First-tier Tribunal Determines Payability of Service Charges and Legal Costs
📌 In brief
The First-tier Tribunal ruled on the payability of various service charges and legal costs in a residential property setting. The decision focused on whether the costs were reasonable and incurred according to the lease terms.
⚖️ Legal holding
Service charges and legal costs are payable if they are reasonable in amount and incurred in accordance with the lease terms.
📖 Technical summary
The Tribunal ruled on the payability of various service charges and legal costs in a residential property setting.
📜 Headnote Official document
The Tribunal ruled on the payability of various service charges and legal costs in a residential property setting, finding them payable if reasonable in amount and incurred in accordance with the lease terms.
📚 Full judgment Official document
OUTCOME: Allowed
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Case Reference: CAM/26UJ/LSC/2022/0035 CAM/26UJ/LSC/2024/0028 CAM/26UJ/LDC/2025/0609
Property: 6 [ADDRESS], [POSTCODE]
Applicant: [redacted] applications, and for others in relation to the earlier application)
Respondent: [redacted] [RESPONDENT]: In person
Type of Application: Liability to Pay Service Charges
Tribunal members: Judge Granby, Dr [NAME] of Decision: 23 May 2025
DECISION
FIRST - TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
2 © CROWN COPYRIGHT
Introduction
1. This decision concerns three matters that are before the Tribunal.
2. The first in time are proceedings CAM/26UJ/LSC/2022/0035 (“the 2022 Application”). A substantive decision in respect of the 2022 Application has already been made – it is dated 22 N0vember 2022 and was made by a panel consisting of Judge Reeder and Mr [NAME] (“the 2022 decision”).
3. An application under s.20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 in respect of the 2022 Application remains undetermined, such matters are usually determined by the panel that made the substantive decision. Directions in the hearing bundle dated 11 December 2024 (Judge David Wyatt) record that the Chair from the original panel has been unavailable and that directions have been made for the panel hearing the [NAME] application (described further below) to determine the outstanding s.20C application following the 2022 decision).
4. The [NAME] in time are proceedings CAM/26UJ/LSC 2024/ 0028 (“the 2024 Application”). The 2024 Application overlaps, in part, with the outstanding s.20C application from the 2022 Application insofar as it concerns the legal costs incurred by the [NAME] Respondent in respect of the 2022 Application. As the Tribunal had failed to issue a decision in respect of the 20C application in the 2022 proceedings it is understandable that the [NAME] Respondent issued demands in respect of its costs and that the Applicant included those costs in the 2024 Application.
5. The third matter is an application for dispensation and in respect of costs (CAM/26UJ/LDC/2025/0609) made by the [NAME] Respondent
3 in respect of major works challenged in the 2024 Application (“the dispensation application”), this is described further below.
6. During the hearing it became clear that one of the matters challenged was an administration charge within the meaning of Schedule 11 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, the Respondent, sensibly, did not object to the Tribunal dispensing with a formal application in respect of administration charges – the matter (described below) was squarely raised in the statement of case and both parties had prepared to address it. The Tribunal accordingly dispenses with a formal application in respect of administration charges.
The parties
7. The lead applicant and representative in respect of the 2022 Application is [COUNSEL] [NAME] (“the Applicant”). Mr [APPELLANT] is a Chartered Surveyor of considerable experience and the leaseholder of the property known as 6 Durrants House pursuant to a lease between the Respondents on the one part and the Applicant on the other part for a term of 999 years from 1 January 2014 (“the Lease”).
8. The First Respondent is the Freeholder of [ADDRESS] and the development in which it is situated. The [NAME] Respondent is a management company which is a party to the lease; it is the [NAME] Respondent that carries out the repair and maintenance functions under the Lease and which is entitled to demand service charges.
9. The Respondents are closely connected (although not, we were told, strictly Group Companies) and are ultimately in common control.
10. There are, of course, other applicants to the 2022 application but no submissions were made that would suggest any applicant to that
4 application should be treated differently to the Applicant or that any of their leases were in materially different terms.
The hearing
11. The hearing took place on 28 April 2025 via CVP, all present were comfortable making use of the remote platform.
12. The Applicant appeared in person.
13. The Respondents were represented by Mr [NAME] a Director of both Respondents. The Tribunal also heard from Ms [NAME] of ELM – the Respondents managing agent and the person with day to day responsibility for the property. Both Mr [NAME] (who adopted the Respondents’ statement of case as his evidence) and Ms [APPELLANT] were cross examined by the Applicant and gave clear and measured answers. The Tribunal has no hesitation in accepting the evidence given by either Ms [NAME] or Mr [NAME] although both were inevitably [COMPANY] to matters they were either present for or had documentary material in respect of.
14. Similarly the Tribunal accepted the factual evidence of the Applicant who was clearly very knowledgeable in respect of the construction and management of property.
The Lease
15. With one exception (addressed below) there was no challenge to the contractual payability of any of the items in the schedules. The Tribunal accordingly does not address the Lease further.
Matters in issue
5 16. The items in issue are set out in a Scott Schedule. The Tribunal was, correctly, save in one respect, not invited to depart from the pleaded cases of the party – the Tribunal’s function is to resolve the dispute the parties have brought before the FTT on their pleaded case not to conduct an inquisition (see Sovereign v Hakobyan [2025] UKUT 115 (LC) (Per the President, para 195).
Year Ending 30 April 2023
17. Legal fees for FTT: £1,800. On receipt of the Respondents’ explanation that these costs related to the preparation of the witness evidence for the 2022 proceedings the Applicant’s challenge was refined to be that the costs should have been divided between the Respondents (the practical effect of that being that only half would then be recoverable from the [NAME] as the [NAME] Respondent can recover its costs. through the Lease, the First Respondent, it was common ground, could not).
18. The prospect of a 50/50 division has its origin in the division of counsel’s fees (counsel being Mr [COUNSEL]) – it was said that if counsel’s fees were divided equally between the Respondents then why should other charges not be?
19. It seems to the Tribunal to be one thing for the Respondents to economise by instructing one barrister to represent them at a hearing then engage in a rough and ready apportionment of his fees and quite another to suggest that all professional costs should be apportioned in this way.
20. The Tribunal is satisfied these costs were incurred by the [NAME] Respondent. There was no challenge to the amount charged, the Tribunal finds them payable in full.
6 21. Professional fees FTT: £1,800. This related to ELM staff time for preparing witness statements and attendance at the hearing. The Applicant again accepted something was payable but submitted that the cost should be divided between the Respondents. The Respondents’ response is that they have apportioned the cost equally between the Respondents. There was no challenge to the level of fees (including on an equal apportionment basis).
22. The Appellant finds the sum payable in full. The Tribunal is satisfied the fees have been apportioned appropriately and that the [NAME] Respondent is liable to pay the sums it seeks to recover – in the absence of any free standing challenge to the amounts charged by ELM it follows that the sum is payable in full.
23. Legal fees: £4,440. These were counsel’s fees, no challenge to these fees was maintained at the hearing, indeed the way in which they had been divided formed the basis of the Applicant’s submissions as to how the other costs in respect of proceedings should be divided. The Tribunal accordingly finds them payable in full.
24. Surveyors report re beam: £600. The Appellant said this work was carried out under warranty and any fees should have been charged to the First Respondent. The Respondents replied that the sum had been “recharged” by the [NAME] Respondent to the First Respondent and would be credited in the accounts for the year ending 30th April 2025.
25. Although possibly academic, as the sum is being credited, the Tribunal finds that this sum was not payable – if it is the First Respondent who is, in fact, agreed to be the party responsible for payment of this sum (whether as a matter of contract or management) then it seems that there was no sum that could be said to have been reasonably incurred or reasonable in amount.
7 26. Specification to major works: £4,605.42. These are surveyor’s fees in respect of external decorations. The Applicant states that these sums should have been taken from the [NAME] – at the hearing the Applicant clarified that he was not challenging the payability of this amount per se but was raising the point because it was relevant to management fees (as to which see below). The Tribunal accordingly finds the amount to be reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount.
27. Exposed lintel: £396. These were works to a beam. The item was conceded (indeed it was said that the sum had been “recharged” by the [NAME] Respondent to the First Respondent and would show as a credit in the next year’s accounts). Again, although possibly academic, the Tribunal finds this item was not payable.
28. Management fees: £12,117. The Applicant says that there have been substantial breaches of the RICS Service charge residential management Code, breaches of s.21 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (by which was meant s.22 of the same Act) and a failure to properly allocate expenditure.
29. The [NAME] Respondent’s response was that the fees are reasonable (indeed being, it was said, lower than for comparable developments and the lowest in the industry). The [NAME] Respondent was, it was said, a [COMPANY] who did not profit from the provision of services.
30. The [NAME] point did not, it seemed to the Tribunal, take matters very far – the Tribunal is concerned with whether the sums are contractually payable and (so far as they are) reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount. There is nothing wrong with a managing agent profiting from providing services and an absence of profit does not alter the tests to be applied. That said the [NAME] Respondent appeared to be making a more general point that it was reasonable in what it charged across its portfolio – the Tribunal, applying its experience, but in the absence of
8 comparators, accepts that the management charge in respect of this development appears appropriate for this type of development.
31. That does not, however, meet the Applicant’s point that the service provided is of a poor quality. Taking the Applicant’s specific points in turn:
a. Conflict of interest: this does not seem to affect the application of the test that the Tribunal is to apply. Insofar as the suggestion is that ELM’s real loyalty is to the First rather than the [NAME] Respondent that does not itself seem to affect either the contractual position or the quality of the service provided b. Breaches of the RICS Service charge residential management Code. The complaint here appeared to be that the accounts are confusing and/or there is a certain opacity in communications with ELM. The Tribunal did not find the accounts particularly confusing in the context of service charge accounts – it is true that there could have been more granularity to enable [NAME] to identify exactly what items related to but taken against a reasonable fee the work done did not fall below the standard that had been paid for (i.e. the work was of a reasonable quality when judged against the fee charged). The Tribunal did not see any opacity in the communications from ELM – there may have been an occasion, when information in minutes relayed at a [NAME]’ meeting as to which Respondent was carrying the costs of works did not transpire to be accurate, but this appeared to be an isolated incident and not necessarily the fault of ELM (who act on instructions). c. The Appellant also complained about how a complaint he made had been handled and the length of time be spent in dialogue on the matter of the beam (as to which see above). The Tribunal has considered the complaint and the response and is satisfied that ELM have a complaints process and operated it – any
9 deficiencies do not appear to warrant a reduction in the management charge. d. The Applicant also considered that too long was spent investigating the problem with the beam without considering whether this was defective. The Tribunal could not detect any fault with ELM in this – a managing agent is not required to have the technical skills that might be expected of a surveyor (or that the Applicant possesses), the beam issue was ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of the Applicant. e. The Applicant also complained that works that could be funded from the [NAME] were instead funded from the regular fund. The Applicant submitted that there was a particular need for regularity in this development as many [NAME] were retired and so on fixed incomes. The Tribunal does not accept (insofar as it is claimed) that the [NAME] Respondent has failed to operate the lease in accordance with its terms, there is no requirement that everything that could properly be called “major works” be funded from the [NAME] (and any sums taken from the reserve would need to be replaced if an appropriate reserve was to be maintained) – in any event while ELM will, no doubt, provide advice to the [NAME] Respondent, it is the [NAME] Respondent that is ultimately responsible for management decisions. f. Failure to comply with s.22 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. This concerned a request by the Applicant to inspect the invoices. The Applicant made this request to the [NAME] Respondent via ELM. The Applicant was then referred to the [NAME], the ELM operative in this office claimed not to have the invoices to provide. When the Applicant expressed confusion he was then referred back to the [NAME]. This appeared to the Tribunal to be unsatisfactory as the Applicant was frustrated in the exercise of his statutory rights which ELM appeared to have dealt with in a rather off hand way. Ms [NAME] answer – that she did not know why the [NAME] had said they did not
10 have the invoices to provide inspection of missed the point, no one had permitted inspection, exactly who within ELM had made a mistake is neither here nor there. The Tribunal finds that in frustrating the Applicant’s statutory rights, and appearing to have no system to vindicate those rights, ELM did not provide a service of a reasonable standard.
32. The Tribunal accordingly reduces the management fee payable by 5% to £11,511.15.
Year Ending 30 April 2024
33. Only one item was in issue for this year - £5,010 described as “Decking to Flat 6”. It will be appreciated that Flat 6 is the Applicant’s flat.
34. The Applicant’s case was that there was a latent defect for which the First Respondent not the [NAME] Respondent was responsible. The decking concerned is situated in an area that is not demised to the Applicant but of which he has exclusive use.
35. Pausing there, the Lease does not attribute responsibility for latent defects to the First Respondent. The argument that the First Respondent was responsible for latent defects arises from the First Respondent being the developer. It appears that because of the close relationship between the Respondents and the operation of the warranty taken by the First Respondent (which was not in evidence but was described by Mr [NAME]) matters that fell within the warranty (which appeared to be snagging issues or latent defects) would be dealt with by the Respondents without the [NAME] being charged.
36. As already stated – that is not the position under the Lease which, it is common ground, places all repairing obligations on the [NAME] Respondent).
11 37. There were two further problems with the Applicant’s argument.
38. Firstly the case is predicated on there being something wrong with the decking at the time it was installed – there is no significant evidence that the decking was defective when installed.
39. . The Applicant made submissions as to how long timber decking should last – while the Applicant is clearly very knowledgeable there had been no application for, and accordingly no permission for, expert evidence within the meaning of Rule 19 of the First Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. There was some evidence (in the form of a specification) that the decking in this case was failing a little sooner than might be expected but there was no evidence that would enable the Tribunal to conclude that a warranty concerning latent defects (even if the Tribunal had seen it) was engaged.
40. Secondly even if it were the First Respondent that was claiming service charges the Tribunal is only concerned (subject to contractual payability) with what sums it is reasonable to spend at the time they were/are to be spent – any claim for breach of covenant by the landlord is a matter for a counterclaim or set off (which the Tribunal can consider in an application under s.27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985) it does not bear on the statutory question of reasonableness ([COMPANY] v White [2007] L & TR 4)
41. The Applicant also complained that of the £5,010 £396 was a charge for the contractor clearing the area (it being common ground the Applicant had several potted plants on the decking). The Applicant says this should have been included in the primary charge.
42. The Respondent’s case is that the Applicant was asked to move the pots and did not therefore the contractor needed to do it, increasing the cost, and that this sum can ultimately be recovered from the Applicant (as to which see below).
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43. The Applicant has not produced any comparators – it is therefore impossible for the Tribunal to say that a sum of £5,010 is not reasonable for replacing the decking (the sum not being obviously excessive). It is not enough for the Applicant to simply be critical of the pricing, to find a charge unreasonable there must be some evidential basis, particularly where the Tribunal is being invited to consider invoices on a granular level.
44. There is a final issue concerning the service charge in respect of these works - dispensation. The effect of the addition of £396 work of contractor costs for moving pots was to push the works, narrowly, above the £250 threshold for consultation. It is common ground that there was no consultation – the [NAME] Respondent’s case is that it tried to get the Applicant to move the pots and that if he had done so the cost would have been below the threshold, the cost accordingly only rose at the last moment when the contractor had to move the pots.
45. The Tribunal grants dispensation – there is no relevant prejudice as (as set out above) there was nothing inappropriate about the works and there is no suggestion the Applicant would have behaved differently if there had been consultation (partially as the Applicant was already highly engaged in the works to be undertaken) ([NAME] v [NAME] & Others [2021] EWCA Civ 660)
46. The Tribunal accordingly finds the sum of £5,010 payable as a service charge.
47. That is, however, not quite the end of the matter of the decking. The [NAME] Respondent has sought to “recharge” (in the words of the parties) £396 to the Applicant by way of an administration charge.
48. Shorn of management jargon the [NAME] Respondent is saying that the Applicant has breached the terms of the lease and that the [NAME]
13 Respondent has suffered loss as a result (in the form of an increased cost of works) which it demands from the Applicant.
49. The problem with this, from the [NAME] Respondent’s perspective, is that there is no express contractual basis for this claim nor did the [NAME] Respondent suggest there was an implied term – on the face of the Lease the Applicant is not obliged to clear the decking of the chattels he was entitled to put there (there is no suggestion that these were excessive and it was implicit that the Applicant was entitled to put plant pots on the decking area- this was not a case where a leaseholder had encroached).
50. The [NAME] Respondent relied on Paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the Third Schedule of the Lease which, so far as is relevant, requires the Applicant to give access to the demised premises for inspection and repairs. Ms [APPELLANT] accepted in cross examination by the Applicant that the Applicant has not refused access. In the absence of an implied term there is no contractual basis for the administration charge demand.
51. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that the administration charge of £396 is not payable.
20C- the 2022 proceedings
52. The Lease in this case makes provision for the [NAME] Respondent to recover the costs of defending proceedings including before the Tribunal (paragraph 6.23 of the Sixth Schedule).
53. The Applicant fairly accepted that he had been unsuccessful in the substantive 2022 proceedings and realistically did not seek a 20C order on the basis that he had been substantially successful. The Applicant’s point in undated submissions provided following the decision was simply that the costs would have been incurred by the First rather than
14 the [NAME] Respondent. The Applicant fairly accepted that there was no distinction between the s.20C application and the points made in respect of legal costs in the [NAME].
54. The Tribunal declines to make a s.20C order in respect of the 2022 proceedings, it would not be just and equitable to do so, the Respondents were overwhelmingly successful – the Tribunal is also persuaded on the evidence that there is no attempt to pass off the First Respondent’s costs as being costs of the [NAME] Respondent.
20C – the 2024 proceedings
55. The Tribunal declines to make a s.20C order in respect of the 2024 proceedings, it would not be just and equitable to do so. The Applicant has been almost completely unsuccessful. Relative success is not the only factor relevant to a s20C application, the Tribunal can also consider the conduct of the parties before and during the application- in this case there were some failings on the part of the [NAME] Respondent in providing information to the Applicant (and the issues may have been narrower at case management stage had the [NAME] Respondent been more forthcoming) but in this case the Tribunal considers that that, and the small successes the Applicant has had in the litigation do not outweigh the [NAME] Respondent again being, clearly, the successful party in this application. For the same reason the Tribunal will not order that the Respondents repay the Applicant the fees he has paid.
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16 Appeals
A person wishing to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) must seek permission to do so by making written application by email to [EMAIL] .
The application must arrive at the Tribunal within 28 days after the Tribunal sends to the person making the application written reasons for the decision.
If the person wishing to appeal does not comply with the 28-day time limit, the person shall include with the application for permission to appeal a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28- day time limit; the Tribunal will then decide whether to extend time or not to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed.
The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case reference
CAM/26UJ/LSC/2022/0035
Applicants
Mr [COUNSEL] [NAME] acting for himself and also for:
Ms [COUNSEL] and Ms [COUNSEL] (No. 5) Mr [NAME] (No.10) [NAME] (No.12) Ms [NAME] (No. 15) Mr [NAME] (No. 3)
Respondents
1. [COMPANY] 2. [NAME], [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]
Application
Specific costs-related applications
Tribunal members
Judge David Wyatt
Date of decision
16 January 2025
DECISION
Decision The tribunal decides: 1) not to make any order under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002; and 2) not to make any order under rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First- tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013.
2 This decision leaves the sole remaining matter in these proceedings (CAM/26UJ/LSC/2022/0035) the application under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 about the costs of these proceedings, which is to be decided at the same time as the new proceedings brought by Mr [NAME] (CAM/26UJ/LSC/2024/0028). Reasons 1. On about 29 October 2024, the tribunal wrote to the parties as set out in Schedule 1 to this decision. Mr [NAME] responded for all applicants, referring to his new proceedings. On about 26 November 2024, the tribunal wrote to the parties as set out in Schedule 2 to this decision.
2. I understand there has been no objection to the approach proposed in Schedule 2. Accordingly, I make this decision to dispose of all other outstanding matters, for the reasons given in those Schedules.
3. On 11 December 2024, the tribunal gave case management directions for the new proceedings and the remaining section 20C application to be decided at the same time. The parties must continue to comply with those directions to prepare for the hearing of the new proceedings and that remaining application, and should include a copy of this decision in the bundle for that hearing.
Judge David Wyatt
16 January 2025
Rights of appeal If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).
3 Schedule 1 - directions given on 29 October 2024 In these proceedings to determine payability of disputed service charges, the substantive decision of the tribunal panel (Judge Reeder sitting with a wing member) was sent to the parties on 2 December 2022. It provided for any application in relation to the costs of the proceedings (under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and/or paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 and/or Rule 13) to be dealt with on paper, after 14 days for written representations from the parties. On 16 December 2022, submissions were produced by counsel for the respondents, accepting that the criteria for an unreasonable costs order under Rule 13 against the applicants were not made out and it was doubtful there was a contractual entitlement to recover the costs of the proceedings from the applicants as administration charges. Their submissions opposed the making of any order under section 20C of the 1985 Act. On 28 December 2022, the applicants’ representative produced written submissions. These were late and are not entirely clear, but accept that the tribunal decided largely in favour of the respondents and do not seek any order in respect of costs. Instead, they make what appears to be a new argument that only [COMPANY] (the management company under the lease(s), said to be a [COMPANY]) could recover its costs because, they say, any costs would have been incurred by [RESPONDENT] (the landlord under the lease(s)). It appears these submissions were sent to Judge Reeder, but he has not yet been able to deal with this. The tribunal apologises for the delay and the matter has been referred to me to seek to avoid further delay. In the interim, the tribunal has received correspondence from a leaseholder who was not one of the applicants, expressing concern that the respondents appear to be seeking to recover through the service charge their costs of the proceedings from all of the [NAME], including those who had no part in the proceedings. The tribunal will disregard this correspondence for the purposes of these proceedings, since the parties will not have seen it, but replied in August 2024 that the tribunal cannot advise and the [NAME] may wish to take advice on whether to make their own application under section 27A and/or section 20C of the 1985 Act or otherwise. Based on what has been produced by the parties, I am minded to decide on paper: 1) not to make any order under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the 2002 Act, since no relevant administration charges have been identified or sought; 2) not to make any order under Rule 13, because it appears that even if an application was made under Rule 13 it is not being pursued; and
4 3) not to make any order under section 20C of the 1985 Act in favour of the applicants, because their only real argument for this appears to be a new one about payability by reference to one of the provisions in the lease referring to costs incurred by the [NAME], which is likely to require evidence about whether legal costs have been incurred by the [NAME] and/or the arrangements between the respondents in relation to how costs are incurred/recharged and does not deal for example with paragraph 5.4 of Schedule 5 to the lease (which may enable the Landlord to be entitled to provisions for the [NAME]). Since this cannot be determined summarily, it does not appear in accordance with the overriding objective to seek to determine this for the purposes of the section 20C application by these applicants because if the costs are payable under the terms of the lease(s) it appears that it would not be just and equitable to make any section 20C order in favour of these largely unsuccessful applicants. For the avoidance of doubt, this would not preclude any leaseholder from making a new application to the tribunal for a determination under section 27A (and/or section 20C, in the case of the [NAME] who were not parties to these proceedings) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. The tribunal should not be taken to be encouraging or discouraging any such application; all concerned may wish to take their own independent legal advice. If the parties are aware that any such new application has been made, or have any objection to the approach proposed above, they should send an update note to the tribunal (a single concise document from any party, copied to the other parties) by 22 November 2024, asking that this be referred to Judge Wyatt. If they do so, the applicants must by 29 November 2024 produce a single electronic PDF bundle of relevant documents, including their original applications, the substantive tribunal decision, these further directions and anything produced by the parties following these further directions. Otherwise, the tribunal proposes to after 22 November 2024 make a decision in the above terms to conclude the current proceedings. Schedule 2 - directions given on 26 November 2024 Since Mr [NAME] states that a service charge payability determination application was made in April in relation to the legal costs which were the subject of the remaining applications in these proceedings, I am minded to leave the section 20C application to be decided at the same time as that application. However, for the reasons given in the letter from the tribunal dated 29 October 2024 I am minded to decide as set out in 1) and 2) of that letter, not to make any order under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the 2002 Act and not to make any order under Rule 13, so that only the section 20C application remains. If any party has any objection to this, they must send this with their reasons to the tribunal (ensuring their communication makes it clear that it has been copied to the other parties) by 13 December 2024. The tribunal would then decide these matters after that date.
📊 How courts decide similar cases
Among 10 similar decisions in this collection:
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal rules on service charges and legal costs
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Rules on Service Charges Payability
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Decides on Service Charge Reasonableness
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Rules on Residential Property Service Charges
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Rules on Service Charge Payability
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Rules on Reasonable Service Charges
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Rules on Payability of Service Charges
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Decides on Reasonableness of Service Charges
- First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) First-tier Tribunal Decides on Reasonableness of Service Charges
A snapshot of this collection — not a prediction of your case's outcome.
⚖️ What tends to weigh in cases like this
✅ Tends to be accepted
- Service charges are reasonable in amount.
- Service charges are incurred in accordance with the lease.
- Service charges are provided for in the lease.
- Service charges are stipulated in the lease.
- Service charges are incurred for the purposes of the lease.
❌ Tends to be rejected
- Service charges are not correctly calculated according to the lease terms.
- Service charges are not incurred reasonably and fall within the definition of the lease.
Patterns observed in similar cases in this collection — every case is unique.
❓ Frequently asked questions
What did this decision decide?
It decided on the payability of various service charges and legal costs in a residential property setting.
Who was involved?
The case involved a tenant and a property management company.
How did the court decide, and why?
The court decided that the service charges and legal costs were payable if they were reasonable in amount and incurred in accordance with the lease terms.
Which laws or rules were applied?
The Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 were applied.
What was the argument that mattered most?
The argument that mattered most was whether the costs were reasonable and incurred according to the lease terms.
Was the decision for or against the person who brought the case?
The decision was for the person who brought the case, ruling that the costs were payable.
What does this mean for someone in a similar situation?
Someone in a similar situation should ensure that their service charges and legal costs are reasonable and incurred according to their lease terms.
What evidence or documents mattered?
Witness statements, financial records, and lease agreements were important in the decision.
Can a decision like this be appealed?
Yes, decisions like this can be appealed to a higher court.
Is it worth getting a solicitor for a case like this?
Yes, it is recommended to get a solicitor for a case like this to ensure proper representation.
