Tribunal Approves 2.3% Pitch Fee Increase Based on CPI

OUTCOME: Allowed

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case reference : LON/00AC/PHI/2025/0003, 0014 & 0023 [NAME] : [NAME], [ADDRESS], [POSTCODE] Park home addresses : Pitches 2, 54 and 81 Applicant : [redacted] : Mr [COUNSEL], counsel Respondents : [redacted] Ms [COUNSEL] (pitch 54) Mr [COUNSEL] (pitch 81) Representative : Mr [COUNSEL] (pitch 81 only) Type of [NAME](s) : Applications under paragraphs 16 - 20 of Schedule 1 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 to determine pitch fees Tribunal members : Judge Timothy Powell & [NAME] of decision : 31 October 2025

DECISION

Decision

The Tribunal determines that the following new quarterly pitch fees apply to the following pitches, as from 1 November 2024:

Pitch no. Name Old pitch fee % increase New pitch fee 2 Ms [NAME] £759.48 2.3 £776.95 54 Ms [NAME] £850.92 2.3 £870.49 81 Mr [NAME] £752.48 2.3 £769.79

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Reasons (1) By notices dated 6 September 2024, the Applicant [NAME], [APPELLANT] (“[NAME]”), gave notice to an unknown number of [NAME] of [NAME], [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] (“the park home [NAME]” or “the [NAME]”) that their quarterly pitch fees would be increased from 1 November 2024. The notices sought an increase of 2.3%, in line with the Consumer Prices Index (“CPI”). (2) On 31 December 2024, the Tribunal received 29 applications from [NAME] for the determination of pitch fees in respect of those [NAME] who had not agreed with the increase. The applications were made under paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”). The applications were dated 30 December 2024 and were delivered by hand to the relevant pitches on or around 14 January 2025. Of those 29 applications, 26 have been withdrawn as the pitch fee has been agreed. The remaining three applications, relating to pitches 2, 54 and 81, were dealt with at a hearing on 20 October 2025. The applicable law (3) The Mobile Homes Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) as amended by the Mobile Homes Act 2013 applies to all written agreements for occupation of mobile homes not excepted by paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act. It implies into all such agreements the terms set out in Chapter 2 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act. (4) Paragraph 29 of Chapter 2 of Schedule 1 defines a pitch fee as “the amount which the [NAME] is required by the agreement to pay to the owner for the right to station the mobile home on the pitch and for use of the common areas of the protected [NAME] and their maintenance, but does not include amounts due in respect of gas, electricity, water and sewerage or other such services, unless the agreement expressly provides that the pitch fee includes any such amounts.” (5) Paragraph 16 of Chapter 2 of Schedule 1 sets out that a pitch fee can only be changed by the owner in accordance with paragraph 17 if either: (i) an [NAME] agrees; or (ii) the Tribunal considers that it is reasonable for the pitch fee to be changed and makes an order determining the amount of the new pitch fee. (6) Paragraph 17 sets out the mechanism for review and paragraph 25A(1) sets out the formality requirements. So long as those formalities have been complied with, paragraph 20(A1) provides that “unless it would be unreasonable having regard to paragraph 18(1), there is a presumption that the pitch fee shall increase or decrease by a percentage which is no more than any percentage increase or decrease in the consumer prices index”. Previously, it was the retail prices index, or RPI. (7) That presumption is therefore displaced, so far as is relevant, by satisfactory evidence of any of the matters in paragraph 18 (although it is not an

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exhaustive list of the factors that the Tribunal may take into account, see: [NAME] v [NAME] [2017] UKUT 24 (LC)). The list in paragraph 18 includes, in summary: certain sums expended by the [NAME] since the last review date; any deterioration in the condition, and any decrease in the amenity, of the [NAME] not previously taken into account; or any reduction in the services that the owner supplies to the [NAME], pitch or mobile home, and any deterioration in the quality of those services, again not previously taken into account. (8) There is considerable case law regarding the Tribunal’s task when dealing with an [NAME] to change a pitch fee. This was set out in detail by a previous Tribunal (LON/00AC/PHI/2023/0001-0051) (“the 2024 Tribunal”) in its decision relating to [NAME] issued on 6 June 2024 (“the 2024 decision”), and it is not repeated here. In short, the Tribunal must decide that it is reasonable for the fee to be changed. If so, then it must have “particular regard” to the factors in paragraph 18(1). If none of those factors are present, there is presumption that any variation to the pitch fee will be limited by reference to the consumer prices index, but it is not an entitlement or an inevitability. The park home [NAME] (9) The Tribunal members inspected the park home [NAME] in the morning of 20 October 2025, in advance of the hearing. (10) The [NAME] appeared to be in generally good condition, and it was neat and tidy except for a couple of locations where new mobile homes are being installed. The Tribunal members’ attention was drawn to several matters during a walking tour of the [NAME], including: new automatic electronic gates installed at the entrance, an old CCTV sign affixed to the inside left brick pillar of the entrance, grass to the side of pitch 3, a new rear fence at the back of pitch 3, new LED lighting heads on top of existing lampposts, grass between paving stones on some car parking spaces, new mobile homes without railings on their entrance steps, new manhole covers on old drains, a square patio at the rear of pitch 24, a new concrete base awaiting a new mobile home, a wooden fence at the rear apparently pushed back from the new base, a new section of rear fencing, a tree close to the rear of a mobile home, elsewhere the stumps of old conifers that had been cut down, and a very tall tree near to two mobile homes. The hearing (11) The hearing of the remaining three applications took place on 20 October 2025. (12) [NAME] was represented by Mr [COUNSEL] of counsel, who appeared with Mr [COUNSEL], [NAME]’s director, [NAME] of [COMPANY], the company’s solicitor, and Mr [COUNSEL]. Mr [COUNSEL] represented Mr [NAME], who did not attend himself. There was no appearance by Ms [NAME] or Ms [NAME].

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(13) Mr [NAME] told us that Mr [NAME] knew of the hearing but did not feel he could contribute anything more than Mr [NAME] who was representing him. Mr [NAME] also said that he had been representing Ms [NAME] until very recently, but no longer after she had turned to her nephew for help with her affairs, and representing Ms [NAME] until she had a severe fall four weeks ago, since when he had not been able to take further instructions from her. (14) Bearing in mind rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal decided to proceed with the hearing despite the absence of the Respondents. This was because the Tribunal was satisfied that all Respondents had been notified of the hearing through their then representative Mr [COUNSEL], and that Mr [COUNSEL], at least, had made a deliberate choice not to attend. It was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in their absence because they had had the opportunity to attend, the hearing bundle contained documents setting out their respective cases, so far as the Tribunal could tell the arguments that Ms [NAME] and Ms [NAME] would have advanced were the same as those put forward on behalf of Mr [APPELLANT] by Mr [COUNSEL], who did attend, and the Applicant’s director, solicitor and counsel had all attended and would be prejudiced by the costs that would be incurred by a postponement. It was also in all parties’ interests to bring this [NAME] to a timely resolution. Preliminary issues [NAME] to admit Mr [NAME] witness statement (15) At the start of the hearing, Mr [NAME] put forward [NAME]’s an [NAME] to adduce evidence from its director, Mr [NAME], in the form of a witness statement dated 10 September 2025. The [NAME] was opposed by Mr [NAME] for the Respondents, who said it introduced new material about the condition of the [NAME]. Mr [NAME], who had made his own [NAME] to admit new evidence, said the Tribunal should either grant both applications, or neither. (16) The Tribunal granted [NAME]’s [NAME] to adduce the witness statement of Mr [NAME], for the following reasons: (i) The Tribunal directions of 2 July 2025 required the [NAME] to provide their case by 15 August 2025, with a Reply by the Applicant by 12 September 2025. The directions did not expressly provide for any witness evidence from the Applicant. That meant that unless the witness statement was admitted, there would be no evidence from the Applicant before the Tribunal in support of its [NAME]. It would not be just and fair to exclude the Applicant from participating in its own [NAME], (ii) The witness statement of Mr [NAME] was specific to the [NAME] against the Respondents and included his evidence and photographic evidence as to the maintenance and condition of the park, which had been put in issue by the Respondents, (iii) The [NAME] was made on 10 September 2025, before the date in directions for the Applicant’s Reply,

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(iv) The evidence of Mr [APPELLANT] would inform the Tribunal as to the matters seen on inspection and the evidence to focus upon at the hearing, and (v) Given all the above, there would be no prejudice to the Respondents by admitting the evidence.

[NAME] by Mr [NAME] to correct the previous pitch fee figure (17) On 26 September 2025, Mr [NAME] made an [NAME] to admit in evidence in the form of (i) a statement from him, explaining Mr [NAME] case in greater detail and countering statement made by Mr [NAME] in his witness statement of 10 September 2025 as to the condition of the [NAME], (ii) a statement from Mr [NAME] himself, reiterating matters in Mr [NAME] statement, (iii) photographs of the [NAME], and (iv) correspondence relating its condition. (18) Mr [NAME] opposed the [NAME] because: it was made late in the proceedings, nearly six weeks after the date for the Respondents’ case; Mr [NAME] case was always that he did not oppose the 2.3% increase in pitch fee, but he wished to argue against the pitch fee determined by the 2024 Tribunal; his [NAME] sought to adduce extensive evidence/ representations not previously made in these proceedings, concerning condition of the [NAME]; and most of the matters raised had already been considered in the 2024 decision. (19) The Tribunal granted Mr [NAME] [NAME] to adduce late evidence, for the following reasons: (i) The allegations relating to the condition of the [NAME] had been raised in Mr [NAME] earlier statement, albeit not in such detail, (ii) Mr [NAME] was not legally qualified and was in effect a lay representative. It was fair to allow his late evidence into the proceedings, if the Applicant was also to have late evidence, (iii) None of the allegations were new, as they had all be raised before the 2024 Tribunal. The evidence was more of an update and reiteration of past complaints and, like Mr [NAME] statement, was apt to inform the Tribunal as to the matters seen on inspection and the evidence to focus upon at the hearing, (iv) The [NAME] had been made more than three weeks before the hearing and there had been time for the Applicant to deal with it. In any event, the Applicant’s case was that evidence of [NAME] condition could not be bought into these proceedings given that it was dealt with by the 2024 Tribunal, and (v) Given all the above, there would be no prejudice to the Applicant by admitting the evidence. Issues for the Tribunal

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(20) In its [NAME] form, [NAME] stated that since the last review date it had spent money on improvements at the [NAME], namely in respect of the installation of new entrance gates. In addition, there was evidence from Mr [NAME] witness statement of 10 September 2025, and at inspection, that there was regular weed killing especially on the internal roads and parking bays, new LED lighting had been installed on old lampposts, new park homes had been placed on redeveloped pitches, water drainage channels had been repaired and a new connection installed, pumping stations for sewerage had been upgraded and, generally, the park had been kept clean and tidy and common areas had been maintained. Notwithstanding the improvements, [NAME] indicated that it only sought an increase in pitch fees in line with the CPI. (21) Each of the remaining three [NAME] raised similar objections to the proposed pitch fee increase. Objection by Mr [NAME], pitch 81 (22) In the hearing, Mr [NAME] said that there was no objection to the CPI increase of 2.3% of itself, which he said was “neither here nor there” in the scheme of things. (23) The objections to any increase were two-fold: first, the fact that the baseline pitch fee (upon which the 2.3% was to be applied) was incorrect, and, secondly, that the condition of the [NAME] was poor. Condition of the [NAME]

(24) Dealing first with the condition of the [NAME], all the issues raised by Mr [NAME] had been raised by him in a hearing on 27 March 2024 before the 2024 Tribunal. That Tribunal had recorded and dealt with Mr [NAME] complaints about the condition of the [NAME] in the 2024 decision. The 2024 Tribunal dealt with the complaints under eight headings: • Removal of six mature conifer trees [59-69], • Issues surrounding removal and replacement of homes and parking issues [70-93], • Surface water and leaks [94-112], • General maintenance of the Grounds/ Gardens/ Entrance to the Park [113-125], • CCTV [126-128], • Harassment and sale blocking [129-134], • Park warden [135-141], and • Provision of a skip for [NAME] [142-144]. (25) The 2024 Tribunal considered that several of the matters raised by Mr [NAME] represented a deterioration in the condition of the [NAME] or a loss of amenity and took them into account when it decided the amount of the then pitch fee increase [146-149]. The 2024 Tribunal reduced the pitch fee increase proposed by the [NAME] from 11.4% to 8.5%, being a 2.9% decrease [152], with an additional 1% decrease for those pitches affected by increased noise

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from the removal of the conifers [153]. As these issues of condition have already been factored into the 2024 Tribunal’s determination of a pitch fee increase, they cannot be considered again by this Tribunal: see paragraph 18(1)(aa) of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act, which states (with added highlighting): “18(1) When determining the amount of the new pitch fee particular regard shall be had to— (a) […] (aa) any deterioration in the condition, and any decrease in the amenity, of the [NAME] or any adjoining land which is occupied or controlled by the owner since the date on which this paragraph came into force (in so far as regard has not previously been had to that deterioration or decrease for the purposes of this sub-paragraph) […]” (26) In any event, our inspection showed that many of the matters raised in 2024 had been remedied by the [NAME] since the last decision had been issued. Incorrect pitch fee figures (27) That leaves Mr [NAME] submission that the pitch fee determined by the 2024 Tribunal was too high because it was based on the wrong previous pitch fee. The arguments were set out in Mr [NAME] letter of 22 July 2025 in the hearing bundle and in the statements from Mr [NAME] and Mr [NAME] dated 26 September 2025, which were admitted in evidence by the Tribunal. (28) Mr [NAME] current pitch fee is £752.48 per quarter. That was the “new pitch fee” determined by the 2024 Tribunal, being an 7.5% increase on the previous “old pitch fee” of £699.48 per quarter. However, Mr [NAME] disputed that £699.48 per quarter quoted by the 2024 Tribunal was the correct figure. He argued that the “old pitch fee” should have been only £648.73 per quarter. (29) The explanation was that in 2022 Mr [NAME] had been paying a pitch fee of £648.73 per quarter. In that year, the [NAME] had proposed an increase of 7.9% that would have brought the pitch fee to £699.48. Mr [NAME] and [NAME] had challenged the increase in writing but, in the absence of their agreement, the [NAME] had not sought a determination of the Tribunal to increase the pitch fee. Consequently, Mr [NAME] argued, the old pitch fee continued in force because, by paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act, the pitch fee could only be changed with the agreement of the [NAME] or if the Tribunal upon [NAME] considers it reasonable for the pitch fee to be changed and makes an order determining the amount of the new pitch fee. (30) However, when the [NAME] proposed an 11.4% increase in 2023, and then applied to the Tribunal for a determination, Mr [NAME] alleged that the [NAME] had erroneously told the 2024 Tribunal that Mr [NAME] pitch fee was £699.48 per quarter, instead of £648.73, as if the 2022 proposed increase had been implemented – which it had not.

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(31) The problem for Mr [NAME] is that none of the [NAME] raised the issue of incorrect pitch fees before the 2024 Tribunal and the issue was not raised in the subsequent request by [NAME] for permission to appeal, nor before the Upper Tribunal on the hearing of [NAME]’s appeal against the 2024 decision. (32) It appears that the same issue may have affected [NAME] in pitches 2 (Ms [NAME]), 81 (Mr [NAME]) and 91 (Mr [NAME]), and perhaps [NAME] (see Mr [NAME] letter of 14 June 2025). So far as we can see, [NAME] first started raising the issue with [NAME] in January, February and March 2025, after [NAME] Legal had sent them copies of the current Tribunal [NAME], on 14 January 2025. For example, Mr [NAME] raised the issue of the incorrect pitch fee in his letter to [NAME] of 1 February 2025, his letter to [NAME] Legal of 6 March 2025 and in his letter to the Tribunal of 13 August 2025. In his statement of 26 September 2025, Mr [NAME] again challenged the “old pitch fee” figure which [NAME] had provided to the 2024 Tribunal. (33) Unfortunately for Mr [NAME], this Tribunal cannot go behind the decision of the 2024 Tribunal. Although one Tribunal is not bound by the decision of another, for reasons of consistency and finality, we consider ourselves bound by the determination of the “new pitch fee” made by the 2024 Tribunal. This is especially so, when Mr [NAME] had the opportunity to raise the issue at the 2024 hearing (where he was represented by Mr [NAME]) and later when seeking permission to appeal, but did not do so; where there has already been a decision of the Upper Tribunal in respect of the 2024 decision ([COMPANY] v [NAME] and [NAME], [2024] UKUT 375 (LC)), where the issue was not raised; and where no [NAME] has been made to the 2024 Tribunal to amend, review or appeal its determination of the new pitch fee on these grounds. (34) The legislation sets out a clear mechanism for changing pitch fees on an annual basis. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act both refer to an order of the Tribunal determining the amount of the new pitch fee, and any subsequent notice of increase by a [NAME] must propose an increase based on the last Tribunal determination (or agreement by the [NAME]). So far as the current proceedings are concerned, [NAME] proposed its 2.3% CPI increase on the “new pitch fee” determined by the 2024 Tribunal, in compliance with the 1983 Act. If any change is to be made to that starting figure, it must involve an [NAME] to the 2024 Tribunal, and not to this Tribunal. However, Mr [NAME] faces significant hurdles in doing so. This is because Mr [NAME] admits he should have recognised the incorrect amount in the 2024 decision and should have notified the Tribunal within the allotted time (paragraph 1(e) of his statement of 26 September 2025), he is out of time to request a set aside or permission to appeal the 2024 decision, and he would have to apply for an extension of time to do so and provide a good explanation for his failure to apply in time. (35) For all these reasons, the Tribunal cannot interfere with the “new pitch fee” in the 2024 decision and Mr [NAME] objection to the pitch fee increase cannot be sustained on this ground either. Objection by Ms [NAME], pitch 54

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(36) The 2024 Tribunal determined a “new pitch fee” as at 1 July 2023 of £850.92 per quarter, being an 8.5% increase on the “old pitch fee” of £784.26. From 1 November 2024, [NAME] sought a 2.3% CPI increase to £870.49 per quarter. (37) Ms [NAME] did not appear at the hearing on 20 October 2025, and she was not represented at that hearing. Ms [NAME] objection was set out in her letter of 23 August 2025, which appeared in the hearing bundle. While she relied upon issues of poor maintenance and management of the park, she did not consider that these issues would be resolved through the First-tier Tribunal process. She then went to say, “For this reason, I am withdrawing my objection to the proposed 2.3% increase in our Pitch Fee.” (38) If that had been all, it would have been a simple matter to confirm the increase sought by [NAME]. However, Ms [NAME] letter made clear that she agreed to the 2.3% increase not on the “new pitch fee” of £850.92, which had been payable by reason of the 2024 decision, but on the “old pitch fee” of £784.26. This is not quite the same situation as Mr [NAME], who disputed the amount of his “old pitch fee” as being incorrect. Here, it appears that Ms [NAME] accepts the “old pitch fee” amount in her case, but she has not accepted or applied the 8.5% increase from 1 July 2023. (39) Mr [COUNSEL] of counsel suggested that “Ms [COUNSEL] appears to be piggy backing on Mr [NAME] arguments, because she fails to recognise that her current pitch fee was previously determined by the FTT at £850.92”. He pointed to [NAME] letter of 9 September 2025 urging Ms [NAME] to pay the correct amount, which she had not done. Because of this, [NAME] still required a determination from this Tribunal, notwithstanding withdrawal of Ms [NAME] objection to the 2.3% increase. (40) In the absence of Ms [NAME] or any other documents or submissions, it is hard to know why she is still paying the “old pitch fee” of £784.26 per quarter. Even if Ms [NAME] had intended to rely on an error in the “old pitch fee” in the 2024 decision (about which there was no evidence), the Tribunal would have been unable to interfere with the “new pitch fee” in that decision, for all the same reasons that it could not do so in respect of Mr [NAME] objection. (41) It follows from this that any objection by Ms [NAME] on these grounds cannot be sustained. Objection by Ms [NAME], pitch 2 (42) Ms [NAME] current pitch fee is £759.48 per quarter. That was the “new pitch fee” as at 1 July 2023 determined by the 2024 Tribunal, being an 8.5% increase on the previous “old pitch fee” of £699.48 per quarter. (43) Ms [NAME] did not attend the hearing and did not provide any witness statement, evidence or submissions in support of her objection to the proposed pitch fee increase. Mr [NAME] told the Tribunal that he was no longer representing Ms [NAME] and had no instructions regarding her objection to the pitch fee review.

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(44) The available evidence suggested that Ms [NAME] objection to the current pitch fee was that the “new pitch fee” determined by the 2024 Tribunal was based on an incorrect “old pitch fee”. Certainly, her name was included in Mr [NAME] letter of 14 June 2025 as one of the possibly affected [NAME]. (45) It appears that Ms [NAME] wrote to [NAME] Legal on 20 February 2025, after receiving their letter of 14 January 2025 enclosing a copy of the current Tribunal [NAME]. Although a copy of Ms [NAME] letter was not in the hearing bundle, a copy of [NAME] Legal’s reply of 24 February 2025 was included in Exhibit MA3 to Mr [NAME] witness statement of 10 September 2025. The letter says amongst other things: “Thank you for your letter dated 20 February in response to ours from 14 January 2025. We note that you say “I am withdrawing my [NAME] against you and am agreeing the proposed increase of 2.3% from 1/11/2024”. In as far as we are aware, you have not made an [NAME] to the Tribunal. The only [NAME] is the one made by our client and it is for them to apply to withdraw it.” (46) The letter goes on to confirm that outcome of the 2024 decision, setting out the “old pitch fee” of £699.98 and the “new pitch fee” of £759.48. The letter continues: “Mr [NAME] represented you in the Tribunal proceedings for 2023. If you disagreed with the amount of the “old pitch fee”, which was the starting point for the Tribunal in those proceedings, Mr [NAME] should have made very clear representations on your behalf that this was your position. Whilst Mr [NAME] sought permission to appeal the decision of the Tribunal, the grounds relied on by him had nothing to do with the “old pitch fee” amount in the Tribunal’s decision and the argument which you appear to be [NAME] that this amount was wrong. The Tribunal’s determination of the new level of pitch fee for 2023, based on the “old pitch fee” is the same as a Court Order and is binding on the parties. […]” (47) Assuming that Ms [NAME] wishes to rely on an error in the “old pitch fee” in the 2024 decision (about which there was no evidence), the Tribunal would have been unable to interfere with the “new pitch fee” in that decision, for all the same reasons that it could not do so in respect of Mr [NAME] objection. (48) It follows from this that any objection by Ms [NAME] on these grounds cannot be sustained. Should the pitch fees be increased by CPI? (49) The Tribunal has seen nothing in the evidence to suggest that it would be unreasonable to change the pitch fees at [NAME]. The Tribunal therefore determines that it would be reasonable to do so in this case.

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(50) By paragraph 20(A1) of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act, unless it would be unreasonable having regard to paragraph 18(1), there is a presumption that the pitch fee shall increase or decrease by a percentage which is no more than any percentage increase or decrease in the CPI. (51) As the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 22 in [COMPANY] v Bamborough [2016] UKUT 144 (LC) made clear, “the FTT is given a very strong steer that a change in RPI [which preceded the CPI] in the previous 12 months will make it reasonable for the pitch fee to be changed by that amount…” (52) The CPI has increased by 2.3% since the last review date and [NAME] only seeks a CPI increase. There are no new matters of deterioration in the condition, or any decrease in the amenity, of the [NAME] alleged by the Respondents (per paragraph18(1) of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act), nor any other weighty factors, which might displace the presumption of an increase reflecting the increase in the CPI. (53) Therefore, the Tribunal determines that the pitch fees should increase by the rate of CPI, namely 2.3%, and the new pitch fees as are set out at the very beginning of this decision. (54) By paragraph 17(4)(c) of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act, the new pitch fee is payable as from the review date, namely 1 November 2024.

Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written [NAME] for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the [NAME]. If the [NAME] is not made within the 28-day time limit, such [NAME] must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the [NAME] for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party [NAME] the [NAME] is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further [NAME] for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).

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Where possible, you should make your further [NAME] for permission to appeal on-line using the Upper Tribunal’s on-line document filing system, called CE-File. This will enable the Upper Tribunal to deal with it more efficiently and will enable you to follow the progress of your [NAME] and submit any additional documents quickly and easily.  Information about how to register to use CE-File can be found by going to this web address: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp- content/uploads/2021/07/Practice-Note-on-CE-filing-Lands-Chamber- 17.6.21_.pdf Alternatively, you can submit your [NAME] for permission to appeal by email to: [EMAIL]. The Upper Tribunal can also be contacted by post or by telephone at: Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 5th [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] (Tel: [PHONE]).