First-tier Tribunal Determines Reasonableness of Service Charges

OUTCOME: Allowed

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FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case Reference

: CHI/29UN/LSC/2024/0102

Property

: 2, 3 & 21 [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

Applicants : [redacted] [NAME_1] 3

Paul Kelleher – Flat 21

Representative

: In person

Respondents

: [redacted] (Cliftonville) Limited (2) [NAME_2]

: (1) [NAME_3] (Director)

(2) In person

Type of Application : Application pursuant to section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 to determine the reasonableness of service charges

Tribunal Members : Judge Paul Letman M.B.E.

Tribunal Member Kevin Ridgway MRICS

Tribunal Member Jayam Dalal

Date and venue of : 11 July 2025 (Online) and on paper Hearing

Reconvene 01 September 2025

Date of Decision : 20 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

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Introduction

1. By application dated 17 May 2024 (the Application) the three applicants named above (the Applicants) applied for a determination of liability to pay and reasonableness of service charges pursuant to section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (the 1985 Act).

Brief Factual Background

2. [ADDRESS] (the building) is a block of 42 apartments originally constructed as a hotel in 1935 and converted into flats in the 1960s. The freehold of the building is owned by [ADDRESS] (2008) Limited which is registered at HM Land Registry under title number K21230. The First Respondent ([ADDRESS] (Cliftonville) Limited) holds a headlease of the property for a term of 999 years from 25 December 1950. The First Respondent granted underleases for terms of 999 years less one day from 25 December 1950 to the owners of the flats.

3. The Applicants are each the current owners of the underleases of their respective flats in the building. Pursuant to each flat underlease, the First Respondent is obliged to insure the building, keep it in a good state of repair and decoration, keep the hall, stairs, landings and passages properly carpeted and cleaned and to keep the [COMPANY_26] in good order. The leaseholders are required to contribute to the costs of the First Respondent by way of a service charge.

4. The Second Respondent, [NAME_2], was the tribunal appointed manager of the building from September 2019 to September 2023. The circumstances of his appointment and the terms of his appointment are as referred to in a decision of the FTT dated 27 August 2019 (at trial bundle, pages 74-97, i.e. [NAME_4][74]-[97]) and Final Management Order of equal date at [NAME_4][98]-[105].

5. As well as an annual fee of £20,000 plus VAT, [NAME_2] was entitled to remuneration in accordance with the schedules of fees at exhibit MB6[47]-[49] of his witness statement dated 18 July 2025. At all material times [NAME_2] has been the sole director of and traded as [COMPANY_2] (presently subject to suspended voluntary strike-off action).

6. The Application seeks a determination of the payability and reasonableness of service charges for the years 2019/20, 2020/21, 2021/22 and 2022/23, reference is also made in the application to 2024. The total value of service charges put in issue is some £923,466. Although this is the total sum demanded from all tenants, not the Applicants’ share; two of the Applicants pay 2.60363% and one pays 1.98698%.

7. An application is also made by the Applicants under section 20C of the 1985 Act for an order that costs in connection with proceedings before the tribunal are not to be included in the amount of any service charge payable by them. Similarly, and

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application is made by the Applicants for an order under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) reduce or extinguish any liability to pay such costs by way of an administration charge i.e. contractual costs in a lease.

Procedural History

8. The application came on for remote hearing on 11 July 2025, when the Applicants began the presentation of their case. However, during the course of the hearing it became apparent that some key documents (for example, copy typical flat lease) were not in the bundle, also that the Second Respondent, [NAME_2], had not responded adequately to the Scott Schedule (the Schedule) prepared by the Applicants setting out each and every item of disputed service charge cost in respect of the 4 years that he was the tribunal appointed manager of [ADDRESS].

9. Further, due to various connectivity and computer issues it was plain that [NAME_2] was not in a position to provide responses at the hearing and in any event to do so would require more than the day listed for the hearing.

10. In the circumstances, [NAME_2] applied for a further opportunity to set out his case in response to the Schedules. This was opposed by the Applicants who argued that he had had more than ample opportunity to do so pursuant to the directions already made herein on 7 February 2025 (see [NAME_4][151]-[160].

11. By those directions the Applicants were required to provide to the Tribunal and the Respondents by 14 March a completed Scott Schedule setting out every item in dispute, the amount and reasons why it was disputed. The directions providing that the ‘Tribunal will only consider the items, reasons and amounts specified in the completed Schedule as provided to the Tribunal.’ The Applicants were also to provide a statement of case, together with witness statements and relevant documents by 28 March 2025. By 16 May 2025 the Respondents were to provide their statements of case, with the Schedule completed with their responses to the issues raised by the Applicants in relation to the disputed service charge items, together with their witness statements and any documents on which they relied in support thereof. The Applicants were to reply by 16 May 2025 and the hearing was set for 11 July 2025, with bundles by 13 June 2025.

12. The Applicants fully complied with these directions, as did the First Respondent, but plainly the submissions received from [NAME_2] were deficient to the point of non-compliance. It was submitted therefore that no further opportunity should be extended to [NAME_2] to supplement or add to his case or produce further documentation. [NAME_2] asked the indulgence of the Tribunal, emphasizing his involvement had been as Tribunal appointed manager and that he had not fully appreciated the level of further detail required in this matter.

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13. In light of the parties submissions and in the circumstances, the Tribunal decided however to grant permission to [NAME_2], subject to a truncated timetable and peremptory (unless) order, for him to put in further responses and documentation by 18 July 2025, with the opportunity to the Applicants (and in so far as relevant, the First Respondent) to reply by 01 August 2025 (the Tribunal’s Order of 11 July 2025 refers). In the judgement of the Tribunal to do so was in accordance with the overriding objective under Rule 3 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (the 2013 Rules) and the central requirement to deal with cases fairly and justly.

14. The Tribunal was particularly concerned not to decide the matter without the relevant documentation, including relevant invoices and payment records, where numerous allegations of double or unexplained charging and even fraudulent charges were made against [NAME_2] in the Applicants’ evidence and the Schedule. Indeed, even treating the application by [NAME_2] as an application for relief from sanction (to which the principles enunciated in Denton v White [2014] 1 WLR 3926 apply), the Tribunal was satisfied that having taken account of (a) the need to conduct cases efficiently and at proportionate cost and (b) the wider interests of justice, nonetheless in these circumstances in order to deal with this application justly the order referred to above was appropriate.

15. [NAME_2] and the Applicants duly complied with the Tribunal’s Order of 11 July 2025. The Applicants’ Reply dated 01 August 2025, however, led to an application dated 02 August 2025 by [NAME_2] for a further hearing. By order dated 07 August 2025 this application was refused for the reasons set out therein. The Tribunal reconvened (in the absence of the parties) on 01 September 2025 to consider the case further including the further submissions from [NAME_2] and the Applicants. This decision follows those and subsequent deliberations.

Jurisdiction

1) Section 27A

16. As referred to above the present application is made under section 27A of the 1985 Act, which provides as follows:

27A Liability to pay service charges: jurisdiction (1) An application may be made to the appropriate tribunal for a determination whether a service charge is payable and, if it is, as to— (a) the person by whom it is payable, (b) the person to whom it is payable, (c) the amount which is payable, (d) the date at or by which it is payable, and (e) the manner in which it is payable. (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not any payment has been made… (4) No application under subsection (1) or (3) may be made in respect of a matter which— (a) has been agreed or admitted by the tenant,

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(b) has been, or is to be, referred to arbitration pursuant to a post-dispute arbitration agreement to which the tenant is a party, (c) has been the subject of determination by a court, or (d) has been the subject of determination by an arbitral tribunal pursuant to a post-dispute arbitration agreement. (5) But the tenant is not to be taken to have agreed or admitted any matter by reason only of having made any payment. (6) An agreement by the tenant of a dwelling (other than a post-dispute arbitration agreement) is void in so far as it purports to provide for a determination— (a) in a particular manner, or (b) on particular evidence, of any question which may be the subject of an application under subsection (1) or (3).

17. Further, the application engages section 19 of the 1985 Act that establishes a statutory test of reasonableness limiting the recovery of relevant costs making up any service charge as follows:

‘19(1) Relevant costs shall be taken into account in determining the amount of a service charge payable for a period – (a) only to the extent that they are reasonably incurred, and (b) where they are incurred on the provision of services or the carrying out of works, only if the services or works are of a reasonable standard; and the amount payable shall be limited accordingly. (2) Where a service charge is payable before the relevant costs are incurred, no greater amount than is reasonable is so payable, and after the relevant costs have been incurred any necessary adjustment shall be made by repayment, reduction or subsequent charges or otherwise.’

18. The meaning of reasonably incurred was considered by the Upper Tribunal in the lead case of [NAME_5] v [NAME_5], where [NAME_5] stated that:

’39. …The question I have to answer is not whether the expenditure for any particular service charge item was necessarily the cheapest available, but whether the charge that was made was reasonably incurred.

40. But to answer that question, there are, in my judgement, two distinctly separate matters I have to consider. Firstly, the evidence, and from that whether the landlord’s actions were appropriate, and properly effected in accordance with the requirements of the lease, the RICS Code and the 1985 Act. Secondly, whether the amount charged was reasonable in the light of that evidence. This second point is particularly important as, if that did not have to be considered, it would be open to any landlord to plead justification for any particular figure, on the grounds that the steps it took justified the expense, without properly testing the market.

41. It has to be a question of degree, and whilst the appellant has submitted a well reasoned and, as I have said, in my view correct interpretation of ‘reasonably incurred’, that cannot be a licence to charge a figure that is out of line with market norm.’

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19. More recently this approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in LB of Hounslow v Waaler [2017] EWCA Civ 45, where Lord Justice Lewison stated ‘In my judgment, therefore, whether costs have been reasonably incurred is not simply a question of process: it is also a question of outcome.’

2) Section 20C and Paragraph 5A

20. As regards the application for a section 20C order, the section itself provides as follows:

20C Limitation of service charges: costs of proceedings. (1) A tenant may make an application for an order that all or any of the costs incurred, or to be incurred, by the landlord in connection with proceedings before a court, residential property tribunal or leasehold valuation tribunal or the First- tier Tribunal, or the Upper Tribunal, or in connection with arbitration proceedings, are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the tenant or any other person or persons specified in the application… (3) The court or tribunal to which the application is made may make such order on the application as it considers just and equitable in the circumstances.

21. The relevant case law in relation to section 20C was reviewed by the Deputy President in the Upper Tribunal in Conway v Jam Factory Freehold Ltd [2013] UKUT 0519 (LC) at paragraphs 51 to 59. His review began necessarily with reference to the Court of Appeal decision in Iperion Investments Corporation v Broadwalk House Residents Limited (1996) 71 P & CR 34 and the well known passages from the judgment of [NAME_6] [NAME_6] LJ, before continuing with detailed reference to the decision of the Lands Tribunal (HH Judge Rich QC) in Tenants of [ADDRESS] (Sherbani) v [COMPANY_7]/37/2000.

22. The Deputy President in Conway quoted with apparent approval the following passages from the judgment of HHJ Rich QC in [COMPANY_7] relating to the exercise of the 20C discretion:-

“28. In my judgement the only principle upon which the discretion should be exercised is to have regard to what is just and equitable in all the circumstances. The circumstances include the conduct and circumstances of all parties as well as the outcome of the proceedings in which they arise.

29. I think that it can be derived from [[NAME_8]] that where a court has power to award costs, and exercises such power, it should also exercise its power under s20C, in order to ensure that its decision on costs is not subverted by the effect of the service charge.

30. Where, as in the case of the LVT, there is no power to award costs, there is no automatic expectation of an Order under s.20C in favour of a successful tenant, although a landlord who has behaved improperly or unreasonably cannot normally expect to recover his costs of defending such conduct.

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31. In my judgement the primary consideration that the LVT should keep in mind is that the power to make an order under s.20C should be used only in order to ensure that the right to claim costs as part of the service charge is not used in circumstances that make its use unjust. Excessive costs unreasonably incurred will not, in any event, be recoverable by reason of s.19 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Section 20C may provide a short route by which a tribunal which has heard the litigation giving rise to the costs can avoid arguments under s.19, but its purpose is to give an opportunity to ensure fair treatment as between landlord and tenant, in circumstances where even although costs have been reasonably and properly incurred by the landlord, it would be unjust that the tenants or some particular tenant should have to pay them.

32. Oppressive and, even more, unreasonable behaviour however is not found solely amongst landlords. Section 20C is a power to deprive a landlord of a property right. If the landlord has abused its rights or used them oppressively that is a salutary power, which may be used with justice and equity; but those entrusted with the discretion given by s. 20C should be cautious to ensure that it is not itself turned into an instrument of oppression.’

23. The review in Conway continued with reference to [NAME_9] v [COMPANY_9]/26/2005 where HHJ Judge Rich QC reiterated that the only guidance as to the exercise of the statutory discretion which can be given is to apply the statutory test of what is just and equitable in the circumstances. Noting that the observations he had made in his earlier decision were intended to be “illustrative, rather than exhaustive” of the matters which needed to be considered, and adding significantly (at paragraph 13) that:

“The ratio of the decision [in [COMPANY_7]] is “there is no automatic expectation of an Order under s.20C in favour of a successful tenant.” So far as an unsuccessful tenant is concerned, it requires some unusual circumstances to justify an order under s20C in his favour.”

24. A similar point was made by the Deputy President in Re SCMLLA [2014] UKUT 58 (LC), where it was noted (at [27]) that an order under s.20C ‘interferes with the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, and for that reason ought not to be made lightly or as a matter of course, but only after considering the consequences of the order for all those affected by it and all other relevant circumstances’. Whilst in Church Commissioners v Derdabi [2011] UKUT 380 (LC) it was suggested that there may be circumstances where the landlord should only be prevented from recovering his costs of dealing with issues upon which the tenant succeeded.

25. More recently in Bretby Hall Management Co Ltd v Pratt [2017] UKUT 70 (LC) His Honour Judge Behrens referred to the decision in Conway v The Jam Factory [2013] UKUT 0592, which he took to contain a full review of the authorities, and summarised the applicable principles as follows:

“1. The only principle upon which the discretion should be exercised is to have regard to what is just and equitable in the circumstances.

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2. The circumstances include the conduct of the parties, the circumstances of the parties and the outcome of the proceedings.

3. Where there is no power to award costs there is no automatic expectation of an order under s 20C in favour of a successful tenant although a landlord who has behaved unreasonably cannot normally expect to recover his costs of defending such conduct.

4. The power to make an order under s 20C should only be used in order to ensure that the right to claim costs as part of the service charge is not used in circumstances which make its use unjust.

5. One of the circumstances that may be relevant is where the landlord is a resident-owned management company with no resources apart from the service charge income.”

26. This Tribunal duly relies upon the guidance detailed above in its consideration of the Applicants’ application for a direction under section 20C and for completeness in relation to the equivalent and like worded provision in respect of litigation costs claimed as administration charges under paragraph 5A of Schedule 11 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.

The Parties’ Cases

27. The Applicants’ case is set out in the Statement of Case dated 28 March 2023 ([NAME_4][887]-[894]) and in their witness statements in support (all of which were presented and spoken to at the hearing), as well as latterly their Reply dated 01 August 2025.

28. As against [NAME_2], their Statement of Case alleges (at paragraph 8) that he failed to comply with his duties as defined in “The Schedule of Functions and Services” Paragraphs 3, 4 & 6, or to adhere to “Accounts” in the said “Schedule of Functions and Services” paragraphs 13, 14 and 16. In particular, that in breach of paragraph 16 he made no effort to complete his records for the years ending 2022 and 2023 and in the event this was done by [NAME_10]’s accountant.

For these reasons the Applicants contend that the demands for accounting years 2019 to 2023 are not due and payable.

29. Further, at paragraphs 11 and 12 of their Statement of Case, the Applicants allege that [NAME_2] failed to act fairly and impartially, and did not exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence as manager. For the detail of these allegations, however, they refer to and rely upon the contents of the Scott Schedule. Nonetheless, a summary of the various allegations contained in the Schedule is given at paragraph 14 of the Statement of Case, from unreasonable expenditure and double entries to work that they contend should have been within the scope of his annual management fee,

30. As against the First Respondent, the Applicants contend that the interim service charge demands issued by them on 1 December 2023 were non-compliant with

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ss.47 and 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) because they did not show the landlord’s name (i.e. [ADDRESS] (Cliftonville) Limited. The Applicants also ‘seek clarity’ on the reserve fund collection and whether the issuing of a separate demand for service charge is correct, query the insurance cost of £64,568 and whether it includes commission, covers the garages and holiday lets, and challenge the levying of late payment charges.

31. In support of their case in different respects the Applicants refer to 3 Upper Tribunal cases: Garside v RFYC Ltd [2011] UKUT 367 (LC) on factors to be taken into account in determining whether costs have been reasonably incurred, including previous service charges and the need to spread costs; Spender v FIT Nominee Ltd [2024] UKUT 175 (LC), where it was held the FTT had erred in concluding that insurance premiums paid by a landlord in respect of a residential estate were reasonably incurred without the landlord proving that the price was reasonable, either by reference to the market or by showing what services were carried out.

32. They also cite three First Tier Tribunal decisions: [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] (CHI/29UL/LSC/2021/067), on non-compliant demands; [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] (LON/00BH/LSC/2023/0140), on section 20B and the ’18-months rule’; and, [ADDRESS], Sutton, Surrey SM2 (LON/00BF/LSC/2022/0257), where the tribunal made a section 20C in favour of successful lessees.

Determination

(1) The Second Respondent/[NAME_2]

33. Considering firstly the broader points raised by the Applicants, before coming to the detail of the Schedule. The Applicants allege breach by [NAME_2] of the following Management Order obligations (under the Schedule of Functions and Services):

‘Service charge

3. Prepare an annual service charge budget and make provision for interim payment in advance, and a balancing payment by, or credit made to, the Tenants at the end of the year as appropriate.

4. Administer the service charge and prepare and distribute appropriate service charge accounts to the Tenants.

6. The Manager shall have the authority to demand payments in advance and balancing payments at the end of the accounting year, to establish a sinking fund to meet the Landlord’s obligation under the lease, to allocate credits of service charge due to the Tenants at the end of the accounting year to the sinking fund, and to collect arrears of service charge and insurance that have accrued before

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his appointment which includes the interim service charge for the year ended 30 June 2019. …

Accounts

13. Prepare and submit to the Landlord and the leaseholders an annual statement of account detailing all monies receivable, received and expended. The accounts to be certified by the external auditor, if required by the Manager.

14. Maintain efficient records and books of account, which are open to inspection by the Landlord and the Tenants. Upon request, produce for inspection, receipts or other evidence of expenditure.

16. All monies collected will be accounted for in accordance with the Code 3rd edition.’

34. Except as set out in the Schedule, which is addressed below, it is not otherwise specified with any sufficient particularity in what respects it is alleged [NAME_2] was in breach of these various obligations. Considering the evidence it is apparent that budgets were set by [NAME_2] for the relevant years (see, for example, [NAME_4][70]-[72]), interim payments were duly demanded each September and March during the currency of his appointment (see the demands at [NAME_4][63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68] and [69]) and year end accounts produced for y/e 30 June 2020 at [NAME_4][165-171] and 2021 at [NAME_4][328-334].

35. It is plain though that there were some deficiencies in [NAME_2]’s performance, for example, it does appear to be the case that the June 2022 accounts had to be completed by [NAME_11], so too the 2023 accounts although this was perhaps inevitable given the end of his appointment in September 2023. Further, whilst extensive documentation does appear to have been made available (enabling no doubt the preparation of the Schedule), not all documents have been readily or timeously produced to the Applicants. Some key documents only now being produced to them in [NAME_2]’s submission of July 2025.

36. Nonetheless, in our view there is nothing in the allegations made or these failings that means the interim demands were not payable. As discussed in the reasons that follow in respect of the Schedule, the source of [NAME_2]’s authority is the management order itself. He is not bound by the strict machinery of the lease and any conditions or pre-conditions it contains for recovery of service charges. Moreover, even if he were, again it is not specified by the Applicants nor is it apparent what if any requirements have not been met that would prevent the recovery of the interim demands. Notably also, in reality matters have been overtaken by the year end accounts and the item by item challenges made to specific charges in the Scott Schedule.

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37. Turning then to the Schedule, each item is addressed in the Appendices to this decision. Appendix A lists (from the 4x schedules) each charge in dispute, the invoice reference and amount, the relevant bundle reference and states our conclusion. Our reasons for that conclusion are separately set out in Appendix B, cross referring to the item numbers in each service charge year in Appendix A. Where any item is not separately addressed, this is because our conclusion relies on reasons already stated as noted in Appendix A. In summary, for the reasons set out therein this Tribunal determines that all the challenged sums are payable, save for two sums, one of £400 and the other of £750 as and for the reasons set out in the Appendices.

(2) The First Respondent

38. Turning to the case against the First Respondent, as regards the alleged failure of their December 2023 demand to comply with the 1987 Act, this has been remedied by subsequent statements of account and cumulative applications for payment containing the relevant notice (see [NAME_4][991]-[994]). The suspensory effect of non- compliance with ss.47 and 48 has therefore been removed and sums previously demanded have become due and payable.

39. As for the challenge to the insurance cost of £64,568.26, this was the budgeted sum for buildings and terrorism insurance with [NAME_12] for 2024/2025 (see [NAME_4][1008]). The primary allegation appears to be that this was unreasonable. However, the Applicants have not produced any evidence in support of this claim; no comparable quotation or rival price. By contrast, in support of the charge, the budget at [NAME_4][1008] notes that this cost was a 7.5% increase on the cost for the previous year, but goes on to assert ‘is very reasonable in the current climate.’

40. [NAME_3] in his statement of case for the First Respondent states that ‘the insurance market has been increasing over recent years, the number of insurers prepared to consider [ADDRESS] has decreased and [it] has made a number of claims in recent years. All these factors have resulted in a rising premium.’ As regards the query over holiday lets, he confirmed that holiday lets are forbidden in the block and not covered by the insurance.

41. The key evidence in this regard, however, comes from [NAME_13] of [NAME_13], the insurance brokers used by [NAME_11]. In his email of 08 April 2025 he confirms that ‘It was a real challenge to place cover due to the extremely poor claims experience and very high frequency of claims in previous years. We have access to around 200 [NAME_12] were the only insurer willing to offer any terms at the time….The premium paid was £53,800 plus Ipt at 12% which very roughly equated to a £0.20p rate applied by Insurers. The policy came with a very high Escape of Water Excess as expected. Compared to many other sites we insure, I do not feel that this premium was any higher than to be expected.’

42. On the query over commission, he states that on [NAME_13] earned a total commission of 5% and that ‘no element of that commission was paid

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to any party as a referral fee, the commission was 100% retained in its entirety by [NAME_13].’ The Tribunal accept this evidence. In our experience, this is a low or at least competitive brokerage fee. Further, given that this is simply a broker’s fee with no referral fee (to the managing agent or any other) there is nothing that calls for explanation or justification. In light of the foregoing the Tribunal are entirely satisfied that the claimed cost inclusive of commission was within the market norm and that both in terms of process and outcome this premium was demonstrably reasonably incurred and is payable.

43. As for the position on the collection of reserve, this was fully explained in the [COMPANY_10]’s letter of 16 September 2024 at [NAME_4][979-80]; crediting back unspent reserve as at 30 June 2024 given the fact that the FTT decision on 18 June 2024 permitting a reserve fund was not retrospective and noting that the service charge budget for 2024/25 was being prepared and would allow for a sum to start building a reserve fund for future expenditure. Similarly, the crediting of the 09 October 2024 demands and recharge to correct the period to which the demands related is fully explained by [NAME_11]’s letter dated 15 November 2024 at [NAME_4][990]. The Tribunal can find no fault with [NAME_11]’s approach in relation to these matters.

44. In terms of the amount of the reserve fund collection, and the allegation that the current interim demands are excessive and in breach of section 19(2) of the 1985 (‘.. no greater amount than is reasonable is so payable’). [NAME_3] for the First Respondent explained the level of reserve covers essential works that are needed to the building in line with the planned maintenance program (‘PMP’) prepared by [NAME_14]. In particular, in the year 2024/25, the urgent need for roof repairs to be carried out (the PMP at [NAME_4][1074]-[1105] refers at [1090]-[1092]). Further, he emphasized that the board of the First Respondent had considered the means of tenants and had ‘set the budget as sympathetically as possible.’ He also pointed out that the current demand was ameliorated (in the case of tenants who were up to date with their service charges) by the fact that tenants were being credited back the reserve collected in earlier years.

45. In the circumstances the Tribunal is satisfied that the current budgeted reserve in the sum of £249,070 (at [NAME_4][983]) though substantial is no more than is reasonable. The Price Lilford PMP dated July 2024 shows total planned major works expenditure for 2024/25, including extensive roof repairs, in the sum of £189,517 including contingency and VAT but excluding professional fees. Notably also this is based on July 2024 prices, with no apparent allowance for inflation, which remains high in the construction sector. Taking all these costs considerations into account, in our judgement the collection is sensibly calibrated and reasonable.

46. Whilst it would not be surprising if there were affordability issues for some tenants with the reserve at this level, as the authorities establish the essential driver must be the need for the works and their cost, neither of which were challenged by the Applicants. Indeed, we note that the FTT hearing the lease variation application in

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2024 found that given the history of the property, including no doubt its condition, ‘there was a compelling case for the creation of a reserve.’ Nevertheless, to the extent that affordability can be taken into account, we accept that it has been. Factoring this into our own analysis does not lead us to any different conclusion. The mitigating effect of the credit for reserve collected in previous years (in an equivalent sum) only confirming this assessment.

47. Lastly, with regard to any late payment penalties or charges (as opposed to any costs, charges and expenses incurred as a result of any default), no lease term was relied upon by the First Respondent or drawn to our attention, nor can we find any clause of the flat lease (as amended or otherwise and provided under separate cover to the Tribunal) which would entitle such charges to be levied.

Section 20C/Paragraph 5A

48. So far as the costs of these proceedings are concerned, none of the parties have made any submissions regarding the entitlement, if any, of either the First or Second Respondent to recover their costs from the Applicants by way of service charge or an administration charge. In these circumstances, the Tribunal merely observes, without deciding, that it is not obvious that there is any clause of the lease enabling recovery so far as the First Respondent is concerned. As for [NAME_2], his initial Position Statement itself appears to acknowledge that presently he has no route to recovering his costs by way of service or administration charges, given the expiry of his appointment as manager.

49. Nonetheless, without prejudice to the any issue of entitlement (as referred to at paragraph 48 above) but for completeness, the Tribunal has considered the Applicants’ applications under section 20C and Paragraph 5A. In summary, as referred to above, the only principle upon which the discretion should be exercised is to have regard to what is just and equitable in the circumstances, including in particular the conduct of the parties, the circumstances of the parties and the outcome of the proceedings.

50. As regards the conduct of the parties, the Tribunal take note of the fact that [NAME_2] failed initially to respond adequately to the application, concerned as he was to know how his costs of participation in the proceedings might be met. This was unhelpful and misguided. But in terms of reversing, what for present purposes must be assumed to be a contractual entitlement to recover costs, having heard and considered the issues above, the Tribunal detect far greater fault on the part of the Applicants, who it seems to us have sought to challenge multiple charges with a complete lack of discernment.

51. By these means the Applicants have sought, so it appears to the Tribunal and we so find, to pursue their enduring opposition to [NAME_2]’s appointment as manager, despite the previous orders made by the FTT appointing him and extending his appointment ([NAME_4][94]). Furthermore, in terms of outcome, the Application has been very largely unsuccessful, with only a handful of issues

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resolved in favour of the Applicants. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal do not consider that it would be just and equitable to make any order under section 20C or direction under Paragraph 5A and the Applicants’ applications under each are dismissed.

Dated as above.

RIGHTS OF APPEAL

1. A person wishing to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) must seek permission to do so by making written application by email to [EMAIL] to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.

2. The application must arrive at the Tribunal within 28 days after the Tribunal sends to the person making the application written reasons for the decision.

3. If the person wishing to appeal does not comply with the 28 day time limit, the person shall include with the application for permission to appeal a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then decide whether to extend time or not to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed.

4. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

Communications to the Tribunal MUST be made by email to [EMAIL]. All communications must clearly state the Case Number and address of the premises.

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NORTHUMBERLAND COURT APPENDIX A: SCHEDULE OF DISPUTED ITEMS

Disputed Item No

Invoice Date Supplier Invoice No. Disputed amount Bundle Refs Tribunal’s Conclusion 2019/ 2020

1 31/3/20 [COMPANY_15] 687789 6,038.88 [NAME_4][172/173]

Payable 2

11/06/20 Gen Prop 364 180.00 [NAME_4][188] Payable

3 26/02/20 [NAME_16] 3308 145.00 [NAME_4][191] Payable

4 02/01/20 [NAME_17] 47873 120.00 M7.25 Payable

5 06/01/20 [NAME_18] 21/10- 21/20 329.08 M7.29 Payable 6 03/01/20 [NAME_19]

110.89 M7.26 Payable

7 28/02/19 [NAME_20] x4 2037 Total £810 [NAME_4][236]- [239] Payable

8 19/12/19 Managing agent FTT 238 237 2,520.00 103.07 [NAME_4][70/71] Payable

9 30/11/19 [NAME_19] 450382 107.30 [NAME_4][245] As (6)

10 29/11/19 Managing agent FTT 235 233.68 [NAME_4][77] As (8)

11 31/10/19 [NAME_19]

218.19 [NAME_4][250] As (6)

12 09/11/19 Managing agent 234 480.00 [NAME_4][278] As (8) & (18)

13 09/11/19 [NAME_19] 233 1,080.00 [NAME_4][279] As (8) & (18)

14 02/10/19 [NAME_19] 444489 107.30 [NAME_4][250] As (6)

15 28/10/19 [NAME_21] [NAME_21]

28.88 [NAME_4][284] Payable

16 02/09/19 [NAME_19] 441712 110.89 [NAME_4][294] As (6)

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17 18/03/20 [NAME_2] 6,000.00 [NAME_4][309], [310] Payable

18 20/06/20 [NAME_2] 1855 1,920 [NAME_4][311] Payable

1857 1,440 [NAME_4][312] “

1845 1,800 [NAME_4][313] “

1847 2,400 [NAME_4][317] “

19 13/01/20 [NAME_2] 1841 404.10 [NAME_4][315] Payable

03/02/20 [NAME_2] 1844 950.00 [NAME_4][316] Payable 2020/ 2021

1 02/04/21 [COMPANY_22] 2181 1,260.00 [NAME_4][897] Payable

2 20/08/20 [NAME_22] 1964 165.00 [NAME_4][114] Payable

3 23/10/20 [NAME_22] 2017 and 2018 305.00 144.00 [NAME_4][1295] Payable 4 06/01/20 [NAME_22] 2034 4,290.00 [NAME_23]

5 08/01/21 [NAME_22] 2073 2074 2,085.00 1,875.00 N/A Payable 6 23/02/21 [NAME_22] 2136 125.00

As item (3)

7 15/10/21 [NAME_21] 8 93.14 [NAME_4][349] Payable

8 25/01/21 [NAME_24] 406 and 409 250 [NAME_4][367] [NAME_23][7] Payable

9 22/02/21 [NAME_22] 2134 4,375.00 [NAME_4][371] Payable

10 08/02/21 [NAME_22] 2126 4,865.00 [NAME_4][379] As item (9)

11 10/05/21 [NAME_25] DPM21082 690.00 [NAME_4][401] Payable

12 10/06/21 [COMPANY_26] 51190/ 51399 312.00 [NAME_4][415] [419] Payable

13 01/04/21 [NAME_19] 51399 120.00 [NAME_4][415] [419] [425] Payable

14 31/10/20 [NAME_29] 223 150.00 [NAME_4][423] Payable 15 16/12/20 [NAME_2] 1940 1,800.00 [NAME_4][423] Payable

16 15/04/21 [NAME_2] 1956 2,000.00 [NAME_4][441] Payable

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17 24/07/20 [NAME_22] 1941 426.00 [NAME_4][447] Payable

18 01/09/20 [NAME_18]

220.36 [NAME_4][453] Payable

19 15/01/21 [COMPANY_26] 50720 120.00 [NAME_4][486] As Item (13)

20 08/01/20 [NAME_22] 2072 1,800.00 [NAME_4][487] Payable subject to reduction of £400

21 31/03/21 [NAME_19] 491963 110.89 [NAME_4][501] [503] [NAME_23][5] Payable

22 13/04/21 [NAME_22] 2172 1,790.00 [NAME_4][505] Payable

23 22/03/21 [NAME_22] 2167 800.00 [NAME_4][507] Payable

24 22/03/21 [NAME_22] 2168 600.00 [NAME_4][509] As item (5) above

25 22/03/21 [NAME_22] 2166 132.50 [NAME_4][511] As item (3) above

26 30/04/21 [NAME_22] 2208 495.00 [NAME_4][523] Payable

27 01/07/21 [NAME_22] 2247 160.00 [NAME_4][526] Payable

28 01/07/21 L&C Cleaning 3 600.00 [NAME_4][528] As item (27)

29 15/04/21 [NAME_2] 1956 6,000.00 [NAME_4][540] As item (16) 2021/ 2022

1 31/07/21 [NAME_12]

24,755.89 Payable

2 30/04 and 31/05/21 [NAME_19] 494552 496114 107.30 110.89 [NAME_4][598] [NAME_4][599] Payable

3 29/07/21 [NAME_22] 2274 1,385.00 [NAME_4][608] Payable

4 01/12/21 [NAME_22] 2336 6,500.00 [NAME_4][614] [NAME_4][615] Payable

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[NAME_23][4] 5-9 [NAME_23] [NAME_23] 493 5 x2 7 x2 277 x2 640/794 380.00 360.00 480.00 510.00 510.00 [NAME_4][646] [NAME_4][651/2] [NAME_4][654/5] [NAME_4][664/5] [NAME_4][667/8] [NAME_23]

10-12 [NAME_18] 180.86

125.25 245.02 [NAME_4][558/ 562] [NAME_4][568/ 571]

Payable

13-15 [NAME_23] and [NAME_22] Not seen 300.00 150.00 1750.00 [NAME_4][859] Payable

16-18 [NAME_2] Not seen 1,680.00 1,920.00 960.00 [NAME_23][9] [NAME_23][10] [NAME_23][11] Payable

2022/ 2023

1 18/07/22 [NAME_23] 64 795 [NAME_4][785] Payable

2 19/07/22 [NAME_21] 475.74 [NAME_23][26] Payable

3 28/07/22 [NAME_23] 510.00 [NAME_23][28] Payable

4 [NAME_19] [NAME_19] 546.00 [NAME_23][28] Payable

5 28/07/22 [NAME_18] 89.77 [NAME_23]] Payable

6 15/08/22 [NAME_2] 2057 720.00 [NAME_4][819] Payable

7 15/08/22 [NAME_2] 1,659.84 [NAME_4][820] Payable

8 15/08/22 [NAME_2] 1,366.51 [NAME_4][821] Payable

9 23/08/22 [NAME_18] 208.18

As item (5)

10 24/08/22 [COMPANY_26]

120.00

As item (13) in 2020/21 11 12/09/22 [NAME_21] 0003, 0001 383.60 [NAME_4][830] Payable

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12 07/10/22 [NAME_18] 127.44

As item (5)

13 17/10/22 [NAME_18] 9029 99.73 [NAME_4][695] Payable

14 17/10/22 [NAME_21] 383.60 [NAME_4][830] Payable

15 31/10/22 [NAME_18] 99.73 [NAME_4][703-6] Payable

16 02/11/22 [NAME_23] 546.00 MD10[28] As items (3) and (4)

17 02/03/22 [NAME_15] 687790 3,020.00 [NAME_4][748] [NAME_4][74-95] Payable

18 02/03/22 [NAME_15] 687791 6,939.86 [NAME_4][752] [NAME_23][2] Payable

19 10/02/22 [NAME_32]

665.44 [NAME_4][848] Payable

20 04/04/22 [NAME_21] 435.10 [NAME_23][26] As item (2)

21 06/04/22 [NAME_2] 2092 960.00 [NAME_4][824] As items (6)-(8)

22 09/05/23 [NAME_23]

600.00 [NAME_23][28] Payable

23 09/05/22 [NAME_27] 1558 2,749.22 [NAME_4][773] Payable

24 23/05/23 [NAME_27]

474.00 [NAME_4][721] Payable

25 11/07/23 [NAME_18] 2899 450.14 [NAME_4][842] [NAME_23]] Payable

26 11/07/23 [NAME_21] 5419 551.48 [NAME_4][838] [NAME_4][842] [NAME_23][26] Payable 27-35 14,15&31/ 08/23 [NAME_2] 2114 2111 2109 2107 2112 2115 2116 2113 2117 Total 18,669.60 MB6[2-11] Payable save for Invoice No.2112 in the sum of £750

36-39 Various Westgate, [NAME_23] 9829 591-593 903.90 [NAME_23][21] [NAME_23][22] Payable

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[NAME_23][23] [NAME_23][24]

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NORTHUMBERLAND COURT APPENDIX B: REASONS

SC Year 2019/2020

1: The Tribunal has examined both invoices 687789 and 687790 and it is clear from the narrative at [NAME_23][23] and in the invoice relied upon by [NAME_2] at [NAME_4][748] that they are charging for different work. However, the Applicants actually allege that 687789 is duplicated by 687791 at [NAME_4][752] and that the amount of £6,939.86 claimed in that invoice is miscalculated. Nonetheless, the relevant position is explained by [NAME_2]’s emails dated 4/8 and 15/9 at [NAME_23][2] challenging each of [NAME_15] invoices (789, 790 and 791). Given this correspondence and the different descriptions of work allocated to each invoice within it, the different narrative references on the invoices and the fact that having reviewed the invoices [NAME_15] declined to withdraw or reduce the amounts charged, the Tribunal is satisfied and finds accordingly that each invoice charges for different work and that there is no duplication. In the premises, no credit is due to leaseholders or the Applicants in this regard.

2: We note the contents of the General Property Maintenance invoice at [NAME_4][188] and the description of works therein. The allegation by the Applicants that these works (including repairs to a collapsed ceiling, to part of a bathroom floor and a copper pipe) should have been covered by the leaseholder contents insurance is obviously untenable, no contents insurance could extend to these kinds of cost. Given that this is the only ground of challenge, the Tribunal determines accordingly that these costs are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

3: The allegation here by the Applicants is that the duplicate entry in the Scott Schedule (prepared by the Applicants) shows that this invoice was paid twice. No evidence is produced in support of this allegation. For his part [NAME_2] denies any double payment. He produces a bank extract [NAME_23][23] showing payments to [NAME_16] in 2020, which he says confirms only a single payment of £145 to [NAME_16] in the year. It is inherently unlikely that a double payment was made and we accept [NAME_2]’s evidence in this regard and find that the said invoice was not paid twice.

Accordingly, no credit is due in this respect to the Applicants.

4: The Applicants again allege that there has been double counting and that invoice 47873 dated 02/01/20 at [NAME_4][216] has been paid twice. It is correct that this invoice appears twice in the Schedule. But [NAME_2] denies that this invoice was paid twice and produces at [NAME_23][25] a bank extract showing all payments to [NAME_34] in this service charge year. The extract shows two payments each of £120, the first for invoice 47873 and the second for invoice 47146 dated 03/10/19 at [NAME_4][251]. It is clear these are different invoices for different periods. In light of the evidence it appears plain to the Tribunal and we duly find that invoice 47873 has not been paid twice and therefore no credit is due in this respect to the Applicants.

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5: The allegation here is again that the invoice has been duplicated and paid twice. [NAME_2], however, produces a bank extract showing two payments to the same [NAME_18] account each of £329.08, the first on 17/01/20 and the second on 10/02/20 . The sum paid tallies with the [NAME_18] invoice dated 6/1/20 at [NAME_4][218]. There is no second invoice. Moreover, it seems implausible that two identical amounts should have been paid in such a short timeframe, so as not to be a duplicate payment. Further, it is certainly the case in our view, that if a double payment is made it will have been credited to the account by [NAME_18] so as to reduce subsequent bills. In the circumstances the Tribunal is satisfied that no credit is due in this respect to leaseholders including the Applicants.

6: As regards the objection to this [NAME_19] amount, [NAME_2] accepts that the entry is for a statement of account, but as confirmed by the bank extracts he provides, there is no evidence of duplicate payments. There is no evidence that statements of account were paid, only that payments were made to meet invoices. There is no basis therefore for any credit to be given in relation to this line item.

7: The allegation that these 4 [NAME_20] invoices are allocated to the wrong year, is rejected by [NAME_2]. In his replies he explains that these invoices were paid together on 19 December 2019, in the total sum of £810. No issue is taken with this evidence in the Applicants’ Reply and we have no reason to doubt that what [NAME_2] states in this regard is correct. Further, given the broad terms of his appointment (see [NAME_4][103] and the discussion below), in our view it was open to him to account, pragmatically, for these invoices together in this year based upon that single payment. It is notable of course that had they been charged to the previous year, the same amounts would have been payable. There is no suggestion that these amounts were not properly incurred or that they are unreasonable and accordingly no question of the Applicants actually being overcharged in any way. In the circumstances, the Tribunal holds that these sums were properly accounted for in this service charge year and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

8: In contesting this invoice and others the Applicants allege that Judge Tildesley stated at some point in the course of the proceedings that there would be ‘no costs’ in relation to the mediation which took place between the parties. There is no record of what Judge Tildesley is alleged to have said in this regard or when. It is sometimes said in relation to mediation that there are ‘no costs’, in the sense that mediators do not make any award of costs. We suspect that this may have been the gist of any comments made by Judge Tildesley. But even taken at its highest such a comment (‘no costs’) does not in our view amount to a statement that [NAME_2] would not charge his costs associated with the mediation to the service charge. Moreover, even if it did, such a comment is not part of any decision or order by the tribunal and could not in our view bind [NAME_2]. If any costs are to be disallowed, it seems to us this is a matter to be considered pursuant to our section 20C jurisdiction (as to which see our principal decision).

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12 & 13: The query over the £480 [NAME_4][278] is what was this charge for. The narrative on the invoice indicates that this was [NAME_2] management time spent instructing solicitors. Whether this relates to the mediation or the FTT proceedings more generally, for the reasons stated in relation to item 8 (above) and 18 (below) in our view there are no sustainable grounds of objection to this charge. The same applies to the £1,080 charged under invoice 233 at [NAME_4][279]. The Tribunal determines accordingly that these costs are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

15. In relation to this item, [NAME_2] has produced a bank extract proving 3 payments to [NAME_21] in 2019-20. However, the complaint here is not that any duplicate payment was made. The allegation appears rather to be that this was an overdue payment charge, which can therefore be attributed to some act of negligence on the part of the managing agent. However, this is based on a mis-reading of the letter dated 28 October 2019 at [NAME_4][284]. The sum claimed and paid is not such a charge, the letter is merely chasing an electricity charge which was overdue. In our judgement, therefore, there is no basis for this payment to [NAME_21] to be disallowed nor for any credit to be allowed to the Applicants.

16: Again this is an [NAME_19] statement. The fact that it is endorsed in manuscript with a note that records the £110.89 was paid by cheque on 06/09/19, however, is evidence of the fact that invoice no. INU441712 was due and paid, not that this sum was paid twice, firstly against the statement and secondly against the invoice. The evidence of [NAME_2] at [NAME_23] does not pick up this payment, but given the recurring monthly charge and the inherent unlikelihood of payment being made twice or that happening without the supplier giving due credit, the Tribunal is satisfied that this amount was reasonably incurred, correctly charged to and properly payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

17: Again the allegation is that there was double charging, with invoice 1875 at [NAME_4][310] alleged to duplicate invoice 1860 at [NAME_4][309]. In response [NAME_2] refers to each quarterly payment for 2019-20; £6,000 paid on 9/10/19, on 18/12/19, 18/3/20 (1860) and 22/8/20 (1875). He acknowledges that 1860 [NAME_4][309] and 1875 [NAME_4][310] mistakenly used the same descriptor, but maintains there was no duplication or double payment. By way of confirmation he has produced a bank extract of payments at [NAME_23][27], which shows just 4 quarterly payments in 2019-20. We accept the evidence of [NAME_2] in this regard. It is not unknown for a template invoice to be imperfectly updated and re-used resulting in this kind of error. We do not regard this as evidence of double charging. The bank extract confirming 4x payments only across the year, however, puts the issue beyond doubt. In the premises, we find that there was no double charging and reject the Applicants’ claims to the contrary.

18; These charges are challenged on the same basis as item (8) (we presume the reference to arbitration is intended to be to mediation), but these are not costs of the mediation but of the prior FTT proceedings themselves. Although no award of costs was made in those proceedings, neither was any section 20C direction made

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restricting their recovery by way of service charge. In the absence of any such direction or other grounds of opposition to these charges, the Tribunal accepts and determines that they were reasonably incurred and payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

19: The justification for these charges is patent from the narrative on each invoice. Invoice 1841 at [NAME_4][315] is for printing and postage costs with regard to the previous FTT application and invoice 1844 at [NAME_4][316] is for 4 hours work also in respect of the FTT application. Further, as [NAME_2] points out, the rates and prices used were in accordance with the schedule of charges approved by the FTT on his appointment. In light of these facts and matters the Tribunal accepts and determines accordingly that these costs were reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

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SC Year 2020/2021

1: The Tribunal notes the parties’ competing allegations in respect of this item. For the Applicants, that the work done is defective and needs to be redone. From [NAME_2], that the repairs were temporary, that the source of the leak was elusive and temporary repairs were a valid choice given the urgency, and the fact that they have lasted until now vindicates the decision made. There is no actual evidence before us that the temporary repairs were poorly carried out; rather the fact they have lasted until now does we think point in the opposite direction. In the circumstances, the Tribunal accepts [NAME_2]’s justification for these costs and finds accordingly that they were reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges.

2: In response to the allegation that these costs should be the leaseholder’s, [NAME_2] states that the re-assembly of kitchen units was consequent on landlord’s works to repair a blocked common pipe. The Applicants do not take issue with this in their Reply dated 01 August 2025. Moreover, [NAME_2]’s explanation is entirely plausible and plainly justifies the inclusion of this cost within the service charges payable by the Applicants and we so decide. 3: In his recent responses, [NAME_2] explains that the contractor, who was a small firm and ‘not the most literate’ with regard to invoicing, used the wrong property descriptor. But, he adds, there was a serious problem with refuse being dumped at the property at and about that time. Further, he was expecting the invoice and therefore accepted it. Again, the Applicants do not take issue with any of this in their Reply. In the circumstances the Tribunal accepts the account provided by [NAME_2] for the incorrect invoice and his explanation for the charge and holds accordingly that these costs are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 4: As for the allegation that there was no asbestos at Flat 2 and that the contractor was not licensed, [NAME_2] has now produced at [NAME_23] copy contemporaneous photographs and a certificate from [COMPANY_28] confirming the presence of chrysotile composite asbestos in and above this flat. The Tribunal accepts this evidence and determines accordingly that this cost was reasonably incurred and is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 5: These two invoices are said to be works to flats 28 and 14 respectively and therefore properly chargeable to the owners of those flats rather than as service charge. [NAME_2] has omitted to deal with these allegations. However, it seems inherently unlikely that [NAME_2] as a professional managing agent discharging his obligations to the tribunal would have charged such costs to the service charge, unless as in the case of item (2) above, those costs were consequent on works to the common parts. Indeed, given the scale and nature of the defects to the common parts which [NAME_2] was tasked to address (see the FTT decision dated 27 August 2019 at [NAME_4][74]-[95]) and the evidence of similar works to other flats (e.g. 17, 26 and 32, see below) we think this is the overwhelmingly likely explanation. In

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the premises, the Tribunal rejects the challenge to these costs and holds that they are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 7: The complaint here that the payment was in relation to a statement rather than an invoice appears to be mistaken. As [NAME_2] notes and it is self evident from the bundle, that the relevant [NAME_21] document at [NAME_4][349] is an invoice for this amount. In the circumstances the challenge is rejected and we find that no rebate is due to the Applicants in this respect. 8: The extra £150 is said by [NAME_2] to be attributable to [NAME_23] invoice #409 dated 01 March 2021 at [NAME_23][7]. This is not contested by the Applicants in their Reply and we have no reason to doubt that this is the case. In the circumstances the challenge is rejected and no rebate is due to the Applicants. 9: The Applicants put the Respondents to proof in respect of these costs, querying the fact that these were works to a directors flat. In response [NAME_2] has provided a detailed justification. He explains that, like other flats, this flat 17 had bad water ingress. In particular the annex suffered such ingress, hence the decision to commence cathodic protection on that section of the building. There is no issue taken with this explanation in the Applicants’ Reply and we can discern no basis why this explanation should not be accepted by the tribunal. In light of the evidence, therefore, the Tribunal concludes that these works were fully justified by the condition of the building and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 10: For like reasons to those stated above in respect of Flat 17, the Tribunal rejects the challenge to these ‘damp works’ costs in respect of Flat 26. In our judgement these costs were reasonably incurred and are payable. 11: It is understood that the challenge here arises from an alleged difference between the address given by [NAME_25] as its administrative office address (on the invoice) and its registered VAT address. To be valid an invoice needs to include the trader’s full business name, address and VAT registration number. There is no requirement for invoicing purposes that the supplier business address is the same as the VAT registration address or that the VAT registration address is the address shown on the invoice. The challenge to this invoice is accordingly rejected. No rebate is due to the Applicants in this regard. 12: [NAME_17]. It is correct that [NAME_4][415] and [NAME_4][455] are statements not invoices but in our judgement that does not amount to evidence of double payment, if this is the allegation, or anything of the sort. The Tribunal accordingly rejects the challenge to these costs on this basis and holds that so far as this allegation is concerned they were reasonably incurred, so as to be payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 13: [NAME_17]. The allegation that the VAT registration on invoices 51399 at [NAME_4][417], 51190 at [NAME_4][419] and 49149 at [NAME_4][425] is invalid is not explained nor substantiated by reference to any evidence. Certainly, there is no evidence that the VAT number was not the correct number at the date of these invoices. Further, the Tribunal notes that in or about July 2023 [COMPANY_26] was acquired and became part of Classic

© [COMPANY_36], which may well have resulted in a change in accounting practices including VAT registration (from individual to group registration). In these circumstances the Tribunal rejects this further challenge to [COMPANY_26] invoices and holds that each is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 14: It is correct that the invoice relied upon to substantiate this £150 charge at [NAME_4][423] does not include reference to [NAME_29], but it is plain that the invoice is of the same type as all other invoices raised by this contractor; it appears to be written in the same manuscript (see for example the invoice at [NAME_4][421]) and the description of work looks also to include reference to ‘Grass Cuts.’ In light of the foregoing the Tribunal rejects this challenge and holds accordingly that this cost is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants in service charges. Indeed, it strikes this Tribunal that this is an unhappy example of the Applicants exhaustively and in the result wholly unreasonably seeking to challenge costs which ought sensibly to have been accepted. 15: No grounds of opposition to this £1,800.00 charge by [NAME_2] are actually articulated. If the complaint is that they relate to the mediation, that is rejected for the reasons stated above. Likewise, there is no apparent basis for contending that [NAME_2] was not otherwise entitled to charge for professional time spent in dealing with the previous FTT proceedings, as also considered and determined above. 16: The challenge here to ‘two months only’ of this £6,000 invoice raised by [NAME_2] during its tenure as tribunal appointed manager is in our view also unmeritorious. In context it is obvious that the invoice contains an error in describing the period to which it relates, given the ongoing appointment of [NAME_2] and its approved annual fee of £20,000 plus VAT (see [NAME_4][105] para.26). The matter is in any event now put beyond doubt by [NAME_2]’s response (including the bank extract at [NAME_23][5]), which confirms that only 4x quarterly payments of £6,000 (inclusive of VAT) were made during this service charge year. In the circumstances the Tribunal has no hesitation in rejecting the Applicants’ allegation that they were overcharged by this invoice. The full quarterly sum of £6,000.00 (for the third quarter) was correctly chargeable to the service charge and is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants. 17: The contested invoice in the sum of £426 is not merely for rubbish collection, but as appears on its face covers ‘9th-16th July, Inspect every evening and remove excess rubbish.’ Further, in support of the allegation that this is excessive, the Applicants have not produced any comparative price nor indicated what they think would have been a reasonable charge. It does not strike this Tribunal that the sum charged is actually excessive for multiple visits and in the absence of any evidence to show that it was, we are satisfied and accordingly find that the charge was reasonable and is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants in service charges. 18: This is not a penalty charge, attributable to some default on the part of [NAME_2]. It is simply a demand for an overdue account. In the circumstances, the Tribunal rejects

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the challenge and holds rather that the sum of £220.36 was correctly chargeable to the service charge and payable by leaseholders including the Applicants. 20: In support of their case that the works for which this charge was levied were defective, the Applicants rely upon a ‘report’ of [NAME_30] dated 25 March 2025 (see [NAME_4][1300]). Notably, this is not an expert report by an independent expert, but a short note by a roofing contractor prepared some years after the invoiced works were carried out. Nonetheless, the note is critical of the standard of work to the flat roof above Flat 2 and clear that the product used to seal the flat roof ‘… is not compatible and is peeling away…’. In light of this evidence and in the absence of any rebuttal by [NAME_2] of this specific allegation, we are satisfied that the ([NAME_31]) roofing felt needs to be resealed (it is not suggested though that the whole of the installed felt will need to be replaced). No cost for this remedial work is proffered by the Applicants but doing the best that we can and informed by our expert experience in these matters we allow £400 for the sealant to be redone. 21: Although this invoice appears twice in the Applicants’ schedule, this does not in our view amount to evidence that the invoice was paid twice, so as the Applicants might have been double charged. Moreover, [NAME_2] has produced a bank extract indicating that this invoice was only paid once (see [NAME_23][5]). In light of the evidence the Tribunal reject this challenge and concludes rather that no credit is due to the Applicants or other leaseholders in relation to this item. 22: The allegation in relation to this invoice is that ‘no works were carried out’, presumably relying upon [NAME_30]’s observation to this effect at [NAME_4][1300]. However, [NAME_2] explains that this invoice covered the examination and testing of the roof, the balcony above, attendances, repairs to the balcony above and treatment of the upstands under the balcony and bracing of the upstand internally. We would not be prepared to find, as is the gist of the allegation, that this invoice was for bogus works on the strength of the single sentence in [NAME_30]’s note, but in any event accept the foregoing explanation given in evidence by [NAME_2]. In the premises, the Tribunal determines that these costs were reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 23: The challenge here is that no detail was provided to explain the sum charged. However, the invoice itself states ‘Deposit for roof works’. Further, in his response [NAME_2] explains that this was a deposit for the repairs to the roof above the Ground floor front. The Tribunal has no reason to doubt this explanation or its adequacy in justifying the sum charged. In the premises, the Tribunal determines that these costs were reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants in service charges. 25: To confirm, the Tribunal accepts [NAME_2]’s evidence that this cost was correctly allocated to [ADDRESS], rather than any other premises, for the removal of rubbish from the bin area as stated on the face of the invoice. It is therefore correctly chargeable to the service charges and payable by leaseholders including the Applicants.

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26: The contested invoice in the sum of £425 states ‘Remove 206 bags of rubbish and various loose rubbish.’ At approx. £2 per bag, this does not obviously appear excessive. Moreover, the Applicants have not produced any comparative price or other evidence in support of their allegation of excessive charging, nor have they indicated what they allege would have been a reasonable charge. Based on the evidence before us, we are satisfied rather and find that the charge was reasonable and is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants in service charges. 27: The Applicants are correct to note that this invoice (at [NAME_4][526]) was dated 01/07/21 so that if that were the basis of accrual or if a cash basis of accounting was adopted this should have been accounted for in the following year. However, a tribunal appointed manager’s ability to raise sums by way of service charge from lessees derives from the terms of his appointment, rather than the strict terms of the leases (see Maunder Taylor v Blaquiere [2002] EWCA Civ 1633). The appointment terms here define the accounting year as 1/7 to 20/6, but as regards the mechanics of collecting service charge state simply as follows, ‘The Manager shall have authority to demand payments in advance and balancing payments at the end of the accounting year …’ (see [NAME_4][103]). In our judgement there is sufficient flexibility in this to entitle [NAME_2] to determine that on an accruals basis these [NAME_22] costs could reasonably be included in the 2020/21 accounts, given the fact that the camera survey appears to have been instructed and carried out in that year rather than the subsequent year. On this basis and in the absence of any substantive challenge to the amount claimed, the Tribunal holds that this sum was properly chargeable to the 2020/21 service charge account and is payable by the leaseholders including the Applicants according to their respective contributions. 29: For the avoidance of doubt, for the reasons already stated above under item (16), the Tribunal reject the allegation of double charging here and in so far as necessary find that each quarterly charge including that levied by invoice [NAME_2] was paid only once. In the premises no credit is due to leaseholders including the Applicants in relation to these charges or this invoice.

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SC Year 2021/2022 1: The Applicants dispute this cost, referring to the fact that the evidence in support is ‘not an invoice.’ However, the policy renewal document at [NAME_4][579], clearly confirms the costs claimed. The Tribunal is satisfied on the basis of this document, that this was the buildings insurance cost incurred in respect of this year and that the sum was reasonably incurred and is payable by leaseholders including the Applicants in service charges. 2: The basis of challenge to these two invoices is far from clear. Inv.494552 dated 30/4/21 at [NAME_4][598] in the sum of £107.30 and Inv. 496114 dated 31/5/21 at [NAME_4][599] in the sum of £110.89 are both clearly continued accrow hire. There is no apparent issue over the need for these or the reasonableness of the hire charges. Confirmation of payment is now provided by [NAME_2] at [NAME_23][3]. In the circumstances the Tribunal is satisfied they were reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. 3: The allegation that these are leaseholder repairs and should have been paid by the subject flat owner is again in our judgement misplaced. [NAME_2] explains that the work to Flat 32 was to repair damage caused by water ingress and that this was due to defects in the fabric of the building, the responsibility of the landlord. But the invoice itself already indicates that these works were due to water ingress, referring as it does to the use of stain block and re-painting of ceilings and walls. The Tribunal accepts this evidence and holds accordingly that these costs were correctly charged to the service charge and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants. 4: The allegation in relation to invoice 2336 dated 01/12/21 in the sum of £6,500 appeared originally, as in other similar cases, to be that the invoice was duplicated and therefore paid twice. Now the allegation appears to be that the invoiced sum was debited to the service charge twice rather than actually paid twice. Although in this instance it is said that the allegation in respect of invoice 2336 dated 02/12/21 is withdrawn given the payment of £5,850.oo show at [NAME_23][4]. The Tribunal rejects these various allegations; noting that the payment of £5,850 did not relate to an invoice of 2/12/21 but was actually payment of 90% of the invoice of 2336 dated 01/12/21. The provision of two copies of 2336 and its inclusion twice in the Schedule, no more show that the invoice was paid twice than it establishes it was double counted in compiling the service charge year end accounts (see here [NAME_4][552]). In each instance the bank extracts telling the true story in terms of payments, as clearly accepted here by the Applicants. In the premises the Tribunal determines that in this regard, as in other similar instances, no credit falls to be given to leaseholders including the Applicants. 5-9: For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal likewise rejects the allegations of ‘duplication’ in relation to these 4 invoices also. In addition, in relation to the alleged duplication of Invoice CA32277 in the sum of £510 at [NAME_4][665], it will be noted that the allegedly repetitive invoice at [NAME_4][664] simply records payment of

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the invoice.

Accordingly, the Tribunal determines that no credits to leaseholders including the Applicants are appropriate in relation to these invoices. 10-12: The complaint ‘not paid before next bill presented’, with the result that sums outstanding were then added as arrears to the subsequent bill, affords no basis for challenging the electricity charges which had been incurred and still needed to be paid. In the premises the Tribunal duly determines that no credits fall to be given to leaseholders including the Applicants in respect of these invoices. 13-15: The Applicants challenge to these invoices is that they have not seen them and do not know what work was done etc,. However, the relevant [NAME_23] invoices appear to be those numbered 431 and 432 dated 29/06/21 which are already to be found at [NAME_4][617] and [618]. These were duly paid on 09 July 2021 (the date incorrectly ascribed it seems in the Schedule to the invoices themselves) as can be see from [NAME_4][859]. [NAME_23][6] also confirms payment of these invoices, albeit giving a date of 02/07/21. In light of the foregoing, it is not apparent that there is any sustainable basis for challenging these invoices and the Tribunal so determines. 16-18: Again, the Applicants’ challenge was that the relevant [NAME_2] invoices had not been seen, and additionally that they all appeared to have the same reference number. The relevant invoices have now been produced at [NAME_23][9]-[11], numbered B2RW1983, 2007 and 2008 respectively. Further, no issue has been pursued in respect of these invoices in the Applicants’ Reply dated 01 August 2025. In light of the foregoing, it is not apparent that there is any sustainable challenge to these invoices and the Tribunal so determines.

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SC Year 2022/2023 1: Reviewing the description of work in the relevant invoice at [NAME_4][785], it is clear that remedial work was carried out to the external waste pipe at the building and to a joint in the flat roof above flat 34’s terrace. It is clear that these are elements of the building within the scope of the landlord’s repairing covenant. We can see no sensible basis upon which these charges should be paid by any given leaseholder or otherwise than as part of the service charges. 2: Although no invoice is available, the bank extract of payments at [NAME_23][26] confirms that exactly this sum was paid to [NAME_21] to the correct account. There is no question therefore that this was properly and reasonably incurred and chargeable to the service charges. 3 and 4: Although no invoices are available, the bank extract of payments at [NAME_23][28] confirms that exactly these sum were paid to [NAME_23] on the relevant date for different periods. We accept therefore that these sums were properly and reasonably incurred and chargeable to the service charges. 5: Again. although no invoice is available, the bank extract of payments at [NAME_23]] confirms that exactly this sum was paid to [NAME_18] on the relevant date to the correct account. There is no question therefore that this was properly and reasonably incurred and chargeable to the service charges. 6-8: The allegation that planned maintenance reports and obtaining tenders should be part of the management fee is not in our view sustainable. The basic fee of £20,000 per annum was expressed to include those services described at paragraph 3.4 of the RICS Code (see [NAME_4][105]). Whilst it may be said this is non- exhaustive, in our view the works covered are limited to works within the scope of that paragraph or equivalent. It does not cover any more substantial works such as those described under paragraph 3.5 ‘Menu of charges’ of the said Code. These costs are plainly not for work within the scope of 3.4 ‘Annual Fee’ (or any of its detailed sub-paragraphs (a) to (o)) but are for work covered by 3.5. The Planned Maintenance Report (as revised in March 2022) is before us (at [NAME_23][3-20]). It is a substantial piece of work, including an updated costed Planned maintenance forecast and is clearly outside the scope of 3.4 and within 3.5. As for obtaining tenders and supervising major work these are expressly covered by paragraph 3.5 of the Code. In our judgement therefore these sums were properly and reasonably incurred and chargeable to the service charges. 11 & 14: The Applicants are correct that this amount was paid twice, as shown at [NAME_4][830] and by the bank extract produced by [NAME_2] at [NAME_23][26]. However, it is clear also from [NAME_4][830] that both payments were credited to the correct [NAME_21] account, hence the reduced bill of £17.19 (also paid). In the circumstances the Tribunal is satisfied that no credit is due in this regard to leaseholders including the Applicants.

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13 & 15: The Applicants are again correct that this amount was paid twice, as shown at [NAME_4][703] and by the bank extract produced by [NAME_2] at [NAME_23]]. However, it is clear from [NAME_4][703]-[706] that both payments were credited to the correct [NAME_18] account, hence the reduced bill of £143.19 (paid subsequently). In the circumstances the Tribunal is satisfied that no credit is due in this regard to leaseholders including the Applicants. 16: This [NAME_15]’ invoice is dated 31 March 2020 in the sum of £3,020 and relates to ‘”Lit” Registration of restriction relating to [ADDRESS]’ for the period 26 November 2019 to 30 March 2020. The Applicants say that this is an amount allegedly disallowed by Judge Tildesley for which credit should therefore be given. The invoice appears to cover the registration of the management order made by the FTT decision dated August 2019 ([NAME_4][95]). No order was made by the tribunal disallowing these costs (nor are these mediation costs covered by the arguments in that regard). In the premises the Tribunal rejects the basis upon which this charge is contested and concludes accordingly that no credit is due in this regard to leaseholders including the Applicants. 17: This [NAME_15]’ invoice dated 31 March 2020 (ref 687791) is for the sum of £6,939.86 and states that is for ‘”Lit” [ADDRESS], [ADDRESS] ..’. The Applicants say this relates to sanction proceedings brought by [NAME_2] against [ADDRESS] (2008) Limited ([NAME_4][1295]) and that this amount has been charged twice. For the reasons explained under item 1 of 2019/2020 the Tribunal rejects the allegation that this amount was double charged and concludes therefore that no credit is due in this regard to leaseholders including the Applicants. 18: The Applicants contend that they have been incorrectly charged VAT in the sum of £95.60 on this invoice. [NAME_2] counters that engineering insurance may be subject to VAT because the inspection services, when supplied separately, are considered a standard-rated supply of services. He refers to HMRC Guidance Note VATINS7210. Where there is a single supply of insurance and inspection services then VAT will be chargeable on the whole at the standard rate (see also VATINS7310). On the information available, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept that VAT has been wrongly charged by [NAME_32], whom it can reasonably be inferred know their own business, and holds therefore that it was correctly levied, so as to be reasonably incurred and payable by leaseholders including the Applicants. 22: The bank extract of payments to [NAME_23] at [NAME_23][28] confirms that only one payment of £600.00 was made in respect of this invoice dated 09/05/25 and that it was not paid twice. In the circumstances the Tribunal rejects the allegation of double payment; no credit is due in this regard to leaseholders including the Applicants. 23: The Tribunal accept [NAME_2]’s evidence that these redecoration works to [NAME_27] were the result of roof leaks and, therefore, that these were the responsibility of the landlord and properly met by the service charge. This is confirmed by the description of works in the invoice itself (at [NAME_4][773]), which states ‘Carry out all

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normal preparation works to all surfaces to be painted in the 3 no. rooms affected by water leaks from above…’. The fact that the works were organised and invoiced to the owner of [NAME_27], as [NAME_2] explains, does not alter the position as regards the ultimate liability for these costs. The Tribunal determines accordingly that these costs were properly and reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as part of the service charges. 24: The Applicants contest this invoice on the basis that it is a ‘1 year old bill’. This is presumably based upon the fact that the invoice relates to works (installing outstanding handsets) which were completed on 03/05/22 (see [NAME_4][721]), but the date for the invoice given in the schedule is 23/05/23 (although the invoice itself is undated). However, assuming for present purposes that these dates are correct, the fact that the invoice was raised a year or so after the works is no reason at all for disqualifying this expenditure. In the circumstances the Tribunal accepts that these costs were properly and reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as part of this year’s service charges. 25 & 26: The available documentation clearly establishes that these charges were invoiced by respectively [NAME_18] and [NAME_21] and were duly paid. There is no question therefore that these costs were properly and reasonably incurred and chargeable to the service charges. 27 -35: The invoices from [NAME_2] in respect of these amounts are produced at MB6[3] to [10]. The Applicants’ challenges to each of them are at paragraph 4 of their response dated 01 August 2025 and are considered in turn below. Invoice B2RW2114 at MB6[3] claims a 12% fee on major works amounting to £4207.28. Although the invoice does not name the works, it appears to relate to [NAME_23] invoice for Flat D refurbishment at [NAME_4][640] and is charged at the correct percentage (MB6[48] refers). In the circumstances the Tribunal accepts that these fees were properly and reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. Invoice B2RW2111 at MB6[5] claims the sum of £4,589.66 for obtaining tenders but is challenged by the Applicants on the basis it does not give any details of what the tenders were for. This is not quite accurate, given that the invoice states, ‘Obtaining tenders, tender reports and administering major works. Fee based upon value of works in accordance with MO Matrix: £31,872 x 12%’. Although the works are not otherwise identified, given the nature and extent of the known remedial works to the building the Tribunal is not prepared to accept the implicit allegation that this fee is in respect of some made up work or duplicates other charges. Rather, on balance the Tribunal accepts that these fees were properly and reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. Invoice B2RW2109 at MB6[4] claims a 14% fee on major works amounting to £4589.66. Al though the invoice does not name the works, it appears to relate to [NAME_22]’s invoice for flood repairs to Flat C at [NAME_4][615] and is charged at the correct percentage (MB6[48] refers). In the circumstances the Tribunal accepts that these

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fees were properly and reasonably incurred and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. The Tribunal notes that no challenged is pursued in respect of invoice B2RW2107 at MB6[7] in the sum of £2,174.40 for the fire door survey. As regards invoice 2112 at MB6[2] and the allegation of duplication with invoice 2062 at [NAME_4][822]. The narrative on 2112 dated 15 August 2023 states ‘Major Works Admin: Works to Flat 7 (B2RW2062) Admin Charges in accordance with FTT direction’, and the charge £750 plus VAT. Invoice 2062 dated 29 July 2022 is for ‘Obtaining competitive tenders, tender reports and administering all major works will be subject to the following charges to Flat 7: Agreed fee % of Contract. Holbrook Invoice IV 1265 (8,134.00)’, and charges £1,138.76 plus VAT i.e. 14% of the Holbrook invoice (at [NAME_4][770]). Although there is an express acknowledgment of the 2062 invoice in invoice 2112, it is not clear to the Tribunal why [NAME_2] should be entitled to both its 14% fee in 2022 and a minimum charge of £750 in 2023 in respect of the same major works. We therefore disallow the later fee of £750. Invoice B2RW2115 at MB6[9] claims a major works administration fee of £1,200.00 relating to the “flash flood” settled insurance claim with [NAME_12]. The Applicants contest this invoice, stating they would normally expect the insurers to meet the Second Respondents costs. However, the Tribunal has no evidence in support of this allegation, to show these fees would or even might have been covered. Moreover, unless and until insurers accepted this liability, there is no reason why the cost itself was not reasonably incurred and therefore recoverable as part of the service charges (see Oliver v Sheffield City Council [2017] EWCA Civ 225 and Avon Ground Rents v Cowley [2019] 1 WLR 1337). Invoice B2RW2116 at MB6[10] claims a major works administration fee of £1,200.00 for a contract that failed and for which the new agents [NAME_10] refused to pay the contractor as the work was substandard and incomplete. The Tribunal does not have any evidence in support of the allegation that the works to which this invoice relates failed. On the contrary [COMPANY_10]’s letter dated 1 December 2023 confirms that ‘Most of the Cathodic Protection and Wall Treatment project has been paid’ without any apparent criticism. The same can be said of the Board minutes, including those from 9 March 2024 at [NAME_4][1065]. Moreover, [NAME_2] are not guarantors of the works but entitled to charge for their own professional services. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied and duly finds that the fees claimed by this invoice were reasonable and are payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. Invoice B2RW2113 at MB6[8] claims a 14% major works management fee amounting to £1,084.44 for concrete repairs to terrace, the details of which the Applicants complain are undisclosed. Although no supporting invoice for the concrete works is available, given the nature of the known remedial works to the building the Tribunal is not prepared to accept the implicit allegation that this fee is in respect of some made up work. Rather, on balance the Tribunal accept that

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these fees were properly levied and are accordingly reasonably incurred and payable by leaseholders including the Applicants as service charges. Invoice B2RW2117 at MB6[6] claims a major works administration fee of £750 plus VAT relating to Flat C. As above (in respect of 2115) the Applicants dispute this charge on the basis that they would expect [NAME_12] to have paid within the terms of the settlement for this “flash flood” claim. For the reasons set out in relation to B2RW2115 above, however, the Tribunal is satisfied that this invoice is also payable. 36-39: Each of these invoices was queried by the Applicants because they could not find the relevant invoices. These have been produced and no further issue in relation to these is raised in the Applicants’ Reply. However, for the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal confirms that these charges are payable.

Dated: As stated in the decision title.