First-tier Tribunal Grants Five-Year Banning Order Against Rogue Landlord

OUTCOME: Allowed

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case reference : CAM/33UE/HRA/2024/0600

CAM/33UE/HBA/2025/0001

Applicant : [redacted]

Representative : [NAME_1], Counsel

Respondent : [redacted]

(2) Application for a Banning Order – section 15 of the Housing and

Planning Act 2016

Tribunal members : Judge K. [NAME_3]

Judge M. Hunt

Date of hearing : 10 September 2025

Date of decision : 16 September 2025

DECISION

Decisions of the Tribunal

(1) The Tribunal makes a Banning Order for 5 years in the terms set out in the order sent to the parties with this Decision. For the avoidance of doubt, the Respondent may continue to take the income from his existing tenants for up to 7 months, provided he engages a reputable and unconnected professional letting agent to manage the properties on his behalf. The agent will be required to ensure the properties are vacant at the end of that period. This means that upon the expiry of 7 months the Banning Order will be absolute.

(2) The decision notice dated 1 November 2024 to include the Respondent’s name on the database of rogue landlords and property agents is cancelled, it having been surpassed by the making of the Banning Order and the requirements for entry on the database by virtue of section 29(1) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.

(3) The Tribunal makes an order under Rule 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 that the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant £330 within 28 days of this Decision, in reimbursement of the Tribunal fees paid by the Applicant.

The appeal

1. On 21 November 2024, [NAME_2] appealed against the decision notice of the Borough Council of King’s Lynn and West Norfolk (a local housing authority) dated 1 November 2024 to include his name on the database of rogue landlords and property agents.

The application

2. On 18 February 2025, the Council applied to the Tribunal for a banning order against the Respondent under section 15(1) of the 2016 Act. The application followed the Respondent’s convictions for breaching prohibition orders in respect of two properties at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark, King’s Lynn on 11 June 2024.

3. A banning order’ is an order made by the Tribunal, banning a person from: (i) letting housing in England; (ii) engaging in English letting agency work; (iii) engaging in English property management work; or (iv) doing two or more of those things. A banning order may also include provision banning the person against whom it is made from being involved in any body corporate that carries out an activity that the person is banned by any order from carrying out. The Council seeks such provision in its proposed form of order.

4. The application seeks an order banning the Respondent from doing any of those things for a period of 5 years. A Notice of Intent dated 1 November 2024 to apply for a banning order was served on the Respondent by email and post sent that same day.

Procedural matters

5. Directions were issued by the Tribunal on 5 March 2025 in respect of both the appeal and application. The Council prepared a bundle in accordance with those directions. When the Respondent failed to produce and serve a bundle, he was directed to comply by 19 May 2025. As no bundle emerged, on 28 May 2025 the Tribunal struck out [NAME_2]’s appeal against the decision notice and debarred him from further participation in the application for a banning order. Nevertheless, the Respondent was encouraged to attend the hearing, and the panel might lift the bar in whole or part.

6. It is unclear if in arriving at the above decision the Judge had seen [NAME_2]’s witness statement and statement of reasons emailed to the Tribunal on 19 May 2025. Given those responses, the Tribunal considered it fair and just at the hearing to set aside its previous decision of its own volition and reinstate [NAME_2]’s appeal in line with its case management powers within Rule 6. In doing so, the Tribunal noted that the Council raised no objection to such course of action.

7. That being so, the Tribunal will decide whether to confirm, vary or cancel the decision notice under section 32 of the 2016 Act. In deciding to reinstate the appeal, the Tribunal remained aware that the appeal could be somewhat academic if a banning order was made triggering the mandatory requirement for the Council to include the Respondent within the database of rogue landlords.

The hearing

8. The hearing took place via online video (CVP). The Council was represented by [NAME_4], Counsel. He called [NAME_5], Housing Standards Officer, to give evidence. No-one appeared for the Respondent. [NAME_2] had been represented by [NAME_6] of [NAME_6] to whom notice of the hearing was sent on 28 May 2025 with the CVP link. [NAME_4] reported that the day before the hearing, Mr [NAME_6] notified the Council by email that he had not been instructed to attend the hearing. It was unclear if [NAME_2] intended to attend without representation.

9. Under Rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“the Rules”) the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in a party’s absence if satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing, or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing, and it is in the interests of justice to proceed. The hearing was adjourned for a short period whilst the clerk telephoned [NAME_2] to establish if he wished to attend. There was no reply.

10. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that reasonable steps had been taken to notify [NAME_2] of the hearing. His solicitors were plainly aware of the hearing. The Tribunal had a statement of reasons from them and a witness statement from [NAME_2] himself Bearing in mind the overriding objective and the need to deal with cases proportionately and avoiding delay, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the absence of the Respondent.

11. As no-one appeared for the Respondent, the Tribunal took a proactive approach in posing various questions to the Council’s witness and challenging the submissions made by their Counsel. In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal has also taken into account all the written material before us, including that submitted on behalf of the Respondent.

12. At the hearing, the Tribunal flagged up that the convictions relied upon by the Council had all become spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 on 11 June 2025. This was 12 months after conviction as the penalty was a fine. In consequence, evidence of the convictions could only be admitted if the Tribunal made an order under section 7(3) of that Act. The Council was referred to [NAME_7] v London Borough of Newham [2023] UKUT 287 and invited to make submissions on its application to this case.

The law

13. Sections 14 to 27 of the 2016 Act contain the provisions in respect of banning orders. In summary, a Local Housing Authority (‘LHA’) may apply to the Tribunal for a banning order against a person who has been convicted of a banning order offence and who was a residential landlord or property agent at the time the offence was committed.

14. Pursuant to section 16 of the 2016 Act, the Tribunal may make a banning order on an application of a LHA, but only if [NAME_8] has complied with section 15. Therefore, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the following conditions have been met:

• The respondent must have been convicted of a ‘banning order offence’.

• The respondent must have been a ‘residential landlord’ or a ‘property agent’ at the time the offence was committed.

• [NAME_8] has given the respondent a notice of intended proceedings no later than 6 months from conviction of the offence to which the notice relates.

• The notice must inform the person of [NAME_8]’s proposal to apply for a banning order, explain why, state the length of each proposed ban, and invite them to make representations within a specified period of not less than 28 days. [NAME_8] must consider the representations made during the notice period. [NAME_8] must wait until expiry of the notice period before applying for a banning order.

15. In deciding whether to make a banning order the Tribunal must under section 16(4) of the 2016 Act consider:- (a) the seriousness of the offence of which the person has been convicted, (b) any previous convictions that the person has for a banning order offence, (c) whether the person is or has at any time been included in the database of rogue landlords and property agents, and (d) the likely effect of the banning order on the person and anyone else who may be affected by the order.

16. The list of ‘banning order offences’ is found within the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (Banning Order Offences) Regulations 2018. The full list was annexed to the Directions issued by the Tribunal on 5 March 2025. For current purposes, it suffices to note that the list includes the offence under section 32(1) of the Housing Act 2004 of failing to comply with a prohibition order.

17. The effect of a banning order is severe. It prevents a person from lawfully letting housing or engaging in letting agency or property management work in England. A ban must last at least 12 months. It may also include a ban on involvement in any company that carries out such an activity. Breaching a banning order is a criminal offence (under section 21 of the 2016 Act). It may also give rise to a financial penalty. There are also anti-avoidance provisions (in section 27). These invalidate any unauthorised transfer of an estate in land to a prohibited person by a person who is subject to a banning order that includes a ban on letting.

18. A LHA must also enter the name of any person with a banning order in its rogue landlord database for the period for which any banning order relates (section 29).

19. Exceptions can be made to a ban imposed by a banning order. For example, to deal with cases where there are existing tenancies, and the landlord does not have the power to bring them to an immediate end. A banning order does not invalidate any tenancy agreement held by occupiers of a property. However, there may be circumstances where, following a banning order, the management of the property is taken over by [NAME_8] under Part 4 of the Housing Act 2004.

20. As evidence of convictions must be considered under section 16(4), it is important to also consider the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Under that Act, convictions which result in a fine are “spent” after 12 months from the date of conviction. Government ‘Guidance for Local Housing Authorities’ titled ‘Banning Order Offences under the Housing and Planning Act 2016’ was published in April 2018 (by the then Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government). At paragraph 3.4, the Guidance states: “A spent conviction should not be taken into account when determining whether to apply for and/or make a banning order.”

21. The treatment of spent convictions in the context of a housing offence was considered by the Upper Tribunal in Hussain v LB Waltham Forest [2019] UKUT 339 (LC), a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal [2020] EWCA Civ 1539. The Upper Tribunal found that on a proper construction of the 1974 Act the First-tier Tribunal may receive evidence of conduct which resulted in a conviction, even if that conviction is now spent. Section 7(3) of the 1974 Act also allows a judicial authority to admit evidence of spent convictions if it is satisfied that justice cannot be done in the case without it. In Hussain v LB Newham [2023] UKUT 287 (LC), the Upper Tribunal upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision to allow such evidence in deciding whether to make a banning order in that case.

Background facts

22. In December 2023, the Council had issued a total of nine Final Notices imposing financial (civil) penalties in respect of two properties owned by [NAME_2] at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark, King’s Lynn. By Decisions dated 14 February 2025, the Tribunal found that [NAME_2] had committed all the housing offences identified across those notices albeit the Tribunal reduced the overall amount of the penalties.

Main Issues

23. At the start of the hearing, it was agreed that the main issues are:

• Whether the Respondent has been convicted of a ‘banning order offence’;

• Whether the Council has complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 15 (in relation to the proposed banning order), and section 31 (in relation to the proposed database entry) of the 2016 Act;

• Whether at the time the offence was committed the Respondent was a residential landlord or a property agent (subject to the exception for officers of a company in section 15(3));

• Whether there are any issues relating to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974;

• In relation to the proposed database entry, whether the Respondent has, at least twice within a period of 12 months, received a financial penalty (under section 249A of the housing Act 2004) in respect of a banning order offence committed at a time when the relevant landlord was a residential landlord or a property agent;

• Whether to make a banning order. If so, what order to make having regard to section 16(4) and the 2018 Guidance.

The Applicant’s Case

24. At King’s Lynn Magistrates Court on 11 June 2024, [NAME_2] was convicted of two offences of failing to comply with a prohibition order. One offence related to 38 Highfield, the other 48 Westmark. He had been convicted of the same two offences in relation to prohibition orders at the same two properties on 19 September 2013 (along with 7 other offences).

25. The Council says it had regard to the 2018 Guidance in suggesting a banning order for 5 years. It requests 5 years as more than one banning order offence was committed involving two properties and 9 financial penalties were imposed for failures at the same HMO premises.

26. Other factors included the severity of the offences. In addition to the 9 financial penalties, 4 improvement notices were served for 38 Highfield, 48 Westmark, [ADDRESS] and 10 Lindens, all being tenant occupied premises owned by [NAME_2] and found in disrepair. Whilst the Council took account of his representations in mitigation, there were multiple offences and a history of providing poor accommodation. The Council considered that the public interest outweighed not taking action.

27. [NAME_2] was a professional landlord of 15 years or more and he knew, or ought to have known, he was in breach of his responsibilities.

The Respondent’s Case

28. The Respondent does not dispute the criminal convictions recorded against him. However, he refers to the gap of several years between the conviction dates in 2013 and 2024. It is contended that the second set of offences, being breaches of prohibition notices, were instances of the Respondent failing to comply with the strict terms of the notices while undertaking requisite remedial works. He honestly believed they fulfilled the practical requirements of the notices. To that extent, it is submitted that the breaches were not the most flagrant of their type.

29. The Respondent points out that the financial penalties in 2024 related to the same properties as those involved in the 2024 prosecution and arose from the same inspections. The Respondent had appealed against the penalties imposed and the Tribunal made a modest reduction in the amounts. The application to pursue a further appeal was refused.

30. After the first conviction, it had been the Respondent’s resolve to ensure that the properties of which he was a landlord were correctly managed. He took what he believed to be adequate steps to ensure compliance, including taking some properties outside the scope of the house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) regulation.

31. It is submitted that whilst the Respondent was convicted (by ‘guilty’ pleas) of relevant offences, there is no necessity to make a banning order against him.

32. In his witness statement, the Respondent accepted he was convicted of two offences for breach of prohibition notices in respect of his properties at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark. He states that he made a mistake by doing building works he understood to be required by the notices without getting the necessary approval for the notices to be lifted in one case. In the other case, the Respondent says that the tenants altered the living arrangements, which he did not take steps to discontinue. He believed the fines imposed by the Magistrates Court to be excessive, but he lost the impetus to appeal for personal family reasons.

33. The Respondent’s witness statement continues to rehearse arguments already heard by the Tribunal before deciding his appeals against the financial penalties. The Respondent accepts that he is “responsible for some shortcomings as a landlord of these properties” but persists with his arguments (already determined on 14 February 2025) that the level of penalties imposed individually and overall is excessive.

34. The Respondent observes that the previous enforcement action was some years ago, and he had intended to operate the properties as “non-[NAME_9]”. He states that 48 Westmark is no longer operated commercially, and 38 Highfield is not an HMO.

Applicant’s reply

35. In its reply dated 20 May 2025, the Council states that on 19 September 2013 the Respondent was sentenced in respect of 9 offences. One was a breach of a prohibition order at 48 Westmark and another was a breach of a prohibition order at 38 Highfield. The prohibition orders have never been lifted. The Council considers the length of time between conviction dates is far from being a mitigating factor but is an aggravating factor. The second convictions were brought due to individuals living in prohibited rooms for at least 9 to 12 months at 48 Westgate and over 3 years at 38 Highfield.

36. Both prohibition orders were served owing to imminent risk of serious harm to the health and safety of occupiers from fire. Individuals had been prohibited from occupying the rooms because there was a risk of death. The occupants of the prohibited room at 38 Highfield included two children. There were other serious fire safety failures at both properties. Breach of the prohibition orders for a second time was also very serious.

37. The Council points out that the only two of the nine financial penalties were reduced in amount relating to the Council’s scoring on confidence in the penalties being a deterrent. The Council’s assessment of the properties being in poor condition were maintained by the Tribunal.

38. The Council considers it entirely unfounded that [NAME_2] resolved to ensure the properties were managed correctly and lists the chronology of events. The Council is concerned that the Respondent has a track record of not only mismanaging the [NAME_9] he runs but also committing multiple criminal offences. In future, he may try to return the properties to [NAME_9]. He has lost the trust of the Council

Evidence and submissions heard

39. Additional to the case already summarised above, [NAME_5] took the Tribunal to the Council’s completed ‘Severity of Offences’ table at page 341 of its bundle. It was explained that a banning order of less than 5 years would not be sufficient deterrent for the Respondent as a repeat offender with so many properties. The length of ban needed to be sufficient to have financial impact.

40. [NAME_5] said that the Council had disregarded the previous 9 spent convictions from 19 September 2013 including those for breach of prohibition orders at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark made in 2012. These were the same offences for which the Respondent was convicted in June 2024.

41. The Council had considered the pattern of previous behaviour. This included the 9 financial penalties for breach of the HMO Regulations at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark. Part of the pattern had been reverting properties back to single lettings when breaches were found. The properties are no longer [NAME_9], but the Council no longer trusts that the Respondent will not revert them back again.

42. Account had been taken of the impact on tenants. Both prohibition orders were on fire safety grounds. [NAME_5] explained that the layout of the properties at 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark was identical. Both had a room immediately next to the kitchen intended for use as a dining room. The prohibition orders made in 2012 prohibited the use of the room for sleeping accommodation due to fire risk. [NAME_5] explained that a kitchen is the most likely source of fire. Should a fire break out in the kitchen then occupants of the adjacent room would have no escape route other than via the kitchen.

43. It is the Council’s understanding that [NAME_2]’s properties within its area at [ADDRESS] and 10 Lindens are now single let flats. Both have been subject to improvement notices. An unauthorised extension has been built at 10 Lindens. [NAME_5] described the condition of 10 Lindens as “awful”. The Council has been dealing with the Respondent since 2012, and he has never managed his properties properly even if the Council has not always taken enforcement action. None of the 4 improvement notices have been “signed off”. The Respondent had undertaken some work himself, but not all the work had been confirmed as completed or done to an appropriate standard.

44. [NAME_5] said that she was aware that the property at [ADDRESS], Great Yarmouth had been converted into flats. Part was in occupation as a HMO for which a prohibition order had been served by the relevant LHA. It was understood that [NAME_8] had not taken any action in respect of the property in Luton that was tenanted.

45. It became apparent that the Council was not seeking an immediate outright ban, as appeared from its draft form of order within the bundle. Following a short adjournment, [NAME_4] clarified that the Council sought an order for an independent professional property manager to initially manage the properties for a short period whilst the tenancies are wound up. [NAME_4] suggested that the manager be appointed within one month and the tenancies ended within 6 months.

Consideration

46. The Memoranda of Conviction confirm that on 11 June 2024 the Respondent was convicted of two offences of breaching prohibition orders contrary to section 32 of the Housing Act 2004. One offence concerned 38 Highfield, the other 48 Westmark. In both cases, the offences concerned permitting the prohibited use of the room accessed off the kitchen for sleeping accommodation. It is recorded that the Respondent changed his previous ‘not guilty’ plea in each case to ‘guilty’. It is undisputed that the offences under section 32 of failing to comply with a prohibition order are banning order offences.

47. The ‘Notice of Intent to Apply for a Banning Order’ dated 1 November 2024 complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 15 of the 2016 Act. The Notice was given within 6 months of the Respondent’s convictions on 11 June 2024. It informed the Respondent of the Council’s proposal to apply for a banning order and why. It stated that the length of the proposed ban was 5 years and gave the Respondent the requisite minimum of 28 days to make representations (i.e. until 29 November 2024). The Tribunal heard that the representations in response were considered. The application for a banning order was received by the Tribunal on 18 February 2025, being after the end of the notice period.

48. When the offences were committed the Respondent was a residential landlord.

49. By the time of the hearing the banning order offences relied upon in the Notice became spent under the 1974 Act. Having considered the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that justice cannot be done without admitting evidence of the convictions at Kings’ Lynn Magistrates Court on 11 June 2024. The application cannot proceed without that evidence. The statutory regime is based upon a banning order offence being committed. That regime would be ineffective if the Tribunal could not have regard to convictions upon which the application is based. It is noted that the application was made within 6 months of the date of convictions.

50. The two convictions on 19 September 2013 for the breach of prohibition orders were spent long ago. They are pertinent, nevertheless, to the direct pattern of offending on which the Council relies, including the Respondent’s knowledge of occupying the prohibited rooms. Similarly, justice cannot be done without admitting evidence of these previous convictions.

51. Pursuant to section 7(3) of the 1974 Act, the Tribunal has decided for the reasons outlined above to admit the evidence of the 2024 convictions and also the 2013 convictions (insofar as they relate to the prohibition orders). The Tribunal has had regard to those convictions so far as necessary for the purposes of determining the application.

52. Before deciding whether to make a banning order, the Tribunal must consider the factors in section 16(4) of the 2016 Act. The first consideration is the seriousness of the banning order offences.

53. The prohibition orders relate to the risk to occupants of fire. Obviously, fire can lead to serious injury and death. The prohibition orders were made to protect the occupants from death. There are two prohibition orders at two separate properties. Therefore, this is not a case of a single isolated incident. The Tribunal heard how both properties had a dining room next to the kitchen, which were prohibited from use as sleeping accommodation due to the fire risk. Both prohibition orders were breached. Following ‘guilty’ pleas, the Respondent was fined a total of £7,000 for the two offences in the Magistrates Court.

54. These were very serious offences. Their severity is not negated or mitigated by the offences having been discovered during the same Council inspections in 2023.

55. The Respondent is not currently included in the rogue landlord database having appealed the Council’s decision notice proposing to place him on it. However, the Respondent had already been convicted twice in 2013 for the same offence, related to the same 2012 prohibition orders.

56. A total of 9 civil penalties were imposed for failures under the Housing Act 2004 at the same two premises in King’s Lynn. At the time, they were operated as unlicensed [NAME_9]. The Final Notices were upheld on appeal by this Tribunal on 14 February 2025. Only two of the civil penalties were reduced in amount by the Tribunal in relation to the licensing offences only. This was on the basis that there had not been previous licensing failures. The Tribunal fully endorsed the Council’s scoring on the failure to take fire safety measures, which were found to be “very serious offences”. As the Tribunal recorded at the time, it could fully understand why the Council would have little confidence that a financial penalty would deter repeat offending. There were multiple offences across the properties which were both in poor condition.

57. The Respondent has been a professional landlord for over a decade. He knew or certainly ought to have known his responsibilities as a landlord. Yet, he has persisted in these proceedings to seek to blame occupiers for some failings. The Respondent’s own failure to take responsibility for the proper management of his rented properties is alarming.

58. If the Respondent had resolved to ensure his properties were managed correctly after his convictions in 2013, he did not succeed. Indeed, his conduct and the numerous failings as illustrated by the financial penalties imposed for 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark demonstrate a blatant disregard of housing standards. His tenants were exposed to the most serious of safety risks. He rented out unsafe and substandard accommodations. The Respondent’s poor management has not been confined to the two properties in King’s Lynn. Two others within the Council’s area have also been subject to improvement notices. Notably, full compliance with all the improvement notices remains outstanding.

59. A series of photographs have been supplied by the Council to demonstrate the multitude of hazards, defects and deficiencies across the Respondent’s let properties in King’s Lynn. An old fuse box was found at [ADDRESS] that is not to current electrical regulation standard, along with damp/mould and windows in disrepair amongst other matters.

60. Similarly, at 10 Lindens there was an old fuse box, damp/mould with a hole in the ceiling and exposed wires in a poorly fitted kitchen light. In addition, a substandard extension had been built without the necessary building control consent. There was no evidence of ongoing periodic checks and maintenance of electrical installation inspections, smoke alarms, supplied electrical appliances or firefighting equipment.

61. Moreover, the witness statement of [NAME_5] records that during and following the Council inspections of 38 Highfield and 48 Westmark, complaints were received from tenants of overcrowding, poor living conditions, electrical and fire safety concerns, a lack of hygiene and poor maintenance and management practices.

62. The Tribunal has no information on the likely effect of the banning order upon the Respondent besides rental properties being his source of income. On 3 October 2024, Mr [NAME_2] had submitted replies to the Council’s requirement to provide information under section 19(1) of the 2016 Act. The replies identified three premises used for commercial purposes, which would not be caught by a banning order. Aside from [NAME_2]’s home address, seven other properties were identified. Four of those properties are within the Council’s area.

63. With so many properties, the Tribunal has no cause for concern that a banning order over 5 years would cause the Respondent undue hardship. As [NAME_4] said, with such a significant property portfolio, assets could be sold to provide income for the Respondent if he so wished. In this regard, the Tribunal notes that the 2018 Guidance says an order should have a real economic impact on the offender and demonstrate the consequences of not complying with their responsibilities.

64. An extremely important factor is the impact on the existing occupiers. The Council’s witness explained that its Housing Options Team is already on standby to assist them in finding alternative accommodation. If given notice to vacate then the occupiers would automatically be treated as though homeless for the purposes of benefitting from Council assistance in finding emergency accommodation. [NAME_10] are available to help.

65. The Council’s witness believed that the Respondent’s ex-wife lives in his property in Dereham, and his ex-partner now occupies 48 Westmark. It is unknown if the Respondent’s Luton property is currently tenanted. The Council understands that the Great Yarmouth property is empty. Bearing in mind all these factors, enough time would be needed for affected occupants to be re-homed before any banning order became absolute.

66. The Tribunal may take account of the 2018 Guidance. At paragraph 1.7 it states that banning orders are aimed at “Rogue landlords who flout their legal obligations and rent out accommodation which is substandard. We expect banning orders to be used for the most serious offenders”.

67. It is noted that the Respondent is a repeat offender. It is no mitigation that several years separated the convictions. If anything, the length of time that the prohibition orders were in place aggravated the offence. During the intervening years, the Respondent continued to be advised and guided by the Council on measures required at his properties within their borough. He knew the prohibition orders remained in force and has not sought to argue otherwise. Despite this, he profited by letting out prohibited rooms in two properties when he should not have done so. This continued over a prolonged period. They were long standing breaches. In doing so, he placed occupiers at very serious risk of injury or death. They were vulnerable individuals by reason of their circumstances, language barrier, or age. They included children.

68. All things considered, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent does fall within the category of a most serious offender. Contrary to what the Respondent says, it is wholly appropriate and necessary to make a banning order. The period of 5 years sought by the Council is proportionate to reflect: (i) the severity of the offences (ii) the previous offending for the same offences (iii) for the duration to be set at a high enough level to prevent recurrence and also (iv) to deter others from committing similar offences.

69. Taking account of all the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Council’s view that the Respondent should be banned from letting housing, engaging in letting agency work and engaging in property management work given his disregard for health and safety risk. As an anti-avoidance measure, the Respondent should also be banned from acting as an officer of any company that lets housing or engaged in property management or letting agency work in England. He should also be banned from any involvement in the management of such a company.

70. The Tribunal is concerned to ensure that the properties are managed properly pending the winding up of the tenancies. It is particularly important to ensure that necessary electrical, gas and fire safety checks and measures etc are in place. Given the Respondent’s track record, the Tribunal is not satisfied that he can be trusted to manage his properties correctly and responsibly.

Accordingly, it shall require an independent professional property agent to be appointed within one month of the order being issued to take over management and bring the tenancies to an end. The Council suggested a 6-month timescale overall. The Tribunal considers that 7 months is more appropriate before the order becomes absolute to allow the agent a full 6 months to take the necessary steps.

The database appeal

71. Once a banning order is made, section 29(1) of the 2016 Act imposes a duty upon the Council, as local housing authority, to make an entry in the database of rogue landlords in respect of [NAME_2] as no entry had yet been made following his conviction. As confirmed by [NAME_5], the Council had served a decision notice of its intention to make an entry in the database. In accordance with section 31(5), the entry had not been made pending the outcome of the appeal, albeit struck out before reinstatement at this hearing. Pursuant to section 29(2), the entry must be maintained for the duration that the Banning Order has effect. In these circumstances, it would serve no purpose to consider the appeal, and the decision notice will be cancelled under section 32(4).

Application for Tribunal fees

72. The Council applied for reimbursement of its Tribunal fees. In view of its findings, the Tribunal further makes an order under Rule 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 that the Respondent shall within 28 days reimburse the application fee of £110 and the hearing fee of £220 paid by the Council.

Conclusion

73. A banning order shall be made against the Respondent for 5 years in the terms set out in the Banning Order to be issued separately.

Name: Judge K. [NAME_3] Date: 16 September 2025

Rights of appeal

By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have.

If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case.

The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit.

The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case reference : CAM/33UE/HBA/2025/0001

Applicant : [redacted]

Respondent : [redacted]

Tribunal members : Judge K. [NAME_3]

Judge M. Hunt

Date of Order : 16 September 2025

BANNING ORDER

1. In accordance with section 16 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016

(the “Act”), [NAME_2] is BANNED from each of the

following:

(a) letting housing (see note D below) in England;

(b) engaging in English letting agency work (see note E below); and

(c) engaging in English property management work (see note F below).

2. Pursuant to section 18 of the Act, [NAME_2] IS ALSO

BANNED from being involved (see note G below) in any body corporate

that carries out any of the activities described in paragraph 1 of this Order.

3. The length of this ban is for 5 years starting on and including 1 October

2025 and ending on and including 30 September 2030.

4. If, by 31 October 2025 [NAME_2] provides the

BOROUGH COUNCIL OF KING’S LYNN AND WEST NORFOLK

with a list of all rental property that he owns or is otherwise involved with

and the details of the reputable unconnected professional property agent he

has appointed to manage those properties on his behalf, he will be entitled

to continue to rent the properties through that agent until 30 April 2026 by

which date the agent must have wound down the tenancies and ensured the

tenants have vacated the properties.

5. Expressions used in this Order are defined in the Act. Please refer to the

explanatory notes below.

NOTES

(A) A person who breaches a banning order commits an offence

and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment, or a

fine, or both (section 21 of the Act). Alternatively, a local

housing authority may impose a financial penalty of up to

£30,000 on a person whose conduct amounts to that offence

(section 23 of the Act).

(B) A person who is subject to a banning order that includes a ban on

letting may not make an unauthorised transfer of an estate in land to a

prohibited person (section 27 of the Act).

(C) A breach of a banning order does not affect the validity or enforceability

of any provision of a tenancy or other contract (section 24 of the Act).

(D) The expressions “housing” and “letting” have the meanings given to

them by section 56 of the Act. At the date of this Order, these are:

“housing” means a building, or part of a building, occupied or

intended to be occupied as a dwelling or as more than one

dwelling;

“letting”—

(a) includes the grant of a licence, but

(b) except in Chapter 4, does not include the grant of a tenancy

or licence for a term of more than 21 years,

and “let” is to be read accordingly;

(E) The expression “English letting agency work” has the meaning

given to it by section 54 of the Act. At the date of this Order, this is:

(3) In this Part “letting agency work” means things done by a

person in the course of a business in response to instructions

received from—

(a) a person (“a prospective landlord”) seeking to find another

person to whom to let housing, or

(b) a person (“a prospective tenant”) seeking to find housing to

rent.

(4) But “letting agency work” does not include any of the

following things when done by a person who does nothing else

within subsection (3)—

(a) publishing advertisements or disseminating information;

(b) providing a means by which a prospective landlord or a

prospective tenant can, in response to an advertisement or

dissemination of information, make direct contact with a

prospective tenant or a prospective landlord;

(c) providing a means by which a prospective landlord and a

prospective tenant can communicate directly with each other.

(5) In this Part “English letting agency work” means letting

agency work that relates to housing in England.

(F) The expression “English property management work” has the

meaning given to it by section 55 of the Act. At the date of this Order, this

is:

(3) In this Part “English property management work” means things done

by a person in the course of a business in response to instructions received

from another person (“the client”) where—

(a) the client wishes the person to arrange services, repairs, maintenance,

improvements or insurance in respect of, or to deal with any other aspect of the management of, premises on the client's behalf, and

(b) the premises consist of housing in England let under a tenancy.

(G) For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Order, a person is “involved” in

a body corporate if the person acts as an officer of the body corporate or

directly or indirectly takes part in or is concerned in the management of

the body corporate (section 18(2) of the Act).

(H) This Order is made for the reasons set out in the decision notice which

is being sent to the parties at the same time as this Order.

(I) At the date of this Order, section 20 of the Act provided as follows:

(1) A person against whom a banning order is made may

apply to the First-tier Tribunal for an order under this section

revoking or varying the order.

(2) If the banning order was made on the basis of one or more

convictions all of which are overturned on appeal, the First- tier

Tribunal must revoke the banning order.

(3) If the banning order was made on the basis of more than

one conviction and some of them (but not all) have been

overturned on appeal, the First-tier Tribunal may—

(a) vary the banning order, or

(b) revoke the banning order.

(4) If the banning order was made on the basis of one or more

convictions that have become spent, the First-tier Tribunal may—

(a) vary the banning order, or

(b) revoke the banning order.

(5) The power to vary a banning order under subsection (3)(a) or (4)(a)

may be used to add new exceptions to a ban or to vary—

(a) the banned activities,

(b) the length of a ban, or

(c) existing exceptions to a ban.

(6) In this section “spent”, in relation to a conviction, means spent for the

purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.