Race Discrimination and Victimisation: Employment Tribunal Ruling

OUTCOME: Allowed in Part

Case Number: 3315314/2023 & 3315340/2023

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent:

[redacted]

Watford Employment Tribunal On: 7 October 2025 Before: Employment Judge Arullendran

REPRESENTATION:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

Orders having been sent to the parties on 23 October 2025 and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60(4) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024, the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

1. The claimant issued proceedings in the Employment Tribunal on 28 and 30 December 2023 and has brought claims of direct race discrimination, harassment related to race and victimisation. In those claim forms the claimant’s makes allegations against various individuals including a [NAME_4]. The claimant asked the respondent to provide the contact details of [NAME_4] as the claimant wished to add him as a further respondent, however that information was not forthcoming.

2. The claimant made an application to strike out the respondent’s response on 16 June 2025 on the grounds that the respondent has misrepresented to the Tribunal that it does not have the contact details for the person the claimant wanted to add as a second respondent in the proceedings. The application also criticises the respondent for failing to comply with the Tribunal orders.

3. And unless order was made on 29 May 2025 by Employment Judge Young stating that “unless by 12 June 2025 the respondent has sent electronically to the claimant and the Employment Tribunal a written explanation of why have

Case Number: 3315314/2023 & 3315340/2023

2 [sic] not provided the contact details of [NAME_4] including his postal address, email, mobile phone number to the claimant and the Employment Tribunal by 24 August 2024 and whether they are prepared to provide [NAME_4]’s aforementioned detailed and if not why not the response form will stand dismissed without further order.” 4. The respondent replied on 12 June 2025 stating that it did not have knowledge of [NAME_4]’s contact details and therefore was unable to provide that information. The respondent stated that [NAME_4] had no association with the respondent company and was a relative of the administrator who is no longer employed by the respondent. At today’s hearing the respondent’s representative stated that they did have a telephone number for [NAME_4] in 2023 but that was no longer the case.

5. The claimant referred to written submissions and extracts from recordings which I have taken into account. The claimant submits that the respondent has a close relationship with [NAME_4] and that [NAME_4] was an employee of the respondent organisation at the relevant time. The claimant submits that the Facebook page for [NAME_5] demonstrate that there has been a long- standing relationship between him and [NAME_4] and the claimant submits that the respondent is misleading the Tribunal by now suggesting they do not have the contact details for [NAME_4].

6. The respondent made oral submissions and accepted that there had been a failure to comply with the Tribunal orders when the respondent was acting in person. The respondent submits that there is sufficient time for orders to be complied with before the final hearing, which is due to commence on 16 February 2026. The respondent also submits that [NAME_4] was not an employee of the respondent organisation and it would not be in keeping with the overriding objective to strike out the response for failings over which they have no control as they no longer have current contact details for [NAME_4]’s. The law 7. I refer to Rule 38(1)(b), (c) and (e) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024: “38. Striking out (1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d) that it has not been actively pursued;

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3 (e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).” Conclusions 8. Applying the relevant law to the facts I find that it is for the parties who is bringing the claim to identify who the claim is to be brought against and to obtain their contact details so that the Tribunal can serve the relevant documents on the proposed respondent. Employment Judge Young acknowledged in the notice of hearing dated 29 July 2025 that the respondent had complied with the unless order and that the reason why today’s hearing has been listed is the claimant is refusing to accept that explanation and appears to want the response to be struck out. The claimant’s submissions that the respondent is being untruthful and is misleading the Tribunal is not supported by the evidence he has relied upon today. At best that evidence demonstrates that [NAME_4] was at the respondent’s place of business in 2023, whether that was as an employee or whether that was as a friend or family member, the claimant’s submissions and the documents to not assist with this point. The pleadings must be taken at their highest when considering striking out and the respondent’s case is that [NAME_4] was not employed by them.

9. The threshold for establishing that a party has behaved in a scandalous or vexatious manner is very high and I find that the claimant has failed to establish today that the respondent has behaved in either a scandalous or vexatious manner. The unless order states that the respondent had to say whether they were prepared to provide the contact details for [NAME_4] which indicate that there was no compulsion on the part of the respondent to provide such information. Therefore I find that the threshold under Rule 38(1)(b) has not been met.

10. The respondent concedes that it has not complied with some of the orders previously made by the Tribunal and therefore the threshold under Rule 38(1)(c) has been met and the question then is whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to strike out the response. The question then is whether or not this Tribunal considers it is still possible for a fair hearing to take place, which I consider below.

11. In respect of the threshold under Rule 38(1)(e), I find that that threshold has not been met because the claimant is not prevented from proceeding with his claims against the respondent even if [NAME_4] is not called as a witness or added the respondent. The fact the respondent has failed to provide the contact details for [NAME_4] does not mean that a fair hearing is no longer possible. The claims as they stand today are exactly the same as the claims the claimant brought when he issued proceedings and nothing has changed therefore this threshold is not met. The claims are against a limited company and the claimant is not disadvantaged if [NAME_4] is not added as a second respondent or if he is not called the witness by the respondent. This is an issue that the claimant can address in cross-examination of the witnesses

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4 which are called by the respondent and it is certainly not grounds for finding that a fair hearing is no longer possible. It is for the respondent to decide who it calls as a witness given that the claimant has made allegations involving [NAME_4].

12. The next question to be answered by this Tribunal is whether or not the response should be struck out because the respondent has failed to comply with Tribunal orders. I accept the respondent was acting as a litigant in person at the time of the non-compliance, but that does not excuse their non- compliance with the orders which are set out in plain English and are relatively easy to follow. However, I also accept the respondent’s submission that, with the assistant of their current legal representative, there is sufficient time for the parties to cooperate and get the case ready for the final hearing. In those circumstances I find that it is still possible to have a fair hearing of the claims the claimant has brought against the respondent and, in the circumstances, it is not in keeping with the overriding objective to strike out the response.

13.

In all the circumstances the claimant’s application to strike out the response is refused.

Approved by: Employment Judge Arullendran 4 November 2025 Reasons sent to the parties on: 10 November 2025 For the Tribunal:

Case Number: 3315340/2023 & 3315314/2023

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Watford Employment Tribunal

On: 16/17/18/19 and 20 February 2026 Before: Employment Judge Alliott

Mrs G [NAME_6]

[NAME_7] Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

REASONS

JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 4 March 2026 written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following reasons are provided:

Preliminary issue: Claimant’s application to strike out the response

1. At the outset of this hearing the claimant made an application to strike out the respondent’s response on the grounds that the respondent had failed to comply with case management orders. The law 2. In considering a strike out application we have to take into account the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly. To that end, and taking into account [COMPANY_10] v [NAME_11] and [COMPANY_30] v [NAME_12], we need to consider:-  The magnitude of the non-compliance.  Whether the default was the responsibility of a party or their representative.

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 What disruption, unfairness, or prejudice has been caused.  Whether a fair hearing is still possible.  Whether strike out or some lesser remedy would be appropriate.

3. Principally we need to consider whether striking out would be a proportionate response and, in particular, a key feature is whether a fair hearing is still possible. The procedural history of this case 4. This case has not had a smooth run up to trial.

5. The first case management preliminary hearing made case management orders, the last of which was the exchange of witness statements by 10 February 2025.

6. On 20 November 2024, the timetable was extended by three months across the board.

7. A further preliminary hearing took place on 27 May 2025 and the case management summary records the complaints of the claimant and what had happened or, more particularly, what had not happened. A finding was made that the respondent had reached the threshold in respect of Rule 38(1)(c) in that it had failed to comply with the employment tribunal’s order. However, a strike out order was not made.

8. A further case management preliminary hearing was heard on 7 October 2025. Revised case management orders were made requiring the file of documents to be agreed by 18 November 2025 and the claimant to be sent a hard and electronic copy by 25 November 2025. Witness statements were due to be sent by each party to the other by 6 January 2026.

9. Notwithstanding the resetting of the timetable, there was further slippage. Various versions of the bundle were sent to the claimant on 5 December, 10 December, 23 December 2025 and, finally, version 5 was sent on 8 January 2026. The claimant was sent a hard and an electronic copy of the bundle on 14 January 2026.

10. Whilst the respondent had served forms of witness statements by 9 February 2025 (the original deadline), revised and extended witness statements were served by the respondent on the claimant on 11 February 2026, two working days before this hearing. The claimant has not served a witness statement. The claimant has sought to explain this by virtue of the fact that he has had work and caring commitments and has not been able to cross reference his witness statement with the trial bundle.

11. Hence, the fact of the matter is that both the claimant and the respondent have been in breach of the latest case management orders.

12. Any failure to comply with case management orders disrupts the litigation and it is regrettable that the final hearing bundle was only sent to the claimant on 14 January 2026. However, it is clear to us that the claimant has had many of the

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documents for some time and the bundle was finally provided a month prior to this hearing beginning.

13. The late service of the respondent’s witness statements was said to be because the respondent was waiting for the claimant to exchange his witness statement.

14. Obviously, the time for the exchange of witness statements is crucial to achieving a fair and just hearing. Consequently, we find that the non-compliance by both parties was significant.

15. The default appears to be the claimant’s personally and the respondent’s representative.

16. We have considered what unfairness or prejudice could be caused. Whilst material in the respondent’s witness statements was new in the sense that it was not covered in their February 2025 statements, it appears to us that most, if not all, of the information in the respondent’s witness statements was contained in the ET3 response form. As such, we find that the late service of those witness statements does not really prejudice the claimant as he had been aware of the information from the start.

17. Notwithstanding the default on both sides, in our judgment, it is still possible to have a fair hearing. If any matter is truly new in the respondent’s witness statements (and it has prejudiced the claimant in the sense that he might have made other enquiries), then we indicate that we will, if necessary likely disregard it. We always intended to treat the claimant’s claim form as his witness statement although on Day 2 of the hearing the claimant was able to produce a 20 page witness statement which he finalised overnight. That rather belies his complaints to us on Day 1 that the respondent’s conduct had prevented him from being able to produce a witness statement.

18. Taking into account all the circumstances, we find that a strike out of the response would not be a proportionate way of dealing with the respondent’s default and the claimant’s application is dismissed. Introduction 19. On 30 January 2023, the claimant applied to the respondent for a university work placement and began his placement following a successful interview on 3 March 2023. The respondent accepts that it was an employment service provider and that the claimant was provided with an employment service, namely vocational training by way of work experience within the meaning of sections 56(2) and(5) Equality Act 2010. During the engagement, the claimant was given the opportunity to undertake paid work. There is a dispute as to his status as the claimant alleges he was employed under a contract of employment and the respondent denies this. However, the respondent accepts that the claimant was a worker within the meaning of section 83(2) Equality Act 2010.

20. By a claim form presented on 28 December 2023, following a period of early conciliation from 19 October 2023 until 30 November 2023, the claimant presents claims of direct race discrimination, harassment related to race and

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victimisation. It has been agreed that the second claim is a duplicate of the first. The respondent defends the claims. The issues 21. The issues were set out in a case management summary by Employment Judge Dick following a case management preliminary hearing held on 15 July 2024. They are as follows:- “1. Employment status and vicarious liability

1.1 Was the claimant an employee of the respondent within the meaning of section 83(2) of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”), either because he was on a work placement with the respondent (which the respondent accepts) or because he was doing paid work for the respondent (which the respondent denies). In either case the Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant was “employed under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work.”

1.2 Alternatively, was the respondent a supplier of employment services to the claimant within the meaning of s 56(2) Eq A (which includes the provision of vocational training, as defined in s 56(6), or guidance). If so, the respondent may be liable for acts of discrimination, harassment or victimisation under s 55 Eq A.

1.3 Additionally, the respondent will only be legally responsible for the actions of [NAME_4] if [NAME_4] was either an employee of the respondent or an agent of the respondent acting with the respondent’s authority.

1.3.1 Did either of those things apply to [NAME_4]? 1.3.2 If [NAME_4] was an employee of the respondent, can the respondent show it took all reasonable steps to prevent him from doing the things that the claimant says he did (or anything of that description).

2. Direct race discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)

2.1 The claimant describes his race as black African/Ugandan. He says that someone who was not black African would have been treated differently; alternatively he says that he was treated in the way that he was because he was not Iranian.

2.2 Did the respondent do the following things:

2.2.1 On 20 July 2023 (“the incident”):

2.2.1.1 Requiring him to leave the premises. (The respondent says that if he was asked, it was not by anyone acting on its authority.) 2.2.1.2 [NAME_4] and [NAME_13] telling him not to come back. 2.2.1.3 [NAME_4] impersonating a police officer. 2.2.1.4 Requiring the claimant to hand over his phone without allowing him to back-up his personal data. 2.2.1.5 [NAME_13] saying, “No mate, not 2 [years]. You will be in prison for 15 years before you’re deported back to your Africa.”

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2.2.1.6 [NAME_4] saying, “For us we are [NAME_14], you don’t belong with us...” 2.2.1.7 [NAME_4] saying “black people black people manners should be left in Africa”. 2.2.1.8 Mr [NAME_4] and others discussing the accusation in Farsi (and so excluding the claimant).

2.2.2 Not assigning the claimant any work after the incident. (The respondent says the claimant’s work placement came to an end, as had always been intended, on 26 July but that the claimant was allowed to keep coming to the premises after that to complete work for his dissertation.) 2.2.3 23 July 2023 – JN [[NAME_15]] sent an email to the claimant’s family making false allegations against him. 2.2.4 25 July – JN saying that the claimant’s reinstatement would hinge on the willingness [NAME_13] to continue working with him. 2.2.5 Refuse to provide CCTV which the claimant asked for in his grievance email. 2.2.6 11 November 2023 – JN threatening the claimant with violence or with [NAME_13] going to the police about him should he pursue his claims. 2.2.7 JN suspended the claimant’s access to company premises and confiscated equipment (communicated by the respondent by email 1 December 2023). 2.2.8 In December 2023, excluding the claimant from participating in various company activities.

2.3 Was that less favourable treatment?

The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s.

If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether they were treated worse than someone else would have been treated.

2.4 If so, was it because of race?

2.5 Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment?

3. Harassment related to race (Equality Act 2010 section 26)

3.1 Did the respondent do the following things:

3.1.1 See 2.2 above.

3.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

3.3 Did it relate to race?

3.4 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

Case Number: 3315340/2023 & 3315314/2023

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3.5 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

4. Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 section 27)

4.1 Did the claimant do protected acts as follows:

4.1.1 Raise a grievance, which included a complaint of race discrimination, on 27 July 2023. 4.1.2 Present this claim to the Tribunal (having first contacted ACAS).

4.2 Did the respondent do the following things:

4.2.1 [NAME_4] maintained a deliberate silence and avoided extending basic courtesies, such as greetings. 4.2.2 Not assigning the claimant any work after the incident. 4.2.3 11 November 2023 – JN threatening the claimant with violence or with [NAME_13] going to the police about him should he pursue his claims. 4.2.4 JN suspended the claimant’s access to company premises and confiscated equipment (communicated by the respondent by email 1 December 2023). 4.2.5 In December 2023, excluding the claimant from participating in various company activities. 4.2.6 Reporting to the police that the claimant had stolen his laptop.

4.3 By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment?

4.4 If so, was it because the claimant did a protected act?

4.5 Was it because the respondent believed the claimant had done, or might do, a protected act?

5. Remedy for discrimination or victimisation

5.1 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?

5.2 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

5.3 Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

5.4 If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

5.5 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

5.6 Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

5.7 Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?

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5.8 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

5.9 Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it and if so how?

5.10 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?”

5.11 By what proportion, up to 25%?

5.12 Should interest be awarded? How much? The law 22. Equality Act 2010 – sections 13, 23, 26, 27, 83, 109 and 136 provide:- 13 Direct discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.

… 23 Comparison by reference to circumstances (1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14, [19 or 19A] there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. … 26 Harassment (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. … (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. (5) The relevant protected characteristics are—

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 race; … 27 Victimisation (1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. (2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act.

… 83 Interpretation and exceptions (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) “Employment” means— (a) employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work;

… 109 Liability of employers and principals (1) Anything done by a person (A) in the course of A's employment must be treated as also done by the employer. (2) Anything done by an agent for a principal, with the authority of the principal, must be treated as also done by the principal. (3) It does not matter whether that thing is done with the employer's or principal's knowledge or approval. (4) In proceedings against A's employer (B) in respect of anything alleged to have been done by A in the course of A's employment it is a defence for B to show that B took all reasonable steps to prevent A— (a) from doing that thing, or (b) from doing anything of that description.

… 136 Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred.

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(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.” The evidence 23. We had a hearing bundle of 394 pages.

24. We were provided with various documents in relation to the claimant’s strike out application as follows:- 24.1 The claimant’s application for strike out. 24.2 A chronology of compliance. 24.3 A strike out chronology evidence pack. 24.4 A 6 January 2026 email from the respondent to the tribunal applying for an extension of time for exchange of witness statements to 1 February 2026. 24.5 The respondent’s objection to the strike out application. 24.6 Attachments to the respondent’s objection. 24.7 The claimant’s reply to the respondent’s objection to strike out. 24.8 The claimant also provided us with a final submission document.

25. We had witness statements and heard evidence form the following:- 25.1 The claimant (verified the contents of his claim form and produced a witness statement at the start of Day 2). 25.2 [NAME_17], Digital Forensics Analyst for the respondent and a director. 25.3 [NAME_19], Senior Digital Forensics Analyst for the respondent. 25.4 [NAME_20], Digital Forensics Analyst for the respondent.

26. On the final day of the hearing, the claimant produced a transcript of a telephone call between the claimant and [NAME_22] on 22 July 2023. The facts 27. The respondent is a small company specialising in digital forensics and cyber security. It employs about five people.

28. The claimant describes his race as Black African/Ugandan.

29. The claimant was studying Digital Forensics and Cyber Security for a master’s degree at [COMPANY_23]. The claimant was required to apply for work placement in a technology company specialising in the field and he

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applied to the respondent on 30 January 2023. Following a successful interview on 3 March 2023 he was engaged on a work placement from the week commencing 6 March 2023.

30. The respondent has a work experience policy. “18.1 Purpose and scope This policy applies to unpaid university student placements at Computer Forensics Lab Limited (CFL). It ensures compliance with UK law and best practice and clarifies expectations for students, supervisors and the company. 18.2 Eligibility

Placements must be a required part of a UK higher education degree and last no longer than one year Placements are training/observation focussed and must not replace paid staff. 18.3 Pay status

Educational placements that meet the criteria above are unpaid and not entitled to the National Minimum Wage. If a placement involves contribution to a project, the student trainee may be compensated on a discretionary basis without any obligation to regular payment or any future compensated contribution. Involvement in any project is for the trainee’s benefit and any monetary compensation given to the student trainee is at the discretion of the manager in charge of the trainee.” 31. The claimant was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.

32. Following the claimant’s application, [NAME_17] sent the claimant an email as follows:- “Thank you for your application. I had a look at your CV and profile which sounds great. If you are looking for unpaid work experience, I can set up an interview with you next week. The minimum work experience required by us is 4 weeks. After the passage of 4 weeks and subject to your experience and knowledge, you will have the opportunity to work with our digital forensics team on a zero-hour contract basis. This means you will be paid per hour if your assistance is required in the digital forensics team.” 33. The assessment of the claimant’s module required the claimant to complete 144 hours of work placement. The claimant could work the hours on top of the 20 hours per week permitted by his visa but, once completed, he had to revert to 20 hours per week part-time work. The work placement was therefore time limited.

34. On 30 June 2023, the claimant was paid £400 which we were told covered a number of projects.

35. We have some WhatsApp exchanges between the claimant and [NAME_17] negotiating future rates of pay and £100 per eight hour case was agreed on 30 June 2023.

36. As part of his placement the respondent provided the claimant with a digital

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forensic workstation laptop said to be valued at £5,500 (from the police report).

37. On 20 July 2023 [NAME_17] was working at home. He received a call from a female employee and colleague of the claimant (hereinafter referred to as [NAME_13]). She complained to [NAME_17] that the claimant had made sexually inappropriate comments to her and had touched her in a manner that she found inappropriate. We stress at the outset that following a review of the CCTV coverage of interaction between the claimant and [NAME_13], the claimant was completely exonerated by the respondent of any wrongdoing.

38. We find that the making of the allegation was not some sort of conspiracy to raise false accusations against the claimant but was genuinely made. [NAME_17] told us that [NAME_13] was very upset and crying. [NAME_17] attempted to calm her down. 39. [NAME_17] told us that he tried to contact [NAME_19] and [NAME_20] but both did not respond.

40. Consequently, [NAME_17] called [NAME_4]. [NAME_4] knew [NAME_13]’s mother and appears to have been akin to an uncle to [NAME_13]. [NAME_4] was described to us as a handyman who attended at the respondent’s premises from time to time to undertake general odd jobs around the office. [NAME_4] was not an employee of the respondent. 41. [NAME_17] asked [NAME_4] to go to the office and find out what had happened and to calm the situation down. 42. [NAME_4]’s status before us was opaque to say the least. In a covertly recorded meeting on 24 November 2023 [NAME_17] described him as a handyman and a friend and denied that he was paid. In his evidence [NAME_19] told us that [NAME_4] had been around the office since 2009 and had worked on the electrics in the office. [NAME_20] told us that she had seen [NAME_4] in the office this year. The claimant told us that [NAME_4], when he attended the office, was able to gain access through the smart door, presumably with a fob or card.

43. Notwithstanding the long-term relationship that [NAME_17] clearly had with [NAME_4], we note that in response to an unless order of the tribunal the respondent asserted that the respondent:[redacted] “Does not have knowledge of [NAME_4]’s contact details.” And “No knowledge of [NAME_4]’s postal address, email address or mobile number.” 44. We find that [NAME_4] was an individual who, from time to time, was employed by the respondent under a contract to do work personally and was a worker of the respondent. Further, insofar as maybe necessary, we find that in being asked by [NAME_17] to attend the office and calm down the situation, [NAME_4] was acting as an agent of the respondent with the authority of the respondent.

45. We find that the respondent’s relationship with [NAME_4] was, and is, a lot closer than

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they have let on and we have no doubt that, had they wanted to call him as a witness, they could have done so. 46. [NAME_4] attended at the respondent’s office. He later told [NAME_17] that [NAME_13]’s boyfriend was downstairs and very angry. From this we infer that [NAME_13] had called her boyfriend and told him about her allegations and that was why he was there. We find that [NAME_13]’s boyfriend probably was very angry.

47. The respondent’s office is a large room with a backroom in a multi-occupation building. [NAME_19] and [NAME_20], [NAME_13] and the claimant were there on 20 July 2023.

48. We have had differing accounts as to what happened in the lead up to the confrontation between the claimant and [NAME_4].

49. We had considerable doubt as to the veracity of both the claimant’s and [NAME_19] and [NAME_20]’s assertions. The claimant, on a number of occasions during this hearing, told us something that he later changed. For example, during the course of the hearing the claimant told us that he signed the proposed zero-hours contract whereas his claim form makes plain he did not. The claimant told us he took a covert video he wanted to introduce on Day 3 of the hearing and then said someone else took it. He told us that he had no further undisclosed material but then produced a number of undisclosed documents (which we did not allow in) on Day 4 before closing submissions. The claimant ’s disclosure has clearly been selective and incomplete.

50. On the other hand, we found the respondent’s evidence concerning the relationship with [NAME_4] to be unconvincing and, as will be explained later, we find that the CCTV footage probably covered a significant part of the altercation between [NAME_4] and the claimant and that, despite the respondent’s denials, all the CCTV coverage was probably deliberately not saved.

51. In the circumstances we have looked at the contemporaneous documentation.

52. The claimant has produced a transcript of a telephone conversation between him and [NAME_22], a colleague, held on 22 July 2023. In that she states:- “Yes, I couldn’t event watch the bit where [? [NAME_4]] came in because it upset me too much, so I saw bits of it – but I knew it was wrong. I just had to turn it off because it was making me so upset.” And “The way he threatened your life, he said to you in the video, you’re lucky you’re not dead or you’re not being killed.” 53. The respondent has suggested that there was no CCTV coverage of the claimant and [NAME_4] having an altercation at all as it took place outside the office and in a corridor. We reject that suggestion and find that most of the incident was in the office and was captured on CCTV. The claimant does refer in his claim form to being ushered out at one point and the verbal abuse persisting in the corridor.

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54. In the [NAME_22] transcript, she refers to [NAME_4] saying he was a police officer. The claimant also references [NAME_4] saying :- “You know, for us, we are [NAME_14].” and that that meant to the claimant that anyone that is not Iranian is not safe.

55. On 23 July 2023, the claimant’s wife, [NAME_25], emailed [NAME_17] stating:- “My husband also felt racially discriminated by one of the people who mentioned to him that “For us, we are [NAME_14],” those who put it clear that they just wanted him to go away, and those who wished him a number of years of suffering and being sent back to Uganda after, over a normal conversation between peers. … He also mentioned a police officer who was involved in some stages of this incident.” 56. She repeated those allegations in another email on 24 July 2023.

57. On 26 July 2023, [NAME_17] replied to [NAME_25] as follows:- “It is universally agreed by everyone in the office that [NAME_1] was treated unfairly, and the behaviour of a gentleman called [NAME_4], present at the time in the office who had no authority, position or permission to say what he said to [NAME_1] – causing a lot of anguish and suffering to him. I have spoken to [NAME_4] and reprimanded him and strongly rebuked him about his behaviour towards [NAME_1]. He admitted that he had done wrong and had interfered in a matter which is none of his business. He said he was sorry and promised to apologise to [NAME_1] when he sees him again. I have also spoken to [[NAME_13]] and pointed out that she had indeed overreacted and her claim of harassment of a sexual[ly] nature in her phone conversation to me on Thursday was incorrect based on what I saw in the CCTV camera. Other girls in the office never made a complaint to me and they all agreed that [NAME_1] had been treated unfairly on Thursday and what happened on that day, should never have happened. [[NAME_13]] said she never intended to make a formal complaint and this matter is now considered closed. I offered my apologies to [NAME_1] in person as a responsible person in the company and we agreed that he should continue as usual if wanted. I wish on that fateful day, I were present as would have never allowed this issue to escalate to such an unfortunate scale.” 58. On 27 July 2023, the claimant sent a grievance to [NAME_17] which includes:- “2. Bullying and intimidation: During the investigation, I experienced distressing bullying and intimidation form an individual who falsely identified themselves as a police officer. Their conduct may not only be in violation of the Police Act 1990, section 90 but also, was entirely inappropriate, had no place within a professional work environment and may be deemed as harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

3. Racial discrimination: In addition to the bullying and intimidation, I was subjected to racist remarks during the same incident which violates the Equalities Act 2010,

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which prohibits discrimination based on race and ethnicity. Such discriminatory behaviour is wholly unacceptable, and it is essential that the company takes measures to address and prevent any recurrence.” 59. We note that the claimant also proposed a number of actions which included:- “(i) Formal written statement and evidence: I request a formal written statement detailing the investigation’s findings, evidence examined, and the ultimate resolution, and in the same way, I highly recommend for preservation of all evidence that relates to this case until this matter is fully sorted out. This will help protect my reputation against potential future false accusations. … (iii) Employment arrangements: To continue my employment with the company, I propose discussing a zero-hours contract with clearly defined terms and conditions that benefit both parties. ... (vii) Compensation: Considering the suffering endured, and the gravity of such false accusations, I request a financial compensation of not less that £35,000 which may be shared by those responsible as a fair and equitable resolution to this matter.” 60. [NAME_17] has given evidence that he was surprised when, on 26 September 2023, the claimant sent an email chasing up his grievance. He stated that he had not seen the email in July 2023.

61. We have a transcript of a covert recording of a conversation between the claimant and [NAME_17] on 27 July 2023. It has a mysterious “recording ends abruptly” in the middle which may suggest that it has been edited. The respondent does not appear to have checked this. We do not have the time of the call. However, the grievance, which was sent at 11.01 on 27 July 2023, is not referenced. However, in the covert recording of the 5 December 2023 meeting between [NAME_17], [NAME_19] and the claimant, the claimant refers to the call as being one minute after the grievance was sent.

62. We find that [NAME_17] probably did receive the grievance on 27 July 2023. The timing of the call supports this. [NAME_17] is a Cyber Security and Digital Forensic Analyst and, in our judgment, it is unlikely he would have overlooked the email given the circumstances of having recently reviewed the CCTV of the interaction of the claimant with [NAME_13] and exonerated the claimant.

63. In a covertly recorded meeting held on 24 November 2023 between the claimant, [NAME_26] and [NAME_19], [NAME_17] is recorded as saying:- “0:29:36 [NAME_17]: So basically, we have evidence of that. [NAME_19] was present. I really rebuked him [presumed to be a reference to [NAME_4]] and then he acknowledged that he shouldn’t have, for example, said, “I impersonated a police officer”. He shouldn’t have said, “Oh, we are [NAME_14], we blah blah blah.” That’s a very bad

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statement. 0:29:55.0 [NAME_19]: That’s wrong, yes. 0:29:56.3 [NAME_17]: Or saying other things, hurtful things, to you. He acknowledged that he had made a mistake and he shouldn’t have done that. But at the same time, its important to know that he had a role in defusing…” 64. It is clear to us and we find that the claimant was treated very badly by [NAME_4] and, to an extent, [NAME_13].

65. We find that, contrary to his evidence, [NAME_19] was probably present for at least part of the incident between the claimant , [NAME_4] and [NAME_13]. It is a small office and he was unlikely to have been unaware of the incident even if he was in the backroom.

66. We find that the claimant’s evidence on how he was treated is probably accurate.

67. On attending the office, [NAME_4] had a conversation with [NAME_19] and [NAME_20] in Farsi. Shortly thereafter, [NAME_13] joined them and also spoke in Farsi. 68. [NAME_4] then called [NAME_17]. [NAME_4] passed the phone to the claimant as [NAME_5] wanted to speak to him. The claimant states that [NAME_26] instructed him to remove the sim card from the claimant’s mobile which was the respondent’s property and hand it to [NAME_4]. [NAME_4] insisted that the sim card be removed there and then and the mobile handed over despite the claimant’s request for a moment to back up his recent data. 69. [NAME_17] gives evidence that he asked the claimant to leave the company premises. The claimant states that [NAME_4] said to him “pack all your bags, you’re fired.” It may be that both happened. Either way, the claimant was required to leave the premises and we find that the treatment in 2.2.1.1 is proved.

70. In a covert transcript of a meeting held on 5 December 2023 between [NAME_17], [NAME_19] and the claimant, [NAME_19] states that [NAME_4] overstepped the mark to fire the claimant.

71. We have no evidence that the claimant was told by [NAME_4] or [NAME_13] not to come back. It is not refenced in the claimant’s claim form or witness statement. In our judgment, the claimant has assumed this from being told he was fired. However, in his claim form the claimant asserts that he was told by [NAME_4] he would be arrested “if we ever see you here again.” 72. We find that that was said and that the essence of the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.2 is proved.

73. We find that [NAME_4] did claim to be a police officer and accordingly, the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.3 is proved.

74. We find that the claimant was required to hand over his phone without allowing him to back up his personal data.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in

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issue 2.2.1.4 is proved.

75. During the incident it is clear to us that both [NAME_4] and [NAME_13] were berating the claimant. In the [NAME_22] transcript, she refers to seeing on the [NAME_13] shouting :- “Touching people up at work, get the fuck out of the office.” 76. We find that [NAME_13] did say to the claimant: [redacted] back to your Africa.” 77. This was following a similar remark by [NAME_4] which referenced to two years in prison, as reported by the claimant in the covertly recorded meeting on 5 December 2023. The context was the alleged sexual misconduct by the claimant.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.5 is proved.

78. We find that [NAME_4] did refer to “For us we are [NAME_14], you don’t belong with us.” 79.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.6 is proved.

80. We accept that the claimant was told by [NAME_4] that “Black people manners should be left in Africa.” We find that that is the sort of offensive comment that is likely to be remembered.

Accordingly, we find that the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.7 is proved.

81. We find [NAME_4] and [NAME_19] and [NAME_20] did discuss things in front of the claimant in Farsi.

Accordingly, the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.1.8 is proved.

82. We accept that some of the treatment, such as being told to leave the workplace and speaking in Farsi, could have innocent explanations as legitimate management conduct and individuals communicating in their first language. However, they all spoke English, and the intention, we find, must have been to speak in front of the claimant without him being able to understand.

83. We find that all the treatment proved was unwanted.

84. We find that due to the overtly racist content of some of the treatment and the manner of it, all of the treatment constituted unwanted conduct related to the claimant’s race.

85. We find that the conduct had the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive environment for the claimant.

86. We find that it did have that effect.

87. We find that the claimant perceived it as such, and, in all the circumstances, that it was reasonable to have that effect.

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88.

Accordingly, the claimant’s harassment claim as regards the issues in 2.2.1 succeeds.

89. Due to the fact that, by virtue of section 212(1) of the Equality Act 2010, detriment does not include conduct that amounts to harassment, we dismiss the direct discrimination claim in relation to issue 2.2.1.

90. Issues 2.2.2 and 4.2.2 are not assigning the claimant any work after the incident. Both the claimant and the respondent accepted that his placement came to an end on 23 August 2023 when the respondent submitted the relevant paperwork to the university. As already recorded, the claimant had completed his 144 hours by early May 2023. The recital in the issue that the placement ended on 26 July 2023 is incorrect.

91. The claimant accepted that he was assigned work after the incident by [NAME_22] but no one could tell us when. It transpires that the claimant’s real complaint was not being assigned paid work.

92. The respondent accepts it paid the claimant £400 on 30 June 2023 which was probably for work on four or five projects.

93. The claimant told us that he received other payments but had no evidence and could not tell us when or how much. He estimated that he had been paid up to £1,000.

94. Both the claimant and the respondent accept that following the completion of his placement on 23 August 2023 the claimant was allowed to continue to come in and work on his work laptop on his dissertation. Neither party has produced any evidence of what payments were made and when.

95. We accept the claimant’s evidence that he earned more than £400 recorded in the bundle. We reject the suggestion in his schedule of loss that he would earn £200 per week as all he had earned by 30 June 2023 was £400.

96. We find that the claimant has failed to prove that he was not offered paid assignments after 20 July 2023. We find that to earn the amount that the claimant estimates he earned, he must have had paid assignments after 20 July 2023. The claimant would not have reached approximately £1,000 in total in the course of three weeks from 30 June 2023.

Accordingly, the treatment alleged in issues 2.2.2 and 4.2.2 is not proved.

97. Issue 2.2.3 is [NAME_17] sending an email to the claimant’s family making false allegations against him on 23 July 2023.

98. On 23 July 2023 [NAME_25] (the claimant’s wife) sent an email to [NAME_26] expressing concerns about the 20 July 2023 incident and its impact on the claimant. She references the claimant being a victim of false accusations and references knowing the consequences of any misconduct by any man against women in this jurisdiction and, as such, we infer that she was aware of the nature of the allegations made against her husband.

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99. [NAME_17] replied on 23 July 2023 as follows:- “I can assure you that this matter will be investigated and on Monday I am scheduled to examine all the video footage of all the conversations that took place between my staff and [NAME_1]. Obviously, we have to take any allegation seriously especially if it relates to sexual harassment or racism. We always have treated [NAME_1] with respect and he can also acknowledge that this is the case and we have a very friendly environment as you might have witnessed yourself and [NAME_1] has been present in all our social get- togethers.” 100. We find that [NAME_17] did not send an email to the claimant’s wife making false allegations. He merely stated that the allegations had to be treated seriously and would be investigated.

Accordingly, the alleged treatment in issue 2.2.3 is not proved. 101. Issue 2.2.4 is [NAME_17] saying that the claimant’s reinstatement would hinge on the willingness of [NAME_13] to continue working with him on 25 July 2023. 102. When the wording of this issue was put to [NAME_17] he responded: “Yes I might have said that.” He went on to confirm that [NAME_13] had told him that she would not work with the claimant as she was not comfortable staying in the office. In the covertly recorded transcript of the conversation between the claimant and [NAME_17] on 27 July 2023, [NAME_17] says, “I think [NAME_13] will not come back to the office anymore” and “I have mentioned that to [NAME_13] that I don’t want her to come back to the office anymore, so basically that’s it.” 103. We find that [NAME_17] probably did say the claimant’s return would depend upon [NAME_13]’s willingness to continue to work with the claimant. 104.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.4 is proved. 105. We have taken a hypothetical comparator, namely a non-Black male employee who had had allegations of sexual misconduct made against him by a female colleague who was saying that she did not want to work with the employee again in a small company of five employees. We readily understand why the comment was made given that there was only one office room where the claimant and [NAME_13] worked. We find that [NAME_13] was telling [NAME_17] that she did not want to work with the claimant again. We find that the hypothetical comparator would have been treated exactly the same due to the same difficulties.

Accordingly, we find that the claimant was not less favourably treated and it was not because of his race. 106. We find that the conduct was unwanted. 107. We find that it did not relate to race for the same reasons as under the direct discrimination claim. It related to the problematic dynamic between the claimant and [NAME_13]. 108. Issue 2.2.5 is refusing to provide CCTV which the claimant asked for in his grievance email. 109. The claimant did not expressly ask for the CCTV coverage in his grievance email

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as he states:- “I highly recommend for preservation of all evidence that relates to this case until the matter is sorted out.” 110. It is the respondent’s case that [NAME_17] did not receive or read that email until September 2023. In his oral evidence [NAME_17] told us that the CCTV would be recorded over after two weeks. [NAME_19] told us that it would be recorded over after two months, which, as it happens is what [NAME_17] said in the transcript of the meeting on 24 November 2023. 111. We have found that [NAME_17] probably did get the grievance in July 2023. We have also found that there was CCTV of the altercation between [NAME_4] and the claimant. 112. We find it highly improbable that individuals specialising in digital forensics and cyber security would fail to appreciate the importance of the CCTV footage and take the relatively easy step of preserving it, especially after it had been requested. We find that both episodes recorded on CCTV (i.e. between the claimant and [NAME_13] and between the claimant and [NAME_4] and others) were probably intentionally not saved due to the highly compromising nature of the content. 113.

Accordingly, we find the respondent did refuse to provide the CCTV footage in the sense that it allowed the CCTV footage not to be preserved. As such, the treatment alleged in issue 2.2.5 is proved. 114. We have taken a similar hypothetical comparator as before but with the addition of having raised a grievance which references racial discrimination and steps to avoid litigation. We find that such a hypothetical comparator would have been treated exactly the same as the respondent would have had the same motive not to preserve highly incriminating evidence. We find that that was not because of the claimant’s race. 115. We find that the treatment was unwanted conduct. 116. We find that it did not relate to the claimant’s race for the same reasons as under the direct discrimination claims. It was in order not to preserve highly incriminating evidence. 117. Issues 2.2.6 and 4.2.3 are [NAME_17] threatening the claimant with violence or with [NAME_13] going to the police about him should he pursue his claims on 11 November 2023. 118. In his claim form, the claimant puts this issue as follows:- “48. Furthermore, in [NAME_5]’s efforts to obstruct justice, during a WhatsApp call conversation between him and me on November 11, 2023, at 11:06, lasting for 12 minutes and 20 seconds, [NAME_5] employed threatening language. He explicitly conveyed a potential for violence should I proceed with legal action against the company and/or [NAME_4]. [NAME_5] asserted that [NAME_4], or others, might take matters into their own hands outside the formal court system. He offered what he labelled as friendly advice, urging me to let go of the situation and focus

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on my life. These statements were deeply concerning as they implied threats to my wellbeing. In response, I promptly informed my wife and subsequently notified [NAME_28] about the alarming nature of [NAME_5]’s statements.” 119. When this was put to [NAME_26] he responded that it was completely and utterly false, that he could not believe such an outrageous allegation and that he would not say that. 120. It is notable that the claimant, who appears to have made covert recordings of many, if not most, of the conversations and meetings with [NAME_17] and others has not produced a recording of this telephone call. The references to the call being at 11.06 and lasting for 12 minutes and 20 seconds are so precise that they suggest strongly to us that the claimant did record the exchange and that he has not disclosed it or produced a transcript. 121. There was a long meeting between [NAME_17], [NAME_19], and the claimant on 24 November 2023 which the claimant did covertly record. We were not taken to any part wherein the claimant complains about being threatened by [NAME_17]. Similarly, there is no complaint in the meeting on 5 December 2023. 122. The first limb of this allegation is very serious. We find that the claimant was very ready to raise any issues of complaint and the fact that he did not in relation to this part of the allegation along with not producing a transcript of the call casts doubt as to whether [NAME_17] did threaten the claimant with violence. We had no evidence of what words were actually alleged to have been said to assist us as to what may have been meant. We have had examples of the claimant interpreting a meaning from what was said, for example his inference from the “We are [NAME_14]” comment that that meant that anyone who was not Iranian was not safe. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the claimant’s assertion and find he has not proved that [NAME_17] threated the claimant with violence. 123. As far as the second part of the allegation is concerned, the transcript of the meeting on 24 November 2023 references [NAME_4] persuading [NAME_13] not to complain to the police and the fact that [NAME_13] still had the intention of going to the police. We readily understand the claimant’s concerns about the police potentially becoming involved but we have had no evidence of a threat to go to the police should the claimant pursue his claims. 124.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in issues 2.2.6 and 4.2.3 is not proved. 125. Issues 2.2.7 and 4.2.4 are [NAME_17] suspending the claimant’s access to company premises and confiscating equipment (communicated by the respondent by email 1 December 2023). 126. The claimant raised a grievance on 27 July 2023. He complained of racial discrimination. We find that that was a protected act. The claimant presented his claim on 28 December 2023 and we find that that was a protected act. 127. The claimant notified Acas on 19 October 2023 and the certificate is dated 30

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November 2023. 128. There were without prejudice negotiations between the claimant and the respondent in November 2023. These did not result in a compromise. 129. On 1 December 2023 [NAME_17] emailed the claimant as follows:- “Without prejudice For your urgent attention & action. As you have expressed your intention to pursue legal action against the company despite mutual cordial attempts to reach conciliation, it is abundantly clear that we have failed to do that. Therefore, it is NOT appropriate that you continue to come to the office and use our premises for your dissertation project. The facility to use computer forensics lab property and premises is suspended and you must bring the Dell Workstation by the close of day today. Provision of the company laptop and provision of company facilities is discretionary and we do NOT have an obligation to provide you this to you [sic]. Failure to comply to bring back the computer which is company property by the close of today will be considered as retaining a property without authorisation and will be reported as theft of company data and breach of confidentiality and we will prosecute you with the full force of law for breach of company data confidentiality and being in possession of company property without authorisation. The authorisation to use the company property and data is withdrawn with immediate effect and you will not be permitted to use company premises from this day onwards.” 130. Although that communication is marked without prejudice, in our judgment it is not privileged as negotiations had failed and concluded and it was not an attempt to settle the case. 131. We find that the respondent believed that the claimant may have done or may do a protected act, namely present a claim in the employment tribunal. 132. We find that the respondent did suspend the claimant’s access to the respondent’s premises on 1 December 2023. We find that the respondent did not actually confiscate the respondent’s equipment (the laptop) as the claimant refused to return it. However, the respondent did demand its return. 133. To that extent, we find that the alleged treatment in issues 2.2.7 and 4.2.4 is proved. 134. Whether or not the claimant’s worker status ceased on the termination of his placement on 23 August 2023 is not really relevant as, notwithstanding section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, case law is that workers are protected from victimisation post-employment. As such, the alleged victimisation arose in prohibited circumstances and would have, had it occurred during the relationship between the claimant and the respondent, contravened the Equality Act 2010.

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135. We find that the exclusion of the claimant from the respondent’s premises and the demand he return the laptop prior to him completing his dissertation, was a detriment. 136. We find that the claimant was subjected to the detriment because the respondent believed he may present a claim to the employment tribunal. Consequently, the claimant’s claim of victimisation on this ground is successful. 137. We have considered whether the treatment was less favourable treatment. We have taken a hypothetical comparator as before. We find that the hypothetical comparator would have been treated exactly the same. We find that the claimant was not less favourably treated and that the treatment was not because of his race but was because he may do a protected act. 138. We find that the treatment was unwanted. 139. We find it did not relate to the claimant’s race for the same reasons as under the direct discrimination claim. It related to the potential bringing of a claim. 140. Issues 2.2.8 and 4.2.5 are excluding the claimant from participating in various company activities in December 2023. 141. This allegation is in very general terms and we had no specifics as to what company activities, whether work related or social, are allegedly involved. The claimant’s witness statement references being refunded a cinema ticket in October 2023 but we have WhatsApp exchanges with [NAME_19] in October 2023 arranging to have a curry. 142. However, we find that by virtue of the claimant being excluded from the respondent’s premises so he must have been excluded from participating in various company activities in December 2023. 143.

Accordingly, we find the treatment alleged in issues 2.2.8 and 2.2.5 is proved. 144. We find that this allegation is, essentially, the same as 2.2.7 and 4.2.4. We find that it was victimisation and not direct discrimination or harassment for the same reasons. 145. Issue 4.2.6 is reporting to the police that the claimant had stolen his laptop. 146. The respondent did report to the police that the claimant had stolen the laptop.

Accordingly, the treatment alleged in issue 4.2.6 is proved. 147. The claimant had been given permission to use the laptop to complete his dissertation and had indicated previously that he would return it by 8 January 2024. That had been agreed. 148. We find reporting the alleged theft to the police was a detriment. 149. We have considered what, consciously or subconsciously, motivated the respondent to subject the claimant to the detriment. We find that the proximate reason was that the claimant had refused to return the laptop earlier than had

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previously been agreed. However, we find that the real reason or motive was a vindictive reaction to the claimant’s threat of presenting an employment tribunal claim.

Accordingly, the claim for victimisation succeeds. 150. Issue 4.2.1 is [NAME_4] maintaining a deliberate silence and avoiding extending basic courtesies, such as greetings. 151. We have no doubt that, following the incident on 20 July 2023 and the subsequent rebuking of [NAME_4], [NAME_4] may well have kept silent in the claimant’s presence and not greeted him. As such, we find that the alleged treatment in issue 4.2.1 is proved 152. We find that treatment was a detriment. 153. However, given that the grievance sent on 27 July 2023 was effectively ignored by [NAME_17], we find that it is unlikely that [NAME_4] was aware of the grievance and that, consequently, the detriment was not because the claimant did the protected act of raising a grievance on 27 July 2023. Further, we have no evidence that [NAME_4] was involved in the without prejudice negotiations or aware of a potential or actual claim to the employment tribunal. We find that the detriment was not because of a belief that the claimant had done or might do a protected act. Remedy 154. We have taken into account the general principles as set out in Prison Service and others v Johnson [1997] ICR 275 EAT, which summarised the general principles that underlie awards for injury to feelings. These are: “• Awards for injury to feelings are designed to compensate the injured party fully but not to punish the guilty party. • An award should not be inflated by feelings of indignation at the guilty party’s conduct. • Awards should not be so low as to dimmish respect fort the policy of the discrimination legislation. On the other hand, awards should not be so excessive that they might be regarded as untaxed riches. • Awards should be broadly similar to the range of awards in personal injury cases. • Tribunals should bear in mind the value in everyday life of the sum they are contemplating, and • Tribunals should bear in mind the need for public respect for the level of awards made.” 155. The factors that we have taken into account in this case are as follows:- 155.1 The first incident of harassment on 20 July 2023 was of relatively short duration being about half an hour. However, it was serious abuse and everyone has agreed that the treatment of the claimant was extremely bad.

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155.2 We heard the claimant on a telephone call on 22 July 2023 and he sounded very distressed. Further, we have seen reference to the claimant effectively taking to his bed because he was so upset. 155.3 That said, we note that the claimant returned to the respondent’s premises and worked there for the next two months and appears to have operated quite well. 155.4 Further, we note that in the grievance document dated 27 July 2023 the claimant was seeking to leverage the event in order to benefit himself. Whilst there is nothing intrinsically wrong in that action, we note that the claimant was making really quite large demands, for example a full time appointment along with £35,000 by way of damages. 155.5 The victimisation effectively operated for about a month and a half from 1 December 2023 until the claimant completed his dissertation on 8 January 2024. The police indicated that no action would be taken towards the end of January 2024. Consequently, the victimisation had a duration of about two months. 156. We find that the claimant’s feelings were injured. 157. In our judgment the treatment falls into the lower Vento band appropriate for 23/24, namely £1,100 - £11,200. In our judgment, an appropriate and just figure to arrive at for injury to feelings would be £10,000. 158. We award interest at 8% per annum from 20 July 2023 which gives a figure of £2,073.43 to today’s date. Acas uplift 159. The claimant submitted a grievance on 27 July 2023. There was a delay in dealing with it until September 2023. There was a meeting with the claimant but he was not given an opportunity to discuss his grievance. The claimant was given a grievance outcome on 2 November 2023. The claimant did not appeal the grievance. 160. In our judgment, this is not a case where there has been a total failure to comply with the Acas Code of Practice on Grievance Procedures. In the words of [NAME_31], “it was clumsy.” 161. We find that there was a partial failure to comply with the Acas Guide and that it would be just and equitable to award an uplift of 10%.

Accordingly, we award £1,207.34 by way of Acas uplift. Anonymity Order/Restriction of Reporting Order The claimant 162. On 20 February 2026 the claimant submitted an application for anonymity and restricted reporting orders.

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163. We acknowledge that the case has involved allegations of sexual misconduct against the claimant. However, we have made expressly clear in paragraph 37 of this judgment that the claimant was completely exonerated by the respondent of any wrongdoing. 164. We have to balance the principle of the open administration of justice with the claimant’s Article 8 right to a private life. 165. In our judgment, the grounds advanced by the claimant do not justify making such orders. The claimant’s security clearance should not be affected by allegations that are unsubstantiated. The claimant’s reputation is intact by reason of this judgment. [NAME_13] 166. Notwithstanding that the allegations of sexual misconduct have been unsubstantiated and the claimant cleared of any wrongdoing, we consider that as [NAME_13] complained of sexual misconduct so her identity should be protected. In [NAME_13]’s case we find that her Article 8 rights do outweigh the principle of open justice due to the public policy of and legislation protecting complainants of sexual misconduct.

Accordingly, we have made anonymity and restriction of reporting orders for [NAME_13].

Approved by:

Employment Judge Alliott

Date: 20 May 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 1 June 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal- decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/

Case Numbers: 3315314/2023 & 3315340/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

On: 16/17/18/19/20 February 2026 Before: Employment Judge Alliott

Mrs G [NAME_6]

[NAME_7] Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the tribunal is that:

1. The claimant was harassed on racial grounds by virtue of the conduct in issue 2.2.1.

2. The claimant was victimised by virtue of the conduct in issues 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6.

3. The respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the total sum of £13,280.77, being:

(i) £10,000 for injury to feelings;

(ii) £2,073.43 interest thereon;

(iii) £1,207.34 10% uplift for unreasonable failure to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice on grievances.

4. The rest of the claimant’s direct race discrimination, harassment on racial grounds and victimisation claims are dismissed.

5. The claimant’s application for an anonymity order is refused.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Alliott

Date: 24 February 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

4 March 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE

Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal- decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

Case Number: 3315314/2023 & 3315340/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s application dated 18 March 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 4 March 2026 is refused.

REASONS

There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked, because the claimant is seeking to re-argue quantum which has been decided. If the claimant considers that the decision is perverse or wrong in law he should appeal.

Date: 5 May 2026

Approved by

Employment Judge Alliott

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

11 May 2026

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE