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances. Her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not therefore succeed. 219.2. From 5 September 2023, failing to adhere to the policy, guidelines and process of the annual review and PDR form 2023. The Tribunal’s findings regarding the PDR Guidance are set out in paragraph 17.5. No evidence was led in relation to any further documented policy or process in relation to PDRs, other than the guidance on the forms themselves. The findings regarding the process followed in relation to the claimant’s PDR for 2023 are at paragraphs 31-56. The Tribunal concluded that there was a failure to follow process in one respect, namely that the form stated that objectives should be agreed during the meeting, and the [NAME_91] should document those within the form following the meeting. That was however in conflict with the process as contained in the PDR Guidance, which indicated that either party could complete the first draft. For the reasons set out in paragraph 31, and intimated to the claimant on 7 August 2023, it was only possible to discuss provisional objectives on 7 August 2023. The claimant was given the opportunity to reflect on any additional objectives she wished to have included, and forward these to [NAME_45] for consideration. [NAME_45] then inserted suggested objectives into the form, once [NAME_98] objectives were finalised, and forwarded the form, with the objectives, to the claimant for consideration. There was no evidence before the Tribunal demonstrating that others were treated, or would have been treated, differently. The evidence was that the objectives of all of the [NAME_95] could only be finalised once the SCMs had had their own objectives confirmed. As less favourable treatment has not been established, the complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. 219.3. [NAME_46]’s comments to the claimant on 12 September 2023. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are in paragraph 35. To the extent reflected in those findings, the Tribunal accepted that the asserted

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 68 treatment occurred. The Tribunal concluded however that [NAME_46] would have made the same comments to any other [NAME_97] in the same circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. The Tribunal was satisfied however that [NAME_46] made these comments because he genuinely believed that to be the case, not because of the claimant’s nationality or national origin. 219.4. [NAME_46] silencing the claimant when she tried to raise her concerns during a Teams call on the afternoon of 12 September 2023. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to that call are at paragraph 36. The Tribunal did not find that [NAME_46] tried to silence the claimant during the discussion. As the treatment asserted was not established, the complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. 219.5. Refusing to engage with the claimant to resolve the issues regarding her 2023 PDR. The findings regarding the steps taken in relation to the 2023 PDR are at paragraphs 31-56. The Tribunal did not accept that there was a refusal to engage with the claimant to resolve the issues. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that considerable steps were taken to try to do so. It was the claimant who was refusing to engage and follow reasonable requests. As the treatment asserted was not established, the complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. 219.6. From 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] continually insisting that the claimant accept the PDR form, and the comments made by him that day. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to [NAME_46]’s actions regarding the 2023 PDR process are set out in paragraphs 35-50. The Tribunal concluded that [NAME_46] was not continually insisting that the claimant accept the PDR form: he was requesting that she engage with the process, by marking up the PDR form with any comments she wished to make, so that these could be considered by her manager, as [NAME_45] had been requesting. In relation to that element, the treatment asserted has not been established. The Tribunal’s findings regarding comments made by [NAME_46] on 26 September 2023 are set out in paragraphs 47-50. To the extent reflected in those findings, the Tribunal accepted that the asserted treatment occurred. The Tribunal concluded however that [NAME_46] would have made the same comments to any anyone else in the same or similar circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different,

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 69 circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. The Tribunal was satisfied however that [NAME_46] made these comments because the claimant was not constructively engaging in the process and was not responding to reasonable requests, not because of her nationality or national origin. 219.7. Completing and closing the PDR form on 19 October 2023, and including additional comments on this. The Tribunal’s findings regarding this are set out in paragraph 56. The Tribunal accepted that this treatment occurred. The Tribunal concluded however that the same course of action would have been followed with any employee in the same or similar circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal was satisfied that this was done because parties had clearly reached an impasse, and HR had indicated that 2 versions of the form could be saved where this occurred, not because of the claimant’s nationality or national origin. 219.8. [NAME_46] stating, on 6 March 2024, that it was odd that the claimant did not want to leave the University. The Tribunal’s findings regarding this are set out in paragraph 87. The Tribunal accepted that this occurred. There was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be concluded that this was less favourable treatment. Further, there was no basis upon which it could be concluded or inferred that [NAME_46]’s statement was because of the claimant’s nationality or national origin. The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination in relation to this comment accordingly does not succeed. 219.9. Failing to initially respond to the claimant’s request to undertake CPD dated 5 June 2024, and then stating that, although approved on this occasion, ‘it was not without concerns’. The Tribunal’s findings regarding this are set out in paragraph 130. The Tribunal accepted that this occurred. There was however no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be concluded that this was less favourable treatment. The Tribunal concluded that the same would have been said to any other member of the team, in the same or similar circumstances. Further, there was no basis upon which it could be concluded or inferred that this was said because of the claimant’s nationality or national origin: it was clearly said because of concerns regarding how the training would directly benefit the claimant’s work and the time commitment required. The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination in relation to this comment accordingly does not succeed.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 70 220. The claimant’s complaints of direct race discrimination do not therefore succeed and are dismissed. Harassment Related to Race 221. The Tribunal then considered each allegation of harassment, considering whether there was unwanted conduct, whether it related to race and, if so, whether the conduct had the proscribed purpose or effect. The Tribunal was mindful that, before the burden of proof can shift to the respondent, the claimant requires to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she has been subjected to ‘unwanted conduct’ which has the proscribed purpose or effect and must also adduce some evidence to suggest that the conduct could be related to race. The Tribunal’s findings regarding each asserted act of harassment related to race are as follows: 221.1. From 5 September 2023, failing to adhere to the policy, guidelines and process of the annual review and PDR form 2023. The Tribunal did not accept that [NAME_45] ‘fabricated an appearance of an annual review conversation’. As set out in paragraph 219.2 above, the Tribunal concluded that there was a failure to follow process in one respect only, namely that the PDR form stated that objectives should be agreed during the meeting and the [NAME_91] should document those within the form, following the meeting. The Tribunal accepted that, from the claimant’s perspective, this was unwanted conduct. The Tribunal concluded however that this was not, in any way, related to race. As set out in paragraph 31, it was only possible to discuss provisional objectives on 7 August 2023: these could not be finalised until the [NAME_98]’s objectives were set. [NAME_45] inserted suggested objectives into the form, once [NAME_98] objectives were finalised, and forwarded the form, with the objectives, to the claimant for consideration. This was entirely unrelated to race. 221.2. Reference to the claimant being a ‘[NAME_104]’ and having a ‘passion for [NAME_103] related work’. There was no dispute that these comments were stated in the 5 September 2023 version of the PDR. The Tribunal accepted the claimant’s assertion that this was unwanted. They did not however accept that these comments were related to race: anyone can have a ‘passion for [NAME_103] related work’ and the fact that an individual has qualified as a solicitor in a particular country is not related to their race: the claimant was also a Scots qualified solicitor, but is not Scottish. Even if that was not the case however, the Tribunal was satisfied that these comments did not have the proscribed purpose: [NAME_45] was in fact highlighting particular areas were the claimant was appreciated – it was helpful to have solicitors qualified in different jurisdictions across the team, and [NAME_45] understood the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 71 claimant did have a passion for [NAME_103] law. He felt that was also beneficial for the team, an example being that she had given a presentation to the team on an [NAME_103] related issue, which was particularly relevant at that time. Whilst the claimant may have perceived the comments to have the proscribed effect, it was not objectively reasonable for them to do so. [NAME_45]’s comments did not, objectively, meet the high test of ‘violating’ the claimant’s dignity, or the threshold of creating an intimidating etc. environment for her. It was not reasonable for the conduct to have that effect in all the circumstances. 221.3. [NAME_46]’s conduct towards the claimant on the afternoon of 12 September 2023. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 36. Whilst this may have been, from the claimant’s perspective, unwanted conduct, the Tribunal concluded that this was not, in any way, related to race. There was no evidence to suggest that it was. 222.

For these reasons, the claimant’s complaints of harassment related to race do not succeed and are dismissed. Harassment related to Disability 223. The Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to each asserted act of harassment related to disability are as follows: 223.1. [NAME_46]’s emails to the claimant on 25 January 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are contained in paragraphs 71-75. The Tribunal accepted that the terms of these emails were, from the claimant’s perspective, unwanted. The Tribunal concluded however that they were not, in any way, related to disability. They were solely related to the fact that the claimant had not been nominated to attend the [NAME_109] and her participation in this had not been discussed or approved. [NAME_46] was also unaware that the claimant had PTSD. The claimant never informed him of this. She only ever, confidentially, stated this to [NAME_119] (see paragraph 175). The respondents first became aware of this when they received her ET1 form, on/after 18 October 2024 (see paragraph 151). 223.2. [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant of 29 March 2024. The claimant stated that this email contained 6 unwelcome references to her mental health. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and the context of those references, are in paragraph 101. Whilst these references may have been unwanted, from the claimant’s perspective, the Tribunal did not however accept that these comments were related to disability. ‘Mental health’ and ‘mental strain’ are not disabilities. The claimant has PTSD, but did

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 72 not inform the respondents of this (other than confidentially to [NAME_119]). Additionally, even if they were so related, whilst the claimant may have perceived the comments to have the proscribed effect, it was not objectively reasonable for them to do so. [NAME_52]’s comments, in the context of his email, did not, objectively, meet the high test of ‘violating’ the claimant’s dignity, or the threshold of creating an intimidating etc. environment for her. He was seeking to support her. It was not reasonable for the conduct to have that effect in all the circumstances. 224.

For these reasons, the claimant’s complaints of harassment related to disability do not succeed and are dismissed. Direct Sex Discrimination/Harassment Related to Sex 225. The Tribunal considered each of the allegations made, considering firstly whether they amounted to direct discrimination (considering whether the [NAME_120] treatment occurred, whether it amounted to less favourable treatment and, if so, what the reason for that treatment was: was it because of sex), and if not, whether they amounted to harassment. 226. The Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to each allegation are set out below: 226.1. On 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] placing pressure on the claimant to accept a unilateral PDR document, using expressions ‘you are here to follow your line manager’s instructions’, ‘all I need is for you to say yes’, ‘otherwise I will take that as a direct refusal to follow instructions (…)’, use of the word ‘obtuse’, ‘(…) unless you tell me now you are going to say yes (…)’; ‘(…) you gave the impression of simply wanting to frustrate/control the PDR process (…)’. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to what occurred on that date are set out in paragraph 47. The Tribunal did not accept that [NAME_46] placed pressure on the claimant to accept a unilateral PDR document. [NAME_46] was trying to get the claimant to mark up the document provided to her with tracked changes, so those proposed changes could be considered. In relation to the comments made by [NAME_46], in so far as reflected in those findings, the Tribunal accepted that the asserted treatment occurred. The Tribunal concluded however that [NAME_46] would have made the same comments to any other [NAME_97] in the same circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter does not succeed. The complaint of harassment in relation to this also does not succeed: the Tribunal was satisfied that the comments which were made were in no way related to sex. It is also notable that in lengthy

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 73 emails which the claimant sent immediately after the discussion, she did not assert that any comments made were because of or related to sex. 226.2. The terms of [NAME_52]’s emails to the claimant and others on 1 February 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 80. The Tribunal concluded [NAME_52] would have responded in the same manner to anyone in these circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter cannot succeed. The complaint of harassment in relation to this also does not succeed. Whilst the Tribunal concluded that it was unwanted conduct, from the claimant’s perspective, the Tribunal was satisfied that the comments which were made were in no way related to sex. They were made as the claimant had suggested that [NAME_52] was supportive of her participating in the [NAME_110]. 226.3. On 14 February 2024, [NAME_52] engaging in an inappropriate, patronising, condescending, demeaning, disrespectful and dismissive verbal interaction with the claimant on the work floor. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to the interaction on 14 February 2024 are set out in paragraph 83. The Tribunal concluded that [NAME_52] did state to the claimant that he wanted to be clear that certain steps required to be taken by 3pm, and repeated this when the claimant would not commit to doing so. This was not however inappropriate, patronising, condescending, demeaning, disrespectful or dismissive. It was entirely appropriate: concerns had been escalated to him about lack of progress and he required to ensure that appropriate action was taken. The Tribunal concluded [NAME_52] would have responded in the same manner to anyone in these circumstances. As the claimant did not demonstrate that she was treated less favourably than others would be treated in the same, or not materially different, circumstances, her complaint of direct discrimination in relation to this matter cannot succeed. The complaint of harassment in relation to this also does not succeed. Whilst the Tribunal concluded that it was unwanted conduct, from the claimant’s perspective, the Tribunal was satisfied that the comments which were made were in no way related to sex. 226.4. Excluding the claimant from team activities, working groups, in- house training and CPD, from January 2024 onwards. The Tribunal made relevant findings in relation to this in paragraphs 86 (4 March 2024), 90 (18 March 2024), paragraphs 115 & 117 (1-2 May 2024) and 138 (August 2024). There was no evidence before the Tribunal from

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 74 which it could be concluded that this constituted less favourably, for the following reasons: 226.4.1.[COMPANY_100] failed to include the claimant in their initial training invite, but there was no evidence that this was sent to other [NAME_95] initially by [COMPANY_100], only that it was sent to [NAME_52]. There was no evidence that [NAME_52] sent it on to other members of his team, but not the claimant. 226.4.2.The concerns regarding the [NAME_111] for the working group around [NAME_112], and the legislation workstream of that, were related to time commitment due to workload in the department. There was no evidence before the Tribunal suggesting that any other [NAME_97]’s in the team were, or would be, permitted to participate in those activities. 226.4.3.By 5 August 2024, the claimant was subject to a disciplinary investigation and [NAME_46] was aware she was to be suspended imminently. There was no evidence before the Tribunal suggesting that any other employee, in the same or similar circumstances, would have their training request, or an application to participate in the [NAME_110], granted in those circumstances. There was also no evidence whatsoever before the Tribunal from which it could be inferred that any of these actions were because of, or related to, sex.

Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed. 226.5. [NAME_52] failing to respond to the claimant’s requests for annual leave, from February 2024 onwards. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to annual leave requests are set out in paragraphs 111-113. Other than in May 2024, the Tribunal’s findings reflect that [NAME_52] did not fail to respond to requests. He responded in a reasonable manner. In the claimant’s email of 10 May 2024, she notes in her email that she wonders whether she received it. No further emails regarding this were referenced, so the Tribunal concludes the request was, shortly thereafter, approved. There was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could conclude that this was less favourable treatment. It appears, even from the claimant’s email, that this is simply a one off oversight. There was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be inferred that this was because of, or related to sex.

Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 75 discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed. 226.6. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 20 March 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to the conduct of the 121 on that date are set out in paragraph 91. The Tribunal did not accept that [NAME_52] acted inappropriately during this meeting, as asserted by the claimant (i.e. using a loud voice, repeatedly cutting her off, talking over her, laughing at her and making veiled threats of disciplinary action). The claimant wrote numerous long emails, raising concerns about numerous other matters, immediately following this meeting, including one addressed to [NAME_52] headed ‘121 today’ (see paragraph 92). She did not raise the particular concerns regarding [NAME_52]’s conduct during the 121 that day, which she now relied upon, in that email, or in the other emails around that time which she sent to [NAME_60] and [NAME_46]. The Tribunal concluded that had [NAME_52]’s conduct been as she now asserts, she would have detailed this in the emails she sent at that time. As the asserted conduct is not established, the complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed. 226.7. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 22 March 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 94. There was no evidence before the Tribunal indicating that this was less favourable treatment: the Tribunal concluded that any [NAME_97] who had been instructed not to attend the [NAME_110] by the [NAME_94] and then the Director of [NAME_93], who subsequently indicated that they still intended to attend (see paragraph 91), and still had the time marked in their diary to do so, would have been treated the same way. Additionally, there was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be inferred that the terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant were because of, or related to, sex.

Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed. 226.8. The terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant dated 29 March 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 101. There was no evidence before the Tribunal indicating that this was less favourable treatment: the Tribunal concluded that that [NAME_52] would have sent the same email to any other direct report in similar circumstances. Additionally, there was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be inferred that the terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant were because of, or related to, sex.

Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 76 226.9. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant in seeking to control her calendar and physical whereabouts in the building at any given time, up to and including 17 April 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 110. There was no evidence before the Tribunal indicating that this was less favourable treatment: the Tribunal concluded that that [NAME_52] would have sent the same email to any other direct report in similar circumstances. Additionally, there was no evidence before the Tribunal from which it could be inferred that the terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant were because of, or related to, sex.

Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex in relation to this do not succeed. 226.10. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 15 May 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 125. As is clear from paragraph 126, there was a dispute between the parties as to what occurred on that date. On balance, the Tribunal preferred that of [NAME_52]: he raised the issue as he was considering whether reporting could be improved, which tied in with him then asserting that improvements could still be considered. Also, taking into account the context, and in particular the fact that the claimant had been advised the day before of the commencement of a disciplinary investigation into her conduct, the Tribunal concluded that it was more likely that the claimant was abrupt during the meeting, rather than [NAME_52]. As the conduct was not established, the complaints of direct discrimination and harassment cannot succeed. For the avoidance of doubt however, no evidence was led from which it could have been inferred that [NAME_52]’s conduct, even if established, was because of, or related to, sex. 226.11. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 24 July 2024. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraph 133. There was a significant dispute between the parties as to what occurred on that date. The claimant’s evidence to the Tribunal reflected (verbatim) the account which she provided in written correspondence on 2 September 2024 (see paragraph 145), although in her evidence she also described this interaction as ‘dehumanising’. The Tribunal notes that she has also described the incident as ‘violent’ in other evidence the Tribunal was referred to. On balance, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of [NAME_52] in relation to this incident. In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal took into account that the claimant did not provide any detail in relation to this extremely serious allegation for nearly 6 weeks. She did not report it to [NAME_6], or indeed the police, initially. She asserted that, when [NAME_52] moved to a farther point, she was unable to hear the ‘slur or remarks’ he was making – implying that she was able to hear the initial ‘slurring taunting remarks’. Indeed, the fact that she categorised them as ‘taunting

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 77 remarks’ suggests she was able to hear what was said, to be able to categorise them as such. No details were however provided, at any stage, of what she asserted that he said initially. The Tribunal concluded that, had this occurred as the claimant stated, details of what was stated initially would have been included in her statement, she would have reported this immediately and would have demanded that her colleagues be spoken to, to corroborate her version of events. In addition, none of the other 4 individuals, who were present during this incident, have come forward to report it. Had it occurred in the manner the claimant suggested, the Tribunal concluded that they would have done so. As the conduct was not established, the complaints of direct discrimination and harassment cannot succeed. For the avoidance of doubt however, no evidence was led from which it could have been inferred that [NAME_52]’s conduct, even if established, was because of, or related to, sex. 227.

For these reasons, the claimant’s complaints of direct sex discrimination and harassment related to sex do not succeed and are dismissed. Disclosures – s43A-H ERA 228. The Tribunal considered each of the matters relied upon by the claimant as protected disclosures. The Tribunal was mindful that five elements require to be considered in determining whether each asserted disclosure amounted to a qualifying disclosure (was there a disclosure of information, did the claimant believe that the disclosure tended to show a relevant failure, was that belief reasonable, did the claimant believe that the disclosure was made in the public interest, was that belief reasonable?). Unless all five conditions are satisfied, there will not be a qualifying disclosure. 229. The Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to each asserted disclosure, and whether it was a qualifying and protected disclosure, are set out below: 229.1. Disclosures, verbally and by email, to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46] on 19 May, 9 June, 31 August and 19 September 2023 regarding a likely failure to comply with the delegated authority schedule and principles. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are set out in paragraphs 26- 28. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s oral statements reflected the content of her emails. In context, her email of 19 May 2023 is a query only: she is asking [NAME_45] if the piece of work should be classed as relating to the provision of services, rather than research, and, if so, whether it should be redirected to a different department. It is not a disclosure of information tending to show a relevant failure. She is requesting, rather than providing, information. There was information disclosed on 31 August 2023, but that was simply that [NAME_45] had previously agreed the

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 78 work required to be sent to a different queue, but that request was not actioned. It was not a qualifying disclosure, as the information disclosed did not relate to a relevant failure. No further information was disclosed on 19 September 2023. Similarly, the claimant’s email of 9 June 2023 (paragraph 28) is, in context, a query: she is asking if her understanding of a particular matter is correct - ‘Forgive my imperfect understanding of how this policy may be implemented in practice as I do not have any insight into acting in this capacity for the University…it does not appear obvious to me that this is open to discretionary adherence…’ She was not disclosing information which she reasonably believed showed a relevant failure. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that these were not qualifying disclosures. 229.2. Concerns raised with [NAME_45] and [NAME_46], verbally and by email, 9 June, 12 & 14 July and 25 August 2023, that there would be a likely breach of clinical trials regulations and research governance frameworks in relation to a material transfer where there was a requirement to ensure that ethics and governance approvals were met, and risks re breach of export control regulations. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and what was disclosed by the claimant, are limited to what is set out in paragraph 29. The claimant did not state that would be a breach of clinical trials regulations. She did not state there would be a breach of research governance frameworks. She did not state there would be a breach of export control regulations. She did not disclose any information in relation to these matters. She merely passed on advice from [COMPANY_100] that [NAME_6] was exposed to an unspecified risk if they arranged the material transfer agreement. That was not a disclosure of information. It was accordingly not a qualifying disclosure. While the claimant asserted in her evidence that she also disclosed information orally on the remaining dates, from the evidence she gave, those statements would not have met the threshold level of sufficiency in terms of factual content and specificity to amount to qualifying disclosures. Her evidence demonstrated that, at best, she made a number of allegations asserting breaches, but did not disclose information. The Tribunal concluded however that it was more likely that what the claimant stated to [NAME_46] and [NAME_45] at the time was reflected in the contemporaneous emails she sent, so made no findings re more extensive oral statements being made. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that these were not qualifying disclosures. 229.3. Her oral statement, in a discussion with [NAME_52] on 17 January 2024, that she was feeling intimidated, threatened and distressed and that behaviours which they had been discussing amounted to victimisation. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and what was

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 79 disclosed by the claimant, are limited to what is set out in paragraph 67. The claimant stated that she ‘felt intimidated’ by the suggestion that disciplinary action could be taken against her, and that she felt she had been treated badly and ‘victimised’ in the PDR process. This was not however disclosure of information tending to show a relevant failure. They were statements explaining how she, personally, felt. The Tribunal concluded that the reference, in the discussion, to feeling ‘victimised’ was synonymous with asserting that she felt badly treated. It was not a reference to the legal concept of victimisation, as contained within the EqA. The claimant was simply stating to [NAME_52] that she felt she had been badly treated in the past and this was continuing with the suggestion that disciplinary action could now be taken. The claimant did not assert that any legal obligation had been, or was likely to be breached, or provide information tending to show that. There was no suggestion that her comments were made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that they were made in the public interest. The claimant was simply discussing her personal circumstances with [NAME_52]. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that these were not qualifying disclosures. 229.4. Her email to HR dated 30 March 2024, and in the investigation meeting held on 12 June 2024 in which she raised concerns in relation to the health and safety of an individual. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and what was disclosed by the claimant, are limited to what is set out in paragraph 104. There was information disclosed on 30 March and 12 June 2024, but that information was simply that a colleague told her that she had raised concerns on 15 February 2024, after she heard, from others, about an incident arising from an inappropriate verbal interaction involving the claimant on 14 February 2024. It did not contain sufficient factual content and specificity capable of tending to show a relevant failure, such as a failure or likely failure to comply with a legal obligation. The Tribunal concluded that, if the claimant believed that his statement tended to show that a legal obligation had not been complied with, or that any other relevant failure had occurred, that belief was not reasonably held in circumstances. In addition, there was no suggestion that the statement was made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a qualifying disclosure. 229.5. Her email to HR dated 7 August 2024 in which she referenced behaviours being contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and what was disclosed by the claimant, are limited to what is set out in paragraph 139. There was

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 80 information disclosed, but that information was simply that [NAME_46] had indicated that he would not approve her attendance on a training course, nor her participation on the [NAME_110], as he did not think it was appropriate for her to attend either course when there were serious concerns in relation to her behaviours. While the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was then listed with other legislation, the claimant did not provide any further detail beyond appearing to allege that [NAME_46]’s refusal may breach that legislation. She did not set out any detail as to how it may do so. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s email did not contain sufficient factual content and specificity capable of tending to show that [NAME_46]’s conduct amounted to a breach of a legal obligation, or criminal offence, under the Protection of Harassment Act 1997. Simply referencing conduct and then the legislation is not sufficient. The Tribunal concluded that, if the claimant believed that his statement tended to show that a legal obligation had not been complied with, or that a criminal offence had been committed, that belief was not reasonably held in circumstances. In addition, there was no suggestion that the statement was made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a qualifying disclosure. 229.6. Her email to HR dated 2 September 2024, in which she reported the [NAME_120] incident on 24 July 2024. The terms of the email relied upon by the claimant are set out at paragraph 145. The Tribunal found that information was disclosed in this email, in relation to [NAME_52]’s conduct towards her. The Tribunal found however that these statements did not have sufficient factual content and specificity capable of tending to show a relevant failure: no information was disclosed regarding what was said during the interaction and, while she stated that it ‘potentially falls within a hate incident’, she did not specify any information which would bring the incident within the remit of a hate crime. She asserted that it was ‘potentially…a hate incident’, not that she reasonably believed it was. Similarly, whilst the claimant stated that it was ‘indeed frightening’, she did not assert that she was in fear of bodily harm, which would bring the incident within the remit of assault. Again, she asserted that it was ‘potentially…criminally relevant’, not that she reasonably believed it was a criminal offence. In addition, there was no suggestion that the statement was made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest. The statement was not made immediately after the incident, but in the context of a grievance investigation, nearly 6 weeks later, as an example of behaviour aimed at forcing her, personally, to resign. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a qualifying disclosure.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 81 229.7. Concerns that there would likely be a breach of data protection obligations in relation to data subjects, who were vulnerable children, if the [NAME_6] authorised a document, which were raised by the claimant as follows: 229.7.1.Orally to [NAME_45] 4 July 2023, and in a recap email of the same date. The Tribunal’s findings regarding what the claimant stated in her email of 4 July to [NAME_45] are set out in paragraph 30. She did not specify in evidence what, if anything, she stated to him orally on that date. She initially stated to [NAME_45] that she had been asked to draft a data sharing agreement, but intended to ask the Lead to draft a project agreement first. She did not disclose any further information in her subsequent email. She did not, at any stage, assert that there had been, or was likely to be, a failure to comply with a legal obligation. 229.7.2.In an email dated 2 May 2024 to the portfolio manager and [NAME_46]. The Tribunal’s findings regarding what the claimant stated in her email are set out paragraph 119. She stated that she required to adopt a consistent and thorough approach and that legal and compliance considerations were mandatory in her remit. While that is a disclosure of information, it is not information which tends to show that there had been, or was likely to be, a failure to comply with a legal obligation. It was her job to ensure that there was no such failure. 229.7.3.Orally in a team meeting on 15 May 2024. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the file was mentioned by the claimant at the team meeting (see paragraph 120), no evidence was given in relation to what was actually stated at the meeting. As the Tribunal were not in a position to make findings in fact in relation to precisely what was stated at the meeting, the Tribunal conclude that the claimant has not demonstrated that she made a qualifying disclosure on that date. 229.7.4.In an email to [NAME_46] dated 28 May 2024. The Tribunal’s findings regarding what the claimant stated in her emails to [NAME_46] are set out in paragraph 121. The only information disclosed in that email was that a collaboration agreement had now been signed. While that is a disclosure of information, it is not information which tends to show that there had been, or was likely to be, a failure to comply with a legal obligation. 229.7.5.In the investigation meeting held on 1 October 2024. The Tribunal’s findings regarding what the claimant stated in her

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 82 email to [NAME_46] are set out in paragraph 150. She simply stated that work required to be done properly and compliantly, giving proper consideration to regulatory requirements and obligations. She stated that the draft initially produced presented would not have ensured compliance with data protection regulations, but she completed the work in a way to ensure that there was compliance. While that is a disclosure of information, it is not information which tends to show that there had been, or was likely to be, a failure to comply with a legal obligation. It was her job to identify where legal risks might arise, and ensure compliance. She stated that she did so. Given the above conclusions, the Tribunal determined that the claimant did not make qualifying disclosures in relation to a breach of data protection obligations by [NAME_6], in relation to data subjects who were vulnerable children. 229.8. A disclosure to [NAME_36] on 5 September 2024, in which the claimant informed them of breaches of equality and human rights laws, disclosing that [NAME_6] was failing to comply with legal obligations, including in relation to the public sector equality, health and safety of employees. For the reasons set out in paragraph 218 above, the Tribunal did not determine whether this was a protected disclosure or not. 229.9. Her [NAME_31], dated 11 February 2024, 30 October 2024 and 18 April 2025, where she made disclosures relating to failure to exercise duty of care and ensuring a safe working environment including by adequately addressing psychosocial hazards and poor behaviour. For the reasons set out in paragraph 217 above, the Tribunal did not determine whether these were protected disclosures or not. 229.10. Her correspondence of 18 March 2025, in which she made complaints in relation to the handling of the grievance and disciplinary process, referencing the conduct amounting to victimisation and this being unlawful. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this, and what was disclosed by the claimant, are limited to what is set out in paragraph 162. The only information disclosed is that the letter ‘seems to imply’ that the disciplinary process is being operated in respect of the grievance. No information is disclosed in the remainder of the email: the claimant simply makes allegations. To the extent that the claimant discloses information (rather than simply making allegations), the Tribunal concluded that there was insufficient factual content and specificity capable of tending to show a relevant failure,

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 83 such as a failure, or likely failure, to comply with a legal obligation. In addition, there was no suggestion that the statement was made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a qualifying disclosure. 229.11. Her written statement, submitted on 26 March 2025, in which she referenced the respondent failing to deal with grievances and follow proper procedures, asserting that this constituted unlawful detriment, victimisation and was unlawful. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this statement are set out in paragraph 164. The claimant did not identify which part of this 32 page statement she relied upon as constituting a protected disclosure. The Tribunal concluded that, while information was disclosed, there was insufficient factual content and specificity capable of tending to show a relevant failure, such as a failure, or likely failure, to comply with a legal obligation. In addition, and more fundamentally, there was no suggestion that the statement was made in the public interest, or that the claimant reasonably believed that it was made in the public interest. It was the claimant’s personal statement to the disciplinary panel, setting out the claimant’s personal response to the allegations of misconduct which had been levelled against her. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a qualifying disclosure. Protected Disclosures - Detriment & Dismissal – s47B & s103A ERA 230. As a result of the above findings, the claimant’s complaints that she was subjected to detriments by the respondents on the ground that she made protected disclosures, or that such disclosures were the reason for her dismissal, do not succeed and are dismissed. Victimisation – Protected Acts 231. The Tribunal have made findings in fact in relation to each asserted protected act, summarising the concern or issue raised in the correspondence or communication and setting out any matters which could, potentially, allude to that concern or issue being a protected act. Where there is no reference, in the Tribunal’s findings in fact, to particular issues or concerns being raised, protected characteristics or conduct prohibited by the EqA, that means that the Tribunal concluded that those issues were not referenced in the correspondence or communication relied upon by the claimant as constituting a protected act. 232. The Tribunal considered each of the matters relied upon by the claimant as protected acts and the findings in fact reached. Having considered each in turn,

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 84 given the number of protected acts relied upon, and to avoid repetition, this Judgment sets out the Tribunal’s conclusions regarding each protected act asserted with reference to 3 categories, as set out below. 233. In each category there is a table, which sets out: the ‘Issue Number’ which is the number from the [NAME_9]; the description of the asserted protected act contained in the [NAME_9]; and the paragraph in this Judgment where the Tribunal’s findings of fact, in relation to that particular asserted protected act, can be found. Where the issue number is marked with a *, that indicates that there is further commentary, below the table, in relation to that particular issue. Category 1 234. The first category is of asserted protected acts where the Tribunal’s findings of fact demonstrate that there was nothing asserted whatsoever in the correspondence/communication relied upon which would, or could, constitute a protected act. In relation to this category, the Tribunal conclude that the claimant made no reference to the EqA, no reference to any protected characteristics, and she did not assert facts which, if proved, could amount to a contravention of the EqA. Rather, the claimant was simply asserting, in the majority of these cases, that she disagreed with the way she had been treated and/or that she expected to be treated fairly, professionally and/or reasonably. The Tribunal concluded that the following asserted protected acts fell within this category: Issue Number Description from [NAME_9] Tribunal’s Findings 6.1.1 Orally stating to [NAME_45] on 15 June 2023 that she expected to be treated as any other contracts manager or solicitor, and should not be treated differently. 25 6.1.2 Requesting, on 11 September 2023 & 17 October 2023, that an HR representative be present at meetings. 34 & 58 6.1.3 Orally stating to [NAME_45], on 12 September 2023, that the conduct referenced in section 7.3 [NAME_136] [fabricating the appearance of an annual review conversation, and the content of the PDR] was unwelcome, and the reasons for this, and that she could not sign off the PDR as a result. 35

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 85 6.1.4 Orally stating to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46], on 12 September 2023, that she felt strongly about being treated fairly and consistently in line with policy and guidelines applicable to all, and that such statements were causing her to feel distressed as she felt the response amounted to unjustifiable differential treatment, and had a degrading and intimidating effect. 35 6.1.5 Orally stating to [NAME_46], on 12 September 2023, that she felt alarmed by what was happening, that her expectation was a respectful, reasonable and joint resolution and that she could not see how it would be justifiable to complete her annual review without her participation at all and against the process to her detriment. Also stating to [NAME_46] that the level of acrimony she was perceiving was unnecessary. 36 6.1.6 Her email to [NAME_60] dated 21 September 2023. 44 6.1.7 Her oral statements to [NAME_46], during their discussion on 26 September 2023, and her follow up emails to [NAME_46] and [NAME_60] later that day. 47, 49 & 51 6.1.9* On 19 October 2023, orally raising concerns with [NAME_60] about [NAME_46]’s behaviour on 26 September 2023 and about the intensified treatment of the same nature she was being subjected to there and then, whereby she felt “scapegoated” and unreasonably retaliated against. 59 6.1.10 Her email to [NAME_60], dated 30 October 2023, in which she reported being unfairly deprived of a promotion opportunity, as retaliation. 61 6.1.14 Orally stating to [NAME_52], on 18 January 2024, that she felt the overall situation was harassing, retaliatory and victimising and was causing her increasing distress and alarm. 69 6.1.15 Her email to [NAME_52] and HR on 25 January 2024. 73 6.1.16 Her email to [NAME_46] and HR on 25 January 2024. 76 6.1.18 Her email to [NAME_52] dated 1 February 2024. 81

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 86 6.1.20 Her oral statements to [NAME_52], on 15 February 2024, that she needed the unacceptable behaviour and harassment against her to cease and be rectified and that there was no good reason why she should be treated unfavourably. 85 6.1.21 Her emails to [NAME_52] and HR in the period from 4-6 March 2024 86 6.1.22* Her oral statements during a meeting with [[NAME_56] and] HR on 7 March 2024. 88 6.1.25 Her emails dated 2 & 4 April 2024. 106 & 109 6.1.30 Her email dated 17 April 2024. 110 6.1.31* Her emails to [NAME_52] dated 22 April, 20 May and 5 June 2024. 127 6.1.32 Her emails to [NAME_46] and HR on 2 & 9 May 2024. 116 & 118 6.1.33 Her email to [NAME_52] dated 2 May 2024. 122 6.1.35 Her email to [NAME_46] dated 28 May 2024. 121 6.1.37 Her email to [NAME_52] dated 26 June 2024. 131 6.1.38 Her email to HR dated 18 July 2024. 133 6.1.43 Her letter dated 15 October 2024. 149 235. In relation to issue 6.1.9, the Tribunal did not accept that the claimant raised issues at that meeting regarding [NAME_46]’s conduct on 26 September 2023: it was not mentioned in [NAME_46]’s email summarising the meeting, sent on 1 November 2023, and the claimant did not raise any issue with that. Rather, in her email to [NAME_60] dated 16 November 2023, she stated ‘you can perhaps suppose how the conversation on 26th September I emailed you about went down.’ She would not have done so had she expressly raised concerns about [NAME_46]’s behaviour that day, at the meeting on 19 October 2023, as she asserts. She would instead have referred to the concerns which she raised during the meeting. While the Tribunal accepts that the claimant likely continued to assert that she was being unreasonably and unfairly treated, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant made no reference to the EqA or any protected characteristics, and she did not assert facts which, if proved, could amount to a contravention of the EqA.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 87 236. In relation to issue 6.1.22, the claimant asserted that she indicated to [NAME_56] during this meeting that she had been harassed. [NAME_56] and [NAME_60] indicated in evidence, that she did not do so. On balance, the Tribunal preferred their evidence in relation to this. If the claimant had indeed said this during the meeting, [NAME_56] would have referenced this in her email sent following the meeting (see paragraph 89), or the claimant would have mentioned this, and the context in which she asserted that, in the lengthy email which she sent following the meeting (see paragraph 89). As the Tribunal concluded that the statements were not made, this cannot amount to a protected act. 237. In relation to issue 6.1.31, while the claimant stated in her Particulars of Claim that she also relied upon emails sent at 16:52 on 22 April 2024 and at 19:55 on 5 June 2024, the Tribunal were not taken to any such emails, and heard no evidence in relation to them. No findings of fact were accordingly made in relation to these issues, and there is no basis for the Tribunal to conclude that protected acts took place on those dates. Category 2 238. The second category is where the claimant used words such as ‘harassment’ or ‘discrimination’ in her communication/correspondence. This was often in lists of descriptors of her treatment which included reference to that being ‘unfair’, ‘unprofessional’ and/or ‘unreasonable’, or with reference to behaviour also constituting bullying. On each occasion, the claimant made no reference to any such behaviour or treatment being because of, or related to, any protected characteristics, and she did not assert facts which, if proved, could amount to a contravention of the EqA. This category also covers scenarios where the claimant referred to ‘victimising’ behaviour or ‘victimisation’, but did not reference that being because she had done anything which constituted a protected act. The Tribunal was cognisant of the claimant’s background, qualifications and experience, and noted that she is legally trained and is an experienced solicitor, qualified in two different jurisdictions. She is intelligent, highly educated and assertive. Taking into account the context, including those facts and how the content of the correspondence/communication would be understood by the recipient, the Tribunal concluded that these were not protected acts. There was nothing in the communication/correspondence which showed that it was a complaint to which the EqA potentially applied. The words used, for example ‘harassment’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘victimisation’, were not being used in the context prohibited conduct contrary to the EqA, but instead to communicate that the claimant was being subjected to detrimental action which was unfair, unprofessional and/or unreasonable. The Tribunal concluded that the following asserted protected acts fell within this category.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 88 Issue No. Description from [NAME_9] Tribunal’s Findings 6.1.8* Her emails dated 8 October 2023. 52 & 53 6.1.11 Her email to [NAME_60], dated 16 November 2023. 63 6.1.12* Her request, submitted on 1 December 2023, entitled ‘PDR form 01/08/2022-31/07/2023, with attached PDR form, which addressed the issue of the conduct of the review and made it clear that the conduct related to her race was unwanted by her. 64 6.1.13 Orally stating to [NAME_52] on 17 January 2024 that she felt intimidated, threatened and distressed, that such behaviour amounted to victimisation, and that she should be protected against it. 67 6.1.25 Her emails dated 20 March, 4 & 5 April 2024. 92 & 108 6.1.26 Her email dated 22 March 2024 95 6.1.27* Her emails dated 25 March 2024. 97 & 98 6.1.28* Her email dated 28 March 2024. 100 6.1.24 Her email to HR dated 29 March 2024. 102 6.1.29* Concerns raised with the Equality, Diversity and Inclusion team on 29 March 2024. 103 6.1.34* Raising a grievance on 24 May 2024, her responses to requests from HR for clarification of her grievances, and the written statements she provided on 12 & 17 September 2024. 128, 146 & 147 6.1.36 Oral statements made at the disciplinary investigation meetings on 7 & 12 June, and 1 October 2024. 129 & 150 6.1.39 Her emails dated 19 July 2024. 131 6.1.40 Her email to [NAME_52] dated 25 July 2024. 136 6.1.41 Her email to HR dated 13 August 2024. 141

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 89 239. For the avoidance of doubt, in relation to issue number 6.1.8 & 6.1.12, which are interlinked as both relate to the claimant’s response to the comments in her PDR document, taking into account the context, the Tribunal concluded that these were not protected acts. In the first email on 8 October 2023, the claimant was simply asserting that: she did not feel her contribution was being appropriately, or fully, acknowledged and reflected in the comments; that her expertise was not limited to being a ‘[NAME_104]’ and the phrase ‘experienced Contracts Manager and dual-qualified solicitor’ would more appropriately reflect her expertise; and that she felt that the PDR process had not been followed. Whilst the claimant stated that her ‘qualifications and experience are undoubtedly more relevant than her national origin’, the reference was to her being a [NAME_104], not of Spanish national origin. The two do not go hand in hand: the claimant is also a Scots qualified solicitor, but is not Scottish. She suggested preferable wording which made reference to her being a dual qualified, rather than a Spanish qualified, solicitor. That is not an assertion of facts which could amount to a contravention of the EqA. Similarly, whether she has a ‘passion for [NAME_103] related work’, as [NAME_45] stated, or a ‘knowledge of [NAME_103]’, as she stated, is a difference in personal opinion or perception. It is not an assertion of facts which could amount to a contravention of the EqA. Taking into account the context, the Tribunal concluded that these were not protected acts. 240. In relation to issue numbers 6.1.27, 6.1.28, 6.1.29 & 6.1.34, the Tribunal noted that the claimant referred to a ‘Zero tolerance stance and policy on bullying, harassment and discrimination’. In the absence however of any reference to any protected characteristics, or facts which, if proved, could amount to a contravention of the EqA, the Tribunal concluded this did not, of itself, amount to a protected act. Category 3 241. The acts asserted in this category did amount to protected acts. The Tribunal concluded that the following asserted protected acts fell within this category. Issue No. Description from [NAME_9] Tribunal’s Findings 6.1.44* Taking steps to raise a Tribunal, namely by commencing early conciliation on 15 August 2024 and presenting a claim on 15 October 2024. 142 & 151 6.1.45* Raising a second grievance on 1 November 2024. 152 6.1.46* The terms of her emails in the period from 28 November 2024 to 10 January 2025, in a chain of 153

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 90 emails under the heading “28.12.2024 – Request (duty of care) – Strictly private and confidential’. 6.1.48* Her email to HR dated 17 January 2025. 154 6.1.49* Raising a third grievance on 25 March 2025. 163 242. Bringing proceedings under the EqA constitutes a protected act by virtue of s27(2)(a) EqA. The claimant clearly specified in her claim that she was bringing complaints under the EqA. Commencing early conciliation constitutes a protected act by virtue of s27(2)(c) EqA. 243. In relation to issue numbers 6.1.45 & 6.1.46, in her grievance of 1 November 2024, and in the email trail from 3 December 2024 to 10 January 2025, the claimant asserted that there had been a failure to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the grievance process. By that time the respondents were aware, by virtue of her ET1 form, of the claimant’s assertion that she was a disabled person as a result of having PTSD. Taking into account the information in the grievance/emails and, how it would be understood in the context of the other information available to [NAME_6] at that time (in particular the terms of the ET1), the Tribunal concluded that this was a protected act. 244. In relation to issue 6.1.48, the claimant expressly states that she feels that the circumstances she outlined potentially amounted to ‘victimisation contrary to the Equality Act’. Whilst she does not set out the protected act relied upon, she is explicitly making an allegation of a contravention of the EqA and had recently raised Employment Tribunal proceedings, which constituted a protected act, which [NAME_6] was aware of. Taking into account how this would be understood by [NAME_6] in context, at that time, the Tribunal concluded that this was a protected act. 245. In her grievance of 25 March 2025, the claimant asserted that there had been a discriminatory confected agenda (in various forms) fundamentally contrary to law’ and ‘a prolonged and severe discriminatory course of conduct.’ Taking into account the information in the grievance and, how it would be understood in the context of the other information available to [NAME_6] at that time (in particular the terms of the ET1), the Tribunal concluded that this was a protected act. Remaining Protected Acts Asserted 246. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal did not determine whether the following amounted to protected acts, for the following reasons: 246.1. The claimant’s email to HR on 28 January 2024 (Issue number 6.1.17). No emails dated 28 January 2024 were introduced into evidence. As the Tribunal were not in a position to make findings in fact

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 91 in relation to precisely what was stated in any such correspondence, the Tribunal conclude that the claimant has not demonstrated that she did a protected act on that date. 246.2. The claimant’s [NAME_119] self-referral forms dated 11 February and 30 October 2024 (Issue number 6.1.19). For the reasons set out in paragraph 217 above. 246.3. Her oral statements during her consultations with [NAME_119] on 20 March and 7 November 2024 (Issue number 6.1.23). For the reasons set out in paragraph 217 above. 246.4. Oral statements made at her grievance investigation meeting held on 19 September 2024 (Issue number 6.1.42). While the claimant stated in her Particulars of Claim that she relied upon oral statements made on this date, the Tribunal were not taken to the minutes of any such meeting, and heard no evidence in relation to what was stated during that meeting. There is accordingly no basis for the Tribunal to conclude that a protected act took place on that date. 246.5. Her email to the respondents’ representative dated 16 January 2025 (Issue number 6.1.47). While the claimant stated in her Particulars of Claim that she relied upon an email sent on 16 January 2025, the Tribunal were not taken to any such email, and heard no evidence in relation to it. There is accordingly no basis for the Tribunal to conclude that a protected act took place on that date. Victimisation 247. The Tribunal then considered whether, because of any of the established protected acts, the claimant had been subjected to the detriments asserted. The Tribunal noted that the first established protected act took place on 15 August 2024. No evidence was led, however, in relation to what complaints the claimant asserted in early conciliation, or whether the respondents were even contacted during, or engaged in, early conciliation. The respondents were not asked whether they were aware the claimant had commenced early conciliation, and, if so, whether they were aware that the claimant was asserting complaints under the EqA (if she was indeed doing so), or believed that she may do so. Instead, the Tribunal concluded that the first established protected act which the respondents were aware of, was the claimant raising Employment Tribunal proceedings. They became aware of this on/after 18 October 2024, when the claim form was sent to them, with the notice of claim. The Tribunal accordingly only considered asserted detriments which occurred on/after that date (as asserted detriments prior to the established protected acts, could not have been because of the protected acts, and there was no

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 92 basis for any finding that detriments occurred because the respondents believed that the claimant may do a protected act: this was not put to the respondents, nor asserted by the claimant). 248. The asserted detriments which occurred on/after 18 October 2024 are numbered 6.2.36-6.2.54 inclusive on the [NAME_9]. As indicated in paragraph 216, beyond listing documents in her statement, the claimant gave no oral evidence in chief in relation to these issues. The Tribunal considered whether the claimant had been subjected to the detriments asserted and, if so, whether this was because of the established protected acts. The Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to each are as follows: 248.1. Unreasonably delaying the outcome of the disciplinary investigation. (Issue number 6.2.36). The Tribunal noted that the disciplinary investigation was instigated on 14 May 2024, paused from 12 June to 16 August 2024, and did not conclude until 13 February 2025. There was accordingly an ‘active’ investigation period of around 7 months. The Tribunal accepted that this was an unreasonable period, taking into account that the claimant was suspended from her employment for the last 6 months of this. The Tribunal accepted that that amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that the progress of the investigation from 18 October 2024 onwards was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. The Tribunal conclude that the lengthy period of the investigation was due to the extent of the documentary and witness evidence, the time taken to review this and prepare what was a very comprehensive Investigation Report. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. 248.2. Disabling the claimant’s [NAME_137] account on 17 January 2025 (Issue number 6.2.37). This was not established. The Tribunal heard evidence regarding this being disabled on the claimant’s suspension, and this was put to [NAME_56]. No evidence was however led in relation to this occurring in January 2025, and this was not put to the respondents’ witnesses. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.3. Failing to hold wellbeing checks with the claimant while she was suspended and signed off (Issue number 6.2.38). The only evidence regarding this came from the email referred to in paragraph 153. The claimant gave no oral evidence in relation to this: she simply referred

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 93 the Tribunal to that page in the bundle. She did not put this point to the respondents’ witnesses. From the email trail it is clear that [NAME_56] was appointed as liaison manager, and [NAME_60] had previously offered to have a Teams call with her to check on her welfare, which he reiterated in his email. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.4. Failing to provide legal representation to the claimant (while providing it to [NAME_138]) (Issue number 6.2.39). The only evidence regarding this came from the email referred to in paragraph 154. The claimant gave no oral evidence in relation to this: she simply referred the Tribunal to that page in the bundle. She did not put this point to the respondents’ witnesses. While it is clear to the Tribunal that this occurred, the Tribunal concluded that this was not something about which a reasonable person would complain: an individual would not expect to be provided with legal representation by their employer to pursue legal proceedings against that employer. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that it was not a detriment. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this accordingly does not succeed and is dismissed. Even if the Tribunal had not reached that conclusion, there was no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. 248.5. Progression of the investigation to a disciplinary hearing (Issue number 6.2.40). The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that the progress of the investigation was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that this was due to [NAME_71]’s clear findings, following a comprehensive investigation, that there was evidence to support each allegation and, in respect of each, a case to answer. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. Even if the Tribunal had not reached that conclusion, there was no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. 248.6. Refusal to disclose the investigation report to the claimant, in response to her subject access requests and requests to HR (Issue number 6.2.41). It is clear, from the timeline, that the Investigation Report was not disclosed to the claimant in the period from 13 February

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 94 (when [NAME_71] concluded his investigation) to 12 March 2025. There was however no oral evidence in relation to the claimant requesting this, and it being refused, and no documents were referred to suggesting this was the case. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.7. Failing to deal with the claimant’s grievances (Issue number 6.2.42). It is clear, from the timeline, that while there continued to be discussion in relation to the claimant’s grievances in the period from 15 October 2024 to 14 March 2025, there was no resolution. The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that the progress of the grievance investigation was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. 248.8. The content of the investigation report (Issue number 6.2.43). The claimant stated, in her Particulars of Claim, that her complaint in relation to this is that the report reflected ‘the absence of fair process and proper investigatory activity which breaches the Respondent’s own policy and procedure and the statutory code of practice’. As indicated in paragraph 216, the claimant’s evidence in chief did not cover this issue. The Tribunal found that [NAME_71] conducted a thorough, comprehensive and fair investigation and that his Investigation Report was detailed, and extremely comprehensive and well structured (see paragraphs 155- 157). As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.9. The generation and adoption of an ad-hoc process which does not follow the disciplinary or any other internal procedure (Issue number 6.2.44). The Tribunal understands, from the Particulars of Claim, that this issue relates to the additional statements which [NAME_60] took in February 2025 from [NAME_46], [NAME_52] and [NAME_56]. As was made clear in the letter of 12 March 2025, inviting the claimant to a disciplinary hearing however (see paragraph 159), these statements were taken to ascertain whether the claimant’s suspension should continue, not as part of the disciplinary process per se. In that context, it was right and proper that the statements be taken. They were not part of the case made against the claimant, as she asserts in her Particulars of Claim: that was contained solely in the Investigation Report. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed.

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 95 248.10. [NAME_66]’s letter to the claimant dated 14 March 2025, and her decision to pause the grievance process, but not the disciplinary process (Issue number 6.2.45). The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this are in paragraph 161. The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the grievance was put on hold at that point simply because there was some overlap between the allegations raised in the grievance and those to be addressed in the disciplinary process, so it was appropriate to wait to see what remained outstanding, following the disciplinary hearing. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. 248.11. The repeated extensions of the claimant’s suspension, up to and including April 2025 (Issue number 6.2.46). The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that this was simply due to the fact that the disciplinary investigation had not yet concluded, and then that a disciplinary hearing had not yet taken place. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. 248.12. HR contacting the claimant’s companion, without her knowledge and consent (Issue number 6.2.47). This was not established. No evidence was led in relation to this, and this was not put to the respondents’ witnesses. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.13. The claimant’s companion informing her that the respondent intended to dismiss her on the grounds of SOSR (Issue number 6.2.48). This was not established. No evidence was led in relation to this, and this was not put to the respondents’ witnesses. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.14. The conscious and deliberate (or grossly negligent) provision of misleading and/or false information in the disciplinary investigation by [NAME_46], [NAME_52], [NAME_90] and [NAME_139] (Issue

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 96 number 6.2.49). This was not established. No evidence was led in relation to this, and this was not put to the respondents’ witnesses. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.15. The refusal to deal with the claimant’s grievance dated 25 March 2025 (Issue number 6.2.50). The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to the respondents’ witnesses. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the grievance was put on hold at that point simply because there was some overlap between the allegations raised in the grievance and those to be addressed in the disciplinary process, so it was appropriate to wait to see what remained outstanding, following the disciplinary hearing. The complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not, accordingly, succeed. 248.16. [NAME_66] repeatedly insisting that the claimant address ‘expressions of intent’ captured in the minutes of meetings with [NAME_46], [NAME_52] and [NAME_56], which were held in February 2025 and despite the claimant asserting that she had nothing further to add (Issue number 6.2.51). This was not established. No evidence was led in relation to this, and this was not put to the respondents’ witnesses. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.17. Being presented with leading questions implying inaccurate factual presuppositions and unclear subjective descriptors in the disciplinary process (Issue number 6.2.52). This was not established. The Tribunal concluded that questions asked were fair and reasonable in the circumstances. As the asserted detriment has not been established, the complaint of victimisation in relation to this does not succeed. 248.18. Not being afforded the right of appeal against the decision to terminate her employment (Issue number 6.2.53). The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. There was, however, no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence, and she did not put this to [NAME_64]. 248.19. Dismissing the claimant (Issue number 6.2.54). The Tribunal accepted that this occurred and that it amounted to a detriment. The

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 97 Tribunal accepted [NAME_64]’s evidence however that this was due to the panel believing that the claimant had committed two counts of gross misconduct and there being an irretrievable breakdown in the employment relationship (see paragraph 169). There was no evidence before the Tribunal which indicated that this decision was influenced, in any way, by any of the established protected acts: the claimant did not assert this in evidence and she did not put this to [NAME_64]. 249.

For these reasons, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s complaints of victimisation do not succeed and are dismissed. Unfair Dismissal – s94-98 ERA 250. The Tribunal referred to s98(1) ERA. It provides that the employer must show the reason for the dismissal or, if more than one reason, the principal reason and that it was for one of the potentially fair reasons set out in s98(2). At this stage the Tribunal was not considering the question of reasonableness. The Tribunal had to consider whether [NAME_6] had established a potentially fair reason for dismissal. 251. Assessing the reason for dismissal involves considering the subjective state of mind of the employer. As Cairns L J stated in [NAME_140] v [NAME_141], Hay and Anderson [1974] IRLR 213, (subsequently approved by Viscount Dilhrone and the House of Lords in the case of Devis v Atkins [1977] ICR 9620): ‘A reason for the dismissal of an employee is set of facts known to the employer, or it may be beliefs held by him, which cause him to dismiss the employee. If at the time of his dismissal the employer gives a reason for it, that is no doubt evidence, at any rate as against him, as to the real reason, but it does not necessarily constitute the real reason. He may knowingly give a reason different from the real reason out of kindness or because he might have difficulty in proving the facts that actually led him to dismiss; or he may describe his reasons wrongly through some mistake of language or of law.’ 252. The Tribunal found that the claimant was dismissed because the panel concluded that her behaviours (which they found constituted misconduct/gross misconduct) had cumulatively, and fundamentally, undermined the employment relationship, such that there was an irreparable and irretrievable breakdown. [NAME_6] asserted that the claimant was dismissed for misconduct and some other substantial reason (namely a breakdown in working relationships), the Tribunal concluded that it was the claimant’s behaviours which were the true reason or operative cause for the claimant’s dismissal. She was dismissed for her conduct which caused the breakdown of working relationships, not simply because those relationships had broken down. 253. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the sole or principal reason for dismissal was related to the claimant’s conduct – a potentially fair reason under s98(2)(b).

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 98 254. The Tribunal then considered s98(4) ERA and reached the conclusions set out below. Was there a reasonable investigation? 255. The Tribunal’s conclusions regarding the investigation conducted, and the steps taken in that process, are set out in paragraphs 155-157 above. [NAME_71] interviewed the claimant on 3 occasions and 6 other members of staff. He gathered all the relevant evidence in relation to the allegations. He prepared a detailed and comprehensive Investigation Report, which set out the findings of his investigation and the basis for those findings. He appended notes of the interviews conducted and the documentary evidence gathered to his report. There were no further steps which should, reasonably, have been undertaken during the investigation. Did the Panel have a genuine belief that the claimant was guilty of misconduct? 256. The Tribunal concluded that the panel did have a genuine belief that the claimant had committed each of the allegations of misconduct which were held to be substantiated. [NAME_64] was a clear and credible witness and explained that the panel were unanimous in their conclusions. The Tribunal accepted her evidence in relation to this. Did the Panel have reasonable grounds for their belief? 257. The Panel reached their conclusion that the claimant had committed the misconduct asserted, for the reasons set out in paragraph 169 above. The Tribunal concluded that the Panel had reasonable grounds for their belief. They explained their rationale in relation to each allegation of misconduct and expressly referenced which of the 102 documents appended to the Investigation Report they relied upon as supporting each allegation. Did the decision to dismiss fall within the band of reasonable responses? 258. The Tribunal then considered whether the decision to dismiss the claimant, as a result of the identified misconduct, fell within the range of reasonable responses available to a reasonable employer in the circumstances. 259. The Panel concluded that the claimant’s behaviours had cumulatively, and fundamentally, undermined the employment relationship and she accepted no personal responsibility for her actions or conduct, as set out in paragraph 169.3 & 169.4 above. As a result, they concluded that the only possible outcome was the termination of the claimant’s employment: she could not continue in any role in the University. 260. It cannot be said that no reasonable employer would have dismissed the claimant in these circumstances. The Tribunal accordingly found that the Panel’s

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 99 conclusion to dismiss the claimant fell within the band of reasonable responses open to [NAME_6] in the circumstances. Procedure 261. In relation to the procedure adopted, [NAME_6] investigated the allegations against the claimant. They informed her of the allegations and the potential consequences. She was provided with the Investigation Report, and all of the evidence compiled. The claimant was given the opportunity to respond to the allegations at the disciplinary hearing. She was given the opportunity to be accompanied at the disciplinary hearing. The process was adjusted, at the claimant’s request, so that she was able to answer written questions, rather than attend the disciplinary hearing in person. She was informed of the outcome in writing. Up to this point, [NAME_6] followed their internal procedures and the Acas Code. The Tribunal found that the procedure adopted by [NAME_6] up to this point, was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. 262. [NAME_6] did not however allow the claimant to appeal against the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. Their internal Disciplinary Policy & Procedure states that employees will have the right to appeal against any disciplinary action taken. The Acas Code states that employers should allow employees to appeal against any formal disciplinary action. [NAME_6] is a large employer, with significant resources. It was practicable for them to allow the claimant the opportunity to appeal. They did not do so. The decision, that the claimant should not be permitted to appeal, did not fall within the range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer. Conclusions re s98(4) 263.

Accordingly, solely as a result of the refusal to allow the claimant the opportunity to appeal, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s dismissal was unfair. Remedy 264. Having found that the claimant was unfairly dismissed, the Tribunal moved on to consider remedy. 265. The Tribunal firstly considered whether it was appropriate to make any adjustments to the basic or compensatory award, and reached the following conclusions. [NAME_142] 266. The compensatory award may be reduced pursuant to section 123(1) ERA, which states: ‘Subject to the provisions of this section and sections 124, 124A and 126, the amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 100 considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.’ 267. There may be a reduction in compensation insofar as it is just and equitable in all the circumstances, having regard to the extent to which the loss sustained was attributable to the actions taken by the employer. Where it is determined that there is a likelihood, or certainty, that the employee would have been dismissed in any event, the Tribunal can reduce a compensatory award to reflect the chance that the employee would have been fairly dismissed if the correct procedure had been followed, and accordingly suffered no injustice in being dismissed (Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] IRLR 50 (HL)). 268. The only basis upon which the Tribunal found that the dismissal was unfair was [NAME_6]’s failure to offer an appeal. The Tribunal determined that, had [NAME_6] allowed the claimant the right of appeal, the decision to terminate her employment, because of her conduct, would have been confirmed in that process: she would not have been reinstated. The Tribunal had no doubt, in the circumstances, of that. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that, had an appeal been offered, the claimant would have been fairly dismissed. The failure to offer an appeal accordingly made no practical difference. In these circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that the [NAME_142] reduction should be 100%. It is not just and equitable for the claimant to receive any compensatory award, as she has not sustained any loss as a result of [NAME_6] failing to offer an appeal. Contribution 269. The Tribunal then considered: 269.1. whether the claimant’s conduct before the dismissal was such that it would be just and equitable to reduce the basic award (s122(2) ERA); and 269.2. whether the claimant’s dismissal was to any extent caused or contributed to by the actions of the claimant, such that it would be appropriate to reduce the compensatory award by a proportion which the Tribunal considers is just and equitable, having regard to that finding (s123(6) ERA). 270. The Tribunal was satisfied that the claimant had repeatedly failed to follow reasonable management instructions, that she had repeatedly engaged in disrespectful communications and behaviours towards colleagues, that she had persistently disregarded feedback, and had repeatedly disseminated unsubstantiated and damaging allegations, as set out in this judgment. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s behaviour in doing so was culpable and blameworthy. The Tribunal accepted that two of the claimant’s direct line

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 101 managers ([NAME_45] and then [NAME_52]) left [NAME_6]’s employment as a result of her behaviours, and were a significant factor in [NAME_46]’s decision to resign. The Tribunal accepted that the claimant’s repeated and persistent misconduct cumulatively and fundamentally undermined the employment relationship. In these circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that it was just and equitable to reduce the basic award by 100%. 271. Given the findings in relation to [NAME_142], there was no requirement to consider contribution in relation to the compensatory award. Conclusions on Remedy 272.

For these reasons, the Tribunal concluded that it is not just and equitable to make any basic or compensatory award, despite the finding that the claimant was unfairly dismissed. Date sent to parties ______________________ 31 March 2026

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 102 Schedule to Judgment [NAME_9] __________________________________________________ 1. Direct Race Discrimination – s13 EqA 1.1. Did the respondents subject the claimant to less favourable treatment, i.e. did the respondents treat the claimant less favourably than they would have treated others (hypothetical comparators) in not materially different circumstances, by: 1.1.1. From 1 March 2023 onwards, allocating complex and time sensitive work to the claimant, as detailed in section 7.1 of the claimant’s Particulars of Claim ([NAME_136]); 1.1.2. From 5 September 2023, failing to adhere to the policy, guidelines and process of the annual review and PDR form 2023 (section 7.2 [NAME_136]); 1.1.3. [NAME_46] stating to the claimant, on 12 September 2023 and in relation to her PDR, that ‘on the whole he thought it was quite a positive review’, that ‘this is about how we progress as individuals and members of the team’ and that he thought that his expectation about the claimant signing was fair ‘in the circumstances’ and insisting that the claimant make additional comments in the section allocated for any final comments or disagreement, and sign (section 7.7 [NAME_136]); 1.1.4. [NAME_46] silencing the claimant when she tried to raise her concerns during a Teams call on the afternoon of 12 September 2023, as detailed in section 7.8 [NAME_136]; 1.1.5. Refusing to engage with the claimant to resolve the issues regarding her 2023 PDR, as detailed in sections 7.6, 7.9 & 7.13 [NAME_136]; 1.1.6. From 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] continually insisting that the claimant accept the PDR form, as detailed in section 7.11 [NAME_136], and making the comments attributed to him in that section; 1.1.7. Completing and closing the PDR form on 19 October 2023, and including additional comments on this, as detailed at section 7.15 [NAME_136]; 1.1.8. [NAME_46] stating, on 6 March 2024, that it was odd that the claimant did not want to leave the University (section 7.50 [NAME_136]); and

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 103 1.1.9. Failing to initially respond to the claimant’s request to undertake CPD dated 5 June 2024, and then stating that, although approved on this occasion, ‘it was not without concerns’ as detailed at section 7.66 [NAME_136]. 1.2. If so, was this because of race? The claimant relies upon being of Spanish national origin and nationality.

2. Direct Sex Discrimination – s13 EqA 2.1. Did the respondents subject the claimant to less favourable treatment, i.e. did the respondents treat the claimant less favourably than it would have treated others (hypothetical comparators) in not materially different circumstances by: 2.1.1. On 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] placing pressure on the claimant to accept a unilateral PDR document, using expressions ‘you are here to follow your line manager’s instructions’, ‘all I need is for you to say yes’, ‘otherwise I will take that as a direct refusal to follow instructions (…)’, use of the word ‘obtuse’, ‘(…) unless you tell me now you are going to say yes (…)’; ‘(…) you gave the impression of simply wanting to frustrate/control the PDR process (…)’, as detailed at section 7.11 [NAME_136]; 2.1.2. The terms of [NAME_52]’s emails to the claimant and others on 1 February 2024, as referenced in section 7.40 [NAME_136]; 2.1.3. On 14 February 2024, [NAME_52] engaging in an inappropriate, patronising, condescending, demeaning, disrespectful and dismissive verbal interaction with the claimant on the work floor, as detailed in section 7.44 [NAME_136]; 2.1.4. Excluding the claimant from team activities, working groups, in- house training and CPD, from January 2024 onwards, as detailed in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 2.1.5. [NAME_52] failing to respond to the claimant’s requests for annual leave, from February 2024 onwards, as detailed in section 7.52 [NAME_136]; 2.1.6. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 20 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.54 [NAME_136]; 2.1.7. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 22 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.55 [NAME_136];

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 104 2.1.8. The terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant dated 29 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.58 [NAME_136]; 2.1.9. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 15 May 2024, as detailed in section 7.61 [NAME_136]; 2.1.10. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant in seeking to control her calendar and physical whereabouts in the building at any given time, up to and including 17 April 2024, as detailed in section 7.62 [NAME_136]; and 2.1.11. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 24 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.72 [NAME_136]. 2.2. If so, was this because of sex? 3. Harassment related to race – s26(1) EqA 3.1. Did [NAME_46] engage in the following conduct asserted by the claimant at sections 7.2, 7.3 & 7.8 [NAME_136]? 3.2. If so, was it unwanted conduct? 3.3. If so, was it related to race? 3.4. If so, did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant? 4. Harassment related to sex – s26(1) EqA 4.1. Did the respondents engage in the following conduct: 4.1.1. On 26 September 2023, [NAME_46] placing pressure on the claimant to accept a unilateral PDR document, using expressions ‘you are here to follow your line manager’s instructions’, ‘all I need is for you to say yes’, ‘otherwise I will take that as a direct refusal to follow instructions (…)’, use of the word ‘obtuse’, ‘(…) unless you tell me now you are going to say yes (…)’; ‘(…) you gave the impression of simply wanting to frustrate/control the PDR process (…)’, as detailed at section 7.11 [NAME_136]; 4.1.2. The terms of [NAME_52]’s emails to the claimant and others on 1 February 2024, as referenced in section 7.40 [NAME_136]; 4.1.3. On 14 February 2024, [NAME_52] engaging in an inappropriate, patronising, condescending, demeaning, disrespectful and dismissive verbal

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 105 interaction with the claimant on the work floor, as detailed in section 7.44 [NAME_136]; 4.1.4. Excluding the claimant from team activities, working groups, in- house training and CPD, from January 2024 onwards, as detailed in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 4.1.5. [NAME_52] failing to respond to the claimant’s requests for annual leave, from February 2024 onwards, as detailed in section 7.52 [NAME_136]; 4.1.6. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 20 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.54 [NAME_136]; 4.1.7. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 22 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.55 [NAME_136]; 4.1.8. The terms of [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant dated 29 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.58 [NAME_136]; 4.1.9. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 15 May 2024, as detailed in section 7.61 [NAME_136]; 4.1.10. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant in seeking to control her calendar and physical whereabouts in the building at any given time, up to and including 17 April 2024, as detailed in section 7.62 [NAME_136]; and 4.1.11. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 24 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.72 [NAME_136]. 4.2. If so, was it unwanted conduct? 4.3. If so, was it related to sex? 4.4. If so, did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant? 5. Harassment related to Disability – s26(1) EqA 5.1. Did the terms of: 5.1.1. [NAME_46]’s emails to the claimant on 25 January 2024, as detailed in section 7.35 [NAME_136]; and/or 5.1.2. [NAME_52]’s emails to the claimant of 29 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.58 [NAME_136]

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 106 amount to unwanted conduct? 5.2. If so, was it related to disability? 5.3. If so, did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant? 6. Victimisation – s27 EqA 6.1. Did the claimant do a protected act(s)? The claimant relies upon the following as constituting protected acts: 6.1.1. Orally stating to [NAME_45] on 15 June 2023 that she expected to be treated as any other contracts manager or solicitor, and should not be treated differently, as detailed in section 7.1 [NAME_136]; 6.1.2. Requesting, on 11 September 2023 & 17 October 2023, that an HR representative be present at meetings, as detailed in sections 7.5 & 7.14 [NAME_136]; 6.1.3. Orally stating to [NAME_45], on 12 September 2023, that the conduct referenced in section 7.3 [NAME_136] was unwelcome, and the reasons for this, and that she could not sign off the PDR as a result, as detailed in section 7.6 [NAME_136]; 6.1.4. Orally stating to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46], on 12 September 2023, that she felt strongly about being treated fairly and consistently in line with policy and guidelines applicable to all, and that such statements were causing her to feel distressed as she felt the response amounted to unjustifiable differential treatment, and had a degrading and intimidating effect, as detailed at section 7.7 [NAME_136]; 6.1.5. Orally stating to [NAME_46], on 12 September 2023, that she felt alarmed by what was happening, that her expectation was a respectful, reasonable and joint resolution and that she could not see how it would be justifiable to complete her annual review without her participation at all and against the process to her detriment. Also stating to [NAME_46] that the level of acrimony she was perceiving was unnecessary. All as detailed in section 7.8 [NAME_136]; 6.1.6. Her email to [NAME_60] dated 21 September 2023, as detailed at section 7.10 [NAME_136]; 6.1.7. Her oral statements to [NAME_46], during their discussion on 26 September 2023, and her follow up emails to [NAME_46] and [NAME_60] later that day, as detailed in section 7.11 [NAME_136];

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 107 6.1.8. Her email dated 8 October 2023, as detailed in section 7.13 [NAME_136]; 6.1.9. On 19 October 2023, orally raising concerns with [NAME_60] about [NAME_46]’s behaviour on 26 September 2023 and about the intensified treatment of the same nature she was being subjected to there and then, whereby she felt “scapegoated” and unreasonably retaliated against, as detailed in section 7.17 [NAME_136]; 6.1.10. Her email to [NAME_60], dated 30 October 2023, as referenced in section 7.19 [NAME_136], in which she reported being unfairly deprived of a promotion opportunity, as retaliation; 6.1.11. Her email to [NAME_60], dated 16 November 2023, as detailed in section 7.23 [NAME_136]; 6.1.12. Her request, submitted on 1 December 2023, entitled ‘PDR form 01/08/2022-31/07/2023’, with attached PDR form, which addressed the issue of the conduct of the review and made it clear that the conduct related to her race was unwanted by her, as referenced in section 7.24 [NAME_136]; 6.1.13. Orally stating to [NAME_52] on 17 January 2024 that she felt intimidated, threatened and distressed, that such behaviour amounted to victimisation, and that she should be protected against it, as detailed in section 7.26 [NAME_136]; 6.1.14. Orally stating to [NAME_52], on 18 January 2024, that she felt the overall situation was harassing, retaliatory and victimising and was causing her increasing distress and alarm, as detailed in section 7.29 [NAME_136] 6.1.15. Her email to [NAME_52] and HR on 25 January 2024, as referenced in section 7.35 [NAME_136]; 6.1.16. Her email to [NAME_46] and HR on 25 January 2024, as referenced in section 7.36 [NAME_136]; 6.1.17. Her email to HR on 28 January 2024, as referenced in section 7.38 [NAME_136]; 6.1.18. Her email to [NAME_52] dated 1 February 2024, as detailed in section 7.40 [NAME_136]; 6.1.19. Her [NAME_119] self-referral forms dated 11 February and 30 October 2024, as referenced in sections 7.42 & 7.86 [NAME_136]; 6.1.20. Her oral statements to [NAME_52], on 15 February 2024, that she needed the unacceptable behaviour and harassment against her to cease

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 108 and be rectified and that there was no good reason why she should be treated unfavourably, as detailed in section 7.45 [NAME_136]; 6.1.21. Her emails to [NAME_52] and HR in the period from 4-6 March 2024, as referenced in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 6.1.22. Her oral statements during a meeting with HR on 7 March 2024, as referenced at section 7.49 [NAME_136]; 6.1.23. Her oral statements during her consultations with [NAME_119] on 20 March and 7 November 2024, as referenced in section 7.53 & 7.86 [NAME_136]; 6.1.24. Her email to HR dated 29 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.58 [NAME_136]; 6.1.25. Her emails dated 20 March, 2, 4 & 5 April 2024, as detailed in section 7.54 [NAME_136]; 6.1.26. Her email dated 22 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.55 [NAME_136]; 6.1.27. Her email dated 25 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.56 [NAME_136]; 6.1.28. Her email dated 28 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.57 [NAME_136]; 6.1.29. Concerns raised with the Equality, Diversity and Inclusion team on 29 March 2024, as referenced in section 7.59 [NAME_136]; 6.1.30. Her email dated 17 April 2024, as detailed in section 7.62 [NAME_136]; 6.1.31. Her emails to [NAME_52] dated 22 April, 20 May and 5 June 2024, as detailed in section 7.60 [NAME_136]; 6.1.32. Her emails to [NAME_46] and HR on 2 & 9 May 2024, as referenced in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 6.1.33. Her email to [NAME_52] dated 2 May 2024, as detailed in section 7.69 [NAME_136]; 6.1.34. Raising a grievance on 24 May 2024, as referenced in section 7.65 [NAME_136], and her responses to requests from HR for clarification of her grievances, as referenced at section 7.68 [NAME_136], and the written statements she provided on 12 & 17 September 2024, as referenced in section 7.81 [NAME_136]; 6.1.35. Her email to [NAME_46] dated 28 May 2024, as detailed in section 7.69 [NAME_136]; 6.1.36. Oral statements she made at disciplinary investigation meetings on 7 & 12 June and 1 October 2024, as referenced at sections 7.67 & 7.82 [NAME_136];

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 109 6.1.37. Her email to [NAME_52] dated 26 June 2024, raising concerns regarding the issues set out in section 7.66 [NAME_136]; 6.1.38. Her email to HR dated 18 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.69 [NAME_136]; 6.1.39. Her emails dated 19 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.69 [NAME_136]; 6.1.40. Her email to [NAME_52] dated 25 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.69 [NAME_136]; 6.1.41. Her email to HR dated 13 August 2024, as referenced in section 7.74 [NAME_136]; 6.1.42. Oral statements made at her grievance investigation meeting held on 19 September 2024, as referenced in section 7.81 [NAME_136]; 6.1.43. Her letter dated 15 October 2024, as referenced in section 7.84 [NAME_136]; 6.1.44. Taking steps to raise a Tribunal claim as referenced in section 7.85 [NAME_136], namely by commencing early conciliation on 15 August 2024 and presenting a claim on 15 October 2024; 6.1.45. Raising a second grievance on 1 November 2024, as referenced in section 7.87 [NAME_136]; 6.1.46. The terms of her emails in the period from 28 November 2024 to 10 January 2025, in a chain of emails under the heading ‘‘28.11.2-24 – Request (duty of care) – Strictly private and confidential’, as referenced in section 7.88 [NAME_136]; 6.1.47. Her email to the respondents’ representative dated 16 January 2025, as referenced in section 7.91 [NAME_136]; 6.1.48. Her email to HR dated 17 January 2025, as referenced in section 7.92 [NAME_136]; and 6.1.49. Raising a third grievance on 25 March 2025, as referenced in section 7.105 [NAME_136]. 6.2. Did the respondents subject the claimant to detriments? The claimant asserts that the following amounted to detriments: 6.2.1. [NAME_46]’s conduct towards the claimant on 26 September 2023, as detailed in section 7.11 [NAME_136]; 6.2.2. [NAME_46] and [NAME_45] refusing to engage with the claimant to rectify the issues with her PDR in the period from 12 September to 17 October 2023, as referenced in section 7.13 [NAME_136];

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 110 6.2.3. The conduct of the meeting on 19 October 2023, and emails from [NAME_46] in relation to that meeting, on 18 October 2023 and 1 November 2023, all as referenced in sections 7.14-7.18 & 7.22 [NAME_136]; 6.2.4. Rejecting the claimant’s application for 4 promoted roles in October 2023, as referenced in section 7.19 [NAME_136]; 6.2.5. The conduct of the meeting on 17 January 2024, as detailed in section 7.26 [NAME_136], including threatening her with disciplinary action and causing her to feel intimidated, threatened and distressed; 6.2.6. Blocking the claimant from accessing the information on the sustained excellence contribution reward policy and procedure and refusing to provide support for the claimant’s application in January 2024, then failing to provide notification of the outcome of her self- nomination, as referenced in sections 7.25, 7.27, 7.28, 7.33, 7.39 & 7.48 [NAME_136]; 6.2.7. The terms and tone of [NAME_46]’s emails to the claimant on 25 January 2024, as detailed in section 7.35 [NAME_136]; 6.2.8. The terms of [NAME_46]’s email of 26 January 2024, as detailed in section 7.37 [NAME_136]; 6.2.9. Instructing the claimant to withdraw from the [NAME_109] on 25 January 2024, as referenced in section 7.35 [NAME_136] and instructing the Talent and Development Team to exclude the claimant from the training programme and refusing to support her reinstatement to that, as referenced in section 7.40, 7.45 & 7.46 [NAME_136]; 6.2.10. Excluding the claimant from participating in the Growing Research Together programme in January 2024, as detailed in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 6.2.11. Excluding the claimant from the [NAME_112] working group and from the [NAME_111] in March to May 2024, as detailed in section 7.51 [NAME_136]; 6.2.12. Excluding the claimant from teamwork, intra-team working groups and team presentations; being isolated in respect of the team; being segregated from colleagues in the legal function across the University; being excluded from CPD and other relevant training opportunities; issuing alienating and marginalising responses; and blocking fair and proper business activities and her professional interests – all as referenced in sections 7.51 and 7.66 [NAME_136];

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 111 6.2.13. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 14 February 2024, as detailed in section 7.44 [NAME_136]; 6.2.14. Failing to respond to the claimant’s requests for annual leave, from February 2024 onwards, as detailed in sections 7.52 & 7.74 [NAME_136]; 6.2.15. [NAME_46] stating, on 6 March 2024, that it was ‘odd’ that the claimant did not wish to leave the University, as detailed in section 7.50 [NAME_136]; 6.2.16. Failing to address and resolve the claimant’s concerns at a meeting on 7 March 2024, and in correspondence which followed from then to 13 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.49 [NAME_136]; 6.2.17. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 20 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.54 [NAME_136]; 6.2.18. [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant dated 22 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.55 [NAME_136]; 6.2.19. [NAME_46]’s email to the claimant dated 28 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.57 [NAME_136]; 6.2.20. [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant dated 29 March 2024, as detailed in section 7.58 [NAME_136]; 6.2.21. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant in seeking to control her calendar and physical whereabouts in the building at any given time, up to and including 17 April 2024, as detailed in section 7.62 [NAME_136]; 6.2.22. Failing to respond to the claimant’s requests, dated 2 & 9 May 2024, for a change of line manager, as referenced in section 7.62 [NAME_136]; 6.2.23. Commencing a disciplinary investigation on 14 May 2024, as detailed in section 7.64; 6.2.24. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 15 May 2024, and the terms of his emails to the claimant in relation to that incident, as referenced in section 7.61 [NAME_136]; 6.2.25. Failing to effectively deal with informal concerns raised by the claimant (sections 7.23, 7.41, 7.43, 7.56 [NAME_136]); 6.2.26. Unreasonable delays in addressing the claimant’s grievances raised on 24 May & 1 November 2024 (sections 7.68, 7.70, 7.79, 7.81, 7.87 & 7.89 [NAME_136]); 6.2.27. Failing to initially respond to the claimant’s request to undertake CPD dated 5 June 2024, and then stating that, although approved

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 112 on this occasion, ‘it was not without concerns’ as detailed at section 7.66 [NAME_136]; 6.2.28. [NAME_52]’s conduct towards the claimant on 24 July 2024, as detailed in section 7.72 [NAME_136]; 6.2.29. [NAME_52]’s email to the claimant on 2 August 2024, as detailed in section 7.72 [NAME_136] 6.2.30. [NAME_46]’s email to the claimant dated 5 August 2024, as detailed in section 7.73 [NAME_136]; 6.2.31. [NAME_46]’s email to the claimant dated 13 August 2024, as detailed in section 7.74 [NAME_136]; 6.2.32. Suspending the claimant on 16 August 2024 (section 7.76 [NAME_136]) and unreasonably prolonging that suspension, without justification (section 7.93 [NAME_136]); 6.2.33. Making unfounded and malicious allegations of gross misconduct against the claimant on 16 August 2024 (section 7.76 [NAME_136]); 6.2.34. Blocking the claimant’s access to information and documents on her suspension (section 7.77 [NAME_136]); 6.2.35. Subjecting the claimant to a disciplinary investigation (section 7.82 [NAME_136]); 6.2.36. Unreasonably delaying the outcome of the disciplinary investigation (section 7.90 [NAME_136]); 6.2.37. Disabling the claimant’s [NAME_137] account on 17 January 2025 (section 7.92 [NAME_136]); 6.2.38. Failing to hold wellbeing checks with the claimant while she was suspended and signed off (section 7.88 [NAME_136]); 6.2.39. Failing to provide legal representation to the claimant (while providing it to [NAME_138]) (section 7.91 [NAME_136]); 6.2.40. Progression of the investigation to a disciplinary hearing (section 7.95 [NAME_136]); 6.2.41. Refusal to disclose the investigation report to the claimant, in response to her subject access requests and requests to HR (section 7.95 [NAME_136]); 6.2.42. Failing to deal with the claimant’s grievance (section 7.96 [NAME_136]);

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 113 6.2.43. The content of the investigation report (section 7.97 [NAME_136]); 6.2.44. The generation and adoption of an ad-hoc process which does not follow the disciplinary or any other internal procedure (section 7.98 [NAME_136]); 6.2.45. [NAME_66]’s letter to the claimant dated 14 March 2025, and her decision to pause the grievance process, but not the disciplinary process (section 7.101 [NAME_136]); 6.2.46. The repeated extensions of the claimant’s suspension, up to and including April 2025 (section 7.102 [NAME_136]); 6.2.47. HR contacting the claimant’s companion, without her knowledge and consent (section 7.103 [NAME_136]); 6.2.48. The claimant’s companion informing her that the respondent intended to dismiss her on the grounds of SOSR (section 7.104 [NAME_136]); 6.2.49. The conscious and deliberate (or grossly negligent) provision of misleading and/or false information in the disciplinary investigation by [NAME_46], [NAME_52], [NAME_90] and [NAME_139] (section 7.105 [NAME_136]); 6.2.50. The refusal to deal with the claimant’s grievance dated 25 March 2025 (section 7.106 [NAME_136]); 6.2.51. [NAME_66] repeatedly insisting that the claimant address ‘expressions of intent’ captured in the minutes of meetings with [NAME_46], [NAME_52] and [NAME_56], which were held in February 2025 and despite the claimant asserting that she had nothing further to add (section 7.107 [NAME_136]); 6.2.52. Being presented with leading questions implying inaccurate factual presuppositions and unclear subjective descriptors in the disciplinary process (section 7.110 [NAME_136]); 6.2.53. Not being afforded the right of appeal against the decision to terminate her employment (section 7.111 [NAME_136]); and 6.2.54. Dismissing the claimant. 6.3. If so, did the respondents subject the claimant to those detriments because of the protected acts?

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 114 7. Time Limits 7.1. Were the complaints of harassment related to disability made within the time limit in section 123 EqA? 8. Qualifying Disclosure – s43B ERA 8.1. Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures, as defined in section 43B ERA? The claimant relies on the following: 8.1.1. Disclosures, verbally and by email, to [NAME_45] and [NAME_46] on 19 May, 9 June, 31 August and 19 September 2023 regarding a likely failure to comply with the delegated authority schedule and principles (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.2. Concerns raised with [NAME_45] and [NAME_46], verbally and by email, 9 June, 12 & 14 July and 25 August 2023, that there would be a likely breach of clinical trials regulations and research governance frameworks in relation to a material transfer where there was a requirement to ensure that ethics and governance approvals were met, and risks re breach of export control regulations (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.3. Her oral statement, in a discussion with [NAME_52] on 17 January 2024, that she was feeling intimidated, threatened and distressed and that behaviours which they had been discussing amounted to victimisation (section 7.26 [NAME_136]); 8.1.4. Her email to HR dated 30 March 2024, and in the investigation meeting held on 12 June 2024 in which she raised concerns in relation to the health and safety of an individual (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.5. Her email to HR dated 7 August 2024 in which she referenced behaviours being contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.6. Her email to HR dated 2 September 2024, in which she reported the incident referenced in paragraph 7.72 of her amended particulars of claim (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.7. Concerns that there would likely be a breach of data protection obligations in relation to data subjects, who were vulnerable children, if the First Respondent authorised a document (section 7.78 [NAME_136]), which were raised by the claimant as follows: 8.1.7.1. Verbally to [NAME_45] on 4 July 2023, and in a recap email of the same date;

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 115 8.1.7.2. In an email dated 2 May 2024 to the portfolio manager and [NAME_46]; 8.1.7.3. Verbally in a team meeting on 15 May 2024; 8.1.7.4. In an email to [NAME_46] dated 28 May 2024; and 8.1.7.5. In the investigation meeting held on 1 October 2024. 8.1.8. A disclosure to [NAME_36] on 5 September 2024, in which the claimant informed them of breaches of equality and human rights laws, disclosing that the First Respondent was failing to comply with legal obligations, including in relation to the public sector equality, health and safety of employees (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.9. Her [NAME_31], dated 11 February 2024, 30 October 2024 and 18 April 2025, where she made disclosures relating to failure to exercise duty of care and ensuring a safe working environment including by adequately addressing psychosocial hazards and poor behaviour (section 7.78 [NAME_136]); 8.1.10. Her correspondence of 18 March 2025, in which she made complaints in relation to the handling of the grievance and disciplinary process, referencing the conduct amounting to victimisation and this being unlawful (section 7.101 [NAME_136]); and 8.1.11. Her written statement, submitted on 26 March 2025, in which she referenced the respondent failing to deal with grievances and follow proper procedures, asserting that this constituted unlawful detriment, victimisation and was unlawful (section 7.99 [NAME_136]). 8.2. In relation to each asserted disclosure, the Tribunal will decide: 8.2.1. Did the claimant disclose information? 8.2.2. Did the claimant believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? 8.2.3. Was that belief reasonable? 8.2.4. Did the claimant believe it tended to show a relevant failure? 8.2.5. Was that belief reasonable? 8.3. If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, was it also a protected disclosure (s43C ERA)?

8001688/2024 & 8001081/2025 Page 116 9. Detriment – s47B ERA 9.1. If the claimant was subject to any of the detriments listed at paragraph 6.2.1- 6.2.53 inclusive above, was she subjected to any of those detriments on the ground that she made a protected disclosure pursuant to section 47B ERA? 10. Unfair dismissal – s103A ERA 10.1. Was the sole or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal the fact the claimant made a protected disclosure(s)? 11. Unfair Dismissal – s94-98 ERA 11.1. Was the claimant dismissed? 11.2. If so, what was the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for dismissal and was it a potentially fair reason for dismissal? The respondent asserts that the claimant was dismissed due to some other substantial reason and/or gross misconduct. 11.3. If so, did the respondent act reasonably, in the circumstances, in treating this as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant? 12. Remedy 12.1. If the claimant establishes any of her complaints, what remedy is she entitled to? Specifically should reinstatement/re-engagement be ordered and/or: 12.1.1. What financial losses has the detriment/discrimination caused the claimant? 12.1.2. What injury to feelings has the detriment/discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 12.1.3. Has the claimant suffered personal injury as a result of any established detriments/discrimination? If so, how much compensation should be awarded for that? 12.1.4. Is it appropriate to adjust any award due to unreasonable failure to follow the Acas Code? 12.1.5. Is it appropriate to make a recommendation?

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND) Case No: 8001081/2025 [NAME_37] Hearing in [NAME_1] 22 May 2025 Employment Judge: [NAME_143] [NAME_196] In person [COMPANY_3] First Respondent Represented by: [NAME_197] [NAME_144] Solicitor [NAME_146] [NAME_147] [NAME_148] Second Respondent -as above Third Respondent -as above Fourth Respondent -as above Fifth Respondent -as above Sixth Respondent -as above [NAME_149] [NAME_150]

8001081/2025 Page 2 [NAME_151] Seventh Respondent -as above

JUDGMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL The judgment of the Tribunal is that 1. the claimant’s Application for [NAME_37] is refused; and 2. the respondent’s expenses application is refused.

REASONS Preliminary Procedure 1. The claimant presented her claim to the Employment Tribunal on 2 May 2025, following ACAS Early Conciliation which commenced, in relation to the first respondent on 1 May 2025 followed by issue of certificate on 2 May 2025, although ACAS early conciliation is not required for current purposes as this is an [NAME_37] Hearing.

2. The claimant identifies that she has a separate claim to the Tribunal against the respondents 8001688/2024 (the 2024 claim) that was presented on 15 October 2024. That claim is ongoing, and so far, as relevant to this claim Order was sent to the parties on 20 January 2025 requiring that the claimant provide specification in relation to each protected act/disclosure relied upon and other matters on or before 13 March 2025 (paragraph 3 of the Order) and by order sent to parties on 6 May 2025 provide further specification of the basis of the 2024 claim.

3. In advance of this hearing, the respondent set out their opposition in written Submissions to the claimant and Tribunal in an email at 9.12 pm on 21 May 2025, list five bullets points of separate documents being; a Bundle of Documents and Index; a Bundle of Authorities and Index, Respondent Submissions, a Respondents Chronology; and as final bullet point; Witness statements for [NAME_152], [NAME_154], [NAME_156] and [NAME_195]. 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 3 4. At the outset of this hearing, there was some discussion as to whether, as intended by the claimant, there were seven respondents, including former colleague [NAME_159] and [NAME_66]; the respondent representative intimated that there is an outstanding application to amend the 2024 claim to add these two further respondents. By clarification, the Tribunal has accepted the claim against all seven listed respondents (Ms [NAME_81] and Ms [NAME_5] were identified at page 7 of the ET1 with respective ACAS Reference Numbers) and are listed above.

5. The claimant confirmed that although she bring the application she is unfamiliar with [NAME_37] itself and accepted that the [NAME_160] is against the first respondent only - the Tribunal cannot compel fellow employees to employ someone who was not their employee.

6. The claimant set out her position in relation to [NAME_37] at page 16 of the paper apart to her ET1 at paragraph 26 describing that she is “claiming unfair dismissal by reason of whistleblowing and I am applying for [NAME_37] pursuant to s128” ERA 1996 “for the reasons set out in the Details of Claim, I submit that it is likely that the Tribunal, will in determining this complaint under s103A ERA, find that the (principal) reason for the decision to dismiss me, pleaded as detriment contrary to s47B “(ERA 1996) “alongside victimisation contrary to S27” (EA 2010) “and on which I am relying as against (the named additional respondents) personally .

Accordingly, unless the Respondents confirm that they are willing to reinstate me. I am entitled to an order for the continuation of my contract of employment pursuant to s129(9)” ERA 1996.

7. While the claimant references victimisation s27 EA 2010 in her ET1, the claim of victimisation in terms of s27 EA2010 is note matter for this [NAME_37] Hearing.

8. The issues which the Tribunal is required to determine were a. [NAME_37] should be granted to the claimant, in terms of sections 128 and 129 of ERA 1996, pending a final determination of her 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 4 complaint, directed against the respondent, that she was automatically unfairly dismissed in terms of section 103A of ERA 1996, that is for the principal reason that the claimant had made a protected disclosure, and b. If [NAME_37] is to be granted, should the Tribunal Order that the claimant be reinstated on particular terms, and/or make an Order to continue the claimant’s Contract of Employment? 9. The claimant and the respondent’s representative's respective written submissions were mutually exchanged at the outset, as set out above, the respondent had emailed documents the previous evening, and the claimant had responded confirming that she would provide her documents in hard copy at the hearing. The respondent also provided hard copies for the hearing. For the sake of brevity, they are not reiterated here.

10. The claimant’s written submission, headed skeleton argument, extended to 15 pages with primary headings of Relevant Law, Authorities, Essential Elements of s103 ERA 1996 and Claimant’s Position, was the first document in the claimant bundle, the second being a witness statement for the claimant dated 17 May 2025 and extending to 36 pages along with other evidential documents in the claimant bundle over 646 pages.

11. The respondent provided a proposed Chronology covering 23 March 2020 to 1 May 2025, the claimant having reviewed same confirmed that she did not accept the content. As this is a non-evidential hearing the Tribunal does not propose to make findings on basis of that Chronology. The respondent although provided an Authorities bundle, a Bundle for the Hearing, witness statements, and written submissions headed Note of Submissions in Relation to the Hearing of the Claimant’s Application for [NAME_37] which extends 59 paragraphs over 17 pages. 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 5 12. At the outset, the Tribunal adjourned for an agreed 30 minutes to allow the claimant and respondent to read each other’s submissions and address matters arising thereafter.

13. As the claimant was unrepresented the Tribunal took the claimant to the terms of her ET1. The Tribunal explained that while witness statements including for the respondents had been provided, this was a non-evidential hearing as the Tribunal must seek to avoid making disputed findings in fact which have the effect of binding or restricting the scope of inquiry which is to be undertaken at a full evidential Merits Hearing and in any event there would no practical opportunity to cross examine all the potential witnesses who may be relevant at a final hearing.

14. The claimant asserts that she was employed by the first respondent, [COMPANY_2], as a Contracts Manager at their [NAME_92] from 23 March 2020 to 1 May 2025. It is understood that this is not disputed.

15. The claimant asserts that, as yet, she has not received the pay in lieu of notice following the termination of her employment on reasonable inquiry (as provided for in terms of Rule Expenses), the claimant advises that she has no other income. While the respondent in their submission at paragraph 59 describes that the claimant has been paid her contractual 3 months' notice, this was clarified to indicate that the respondent intends to make payment at the end of this calendar month.

16. While the Tribunal concluded that it was not necessary to reserve judgment on both [NAME_37] Application at the conclusion of the Hearing and oral judgment was given, the Tribunal intimated that it considered in all the circumstances it was appropriate to set out fully matters in this written judgment. 17. [NAME_37] & Pleadings/Fair Notice 18. Relevant Law 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 6 19. Section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) provides employees with the right to claim [NAME_37] in certain circumstances, including where they assert that their dismissal was automatically unfair, as the reason, or principal reason, for their dismissal was that they had made protected disclosures.

20. In order to succeed in an application for [NAME_37], the claimant must show that it is 7/ke/y'that the complaint of unfair dismissal will succeed (s129 ERA 1996 ).

21. An [NAME_160] may be heard by an Employment Tribunal Judge sitting alone (s4(2)(a) and (c) Employment Tribunals Act 1996) and is heard in public. The application will be heard at an Open Preliminary Hearing under rules 52-54 of the 2024 ET Rules. There is no requirement for the respondent to expedite an ET3 Response Form. The ET3 in this instance is due by 5 June 2025.

22. The test for the Employment Tribunal to apply is whether it appears to the Tribunal that it is likely, on determining the complaint to which the application relates, that it will find that the complainant has been unfairly dismissed for the asserted qualifying reason.

23. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

24. A leading authority remains Taplin v Shippam Limited [1978] ICR 1068, [NAME_205] (which is referred to by the respondent at paragraph 13 of their written submission) where the Employment Appeal Tribunal further defined “likely” as meaning “a pretty good chance of success”.

25. The test is that the claimant has “a pretty good chance of success” in establishing that the reason he/she was dismissed was that he had made a protected disclosure.

26. In [NAME_161] the EAT expressly ruled out alternative tests. According to the EAT the burden of proof in an [NAME_160] was intended to be greater than at a full Hearing, where the Tribunal need only be satisfied on the 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 7 “balance of probabilities" that the claimant had made out his case. The threshold for succeeding in an [NAME_160] is accordingly a high threshold for an “an exceptional form of relief” (see [NAME_161] at paragraph 19).

27. In [NAME_162] v University of Bath [2009] UKEAT/0408/09 [[NAME_162]] Underhill J set out at paragraph 17: An application for [NAME_37] is, as we have said, necessarily summary in character. It was in our view enough for the Tribunal to indicate the essential gist of its reasoning.”, and at paragraph 20 we do in fact see good reasons of policy for setting the test comparatively high, in the way in which this Tribunal did, in the case of applications for [NAME_37]. If relief is granted the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing, and pay the claimant, until the conclusion of the proceedings: that is not [a] consequence that should be imposed likely”.

28. The approach to be followed by a Tribunal was described in [NAME_163] v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] UKEAT/0364/09/ CEA ([NAME_163]) paragraph 25: “What a Tribunal has to do in an application for [NAME_37] is to examine the material put before it, listen to submissions and decide whether at the final hearing on the merits “that it is likely that” that Tribunal will find that the reason or reasons for the dismissal is one or more of those listed in section 129(1).” 29. In Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, EAT [[NAME_164]] Mr Justice Underhill, then President of the EAT, commented that the test of a “pretty good chance of success” does not mean simply “more likely than not” but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood, i.e. “something nearer to certainty than mere probability”. “ 30. In London City Airport v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610 [[NAME_165]] at paragraph 23, the EAT set out “The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The Employment Judge must do the best he can with such” [relevant] “material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases . . . what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance Employment Judge as to how the matters look to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 8 places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at a full Hearing of the claim.” and at paragraph 39 “Parliament has entrusted an assessment to the employment judge on the front line. The statutory rubric requires the judge to assess how the matter ‘appears’ to him or her.” 31. In Parsons v Airplus International Ltd [2016] UKEAT/0023/16/ [[NAME_166]], the EAT offered the following guidance as to approach: - “On hearing an application under section 128 the Employment Judge is required to make a summary assessment on the basis of the material then before her of whether the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding on the relevant claim. The Judge is not required (and would be wrong to attempt) to make a summary determination of the claim itself. In giving reasons for her decision, it is sufficient for the Judge to indicate the essential gist of her reasoning”: this is because the Judge is not making a final Judgment and her decision will inevitably be based to an extent on impression and therefore not susceptible to detailed reasoning; because, as far as possible, it is better not to say anything which might prejudge the final determination on the merits.” 32. In His Highness Sheikh Khalid Bin Saqr Al Qasimi v Robinson [2017] UKEAT/0283/17/JOJ [[NAME_167]] Her Honour Judge Eady QC at paragraph 59 set out: “I start by reminding myself of the exercise that the ET had to undertake on this application. By its nature, the application had to be determined expeditiously and on a summary basis. The ET had to do the best it could with such material as the parties had been able to deploy at short notice and to make as good an assessment as it felt able. The ET3 was only served during the course of the hearing and it is apparent that points emerged at a late stage and had to be dealt with as and when they did. The Employment Judge also had to be careful to avoid making findings that might tie the hands of the ET ultimately charged with the final determination of the merits of the points raised. His task was thus very much an impressionistic one: to form a view as to how the matter looked, as to 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 9 whether the Claimant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out her case, and to explain the conclusion reached on that basis; not in an over- formulistic way but giving the essential gist of his reasoning, sufficient to let the parties know why the application had succeeded or failed given the issues raised and the test that had to be applied.” 33. The EAT in Wollenberg v Global Gaming Ventures (Leeds) Limited, [2018] EAT/0052/18 [[NAME_169]] (to which the respondent refers to in paragraph 13 of the respondent written submission), set out at para 42 “I would however urge the parties carefully to consider preparation for any remitted hearing. Such hearings are intended to be short. They are, as the cases make plain, intended to be broad assessments by an Employment Judge who cannot be expected to grapple with vast quantities of material. . . . It is only a preliminary view taken by an Employment Judge in a case which will have to be in due course the subject the detailed investigation.” 34. Such Hearings are intended to be short with broad assessments made by the Employment Judge who is not expected to grapple with large quantities of material. The statutory rubric requires the judge to assess how the matter ‘appears’ to him or her. The exercise carried out by the Employment Tribunal is necessarily somewhat cursory, given the short time scales dictated in s. 128 ERA 1996 35. The very nature of the exercise carried out by the Employment Tribunal is necessarily somewhat cursory, given the short time scales provided in s. 128 ERA 1996.

36. In terms of Rule 94 of the 2024 ET Rules, a Tribunal will not hear oral evidence at a Hearing on an Application for [NAME_37] but will consider both parties positions, commonly by reference to written submissions supplemented by oral comments on the [NAME_37] issues, in terms of section 128 of the ERA 1996 not the merits of the full claim. The general prohibition against the hearing of oral evidence which is contained in Rule 94 is for the long-established reason that the Tribunal at such an Interim Hearing 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 10 must seek to avoid making findings in fact which have the effect of binding or restricting the scope of inquiry which is to be undertaken at a full evidential Merits Hearing and in any event there would no practical opportunity to cross examine all the potential witnesses who may be relevant at a final hearing.

37. The Tribunal noted that in Chandhok v Tirkey [2015] ICR 527 ([NAME_17]) the EAT set out at paragraph 16 “The claim, as set out in ET1, is not something just to set the ball rolling, as an initial document necessary to comply with time limits but which is otherwise free to be augmented by whatever the parties choose to add or subtract merely on their say so. Instead, it serves not only a useful but a necessary function. It sets out the essential case. It is that to which a respondent is required to respond. A respondent is not required to answer a witness statement nor a document, but the claims made...”.

38. Unfair Dismissal: General 39. Relevant Law 40. Section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) provides “An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.” 41. Section 98 ERA 1996 states (1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2)_or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind for which he is employed by the employer to do, 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 11 (b) relates to conduct of the employee, (4) In any other case where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.

42. The claimant at page 8 of the paper apart to her ET1, describes at paragraph 21 that the respondent failed to follow the ACAS Code on ACAS Code on Discipline and Grievance. In accordance with the overriding objective (Rule 3 of the 2024 ET Rules of Procedure) and pending sight of the ET3, it is noted that in Phoenix House Ltd v Stockman [2016] ICR 84 (Stockman), the EAT set out at paragraph 21 “The code does not in terms apply to dismissals for some other substantial reason.” 43. The claimant at page 15 of the paper apart to the ET1, references, in paragraph 26, towards the foot of the unnumbered second paragraph, set out part of the sentence from paragraph 58 of the EAT decision in Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2011] UKEAT/0399/09 [[NAME_170]] “on the lookout”. The Tribunal notes that full sentence of which paragraph reads “We have no reason to think that employment tribunals will not be on the lookout, in cases of this kind, to see whether an employer is using the rubric of “some other substantial reason” as a pretext to conceal the real reason for the employee's dismissal.” 44. Unusually, in accordance with the overriding objective, it is considered helpful to provide a brief summary of [NAME_170], in which the EAT held that an employee who had been dismissed because of the breakdown of his working relationships with colleagues, irrespective of whether he had been 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 12 responsible for or had contributed towards that breakdown, had not been dismissed because of his conduct.

Accordingly, it had been open to the Tribunal to find that disciplinary procedures relevant to allegations of misconduct did not have to be invoked in his case. 1. [NAME_171] appealed against the Tribunal's finding that he had not been automatically unfairly dismissed by the Trust for making protected disclosures or unfairly dismissed. 2. [NAME_171] was a consultant surgeon who, from the beginning of his employment, had expressed concerns about the competence of colleagues and management, and had written frequent letters on the subject. Nine senior members of staff signed a petition expressing concerns regarding [NAME_171]’ conduct and how it was being dealt with. An investigation found that working relationships between [NAME_171] and his colleagues had broken down irretrievably. [NAME_171] was dismissed on the basis of that breakdown of trust and confidence. He brought proceedings arguing that the real reason for his dismissal was that he had made protected disclosures on 75 topics. The Tribunal examined some and found they did not amount to protected disclosures, but even if they did, the reason for his dismissal had been the breakdown of working relationships in the department, categorised as dismissal for a reason within the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.98(1)(b). Therefore, [NAME_171]' claim that his dismissal was automatically unfair did not succeed, and the Tribunal went on to find that the reason for his dismissal had been fair. 3. [NAME_171] submitted, among other things, that (1) in relation to automatic unfair dismissal, the Tribunal had failed to determine the reasons behind the petition and had failed to consider separately all of the 75 topics; (2) in relation to ordinary unfair dismissal, he had been dismissed otherwise than in accordance with the disciplinary procedures which had been incorporated into his contract of employment.

4. The EAT dismissed the appeal noting regarding the petition, it was plain that the tribunal had found that it was the way [NAME_171] had treated his 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 13 colleagues, rather than any concerns on their part that he was disclosing things which they would have preferred to be kept secret, which was the cause of the breakdown of working relationships. Regarding the 75 topics, in the normal course of events, a Tribunal would have to address the topics which a claimant claimed to have complained about to decide whether they amounted to protected disclosures; it would then need to decide which of those topics the claimant actually complained about, whether they amounted to the disclosure of information, and if so whether the information came within any of the categories set out in s.43B(1). That was less appropriate where it was claimed that a large number of topics were the subject of complaints. However, even if [NAME_171] reasonably believed that such information as he was disclosing tended to show one or more of the things set out in s.43B(1), the Tribunal's finding that that information was not disclosed in good faith made it unnecessary for it to consider each complaint separately. Nor did the tribunal have to make findings about each of the 75 complaints in order to decide why the relationships between [NAME_171] and his colleagues had broken down (see paras 33, 37-38 of judgment).

5. The relevant question for the Tribunal had been whether the action taken by the Trust against [NAME_171] should have been regarded as action taken against him because of his conduct. If so, the Tribunal would have had to consider whether that conduct should have been classified as personal or professional. If the latter, then it would have had to decide whether the failure to follow the correct disciplinary procedure had made [NAME_171]' dismissal unfair. If the former, [NAME_171]' dismissal would only have been capable of being unfair if the procedure in fact adopted by the Trust had not met the requirements of its own disciplinary procedure. However, if the Tribunal were to be regarded as having found that the reason for [NAME_171]' dismissal was the fact of the breakdown of his relationships, and not his contribution to that breakdown, the conclusion it had reached was inevitable (paras 47, 56). 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 14 45. The claimant at page 15 of the paper of the ET1, in the second unnumbered sub paragraph of paragraph of 26 provides an extract from Tubbenden Primary School Governors v Sylvester [2012] UKEAT/0527/11 (Slyvester)

46. Again unusually it considered appropriate in accordance with the overriding objective to provide a summary of [NAME_172], in which it was held that where a dismissal had been for some other substantial reason and that reason was a breakdown of trust and confidence, the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to how that situation came about to determine the fairness of the dismissal. The governors of a [COMPANY_115] (the employer) appealed against a decision that they had unfairly dismissed [NAME_173], the deputy head.

47. The headteacher in [NAME_172], had instructed [NAME_173] not to contact another teacher who was subject to serious allegations, but she refused. [NAME_173] attended a meeting nine months later concerning the continuation of the friendship, and it was decided that no action would be taken. After a further seven months, she was asked to attend another meeting, at which she was suspended because of her continuing friendship with that other teacher. Disciplinary proceedings resulted in her dismissal as a result of the breakdown in trust and confidence between [NAME_173] and the Head Teacher, which was a dismissal for some other substantial reason within the meaning of the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.98(1)(b). [NAME_173] claimed unfair dismissal. The Tribunal held that, whilst the loss of trust and confidence was a potentially fair reason, [NAME_173]'s dismissal had been unfair because the Head Teacher had given his tacit consent at the first meeting to her friendship with that other teacher and had not thereafter warned her of the potential consequences of its continuing. For those two reasons, it also found [NAME_173]'s conduct had not contributed to her dismissal.

48. The EAT allowed appeal in part: (1) Where, as in the instant case, the substantial reason relied upon was a consequence of conduct, there was such a clear analogy to a dismissal for conduct itself that it was entirely appropriate that a Tribunal should have 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 15 regard to the immediate history leading up to the dismissal. The conclusion that there had been a loss of confidence did not mean that there was no need to examine all the circumstances of the case and the substantial merits of the case, as s.98 ERA would require. If, as a matter of principle, it were to be open to an employer to conclude that he had no confidence in an employee, and if a Tribunal were, as a matter of law, precluded from examining how that position came about, it would be open to that employer, if he could establish that the reason was genuine, to dismiss for any reason or none in much the same way as they could have done at common law before legislation in 1971 introduced the right not to be unfairly dismissed. The Tribunal had not been perverse in concluding that it was relevant to the fairness of the instant dismissal that [NAME_174] had not only not been warned of the consequences of the continued relationship but had been entitled to think that her conduct had been condoned by the Head Teacher, or certainly not objected to. The Tribunal had been entitled to take those facts into account in determining the fairness of the case (see paras 37-39 of the judgment). (2) The employer’s disciplinary code provided for automatic suspension where the [NAME_120] offence was gross misconduct. The only example of gross misconduct in the code that might be applicable in the instant case was wilfully ignoring responsibilities or refusing to carry out reasonable, lawful and safe instructions, thereby placing other members of staff or pupils in danger. It would be difficult, but not impossible, to classify [NAME_173]’s case as gross misconduct. It was noted that the Head Teacher could have asked for somebody else to investigate, particularly as he had been extensively involved in the case, although it was recognised that the Head Teacher was customarily involved in initial investigations. Therefore, the Tribunal had been entitled to its view as a matter of objective observation. A Tribunal was required to pass judgment upon the overall fairness of a dismissal, which often involved expressing itself as to elements that had fed into the dismissal. There was no indication that it had substituted its own decision for that of the employer as opposed to commenting from its own perspective upon what the employer had done (paras 42-44). 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 16 (3) The Tribunal had not dealt with a second and distinct reason for arguing that there might have been some contributory conduct, namely that [NAME_173] had made ill-founded aspersions on the Head Teacher’s good faith during the internal hearing, which made it difficult for her to continue to work as his deputy. The appeal on that ground would be allowed, the issue of contributory conduct would be remitted to the same Tribunal (paras 55-58).

49. Relevant Law 50. Protected Disclosures 51. Section 47B of ERA 1996, so far as relevant, provides: “47B Protected disclosures. (1)A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.” 52. Section 43B ERA, provides: “43B Disclosures qualifying for protection. (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a) ..., (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject ...” 53. The word “information” (or for that matter “disclosure”) is not defined in the ERA 1996. In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38 ([NAME_175]), the EAT set out, considering whether a solicitors letter which set out that health and safety requirements were not being complied with was an unprotected allegation (The EAT indicating in contrast that to say “wards of the hospitals have not been cleaned for two 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 17 weeks and sharps were left lying around” would be conveying information) that for the legislation to have effect a disclosure must involve information, and not simply voice a concern or raise an allegation.

54. Subsequently the Court of Appeal in [NAME_16] v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 1850 ([NAME_16]) (which the respondent references at paragraph 21 of their written submission) approved the EAT decision in [NAME_16] v London Borough of Wandsworth [2016] IRLR 422 in which it was noted the statute did not draw a distinction between information and allegation. 55. [ADDRESS] of Appeal went on to say in [NAME_16] at para 35 to 36: “In order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content and specificity which is capable of intending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1) .... Whether an identified statement or disclosure in any particular case does or does not meet that standard, will be a matter for an evaluative judgment by the tribunal in the light of all of the facts of the case. It is a question that is likely to be closely aligned with the other requirements set out in section 43B (1) namely that the work in making the disclosure should have the reasonable belief that the information that he or she disclosures does tend to show one of the listed matters.” (emphasis added).

56. At para 41- 42 the Court of Appeal set out:

41. It is true that whether a particular disclosure satisfies the test in section 43B(1) should be assessed in the light of the particular context in which it is made. If, to adapt the example given in the [NAME_176] case [2010] ICR 325, para 24, the worker brings his manager down to a particular ward in a hospital, gestures to sharps left lying around and says “You are not complying with health and safety requirements”, the statement would derive force from the context in which it was made and taken in combination with that context would constitute a qualifying disclosure. The oral statement then would plainly be made with reference to the factual matters being indicated by the worker at the time that it was made. If such a disclosure was to be relied upon for the 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 18 purposes of a whistleblowing claim under the protected disclosures regime in Part IVA of the 1996 Act, the meaning of the statement to be derived from its context should be explained in the claim form and in the evidence of the claimant so that it is clear on what basis the worker alleges that he has a claim under that regime. The employer would then have a fair opportunity to dispute the context relied upon, or whether the oral statement could really be said to incorporate by reference any part of the factual background in this manner.

42. However, in the present case the claimant and her legal representatives did not identify any relevant context for the statement said to constitute the third disclosure which might inform or supplement its meaning; nor did they specify any part of that context which was said to supply the relevant minimum factual content which could satisfy the test in section 43B(1) . Even at the hearing before us, [NAME_178] did not do this with any particularity. 57. [COMPANY_180] t/a Chemistree v Gahir [2014] IRLR 416 ([NAME_181]) the EAT set out (at paragraph 98) guidance, indicating that the Tribunal should: (a) separately identify each disclosure by reference to date and content. (b) identify the employer's [NAME_120] or likely failure to comply with a legal obligation and/or the matter giving rise to the endangering of an individual's health and safety; (c) address the basis upon which the disclosure was said to be protected and qualifying; (d) separately identify each failure; (e) identify and verify the source of the obligation by reference to statute or regulation. It was not enough for the tribunal to lump together a number of complaints, some of which might not show breaches of legal obligations; 5 10 15 20 25 (f) determine whether the claimant had the necessary reasonable belief;

8001081/2025 Page 19 (g) where a detriment short of dismissal was [NAME_120], identify the detriment and the date of the act or deliberate failure to act; (h) determine, as appropriate, whether the claimant acted in good faith or whether the disclosure was made in the public interest 58. In Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] IRLR 115 [[NAME_182]] (to which the respondent refers at paragraph 22 of their written submission) the EAT set out that before finding that an employee had made a qualifying disclosure under ERA s.43B(1), a Tribunal requires to have identified the source of the legal obligation to which the employer was subject, and set out how it had been breached. The Tribunal was required to decide whether, in making the disclosure, the employee reasonably believed that it tended to show that her manager had failed to comply with a legal obligation. It was not obvious that failing to inform a client of the identity of the person they were dealing with was a breach of a legal obligation. Therefore, to fall within s.43B(1) ERA 1996, the Tribunal requires to identify the source of the legal obligation to which the employee believed her manager was subject, and how he had failed to comply with it, [NAME_181] applied. The identification of the obligation did not have to detailed, but it had to be more than a belief that the actions were morally wrong. The Tribunal had failed to decide what legal obligation the employee believed to have been breached, and was therefore unable to determine the reasonableness of the employee's belief that a legal obligation had not been complied with. The decision that the employee made a qualifying disclosure was therefore set aside (paras 44-48).

59. The public interest test was considered by the Court of Appeal in [COMPANY_199] (t/a Chesterton) v Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979 ([NAME_183]) (which the respondent refers to at paragraph 24 of their written submission), which set out (para 27) that a Tribunal must determine: a. whether the worker believed at the time of making it, that the disclosure was in the public interest, and, 5 10 15 20 25 30 b. whether, if so that belief was reasonable.

8001081/2025 Page 20 60. Further in relation to 1.b. the Tribunal is required to recognise that there might be more than one reasonable view as to whether a particular disclosure was in the public interest, and the Tribunal should not substitute its own view for another reasonable view. The necessary belief is simply that the disclosure is in public interest. While the worker must have a genuine (and reasonable) belief that the disclosure is in the public interest, that does not require to be the predominant motive in making it. 61. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in [NAME_183], also identified that the test is not one of mere numerical analysis (as to how many its serves) but depends on the character of the interest served. All the circumstances of the case should be considered including: 1. the numbers whose interests are served by the disclosure, and 2. the nature of the interest affected and its importance, and 3. whether the matter complained of was deliberate; and 4. the identity of [NAME_184].

62. Relevant Law (for IR hearing) 63. [NAME_187].

64. The claimant refers to the [NAME_187]. From 6 April 2011 public authorities must have ‘due regard’ io the [NAME_187] set down by section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010).

65. S 149(1) EA 2010 provides that, a public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under [the Equality Act 2010]; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 21 66. S 149(3) EA 2010 having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to (a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic; (b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it; (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low 67. R. (on the application of Buckley) v Bath and North East Somerset Council [2018] EWHC 1551 (Admin) [R (On application of Buckley)] per Lewis J at para 36 “the duty is a duty to have due regard to the specified matters, not a duty to achieve a specific result. The duty is one of substance, not form, and the real issue is whether the relevant public authority has, in substance, had regard to the relevant matters, taking into account the nature of the decision and the public authority's reasoning. The absence of a reference to the [NAME_187] will not, of itself, necessarily mean that the decision-maker failed to have regard to the relevant matters although it is good practice to make reference to the duty, and evidentially useful in demonstrating discharge of the duty”: 68. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in R (Bridges) v [NAME_131] of South Wales Police [2020] 1 WLR 5037 R (Bridges) set out at [181]: “We acknowledge that what is required by the PSED is dependent on the context and does not require the impossible. It requires the taking of reasonable steps to make enquiries about what may not yet be known to a public authority about the potential impact of a proposed decision or policy on people with the relevant characteristics, in particular for present purposes race and sex.” 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 22 69. Relevant Law (for IR hearing)

70. Health and Safety 71. Section 2(1) of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 provides that (1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees.

72. Relevant Law 73. Expenses Application 74. Rule 73 of the 2024 Rules (while the Rules refer to costs - in Scotland they are referred to as Expenses) (1) A (expenses) order is an order that a party (“the paying party”) make a payment to- (a) another party (“the receiving party”) in respect of the costs that the receiving party has incurred while represented by a legal representative . . .

75. Rule 74 of the 2024 Rules provides that (1) A Tribunal may make (an expenses) order or a preparation of time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party (2) The Tribunal must consider making a cost order or a preparation time order whether it considers that- (a) a party. . . has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of proceedings, or part of it, or the way that proceedings (or part) have been conducted. (b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or (c) A hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins. 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 23 (3) A Tribunal may also make a (expenses,) order or a preparation of time order (as appropriate) on the application of a party where a party has been in breach of any order, rule or practice direction or where a hearing has been postponed on the application of party.

76. Rule 75 of the 2024 Rules provides; “Procedure (1) A party may apply for a (expenses,) order or a preparation time order at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which the judgment finally determining the proceedings in respect of that party was sent to the parties. (2) The Tribunal must not make a (expenses) order or a preparation time order against a party unless that party has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order).” 77. Rule 76 of the 2024 Rules provides (1) A (expenses) order may order the paying party to pay (a) the receiving party a specified amount, not exceeding £20,000, in respect of the (expenses) of the receiving party; (b) the receiving party the whole or a specified part of the (expenses) of the receiving party, with the amount to be paid being determined (ii) n Scotland, by way of taxation carried out by the auditor of court... (3) A (expenses) order under sub-paragraph (b) ... of paragraph (1) may exceed £20,000 78. Rule 82 of the 2024 Rules provides 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 24 Ability to pay In deciding whether to make a (expenses) order, preparation time order, or wasted costs order, and if so the amount, the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s (or, where a wasted costs order is made, the representative’s) ability to pay.” 79. The respondent has made an application for expenses (using the Scottish terminology) in accordance with Rule 73 (1) (a) of the 2024 Rules on the basis that the [NAME_160] had no reasonable prospects of success (Rule 74(2) (b)).

80. The respondent refers at paragraph 41 of their submission to Queensgate Investments LLP v Millet [2021] ICR 863 (Millet) and paragraphs 28 to 29 as support for a proposition that an application for expenses is apt for [NAME_160]. The Tribunal considers that the principal analysis of the EAT is that a hearing to determine an application for [NAME_37] should be held in public unless an order restricting publicity was made pursuant to what is now Rule 49. It is not considered that an [NAME_37] Hearing could not be subject to an expenses application. However, the Tribunal recognises that expense cases are very much fact-dependent and that it is a fact-sensitive exercise.

81. The principle is that an award of expenses is the exception and not the rule as described by the Court of Appeal in [NAME_188] v London Borough of Southwark [2004] ICR 884 ([NAME_188]) and [NAME_10] v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 2012 ICR 420, CA ([NAME_10]); Rule 74 uses the word “may” when talking about circumstances which may lead to the making of such an order. [NAME_10] sets out that costs should be limited to those “reasonably and necessarily incurred”.

82. The ability of the paying party can be a relevant factor in deciding how to exercise the Tribunal’s discretion (and also when considering how much should be paid). 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 25 83. The Tribunal is not required to consider the ability to pay, but it may choose to do so.

84. The Tribunal has reminded itself of the guidance set out in Abaya v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2017] UKEAT 0258/16 (Abaya). In Abaya, Mr Justice Singh, at paragraphs 14 to 16, identifies that there are, in essence, three stages in the exercise involved when an Employment Tribunal considers a costs (in Scotland, expenses) application: “14 The first stage is to ask whether the precondition for making a Costs Order has been established. For example, in the present case, whether the claim or part of the claim had no reasonable prospect of success. However, that precondition is merely a necessary condition; it is not a sufficient condition for an award of costs. This is because the second stage of the exercise that has to be performed is that the Tribunal must consider whether to exercise its discretion to make an award of costs.

15. The position was summarised by HHJ Eady QC in the Ayoola case at paragraphs 17 and 18. As she said at paragraph 17, at the second stage of the exercise: “17. ... The Tribunal must then specifically address the question as to whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion to award costs. Simply because the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction is engaged, costs will not automatically follow the event. The Employment Tribunal would still have to be satisfied that it would be appropriate to make such an order ...” 16. The third stage of the exercise only arises if the Tribunal decides that it is appropriate to make an award of costs. The third stage is to assess the quantum of that award of costs.. ..” 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 26 85. In Abaya, Mr Justice Singh emphasises, at paragraph 20, that all cases are fact-sensitive, that the assessment of whether to award expenses will depend on the particular circumstances of each case, and that “the discretion under the 2004 Tribunal Rules is very broad [and I would say the same of the 2013 Rules]”. The same broad discretion applies under the 2024 Rules, which are broadly expressed in similar terms to the 2004 Rules.

86. Discussion 87. [NAME_37]

88. The claimant at paragraph 5 of the paper apart from the current ET1 (the 2025 claim), provides an extract of what is said to be her pleadings from the 2024 claim within which she asserts that she made internal to the respondent qualifying protected whistleblowing disclosures on various dates, which are (from page one) to be said to have been made on dates (the claimant confirmed at this hearing that the year for each date was 2024) :

1. Three in March 2024; and 2. Five in April 2024; and 3. Six in May 2024; and 4. One in June 2024; and 5. Three in July 2024; and 6. One in August 2024; and 7. Three in September 2024; and 8. Two in October 2024 (both before 15 October 2024, the date of presentation of the 2024 claim); and 5 10 15 20 9. One in November 2024

8001081/2025 Page 27 89. The claimant in that extract, in the unnumbered first paragraph, refers to “potential breach of legal obligation of compliance with the [NAME_187] and/ or with duty of care in relation to health and safety in the work place.” 90. However, at this summary hearing the Tribunal concludes that the claimant gives no specification/fair notice within the ET1 on the substantive information/ (who, in what way and when) on the content, that is what, she says, was the respondent’s failure in terms of S 149(1) EA 2010, in the exercise of its functions by identifying for instance what actual decision the claimant says the respondent failed , in terms of the [NAME_187] to have due regard to the need to ...etc. There is no fair notice of what specific actions (or omissions) the claimant relies on (the who, what and when). Reference is made to [NAME_190].

91. Further Tribunal considers that the claimant gives no specification/fair notice of the substantive information/content, in what way (on what date or approximate date and in what way she asserts the respondent failed to take reasonable care (in the context of the Health and Safety at Work Act). The respondent is not given fair notice of what they (or their employee) are challenged over; there is no notice of what actions (or omissions) the claimant relies on (the who, what and when). Reference is made to [NAME_190].

92. In the context of what is said to be the first disclosure (which is said to have been made 25 March 2024), the claimant took the Tribunal to the foot of page 15 of her statement (which sets out she spoke to an individual at 5.50pm on 25 March 2024). In that she describes that she conveyed to an individual that she had said in the presence of a different individual on 7 March 2024 that she was being harassed and discriminated against. There, however, is no notice given either at that part of the statement or in the written pleadings of what actual [NAME_120] event (what words or actions) are relied upon as amounting to unlawful harassment (on the assumption that is argued to be in contravention of s26 EA 2010, harassment related to what 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 28 would require to be identified as protected characteristic), when it took place and who is [NAME_120] to have been the perpetrator. Reference is made to [NAME_191].

93. The claimant at paragraph 8 of the paper apart to this (the 2025 claim) claim, describes that in the 2024 claim on 3 April 2025, she made it known that she intended to apply for leave to amend (the 2024 claim) and add individuals in accordance with paragraph 7 of this claim. Paragraph 7 refers to an extract of the 2024 claim.

94. At paragraph 9 of this (2025) claim, the claimant describes that “from September 2023” she “informed the [NAME_192], of the failings to the equalities duties (and [NAME_187]) and duty of care happening, even escalating such disclosures to the Director of HR Partnering, and from March 2024 I informed that Equality, Diversity and Inclusion teams of the same.” and describes that she disclosed “that information... tending to show failing lined to harassment and to potential hate incident, in multiple forms and statements...” 95. Again, there is no fair notice of the specific information (the who, what and when); reference is made to [NAME_191].

96. At paragraph 13 of this (the 2025 claim), the claimant describes that she informed the [NAME_36] by “e-form of the breaches of equality and human rights law” and at paragraph 14 of this claim describes that being a protected disclosure because she “believed it contained information tending to show that my employer was failing to comply with a legal obligation . . . specifically compliance with the [NAME_187] under s149 of the Equality Act 2010; that the health and safety of employees., was likely to continue to be endangered as a result of continuing failings of the duty of care” 97. The claimant gives no specification/fair notice, in what way (she argues) the respondent failed in terms of S 149(1) EA 2010, which provides that a public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to . . .etc. The respondent is not given fair notice of what act or omission (such 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 29 a specific decision on a date) they (or their employee) are challenged over; there is no fair notice of what actions (or omissions) on which the claimant relies upon as the who, what and when. Reference is made to [NAME_191].

98. The claimant is considered, at this summary hearing, to give no specification/fair notice in the ET1 in what way the respondent failed to take reasonable care (in context of Health and Safety at Work Act). The respondent is not given fair notice of what act (or acts) or omission they (or their employee) is challenged over; there is no notice of what actions (or omissions) on which the claimant relies in the who, what and when. Reference is made to [NAME_191].

99. The claimant asserts at paragraph 20 of this (the 2025 claim) that she was informed on 1 May 2025 of the decision to dismiss, describing that it was said that the “panel has unanimously concluded that there are findings of misconduct which significantly damage the employment relationship and there is an irreparable and irretrievable breakdown in the employment relationship between you and the University” and notes that it is set out there is no right of appeal. 100. The claimant at paragraph 26 (of the 2025 claim) toward the end of the unnumbered sub paragraph (which start on page 15) references [NAME_172] in which it was held that where a dismissal had been for some other substantial reason and that reason was a breakdown of trust and confidence, and a Tribunal was entitled to have regard to how that situation came about to determine the fairness of the dismissal. 101. The claimant at paragraph 26 (of the 2025 claim), toward the end of the unnumbered sub-paragraph (which starts on page 15), also references [NAME_170] in which the EAT held that an employee who had been dismissed because of the breakdown of his working relationships with colleagues, irrespective of whether he had been responsible for or had contributed towards that breakdown, had not been dismissed because of his conduct. 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 30 Accordingly, it had been open to a Tribunal to find that disciplinary procedures relevant to allegations of misconduct did not have to be invoked in his case. 102. The respondent, in its response does not propose that it is not subject to the [NAME_187] but rather sets out at paragraph 21, that the claimant’s [NAME_120] disclosures lack sufficient factual content and specificity for the Tribunal to conclude that it is likely to succeed at a future full hearing. 103. As has been set out above, the onus of proof on an [NAME_160] does not sit with the respondent to establish that the principal reason for dismissal was that which the respondent asserts. 104. Rather, the onus sits with the claimant to show that it is likely that she will succeed in establishing all of the elements itemised and confirmed by the EAT in [NAME_167] v [NAME_193] of Justice v [NAME_164]. 105. On the materials presented, and setting aside the contents of the witness statement and on the submissions made, the Tribunal has been unable to form the view that the claimant has discharged that onus. 106. It is considered taking the case as currently pled, it is not considered that fair notice is given. The giving of such notice of the actual events relied upon, the who what and where is central to any such dispute and is wholly consistent with the overriding objective, a respondent is entitled to know what factual allegations they are facing. 107. The respondent in their written submission set out (at paragraph 33 of their submission) that the claimant was dismissed because of gross misconduct and an irretrievable breakdown in the working relationship between the [NAME_194] and the first respondent and argue that this is supported by documents including the termination letter (while the respondent provide witness statements , the Tribunal has, as this an [NAME_37] Hearing not taken those into account) working relationship between them and the claimant had broken down. This constituted some other substantial reason, a potentially fair reason for dismissal. 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 31 108. What is apparent, from a broad assessment, is that there is a clear and fundamental dispute between the parties as to the reason for dismissal. The Tribunal reminded itself that it was not its purpose to resolve that dispute (especially given that no evidence is led at [NAME_37] hearings) and that the only question is whether the claimant has demonstrated that she is likely to be able to show at a final hearing that she was dismissed for making a protected disclosure. 109. There is clearly a lot of material which, subject to fair notice being given, would be examined by the Tribunal at a full hearing. That Tribunal would have the benefit of hearing evidence in chief and cross-examination, and of looking at the documents in that light. 110. Whilst these points may be tested by evidence being led, it cannot be said, at this stage and from the broad assessment conducted, that it is likely that the complaint of unfair dismissal will succeed - the high test for an [NAME_160] has accordingly not been met. 111. At present it is not, in the Tribunal’s view, sufficiently clear for it to appear, from the broad assessment which requires to be undertaken at this stage, on the case for which she has given notice ([NAME_17]) that the claimant is likely to succeed. It is not the Tribunal’s role today to determine the substantive matters as between the parties. 112. Expenses 113. Discussion 114. At the outset of this hearing, the claimant identified that she is not represented and does not have experience in [NAME_37] procedure. While the claimant confirms that she is a lawyer with dual (including Spanish Law) qualification, she describes that her legal background is not that of employment law, and in Spain, it was contract law and Immigration law. 5 10 15 20 25

8001081/2025 Page 32 115. The respondents, who as above set out their opposition in written Submissions to the claimant and Tribunal in an email at 9.12 pm on 21 May 2025, list five bullets points of separate documents including; a Bundle of Documents and Index; a Bundle of Authorities and Index, Respondent Submissions, a Respondents Chronology; and as final bullet point; Witness statements for [NAME_152], [NAME_154], [NAME_156] and [NAME_195]. 116. Within the respondent’s written Submissions (within the document headed Respondent’s Note of Submission in Relation to the Hearing of the Claimant’s Application for [NAME_37] ), which extend to 17 pages and 59 paragraphs, in addition to setting out the respondent's opposition to the [NAME_160], contains application for expenses at paragraphs 41 to 51 (at which paragraph the respondent set out they also included a Schedule of Expenses for the preparation of this hearing). 117. The separate Bundle Document and Index, which extends to 134 pages, includes that Schedule of Expenses, providing a detailed breakdown of the respondent's solicitor hours (not including today's hearing) and costs set out at the end of that Bundle -at pages 131 to 134, broadly amounting to 68 hours in preparation with a total cost of £10,020. 118. At paragraph 55 of the respondent Submissions, the respondent set out that they had considered whether to send an expense warning letter to the claimant in advance of this [NAME_160]; however, given the short period the respondent had to prepare, they decided that doing so would risk becoming sidetracked from the hearing preparation. They set out that, in any event, it was considered futile due to the unlikelihood of the claimant withdrawing the application in such close proximity to the hearing. 119. Having raised the respondent's expenses application with the claimant, the claimant intimated she understood that she had the right to seek [NAME_37]. 120. The respondent’s proposition, as set out, addresses the first stage of Abaya, though not the second or third stage.

In all the circumstances, the Tribunal declines to exercise its discretion in this instance to award expenses. 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 33 121. The Tribunal notes that the respondent is currently preparing the ET3, it is considered that much the preparation for a factual response to afford a detailed ET3 would have been required to be carried out in any event. 122. On the current factual matrix, while the claimant has a legal background, though not in employment law, she is unrepresented. It is noted that she has a separate claim ongoing, within which she has been directed to provide further specification. While the Tribunal here makes reference to [NAME_17], the [NAME_194] intimated that she anticipated that she would be able to refer to documentation which she included in her bundle. The Tribunal concludes that while further particulars have been directed in her 2024 claim, the [NAME_194] proceed with the [NAME_160] and the the bundle was prepared by the claimant on the basis that she had not anticipated the fair notice issue as described out in [NAME_17]. 123. In any event, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the claimant who is unrepresented and unfamiliar with the process of [NAME_37], ought to have considered that her [NAME_160] had no reasonable prospect of success, against the specific factual matrix the claimant is yet to see the ET3 and it is understood not to be in dispute that her former employer did not offer a right an appeal (as the dismissal understood to be said by the respondent to be on grounds of SOSR resulting from breakdown of working relationship). In the ET3 it is anticipated that the respondent will set out their position in detail and point to case law such as Stockman as basis for the proposition that the ACAS Code of Practice on Discipline and Grievance is therefore disapplied. It is observed that while criticism is made of the claimant’s pleadings above there is an underlying dispute on the factual matrix around the reason for termination. 124. In any event, it is observed that the respondent elected not to give any advance expense warning letter to the claimant in advance of this [NAME_160]. In effect, the only notice prior to the hearing was the respondent position set out within and at the end of an un-signposted (in the sense of notice of expenses application) document headed Note of Submission in Relation to the Hearing of the Claimant’s Application for [NAME_37], received by email 5 10 15 20 25 30

8001081/2025 Page 34 after 9 pm the evening before this hearing along with a number other documents, none of which (in their title) on the face of them identified any material issue of expenses application, reference is made to Rule 75 of the 2024 ET Rules above 5 125. [NAME_37] 126. Conclusion 127. The Tribunal’s conclusion therefore that, whilst nothing set out here prejudges the final outcome in these proceedings and the claimant may ultimately succeed in her claim, it cannot be said, at this stage on a broad summary io assessment, that the claimant has a pretty good chance of success.

For these reasons, the application for [NAME_37] is refused 128. Expenses 129. Conclusion 130. The respondent’s expenses application is refused. Entered in register: 28 May 2025 and copied to parties