First-tier Tribunal Rules Against Park Home Owner Over Parking Rules

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FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)

Case Reference

: CAM/00KB/PHC/2025/0008

Site

: [COMPANY_1], [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

[NAME_2] : [ADDRESS], [COMPANY_1], [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE]

Applicant (Site Owners and Operators)

: [COMPANY_3]

Respondent ([NAME_2] Owner)

: [NAME_7] of Application : To determine questions arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or a Statement to which it applies under section 4 Mobile Homes Act 1983 - in particular: To determine whether there has been a breach of the express or implied terms of the Applicant’s Statement with the Respondents

Tribunal

: Judge JR Morris Regional Surveyor [NAME_10] [NAME_41] (Hons)

Date of Application : 17 February 2025 Date of Directions : 20 June 2025 Date of Decision : 20 November 2025

________________________________

DECISION _________________________________

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2025

Decision

1. The Tribunal determines that the Respondent is in breach of Rule 21 of the Park Rules the compliance with which is required under the Written Statement of Agreement Part IV Express Terms paragraph 3 (j).

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2. The Tribunal makes a direction under section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 that a reasonable time for the Respondents to remedy the breach and find an alternative place to park the second vehicle is by 31 December 2025.

Reasons

Introduction

3. An Application dated 17 February 2025 was made by the Applicant for a determination of a question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or the Written Statement to which it relates under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 as amended, as follows:

4. The Applicant sought a determination:

1) that the Respondent is in breach of the Park Rules under Rule 21, which states:

21. Parking is only permitted for one vehicle per [NAME_2].

2) that the Respondent is further in breach of the terms of the Written Statement of Agreement Part IV Express Terms paragraph 3 (j) which states:

3 (j) To comply with the park rules from time to time in force.

3) that a direction be made under section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 that the Respondent be required to remedy the alleged breach within a reasonable period and suggested 28 days.

5. The Application identified an issue regarding the failure of the Respondent to register [NAME_12] as an occupier of the [NAME_2] which is important to ensure the occupants meet the criteria of the Site. This has since been remedied, [NAME_15] meets the criteria and was registered as an occupant on 4 December 2024.

6. In the course of the correspondence between the Applicant and the Respondent, the Respondent submits that she represents a group of Occupiers regarding the issue of vehicle parking. This case is brought by the Applicant against the Respondent as an individual and so concerns the Respondent alone. A group of occupiers could apply collectively for a determination of a question arising under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 or the Written Statement of Agreement to which it applies under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 but in that instance it is they who would be the applicants and the site owner, the respondent.

7. Directions were issued on 20 June 2025 under which the Applicant was required to send a bundle of relevant documents to the Tribunal and the Respondent by 18 July 2025. The Respondent in return was required to send a bundle of relevant documents to the Tribunal and the Applicant by 8 August

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2025. The Applicant was to reply to the Respondent’s evidence by 15 August 2025.

8. The Applicant and Respondent complied with Directions.

9. The Tribunal determined that a hearing should be held and this was arranged to be by video call on 18 November 2025.

The Law

10. The relevant sections of the legislation are set out in Appendix 2.

Hearing

11. A hearing was held on 18 November 2025 by video link which was attended by [NAME_16], the Applicant’s Operations Manager and [NAME_7], the Respondent and [NAME_12], [NAME_19]’s partner.

Evidence and Submissions

12. The Applicant provided a written statement of case in the form of a witness statement by [NAME_16], the Applicant’s Operations Manager together with supporting documents. This statement of case essentially took the Tribunal through the correspondence between the parties and the supporting documents were copies of the correspondence from both parties. This correspondence set out their respective cases. Therefore, the Applicant’s statement of case effectively included the Respondent’s statement of case. The following is an account of that evidence and submissions some of which is précised and paraphrased. Sections of the correspondence are quoted where considered relevant and pertinent.

13. In accordance with the Directions the Applicant provided a copy of the Written Statement of Agreement for the occupation of the pitch by the Respondent. The Agreement which commenced on 29 June 1991 was originally between the Applicant and [NAME_20] who sold the Home and assigned the Agreement to the Respondent’s predecessors [NAME_27] and [NAME_24] on 2 February 2014. [NAME_27] ([NAME_24] being deceased on 1 August 2016 sold the Home and who assigned the Agreement to the Respondent on 14 December 2016. A Schedule 5 Notice of Assignment dated 13 January 2017 gave the Respondent as the sole occupier. [NAME_12] was added as an occupier on 4 December 2024.

14. The Applicant said it became concerned about the increasing numbers of vehicles being reported on the site in 2024 and persons parking additional vehicles on their pitch, which contravenes Park Rule 21.

15. Following monitoring carried out by the Park Management Team and the Area Manager it was observed that the Respondent was parking two vehicles on the pitch.

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16. On 17 July 2024 the Park Manager wrote to the Respondent reminding her of Park Rule 21 and giving 28 days for alternative parking to be found.

17. The Respondent did not acknowledge or respond to the letter.

18. On 2 September 2024 the Applicant wrote to the Respondent outlining the contravention of the Park Rule and the Terms of the Written Statement of Agreement. The Applicant said that the Respondent was aware of the Park Rules adding that homeowners are at liberty to own as many vehicles as they choose but are only permitted to park one vehicle on the Site and the type of vehicle must be in accordance with the Park Rules. The Applicant gave a further 7 days (until 9 September 2024) for the breach to be resolved.

19. On 5 September 2024 the Respondent wrote to the Applicant seeking to answer as representing a group of Occupiers saying:

“As a group we realise that we are in breach of Park Rule 21 which states that parking is only permitted for one vehicle per [NAME_2].

…we feel…we have been misled when we purchased our properties. [ADDRESS] were not very transparent and at best were glossed over in order to get a sale. With reference to parking a second vehicle, the general response was that it was OK to park in one of the car parks on site. If it was made clear at the time then most of us would not have gone through with the purchase as for various reasons, we needed two cars.

This is possibly an issue that [NAME_6] can take up with the estate agents selling park homes. As we write, there is currently one unit advertised as having a drive that can take two cars and also states it’s an over 55 site.

We know that you provide adequate parking on the park to comply with the site licence. At the moment the extra cars in question have zero impact on the car parks. This can be easily monitored for the foreseeable future to ensure that it does not become an issue. In the ten years since the rule came into place there have been no issues over parking. In fact, there has always been more than enough spare parking to accommodate residents and visitors.”

20. On 12 September the Applicant replied as follows:

“We are unable to respond to you as a collective group as this is a breach of individual Agreements. Therefore, we can only address our response directly to the points raised within your correspondence.

Due to the amendments in 2013 by the Government to the Mobile Homes Act, Site Operators were no longer permitted to be involved in the sales of previously owned homes, and it was the legal duty of the seller and their representative, to ensure the home was sold in accordance with the Mobile Homes Act.

It is the responsibility of the seller to ensure the buyer is aware of the park rules prior to their commitment to purchase a [NAME_2]. This would then

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give the proposed buyer(s) an opportunity to decide if buying a [NAME_2] meets their own personal requirements. It is also the responsibility of the buyers to ensure they are fully aware of the park rules and how it would impact on their lives once moved onto the park.

If you feel you have been misled when you were sold the home, you will need to take this matter up directly with the seller or their legal representative, or even your own legal representative if you used one as it was their legal duty to ensure the home is sold correctly as stated above.

We would draw your attention to your Schedule 5, Notice of Assignment Form section 4, which states: “You have read and understood the site rules (or have had them explained to you) and agree to comply with them.”

We note your comments regarding estate agents and possible solutions to future sales, and unfortunately, again due to the amendments by the Government in 2013, the Site Operators are not permitted to stop or interfere with the sales.

We can advise sellers and estate agents of the procedures and the park rules, however, we are not permitted to liaise directly with potential buyers prior to the sale and any information they seek must be relayed to them from the seller. The information that we advise sellers, estate agents or solicitors would be up to them to forward to the buyer.

In reference to your comments regarding the estate agent misinforming prospective buyers, it is their responsibility to obtain the park rules and advertise the home. We are not responsible for them misinforming potential buyers.

Our Area Managers monitor the parks at different times to ensure we manage our parks and site licence responsibly. We cannot agree with you that the additional vehicles being parked on [COMPANY_1] is not having an impact. We are having to address this breach as we have become very concerned by the limited number of available spaces on the park.

One of the conditions of the site licence which we are required to adhere to, is to ensure there is enough parking bays for residents, their visitors, carers and home delivery drivers.”

21. On 24 September 2024 the Applicant served a “Letter Before Action” which stated:

“We understand that currently, the contravention of the park rule has yet to be remedied. [Site Rule 21 and Express Term paragraph 3(j) were quoted] … parking more than the permitted number of vehicles on the park could cause [COMPANY_3], to breach one of the conditions of the Site Licence as issued by the Local Authority. We manage the permitted

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number of vehicles on the park, to ensure we meet this condition of the Site Licence.

One of your obligations in accordance with the Written Statement under Mobile homes Act 1983 Amendment, and part IV of the Express Terms of the Agreement under section 3 (h) states as follows:

• 3(h) - Not to do or cause to be done anything upon any part of the park which would constitute a breach of any of the conditions of any Site Licence applicable from time to time to the park and to comply with any enactments orders regulations and bye-laws which relate to the park the pitch or the Mobile Home whether national local or any other competent authority.

[COMPANY_3] feel that a reasonable period has been given for this breach to have been remedied. We cannot permit for the breach to remain indefinitely and therefore we require the following to remedy the breach.

Remedy of Breach

• To find alternative parking off the site for your additional vehicle and to ensure that the number and type of vehicles parked on the site, are in accordance with the park rules.

If the breach is not remedied within 7 days from the date of this letter we will unfortunately, have no alternative, other than to serve a Notice of Breach and make an application to the First-Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Residential Property, and seek resolution that the said breach is remedied.”

Paragraph regarding the obtaining of Legal Advice was included.

22. On 23 September 2024 the Respondent replied saying:

“…it would be very easy to monitor the car parking issues so it does not become an issue in the future, by allowing the park manager to have discretion in the matter… … On average on any day, morning, afternoon or night there are 50 to 60 spare spaces on the park.

We are still hoping for a conclusion that will suit all parties so that we can continue to park the extra 7 vehicles in question on the park, as at the moment this does not cause a breach of the site licence by yourselves.”

23. On 27 September 2024 the Applicant replied saying:

“The park has always been resident parking for one vehicle and there cannot be an amendment to this park rule. We are obligated to ensure that there are sufficient available spaces in accordance with the site licence.

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If we had a situation where some could park a second vehicle and some could not, or visitors had nowhere to park, we would fall foul of the Government requirements and possibly our site licence.”

24. A copy of the Site Licence was provided which stated:

“13. Communal Vehicular Parking Suitably surfaced parking spaces shall be provided to meet the requirements of residents and their visitors.”

25. On 7 October 2024 the Respondent replied drawing “attention to a First-tier Tribunal, case reference CHI/24UJ/PHC/2021/0002 “between the Applicant and an occupier at another site. “Although slightly different there are a lot of similarities to our cause, in particular how the homes were sold regarding 2 cars. The tribunal ruled in favour of the respondent.”

26. In addition the Respondent referred to [NAME_28] which she interpreted as stating that if a rule is not enforced for a significant period (in this case nearly 10 years) then [NAME_28] can be used if certain criteria can be met.

27. On 23 October 2024 the Applicant replied stating that it did not agree that there are any similarities between the present case and case reference CHI/24UJ/PHC/2021/0002 or that [NAME_28] applied.

28. On 20 November 2024 the Respondent replied stating:

“[NAME_28] is relevant as you as a company have failed to enforce rule 21 since 2014. The fact that it was not enforced and we were led to believe that it wouldn't be enforced (10 years is a long time) then it became the norm. The fact that it would now be detrimental to us if we had to sell one car, or have to park maybe 10 to 15 mins walk off the park, would meet the criteria for [NAME_28].”

It was added that the issue only concerned 11 occupiers who had 2 cars.

29. On 2 December 2024 the Applicant replied saying:

“We cannot agree with you that this matter is limited to an extra 11 vehicles. We have previously addressed this contravention with other residents on the park and most residents abide by the park rules however, with residents parking additional vehicles on the site this will leave [COMPANY_3], with no redress for any future breaches of this type.

We must be fair and consistent in our approach to addressing our park rules and by allowing 11 homeowners to breach rule 21, we are not being fair to the 204, other homeowners on the park who may want to have an additional vehicle.

We have previously carried out a survey to assess the parking spaces available at [COMPANY_1] including those who could potentially have multiple vehicles on their drive, which could breach Licence conditions) and we found

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that if everyone was to have two vehicles on the park, we would be short of 97 spaces, not including our requirement to provide visitor spaces.

Therefore, we are unable to change the rule to allow 2 vehicles per home as we would not be compliant to park the additional cars in accordance with the licence conditions.”

30. Also on 2 December the Applicant served a Notice of Breach on the Respondent in like form to the Letter Before Action dated 24 September 2024.

Respondent’s Reply to Applicant’s Case

31. In addition to the above correspondence the Respondent provided a statement re-enforcing the points made in correspondence. In particular:

a) The main concern was that the Respondent had been misled when purchasing the Home. The park rules were not very transparent and at best were glossed over in order to get a sale. With reference to parking a second car, the Respondent was told that as there was a double drive, both cars could be parked on it. At no time was attention drawn to the rule stating Occupiers could only have 1 car on the park. If it this had been made clear the Respondent said she would not have gone through with the purchase as for various reasons, she and her partner needed two cars.

b) It was submitted that the additional cars parked on the site are not having an impact. The Respondent said that having lived on the park for almost 9 years the additional vehicles of Occupiers who have 2 cars are having virtually zero impact. She said she did not park on the car park as both her car and her partner’s are on their double drive.

c) The Respondent said she also had a garage for which she was charged an additional £48.50.

d) She suggested that Park Rule 21 could be amended.

e) The Respondent said that there are 215 units which if they had double occupancy and a car each would give a potential of 430 vehicles. While this is possible, it is a highly unlikely scenario. At the moment there are between 90 to 95 units with single occupancy. Which would equate to 320 vehicles if every occupant had a car but this is unlikely because of the number of older persons on the Site. It was added that the Respondent’s understanding was that a Site Owner was obliged to provide 1 parking space per unit plus 1 extra per every 5 units. It was submitted that there are more than adequate spaces provided.

f) It was submitted that [NAME_28] applied.

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Applicant’s Response to Respondent’s Reply

32. The Applicant made a response re-enforcing the points made in correspondence. In particular:

33. The Applicant said that to avoid the risk of being misled it is important that [NAME_29] take independent legal advice.

34. Whilst the Respondent is not parking in one of the communal parking bays around the site, they are parking two vehicles on the pitch of the [NAME_2] which clearly breaches Park Rule 21.

35. The Applicant notes an image provided by the Respondent shows there are very few cars in the communal car park and does not dispute that there are periods when the car park is not at capacity and this is in part due to how the Applicant manages the permitted number of vehicles on the site.

36. The Applicant said it would consider running a consultation on a park rule if a majority of homeowners were in favour of a rule being amended, removed or added. However, such new rule must not have discretionary element. The Applicant did not consider it fair to create a rule where some homeowners would have the ability to park 2 vehicles and other would not. For every homeowner to have two vehicles and to allow for the 1:5 visitor ratio, we would need to have 477 parking spaces throughout the Site. From a companywide survey we carried out, we calculated there was a total of 337 parking spaces at [COMPANY_1]. Therefore over 50% of the homeowners would not benefit or be able to have an additional vehicle, or we would be short of our parking allocation and therefore be in breach of our Site Licence Conditions.

37. The Applicant said that whilst it does not agree with the principle of residents having Personal Permissive Agreements between one homeowner and another for parking an additional vehicle on another residents’ drive who do not own a vehicle, a previous Tribunal (case reference MAN/OOCZ/PHC/2021/0028 on 11 July 2022) determined that the Park Rule did not preclude this. If the Personal Permissive Agreement breaks down, the Applicant said that it expected the additional vehicle to be removed from the park or an alternate agreement to be found with another homeowner.

Hearing

38. The hearing was by video link and was attended by [NAME_30], the Applicant’s Operations Manager and [NAME_19] and her partner [NAME_15].

39. The Tribunal went through correspondence between the parties: a) To ensure that the Applicant had given sufficient notice and opportunity for the Respondent to either remedy the alleged breach or challenge that there was a breach at all; and b) To express and, if necessary, clarify the parties’ respective cases.

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40. Regarding the car parking across the Site the parties provided the following figures. These may not be precise but are understood to be generally correct. It is appreciated that not every [NAME_2] has an occupier with a car. There are 218 park homes on the Site with approximately 290 occupiers. 162 park homes have hardstanding for a vehicle on their pitch and 34 have an allocated parking space in the communal car park. There are 22 park homes which have neither parking on their pitch nor do they have an allocated parking space. These occupiers would need to park in the communal car park on a first come basis. Therefore the communal car park has 34 allocated spaces, 22 spaces for occupiers who have neither parking on their pitch nor allocated parking which leaves some 60 spaces for visitors which is, on an arithmetical average, just over 1 space per 4 park homes. In addition there are a number of garages which are let by the Site Owner to Occupiers at a rent separately from the Written Statement of Agreement.

41. In response to the figures [NAME_30] said that, where historically there had been allocated parking spaces which were marked on the car park, these were preserved when the car park was resurfaced and remarked. Otherwise there was no allocated parking in the communal car park.

42. The following is the evidence and submissions of the parties followed by the Tribunal’s findings:

Applicant’s Submissions-

43. The Applicant represented by [NAME_30] submitted that the Respondent is in breach of Park Rule 21 for the following reasons:

a) Two cars are parked adjacent to the [NAME_2] on the pitch.

b) [ADDRESS] took effect as a new rule in 2014 before the Respondent bought her Home from the previous occupier and was assigned the occupation of the pitch in 2016. The previous rule was discretionary and therefore prohibited under the 2013 legislation. The new rule was not retrospective for existing occupiers but did apply to new occupiers and the Respondent was a new occupier.

44. The Applicant’s case was that Rule 21 states that “Parking is only permitted for one vehicle per [NAME_2]”. The Respondent has two vehicles which are parked on the pitch and therefore is in breach of Rule 21. In the Applicant’s opinion that means one vehicle per home (and its occupants) and not just one vehicle per pitch. Therefore second vehicles should be removed from the Site. However, this has not been the interpretation of previous tribunals which interpreted the rule as being one vehicle per pitch, irrespective of by whom the vehicle was owned. In the light of this the Applicant has allowed a second vehicle of one occupier to be parked on the pitch of another occupier who does not have a vehicle under a “permissive” arrangement. The Applicant did not approve of this arrangement but had so far allowed it following the decisions, but was monitoring its application.

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45. The Tribunal noted that garages were available to rent which, although within the curtilage of the Site, were neither on a pitch or part of the communal area of the site. The provision of these garages was not part of the pitch fee and were let for a rent on a separate contract. The Respondent had said that she and her partner rented one of these garages. The Tribunal asked if these could be used to house a second car. [NAME_30] said that he had not considered this possibility. The Respondent said that a garage had been used by an occupier to park a second car and had been told to remove it by the Site Owner.

46. [NAME_30] said that the Applicant was under the impression that the Respondent’s Home was only occupied by one person and therefore was not alerted to the two cars parked on the pitch being the second car of the occupiers. When it became aware in December 2024 that the Respondent was parking more than one vehicle for her Home on the pitch the Applicant took action. This was contrary to the 2014 Park Rules, which were applicable to the Respondent.

Tribunal’s Finding re Applicant’s Submission

47. The Tribunal found that the Respondent admitted that she was parking a second car on her pitch.

48. Where the Respondent’s second car was to be moved to, if the Tribunal found there was a breach, was not an issue in this case. Therefore, the Tribunal did not make a finding or decision in respect of the parking of a second car: • on the pitch of an occupier, who did not have a car, and gave permission for another occupier to park a car on the hard standing on their pitch; • in an allocated space of an occupier who did not have a car; or • in a garage.

However it is a matter that the parties ought to consider and hopefully settle without the Tribunal’s involvement.

Respondent’s Submission 1

49. The Respondent admitted that there were two cars parked on her pitch but made the following submissions.

50. The Respondent submitted that Park Rule 21 is not applicable to her because she was misled when she purchased the Home and was assigned the written statement of Agreement for the pitch. It was noted that the Applicant took no part in the sale of the Home or assignment of the pitch agreement which was negotiated through an estate agent.

Tribunal’s Finding re Respondent’s Submission 1

51. The Tribunal said that any cause of action such as for misrepresentation is not a matter within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Respondent’s Submission 2

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52. The Respondent submitted that Park Rule 21 is unreasonable for the following factual reasons:

a) There is hardstanding for two vehicles on the pitch next to her home.

b) There is a relatively small number of [NAME_2] owners who have two vehicles and there is sufficient space on the communal car park to accommodate their additional vehicles if there was not enough room for hard standing for two vehicle on their pitch.

53. The Respondent submits that the rule should be changed.

Tribunal’s Finding re Respondent’s Submission 2

54. The Tribunal said that it was possible to change the Park Rule but there was a procedure to follow to do so. Changes in site rules required very careful drafting as was evidenced following the Mobile Homes Act 2013, which required site rules to be compliant with set principles. In respect of these proceedings, the Tribunal could not declare the present Rule reasonable or unreasonable nor could it change the rule.

Respondent’s Submission 3

55. The Respondent further argued that Park Rule 21 is not applicable to her because it has not been enforced against her for the past 8 to 9 years, and therefore is not applicable to her under the doctrine of [NAME_28].

56. The Respondent understands that if a rule which in this case has become a term of the Written Statement of Agreement (which is a contract between the Site Owner and the Occupier) has not been enforced for a considerable time this amounts to a representation upon which the Respondent has relied. Its subsequent enforcement would be a detriment to the Respondent and unconscionable. The Respondent submitted that by reason of [NAME_28] by convention the rule cannot be enforced against her. The Applicant is prevented (stopped) from doing so now because it has not done so in the past.

Tribunal’s Finding re Respondent’s Submission 3

57. The Tribunal said there are a number of different estoppels including promissory [NAME_28], proprietary [NAME_28], [NAME_28] by representation and [NAME_28] by convention. some of which overlap. In the present case the [NAME_28] by convention appears to be applicable but it has its limitations with regard to what the Respondent was seeking to achieve. The Tribunal referred to the case of Mears Limited v Shoreline Housing Partnership Limited [2015] EWHC 1396 (TCC) in which at [49] Mr Justice Akenhead summarised the law on [NAME_28] by convention as follows:

(a) An [NAME_28] by convention can arise when parties to a contract act on an assumed state of facts or law. A concluded agreement is not required but a concluded agreement can be a "convention".

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(b) The assumption must be shared by them or at least it must be an assumption made by one party and acquiesced in by the other. The assumption must be communicated between the parties in question.

(c) At least the party claiming the benefit of the convention must have relied upon the common assumption, albeit it will almost invariably the case that both parties will have relied upon it. There is nothing prescriptive in the use of "reliance" in this context: acting upon or being influenced by would do equally well.

(d) A key element of an effective [NAME_28] by convention will be unconscionability or unjustness on the part of the person said to be estopped to assert the true legal or factual position. I am not convinced that "detrimental reliance" represents an exhaustive or limiting requirement of [NAME_28] by convention although it will almost invariably be the case that where there is detrimental reliance by the party claiming the benefit of the convention it will be unconscionable and unjust on the other party to seek to go behind the convention. In my view, it is enough that the party claiming benefit of the convention has been materially influenced by the convention; in that context, Goff J at first instance in the case of [COMPANY_38] v [COMPANY_32] 1982 1 QB 84 described that this is what is needed and Lord Denning talks in these terms.

(e) [NAME_28] cannot be used as a sword as opposed to a shield, analysis is required to ascertain whether it is being used as a sword. In this context, the position of the party claiming the benefit of the [NAME_28] as claimant or indeed as defendant is not determinative or does not even raise some sort of presumption one way or the other. While a party cannot in terms found a cause of action on an [NAME_28], it may, as a result of being able to rely on an [NAME_28], succeed on a cause of action on which, without being able to rely on the [NAME_28], it would necessarily have failed.

(f) The [NAME_28] by convention can come to an end and will not apply to future dealings once the common assumption is revealed to be erroneous.

58. Applying this to the facts:

a) There is an agreement (a convention) between the parties namely the Written Statement of Agreement.

b) The Respondent made an assumption that she was able to park two vehicles on the pitch she occupied notwithstanding Park Rule 21. She had been led to believe that she could do so by the estate agent acting for the previous [NAME_2] owner and occupier of the pitch.

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The Applicant disputes that this was a shared assumption or that it acquiesced. The Applicant says that when it became aware that the Respondent was parking more than one vehicle on the pitch contrary to the 2014 Park Rules, which were applicable to the Respondent, the Applicant took action.

c) The Respondent relied upon the assurance of the estate agent that she was able to park two vehicles on the pitch she occupied, there being hardstanding for two vehicles, and did so for a number of years.

d) It would now be unconscionable to assert Rule 21 and apply it retrospectively and, for example, impose some penalty on the Respondent for the years that more than one car was parked on the pitch.

e) The Respondent uses the failure to assert the rule as a defence to her having parked two vehicles in contravention of Rule 21.

f) However, now that both the Applicant and the Respondent are aware of the effect of Rule 21 on the Respondent, namely that she is not permitted to park two vehicles on the pitch under Rule 21, the Applicant may enforce the Rule from now on.

59. The Applicant is not seeking to claim any penalty for the Respondent being in contravention of Rule 21 over the past years, which the application of [NAME_28] by convention would prevent. However it does seek to enforce Rule 21 for the future which [NAME_28] by convention allows.

Previous Cases Referred to by the Parties

60. The Tribunal considered the two First-Tier Tribunal cases to which it had been referred by the parties.

61. In case reference CHI/24UJ/PHC/2021/0002 the issue related to Schedule 5 of The Mobile Homes (Site Rules) (England) Regulations 2014 which required that new rules be put in pace where the old rules had a discretionary element. However, under the legislation no occupier who is in occupation on the date the new rules take effect will be treated as being in breach due to circumstances which were in existence on that date and which would not have been a breach of the rules in existence before that date i.e. the rules were not retrospective in those circumstances.

62. The Tribunal, quite rightly, held that the respondent in that case was able to claim that the concession, either negotiated, promised or granted prior to his signing his occupation agreement when the Old Rules applied, was a circumstance which gave him a continuing benefit which was not removed or overridden by the New Rules. Prior to the new rules the respondent did not have any need to park two cars on the site but was assured that he could do so. Under the new rules this was not permitted but the respondent having obtained an assurance under the old rules that he could do so, was a

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circumstance that he cannot be treated as being in breach of the New Rules and so was able to park a second car on the site.

63. The Respondent in the present case clearly comes under the new rules and therefore the case reference CHI/24UJ/PHC/2021/0002 is not applicable.

64. It was mentioned in that case and determined in a subsequent case, reference MAN/OOCZ/PHC/2021/0028, that the wording of Park Rule 21 did not prevent an occupier of one pitch, who did not have a car, allowing an occupier of another pitch, to park a car on that pitch. It was agreed in both cases by all parties that such an arrangement was only permissive and could be withdrawn at any time.

65. As mentioned above if the Tribunal found there was a breach, to where the second car was to be moved was not an issue in this case and the Tribunal makes no finding or decision.

Decision

66. The Tribunal considered the evidence and submissions of the parties.

67. The Tribunal finds that there were two vehicles for the Respondent’s Home parked on the pitch which is in breach of Park Rule 21.

68. For the reasons given above the Tribunal finds the Respondent’s submissions are not a defence to the breach and therefore one of the vehicles must be removed.

69. Therefore the Tribunal determines that the Respondent is in breach of Rule 21 of the Park Rules the compliance with which is required under the Written Statement of Agreement Part IV Express Terms paragraph 3 (j).

70. The Tribunal makes a direction under section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 that a reasonable time for the Respondent to remedy the breach and find an alternative place to park the second vehicle is by 31 December 2025.

Judge JR Morris

APPENDIX 1 - RIGHTS OF APPEAL

1. If a party wishes to appeal the decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.

2. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional Office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.

3. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not

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complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.

4. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e., give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.

APPENDIX 2 – THE LAW

1. Section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (as amended)

(1) In relation to a protected site in England, a tribunal has jurisdiction – (a) to determine any question arising under this Act or any Statement to which it applies, and (b) to entertain any proceedings brought under this Act or any such Statement subject to subsection (2) to (6).

(2) Subsection (1) applies in relation to a question irrespective of anything contained in an arbitration Statement, which has been entered into before that question arose.

(3) In relation to a protected site in England, the court has jurisdiction— (a) to determine any question arising by virtue of paragraph 4, 5 or 5A(2)(b) of Chapter 2, or paragraph 4, 5 or 6(1)(b) of Chapter 4, of Part 1 of Schedule 1 (termination by owner) under this Act or any Statement to which it applies; and (b) to entertain any proceedings so arising brought under this Act or any such Statement, subject to subsections (4) to (6).

(4) Subsection (5) applies if the owner and occupier have entered into an arbitration Statement before the question mentioned in subsection (3)(a) arises and the Statement applies to that question.

(5) A tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the question and entertain any proceedings arising instead of the court.

(6) Subsection (5) applies irrespective of anything contained in the arbitration Statement mentioned in subsection (4).

2. Section 231A of the Housing Act 2004 provides:

Additional Powers of First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (1) The First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal exercising any jurisdiction conferred by or under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, the Mobile Homes Act 1983, the Housing Act 1985 or this Act has, in addition to any specific powers exercisable by them in exercising that jurisdiction, the general power mentioned in subsection (2).

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(2) The tribunal’s general power is a power to give such directions as the tribunal considers necessary or desirable for securing the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the proceedings or any issue in or in connection with them. (3) When exercising jurisdiction under this Act, the directions which may be given by the tribunal under its general power include (where appropriate)— (a) directions requiring a licence to be granted under Part 2 or 3 of this Act; (b) directions requiring any licence so granted to contain such terms as are specified in the directions; (c) directions requiring any order made under Part 4 of this Act to contain such terms as are so specified; (d) directions that any building or part of a building so specified is to be treated as if an HMO declaration had been served in respect of it on such date as is so specified (and such a direction is to be an excluded decision for the purposes of section 11(1) and 13(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007); (e) directions requiring the payment of money by one party to the proceedings to another by way of compensation, damages or otherwise. (3A) … (4) When exercising jurisdiction under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, the directions which may be given by the tribunal under its general power include (where appropriate)— (a) directions requiring the payment of money by one party to the proceedings to another by way of compensation, damages or otherwise; (b) directions requiring the arrears of pitch fees or the recovery of overpayments of pitch fees to be paid in such manner and by such date as may be specified in the directions; (c) directions requiring cleaning, repairs, restoration, re-positioning or other works to be carried out in connection with a mobile home, pitch or protected site in such manner as may be specified in the directions; (d) directions requiring the establishment, provision or maintenance of any service or amenity in connection with a mobile home, pitch or protected site in such manner as may be specified in the directions.

3. Schedule 1 Part 1 Chapter 2 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983

Termination by owner

4. The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith, if on the application of the owner, the appropriate judicial body (County Court)— (a) is satisfied that the occupier has breached a term of the agreement and, after service of a notice to remedy the breach, has not complied with the notice within a reasonable time; and (b) considers it reasonable for the agreement to be terminated.

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5. The owner shall be entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith if, on the application of the owner, the appropriate judicial body— (a) is satisfied that the occupier is not occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence; and (b) considers it reasonable for the agreement to be terminated.

5A. (1) This paragraph applies in relation to a protected site in England.

(2) The owner is entitled to terminate the agreement forthwith if— (a) on the application of the owner, a tribunal has determined that, having regard to its condition, the mobile home is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site; and (b) then, on the application of the owner, the appropriate judicial body, having regard to the tribunal’s determination and to any other circumstances, considers it reasonable for the agreement to be terminated.

(3) Sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) apply if, on an application to the tribunal under sub-paragraph (2)(a)— (a) the tribunal considers that, having regard to the present condition of the mobile home, it is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site, but (b) it also considers that it would be reasonably practicable for particular repairs to be carried out on the mobile home that would result in the mobile home not having that detrimental effect, and (c) the occupier indicates to the tribunal that the occupier intends to carry out those repairs.

(4) In such a case, the tribunal may make an interim order— (a) specifying the repairs that must be carried out and the time within which they must be carried out; and (b) adjourning the proceedings on the application for such period specified in the interim order as the tribunal considers reasonable to enable the repairs to be carried out.

(5) If the tribunal makes an interim order under sub-paragraph (4), it must not make a determination under sub-paragraph (2) (a) unless it is satisfied that the specified period has expired without the repairs having been carried out.

4. The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013

Orders for costs, reimbursement of fees and interest on costs

13. (1) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only—

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(a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and the costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in— (i) an agricultural land and drainage case, (ii) a residential property case, or (iii) a leasehold case; or (c) in a land registration case. (2) The Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to reimburse to any other party the whole or part of the amount of any fee paid by the other party which has not been remitted by the Lord Chancellor. (3) The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative. (4) A person making an application for an order for costs— (a) must, unless the application is made orally at a hearing, send or deliver an application to the Tribunal and to the person against whom the order is sought to be made; and (b) may send or deliver together with the application a schedule of the costs claimed in sufficient detail to allow summary assessment of such costs by the Tribunal. (5) An application for an order for costs may be made at any time during the proceedings but must be made within 28 days after the date on which the Tribunal sends— (a) a decision notice recording the decision which finally disposes of all issues in the proceedings; or (b) notice of consent to a withdrawal under rule 22 (withdrawal) which ends the proceedings. (6) The Tribunal may not make an order for costs against a person (the “paying person”) without first giving that person an opportunity to make representations. (7) The amount of costs to be paid under an order under this rule may be determined by— (a) summary assessment by the Tribunal; (b) agreement of a specified sum by the paying person and the person entitled to receive the costs (the “receiving person”); (c) detailed assessment of the whole or a specified part of the costs (including the costs of the assessment) incurred by the receiving person by the Tribunal or, if it so directs, on an application to a county court; and such assessment is to be on the standard basis or, if specified in the costs order, on the indemnity basis. (8) The Civil Procedure Rules 1998(15), section 74 (interest on judgment debts, etc) of the County Courts Act 1984(16) and the County Court (Interest on Judgment Debts) Order 1991(17) shall apply, with necessary modifications, to a detailed assessment carried out under paragraph (7)(c) as if the proceedings in the Tribunal had been proceedings in a court to which the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 apply. (9) The Tribunal may order an amount to be paid on account before the costs or expenses are assessed.

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50. [NAME_28] by representation may in some cases overlap with [NAME_28] by convention but it is, in legal terms, distinct. [NAME_36] (The Law of Waiver, Variation, and [NAME_28] 3rd Ed) summarise the elements of this [NAME_28] at Paragraph 9.01 by reference to two parties A and B as follows: "First, A makes a false representation of fact to B…Second, in making the representation, A intended or knew that it was likely to be acted upon., B, believing the representation, acts to its detriment in reliance on the representation. Fourth, A subsequently seeks to deny the truth of the representation. Fifth, no defence to the [NAME_28] can be raised by A". They go on to say at Paragraph 9.04 that the "weight of authority favours the view that [NAME_28] by representation is a rule of evidence rather than of substantive law". The doctrine does not, in itself, amount to a cause of action. The authors consider that representations of present intention can give rise to [NAME_28] by representation but that representations of future intention in simple terms will not at least usually give rise to such [NAME_28] due to running foul of the contractual doctrine of consideration (see for instance Paragraph 9.26). They accept that representations of mixed fact and law may give rise to an [NAME_28] by representation. The editors of Spencer Bower on The Law Relating to [NAME_28] by Representation (4th Ed) go somewhat further and suggest that an [NAME_28] by representation of law may now be raised, quoting Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349 and Azov Shipping Co Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 159.

1. The Tribunal considered the statement of the law in Mears Ltd v Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2015] EWHC 1396 (TCC), by Akenhead J at paragraph 49:

49. From the cases, one can conclude that the relevant law on [NAME_28] by convention is: (a) An [NAME_28] by convention can arise when parties to a contract act on an assumed state of facts or law. A concluded agreement is not required but a concluded agreement can be a "convention". (b) The assumption must be shared by them or at least it must be an assumption made by one party and acquiesced in by the other. The assumption must be communicated between the parties in question. (c) At least the party claiming the benefit of the convention must have relied upon the common assumption, albeit it will almost invariably be the case that both parties will have relied upon it. There is nothing prescriptive in the use of "reliance" in this

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context: acting upon or being influenced by would do equally well. (d) A key element of an effective [NAME_28] by convention will be unconscionability or unjustness on the part of the person said to be estopped to assert the true legal or factual position. I am not convinced that "detrimental reliance" represents an exhaustive or limiting requirement of [NAME_28] by convention although it will almost invariably be the case that where there is detrimental reliance by the party claiming the benefit of the convention it will be unconscionable and unjust on the other party to seek to go behind the convention. In my view, it is enough that the party claiming benefit of the convention has been materially influenced by the convention; in that context, Goff J at first instance in the Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84 case described that this is what is needed and Lord Denning talks in these terms. (e) [NAME_28] cannot be used as a sword as opposed to a shield, analysis is required to ascertain whether it is being used as a sword. In this context, the position of the party claiming the benefit of the [NAME_28] as claimant or indeed as defendant is not determinative or does not even raise some sort of presumption one way or the other. While a party cannot in terms found a cause of action on an [NAME_28], it may, as a result of being able to rely on an [NAME_28], succeed on a cause of action on which, without being able to rely on the [NAME_28], it would necessarily have failed. (f) The [NAME_28] by convention can come to an end and will not apply to future dealings once the common assumption is revealed to be erroneous.

2. In applying the principles to the present case, the Tribunal found that the Tenants had been served with an account of the Actual Maintenance Charge each year and both Respondent and Tenants, including the Applicant assumed it to be correct. The Tribunal is of the opinion that it would be unconscionable or unjust on the part of the Applicant to now insist on the strict application of the apportionment retrospectively.

3. Taking into account that now the apportionment applied by the Respondent is erroneous the parties should consider varying the Apartment Lease.

4. The Tribunal determines that the apportionment of the Service Charge by the Respondent is reasonable.