Employment Tribunal Rejects Claims Against Trade Union
📌 In brief
An employment tribunal rejected claims made by a person against a trade union for victimisation and unjustifiable discipline. The tribunal found that the decision not to provide legal assistance was reasonable given past actions of the claimant.
⚖️ Legal holding
A trade union is not subject to unjustifiable disciplinary action for refusing legal assistance to a member based on previous conduct.
📖 What the law says
Victimisation occurs when a person (A) subjects another person (B) to a detriment because B does a protected act or A believes B has done or may do a protected act. Protected acts include bringing proceedings under the Equality Act, giving evidence or information related to these proceedings, doing something for the purposes of or in connection with the Act, or making an allegation that someone has contravened the Act. However, giving false evidence or making a false allegation in bad faith is not considered a protected act.
Plain-English explanation — does not replace advice from a solicitor.
📖 Technical summary
The claimant's complaints of victimisation and unjustifiable discipline were dismissed by the Employment Tribunal.
📜 Headnote Official document
The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claimant's complaints of victimisation and unjustifiable discipline against a trade union, finding that the refusal to provide legal assistance was justified due to previous conduct.
📚 Full judgment Official document
OUTCOME: [NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Claimant: [redacted]
Respondent: [redacted]
(2) Mr [APPELLANT] at:
Manchester Employment Tribunal
On:
07, 08, 09, 10, 11 and 14 October 2024, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 February 2026 and 02 March 2026
04, 05 and 06 March 2026 (in Chambers)
Before:
Employment Judge M Butler
Representation Claimant: [redacted]
Respondent: [redacted]
(2) [APPELLANT]
1. The complaints of victimisation pursuant to s.27 of the Equality Act 2010 fail in their entirety and are dismissed.
2. The complaints of unjustifiable discipline under the [RESPONDENT] 3. [NAME] (Consolidation) Act 1992 fail in their entirety and are dismissed.
4. For the avoidance of doubt, all complaints brought as part of these proceedings have failed and are dismissed.
REASONS
INTRODUCTION
5. Where a document is contained in the pleadings bundle, reference will be
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
made to ‘[NAME]’ after the page number being referred to. Where there is just a page number then this is referring to the main bundle. The Tribunal will refer to the supplemental bundle for documents contained in that.
6. This [NAME] was brought by the claimant through the presentation of three claim forms. The first was presented on 02 April 2021 (pp.1-30 [NAME]). The [NAME] claim form was presented on 02 April 2022 (pp.63-90 [NAME]). And the third claim form was presented on 09 September 2022 (pp.108-125 [NAME]). The three claims were combined, were [NAME] managed together and have been heard together at this final hearing. The combined claim will be referred to as the claim for ease (however, where they are discussed separately it will be made clear in this judgment).
7. This claim relates closely to claims brought under [NAME] numbers 2205756/2018 and 2401913/2019 (the Tribunal that heard this [NAME] is referred to in this judgment as the ‘Slater Tribunal’, whilst the judgment that was reached is referred to as the ‘Slater Judgment’). The Slater Tribunal heard these claims across February and March 2020, and following deliberations in March and April 2020, handed down a decision on 01 May 2020 (which was sent to the parties on 04 May 2020). In the claim before this Tribunal, there is significant focus on the first respondent’s decision not to accede to the claimant’s request for legal assistance in claims brought against his [NAME] employer. This was also a feature of the claim brought before the Slater Tribunal. This Tribunal was therefore conscious that some of the findings that the Slater Tribunal made may be of some relevance to the issues that were before us, and this Tribunal would not be able to look behind any such findings. This included, but not limited to, any findings the Slater Tribunal made as to why the legal assistance the first respondent initially granted to the claimant in his claims against his previous employer was ended, and why legal assistance was not then provided thereafter despite requests from the claimant.
8. This claim was [NAME] managed over several preliminary hearings. Following a preliminary hearing before [NAME] Employment Judge Franey on 27 January 2023 (pp.140-154 [NAME]), a [NAME] management decision was made in respect to the scope of these proceedings. This was to ensure that this Tribunal was not re-hearing the issues already decided by the Slater Tribunal. The list of issues to be determined at this hearing were contained in the annex to the record of that hearing.
9. This Tribunal also reminded the parties during this hearing on several occasions that the scope of this hearing was not to look behind the findings and conclusions of the Slater Judgment. The scope of the issues before this Tribunal has been made extremely clear to the parties throughout this process, and that is that this Tribunal is only concerned with decisions made following the date that made up the final allegation that was decided by the Slater Tribunal. Anything that pre-dated this was not within the scope of these proceedings.
10. The Tribunal had several files of documents before us at the outset of the hearing. There was:
a. A primary hearing bundle, which contained 508 electronic pages.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
b. A supplemental bundle supplied by the claimant, which contained 246 electronic pages. The numbering in this bundle was somewhat difficult to follow, as pages had clearly been removed and the claimant had attempted to change the page numbers at the bottom of the page. However, this appeared incomplete as there appeared to be missing page numbers. For example, p.13 is directly followed by p.28 (although, there is also the number 5 present). c. A pleadings bundle, which contained 197 electronic pages. d. A file containing the Slater Tribunal’s judgment, which contained 197 pages. e. A witness statement bundle. We note here that the claimant’s witness statement ran to 102 pages in length.
11. The claimant gave evidence on his behalf. This took place across 09 October 2024, and the morning of 10 October 2024. The claimant did not cross-examine any of the respondents’ witnesses before the [NAME] was adjourned, to be re-listed at a later date (see below).
12. The first respondent called the following witnesses:
a. Mr [COUNSEL]. The Senior Employment Solicitor in the first respondent’s Legal Department. Mr [COUNSEL] was the person responsible for making decisions as to whether to provide members with legal assistance. b. Mr [RESPONDENT]. He had responsibility for the first respondent’s [NAME], which the claimant had used to raise certain issues. c. Ms [APPELLANT]. The Director of HR, [NAME] and [NAME] for the first respondent. d. [NAME]. A Member [NAME] for the first respondent during the material time, up until retirement on 31 December 2020. e. Mr [NAME]. The current Director of [COMPANY] for the first respondent. He filled this role first in an acting capacity from April 2022, before taking up the post on a permanent basis from July 2023. f. Mr [RESPONDENT]. A [NAME] of the first respondent’s [NAME], but who had additional responsibilities in the [NAME]. g. Mr [RESPONDENT]. [NAME] of the first respondent’s [NAME].
13. The [NAME] respondent gave evidence on his own behalf and called no additional witnesses.
[NAME]’S WITNESS STATEMENT
14. Witness statement exchange was directed by [NAME] Employment Judge Franey to take place by 28 June 2024.
15. [NAME] Employment Judge Franey at the preliminary hearing on 30 August 2024, noted that Mr [NAME] had not produced and exchanged a witness statement in this [NAME] (see para 12 on p.182 of the Pleadings Bundle). [NAME] Employment Judge Franey then explained the following:
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
“That means that the [NAME] respondent is not permitted to give evidence at the final hearing. If he wishes to do so he will need to provide a witness statement and seek permission to give evidence even though it has been served late.”
16. Mr [NAME] emailed the Tribunal on 05 October 2024, attaching a witness statement on which he was seeking to have accepted by the Tribunal late. In his email, Mr [NAME] wrote that:
“I regret I am unable to attend the ET in the week of the 7th October. I mean no discourtesy to the ET. I hope the ET can accept this late statement.
Please note in addition to the statement I would seek to adopt the defence of the First Respondent.
Regrettably what I can say from reading of the papers is limited. I do not have access to [NAME] emails and the decision of Mr [NAME] to withdraw legal assistance and to refuse access to [NAME] [NAME], as a consequence of separate proceedings I have issued against the First Respondent and without regard to the client retainer, impacts greatly on how much I can assist the Tribunal.
I note the Tribunal will be discussing timetabling on Monday. If the Claimant wishes to cross examine me on this statement, should the Tribunal accept the statement, then I would be grateful if such could be timetabled for the morning of Tuesday the 15th October, if at all possible.”
17. The witness statement that Mr [NAME] attached to his email extended to 15 paragraphs, across 2 pages.
18. The email above, sent by [NAME], complies with [NAME] Employment Judge Franey’s direction that should [NAME] want to give evidence then he will need to provide a witness statement and seek permission from the Employment Tribunal.
19. The claimant objected to Mr [APPELLANT] witness statement being accepted late. In short, he submitted that Mr [NAME] has produced no medical evidence to support why the statement was disclosed late. That Mr [NAME] had not engaged with the process. That Mr [APPELLANT] knew that the claimant was making an application to strike out his response (and that of the first respondent), which led to a statement being submitted. That Mr [NAME] had been given an unfair advantage in that he had had the opportunity to read the claimant’s statement in advance of creating his own. That Mr [NAME] had enough time already to produce his statement, and by not doing so has caused him anxiety. And lastly, that the late disclosure of the statement was unfair to the claimant as he had not yet had the chance to read it or prepare cross-examination questions for [NAME].
20. Mr [RESPONDENT] did not oppose Mr [RESPONDENT] application. He submitted that it would be helpful for the Tribunal to have all the evidence before it. That the
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
claimant could be afforded time to read and prepare cross examination questions for Mr [NAME] whilst the Tribunal was reading into the [NAME]. That Mr [NAME] had done what was required of him by [NAME] Employment Judge Franey in submitting a late witness statement. And that the first respondent would be put to significant prejudice if Mr [RESPONDENT] statement was disallowed, given the actions of Mr [NAME] were also part of the claim brought against the first respondent.
21. Having considered the matter and having taken account of the submissions of the parties, the Tribunal decided that it would allow Mr [NAME] witness statement to stand as his evidence in this [NAME], albeit disclosed in close proximity to these proceedings. In reaching this decision the Tribunal considered that Mr [NAME] had done what was asked of him from [NAME] Employment Judge Franey, at least insofar as seeking permission and producing a statement. There was no requirement placed on Mr [NAME] to produce medical evidence. The Tribunal considered that the issues raised by the clamant could be mitigated against:
a. The claimant could cross-examine Mr [APPELLANT] on whether he produced his witness statement to directly contradict the evidence he had given in his statement or only in response to a strike out application being made, if he considered that appropriate. And he could make closing submissions on that too. b. The claimant was still having to prove his [NAME], which introduces [NAME] anxiety in presenting a [NAME] in any event. The Tribunal was not convinced that not having had a statement from Mr [APPELLANT] caused the claimant any additional stress or anxiety. c. The Tribunal would be taking 1.5 days to read into the [NAME]. And there was a half-day break planned in between the claimant completing his evidence and him starting cross-examination of [NAME]. And given the brevity of Mr [APPELLANT] witness statement, the claimant had more than enough time to read the statement carefully and plan what cross-examination questions he had for Mr [NAME]. d. Both respondents would be put at a significant disadvantage of the Tribunal refused to allow the witness statement to stand as evidence.
APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT RESPONSES OF BOTH RESPONDENTS
22. The claimant made an application in writing to strike out the responses of both the first and [NAME] respondents. The Tribunal heard submissions from the claimant, and from Mr [RESPONDENT] in reply.
23. The Tribunal decided to refuse the application.
24. The Tribunal is familiar with the applicable principles. And strike out is a last resort. A Tribunal must tread carefully, particularly when it reaches the point of final hearing, as in most cases striking out a parties [NAME] when the [NAME] is ready to be heard would be an extreme decision to make.
25. The Tribunal refused the application as a fair hearing was still possible.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
26. The claimant would be able to put to Mr [APPELLANT] questions concerning documents that he had in is possession and whether they have been disclosed. And he can invite the Tribunal to make inferences where there has been some failing in this respect. The claimant could also pursue a Time Preparation Order based on conduct if the Tribunal concludes that Mr [NAME] has withheld relevant documents.
27. However, in short, the claimant had all witness statements, all relevant documents (subject to cross-examination by the claimant, although he has not identified the documents in question and accepts it is just something he presumes) and the parties and witnesses were present. We were on day 1 of the listing. And a fair hearing was still possible in the circumstances.
ADJUSTMENTS TO HEARING
28. The Tribunal was aware of the claimant saying that he had a need for breaks. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of a 15-minute break mid- morning, a 1-hour break for lunch, and a 15-minute mid-afternoon break. The hearing day was to end by 16.15 at the latest. This ensured that the length of the day was managed and there were sufficient and adequate breaks during the proceedings. The parties were invited to request additional breaks when they were required. Neither party raised any concerns with this approach.
29. The Tribunal also explained that it would observe the break that [NAME] Employment Judge Franey agreed to. That was that the parties were to be offered a break in the afternoon that immediately followed the completion of the claimant’s evidence. This was observed. However, unfortunately the claimant was taken ill during this short adjournment to the extend that the hearing was adjourned, this being after completing his evidence and before commencing with any cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses, (see below).
30. The Tribunal, when timetabling the adjourned hearing, made provision for a half-day break in proceedings between the completion of the respondent’s evidence and parties making closing submissions.
31. The claimant made an application to make an audio recording of the proceedings. The claimant explained that this would help him to manage his stress levels as it would mean he would not have to try and keep a note of the evidence during the proceedings. The claimant had no evidence to support that such an adjustment was needed in relation to his mental health impairments. The respondent did not object to the claimant being allowed to make recordings. The Tribunal considered the claimant’s application carefully and decided to allow the claimant to make a recording. The Tribunal considered this to be a sensible and pragmatic response to the claimant’s application, despite this being unsupported as a need for the claimant. The claimant agreed to the following undertakings as a condition to the permission being granted:
a. The recording was audio only, not video;
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
b. The claimant agreed that he would not provide a copy of that recording to anyone else, or make it accessible on the internet or otherwise or use it for any other purpose;
c. The audio recording would not be treated as the official record of the proceedings, which would remain the Judge’s notes, and was not to be used in any appeal;
d. The recording device must be removed from the Tribunal room during breaks/lunch; and
e. The recordings are used as an aide memoire during the hearing only. And the claimant will delete the recordings immediately following the conclusion of closing submissions. No copies of the recordings were to be made (either an audio file or through transcribing).
32. The Tribunal reminded the claimant on 02 March 2026, following closing submissions that he must now delete any recordings he possesses of the hearing and any documents that contain a transcription of any part of the hearing. The claimant was reminded to ensure that all recordings were deleted, including anything stored remotely in the cloud. The claimant acknowledge this and expressed that he would be doing that the moment he got home.
CLAIMANT’S HEALTH AND ADJOURNMENT
33. The Tribunal had agreed to a break in between the claimant completing his evidence and before he started cross-examining the witnesses of the respondent. This fell on the afternoon of the fourth day, that being Thursday 10 October 2024.
34. On Wednesday 09 October 2024, before the claimant started his evidence, he informed the Tribunal of the following:
a. He had suffered some heart issues the day before, which caused various symptoms. This included severe tingling in his left arm, the loss of grip in his left hand, mobility issues with the left-hand side of his body and a headache. b. The claimant called [NAME] to seek assistance. The claimant told the Tribunal that the operator he was speaking to had advised him to get urgent medical assistance, this included attending at a hospital or calling for an ambulance. The claimant refused. c. The claimant was told to attend his [NAME] on the morning of Wednesday 09 October 2024. However, the claimant refused on the basis that he was due to give evidence in the Tribunal. d. The claimant agreed to a telephone appointment with his doctor on the afternoon of Thursday 10 October 2024.
35. The claimant explained to the Tribunal that he felt well enough to start his evidence on the morning of 09 October 2024, but that he would keep the Tribunal updated should that change during the course of the day.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
36. The claimant proceeded to give his evidence, with the Tribunal monitoring the claimant during this period.
37. On the morning of Thursday 10 October 2024, the claimant explained that his [NAME] had texted him to cancel the telephone appointment and required him to attend in person at the [NAME] on the morning of Friday 11 October 2024.
38. In light of the above, the Tribunal vacated the morning of 11 October 2024 to enable the claimant to attend his doctor’s appointment. It was agreed that the claimant would attend Tribunal in the afternoon, and the respondent’s evidence would commence at that point. However, the claimant wrote to the Tribunal at 09.39 on 11 October 2024 to explain that the claimant had attended at this GP who then referred him to [COMPANY] to investigate whether he had had a series of mini strokes which could lead to a major stroke. The claimant explained that he would not be able to attend the Tribunal that day.
39. The Tribunal, considering this correspondence and decided to vacate the hearing date of 11 October 2024 in its entirety.
40. The claimant then emailed the Tribunal on 12 October 2024. This explained that he had been subject to several tests which signified that he had suffered a number of “mini strokes”, and that this could lead to a major stroke. The claimant explained that he had been advised to take it easy for a month, to take necessary medication and that further tests will be undertaken. The claimant attached his discharge summary from hospital and a copy of his GP consultation notes relating to this episode.
41. On 14 October 2024, the Tribunal considered the claimant’s email of 12 October 2024. The Tribunal invited a reply from Mr [RESPONDENT] on behalf of the first respondent, as he was present at the Tribunal on 14 October 2024.
42. Having considered this matter, the Tribunal decided to adjourn the hearing and put in place directions to have the final hearing reconvened at a later date.
LISTING OF PART-[NAME] THAT PERIOD
43. There were difficulties in re-listing the part-heard [NAME]. This was in finding suitable dates when the parties, the relevant witnesses and the Tribunal were all available. This did lead to a significant delay between hearing the claimant’s evidence and hearing the evidence of the [NAME].
44. The original listing for this final hearing was for a 10-day listing, that commenced on 07 October 2024, concluding on 18 October 2024. However, a decision to adjourn this listing part-heard took place on 14 October 2024. Due to the various difficulties in listing this matter to come back, this [NAME] came back to be concluded from 23 February 2026. And was listed for 6 days. This was listed to conclude the evidence and closing submissions only. It was decided that the Tribunal would reserve the decision and seek a 3-day listing for deliberations and writing up of the
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
written decision without the parties outside of this listing. These dates were set as 04, 05 and 06 March 2026.
45. The Tribunal considers it important to record the following matters in this judgment:
a. On deciding to adjourn this [NAME], the Tribunal also sent to the parties [NAME] Management Orders. This explained that the Tribunal had used part of the time without the parties to review the statements of the [NAME] in light of the claimant’s evidence, which had now concluded. It suggested a 5-day listing would be sufficient to complete the evidence and for the making of closing submissions when the hearing reconvened. And this also accounted for any agreed breaks. The claimant was encouraged to use the time before the reconvened hearing to consider and develop his cross- examination questions. The Tribunal produced what was a proportionate and reasonable timetable for completing the evidence. And explained that the timetable would be flexible, where necessary.
b. The claimant objected to the timetable suggested by the Tribunal and expressed that 5 days would not be sufficient (email of 28 October 2024). The claimant also made a request for a further preliminary hearing. This was to make representations about the timetable. And to give further consideration to the list of issues.
c. The Tribunal replied to the claimant’s email of 28 October 2024, by letter dated 21 November 2024. Although the Tribunal did not consider that a listing beyond 5 days was necessary (as explained in detail), the Tribunal agreed to extend the time estimate to 6 days and invited the claimant to produce a draft timetable of cross-examination of the [NAME]. The Tribunal refused a further preliminary hearing to consider the timetable or the list of issues. This was especially given that the list of issues had been considered across several [NAME] management hearings, was settled, the claimant confirmed their accuracy at the commencement of this hearing and had completed his evidence, which had been given to the list of issues that were before the Tribunal.
d. Unfortunately, the Tribunal had to write to the parties on 13 February 2025, to inform them that [NAME] had sadly passed away. She was a valuable member of the Tribunal community. A substitute member was to be identified by [NAME] Employment Judge Franey in advance of the reconvened hearing.
e. There were further emails from the claimant on 05 December 2024 and 23 January 2025
f. The Tribunal, in its email of 11 March 2025, approaching the matter of timetabling pragmatically, listed the reconvened hearing for 6 days considering the claimant’s suggestion. However, it was made clear that that timetable would also be flexible. And that it was sufficient to complete the evidence and hear closing submissions. However, time afforded for cross-examination would be reduced where the Tribunal
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
needed to determine any applications made by the claimant. The claimant’s timetable was therefore considered a maximum amount of time for which a respondent witness will be giving evidence. The respondent was reminded of its ongoing obligations in respect disclosure. And the claimant was reminded that he can cross- examine relevant witnesses of the respondent in respect to the existence or non-existence of what would be relevant documents. The Tribunal refused a further [NAME] management hearing for the same reasons previously given and did not consider it necessary to alter detriment 10 on the agreed list of issues.
g. The first respondent sent two letters by email to the Tribunal on 26 March 2025. The first was addressing re-listing issues. The [NAME] was to confirm a position already stated by the first respondent, that they had already investigated all relevant correspondence and no documents existed beyond that already discovered (and thus part of the bundle). However, it indicated that they would investigate further. The first respondent took objection to the Tribunal’s suggestion that Mr [COUNSEL] be cross-examined in respect to his role as solicitor to proceedings. And that this could encroach on legally privileged matters. It suggested that Mr [NAME], who is giving evidence, could answer questions on the alleged correspondence the claimant refers to, given he is the purported author.
h. The claimant, by email of 26 March 2025, made a further request for a preliminary hearing. This was for two reasons: (i) to determine the dates of re-listing. And (ii) to determine the disclosure of documentation that the claimant says should have been disclosed.
i. The Tribunal replied to the claimant and the respondents on 21 May 2025. It updated the parties with re-listing of the [NAME] and sought a broad window of unavailability from the parties. It addressed the issue of legal privilege, to explain that the purpose of the suggestion was limited to cross-examining on what efforts were made by any relevant witness to identify key documents. The request for a further preliminary hearing was refused, as the document issue has been addressed as far as it could, the list of issues had already been addressed, and it was not needed to finalise the re-listed dates.
j. The claimant made a further application for a [NAME] management hearing on 15 May 2025. This was for the same reasons already canvassed previously. This was refused by the Tribunal by letter dated 17 June 2025, explaining that the reasons given by letter dated 21 May 2025 still stood.
CLAIMANT’S FURTHER APPLICATIONS
46. The claimant has now presented a further set of proceedings against the first respondent (and 3 individual respondents). This was initially presented at London Central Tribunal. This has now been transferred to the [NAME] Employment Tribunal.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
47. This new claim concerns events which have resulted in there being a failure to present the claimant’s civil claim in time.
48. In a letter dated 03 October 2025, the claimant responded to a letter sent out by a Legal Officer at London Central Employment Tribunal. He explained that he considered that this most recent claim should be consolidated with these proceedings. The claimant explained that the claims gave rise to common or related issues of fact and law. And (surprisingly given the claimant’s previous response to the proposed timetable for the adjourned hearing) asserted that even with adding the new claim to these proceedings then it could be completed within the 6 day trial window.
49. On 27 January 2026, the claimant wrote to Manchester Tribunal to apply to vary the [NAME] Employment Judge Franey’s [NAME] Management Orders of 26 September 2024, relating to what documents had to be excluded from the claimant’s supplementary bundle. These were as follows:
a. Counsel’s Note on the claimant’s civil claims dated 12 June 2018 b. Counsel’s Advice on the claimant’s personal injury claim dated 12 June 2018. c. Correspondence from the [NAME] to Mr [COUNSEL] providing a summary of Counsel’s advice dated 29 May 2018.
50. The claimant attempted to explain that these documents are relevant to these proceedings. The claimant suggested that these documents would help demonstrate that the real reason why the first respondent failed to provide him with legal assistance was because of his legally protected acts.
51. The claimant in his letter of 27 January 2026 also informed the Tribunal of his mother’s health issues and attached a copy of medical evidence of his medication having been increased as a result. The medical documents show that the claimant’s medication was increased following a review on 26 August 2025.
52. The claimant sent a further letter dated 05 February 2026. This appeared to expand the application with regards documentation and was an application for inclusion in the bundle for this hearing all documentation between the first respondent and [NAME] regarding the issuing of the claimant’s personal injury claims during 2018. The claimant changed the rationale for the application, explaining that the [NAME]’s advice included negligent advice, and this correspondence was needed to assist the Tribunal in determining whether the respondent was aware of [NAME]’s negligence when refusing his request for legal assistance. The claimant made a further request to join his new claim to these proceedings.
53. Employment Judge Butler replied to the claimant on 11 February 2026. He refused both matters that were the subject of the claimant’s correspondence on 27 January 2026 and 05 February 2026. A decision was made by [NAME] to stay the new proceedings until the outcome of these proceedings. These current proceedings were part-heard. There has been a significant delay in getting this [NAME] back at trial to be completed. And the claimant has
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
already completed his evidence. In those circumstances, [NAME] decided that the part-heard [NAME] should be concluded first. And the claimant’s new [NAME] can then be considered after that.
54. Further, [APPELLANT] does not consider the documents the claimant refers to be relevant to the issues in this [NAME].
55. The claimant, by letter dated 16 February 2026, made further applications. The first was to start the hearing days at 10.40am. [NAME] explained that this can be accommodated in the first instance and should not cause any difficulties. However, this will be reviewed depending on the progress of evidence in this [NAME]. The claimant aregards toght the [NAME] management decision with regards documents to be varied. However, this was refused on the morning of the first day of the part-heard hearing as there was no material change in circumstances. The claimant is referring to events in 2018 and decisions made at that stage. [NAME] has already addressed the issue of drawing inferences from such documents. For the avoidance of doubt, it is difficult to understand on what basis the Tribunal would draw the inferences the claimant is seeking on the basis that a common law assault claim should have been issued in 2018.
56. This application with regards to documents in effect repeats an application that the claimant has already made to [APPELLANT] on various occasions. The claimant has adopted an approach of where he disagrees with a decision, he attempts to get around the decision by making it again but adding more detail. [NAME] had already considered the same application on 27 January 2023 (see paragraphs 35 and 36 p.145 [NAME]) and on 26 January 2024 (see paragraphs para 24 and 25 p.159-160 [NAME]). These decisions were challenged by the claimant on appeal, which was deemed not arguable by HHJ Sadiq on 10 February 2026. In short, the same application has in effect been considered on 5 separate occasions, all with the same outcome.
57. On 25 February 2026, that being the third day of the part-heard hearing, and whilst cross-examining Mr [APPELLANT], the claimant sought to introduce a new document. There was no explanation as to why this was not disclosed sooner by the claimant, other than he said that he was a disabled litigant in person and this led him to forgetting. Mr [RESPONDENT] objected to the document being introduced. The claimant said that this was a report from a Mr [APPELLANT] which supported his [NAME] that he had made the first respondent aware of his unemployment some years previous. The application was refused. This was very late in the proceedings. The claimant gave no acceptable reason as to why he had not disclosed this sooner, and why he waited until he was cross-examining Mr [NAME] to raise this document. There is nothing to support any causal connection between the claimant having a disability and him not remembering to disclose documents, something he had managed to date. Furthermore, the questions to Mr [NAME] were not to be about the contents of the document (which were irrelevant), but rather had to be about the knowledge that he and his team had when making a decision on his reduced subscription rates. The claimant was able to, and did, ask Mr [APPELLANT] whether he was aware of a report from Mr [NAME] from 2018, and to challenge him on what and when knowledge of the claimant’s unemployment was known to the team that administered membership
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
subscriptions. And Mr [APPELLANT] gave his answer. The claimant was not prejudiced from the decision made form the Tribunal, as he was still able to put the question that he wanted to put to Mr [APPELLANT].
CLAIMANT’S CROSS-EXAMINATION
58. There was occasion when the Tribunal interjected with regards questions being asked by the claimant. This was primarily to do with relevancy, although there were occasions where there was repetition of an issue, and where the question required understanding of other issues first.
59. However, with respect most of these occurrences, Mr [APPELLANT] was not prevented from asking the questions he was seeking to ask, so long as they had some relevancy (even tangential) to the issues in the [NAME]. For example, although its relevancy was unclear, and although there were many other issues that would need to be unpicked to understand the context of [NAME]’s answer, Mr [APPELLANT] was not prevented from asking why he has not referred to various matters, including [NAME]’s emails, in the witness statement he presented before the Slater Tribunal.
60. However, on 25 February 2026, there were 3 occasions during Mr [APPELLANT]’s cross-examination of [NAME] where the judge interjected and informed the claimant that his questions were not relevant and his questions had to be on issues of relevance. This was in relation to the following:
a. The claimant sought to ask Mr [APPELLANT] why there were not adjustments made to the process of applying for a reduction in membership fees for disabled members. The Judge interjected and explained to the claimant that he had not brought a claim for disability discrimination, nor for a failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustments. And therefore his question was not relevant. The claimant responded to ask whether the judge was stopping the claimant from asking a question that he was entitled to ask. To which the judge explained that the claimant was not being permitted to ask the question given it is not relevant to his claims.
b. The claimant started to ask questions about the document at p.29. And he put to Mr [NAME] that him taking no action in response to this letter was an act of victimisation or an act of unjustified detriment. The Judge again interjected on the basis that the questions had no relevance to an issue in the [NAME]. The claimant responded again to ask whether he was being prevented from asking the question. The judge invited the claimant to correct him if he had made a mistake and identify which of the allegations in the list of issues did he allege that Mr [NAME] not taking action on this document was a complaint he brought. The claimant conceded that he had not brought any such allegation about the actions of Mr [APPELLANT].
c. The claimant started to ask question of Mr [APPELLANT] that around August 2020, him not intervening with the decision to deny him legal assistance was [NAME] putting him to some form of detriment. Again, the judge interjected, as there was no such allegation present
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in this [NAME].
LIST OF ISSUES
61. [NAME] Employment Judge Franey made a [NAME] management decision in respect of the scope of these proceedings. Although the claimant applied at the 26 January 2024 preliminary hearing to vary the order with respect the scope of proceedings, it remained as recorded in the Orders from the hearing on 27 January 2023, after [NAME] Employment Judge Franey refused that application. The scope of proceedings in this [NAME] were therefore as follows:
“1.1 At the final hearing the Tribunal will not be required to make primary findings of fact about dealings between the respondents, [NAME] and the claimant in 2018 since it is not necessary to do so in order to resolve the issues in the [NAME] as set out in the annex to this [NAME] management order or any subsequent revision.
1.2 However, the parties must have disclosed to each other and should include in the hearing bundle such of those documents as:
(a) were provided by the claimant to the respondents with any of his alleged protected acts in these three claims, and/or
(b) were considered by the decision-makers before making the decisions which the claimant alleges amounted to detriments, whether they were documents supplied by the claimant or otherwise.
62. The list of issues was recorded by [NAME] Employment Judge Franey at the Preliminary Hearing on 27 January 2023. The parties confirmed that these remained the issues to be determined in this [NAME]. The issues to be determined were therefore as follows:
Protected Acts
1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, the respondents concede that the claimant did acts protected by section 27 EQA and section 65(2)(c) TULRCA on the following occasions:
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P1: The presentation of Employment Tribunal claim numbers 2205756/2018 and 2401913/2019;
P2: The claimant's email of 4 June 2020;
P3: The claimant’s emails of 14 July 2020;
P4: The claimant’s letter of 22 January 2021;
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P5: The claimant's email of 8 February 2021;
P6: The claimant’s emails of 9 and 16 February 2021.
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P7: The presentation of Employment Tribunal claim number 2402745/2021 on 2 April 2021.
P8: The claimant’s letter to the [NAME] of 14 October 2021(re-
sent on 7 December 2021).
P9: The claimant’s e-mails of 22 October, 5 November, 7 November and
8 November 2021.
P10: The claimant’s e-mails of 7 and 13 January, and 24 and 28 February
2022.
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P11: The claimant’s e-mail of 6 June 2022 and what the claimant said in the meeting on 8 June 2022.
P12: The claimant’s e-mail of 13 June 2022.
P13: The claimant’s letter of 25 July 2022.
2. Can the respondent show that protection is lost in relation to any of those acts by:
1. Establishing that the claimant was making a false allegation in bad faith for the purposes of section 27(3) EQA; and/or
2. Establishing that the assertion was false and the claimant made it in the belief that it was false or otherwise in bad faith for the purposes of section 65(6) TULRCA?
Alleged Detrimental Treatment
3. Did any of the following alleged detriments amount to:
(a) A detriment for the purposes of section 27 EQA; and/or
(b) Depriving the claimant of, or of access to, any benefits, services of facilities, or subjecting him to some other detriment for the purpose of section 64(2)(c) and/or (f) TULRCA?
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[NAME]: The failure to provide the claimant with legal assistance following his initial request of 6 May 2020 as set out in the following paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim: 41, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 54;
D2: In treating the claimant's complaint first raised on 4 June 2020 as a matter to be dealt with under the [COMPANY] procedure rather than as a member complaint as set out in the following paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim: 42, 43 and 54;
D3: In failing in August 2020 to provide the claimant with sickness benefit and/or to refund the overpayment of his subscriptions as set out in paragraph 46 of the Particulars of Claim;
[NAME]: In failing properly to respond to the claimant's grievance presented on 22 January 2021 as set out in the following paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim: 48, 51 and 54;
D5: In failing to respond to the claimant's email of 16 February 2021 as set out in paragraph 55 of the Particulars of Claim?
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D6: The refusal to give the claimant legal assistance on 5, 27 and 28 January 2022.
D7: The decision of [APPELLANT] to refer the claimant’s complaints about [NAME] and the legal department to the legal department.
D8: The failure of Mr [APPELLANT] to provide the claimant with an update on 2 January 2022.
D9: The failure of Mr [NAME] in a telephone call on 27 January 2022 to provide an answer for why the claimant had been refused legal assistance and failing to give him the name of the person or persons who took that decision.
D10: The continuing failure to investigate the claimant’s allegations against [APPELLANT] and [NAME].
D11: The continuing failure to investigate the claimant’s complaints against the [NAME] legal department.
D12: The failure of the [NAME] respondent to investigate the allegations made against [APPELLANT].
D13: ln relation to the claimant’s complaint that [APPELLANT] had made misleading statements, (a) the failure to tell the claimant who was investigating that, (b) the failure to interview the claimant regarding that allegation, (c) the failure to tell the claimant what evidence had been utilised, the procedure being followed, and the reasoning behind the decision to reject the allegations, and (d) the failure to
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allow the claimant a right of appeal.
D14: The failure of [APPELLANT] to answer the claimant’s correspondence of 28 January 2022.
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D15: The letter from [NAME] of 12 July 2022 in so far as it refused to provide the claimant with [COMPANY].
D16: The letter from [APPELLANT] of 12 July 2022 in so far as it said that the claimant’s allegations would not be investigated.
D17: The e-mail from [APPELLANT] of 1 August 2022 confirming that the claimant’s allegations would not be investigated.
4. If so, was any of that treatment:
(a) because of a protected act contrary to section 27 EQA; and/or
(b) for reasons which include one or more of the protected acts contrary to section 65(1) TULRCA?
Additional TULRCA Defences
5. Can the respondent show that any act, omission or statement which falls within section 65(1) is one in respect of which individuals would be disciplined by the [RESPONDENT] irrespective of whether their acts, omissions or statements were in connection with conduct within subsection (2)?
6. Insofar as there has been a contravention of 65(1) by reason of a protected act shown to have been a false assertion under section 65(6), can the respondent show that there was no other reason for taking the action against the claimant, or that the only other reasons were reasons in respect of which he does not fall to be treated as unjustifiably disciplined under section 65(6)?
EQA Liability of [NAME] Respondent
7. In relation to any complaints of victimisation contrary to section 27 Equality Act 2010 which are well-founded, is the [NAME] respondent personally liable as an employee of the first respondent under section 110 EqA? The claimant contends that the [NAME] respondent is personally liable in relation to [NAME] and [NAME].
Time Limits
8. Insofar as any of the matters for which the claimant seeks a remedy
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occurred more than three months prior to the presentation of the relevant complaint, allowing for the effect of early conciliation, can the claimant show:
(a) that it formed part of an act extending over a period ending after that date, or otherwise that it would be just and equitable for a longer time limit to be allowed under section 123 EQA; or
(b) that the Tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period, or that any delay in making the complaint is wholly or partly attributable to a reasonable attempt to appeal against the determination or to have it reconsidered or reviewed, and the complaint has been presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable under section 66 TULRCA?
Remedy
9. If any of the above complaints succeed, what is the appropriate remedy? Issues likely to arise include:
(a) A declaration of a breach of section 27 and/or section 65 respectively;
(b) An award for injury to feelings;
(c) An award for financial losses;
(d) An award for injury to health;
(e) Interest on any awards.
LAW
63. This [NAME] concerns complaints under the Equality Act 2010 and under the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] (Consolidation) Act 1992.
Application of Equality Act 2010 to [NAME]
64. Section 57 of the Equality Act 2010 contains provisions which include making it unlawful for trade organisations, which includes [NAME], to discriminate against their members or to harass or victimise their members and which require reasonable adjustments to be made.
65. Specifically, s.57 (5) of the Equality Act 2010 expresses that a trade organisation must not victimise a member:
a. in the way it affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for receiving a benefit, facility or service;
b. by depriving B of membership;
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c. by varying the terms on which B is a member;
d. by subjecting B to any other detriment.
Victimisation
66. Protection from victimisation is contained at s.27 of the Equality Act 2010. It provides: (1) A person (A) victimises [NAME] (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because—
(a) B does a protected act, or
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.
(2) Each of the following is a protected act—
(a) bringing proceedings under this Act;
(b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act;
(c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act;
(d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that [NAME] or [NAME] has contravened this Act.
(3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.
67. The EAT in HM Prison Service and ors v Ibimidun 2008 IRLR 940 explained that protection against victimisation was designed to protect legitimate claims only. So, where an employee was dismissed by their employer for making numerous claims of race discrimination against his employer for the purpose of harassing the employer into settlement this was found not to be victimisation.
68. When considering the previous iteration of the test (worded as ‘false and not made in good faith’, which is similar in nature to the current test) the EAT in [RESPONDENT] v [NAME] 0798/02 explained that the test had two limbs:
a. Whether the allegation was false. b. And whether the person making the allegation knew it was false at the time it was made.
69. The EAT in [NAME] also observed that if a claimant ‘has a belief that he has a good claim, but perhaps one that is not terribly likely to succeed, and he brings that claim with some collateral purpose, it appears to us that that
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does not necessarily make the bringing of that claim in bad faith. The issue is not the purpose, but the belief in the claim.’
70. In [NAME] v [COMPANY] 2019 ICR 311, the EAT considered the specific wording of s.27(3) of the Equality Act 2010. It held that the primary question for victimisation purposes is whether the employee has acted honestly in giving the evidence or information, or in making the allegation, that is relied on as a protected act. It was explained that the Tribunal is first tasked with determining whether the evidence, information or allegation is true or false. And if false, it must then determine whether it was given or made by the employee in bad faith. Tribunals should not equate falsity with bad faith, although it may be a relevant consideration, with the more obviously false the allegation, the more likely a Tribunal would be inclined to find that it was not made with an honest belief. The EAT also did not rule out that an employee’s motivation would also be relevant to the determination of bad faith, but emphasised that the primary focus remains on the question of the employee’s honesty. In paragraph 50 of the EAT’s judgment HHJ Eady said this:
“When determining whether an employee has acted in bad faith for the purposes of sub-section 27(3) of the Equality Act, the primary question is thus whether they have acted honestly in giving the evidence or information or in making the allegation. As [NAME] J observed in [NAME], the issue is not the employee’s purpose but their belief. I do not say that the existence of a collateral motive could never lead to a finding of bad faith – not least because it is impossible to foresee all scenarios that might arise – but the focus should be on the question whether the employee was honest when they gave the evidence or information or made the allegation in issue. In answering that question, the Employment Tribunal will already have established that the evidence, information or allegation was false. That does not mean the employee acted in bad faith, although it may be a relevant consideration in determining that question (the more obviously false the allegation, the more an Employment Tribunal might be inclined to find that it was made without honest belief). Similarly, the employee’s motive in giving the evidence or information or in making the allegation may also be a relevant part of the context in which the Employment Tribunal assess bad faith. The Employment Tribunal might, for example, conclude that the employee dishonestly made a false allegation because they wanted to achieve some other result, or that they were wilfully reckless as to whether the allegation was true (and thus had no personal belief in its content) because they had some collateral purpose in making it. Motivation can be part of the relevant context in which the Employment Tribunal assess bad faith, but the primary focus remains on the question of the employee’s honesty”.
71. Mr [RESPONDENT], in his written submissions, referred to the following extract in [NAME] on [NAME] and Employment Law on the concept of ‘bad faith’:
“HHJ Eady QC noted the warning given in the whistleblowing [NAME] by Auld LJ, [NAME] v [NAME]' Centre [2004]
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EWCA Civ 964, [2004] IRLR 687, that the term 'good faith' is 'found in many statutory and common-law contexts, and, because they are necessarily conditioned by their context, it is dangerous to apply judicial attempts at definition in one context to that of [NAME]'. She held that when determining whether an employee has acted in bad faith for the purposes of EqA 2010 s 27(3), the primary question is whether they have acted honestly in giving the evidence or information or in making the allegation.”
Burden of proof under the Equality Act 2010
72. We reminded ourselves of the burden of proof in discrimination cases, with reference to section 136 of the Equality Act 2010:
(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred.
73. Lord Justice Mummery (with which Laws and Maurice Kay LJJ agreed) in Madarassy v [COMPANY] [2007] ICR 867, at paragraphs 56- 58, provided a summary of the principles that apply when considering the burden of proof in Equality Act Claims:
"56. The court in [NAME] v [NAME]… expressly rejected the argument that it was sufficient for the complainant simply to prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the respondent "could have" committed an unlawful act of discrimination. The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a Tribunal "could conclude" that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.
57. "Could… conclude" in section 63A (2) must mean that "a reasonable Tribunal could properly conclude" from all the evidence before it. This would include evidence adduced by the complainant in support of the allegations of sex discrimination, such as evidence of a difference in status, a difference in treatment and the reason for the differential treatment. It would also include evidence adduced by the respondent contesting the complaint. Subject only to the statutory "absence of an adequate explanation" at this stage (which I shall discuss later), the Tribunal would need to consider all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint; for example, evidence as to whether the act complained of occurred at all; evidence as to the actual comparators relied on by the complainant to prove less
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favourable treatment; evidence as to whether the comparisons being made by the complainant were of like with like as required by section 5(3) of the 1975 Act; and available evidence of the reasons for the differential treatment.
58. The absence of an adequate explanation for differential treatment of the complainant is not, however, relevant to whether there is a prima facie [NAME] of discrimination by the respondent. The absence of an adequate explanation only becomes relevant if a prima facie [NAME] is proved by the complainant. The consideration of the Tribunal then moves to the [NAME] stage. The burden is on the respondent to prove that he has not committed an act of unlawful discrimination. He may prove this by an adequate non-discriminatory explanation of the treatment of the complainant. If he does not, the Tribunal must uphold the discrimination claim." 74. [NAME] LJ also explained further how evidence adduced by the employer might be relevant, noting that it could even relate to the reason for any less favourable treatment (paras. 71-72):
"71. Section 63A (2) does not expressly or impliedly prevent the Tribunal at the first stage from hearing, accepting or drawing inferences from evidence adduced by the respondent disputing and rebutting the complainant's evidence of discrimination. The respondent may adduce evidence at the first stage to show that the acts which are alleged to be discriminatory never happened; or that, if they did, they were not less favourable treatment of the complainant; or that the comparators chosen by the complainant or the situations with which comparisons are made are not truly like the complainant or the situation of the complainant; or that, even if there has been less favourable treatment of the complainant, it was not on the ground of her sex or pregnancy.
72. Such evidence from the respondent could, if accepted by the Tribunal, be relevant as showing that, contrary to the complainant's allegations of discrimination, there is nothing in the evidence from which the Tribunal could properly infer a prima facie [NAME] of discrimination on the proscribed ground…."
75. Lord Justice Mummery also pointed out that it will often be appropriate for the Tribunal to go straight to the [NAME] stage. An example is where the employer is asserting that whether the burden at the first stage has been discharged or not, he has a non-discriminatory explanation for the alleged discrimination. A claimant is not prejudiced by that approach since it is effectively assumed in his favour that the burden at the first stage has been discharged.
76. The Tribunal also reminded itself of two important matters (amongst others) by the then House of Lords in [NAME] v [NAME] [1999] IRLR 572:
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a. If the burden shifts, the Tribunal should then focus on the employer’s conscious or subconscious reason for treating the worker as they did, and b. The protected characteristic needs to “significant[ly] influence” the less favourable treatment so as to be causally relevant.
77. To summarise, when considering victimisation, the claimant must first prove, on the balance of probabilities, primary facts from which a Tribunal could conclude that the respondent had subjected him to a detriment because of having made a protected act, after which the burden shifts to the respondent. This is known as the shifting burden of proof. Once the claimant has established a prima facie [NAME] (, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to disprove the allegations. This will require consideration of the subjective reasons that caused the employer/alleged perpetrator to act as it did.
78. According to the Supreme Court in [NAME] v Grampian Health Board 2012 ICR 1054, where the Tribunal is able to make positive findings on the evidence one way or [NAME], the burden of proof provisions do not come into play.
Unjustifiable discipline
79. Much of this section is as set out by the Tribunal chaired by Employment Judge Slater, written judgment of which was sent to the parties on 04 May 2020.
80. Section 64 of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides that:
(1) [NAME] who is or has been a member of a trade [RESPONDENT] has the
right not to be unjustifiably disciplined by the [RESPONDENT].
(2) For this purpose [NAME] is “disciplined” by a trade [RESPONDENT] if a determination is made, or purportedly made, under the rules of the [RESPONDENT] or by an official of the [RESPONDENT] or a number of persons including an official that—
…
(c) sums tendered by him in respect of an obligation to pay subscriptions or other sums to the [RESPONDENT], or to a branch or section of the [RESPONDENT], should be treated as unpaid or paid for a different purpose,
…
(f) he should be subjected to some other detriment;
and whether [NAME] is “unjustifiably disciplined” shall be determined in accordance with section 65.”
81. Section 65 sets out the meaning of “unjustifiably disciplined”:
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(1) [NAME] is unjustifiably disciplined by a trade [RESPONDENT] if the actual or supposed conduct which constitutes the reason, or one of the reasons, for disciplining him is —
(a) conduct to which this section applies, or
(b) something which is believed by the [RESPONDENT] to amount to such conduct;
but subject to subsection (6) (cases of bad faith in relation to assertion of wrongdoing).
(2) This section applies to conduct which consists in—
…
(c) asserting (whether by bringing proceedings or otherwise) that the [RESPONDENT], any official or representative of it or a trustee of its property has contravened, or is proposing to contravene, a requirement which is, or is thought to be, imposed by or under the rules of the [RESPONDENT] or any other agreement or by or under any enactment (whenever passed) or any rule of law;
82. According to section 65(6) of the 1992 Act:
[NAME] is not unjustifiably disciplined if it is shown—
(a) that the reason for disciplining him, or one of them, is that he made such an assertion as is mentioned in subsection (2)(c), or encouraged or assisted [NAME] to make or attempt to vindicate such an assertion,
(b) that the assertion was false, and
(c) that he made the assertion, or encouraged or assisted [NAME] to make or attempt to vindicate it, in the belief that it was false or otherwise in bad faith,
and that there was no other reason for disciplining him or that the only other reasons were reasons in respect of which he does not fall to be treated as unjustifiably disciplined.
83. “Official” is defined in section 119 of the 1992 Act as “(a) an officer of the [RESPONDENT] or of a branch or section of the [RESPONDENT], or (b) a person elected or appointed in accordance with the rules of the [RESPONDENT] to be a representative of its members or of some of them.”
84. “Officer” is defined in section 119 as including: “(a) any member of the governing body of the [RESPONDENT], and (b) any trustee of any fund applicable for the purposes of the [RESPONDENT].”
85. In Beaumont v Amicus [2007] ICR 341, at paragraph 6, HHJ Ansell described what he considered to be the [NAME] purpose of these provisions
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as follows:
“I certainly read the [NAME] purpose of this section as an attempt to prevent [RESPONDENT] officers or officials either using or misusing [RESPONDENT] rules and powers to discipline members of the [RESPONDENT] in various ways, for example by expulsion, by fine, by removing their benefits, as a response to the individual's complaint that a [RESPONDENT] official had acted to breach of the rules of the [RESPONDENT], and, thus, it would appear that the discipline that can give rise to a finding of unjustifiable discipline relates to the powers of the particular [RESPONDENT] officials concerned under the [RESPONDENT] rules, namely whether they are using the rules properly or misusing those powers. The only authority that has been found in this area of law is a [NAME] from 1990 under predecessor legislation, namely section 3 of the Employment Act 1988, being [NAME]' [RESPONDENT] v Webber [1990] ICR 711, a decision of this court presided over by [NAME].”
Burden of proof in unjustifiable discipline cases
86. Consistent with that recorded in the [NAME] decision, this Tribunal concludes that in the absence of burden of proof provisions in the 1992 Act, the ordinary civil burden of proof applies. That is that the person seeking to make out the claims to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the facts on which they rely.
CLOSING SUBMISSIONS
87. The Tribunal received written submissions form the claimant and from Mr [RESPONDENT], on behalf of the first respondent. And it heard oral submissions form both the claimant and from Mr [RESPONDENT]. [NAME] did not make any closing submissions, either orally or in writing. The submissions of the parties have been considered when making this decision. However, they have not been set out here.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Tribunal makes the following findings of fact based on the balance of probability from the evidence it has read, seen, and heard. Where there is reference to certain aspects of the evidence that have assisted the Tribunal in making its findings of fact this is not indicative that no other evidence has been considered. The Tribunal’s findings are based on all of the evidence, and these are merely indicators of some of the evidence considered in order to try to assist the parties understand why the Tribunal made the findings that it did.
The Tribunal does not make findings in relation to all matters in dispute but only on matters it we considered relevant to deciding on the issues currently before it.
The Tribunal has tried to make its findings of fact under sections that relate to the specific allegations brought by the claimant. This was considered the most appropriate way to ensure that any reader can follow the decision of the Tribunal
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and also to ensure that the allegations are all considered fully and appropriately. However, there is some overlap, so the sections should not be read independently from one [NAME].
88. The claimant received judgment (the Slater Judgment) in the [NAME] he brought against the first respondent (and other respondents) on 04 May 2020.
Detriment 1. This allegation is a failure to provide the claimant with legal assistance following his initial request of 06 May 2020. This allegation relates to the following:
(i) Mr [NAME] refusal on 11 May 2020 (ii) Mr [NAME] email of 04 June 2020 where he confirmed that the position as outlined on 11 May 2020 remained. (iii) Mr [RESPONDENT] on 14 July 2020, contrary to the first respondent’s procedures stating that Mr [RESPONDENT] decision was final (iv) Mr [NAME] failing or refusing to answer Mr [NAME] email of 08 June 2020. (v) Mr [NAME] failing to acknowledge or provide a substantive response to the claimant’s letters of 03 October and 27 November 2020. (vi) Mr [NAME] refusal on 08 February 2021. (vii) Mr [NAME] failed to provide detailed reasons as to why he refused the claimant legal assistance on 08 February 2021.
89. Provision of Legal Assistance by the first respondent is under Rule 4.6-4.7 (pp.325-326). This is a wholly discretionary matter that rests with the first respondent. There does not give rise to an entitlement to legal assistance. The Rules provide that:
“4.6.1 A member who is entitled to benefit who suffers injury or disease arising out of or in connection with his/her employment (or the dependants of such a member who has died) shall be entitled to such legal advice and representation, and on such terms, as the Executive Council may consider appropriate.
“4.6.3 A member who requires advice and/or representation on a problem relating to the member’s employment which first arose at a time when the member was entitled to benefits and which cannot be resolved through the members workplace representative should refer the matter to the appropriate [NAME]. The [RESPONDENT] may provide such advice and/or representation as the Executive Council shall consider appropriate, whether by a full-time officer or otherwise, and on such terms as the Executive Council shall consider appropriate.”
“4.6.4 The Executive Council may provide such additional legal advice and representation to members and to members’ families as it may consider appropriate.”
“4.6.5 The Executive Council may extend legal assistance to a member who is not otherwise entitled to benefits.”
“4.6.6 A member who is given advice and/or representation under
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this rule shall provide all relevant information and cooperate fully with the compilation of evidence for any legal proceedings and shall comply with any other obligations and/or conditions set out in any arrangements for the provision of legal assistance. If a member fails to do so or provides false or misleading information or fails to act upon the advice of those appointed to represent him/her, the Executive Council may at its absolute discretion annul all legal assistance or withdraw any further legal assistance to that member.”
“4.7 The Executive Council shall have discretion to provide additional benefits.”
90. It is not in dispute between the parties that for a member to be provided with legal assistance by the first respondent, the member must co-operate fully, as per Rule 4.6.6. And this is spelled out by Mr [NAME] at paragraph 365 of the Slater Judgment, where he explains in an email to the claimant on 15 August 2018 that:
“The offer of legal assistance in both these matters is contingent on you continuing to follow advice and the continuation of [COUNSEL] and [NAME] as the [NAME] dealing with these matters. I appreciate you have an outstanding complaint with [NAME] and [NAME] and neither Mr [NAME] nor Mr [NAME] will have conduct of these matters. It is a matter for [NAME] and [NAME] who would be allocated to deal with however I do urge you to reconsider, particularly in respect of Mr [NAME] who is an acknowledged expert in this area.
“The grant of legal assistance is also contingent on cooperation with solicitors. You do have the right to make your points to them but once they are made, considered and either accepted or rejected, to retain the [RESPONDENT]’s assistance, their advice should be followed.”
91. The first respondent would not provide legal assistance to any member who had previously terminated a retainer with [NAME]. This is the clear evidence of several of the [NAME], including Mr [RESPONDENT], Mr [RESPONDENT] and Mr [NAME]. The Tribunal accepts this evidence from those witnesses as being accurate. Especially given that there was no evidence ‘…to suggest that [NAME] member who unilaterally terminated a retainer with solicitors appointed to act for them, with legal assistance from [NAME], would have been offered further legal assistance with different solicitors’ (paragraph 812 of the Slater Judgment).
92. Any discretion to award legal assistance is not with the National Executive Council ([NAME]). The Council has delegated the authority on legal assistance to the Legal Department. In practice these decisions were made by Mr [COUNSEL], as the principal solicitor in the Department. The Director of the Legal Department (for a period that was Mr [NAME], and latterly Mr [NAME]) had the authority to overturn Mr [NAME] decisions on provision of legal assistance, as his line manager. Mr [NAME] had never taken such action in practice. Nobody else within the first respondent, save for the [NAME] and Ms [RESPONDENT], can overturn Mr [NAME] decision on whether to grant or refuse legal assistance.
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93. The first respondent would consider supporting a negligence claim brought by a member if it was sufficiently linked to the members’ employment. Any such decision still rests with the legal department, and ultimately with Mr [NAME]. The Tribunal accepts Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] evidence that legal assistance is primarily concerned with supporting members with their employment disputes and supporting a negligence claim would only be in exceptional circumstances.
94. The first respondent adopts an approach that it only provides or continues with legal assistance where the legal advice, including that of Counsel, is followed.
95. In August 2018, Mr [APPELLANT] gave [NAME] authority to start discussions with [NAME] with a view to settling his claims against them. The claimant puts this as giving Mr [APPELLANT] the authority to settle his claims. However, there was no offer that had been made by RMT that could be accepted in settlement. Rather, Mr [NAME] was entering discussions with RMT to scope the possibility of a settlement. This is consistent with the findings of the Slater Tribunal (particularly see paragraphs 124-133 and paragraphs 385, 579 and 587). Mr [NAME] had those discussions and RMT declined to put forward an offer to settle the claims.
96. The following documents were disclosable documents (pp.352-365) but had not been included in the Slater Tribunal bundle of documents:
a. An email dated 02 August 2018 at 11.51 (p.352) from Ms [NAME], Head of Practice (Industrial Disease, Travel and Military) at [NAME], to Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME], with Mr [NAME] (of [NAME]) copied in. This email included a proposed Advice from Counsel and letter to Mr [COUNSEL], with the recipients invited to consider the documents and discuss them before they were sent to the claimant.
b. A copy of a further [NAME]’s advice from Mr [COUNSEL] (pp.353- 359). At paragraph 1 it is indicated that Mr [APPELLANT] should be ‘put to his election as to what proceedings he would prefer to advance. Either, his existing employment Tribunal claims or an as yet unissued county court claim. However, at paragraph 3 it is explained that ‘if, against my advice, Mr [APPELLANT] seeks to lead with a personal injury claim…’ In other words, this further advice from Mr [APPELLANT] did not change his position of advising that the claimant first commences with the Employment Tribunal claims.
c. A draft letter to the claimant dated 02 August 2018 (pp.360-361), which amongst other things expressed that Counsel recommends leading with the Employment Tribunal claims.
d. An email was sent from Mr [NAME] dated 02 August 2018 at 12.26 (Mr [NAME] was providing cover for Mr [NAME] who was on annual leave), which explained that the first respondent’s position was that it would follow Counsel’s advice in terms of which proceedings to pursue initially (namely the Employment Tribunal claims), and asked
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Ms [NAME] to amend the proposed letter to state that ‘…if Mr [APPELLANT] wishes to proceed with his claims, then he must also follow [COUNSEL] advice to issue and stay the PI claim and proceed with the Employment claim at this stage’. Mr [NAME] was copied into this email.
e. Ms [NAME] email to [NAME] on 02 August 2018, at 15.08 (p.363). She sends to Mr [NAME] the amended letter and explained that she would also change the date on counsel’s advice to today.
f. Mr [COUNSEL] replied to Ms [COUNSEL] on 02 August 2018 at 15.23, to correct a sentence in the letter (p.364).
g. Ms [COUNSEL] sent the letter and Counsel’s advice to the claimant on 02 August 2018 at 15.57.
97. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr [NAME] that there was no decision made to withhold these documents and the only reason these were not included in the Slater Tribunal bundle was because they had not been identified at the time and only came to light at a later date. For the avoidance of any doubt, the claimant became aware of these documents in or around August 2022 (this is consistent with the claimant’s application for reconsiderations made against the Slater Judgment) and made an application for reconsideration of the Slater judgment based on this information coming to light. These documents were considered by Employment Judge Slater, who refused the claimant’s application and explained in some detail why the email chain would have made no difference to the decision that had already been reached. In other words, although the documents were relevant to the issues being determined, the claimant’s [NAME] was not disadvantaged by them not having been included in the Slater Tribunal bundle. Employment Judge Slater concluded that the documents supported the course of action taken by the first respondent.
98. Mr [RESPONDENT], when he directed that Ms [APPELLANT] include the sentence that ‘…if Mr [APPELLANT] wishes to proceed with his claims, then he must also follow Counsel's advice to issue and stay the PI claim and proceed with the Employment claim at this stage’ was simply requesting that Ms [RESPONDENT] letter adequately reflected the first respondent’s policy that was applicable when providing legal assistance.
99. Mr [COUNSEL] provided a Counsel note (pp.464-465) along with an initial advice (dated 18 June 2018, the Advice is at pp.466-475). Following various complaints and issues raised by the claimant about Counsel’s Note and the Advice (these are referenced throughout the Slater Judgment, and particularly around paragraph 292 onwards. Also see paragraph 318 of the Slater Judgment where it is found that the claimant was preparing written comments for Counsel on or around 05 July 2018, and paragraph 6 et seq of Mr [NAME] [NAME], p.477), a further advice was sought from Mr [NAME]. The [NAME] advice, dated 02 August 2018, is at pp.476-489.
100. In Mr [COUNSEL] Counsel Note he explains that he had not read the pleadings in the five consolidated Employment Tribunal claims but had read the Advice of Counsel from Mr [COUNSEL] dated 26 May 2018. He
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also explained, at paragraph 3 of the note:
“It is clear that the present claim arises from the same or similar facts. Presumably the same financial remedies are sought, in particular damages for psychiatric injury, in these circumstances, if Mr [APPELLANT] were to launch personal injury proceedings then a stay would have to be considered.”
101. Mr [APPELLANT] is clear in his Note that the claimant should lead with his Employment Tribunal claims, and his Personal Injury claim should be issued together with an application to be stayed pending the outcome of the claims before the Employment Tribunal (paragraph 2, p.465). Similar views are expressed in Mr [NAME] [NAME] (see paragraphs 28 and 29, pp.474-475).
102. Having considered each of the matters raised by the claimant when he complained about his [NAME], Mr [APPELLANT] still concluded that from his tactical analysis his advice was to proceed initially with the Employment Tribunal claims and present a claim for his personal injuries along with an application to stay pending determination in the Employment Tribunal. He further notes that he scarcely knows of a practitioner who would advise that the county court claims take precedence.
103. Mr [NAME] considered Mr [NAME] and his two Advices. He did not consider the advice to be negligent.
104. Mr [APPELLANT] was aware that the claimant could not pursue a claim for assault in the Employment Tribunal. And that this was not part of his Employment Tribunal claim against RMT. However, he did consider that there was likely to be some overlap in the factual matrix and the compensation being pursued in both the Employment Tribunal and in the County Court.
105. Mr [NAME] has not practiced in Personal Injury law. He considers it prudent to rely on advice from practitioners with expertise in this area where such a claim arises. Mr [NAME] (see paragraph 234 of the Slater Judgment, for example) and Mr [NAME] (see paragraph 243 of the Slater Judgment, for example) both advised Mr [APPELLANT] of substantial overlap between the claimant’s employment and personal injury claims against RMT. Mr [NAME], whose expertise is in Personal Injury Law, saw no reason to disagree with Mr [NAME] advice when he asked Ms [NAME] to include the sentence about proceeding with the Employment claim first. Mr [NAME] did not consider Mr [NAME] advice to be negligent (either at the time or at any point during the period that these claims concern), as suggested by the claimant. Rather, Mr [APPELLANT] was deferring to and following the views of practitioners with expertise in the personal injury field. In short, Mr [COUNSEL] did not and would not know whether paragraph 3 of Counsel’s Note was incorrect. He saw no reason to question this given that none of the legal experts in this field had considered this to be incorrect or negligent.
106. The first respondent’s approach, and the view of Mr [COUNSEL], is that complaints against a [NAME] are a matter that should be
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considered under that Solicitor’s internal procedures, at least initially (see paragraph 579 of the Slater Judgment).
107. Following the claimant raising complaints with [NAME], on 02 August 2018 at 16.33, Ms [NAME] forwarded to the [NAME]’s Client Care team the letter that had been drafted for Mr [APPELLANT] that day and a copy of Mr [APPELLANT] advice.
108. There is correspondence on 03 August 2018 between Ms [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT] about the letter to be sent to the claimant in response to his complaints (pp.262-263).
109. On 06 August 2018, the claimant submitted a further complaint to [NAME] (p.264).
110. On 06 August 2018, the claimant brought a claim against the first respondent. In that claim he alleged that the first respondent had discriminated against him because of his disability and unjustifiable discipline in relation to an alleged failure to provide assistance.
111. Ms [NAME], one of [NAME] Client Care Advisor’s replied to Ms [NAME] and included her reply to Mr [NAME] on 09 August 2018 at 15.10.
[NAME]. Ms [COUNSEL] is not a solicitor and is concerned with client care. Her role, in effect, is to firefight situations and try to resolve any complaints that have been received by [NAME]. In light of Mr [APPELLANT]’s complaint, Ms [APPELLANT] asked whether the [NAME] could find somebody to review the claimant’s 6 lever-arch files to make sure nothing had been missed, and to avoid Mr [APPELLANT] being able to state that it was only Ms [APPELLANT] who looked at the issue along with a suggestion of bias in any complaint to the [NAME] (p.255).
113. Mr [NAME] replied to Ms [NAME], including Ms [NAME] in the reply, on 09 August 2018 at 15.21 and asked whether Ms [NAME] suggestion was necessary as he had understood that the claimant had ‘sacked’ the [NAME] (p.256).
114. Ms [APPELLANT] also replied on 09 August 2018, at 15.40 (p.257). She stated that Mr [NAME] was happy with the advice, that she is happy with the advice and it came from a [NAME] specialized in this area. She also explained that the [NAME] would review the files if the [RESPONDENT] were to pay him to do that. However, she ultimately proposed that they don’t take the action suggested by Ms [NAME].
115. Ms [NAME] replied to Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] on 09 August 2018 at 15.43. She explained that the claimant had not sacked the [NAME], that the claimant wanted somebody to review all the evidence and stated that reviewing the evidence was what they needed to do. This was with the view to preventing any allegations of negligence from the claimant. And was to ‘cover’ themselves if/when the claimant complains to the [NAME].
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116. Ms [NAME] replied further on 09 August 2018, at 15.51 (p.259). Ms [NAME] explained that the relevant documents have already been reviewed by Mr [COUNSEL] and a [NAME]. And that the 6 lever-arch files referred to by the claimant relate to the employment claim. Ms [APPELLANT] also explained that those files have been reviewed by the employment [NAME], advised on them, and that advice has been considered by the Personal Injury team and the [NAME] that was instructed. Ms [COUNSEL] concludes by explaining that the claimant’s complaint relates to the advice that the Employment Tribunal claim should proceed first and the personal injury claim stayed until that is concluded.
117. Ms [NAME] replied to Ms [NAME] email on 09 August 2018 at 16.20 (p.260). She maintained that somebody unconnected to the [NAME] should review the files, as if it is somebody connected then the claimant would probably come back and state that he has no trust in anyone already connected to the [NAME].
118. Ms [NAME] replied again to Ms [NAME], on 09 August 2018 at 20.02 (p.261). She explains that the [NAME] has no other lawyers with the requisite experience. And asks the question as to whether the client, that being the first respondent, would pay for the cost of an additional [NAME].
119. On 15 August 2018, Mr [COUNSEL] offered the claimant legal assistance on the basis outlined in [NAME]’s letter of 02 August 2018 (see above).
120. The claimant’s complaint was investigated by [NAME] under their internal procedures. An outcome to the internal investigation was sent to the claimant on 12 October 2018 (see paragraph 579 of the Slater Judgment). Mr [NAME], on considering the outcome, and on realizing the strength of the claimant’s feelings about Mr [APPELLANT], required that Mr [APPELLANT] be taken off the claimant’s [NAME]. He considered that the complaint could be dealt with by other solicitors at [NAME], because of the size of the [NAME], but, after the outcome of the claimant’s internal complaint to [NAME], was willing to consider moving the claimant to other solicitors (this is the finding of the Slater Tribunal at paragraph 776).
121. Mr [APPELLANT] informed the claimant on 12 October 2018 that the issue of would be the claimant’s [NAME] going forward would be dealt with in due course. Mr [APPELLANT] was, at the time, waiting to hear whether the claimant was going ahead with a settlement of the claim he had presented against the respondent in August, and, if the claimant did not, Mr [APPELLANT] was to draft a response to that claim which was due on 15 October 2018 (paragraph 801 of the Slater Judgment).
122. The claimant terminated the retainer with [NAME] on 24 October 2018 (p.265 and see findings in Slater Judgment at paragraphs 383 and 384). This is the most uncooperative act the claimant could have done in these circumstances.
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123. The claimant got the documents at pp.255-261 as part of either discovery in his County Court claims or as a result of a subject access request (see paragraph 206 of the claimant’s witness statement). Mr [APPELLANT] was not aware of any of these documents, until two of them were disclosed by the claimant to be included in the bundle of evidence that was before the Slater Tribunal. [NAME], at that stage, had not seen the entirety of these documents and had only seen those that were in the bundle before the Slater Tribunal.
124. Nobody at [NAME] approached the first respondent to ask whether they would fund a further legal advice. And, as far as Mr [COUNSEL] and the first respondent are aware, [NAME] [NAME] did not review the claimant’s claim.
125. The claimant presented his claims under [NAME] numbers 2205756/2018 and 2401913/2019 at final hearing on 24-28 February 2020 and 02 and 04 March 2020. The decision in that [NAME] was reserved. The reserved decision was sent to the parties on 01 May 2020. This is the decision that is referred to throughout this judgment as the ‘Slater Judgment’.
126. On 06 May 2020, Mr [APPELLANT] emailed [NAME], copying in Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT], seeking Legal Assistance from the first respondent. This was in respect of: (i) his Employment Tribunal and personal injury claims that he had brought against RMT, insofar as the parts of the claims that had been assessed as having reasonable prospects of success, and (ii) in respect of legal advice and potential mediation of any legal claims against [APPELLANT] and [NAME] (see p.1). The claimant explains the basis of potential claims against [APPELLANT] and [NAME] as being ‘unfair and discriminatory’ treatment of him.
127. Mr [APPELLANT] replied to Mr [APPELLANT] by email on 11 May 2020 (see p.2). He explained that the [RESPONDENT] would not be offering the claimant legal assistance (and this forms, in part, paragraph 13 of Mr [NAME] witness evidence). He explained the following:
‘As you are aware the [RESPONDENT] offered legal assistance in relation to some of your Tribunal and civil claims against the RMT based on independent advice on the merits of your claims. Notwithstanding in October you chose to terminate the legal assistance funded by the [RESPONDENT].
In addition, one of the terms of the grant of legal assistance previously made to you was that you accept the advice of the [RESPONDENT]'s officers and [NAME]. This you consistently failed to do. Cooperation with the [RESPONDENT] and its servants and agents is a fundamental aspect of the grant.
In relation to your civil claim against Slater & Gordon, you are aware of the functions of the [RESPONDENT]'s Legal Assistance Scheme and its purpose to assist with issues in the workplace. This claim is not a workplace issue but relates to service provision.’
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128. The reason why Mr [APPELLANT] refused the claimant further assistance is the same reasons that the claimant was refused further legal assistance in the hearing that resulted in the Slater Judgment: that the claimant had terminated his retainer with [NAME] and that he had consistently failed to co-operate with the [RESPONDENT] officers and [NAME].
129. The findings on a failure by the claimant to co-operate in the Slater Judgment are numerous including (but not limited to):
a. At paragraph 236, the claimant wrote to Mr [COUNSEL] as he considered counsel’s advice to be flawed/defective. b. At paragraph 267, the claimant questioned Mr [COUNSEL] statement that counsel’s advice would normally be followed. c. At paragraph 277, Mr [APPELLANT] was concerned that the claimant was not co-operating such that he wrote to the claimant. d. At paragraph 327, the claimant wrote a letter of complaint to the [NAME]. e. At paragraph 328, the claimant also sent a complaint to the head of chambers to the [NAME]. f. At paragraphs 342-344, and particularly paragraph 344 where it is a finding that Mr [NAME] felt as at 23 July 2023, there was a lack of co- operation on the claimant’s part. g. At paragraph 349, it was found that the claimant at a meeting on 25 July 2018 would not agree to anything being taken forward unless the [RESPONDENT] assisted all his claims. h. At paragraph 373, where the claimant complained of his service and asked to be referred to other solicitors.
130. In addition to the non-exhaustive list of findings in the Slater Judgment, the claimant only accepted the advice of Mr [APPELLANT] ‘under protest’, and his acceptance was due to the proximity to the deadline for presenting his claims (paragraph 190 of the claimant’s witness statement).
131. There are no instances between the Slater Judgment being sent to the parties on 01 May 2020 and the claimant applying for further legal assistance on 06 May 2020 with regards the claimant co-operating or not co-operating. There is nothing added in this [NAME] in this respect to the findings already made in the Slater Judgment.
132. The claimant replied to Mr [APPELLANT] on 03 June 2020 at 11.28 (p.3). The claimant asked the Legal Department to reconsider its decision not to provide legal assistance to him. He explained:
a. He was entitled to legal assistance under the Rule Book b. He never had a written retainer from [NAME], and therefore they could not terminate any such retainer. c. That [NAME] did not consider him their client, and therefore he could not terminate any such retainer. d. That if a retainer was implied, which the claimant considered unlikely, then it was [NAME] who breached it such that he would be entitled to terminate it. e. That the treatment of him by [NAME] was making him ill, and he could no longer have contact with solicitors
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doing that. f. That Mr [NAME] was incorrect to state that he had been consistently refusing to accept the advice of the [RESPONDENT] Officers and [NAME]. g. That he was accepting of certain advices that he had received. h. There were reasons why the legal advice in the personal injury claim could not be relied on and that is why he would not accept that advice. i. The [RESPONDENT] has broad discretion to provide members legal assistance, including for those matters he raises in respect the services provided by [NAME] and [NAME].
133. Mr [APPELLANT] responded to the claimant on 04 June 2020, at 17.28 (p.6). He wrote, ‘[t]he position remains as outlined in my previous correspondence for the reasons set out therein’.
134. The Tribunal accepts Mr [NAME] evidence that when making the decision that he did on 11 May 2020, and when replying to the claimant on 04 June 2020, he had no knowledge of what [NAME] had done under the complaints process. Mr [APPELLANT] would not get any such update unless the claimant gave permission for that information to be released to Mr [APPELLANT], and the claimant never suggested that he gave such permission. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that no such permission was given to [NAME] to update Mr [NAME] on this and therefore he had no way of knowing.
135. Although Mr [APPELLANT] was copied into the claimant’s email of 06 May 2020, 03 June 2020 and 04 June 2020, there was no discussion about this matter between Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME]. In short, Mr [NAME] at this time had his time filled with significant collective labour issues relating to the impact of Covid. He was not concerning himself with complaints raised by individuals. And he implicitly trusted that Mr [NAME] could deal with such matters at this time (see below for further findings in this respect). This is further supported by Mr [NAME] evidence under cross-examination when he explained that he does not recall any such conversation with Mr [NAME] at this time, and it was unlikely that there was. There is no evidence to the contrary to suggest that any such discussion did take place.
136. Mr [APPELLANT] was copied into an email sent to the claimant by Mr [APPELLANT] on 08 June 2020 (pp.9-10, details of which are considered below as its contents relate to Detriment 2).
137. On 03 October 2020, the claimant’s sister emailed Mr [APPELLANT] on the claimant’s behalf (p.28) and copied in Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT]. This email explains that a letter was attached, with that letter being a request for legal assistance from the [RESPONDENT]. The letter is at pp.29-32. This repeated matters the claimant has already raised by this stage.
138. The claimant’s sister sent a further email to Mr [APPELLANT] on 27 November 2020, again copying in Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] (p.33). This explained that this was a further request for legal assistance, that the claimant’s health had deteriorated and that Mr [APPELLANT] had not responded to the letter of 03 October 2020. This letter is at pp.34-35.
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139. Mr [NAME], being Director of the Legal Department at the time, did not involve himself in individual matters. Rather he was involved at a strategic level and in matters that concerned significant collective issues. Mr [NAME] had rarely ever dealt with [NAME] matter during his employment with the first respondent. This would only happen where the [NAME] brought matters to the attention of Mr [NAME]. Where this happened, Mr [NAME] would involve himself in [NAME] matter; outside of this, he would not.
140. Before the claimant’s complaint that was sent to the [NAME] on 22 January 2021 (pp.37-46), which was referred to Mr [APPELLANT] by members of the [NAME], and despite the claimant’s emails being sent to Mr [APPELLANT], Mr [APPELLANT] had not seen or read any of the claimant’s emails. This was due to the mass of emails that Mr [NAME] was receiving at this time. The volume of emails received by Mr [NAME] had intensified at this time due to the impact of Covid and Mr [NAME] being tasked with lobbying the Government to increase support for workers and being involved in mass redundancy programmes such as with [NAME].
141. Mr [NAME] would receive thousands of emails a day. He operated by scanning his inbox and searching for key terms in the subject line, which would inform him of which emails he needed to read and deal with. Mr [NAME] focus at the material time was on mass redundancies and interactions with the TUC. Mr [NAME] did not open, read or deal with any emails that concerned issues raised by [NAME]. And he would not open or deal with emails sent by family members of members either.
142. Mr [NAME] left issue relating to individual matters for others to deal with, and specifically Mr [NAME] if the matter concerned the Legal Department.
143. Mr [NAME] did not reply to the email he was copied into by Mr [APPELLANT] on 08 June 2020, or the emails sent to him by the claimant’s sister on 03 October 2020 and 27 November 2020. And the reason was because Mr [NAME] had not seen or read the emails, as his role was not to respond to complaints made by individuals, unless specifically directed to by the [NAME]. Rather, Mr [NAME] role involved him in strategic and collective matters. Mr [NAME] at this time was receiving vast numbers of emails. And he only read and addressed matters that he needed to, namely where it concerned mass redundancies or other strategic issues such as interacting with other unions.
144. The claimant sent a letter to all [NAME] members and the [NAME] on 22 January 2021 (see pp.37-46). Mr [NAME] was made aware of this document by members of the [NAME] and was required to respond to the claimant.
145. Mr [APPELLANT] considered the claimant’s complaints.
146. The claimant, at pages 42 and 43, raised complaints about Mr [APPELLANT]. This concerned him not responding to the above emails. Mr [NAME] has no knowledge whether this was investigated. He reviewed a
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large bundle of documents that had been left in his office and that were related to these complaints. This included the Slater Judgment and various complaints the claimant had made to several employees of the first respondent. Mr [RESPONDENT] considers that if a person terminates their grant for legal assistance, then they should not be entitled to further legal assistance. And that this approach is consistent with the first respondent’s policy. [NAME] considered that allowing a member to terminate a retainer but then to provide them with further legal assistance would see the whole [NAME] fail. As [NAME] would be reluctant to engage in a [NAME] where they could be removed from work by a member, given the [NAME] operated on the basis that [NAME] used fees generated covering personal injury cases to fund employment work, which was done at a reduced rate. In short, if the claimant’s approach was acceptable, [NAME] would likely see no commercial benefit from the arrangement, as they could have completed work on an employment [NAME] at a loss, but be at risk of being swapped out by a member and so lose the benefit of fees generated from the personal injury work.
147. As the claimant had terminated his assistance with [NAME], Mr [NAME] agreed with the decision of Mr [NAME]. Mr [APPELLANT] considered that all of the issues raised in the claimant’s complaint were integral to the decision made by Mr [APPELLANT] and he considered as part of reviewing the claimant’s complaint.
148. In Mr [APPELLANT] opinion, having experience in both employment law and personal injury law, he did not consider Mr [NAME] advice to be incorrect.
149. Mr [APPELLANT] responded to the claimant’s complaint on 08 February 2020 at 09.50 (p.57). He wrote:
“Thank you for your emails in this matter.
I have taken the time to review the decision by Mr [NAME], to whom the previous decision to refuse further legal assistance to you was delegated.
I have considered the points you have made and can see no reason to overturn Mr [NAME] decision in which he has applied the discretion exercised by the [RESPONDENT]'s Legal Department on behalf of the [NAME], fairly and in accordance with our Rules and Policies.
This concludes the matter and I wish you the best.”
150. In writing this response, Mr [APPELLANT] considered the claimant’s complaint in its entirety. He found no evidence of professional misconduct by Mr [NAME]. He did not consider Mr [NAME] advice to be incorrect or misleading. And he agreed that the claimant should not be offered further legal assistance where he had terminated his retainer with [NAME] and there was evidence of non-cooperation, which was a key requirement for the granting of legal assistance. Mr [NAME] considered it necessary that he needed to bring this matter to an end and that was the purpose of his email.
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151. The Tribunal considered Mr [NAME] to be an entirely honest witness in his evidence. He answered questions in a straightforward manner. His evidence was consistent in itself and was consistent with documents. Mr [NAME] accepted responsibility when he recognised he could have done something different (such as his lack of responses). The claimant has not adduced anything or highlighted anything to support that Mr [NAME] evidence was not reliable. Furthermore, Mr [RESPONDENT] himself is in legal dispute with the first respondent. He has resigned from his employment, following disciplinary investigations being raised against him. Mr [NAME] is [NAME] who it could be suggested is in conflict with the first respondent and could have given his evidence in a manner designed to damage the first respondent. And yet he gave the evidence that he did, which was consistent with the evidence of other witnesses called by the first respondent. This further supports the reliability of his evidence. And that further supports the Tribunal’s findings with regards to Mr [NAME] actions in this [NAME].
Detriment 2
152. Members of the first respondent can raise a Members Complaint (pp.350-351). Importantly, and relevantly, this explains that ‘Where members complain about advice from our lawyers, or conduct of our lawyers, the [RESPONDENT] shall use its normal procedures for legal review, which may include the solicitors' own internal complaints procedure. The decision shall be final’ (see final paragraph on p.351).
153. Mr [APPELLANT] sent a response to Mr [APPELLANT] on 04 June 2020 at 17.42 (p.6). He explained that he was disappointed with the decision and refusal to answer the points that he had raised in his email. He stated that he considers that he was being deprived of this [RESPONDENT] service because of protected concerns he had raised, and because of the Employment Tribunal claims he had submitted for discrimination and unlawful discipline. The claimant then explained that he wanted to raise an informal complaint under the Members Complaints Procedure. He ended this response by asking to be advised as to whether the matter was being submitted to Mr [NAME] or the [NAME].
154. For the avoidance of any doubt, the Tribunal makes the finding that the email of 03 June 2020 and 04 June 2020 is the claimant complaining about the decision not to provide him with legal assistance only. The claimant was not raising any other complaints at this stage. The email makes this clear in the [NAME] paragraph, when the claimant makes a ‘request that the Legal Department reconsider the refusal to provide me a member with [COMPANY]’. The rest of the email contains the claimant’s response to Mr [APPELLANT] reasoning for the refusal, an explanation as to why the claimant considers Mr [APPELLANT] rationale to be incorrect and why the decision should be reconsidered. Despite the reasons given to him by Mr [NAME] on 11 May 2020 being the same as those that were found to be legitimate and justified reasons for the initial refusal to provide the claimant [COMPANY] in the Slater Tribunal, the claimant sought to link this refusal as being caused by him having brought the previous proceedings. The claimant has tried to reinterpret the decision of Mr [APPELLANT] and his emails of
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03 and 04 June 2020 as being an allegation that an official of the first respondent has not provided the claimant with services on discriminatory grounds. And he then tried to link this to paragraph 36 of the Slater Judgment to suggest that his complaint should have been addressed as a Members Complaint. However, the claimant’s interpretation is rejected, given the decision reached in the Slater Judgment, given the clear reasoning of Mr [APPELLANT] in his email of 11 May 2020 and given the claimant has not adduced any evidence of a material change in circumstances between the Slater Judgment being released and 04 June 2020. In short, the claimant has provided no basis in his email of either 03 and 04 June 2020 from which Mr [APPELLANT] could have concluded that the claimant was raising such a conduct issue about Mr [APPELLANT].
155. Mr [APPELLANT] replied to the claimant on 04 June 2020 at 18.00 (p.7), to explain that the claimant’s email had been forwarded to Mr [APPELLANT], who was the Official responsible for the Members Complaints Procedure.
156. Mr [NAME] was the person who decided which complaints would be addressed through the Members Complaint Procedure and which would be addressed through the [COMPANY]. [NAME] has significant experience in dealing with member complaints. He had dealt with thousands of complaints during his employment with the first respondent by the time he had received the claimant’s complaint. He was familiar with the procedures and making decisions as to which to follow. Mr [NAME] approach to complaints is to review it, and if it concerns matters relating to unhappiness about conduct of solicitors then he would put the complaint through the [COMPANY] route. He adopted this approach irrespective of who the complainant was.
157. In Mr [APPELLANT] experience with dealing with complaints for the first respondent, any complaint against a [NAME] was to be taken up with the [NAME] internal procedures. And if a member is still dissatisfied then the matter would be addressed by Mr [NAME].
158. On 08 June 2020, Mr [APPELLANT] emailed the claimant at 12.31 (pp.9- 10) with his decision. Mr [APPELLANT] copied both Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] into this email. Mr [NAME] was copied in as Mr [NAME] understood that the final decision on Legal Assistance rested with Mr [NAME]. Mr [NAME] copied Mr [NAME] into the email as he was Director of the Legal Department at the time. However, Mr [NAME] considered that Mr [NAME] was unlikely to reply as he was known for not responding to emails. Mr [NAME] attached a copy of the Lay Members Complaints Procedure and a copy of Rule 4, and explained the following in his email:
a. Access to [NAME] legal assistance is set out in Rule 4, attached. b. From this, legal assistance is at all times discretionary and is not the membership entitlement that you claim it to be. c. You complain about the decision of [NAME] in relation to legal support. d. You have sought legal assistance through an unconventional route which in the circumstances is understandable. e. The [NAME] Member Complaints Procedure, attached, sets out the basic parameters for dealing with complaints however it does not fit
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easily with your request. f. Where a member’s complaint concerns advice from the [RESPONDENT] lawyers or the conduct of the [RESPONDENT]’s lawyers, the [RESPONDENT] shall use its usual procedures for legal service review, which may include the solicitors own internal complaints procedure. The decision shall be final. This is taken directly from the Members Complaint Procedure (see final paragraph on p.351). g. [RESPONDENT] decision concerned advice from the [RESPONDENT] and one of its lawyers, [RESPONDENT]. h.
Accordingly, in the circumstances I have referred the correspondence to the Director of [COMPANY], [NAME] line manager, [NAME] [NAME], who will adjudicate on this matter and make a final decision.
159. The claimant responded to Mr [APPELLANT] on 13 July 2020, at 16.07 (p.11). He asked Mr [NAME] to reconsider the decision to deal with his complaint under the [COMPANY] process, as he was concerned that his allegations against a staff member would not be addressed, and he would be denied an appeal. The claimant raised the transferring of his membership to the [NAME], that he had sought help form an officer in ensuring he was paying the right fee and for help in claiming [RESPONDENT] benefits for a workplace injury but that he had not received a promised call back.
160. Mr [APPELLANT] replied to the claimant on 14 July 2020 at 18.25 (p.12) with the following responses:
a. The complaint raised could not be recast as a matter of conduct or capability. The complaints procedure is clear. And this matter would remain in the [COMPANY] process. b. Nevertheless, he has referred the claimant’s request to Mr [APPELLANT], who is extremely busy and had not yet responded. c. The claimant’s requests for legal assistance had already been considered and determined. d. He would forward on the matters to do with membership transfer, fee and benefits to Mr [NAME], who has delegated responsibility over such matters.
161. Mr [APPELLANT] was of the opinion that the claimant was now including terms such as ‘discrimination’ with a view to trying to push his complaint down the ordinary complaints path, as he disliked the decision he had made. In short, Mr [NAME] did not consider this to be genuine in the circumstances.
162. The claimant replied to Mr [APPELLANT] on 14 July 2020, at 20.42 (p.13). He asks various questions, primarily about whether Mr [NAME], on review, can overturn Mr [NAME] decision not to provide legal assistance.
163. Mr [APPELLANT] replied to the claimant on 14 July 2020 at 20.45 (p.14). He explained that Mr [NAME] decision was a final decision, and that he had referred the correspondence to Mr [NAME] as a matter of courtesy as he was head of [COMPANY].
164. Mr [NAME] would have adopted the same course of action with any
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Member raising a complaint. [NAME] made the decision that the claimant’s complaint was to follow the [COMPANY] procedure as the core complaint was about refusal of [COMPANY]. Mr [APPELLANT], in such circumstances where a complainant was trying to, in his opinion, recast matters as a conduct issue about somebody in the Legal Department, would still refer the matter for a [COMPANY] but would copy in Mr [NAME] as head of the department, who could pick up and address any other issues that were identified.
165. There is further correspondence on this matter between the claimant and Mr [APPELLANT] on 14 and 15 July 2020 (pp.14-16). Much of this is the claimant disagreeing with Mr [APPELLANT]‘s decision and Mr [APPELLANT] responding accordingly, and this was despite Mr [NAME] trying to bring the correspondence to an end on 14 July 2020 at 2059 (p.15).
166. The claimant’s reply on 14 July 2020 at 21.17 (p.15), included the following: ‘…I do consider my complaints against Mr [NAME] rejection of legal assistance and your decision that Mr [NAME] decision was final without having Mr [NAME] review be immediately referred to the [NAME] under the members complaints procedure.’
167. On 15 July 2020 at 11.46, Mr [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant as follows:
“I have reflected upon yesterday evenings email exchange and write to clarify matters, for the avoidance of any confusion.
[NAME] considered the requests as they were directed to him and made a decision.
This decision stands.
You sought to challenge that decision, and I referred the matter to [NAME], who is the Head of [COMPANY].
He will review the decisions made.
You will receive a considered response in due course.
In the meantime [NAME] decision stands and [NAME] is not providing legal assistance in relation to the proceedings in which you are currently engaged.”
168. The claimant on 15 July 2020, at 12.00 replied to an email from Mr [NAME] (copying in Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME]) and requested that his complaint against Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] be referred to the [NAME] under the Members Complaint Procedure. Mr [APPELLANT] did not refer the claimant’s complaint about him either as suggested by the claimant or to his line manager. As, in his opinion, it was not his responsibility to do so.
Detriment 3
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169. The first respondent utilizes a [NAME] called ‘[NAME]’ to record interactions with Members. [NAME] would record details of events on [NAME] once they were made aware by the Member.
170. The responsibility rested with a member to make an application for a reduced subscription rate and/or for sickness benefit.
171. There was no record of an event having been raised in early 2016 or October 2017 by the claimant concerning him having gone off work sick during November 2015 and that he never returned to work. Mr [APPELLANT] was clear on his evidence on this. The claimant did not seek to challenge Mr [APPELLANT] evidence on this. The Tribunal considered Mr [NAME] to give straightforward evidence. And accepted this evidence to be true.
172. The claimant did not inform the first respondent in early 2016 or October 2017 or in March 2020 of the events recorded above. The Tribunal rejects the claimant’s evidence on this matter and finds that no such communication took place. The following, amongst other matters, support this finding. The claimant is an experienced [RESPONDENT] Member and is familiar with the first respondent’s policies and procedures. The claimant was paying an enhanced membership fee and would have known what benefits this entitled him to. There is no evidence of the claimant having contacted anybody at the first respondent between early 2016 and 31 July 2020. And this is against the background that the claimant raises emails and queries over any action he considers to be detrimental to him (and this would certainly fall into this category). This is shown in these emails themselves. From 11 August 2020, when Ms [APPELLANT] first contacted the claimant about support/help (p.18), the claimant was in contact with Ms [APPELLANT] on 5 occasions (one phone call and 4 emails) from this date until 13 August 2020 (p.26). Had the claimant raised this matter earlier, then the claimant would more likely than not have followed this up in subsequent communications. The lack of any record of such contact on [NAME] further supports this finding.
173. The claimant sought to introduce into evidence and rely on a report from a Mr [NAME]. However, the Tribunal refused to allow this into evidence (this is recorded above). The claimant tried to introduce this at a very late stage of these proceedings, without any acceptable reason. However, the claimant was still permitted to ask necessary questions about this and so was not prejudiced by this decision. It is difficult to envisage how this document would have changed the evidence or outcome in any event. The Tribunal accepted Mr [NAME] evidence when he was asked about Mr [NAME] report. That is that he had never seen Mr [NAME] report and that it had not been presented to the [NAME] and there was no record of it on [NAME].
174. Following transfer of the claimant’s membership to the [NAME], Ms [APPELLANT] contacted the claimant. And on 12 August 2020, at 08.47 (p.19), she requested information from him so that she could ensure the correct subscription rate was being paid and to address member benefits.
175. [NAME] was likely supporting the claimant given his reference to the need for support in his email of 06 May 2020 (p.1). However, the
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claimant, on whom the responsibility laid, had not made any application for reduced membership rates at this stage.
176. The claimant replied on 12 August 2020 at 09.07 (p.20). He explained that he told [NAME] during early 2016 that he went off sick during November 2015 and never returned to work. And that he resigned from his job during November 2017. The claimant further explained that he has been on long term sickness benefit since 2018. He also requests that Ms [NAME] contact Mr [NAME] about his personal injury and employment claims against his [NAME] employe, and legal advice and mediation in respect to [NAME] and [NAME]. Ms [NAME] seeks clarification in respect to sick leave and specific dates on 12 August at 10.53 (p.21). The claimant responded on 12 August 2020 at 11.18 (p.22).
177. Ms [APPELLANT] emails the claimant on 13 August 2020 at 14.16 (p23). She explained the following:
a. The legal issues the claimant referred to were being considered centrally, by Mr [NAME]. b. Unless there were new issues, there was no further legal advice or assistance required. c. Benefits were on the [NAME] website and she provided a link. d. The claimant’s membership had been transferred to the [NAME]. e. The claimant’s subscription rate was changed to the Back to Work rate as from 01 August 2020.
178. The claimant replied to Ms [APPELLANT] on 13 August 2020 at 17.08 (p.24). He said that Mr [NAME] was not considering his legal issues. He raised that he had not yet had a response from Mr [NAME]. He asked what enhanced benefits he was entitled to, given he was paying an enhanced rate, along with what other benefits he was entitled to. And he asked why his subscription rates were only being reduced from 01 August 2020, when he had requested this assistance a long time ago.
179. Ms [APPELLANT] replied to the claimant on 13 August 2020 at 17.56 (p.25). She apologized for getting her information wrong and explained that the legal matters were with Mr [APPELLANT]. Ms [APPELLANT] explained to the claimant that she could not make a decision on such matters.
180. The claimant replied to Ms [APPELLANT] on 13 August 2020 at 18.03 (p.26). He asked whether Ms [NAME] could contact Mr [NAME] on his behalf or whether somebody else in [NAME] could. He also asked for assistance in making an application for sickness benefit and for getting subscription refunds he has paid, as he requested assistance a long time ago.
181. Ms [APPELLANT] emailed a response to the claimant on 14 August 2020 at 13.10 (p.27). Ms [APPELLANT] confirmed that an email had been sent to Mr [APPELLANT] for him to contact the claimant about his legal claims. She clarified to the claimant that sickness benefit was a working benefit, and if he was still employed but off sick then it could only be backdated for the previous 12 months. Ms [NAME] provided an excerpt from the policy that explained this. Ms [NAME] further explained that she could only change the membership
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rate from the date the office was notified, and that there was no discretion involved in this. Ms [NAME] explained that she had changed the membership rate to be effective from the date that Mr [NAME] first escalated the matter to Mr [NAME]. This was reduced retrospectively to 01 August 2020.
182. Mr [APPELLANT] was copied into the claimant’s sister’s email of 03 October 2020 (p.28). This included a request for legal assistance. Amongst various other matters.
183. Mr [NAME] had no responsibility for the issues in this letter. And the email (and attached letter) was specifically addressed to Mr [NAME]. And those were the reasons that Mr [NAME] provided no response to this letter. And this also applies to the claimant’s sisters email, with letter attached, of 27 November 2020 (pp.33-35).
DETRIMENT 4 AND DETRIMENT 5
184. The claimant emailed the members of the first respondent’s Executive Council and Mr [RESPONDENT] on 22 January 2021 at 11.09 (p.36). He explains that he has attached a letter requesting legal assistance, which contains a complaint against [NAME], and against [NAME] and the [RESPONDENT]’s Legal Department. The letter that was attached to this email is at pp.38-46. In this letter, the claimant makes a further request for legal assistance (p.38), raised complaints against [NAME] (pp.39-41), raised complaints against Mr [NAME] (pp.42-43) and raised complaints against the first respondent’s legal department, and specifically Mr [APPELLANT] (pp.43-45)
185. The claimant forwarded the above email and letter to Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [NAME] on 22 January at 11.19 (p.47) and several other individuals at 13.20 (p.49) and 13.48 (p.50).
186. Mr [APPELLANT] emailed the claimant on 25 January 2021 at 14.28 (p.51). He explained to the claimant that he had referred to claimant’s email to the first respondent’s complaints person to ensure he got a response to his request for legal assistance.
187. In response to Mr [APPELLANT] on 26 January 2021 at 10.28 (p.52), the claimant thanked Mr [APPELLANT] for his response and action. Mr [APPELLANT] clarified with the claimant on 27 January 2021 at 15.12 (p.53) that he had forwarded the claimant’s email to [NAME], as they had the administration of the Executive Council as part of their responsibilities. He also explained that he understood that they had already brought the claimant’s previous correspondence to the attention of the Executive Council members for consideration.
188. Mr [APPELLANT] sought information from Mr [APPELLANT] on 01 February 2021 at 12.18 (p.54). Asking for the name of the person that informed him that the claimant’s correspondence had been forwarded to the Executive Council. The claimant asked that his request for legal assistance by dealt with by the [NAME], in the vent that there is no response form the Executive Council or Mr [NAME].
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189. Mr [NAME] on 01 February 2021 at 13.39 (p.55) clarified that it was the claimant that informed Mr [APPELLANT] that his correspondence had been forwarded to the Executive Council, in his email of 22 January 2021. Mr [NAME] apologies for any misunderstanding he may have caused.
190. On 01 February 2021 at 14.11 (p.56), the claimant emailed Mr [APPELLANT], copying in Ms [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT]. He alleges that [RESPONDENT] procedures are not being followed. And seeks assistance in ensuring the Executive Council investigates his complaints and answers the request for legal assistance. Or in the alternative, where such is not done, that the [NAME] deals with his request for legal assistance.
191. Mr [APPELLANT] emails the claimant on 08 February 2021 at 09.50 (p.57). He writes as follows:
“Thank you for your emails in this matter.
This concludes the matter and I wish you the best.”
192. The claimant replied to Mr [APPELLANT] on 08 February 2021, at 11.37 (p.58), copying in Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME]. In this email he explains that his letter of 22 January 2021 went beyond the legal assistance issue. And there was also a complaint against the [RESPONDENT]’s Legal Department and the failure to provide legal assistance and a complaint against [APPELLANT] and [NAME]. The claimant explained that his complaint about [APPELLANT] and [NAME] were serious allegations, concerned breaches of the Equality Act 2010, and that Mr [NAME] had failed to investigate them. In respect of the Legal Department, the claimant explained that the reasons given by Mr [APPELLANT] for refusing legal assistance were not correct, and the Mr [NAME] conduct in advising the [NAME] not to respond to the claimant’s complaints or requests was not acceptable and a breach of [RESPONDENT] procedures. The claimant repeats the detail from his 22 January 2021 letter to explain why he says Mr [NAME] decision to refuse him legal assistance was incorrect.
193. The claimant received an automated message on 08 February 2021 from Mr [NAME] email address, explaining that Mr [NAME] had now retired and complaints would need to be re-sent to [EMAIL].
194. The claimant, in line with the automated message, re-sent his complaint to the complaints email address on 08 February 2021 at 13.04 (p.62). In the body of the email, the claimant explained that he hoped his email is treated as a complaint.
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195. The claimant received an email response from Ms [APPELLANT] on 09 February 2021, at 16.04. This explained to the claimant that she was now responsible for administering complaints following Mr [APPELLANT] retiring. This explained that the claimant’s request for legal assistance had now been addressed by both Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME]. Ms [NAME] apologized for the delay and for the lack of acknowledgement of the claimant’s email. She concluded with:
“However the substance of the matter remains the same and the decision on legal assistance is final, which I understand Mr [NAME] has communicated directly to you. These decisions are delegated by the [NAME] to the Legal Department who have now looked at the matter twice and accordingly there is no further right of appeal and the matter is closed.”
196. The claimant responded to Ms [APPELLANT] on 09 February 2021 at 16.52 (p.64), copying in various individuals including Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME]. This explained that the letter of 22 January 2021 was not simply a request for legal assistance but included a complaint against Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and [NAME] and [NAME] Solicitors. And that the substance of those complaints had never been addressed and that they need to be in accordance with [RESPONDENT] procedures.
197. The claimant sent an email to Mr [APPELLANT] on 16 February 2021, at 10.43, (pp.65-66), copying in several individuals, including Ms [APPELLANT]. In this email the claimant reiterates that his emails of 08 and 09 February 2021, and his letter of 22 January 2021 was a complaint against [NAME] and [NAME] Solicitors, and the conducts of Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME]. He explained that the allegations including allegations of tortious conduct that included discrimination contrary to the Equality Act 2010, misrepresentation and/or deceit and unlawful acts as a breach of fiduciary duties by solicitors. The claimant repeats the details he had already included in previous correspondence to explain his allegations.
198. Mr [APPELLANT] did not reply to the claimant’s email response to Mr [APPELLANT] on 08 February 2021, his email to the complaints email address on 08 February 2021 or his email of 16 February 2021. This was because Mr [NAME] considered that this was not part of his role. Mr [NAME] had passed the matter to the [NAME]. As far as he was concerned, the extent of his involvement was in regards the claimant’s membership and benefits (see paragraph 14 of Mr [APPELLANT] witness statement).
Detriments 6-13
199. Ms [RESPONDENT] was elected the [NAME] of the first respondent in August 2021. In her manifesto, she pledged to set up a [RESPONDENT] [NAME]. This was a [NAME] that was set up to provide a direct route to the [NAME].
200. On 14 October 2021, the claimant sent an email to Ms [APPELLANT] (pp.70-74). The subject is “Request for Legal Assistance; Complaint against [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] and [NAME] the [RESPONDENT]”. This included the
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same complaints that had been raised by the claimant previously.
201. The claimant sent a further email on 07 November 2021, this being sent to Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] (p.88). The focus of this email was on the conduct of Mr [APPELLANT]. The claimant raised serious allegations about Mr [APPELLANT], referring to Mr [NAME] having made misleading statements to the Employment Tribunal and was in breach of Rule 1.4 of the [NAME].
202. Ms [NAME] required Mr [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT] to discuss the contents of the claimant’s email of 07 November 2021 and deal with them (p.89).
203. On 08 November 2021 at 09.14, the claimant emailed a complaint of professional misconduct concerning Mr [NAME] to Mr [NAME], copying in Ms [NAME] (p.92). This repeated the same allegations against Mr [NAME], in respect of him making misleading statements in breach of the [NAME]. This again refers to the conduct of Mr [APPELLANT] which led to the claimant being refused legal assistance. The claimant requested that Mr [APPELLANT] professional conduct be investigated and asked to be informed that [NAME] solicitor would have conduct of the claimant Employment Tribunal [NAME] under [NAME] number 2402745/2021.
204. Mr [NAME] had spoken to Mr [NAME] about this complaint around this time, with both agreeing that this matter needed investigating.
205. Ms [NAME], following discussing this complaint with both Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] decided that, given Mr [RESPONDENT] absence from work and that [NAME] was the [RESPONDENT]’s most senior solicitor, this matter would need to be investigated by an independent external solicitor (para 2 of [COUNSEL] witness statement). Ms [COUNSEL] asked Mr [NAME] to provide names of suitable people, and to seek their willingness to undertake such an investigation.
206. Mr [NAME] contacted several individuals with a view to undertaking the first respondent’s investigation into Mr [RESPONDENT]. A [NAME] [NAME] gave Mr [NAME] the name of Mr [NAME] as a suitable person to investigate the matter.
207. Neither Mr [NAME] or Ms [NAME] had had any previous contact with Mr [NAME]. And he had no ongoing relationship with the first respondent. In short, he was objectively independent.
208. Mr [NAME] made initial contact with Mr [NAME] to see whether he was willing and able to undertake the investigation. When Mr [NAME] said that he was willing to do the investigation, Mr [NAME] passed Mr [NAME] name and contact details to Ms [NAME].
209. Ms [NAME] directed Mr [NAME] to provide a draft instruction for Mr [NAME]. Mr [NAME] provided Ms [NAME] this on 16 December 2021 (see p.100) and confirmed that he had never met Mr [NAME] professionally or socially.
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210. Ms [NAME] checked the draft letter and considered it to be an appropriate letter of instruction. Ms [NAME] sent the letter of instruction to Mr [NAME] on 21 December 2021 (see p.98). This explained that:
a. The claimant has raised a number of issues. b. That the [RESPONDENT] is not seeking to re-run the previous Tribunal, nor to review the advice provided to the [RESPONDENT] in defending the previous claim. c. The [RESPONDENT] is concerned with allegations raised by the claimant in emails of 05 and 07 November 2021, alleging that Mr [COUNSEL] had acted in breach of Solicitor conduct rules. d. The [RESPONDENT] does not have a process or facility for investigating such a complaint. e. Mr [RESPONDENT] is currently unavailable. f. The [RESPONDENT] wanted a view as to whether it remained professionally acceptable for Mr [COUNSEL] to remain the solicitor with conduct of the [NAME] set of proceedings. g. The relevant documents were attached, however, if Mr [NAME] considered that anything was missing he could request it. h. It was up to Mr [NAME] how to investigate the matter. i. The intended recipients of the report as Ms [NAME], the [NAME] and the Chief of Staff.
211. Mr [NAME] contacted Ms [NAME] (Mr [NAME] copied in) on 07 January 2022 (p.111). In the email, Mr [NAME] wrote:
a. He considered the matter could be dealt with on the papers. b. He referenced Rule 1.4 of the Solicitor’s Code of Conduct c. The allegation was that on numerous occasions Mr [APPELLANT] has stted wrongly that the claimant was in breach of his retainer with [NAME]. The claimant asserts that there was either no retainer or he was entitled to end matters due to the [NAME]’s conduct. d. He references the Slater Tribunal decision, and that the claimant was offered [RESPONDENT] support on limited terms by letter dated 01 August 2018, which was accepted by the claimant on 16 August 2018 (para 369). An that the claimant terminated his retainer on 24 October 2018 (para 383). e. He would require specific documents to assist him with completing his report. f. A Specific question that Mr [NAME] was asked to answer, relating to whether he spoke at the Preliminary Hearing on 22 July 2021, or whether Mr [NAME] spoke on his instruction.
212. Mr [NAME] replied to Mr [NAME] on 13 January 2022 (see p.118). Mr [RESPONDENT] confirmed that it was Mr [RESPONDENT] who spoke on behalf of the respondents at that hearing and was doing so on Mr [NAME] instruction. But that he himself did not speak or present the [NAME]. Mr [RESPONDENT] explains that the position put forward by Mr [RESPONDENT], which was consistent with Mr [RESPONDENT] position, was that:
“(i) The terms of the professional relationship between Slater & Gordon and the Claimant was not a relevant issue in the [NAME] against
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[NAME] bar its termination in October;
(ii) The [RESPONDENT]’s position as set out by me in both the Tribunal and subsequently was that the Claimant was not adhering to the terms of the grant of legal assistance made to him.
213. Mr [NAME] continued and explained that he did not ‘…recall at any time having given evidence or stating in correspondence or instructing Mr [RESPONDENT] that Mr [APPELLANT] was in breach of any retainer with Slater & Gordon, unless of course Mr [APPELLANT] is referring to the act of termination (as communicated in his letter of 24th October and found as fact by the Tribunal at paragraph 383) as a breach’.
214. Mr [NAME] report was sent to Ms [NAME] on 21 January 2022 (copy at pp.119-124). Having considered all of the evidence, amongst various findings, Mr [NAME] specifically found the following:
a. In none of the documentation does [APPELLANT] specifically say that the claimant was in breach of his retainer with [NAME] (paragraph 10 on p.123). b. Mr [NAME] has not at any time in correspondence, employment Tribunal pleadings or at an employment Tribunal hearing made any misleading statements to the effect that Mr [APPELLANT] had breached his retainer with [NAME] (paragraph 14, p.123). c. Mr [NAME] has not breached Rule 1.4 of the [NAME]. There is no reason to consider a referral to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Mr [NAME] can continue to act for the respondents in the [NAME] ET (paragraph 16, p.123).
215. Around the same time as the events outlined above, Mr [NAME], oversaw the introduction of the [NAME] [NAME] in or around December 2021.
216. Members use the [NAME] for a variety of reasons, including to raise queries and communications. Although the [NAME] was not initially set up to receive complaints, sometimes members used it as a vehicle for raising complaints. This led to the [NAME] being modified to ensure that complaints were passed on and addressed appropriately within the first respondent’s processes and procedures.
217. The first respondent keeps a record of contacts made by members through the [NAME]. When an issue is raised by a member a ticket is raised. Details of the issue raised, along with any action points, are recorded. This [NAME] is used to record all communications under a ticket, including calls received from a member, calls made to a member.
218. [NAME]’s role with the [NAME] (amongst other things), at the material times, was to consider a complaint and then signpost it to the relevant team/persons who he considered were best placed to consider and address the complaint. Mr [NAME] did not make decisions on complaints himself.
219. On 03 December 2021, the claimant called the [NAME] and talked to Ms [APPELLANT] (p.289). The claimant explained his complaint to Ms [APPELLANT], this being:
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a. A complaint about the way his [NAME] has been handled by the [RESPONDENT]’s legal department and [NAME]. b. That the [NAME] gave advice when he was not in possession of all the facts and evidence c. [NAME]’s compliance department considered that he had a legitimate complaint and that [NAME] advice should be prepared. d. [NAME] and [NAME] did not advise him of the views of their compliance department, which is a breach of their Judicial duties and Solicitor code of conduct. e. [NAME] claimed that he was in breach of his retainer. f. Mr [NAME] and the legal department had been aware of [NAME]’s breach and were aware that the claimant was not in breach of his retainer. g. The claimant has had a lack of responses from those he raised the issues with. h. The matter has had a terrible impact on the claimant’s health and his family.
220. The claimant’s contact of 03 December 2021 was referred to Mr [APPELLANT] to manage.
221. Mr [APPELLANT] on reviewing the note of the claimant’s contact with the [NAME], considered that the issues being raised were legal in nature. This was beyond his understanding as he was not a lawyer. He decided that he would contact the legal department to try to understand some contextual background to the claimant’s complaint.
222. Mr [APPELLANT] contacted Mr [APPELLANT] in relation to the claimant’s contact, who referred him to speak to Mr [APPELLANT], who had assumed senior responsibilities for matters in the [NAME]. And this was between 03 December 2021 and 07 December 2021. The Tribunal had to resolve whether Mr [NAME] first had contact with Mr [NAME] between 03 December 2021 and 07 December 2021 or on 05 January 2022. Mr [APPELLANT] when he was cross-examined by the claimant was unsure of the precise date of his first contact with [NAME]. Although on a question by the judge appeared to consider that the correspondence between himself and Mr [NAME] on 05 and 06 January 2022 (pp.103-105) was the first contact. However, Mr [NAME] sets out a different position in paragraph 5 of his witness statement. And this is consistent with the updated entry on the [NAME] records at p.295. On balance, the Tribunal accepts the accuracy of paragraph 5 of Mr [APPELLANT] Witness Statement, which was unchallenged by the claimant, given its consistency with the contemporaneous document at p.295.
223. Mr [NAME] informed Mr [APPELLANT] that there was litigation between the claimant and the [RESPONDENT] and that the legal department was dealing with that. And that the request for legal assistance should be dealt with by the legal department. On 07 December 2021 at 12.03, Mr [NAME] noted this on the internal [NAME] and advised his colleagues by email (see p.295). Mr [NAME] did not have the authority to grant legal assistance nor did he have the
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
authority to change Mr [NAME] decision in respect to legal assistance.
224. For the avoidance of any doubt, all decisions on legal assistance and funding are delegated to the first respondent’s legal department. All decisions about legal assistance are taken by the legal department (paragraph 34 of the [NAME] judgment).
225. On 07 December 2021 at 13.28, the claimant had contact with Mr [APPELLANT]. First, by phone, and then by email (see p.95). During the phone call the claimant’s primary focus was that he wanted legal assistance for his upcoming cases, and this was then reflected in the email sent by the claimant in follow up to that phone conversation (para 6 of Mr [NAME] witness statement is consistent with the email itself). The claimant in his email explains that:
‘I would be grateful to resolve all my complaints with our [RESPONDENT], including legal and would be grateful for legal assistance in my Employment Tribunal claims (EAT hearing on the 25th of January 2022 and the ET hearing starting on the 25th of April 2022), help with negligence and disability discrimination claim against [NAME] [COUNSEL] and [COUNSEL] (my personal injury claims being struck out as a result of a breach of fiduciary duties) if they have merits.’
Further supporting this finding is that there was also focus on overturning the decision on refusing the claimant with legal assistance in subsequent correspondence. Including in the email sent by the claimant to Mr [APPELLANT] (copying in Ms [APPELLANT]) on 07 January 2022 (pp.109-110), and further correspondence detailed below.
226. The claimant attached to his email of 07 December 2021 to Mr [APPELLANT] the email that he had sent to Ms [NAME] on 15 October 2021. The 15 October 2021 email is that at p.69, with the attached complaint at pp.70-74. Although the claimant raises a series of matters in this document, these are all with the view of persuading Ms [NAME] that the previous decision to refuse him legal assistance by Mr [NAME] was incorrect and he invites Ms [NAME] to now authorize legal support (see p.74).
227. The claimant forwarded further emails to Mr [APPELLANT] on 07 December 2021 (see pp.94 (entitled complaint of professional misconduct against Mr [APPELLANT], 96 (entitled [NAME] [APPELLANT] v [NAME] the [RESPONDENT] (Respondent 1) & [APPELLANT] (Respondent 2) [NAME] number 2402745/2021) and 97(entitled complaint of professional misconduct against Mr [APPELLANT]).
228. Mr [APPELLANT] did not inform the claimant that he would update him by 02 January 2022 about his complaint during the conversation on 07 December 2021 or at any point. Rather, Mr [APPELLANT] more likely than not explained to the claimant that he would provide an update in due course. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal has taken into account the following: (i) the claimant does not give any evidence in his witness statement that Mr [NAME] told him that he would be updated by a specific date, namely 02 January 2022; (ii) at its height, the claimant’s supporting evidence is that he contacted the [NAME] on 05 January 2022 and explained that he had not heard back from Mr [NAME] regarding his complaint (this is recorded at p.296); there is no
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
document that makes any reference to a need to provide an update, or a failure to provide an update by 02 January 2022; Mr [NAME] evidence under cross-examination is that he would not give a specific date but rather would indicate he would update in due course; there is no upcoming action recorded in the [NAME] records; the claimant in his email to Mr [APPELLANT] following the phone call makes no reference to such an update being due by 02 January 2022 (p.95), and; when the claimant has a date set for being given an update, he makes reference to it (see email of 07 January 2022 from the claimant to Mr [APPELLANT] at pp.109-110, but specifically the final paragraph on p.110).
229. The claimant contacted the [NAME] on 05 January 2022 at 12.30pm. Ms [APPELLANT] told the claimant that information was being collated from the legal department and a response would be sent in due course, in line with Mr [NAME] note on the [NAME] (see p.296).
230. 05 January 2022, the claimant called Mr [APPELLANT], seeking an update on the matters he raised with Mr [NAME] on 07 December 2021.
231. On 05 January 2022 at 17.03, Mr [NAME] referred the matter to Mr [NAME] (p.102), who was the Senior Advisor to the [NAME]. Mr [APPELLANT] explained that part of the claimant’s correspondence with him was a complaint against Mr [NAME] that would have to be handled centrally, and that he had informed the claimant that someone would be looking at it. Mr [APPELLANT] also explained that there was supposed to be a response about the claimant suing the [RESPONDENT], but that hadn’t happened, and so he would check with Mr [NAME] in relation to the request for legal assistance.
232. Mr [NAME] informed Mr [APPELLANT] that he should ask Mr [APPELLANT] to look into the claimant’s complaint (paragraph 9 of Mr [APPELLANT] witness statement).
233. On 05 January 2022 at 17.08, Mr [NAME] wrote to Mr [APPELLANT], explaining that he had not yet responded to the claimant about legal assistance, and asked whether it was possible for the [RESPONDENT] to provide such assistance (see p.105).
234. Mr [NAME] responded to Mr [NAME] on 05 January at 17.42 (pp.104- 105). He replied to say ‘no’ to providing legal assistance, and that [NAME] was considering the matter before he went off, that his complaint was being considered and that a response would be sent in due course.
235. Mr [NAME] asks Mr [NAME] on 06 January 2022 at 10.07 what reason he should give re no legal assistance being provided (p.104). To which Mr [NAME] replies at 10.12 to explain that ‘The decision as previously communicated to him stands while we consider his complaint’ (p.104). This is reiterated again by Mr [NAME] at 14.02 (p.103).
236. Having received the replies he had from Mr [NAME], on 06 January 2022, at 17.42, Mr [APPELLANT] writes to the claimant and explains: ‘Thanks for the call yesterday, I can confirm that your complaint is being considered and a decision on your legal assistance remains the same as it was previously’ (p.108).
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
237. On 06 January 2022 at 18.02, the claimant emailed Mr [APPELLANT] (see p.107). The claimant explains that he did not understand what was meant by ‘the decision on legal assistance remains as previously’. He further explains that he has submitted evidence that [NAME] were in breach of their fiduciary duties and breached the retainer. Alleges that Mr [NAME] breached the [NAME], amongst other things. He then asks to be informed of who made the decision and on what evidence it was made.
238. The claimant emailed Mr [APPELLANT] again on 07 January 2022, at 16.34 (pp.109-110). He explained that when he called the [NAME] on 05 January 2022, he was told that his complaint had been referred to the [NAME] Legal Department. He then summarises his complaints.
239. On 07 January 2022 at 16.40, Mr [NAME], of [NAME] emails Ms [NAME], copying in Mr [NAME] (p.111). He explains that he has read through all of the papers and considered that he can determine the claimant’s complaint about Mr [APPELLANT] on the papers. However, to facilitate that he requested additional documents to be sent to him, and asked a series of questions to which Mr [APPELLANT] was to provide answers.
240. The claimant again emailed Mr [APPELLANT] (copying in Ms [APPELLANT]) on 13 January 2022 (p.113-114), at 08.24. He explains that he hopes that Mr [NAME] realises that it was an error to send his complaint and request for legal assistance to the [RESPONDENT]’s legal department as his complaint is against the [NAME] and the legal department.
241. On 13 January 2022 at 20.28, Mr [NAME] emailed Mr [NAME] in line with that suggested by Mr [NAME], asking him to look at the complaint made against Mr [APPELLANT] contained in the claimant’s email sent earlier that day (p.116). There was communication between Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] into this matter on 14 January 2022.
242. Ms [NAME] emailed Mr [NAME] on 14 January 2022 at 16.25 to explain that the [NAME] was aware of the complaint, and it was being dealt with. And that if the [NAME] received any further communication from the claimant they should let him know that his complaint is under consideration (p.289).
243. The claimant called the [NAME] again on 19 January 2022. He raises that he is seeking representation for a hearing on 25 January 2022 and 25 April 2022, and that he was being denied legal representation despite the issue of his non-compliance being found to be untrue and that he was waiting for somebody to call him back, but they hadn’t (see.125). This was forwarded to Ms [NAME] on 19 January 2022 at 15.23 (p.129).
244. Ms [NAME] replied to Mr [NAME] by email on 19 January 2022 at 15.59 (p.129) and explained that he should write back to the claimant and advise him that ‘…a decision was taken previously not to grant legal assistance and that that decision stands, but that his complaint is being looked at.’
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
245. On 21 January 2022, Mr [NAME] sent his report recording his findings in respect to the claimant’s complaints about Mr [APPELLANT] to Ms [APPELLANT] (pp.119-124 and detailed above).
246. On 24 January 2022 at 09.40, the claimant wrote to Ms [APPELLANT] (pp.130-132). This email continued to raise the matters previously raised by the claimant, namely: complaints against [NAME], complaints about the conduct of Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] and that he required legal assistance for his claims against his previous employer. The claimant, in the outcome section of his email, writes:
“As a result of suffering from physical violence and discrimination by my [NAME] employer the RMT I have been diagnosed with PTSD, depression, anxiety and acute stress reaction. I resigned my employment as the end of 2017 as a result of the treatment from [NAME] and the [NAME] Legal Department from 2018 onwards and having no [NAME] and representing myself, I have not been able to recover from my illness
Ms [NAME] to assist me to start to recover from my illness and relieve my anxiety, I would be grateful if you grant [NAME] to me as a member of the [RESPONDENT]: I have provided you with evidence attached that I was not in breach of the retainer.
I would be grateful for legal assistance for my Employment Tribunal claim against my [NAME] employer listed for a 25 day hearing starting on the 25th of April 2022, legal advice regarding [NAME]’s breach of fiduciary duties, their discriminatory conduct and their impact on my health, legal advice and representation regarding my civil claims being struck out”
247. The claimant’s email of 24 January 2022 was passed to Mr [APPELLANT] to consider. And Mr [APPELLANT] was tasked with responding to the claimant with respect to this email, on behalf of Ms [APPELLANT].
248. Mr [NAME] spoke to to Mr [NAME] concerning this matter, who was the subject of some of the complaints. Mr [NAME] spoke to Mr [NAME] about this as he considered the content to be in regards legal complaints and therefore he considered that it needed to be addressed by the Legal Department. Mr [NAME] would have taken this approach with any complaint that was raised that contained matters that he viewed as being legal complaints.
249. Mr [NAME] advised Mr [NAME] that Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] had commissioned an investigation into Mr [APPELLANT] conduct as a result of the issues raised by the claimant, and that he should speak to Ms [APPELLANT] about this (para 5 of Mr [NAME] Witness Statement).
250. Mr [NAME] understood that complaints concerning solicitors should be addressed through the solicitors’ own complaints process (para 7 of Mr [NAME] witness statement). And therefore, this was not a matter he could take any further.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
251. Mr [NAME] was advised by Ms [NAME] that an external lawyer (Mr [NAME]) had considered the complaints made against Mr [NAME] and had reached an outcome. Mr [NAME] was provided a copy of the report, and understood that the outcome was that Mr [NAME] was considered not to have breached the [NAME].
252. In respect of legal assistance, Mr [NAME] understood that a decision on whether to provide the claimant with legal assistance had been made by those in the [RESPONDENT]’s Legal Department and that that was a decision properly made by those involved.
253. On 27 January 2022, the claimant received a phone call from Mr [APPELLANT]. This was to inform him that he was not being granted legal assistance. The claimant asked on several occasions during this phone call what the reasoning behind him not being provided legal assistance and who had made the decision (Mr [APPELLANT] accepted the content of the claimant’s witness statement paragraph 167 in terms of what the claimant asked him during the phone call). Mr [APPELLANT] did not provide the claimant with this information. The reason why Mr [APPELLANT] did not provide this information is because he did not want to say anything inappropriate, he thought that the claimant already knew who had made the decision and he only wanted to give the claimant the information that he had been advised to give by Ms [NAME] and Ms [NAME].
254. For the avoidance of any doubt, Mr [APPELLANT] was not making any decision to refuse the claimant legal assistance. He did not have that authority. Rather, he was simply reiterating a decision that had already been made by Mr [NAME].
Detriment 14 (and in part relates to Detriment 6)
255. On 28 January 2022, Mr [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant at 15.56 (p.133). He explained the following:
Thank you for your recent communications.
I understand that in Mr [NAME] absence the matter of your allegations concerning the professional conduct of Mr [NAME] were investigated by an independent party and not upheld.
The previous decision on legal assistance stands.
Mr [COUNSEL] will remain the solicitor instructed in your [NAME] against the [RESPONDENT] and correspondence should re-commence with him in respect of the same.
I believe that matters have now concluded and correspondence in this matter is at an end. I wish you every success in your legal action against your employer.
256. For the avoidance of any doubt, Mr [APPELLANT] was not making a decision to refuse the claimant legal assistance. He did not have this authority. Mr [NAME] was simply reiterating that the decision that had been
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
made by Mr [NAME] still stood.
257. Mr [NAME] sent an email to Mr [NAME] on 28 January 2022 at 15.58 to inform him of the email that had been sent to the claimant and that his complaint had now been closed (p.134) and that he was to inform the [NAME] of this.
258. The claimant responded to Mr [APPELLANT] on 28 January 2022, at 17.05 (p.135), with the following:
Please inform me who investigated my allegations and why I received no communication from them?
Please may I have the findings against Mr [NAME] and Mr [RESPONDENT]. I have received no documentation from the [RESPONDENT] regarding my complaint.
Do I have a right of appeal?
I have not been interviewed about my complaint against Mr [NAME] or Mr [NAME]
I have raised serious allegations that Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] are in breach of the [NAME] and knowingly made made misleading statement in legal proceedings, please inform me how this was investigated and provide the outcome.
Can you please inform me about my complaint against [NAME] and [NAME]?
I have provided documentary evidence to [NAME] the [RESPONDENT] they were in breach of the retainer and the [NAME].
This evidence, which Mr [NAME[NAME] has had since 2019 at the latest shows I was not in breach of the retainer and as a lawyer has knowingly made misleading statements stating I was and I should not be denied [NAME].
Can you please inform me why [NAME] has not been restored when I have provided the [RESPONDENT] with evidence I was not in breach of the retainer with [NAME]?
This service is causing a disabled member anxiety, it is effecting my health please respond as soon as possible.
259. Mr [APPELLANT] did not respond to this email from the claimant. He considered it unnecessary. The reason for not replying was that Mr [NAME] considered that the email simply repeated the same points that the claimant had already raised, the matter was closed, and he did not wish to protract the correspondence (para 10 and 11 of Mr [APPELLANT] witness statement).
260. The claimant emailed Ms [APPELLANT], copying in Mr [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT], on 28 January 2022, at 18.49 (see p.136). He explains that he has
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
received Mr [NAME] response, but that his complaint has not been addressed, before explaining why he considers that to be the [NAME]. [NAME] did not reply to this email as it was not addressed to him, and he was merely copied into it so he did not consider it necessary for him to respond.
261. On 14 March 2022, Ms [NAME] (Ms [NAME] secretary) emailed Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME], copying in Mr [NAME] (p.160). Ms [NAME] explained that Ms [NAME] proposed that Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] meet with the claimant. And asked Mr [APPELLANT] whether he could assist by producing a brief precis of the claimant’s complaints. On 14 March 2022 at 16.09, Mr [APPELLANT] agreed to provide a brief background but explained that he did not have the paperwork of the claimant’s most recent complaints (p.161).
262. Mr [APPELLANT] sent to Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME], copying in Ms [APPELLANT], on 16 March 2022, a neutral brief precis of the claimant’s complaints (pp.165-166).
263. Mr [APPELLANT] emailed the claimant on 24 March 2022 (p.170) (Ms [APPELLANT] saw the draft on 24 March 2020 and confirmed she was happy with it (p.169)). He explained that he had been requested by the [NAME] to arrange a meeting with him with regard his ongoing complaints. He requested the claimant to provide dates of availability. And asked the claimant to provide a brief summary of his complaints.
264. This meeting was not set up with the purpose of commencing an investigation. Rather, it was to identify where the claimant’s complaints were up to. This would then inform Mr [NAME] as to whether an investigation into an issue/issues was needed. The claimant appeared to be focusing his cross-examination questions of Ms [NAME] on him not being informed in advance of this meeting that it would be used to inform Mr [APPELLANT] whether any further investigation into the claimant’s complaints were necessary. However, the claimant not being informed in advance does not alter the fact that that was what the meeting was set up for, and it was what it was used for. It is unclear what the claimant thought the meeting was for, if he did not consider it was to assess what further action was needed to be done, given it was discussing the claimant’s complaints and where they were up to.
265. On 04 May 2022, following several emails, Mr [APPELLANT] invited the claimant to a meeting on 08 June 2022 (p.175). He again reiterated that it would be appreciated if the claimant could provide him with a summary of the issues he had been raising.
266. On 06 June 2022, the claimant sent Mr [APPELLANT] a summary of his complaints (p.181). This document is at pp.183-192. This included allegations that there was a conflict situation created (paragraph 10 on p.184), that the Legal Department has made misleading statements in falsely asserting that he was in breach of the retainer with [NAME] (paragraph 12 at p.184), [COUNSEL] and [NAME] had acted in breach of the [NAME] and that their actions include fraud (paragraph 5.13, p.188) and that the Legal Department perpetuated this fraud (paragraph 5.14 at p.189), amongst other matters.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
267. Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] met with the claimant on 08 June 2022. At this meeting Mr [APPELLANT] told the claimant that the meeting was to consider the claimant’s complaints and then a decision would be made as to whether any of the issues required further investigation. In this meeting Mr [APPELLANT] also explained to the claimant that any allegations relating to [APPELLANT] and [NAME], including those of fraudulent activity would not be investigated, as it was not an issue that the first respondent would deal with. On this matter, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of Ms [NAME]. Mr [NAME] was not present to give evidence. However, Ms [NAME] explained that although she does not recall now whether it was said to the claimant that the allegations against [APPELLANT] and [NAME] were not an issue the first respondent would deal with, she explained that it must have been said given it was contained in the outcome letter sent to the claimant 12 July 2020. With this being a letter that was reviewed by [NAME] at the time and she had agreed to its content before it was sent. And further, this has been the consistent message given to the claimant in response to this complaint when it has been raised on several previous occasions. In contrast, the claimant was not considered reliable in his recollection of meetings, and rather his memory appeared to distort his recollection of what had been stated by individuals and what was recorded in emails on numerous occasions during this hearing. The claimant does say that his evidence is supported by the email he sent to Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] a few days after the meeting, insofar as his email would have referenced such an expression had it been said. However, the Tribunal places less weight on this email than the claimant does. As the email reads as a further attempt to convince Mr [NAME] that there is something to investigate and rather focusses on the impact of the fraud on him being given access to legal assistance (rather than on an investigation into the actions of [NAME] and [NAME] Solicitors themselves). On balance, the Tribunal, by a narrow margin preferred the evidence contained in the outcome letter sent to the claimant on 12 July 2022 (pp.213-214), and finds that the claimant was told in the meeting on 08 June 2022 that allegations relating to [NAME] and [NAME] Solicitors, including those of fraudulent activity would not be investigated, as it was not an issue that the first respondent would deal with.
268. On 13 June 2022 at 09.24, the claimant sent an email to Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT], copying in the [NAME] and the first respondent’s [NAME] complaints email address (pp.194-195). In that email, the claimant explained the following:
a. He was surprised that the meeting was used to ascertain whether any of his complaints needed to be investigated. b. That his allegations were serious and included allegations of fraud by [NAME] and [NAME] Solicitors. c. That he was denied [COMPANY] because of this fraud. d. That there was a conflict situation between the Legal Department and the [NAME]. e. The Legal Department failed to protect the claimant’s interests. f. Mr [APPELLANT] and Mr [APPELLANT] actions were unlawful. They failed to protect the claimant’s interests and perpetuated a crime. g. He has documentary evidence that [NAME] and [NAME] committed a fraud. h. That he hopes that Mr [NAME] reconsiders his statement that he will
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
not be granted legal assistance. i. He asked Mr [NAME] to approach Ms [NAME] and ask her to provide legal assistance.
269. Throughout Ms [APPELLANT] interactions with the claimant, the Tribunal accepts that he motivation was to simply assist both the first respondent and the claimant in ensuring that the claimant’s issues were addressed by a senior manager.
Detriments 15-17
270. Mr [NAME] was appointed as acting Director of [COMPANY] for the first respondent in April 2022. And he was appointed on a permanent basis in July 2023. In short, Mr [RESPONDENT] on appointment became the first respondent’s most senior lawyer, and had responsibility for its [COMPANY], amongst other things.
271. The claimant forwarded the email that he had sent to Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [RESPONDENT] (pp.194-195) directly to Ms [RESPONDENT], the [NAME], on 13 June 2022 at 09.37 (p.197). Ms [NAME], on that same day, at 10.33, forwarded the matter to Mr [NAME], telling him to ‘discuss and deal’. Mr [NAME] likely spoke to Ms [NAME] or her secretary to explain that he would deal with it, before sending an email at 10.44 to explain that he would tell the claimant he had been asked to investigate the matter (p.197).
272. On 13 June 2022 at 11.01, Mr [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant (pp.198- 199) to introduce himself as the acting Legal Director for the [RESPONDENT], and that he had been asked by Ms [APPELLANT] to address the complaint the claimant sent to her office on 13 June 2022. Mr [APPELLANT] explained that he will investigate the claimant’s complaint and revert back to him with a summary of the issues and confirmation as to whether he needs any further information. Mr [APPELLANT] informed the claimant that he expected to have a formal response to the claimant’s complaints within the following 28 days.
273. Mr [NAME] approach whenever he is asked to look into something, including from the [NAME], is to investigate what had happened to date before then considering what process or procedure needed to be followed. Mr [NAME] used the term ‘investigate’ to refer to looking into the complaint to get an understanding of what has happened to date, before deciding what to do about it. This is because [NAME] would on occasion be sent a complaint and that complaint had already been addressed by somebody else within the first respondent. Mr [RESPONDENT] explained that it was not uncommon for members to contact the [NAME] to try and ‘have [NAME] go’. The Tribunal accepted Mr [NAME] explanation with regards to the use of this term and rejects the claimant’s interpretation that the use of the word investigate meant that Mr [NAME] would undertake a formal investigation into his specific complaints.
274. Given the claimant’s reference to a meeting he had recently had with Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME], Mr [NAME] emailed Mr [NAME], copying in Ms [NAME], on 13 June at 11.09 (see p.200). Mr [NAME] informed Mr [NAME] that he was investigating a complaint made by Mr [APPELLANT]. He suggested that
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
it would be useful for them to meet to discuss the matter given the seriousness of the allegations. Mr [APPELLANT] also referenced a meeting that the claimant attended with Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] and asks for copies of relevant documents and communications to be sent to him. Mr [APPELLANT] explained that he was concerned that the claimant had raised a serious complaint and wanted to get to the bottom of it as speedily as possible. Mr [NAME] explained that he was on holiday for the remainder of the working week but would be available to meet the following week.
275. Following this email, Mr [NAME] was sent documents from Mr [NAME]. This included the Slater Judgment, the various letters of complaints sent by the claimant and the claimant’s summary of complaints that he had sent before his meeting with [NAME] and [NAME] (pp.183-192).
276. The claimant replied to Mr [APPELLANT] on 13 June 2022 at 11.25 (p.198). He explained that he thought that Mr [NAME] was dealing with the complaint and that he had recently met with Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] about it. He explained that he would be willing to meet Mr [APPELLANT] to assist with his investigation. The claimant then sought Mr [APPELLANT] to provide him with legal assistance for an upcoming [NAME] management conference. Mr [NAME] responded that same day at 11.31 and explained that he would come back to the claimant as to the best way forward, once he had received the relevant background information (p.198).
277. The claimant emailed Ms [APPELLANT] on 29 June 2022 at 10.23. He asked whether he would be interviewed as part of his complaint and whether he required any documentation to be sent to him. This email was forwarded to Mr [APPELLANT] by Ms [APPELLANT] (see p.201). The claimant sent a further email to Mr [APPELLANT] on 29 June at 11.06.
278. Ms [NAME] sent Mr [NAME] a copy of Mr [NAME] report on 13 June 2022 at 12.54. Mr [NAME] was told that the report had not been shared with the claimant.
279. By the time Mr [APPELLANT] met with Mr [APPELLANT] he had a better understanding of the history of the claimant’s complaints. Mr [APPELLANT] view was that the claimant had raised the same matters several times, and that all of the matters that the claimant had raised had all been dealt with: he was aware of the Slater Judgment and its findings, he knew that Mr [NAME] had made a decision on and why legal assistance had been refused, he knew that Mr [NAME] had reviewed that decision and agreed with that reached by Mr [NAME], he was aware that Mr [NAME] conduct had been reviewed externally by Mr [APPELLANT], and he was aware that the claimant had raised the same complaints on several occasions to different senior people of the first respondent, and they had all looked into the issues raised.
280. On or around 16 June 2022, Mr [APPELLANT] met with Mr [APPELLANT] and discussed the claimant’s complaints (see Mr [APPELLANT] email of 23 June 2022, where he references having met with Mr [NAME] the previous week). During this meeting, Mr [NAME] explained to Mr [APPELLANT] that Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] had met with the claimant in early June, were dealing with the complaints, and were due to agree a way forward.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
281. On 23 June 2023 (p.461), Mr [NAME] provided Ms [NAME] with an update. And suggested that he should deal with Mr [APPELLANT] to agree on a single reply to the claimant with a view to bringing it to an end (Mr [APPELLANT] uses the phrase ‘to knock it on the head), as the claimant’s complaints had already involved numerous people. Mr [NAME] did not go back to the [NAME] on this matter.
282. On 05 July 2022 at 10.54, Ms [NAME] on behalf of Mr [NAME] sent an email to Mr [NAME] (p.204). This had a draft letter attached to it, which was created following Mr [NAME] meeting with Mr [APPELLANT]. The draft letter was in response to the claimant’s complaints. The letter was drafted on behalf of Ms [NAME]. Mr [NAME] was invited to consider the letter and provide any views he wished to raise in response to it. The email concludes by explaining that:
“No doubt you will want to consider this and send me back your views or edits etc. and then we should consult with [NAME] and [NAME] before approaching Gail to send correspondence to Mr [APPELLANT] in the hope that he will recognise the futility of his ongoing actions against [NAME].”
283. The reference to ongoing actions in this email clearly relates to the claimant’s ongoing legal issues, which formed the basis of this [NAME]. It is unclear on what basis the claimant is trying to suggest a different interpretation to this phrase. As the response being drafted was addressing a number of the complaints raised in this [NAME], and so clearly is relates to those.
284. Mr [NAME] sent Ms [NAME] a revised draft letter on 06 July 2022 at 14.34 (p.205). Ms [NAME] and Mr [NAME] were copied into this email and invited to consider the draft to ensure that there were no errors of fact. Ms [NAME] made some amendments to the letter, and returned this to Mr [NAME] on 11 July 2022, at 15.47 (p.206). Mr [NAME] provided no comment to the draft.
285. The letter was approved by Ms [NAME] on or around 12 July 2022 (pp.209-210).
286. The letter (pp.213-214) responding to the claimant’s complaints was sent to the claimant on 12 July 2022, at 12.50 (p.212). This letter stated the following:
a. The meeting between the claimant, Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT] on 08 June 2022 was not an investigatory meeting, but was at the request of the [NAME] to have a discussion about the claimant’s ongoing complaints. b. In that meeting, it was made clear to the claimant that the [RESPONDENT] would not be reversing its decisions either regarding the claimant’s complaints or for legal assistance in his legal cases. c. That all matters had been dealt with correctly by the [RESPONDENT]’s legal department. d. Following the 08 June 2022 meeting, the claimant wrote to the [NAME] referencing a complaint. This was passed
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to Mr [NAME], acting Legal Director, who acknowledged receipt of that correspondence. e. At the meeting of 08 June 2022, the claimant was advised that the [RESPONDENT] did not act nor could not deal with the claimant’s allegations of fraud by [NAME], and that the [RESPONDENT] would therefore not take the matter further. f. At the meeting, the claimant was told that his ongoing [NAME] against the [RESPONDENT] could not be discussed. g. That the [RESPONDENT] was not prepared to provide the legal representation requested. And would no longer engage with the claimant on matters which relate to previous or potential legal claims or legal issues which the [RESPONDENT] consider have been dealt with and concluded. h. The [RESPONDENT] has no intention in engaging in correspondence of the claimant persists to advance claims that have no merit. i. The claimant should recognise that all matters he has raised have been dealt with. j. The [RESPONDENT] will provide no further comment on matters which have concluded, and none of the claimant’s complaints will be reopened. k. This letter is to be treated as concluding the claimant’s complaint , which was considered at the 08 June 2022 meeting and contained in the claimant’s email of 13 June 2022.
287. The claimant emailed a response to the letter on 12 July 2022 at 13.09 (p.211), stating that the letter was full of inaccuracies, and asking whether this meant that Mr [NAME] would not be investigating his complaints despite having previously stated that he would be.
288. Mr [APPELLANT] replied to the claimant by email on 12 July 2022 at 14.24 (p.215). This explained that a decision had been made, which was confirmed in the letter sent on 12 July 2022, and that there would be no further investigation. Mr [APPELLANT] informed the claimant that he would be making no further comment on these matters.
289. The claimant sent a further email to Mr [APPELLANT], copying in Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT], on 12 July 2022 at 15.09 (p.216). The claimant highlighted where he said there were inaccuracies in the letter, that his allegations had never been investigated and that he would be contacting the [NAME] directly.
290. Mr [NAME] replied on 13 July 2022 at 09.20 (p.217), to again confirm that Ms [NAME] letter was clear and he would not be commenting further.
291. The claimant sent an email to Ms [APPELLANT], copying in Mr [APPELLANT], Ms [NAME] and Ms [NAME], on 25 July 2022 at 13.55 (p.218). This contained a number of different attachments and copies of emails (pp.219-280). In short, the claimant was asking Ms [APPELLANT] to investigate his complaints to date.
292. Following email discussion with Ms [NAME] and Mr [APPELLANT] (see pp.281-283), Mr [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant on 01 August 2022, at 14.12 to inform him the following:
“You wrote on 25 July 2022 to the [NAME] [NAME] Ms [NAME]
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[NAME], providing four emails with various attachments, copied to me and others.
As you acknowledge, on 12 July 2022 you received a letter by email from Ms [RESPONDENT], and it was confirmed that the [RESPONDENT] would no longer engage with you on any matters, as the [RESPONDENT] considers your complaint and any associated issues to be concluded. As Ms [NAME] confirmed, none of your complaints will be reopened, and this includes the complaint contained in your email dated 13 June 2022.”
CONCLUSIONS
Has the claimant acted in bad faith?
293. The Tribunal must take into account the fact that the claimant is a qualified solicitor, with many years of experience. And he understands the significance of his words used in his correspondence, particularly where he raises that a solicitor has failed in their duty to their client, has committed a serious breach of duties as a solicitor, allegations of using misleading phrases, allegations of misleading the Tribunal in witness evidence, being in breach of the [NAME].
294. The Tribunal also considered the claimant’s mental health issues. And given there is no evidence to the contrary, the claimant is presumed to have capacity throughout the relevant period.
295. The Tribunal agrees with Mr [RESPONDENT] that the claimant was not acting in bad faith before 03 October 2020. The question therefore for the Tribunal was whether the claimant was acting in bad faith from, and including, his emails of 22 January 2021, that being the next protected act relied on.
296. There are two relevant correspondences considered by the claimant: [redacted] the emails on 22 January 2021.
297. In the letter of 03 October 2020 (pp.29-32), the claimant starts to raise several allegations (albeit through his sister), none of which an experienced solicitor with capacity could have considered to be true or had a belief in. It is in this letter that the claimant starts to develop a theory that [NAME] have wronged him, a theory that is misconceived. And this must be one that the claimant knew to be misconceived. And this is then developed in subsequent correspondence.
298. The claimant’s allegations are then developed in his letter dated 22 January 2021 (pp.37-46), where his allegations seem to have developed into something more serious, including allegations of serious breaches of the [NAME]. And it is in this correspondence where the claimant starts to develop serious professional allegations against Mr [NAME]. This includes that Mr [NAME] failed to protect his interests in light of an advice that was wrong, that his actions could be unlawful and that Mr [NAME] was aware that [NAME] had breached their
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fiduciary duties and yet insisted on following their advice. The allegations continued to develop, with the allegations against Mr [APPELLANT] becoming more significant in the claimant’s email of 08 February 2021. However, it is in this email (pp.58-60) that the claimant starts to make serious allegations, particularly aimed at Mr [NAME], including that Mr [NAME] had accused him of breaching his retainer, had misled the Employment Tribunal in evidence, was negligent in his approach and that he committed a serious breach of his duties as a solicitor. The allegations against Mr [COUNSEL] continued to get worse throughout 2021, with particularly serious allegations made against him in his email of 05 November 2021 (pp.85-86).
299. The Tribunal does not consider that the claimant has been acting honestly in the allegations that he has raised since 03 October 2020. The Tribunal has already made findings on these matters and found them to be untrue and misconceived. The claimant’s motivation throughout has been to raise such complaints with a view to persuading somebody to overturn Mr [NAME] decision to refuse him legal assistance. And this is a relevant factor. The Tribunal does not consider that the claimant was being honest in raising the matters he did on 03 October 2020, or in subsequent correspondence. As an experienced solicitor the Tribunal does not accept that he had an honest belief in the matters he was raising.
300. The Tribunal also found the allegations raised against Mr [NAME] in both the emails on 22 January 2021, 08 February 2021 and 05 November 2021 to all be untrue and misconceived. The Tribunal makes the same point as above. His allegations in this email, and the claimant’s motivation, was clearly to persuade somebody to overturn Mr [NAME] decision to refuse him legal assistance. And this is a relevant factor. The Tribunal does not consider that the claimant was being honest in raising the matters he did on 22 January, 08 February or 05 November 2021, or in subsequent correspondence (which sees the allegations being developed and becoming increasingly more significant). As an experienced solicitor the Tribunal does not accept that he had an honest belief in the matters he was raising.
301. What is particularly telling in these correspondences from 22 January 2021, the claimant has developed an argument that Mr [APPELLANT] was refusing the claimant legal assistance on the grounds that he breached the retainer with [NAME]. However, the claimant knew this to be untrue. The claimant knows that Mr [APPELLANT] has never stated this, and it is clear throughout the Slater Judgment and the relevant correspondence that Mr [APPELLANT] has consistently maintained that the claimant had terminated the retainer. The claimant accepted under cross examination that Mr [APPELLANT] had never stated that he had breached the retainer. This is a central feature of the claimant’s complaints. And it is one that is untrue, and one that the claimant was not being honest with when he raised it.
302. And therefore, the Tribunal concludes that the correspondence relied on as a protected act from, and including that on, 22 January 2021 are not protected acts as the allegations were made in bad faith.
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303. And this also affects the unjustifiably discipline allegations too. Any act relied on as allegations of being unjustifiably disciplined from 22 January 2021 fail as the claimant has made assertions from this date in bad faith.
304. In the alternative, the Tribunal finds that the claimant was certainly acting in bad faith by 08 February 2021, or at the very latest 05 November 2021.
305. The Tribunal has made findings and reached conclusions on each of the allegations in the alternative below. This covers fully the allegations that would have failed on this basis of the above, to explain what the Tribunal’s decision would have been had it not made the finding that the claimant had acted in bad faith from 22 January 2021.
Detriment 1
306. In short, if the decision to refuse the claimant legal assistance in this [NAME] is for the same reasons that were found in the Slater Judgment, then this [NAME] must follow that decision (as it has already been considered and determine) and the claimant’s allegations must fail.
307. The claimant relies on several matters to try to distinguish this [NAME] from that that was determined by the Slater Tribunal. And these are succinctly set out by Mr [RESPONDENT] at paragraph 18 of his written submissions. These have been adopted as they are a neutral representation of what the claimant relies on:
a. The solicitors ([NAME]) and the [NAME] (Mr [COUNSEL]) breached their duties to the Claimant: [redacted] claims could be brought and remedies obtained in the Tribunal and court; advising that the Tribunal claim should proceed first. ii. Discrimination of the Claimant by Mr [APPELLANT] of [NAME] with respect to the use of the term ‘paranoid’. iii. Failing to undertake a review of the [NAME] advices to ensure that all the files were considered, when this was recommended by the Compliance Department. iv. Dishonestly saving money by failing to undertake a review and recouping the money spent on issuing the proceedings.
b. The solicitors in conjunction with Mr [NAME] of [NAME] acted improperly by: i. changing a draft letter dated 2 August, and, ii. based on the [NAME]’s allegedly negligent advice, offering to fund the Claimant’s cases on the basis that he pursued the claim in the Tribunal and stayed the court proceedings i.e. removing the choice of venue;
c. Mr [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] the [RESPONDENT], with knowledge of the above, refused to fund the Claimant when its knowledge of the above should have caused them to provide funding in the circumstances, importing a
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duty to ‘make amends’.
d. Mr [NAME] has deliberately in breach of legal duty withheld documentation.
e. Mr [NAME] misled the Slater Tribunal.
308. Looking at each of these in turn.
309. With respect to (a)(i), the Tribunal does not understand the basis on which the claimant suggests that Mr [APPELLANT] advice was negligent. Arguably, Mr [NAME] and [NAME] could have been more precise than it was. It does not express what the claimant says it does to make it negligent. It does not express that damages for assault formed part of the claimant’s employment [NAME]. Rather, it expresses the position on remedy ambiguously, with specific reference made to the claims arising from the same or similar facts and to remedy for psychiatric injury being a matter of overlap. However, even if the claimant was right, and the note and advice was advising, in error, that remedy for the assault was also a live issue in the employment claim, Mr [NAME] [NAME] advice of 02 August 2018 makes it clear that the assault does not feature in the employment claim. In short, he cures any error in the [NAME], should one have been present. And despite this now being explicit in the [NAME] advice, Mr [APPELLANT] still concludes that the claimant should lead with the employment claims, which is something that several other experienced personal injury lawyers agreed with.
310. The claimant’s submission that any adverse findings in the Employment Tribunal may affect his claims in the County Court is correct. However, the vice versa is also true, in that any adverse findings in the County Court (had that been led with) may also have affected his Employment Tribunal claims. That is always going to be the [NAME] where the same or similar facts gives rise to claims in two or more distinct jurisdictions. It is not surprising to the Tribunal that the claimant was advised to lead with his Employment Tribunal claim, given the more relaxed evidential rules in the Employment Tribunal rules, and the lessened risk of costs where a claim is unsuccessful (including other reasons).
311. Given the above, the claimant’s suggestion that Mr [APPELLANT] advice was negligent is misconceived.
312. With respect to (a)(ii), as found above, Mr [APPELLANT] was removed from representing the claimant and Mr [APPELLANT] was willing to consider moving the claimant to a different set of [NAME]. This was a reasonable approach in the circumstances by the first respondent. The claimant’s allegation that this was such as to be a breach of duty by [NAME], where it had been remedied by Mr [NAME], is again misconceived.
313. With respect to (a)(iii), the claimant’s argument relates to Ms [APPELLANT] from [NAME]’s client care team/compliance department looking to defend complaints that were being raised by the claimant. Ms [APPELLANT] is not a lawyer. She had no involvement in how [NAME] should run the claimant’s [NAME], nor does she give legal advice.
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This is no more than the compliance department suggesting to a legal team what they could do to ensure the [NAME] has strong responses to any inevitable complaint made by the claimant to the [NAME]. The claimant’s argument that failing to review Mr [APPELLANT] advice or get a further legal advice was in some way [NAME] breaching their duties to him is misconceived.
314. The [NAME] part of (a)(iii) and (a)(iv) relates to a failing to review Mr [NAME] advice as it had been prepared without having considered all of the claimant’s documents that were in 6 lever-arch files. The claimant’s argument is that by Mr [APPELLANT] not looking at these files, his advice was flawed, and therefore not undertaking a review of his advice or getting a further advice in those circumstances was a breach of a duty owed to him by [NAME] and [NAME]. However, Mr [NAME] was tasked with advising on the merits of the personal injury claim, considering any overlap between the claims and how the claim could be managed. The files the claimant is referring to are those that were part of the Employment Tribunal claims. These files had been reviewed by and formed part of the advice given by Mr [NAME]. His advice contained a summary of the legal paperwork. Mr [NAME] considered Mr [NAME] advice when producing his advice. There was no need to commission any further review to take account of these files. This was not done to save money, but rather it was not done as it was considered unnecessary by the [NAME] in the circumstances. The claimant suggesting that not undertaking a further review of Mr [NAME] advice is a breach of a duty owed to him by [NAME] is misconceived.
315. Turning to (b)(i). The amendment to the draft letter the claimant is referring to is when Mr [APPELLANT] required the inclusion of ‘…if Mr [APPELLANT] wishes to proceed with his claims, then he must also follow Counsel's advice to issue and stay the PI claim and proceed with the Employment claim at this stage’ into the letter of 02 August 2018. This is merely Mr [NAME] asking for an amendment to ensure that the letter being sent to the claimant was consistent with the first respondent’s policy. The first respondent requiring that this letter was consistent with its policy on providing legal assistance, and Ms [NAME] updating the letter accordingly, is not Mr [NAME] and Ms [APPELLANT] acting improper. Such a suggestion by the claimant is again misconceived. The claimant does also raise that Ms [COUNSEL] amended the date on counsel’s advice. It is unclear to the Tribunal how he says this is acting improper, given there were no changes made to the substance of the advice. And if the claimant does rely on this as some improper act by Ms [APPELLANT], the Tribunal would also consider this to be misconceived.
316. With regards (b)(ii) this is taken no further given the conclusions above. Save for the following. The Tribunal considered it to be within the discretion of the first respondent to require the claimant to lead with the Employment Tribunal claims to continue to attract funding, given that this was the clear advice by the barristers advising the claimant. To suggest that this was the first respondent acting improperly is again misconceived.
317. Given the conclusions above, no more is said on (c), apart from that the Tribunal concludes that the claimant suggesting that Mr [APPELLANT] and the
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first respondent not giving the claimant legal assistance in the circumstances is in some way improper is also misconceived.
318. Turning to (d). The claimant suggests that Mr [APPELLANT] has acted in breach of a legal duty by withholding documentation from the Employment Tribunal. The Tribunal has made a clear finding of fact on this, and found that Mr [NAME] had not withheld documentation. Rather, the documents in question (pp.352-365) had not been identified by Mr [NAME] when undertaking a reasonable search for documents to meet the first respondent’s disclosure obligations for the claim before the Slater Tribunal. These were only discovered later. And furthermore, the claimant has made two unsuccessful applications for reconsideration of the Slater Judgment (as well as presenting an appeal to the EAT) based on these documents. Employment Judge Slater decided that those documents would have made no difference to the decision that was reached, and in fact expressed that they gave further support to the first respondent’s position. Given this, and the findings of this Tribunal, the claimant’s submission that Mr [APPELLANT] had deliberately withheld documents from the Slater Tribunal is rejected. Mr [NAME] had not acted improperly, and so any decision to refuse the claimant legal assistance was not with a view to ‘hide’ such failings.
319. Turning to (e). The claimant’s argument in respect of Mr [APPELLANT] misleading the Tribunal appears to be twofold: (i) that Mr [APPELLANT] falsely stated that the claimant had consistently failed to cooperate; and (ii) that Mr [APPELLANT] had falsely accused the claimant of breaching his retainer with [NAME].
320. With respect to Mr [APPELLANT] stating that the claimant had consistently failed to cooperate. The Tribunal finds that to be the [NAME], and that it was certainly the view of Mr [APPELLANT] at the time based on the actions of the claimant. And this is referenced at various places throughout the Slater Tribunal (this Tribunal has set out some of the examples above). It is the [NAME] that on occasion, where the position presented is favourable to the claimant, he would accept the position as presented. However, whenever the position was not favourable to the claimant then the first respondent found him not to be co-operative. And the claimant is missing the point that the ultimate act of not co-operating was when the claimant, in disagreeing with the outcome of the [NAME] internal procedure, terminated his retainer with the [NAME] without informing the first respondent. The Tribunal does not consider such statements by Mr [NAME] to be misleading as they are supported by the findings in the Slater Judgment.
321. With respect to Mr [APPELLANT] falsely accusing the claimant of breaching his retainer with [NAME], the claimant, despite presenting his [NAME] on this basis, accepted under cross-examination that Mr [NAME] at no point had said or expressed in an email that the claimant was in breach of the retainer. Rather, Mr [APPELLANT] had consistently referred to the claimant having terminated the retainer without first consulting the first respondent. And the claimant accepted this. Mr [APPELLANT] has not misled the Tribunal in the way alleged. This allegation is misconceived.
322. Given the above, the Tribunal concludes that the matters relied on by the claimant to try to distinguish the decision reached by Mr [APPELLANT] on
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11 May 2020 and 04 June 2020, and Mr [NAME] decision of 08 February 2021 from that present in the Slater Tribunal simply do not exist in this [NAME]. And the reasons presented by Mr [NAME] in his email of 11 May 2020 are the reasons why the claimant’s request for legal assistance was refused on each occasion (Mr [NAME] simply confirmed his agreement with Mr [NAME] decision having considered the relevant documentation): that being for previously terminating the legal assistance he had been provided through funding by the first respondent, and for consistently failing to co-operate. This is simply a continuation of the decision that the first respondent had made previously, and which was considered and determined in the Slater Judgment. And given that this allegation failed in the Slater Judgment, it must also fail in these proceedings. Had the Tribunal had to consider this allegation further, insofar as it relates to the decision of 11 May 2020, it would have concluded that the claimant had not been subjected to a legal detriment. Although the Tribunal accepts that the claimant had been disadvantaged, in that he was not receiving legal assistance funding, it would not have been reasonable in the circumstances for him to perceive this as a detriment, given that it was a valid decision reached by the first respondent. And further, it would have been concluded that the reason for the decision was because of the claimant’s previous termination of his retainer with [NAME] and because of his consistent failure to co-operate on the occasion when he was provided with funding.
323. Turning to the allegation insofar as it applied to Mr [APPELLANT] email of 14 July 2020. The claimant knew that decisions relating to legal assistance rested with the Legal Department, and specifically with Mr [APPELLANT]. The claimant knew that Mr [APPELLANT] did not have the authority to overturn the decision of Mr [NAME], or to grant legal assistance. Mr [NAME] explaining that his request for Legal Assistance had already been determined by Mr [NAME], and that his decision was final cannot reasonably be viewed as a detriment by the claimant. Further, this email was sent because that was the position of the first respondent, from a procedural perspective. This part of the allegation therefore fails as the claimant had not been subjected to a detriment, nor does he satisfy the requisite causation aspect of his legal claim, as Mr [APPELLANT] actions were not caused by the claimant having done a protected act, nor was it because of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
324. Turning to the failure of Mr [NAME] to respond to Mr [NAME] email of 08 June 2020, and failing to reply to the claimant’s letters of 03 October 2020 and 07 November 2020. Given the findings above, it would not be reasonable for the claimant to view Mr [APPELLANT] non-replies to be a detriment when they concerned matters that he would not reply to and not for him to reply to. In terms of causation, the reason why Mr [NAME] did not reply to these correspondences was because he did not get involved with individual complaints, unless required to do so by the [NAME] and Mr [NAME] was overwhelmed with emails and only read and dealt with correspondences that concerned key matters within his remit. Mr [NAME] focus at this time was on significant collective issues which had largely been caused by the impact of Covid.
325. The final issue under detriment 1 relates to Mr [NAME] failure to provide detailed reasons as to why he refused the claimant legal assistance
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on 08 February 2021. Mr [NAME] makes it clear in his email of 08 February 2021 that he agreed with the decision reached by Mr [APPELLANT]. The claimant already had the details of that decision, and therefore the claimant understood the reasoning that Mr [APPELLANT] was applying. In those circumstances, and where there is no obligation on Mr [NAME] to provide detailed reasoning, it would be unreasonable for the claimant to view this as detrimental treatment. Further, given the findings above, the Tribunal made the finding that the reason for this email and its contents was based on Mr [APPELLANT] having considered the claimant’s complaint in its entirety, alongside a bundle of evidence that was in his room, and finding himself in agreement with that already communicated to the claimant by Mr [APPELLANT].
326. Furthermore, regarding the question of causation. The first respondent still offered to provide legal assistance to the claimant in August 2018, and this was following the claimant having brought a claim against the first respondent. This is a factor that is an important factor for this detriment and the other detriments below, that further supports that the claimant was not subjected to a detriment for having brought claims against the first respondent. This is not repeated again.
327. Given the above, the Tribunal has concluded that none of the matters relied on in Detriment 1 reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if they were, they were all for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 2
328. Given the findings above, and particularly that the claimant’s emails of 03 June 2020 and 04 June 2020 were properly considered by Mr [NAME] as being a complaint about the decision not to provide him with legal assistance, the correct procedure for the complaint was the [COMPANY]. The Members Complaint Procedure was not the correct procedure given the final paragraph of the procedure on p.351.
329. Therefore, Mr [APPELLANT] treating the claimant’s complaint under the [COMPANY] rather than the Members Complaint Procedure cannot have been perceived as a detriment by the claimant, or if he did, it would have been unreasonable for him to do so.
330. And even if the Tribunal is wrong on that, and it had found that this procedural decision was a detriment, the Tribunal would have concluded that the reason Mr [NAME] invoked this procedure is because his understanding of the claimant’s email was that he was complaining about the decision of Mr [NAME] to refuse him legal assistance and he understood that the [COMPANY] was the correct procedure to be applied.
331. Given the above, the Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 2 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
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Detriment 3
332. Given the findings above, the claimant was not entitled to sickness benefit as this was an in-work benefit, and the claimant was out of work. And the claimant’s subscription rate was reduced in accordance with the requisite policy, from the date that he notified the first respondent of changed status. It would be unreasonable for the claimant to perceive this treatment as a detriment. And further, the treatment complained of was applied to the claimant in line with the first respondent’s policies. There was no discretion to depart from this policy.
333. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 3 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 4
334. This allegation relates to the claimant’s letter to the [NAME] on 22 January 2021. And relates to Mr [NAME] reply on 08 February 2021 and Ms [NAME] email of 09 February 2021.
335. The Tribunal findings are that this matter was passed on to Mr [NAME] to investigate. Mr [APPELLANT] investigated all of the matters raised by the claimant. Considered the necessary evidence and reached a conclusion based on this. Mr [APPELLANT] rightly considered the claimant’s letter as raising issues with a view to persuading the [NAME] to authorize him legal support (this is clear in the conclusion to the letter written by the claimant). Mr [APPELLANT] considered each of the allegations raised in the claimant’s letter in the round and concluded that he saw no reason to overturn Mr [APPELLANT] decision. The claimant’s grievance of 22 January 2022 was responded to by Mr [NAME]. And as per the conclusions above, there is no obligation on Mr [NAME] to give detailed reasons, and not doing so does not make this detrimental treatment. Mr [NAME] decision is valid, especially given the findings and conclusions of this Tribunal. It would be unreasonable to view this treatment of the claimant’s grievance as a detriment in the circumstances.
336. Mr [NAME] sent his decision on 08 February 2021, that being just over two weeks after the claimant sent his letter to the [NAME]. There is no evidence before this Tribunal to conclude that this period of time was in any way detrimental to the claimant. And a decision being sent to the claimant after a period of some 16 days could not reasonably be viewed as a detriment in any event, especially given the complaints raised by the claimant.
337. There is no evidence before this Tribunal that would satisfy the ‘something more’ that would link this treatment in any event to the protected act or a conduct that falls within s.65(2) of TULRCA.
338. The claimant disagreed with the email he received from Mr [APPELLANT],
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and sought to send this in a different direction on 08 February 2021. He sent this to Mr [NAME] email address, and then eventually it was picked up by Ms [APPELLANT].
339. Ms [APPELLANT] was simply stating to the claimant what the position was from the first respondent’s perspective, which was in line with its [COMPANY]. In short, the Legal Department had considered the claimant’s request and reached a decision, and this had been reviewed by Mr [NAME], who was Director of the Legal Department at the time. Ms [NAME] was not making any decisions but rather simply explaining to the claimant that he had exhausted the process. It would be unreasonable to view Ms [NAME] response as subjecting him to a detriment in those circumstances. And further, the reason behind the substance of the email was because under the [COMPANY] Mr [NAME] decision was final, there was no further right of appeal and the matter was closed.
340. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 4, insofar as Ms [NAME] email, does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
341. This allegation in its entirety must therefore fail and is dismissed.
Detriments 5-17
342. The Tribunal considers that there are [NAME] conclusions that apply to each of these detriments. These are set out here, before then providing further conclusions in respect of the detriment claims separately. These [NAME] conclusions must be read in conjunction with any specific conclusions below.
343. The claimant has raised the same complaints on several occasions, and this was after Mr [APPELLANT] had considered the claimant’s complaints in their entirety and gave him a decision, which was a final decision on these matters. The first respondent was under no obligation to consider the claimant’s complaints any further once Mr [APPELLANT] had reached a decision on these matters.
344. The claimant disagreed with Mr [APPELLANT] decision, and from there appears to try to seek other routes to have his complaint reconsidered, all with the ultimate goal of securing legal assistance. The refusing of legal assistance is the core of the complaints raised by the claimant throughout these subsequent correspondences. The claimant is trying to convince other senior officers to overturn Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] decisions with regard to the refusal to provide him [COMPANY] and appears to develop other complaints to try to achieve this end goal. The claimant presented his claim in Tribunal as if he was raising serious complaints and that his focus was on having them investigated to protect other members. However, it is clear on any reading of those documents and correspondences that the claimant was raising issues and complaints and then using them as a platform to invite the recipient to overturn these previous decisions on legal
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
assistance.
345. There is no obligation on the first respondent to continually investigate and respond to complaints raised by the claimant, especially when they are raising complaints which, from the first respondent’s perspective, have been looked at, considered and determined. The only obligation on the first respondent was to not act unlawfully in the approach that it has adopted.
346. The claimant’s complaints had been considered and determined by Mr [APPELLANT]. And the claimant’s complaint about denying him legal assistance had been considered and determined under the [COMPANY] process. Alongside other ad hoc processes, which involved several senior officers of the first respondent.
347. In circumstances where the first respondent, and Mr [RESPONDENT] (the [NAME] respondent), had already determined the claimant’s complaints, not taking action in subsequent correspondence in which the same issues were being raised cannot reasonably be perceived as a detriment by the claimant. This affects all of the allegations that are detriments 5-17 on the list of issues.
348. Given the above, none of the allegations contained within detriments 5-17 are found to be detriments in the decision of this Tribunal. And therefore, they must fail. There are additional conclusions on each of the specific allegations, including on the cause of the actions.
Detriment 5
349. The claimant’s email sent on 16 February 2021 was following Ms [APPELLANT] explaining to the claimant that his complaint had been addressed through the [COMPANY], there was no right of appeal against Mr [APPELLANT] decision and the complaint was now closed. The claimant’s [NAME] throughout these proceedings appears to be that as he has raised something, then somebody must investigate it, and this is irrespective of whether somebody else has already considered the matter and reached a conclusion on it. Given that Mr [APPELLANT] had already considered the claimant’s complaint, and given the claimant an outcome, it would be unreasonable for the claimant to consider him being subjected to detrimental treatment by other officers, including Mr [APPELLANT] and Ms [APPELLANT], when they did not reply to the claimant’s email of 16 February 2021, in which he was simply repeating allegations that had already been looked at.
350. Further, Ms [APPELLANT] had told the claimant that the matter was now closed, and the email was not sent to her, rather she was only carbon copied into it. Ms [APPELLANT] not replying further when the claimant raised the same issues again was more likely because from her perspective the matter had been dealt with already and it was contained in an email that was not addressed to her. And, so far as Mr [NAME] is concerned, this was not part of his role. And that was the reason why Mr [NAME] did not reply.
351. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
Detriment 5 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 6
352. This allegation relates to Mr [NAME] (06 and 27 January 2022) and Mr [NAME] (28 January 2022). Neither Mr [NAME] or Mr [NAME] had the authority to grant or refuse legal assistance. They have not made the decisions as alleged. And therefore, this allegation fails.
Detriment 7
353. Considering the findings of fact, Mr [APPELLANT] considered that the focus of the claimant’s contact with him was on getting legal assistance for his upcoming cases. Mr [NAME] understanding was that issues relating to legal assistance rested with the Legal Department. The claimant could not reasonably perceive Mr [APPELLANT] decision to refer the claimant’s complaint to the legal department in these circumstances to be detrimental treatment. This was the appropriate course of action given the substance and primary focus of the claimant’s complaint.
354. And further, the reason for this course of action was because Mr [APPELLANT] understood the primary focus of the claimant’s complaint was the refusal of legal assistance, and legal assistance was within the remit of the Legal Department.
355. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 7 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 8
356. The Tribunal has found that Mr [APPELLANT] did not inform the claimant that he would update him by 02 January 2022. And therefore, not doing so cannot reasonably be perceived by the claimant as subjecting him to a detriment. And that is also the reason why no update was provided.
357. This allegation is further weakened by the regular interaction that Mr [APPELLANT] had with the claimant over a short period of time. And when the claimant made contact with the [NAME] on 05 January 2022 seeking an update, Mr [APPELLANT] wrote to the claimant on 06 January 2022 to provide an update. Mr [APPELLANT] was clearly not seeking to subject the claimant to any form of disadvantage either for having made a protected act or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA. The claimant may not have liked the information that was being communicated to him by Mr [NAME], but that does not support his [NAME].
358. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 8 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 9
359. It is unclear on what basis the claimant says that Mr [APPELLANT] not informing him on 27 January 2022 why he had been refused legal assistance and the person who made the decision is subjecting him to a detriment. As this must be considered against the relevant circumstances:
a. the claimant knew that decisions on legal assistance were made by the Legal Department, and ultimately by Mr [NAME]. b. Mr [NAME] had already made a decision on his [NAME] and explained the reasons behind the refusal to give him legal assistance. c. The claimant had also had a decision sent to him by Mr [APPELLANT]. d. The claimant had received and read the Slater Judgment. e. The claimant was aware that the [NAME], including Mr [APPELLANT], had referred the claimant’s complaint to the Legal Department, due to the nature of his complaint.
360. Given all that the claimant knew, it is extraordinary that he suggested that he did not know who made the decision on refusing him legal assistance or the reasons for that refusal. As the first respondent has been consistent since the claimant made his application on 06 May 2020. The decision on legal assistance was made by Mr [NAME], and he was refused legal assistance on the grounds that he terminated his retainer with [NAME] previously, and he was considered to have consistently failed to co-operate with [NAME] when he had been provided with legal assistance. Mr [APPELLANT] not repeating information that the claimant already knew is not subjecting him to a detriment.
361. Furthermore, Mr [NAME] not providing this information was for the simple reason that he just wanted to present the information he was advised to give to the claimant and avoid saying anything inappropriate.
362. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 9 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 10
363. The [NAME] position identified above applies. And further, the Tribunal has made findings that support that there was nothing to investigate, as there was no wrongdoing by [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT] Solicitors in the way suggested by the claimant. It would be unreasonable in these circumstances for the claimant to perceive this as subjecting him to some form of legal detriment. The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to take this any further.
364. The reason for no further investigation into the allegations against
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
[NAME] was because the matters had already been looked at and concluded on by Mr [NAME]. And the proper recourse against [NAME] was to go through their internal processes (which the claimant did) and to pursue them (which the claimant did).
365. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 10 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 11
366. The [NAME] position identified above applies. And further, the Tribunal has made findings that support that there was nothing to investigate, as there was no wrongdoing by the first respondent’s Legal Department in the way suggested by the claimant. It would be unreasonable in these circumstances for the claimant to perceive this as subjecting him to some form of legal detriment. The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to take this any further.
367. The reason for no further investigation into the allegations against first respondent’s Legal Department was because the matters had already been looked at and concluded on by Mr [NAME].
368. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 11 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriment 12
369. The [NAME] position identified above applies. And further, the Tribunal has made findings that support that there was nothing to investigate, as there was no wrongdoing by Mr [APPELLANT] in the way suggested by the claimant.
370. Furthermore, in light of the serious allegations raised by the claimant about Mr [APPELLANT], the first respondent engaged with a senior external and independent solicitor, Mr [COUNSEL], to investigate the complaints raised by the claimant. This, in the view of the Tribunal, goes beyond and is on top of any considerations given by Mr [APPELLANT] into Mr [APPELLANT]. Mr [APPELLANT] found that the claimant’s complaints were not made out, and that Mr [APPELLANT] had not acted inappropriately in the way that the claimant was stating.
371. The claimant at the hearing was appearing to try to develop an argument that Mr [NAME] investigation was flawed as he had ‘constant contact’ with Mr [NAME]. The Tribunal rejects any such argument, as there is simply no evidence to support this. The height of Mr [NAME] involvement with Mr [NAME] was that he approached Mr [NAME] to see whether he was willing to undertake the investigation. He drafted the letter of instruction, which was checked by Ms [NAME] and on any reading is [NAME] in nature
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
and give Mr [NAME] substantial latitude to conduct the investigation in the way he considered best. And he responded to Mr [NAME] request for further information, without straying from the questions that were asked. In short, there is nothing in this line of attempted argument developed by the claimant that led the Tribunal to consider that Mr [APPELLANT] investigaiotn and report were flawed or tainted in some way.
372. It would be unreasonable in these circumstances for the claimant to perceive this as subjecting him to some form of legal detriment. First, Mr [APPELLANT] did investigate the matters raised by the claimant in their entirety (as already referred to on several occasions in this judgment). Furthermore, the first respondent engaged an external solicitor to undertake an independent investigation into the complaints raised by the claimant about Mr [APPELLANT]. The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to take this any further.
373. So far as the respondents were concerned, the claimant’s complaints about Mr [APPELLANT] had all been satisfactorily investigated and permitted conclusions were reached. And that is the reason that no further investigation was undertaken.
374. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegation contained in Detriment 12 does not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if it did, it was for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriments 13 and Detriment 14
375. Detriments 13 and 14 both arise from the same matter: Mr [APPELLANT] decision not to respond to the claimant’s email of 28 January 2022 at 17.05 (p.135). The analysis for both is the same and therefore they are dealt with together below.
376. Mr [APPELLANT] not responding to the claimant’s 28 January 2022 email, where he raises the same issues that had already been investigated and the first respondent had already concluded on cannot reasonably be viewed as a detriment by the claimant. And further, the claimant asking additional questions in this email about who was investigating, why the claimant was not interviewed, the failure to explain the evidence considered and the failure to allow a right of appeal, and not getting a response, in circumstances where Mr [APPELLANT] was explaining to the claimant that the matter was now closed cannot reasonably be perceived as a detriment by the claimant. Especially given that the claimant had no entitlement to any of that information or to be involved in that investigation, given that this was an internal investigation into Mr [RESPONDENT] by the first respondent. The Tribunal does not consider Mr [RESPONDENT] non-reply to this email to be a detriment.
377. And further, even if that was considered to be detrimental treatment, the Tribunal has made a positive finding that Mr [APPELLANT] did not reply to the claimant’s email because the claimant’s email simply raised the same points that had already addressed, and as he did not want to protract the correspondence.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
378. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegations contained in Detriments 13 and 14 do not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if they did, the reasons for Mr [NAME] action was unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
Detriments 15, 16 and17
379. Mr [APPELLANT] did not know the history of the claimant’s complaints when he was tasked with looking into the claimant’s complaints contained in his email of 13 June 2022. However, having appraised himself of the complaints and did some investigation into what had happened to date, Mr [NAME] reached the conclusion that:
a. A decision on legal assistance had been made some time previously by Mr [NAME]. b. Mr [NAME] affirmed the decision made by Mr [NAME]. c. That Mr [APPELLANT] conduct, which had become a focus in the claimant’s latter emails, had been investigated by an [NAME], who had found no wrongdoing on the part of Mr [NAME]. d. Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME] had not done anything inappropriate with regards to the legal advice and letter. e. That the decision to refuse the claimant legal assistance was because he had terminated his retainer with [NAME] and consistently failed to co-operate with [NAME]. Mr [NAME] agreed with Mr [APPELLANT] decision. f. Mr [APPELLANT] was aware that the claimant had raised he same complaints on multiple occasions, and several senior persons within the first respondent had addressed those concerns.
380. Given that Mr [NAME] did not see any wrongdoing from those accused by the claimant (including Mr [APPELLANT], Mr [APPELLANT] and those at [NAME]), and given that he agreed with the decision made by Mr [APPELLANT] to refuse the claimant legal assistance in the circumstances that he did, and given that the letter sent to the claimant on behalf of Ms [APPELLANT] simply reflected this position (following consultation and agreement between Mr [NAME], Mr [NAME] and Ms [APPELLANT]), it would not be reasonable for the claimant to consider the letter of 2 July 2022 refusing the claimant legal assistance as a detriment. Although he is disadvantaged by the decision, it is entirely justifiable in the circumstances. Simply asking the same question again, and getting an answer that has been explained to the claimant on multiple occasions is not detrimental treatment in the judgment of this Tribunal.
381. Further, given that Mr [NAME] and Ms [NAME], and then Mr [NAME] had investigated what had been done with respect to the complaints raised by the claimant, and legitimately concluded that they had all already been considered and concluded on, it would not be reasonable for the claimant to conclude that informing him that there would be no further investigation on 12 July 2022 (in the letter sent on behalf of Ms [NAME] and in Mr [NAME] email of 01 August 2022) is subjecting him to a detriment.
[NAME] No: 2402745/2021, 2402470/2022 and 2407114/2022
382. And even if the Tribunal is wrong, and these had been considered to be detriments, the decisions made in those communications were because Mr [APPELLANT], having investigated the progress of the claimant’s complaints considered that each had been properly looked at and determined.
383. The Tribunal has concluded that the allegations contained in Detriments 15, 16 and 17 do not reach the level of being a legal detriment. And, even if any of them did, they were for reasons unconnected to any of the protected acts present in this [NAME] or by reason of any conduct which falls under s.65(2)(c) of TULRCA.
CONCLUSION
384. Given the above, the Tribunal does not consider it necessary to make any decisions on whether the claimant acted with malice, or on time limit issues.
385. For all the reasons explained above, all allegations brought by the claimant fail and are dismissed.
Approved by:
Employment Judge M Butler
Date: 11 March 2026
JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON
21 April 2026
FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE
Public access to employment Tribunal decisions
Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-Tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a [NAME].
Recording and Transcription
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https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/
📊 How courts decide similar cases
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A snapshot of this collection — not a prediction of your case's outcome.
⚖️ What tends to weigh in cases like this
✅ Tends to be accepted
- The Tribunal concluded that the refusal to provide legal assistance was justified due to the claimant's previous conduct, including terminating his retainer and failing to cooperate.
- The Tribunal found that the claimant's complaints had been satisfactorily investigated and that there was no wrongdoing by the individuals accused by the claimant.
- The Tribunal determined that the allegations of detriments did not reach the level of being a legal detriment and were unconnected to any protected acts.
- The Tribunal accepted that the decision not to respond to the claimant's email was reasonable as the issues had already been addressed and the matter was considered closed.
❌ Tends to be rejected
- The claimant's argument that the investigation conducted by the external solicitor was flawed due to alleged 'constant contact' with a party was rejected by the Tribunal as there was no evidence to support this.
- The claimant's objection to the late acceptance of a witness statement was rejected, as the Tribunal found it helpful to have all evidence before it.
Patterns observed in similar cases in this collection — every case is unique.
❓ Frequently asked questions
What did this decision decide?
The Employment Tribunal dismissed all claims brought by the claimant against a trade union.
Who was involved?
A worker and their former employer's trade union were involved in the dispute.
How did the court decide, and why?
The tribunal found that the refusal to provide legal assistance was justified based on previous conduct of the claimant.
Which laws or rules were applied?
Equality Act 2010 s.27 and Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 were considered.
What was the argument that mattered most?
The tribunal concluded that the refusal to provide legal assistance was justified due to previous conduct of the claimant.
Was the decision for or against the person who brought the case?
The decision was against the person who brought the case.
What does this mean for someone in a similar situation?
Someone in a similar situation may face dismissal if their previous conduct is deemed unreasonable by their trade union.
What evidence or documents mattered?
Witness statements and correspondence regarding legal assistance requests were crucial to the decision.
Can a decision like this be appealed?
Decisions from Employment Tribunals can typically be appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
Is it worth getting a solicitor for a case like this?
It is advisable to seek legal advice from a qualified solicitor for such cases.
