Upper Tribunal Sets Aside Asylum Decision Due to Errors

OUTCOME: Allowed

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 [NAME] & Reasons Issued: On 19th of March 2026 Before DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE [APPELLANT]) Appellant and SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent Representation: For the Appellant: [redacted] For the Respondent: [redacted] Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025 Order Regarding Anonymity Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND

REASONS Introduction 1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the [NAME]”), promulgated on 22 June 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.

2. The appellant’s protection claim arises from events in Bangladesh connected to his long-standing political profile within the [NAME] [NAME] ([NAME]) and [NAME] ([NAME]), and his past association with former [NAME] [APPELLANT]. The appellant maintains that he was detained and tortured in 2016, and is now subject to two politically-motivated criminal cases, one brought under the previous Awami League government and one brought under the subsequent [NAME] installed in mid-2024.

3. The [NAME] accepted significant aspects of the appellant’s political profile, including his seniority within [NAME] and his role as personal assistant to [NAME] [APPELLANT], and accepted that the appellant witnessed the [NAME]’s abduction on 22 August 2016. However, the [NAME] rejected the core allegations of detention and torture in 2016, and rejected the existence of the two criminal cases said to be pending in Bangladesh. These adverse credibility findings were determinative of the outcome.

4. The appellant challenges those adverse findings, contending that the [NAME] failed to consider key corroborative evidence, acted unfairly in refusing to admit late documents, and misapplied several principles of asylum law including section 8 of the 2004 Act, the correct approach to delay, and the assessment of sur place political activity. Procedural History 5. The [NAME] dismissed the appeal in a decision dated 22 June 2025. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the [NAME], which was refused by Judge Cartin on 20 August 2025.

6. The appellant renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal. In a decision dated 8 October 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst granted permission to appeal on all grounds, observing that each of the seven grounds advanced was arguable. 2

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 7. The Secretary of State filed a Rule 24 response on 27 October 2025 opposing the appeal, maintaining that the [NAME] did not commit an error of law and that the grounds amounted to disagreement with findings open to the [NAME]. Issues Before the Upper Tribunal 8. In accordance with the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission, the issues for determination are: a. Whether the [NAME] acted unfairly in refusing to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025. b. Whether the [NAME]’s adverse credibility findings were reached in error of law by reason of failing to consider or engage with material corroborative evidence. c. Whether the [NAME] misdirected itself in its application of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. d. Whether the [NAME]’s findings were inconsistent or contradictory, particularly in light of its acceptance of the appellant’s senior political role. e. Whether the [NAME] placed irrational weight on minor or immaterial inconsistencies. f. Whether the [NAME] erred in its treatment of sur place activities, including its approach to the [NAME] evidence and to the relevant CPIN material. Legal Framework 9. In assessing credibility, the [NAME] must evaluate all the evidence in the round, including corroborative material, consistency with country background evidence, and the internal coherence of the account: Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367. 10.Behaviour falling within section 8 of the 2004 Act may damage credibility, but it does not mandate rejection of an account: [NAME] (Iran) [2005] UKAIT 00116. 11.Late evidence must be considered in accordance with the overriding objective and the principles in [NAME] (non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 28. 12.Where decision-making is significantly delayed, the [NAME]’s findings must be scrutinised with “particular care” to ensure the delay has not infected the determination: [NAME] (Sri Lanka) [2018] EWCA Civ 1391. 13.Where a Judge accepts part of a claim which on its face increases the plausibility of another part, the Judge must demonstrate coherent reasoning if nevertheless rejecting the related element: [NAME] (Afghanistan) [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. The Hearing 3

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 14.The appeal was heard at Field House on 11 December 2025. Mr [APPELLANT] appeared for the appellant and Mr [COUNSEL] appeared as Presenting Officer for the Secretary of State. 15.Mr [APPELLANT] submitted that the [NAME] Judge accepted important parts of the appellant’s account—most notably his senior political role and his close association with [NAME] [NAME]—but rejected the central allegations of detention, torture, and the existence of two criminal cases. It was argued that the Judge’s adverse findings were based on procedural unfairness and legal error. 16.Ground 1 focused on the [NAME]’s refusal to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025. While the [NAME] admitted additional [NAME] material, it refused to admit the [NAME]’s email and the [NAME]’s clarificatory letter—both of which, it was submitted, directly addressed the discrepancies relied on adversely by the [NAME]. The appellant argued that this selective exclusion was unfair and contrary to the overriding objective, particularly given the significance of the matters at issue. 17.Turning to Grounds 2 and 3, Mr [APPELLANT] submitted that substantial corroborative evidence was not adequately considered or engaged with. This included the statements of [NAME] [NAME] [NAME], [NAME], and multiple [NAME] who verified the authenticity of the criminal case documents. Reliance was placed on [APPELLANT] [NAME], with emphasis on the steps the appellant had taken to obtain precisely the kind of verification that case law contemplates. 18.It was submitted that the [NAME] failed to put its concerns to key witnesses, including the [NAME], contrary to well-established principles of procedural fairness recently restated by the Supreme Court in in Griffiths v [NAME] [2023] UKSC 48. 19.Under Ground 4, it was argued that the [NAME] misapplied section 8 of the 2004 Act. The Secretary of State did not rely upon delay in claiming asylum in the refusal letter; the [NAME] nevertheless relied on it without properly engaging with the appellant’s detailed explanation in his witness statement. 20.Grounds 5–7 challenged the [NAME]’s reasoning as inconsistent, contradictory, and legally flawed. It was submitted that having accepted the appellant’s political prominence and presence at the [NAME]’s abduction, the [NAME]’s rejection of detention and subsequent targeting was irrational. 21.On disposal, Mr [APPELLANT] submitted that the adverse findings were fundamentally flawed and should be set aside, but the [NAME]’s positive findings should be preserved. Given the nature of the errors, he submitted that the appropriate course was for the Upper Tribunal to retain the appeal for re-making. 4

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 22.For the Secretary of State, Mr [NAME] relied on the Rule 24 response. He submitted that the grounds amounted to disagreement with findings open to the Judge but did not identify any substantive legal error. 23.He emphasised that the [NAME] found at paragraph 47 that [NAME] [NAME] had been released following the change of government and was living freely. This finding, he submitted, was unchallenged and undermined the appellant’s risk profile: if the [NAME] was no longer of interest to the authorities, his former assistant would be at even lower risk. 24.In relation to Ground 1, he submitted that [NAME] supported the [NAME]’s refusal of late evidence. The Judge admitted the [NAME] material because it caused no unfairness, but was entitled to exclude other material filed late and without explanation. 25.On delay, he relied on [NAME] (Sri Lanka), submitting that no causal nexus was shown between the delay and the [NAME]’s findings. 26.He contended that any failure to put matters to the [NAME] was immaterial, given that the Judge had accepted that the appellant was present at the abduction, and that circumstances in Bangladesh had “moved on” following the change of government. 27.On section 8, he submitted that the [NAME] had directed itself adequately and had properly considered the appellant’s delay. 28.Finally, he submitted that the [NAME]’s approach to sur place activity, including its reliance on CPIN material, disclosed no legal error. 29.In reply, Mr [APPELLANT] submitted that the respondent’s reliance on the [NAME]’s release overlooked evidence from the [NAME] himself indicating ongoing monitoring and surveillance. In any event, the appellant faced criminal proceedings whereas the [NAME] did not. 30.He emphasised that the core issue was not delay per se but the [NAME]’s failure to engage with highly material evidence. The [NAME]’s refusal to admit complementary clarificatory evidence was central to the unfairness. 31.He submitted that the determination was fundamentally flawed in its treatment of credibility and should be set aside with preservation of the [NAME]’s positive findings. ERROR OF LAW ANALYSIS 32.I am satisfied that the [NAME]’s decision contains material errors of law. The adverse credibility findings were not reached through a correct and lawful process. It is not necessary for me to determine all the grounds which were argued, as the outcome is the same, and so this judgment will not go through all of the pleaded grounds of appeal one by one but instead will focus on the 5

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 core errors of law. Some of the grounds overlap, and will be considered as one rather than individually. Ground 1 – Procedural unfairness (refusal to admit late evidence) 33.The [NAME] refused to admit the appellant’s supplementary evidence filed on 11 March 2025, whilst admitting other late evidence from the same tranche (namely the [NAME] download). The excluded evidence consisted of (i) an email from the [NAME], clarifying the timeline of his detention and hospitalisation, and (ii) a letter from the appellant’s [NAME] addressing a typographical error on the forensic report and verifying the status of the criminal proceedings. 34.Both documents bore directly on matters the [NAME] later treated as central inconsistencies undermining the appellant’s credibility. By excluding material which addressed concerns raised at the hearing, yet relying on the absence of such clarification to make adverse findings, the [NAME] acted unfairly. The selective admission of some parts of the late evidence but not others was not adequately reasoned and resulted in an unbalanced evidential picture. 35.While the Courts have stressed the importance of procedural rigour in numerous recent decisions, the overriding objective requires the [NAME] to deal with cases fairly and justly, particularly in protection appeals, where consequences are of the utmost gravity. The [NAME]’s approach prevented consideration of evidence directly relevant to the appellant’s central claims and infected the fairness of the process. This constitutes a material error of law. Grounds 2 & 3 – Failure to take account of material corroborative evidence 36.The [NAME] rejected the appellant’s account of detention and torture in 2016 and his claim to be subject to two outstanding criminal cases. In doing so, the [NAME] failed to engage with extensive corroborative evidence from multiple sources, including: • the unchallenged oral evidence of [NAME] [NAME] [NAME]; • letters from [NAME] confirming the appellant’s detention; • statements from several long-standing associates; • multiple verification letters from [NAME] who attended court offices and confirmed the existence and authenticity of both sets of proceedings. 37.The [NAME] described some of this evidence as “particularly persuasive” (in relation to the [NAME]), yet did not reconcile its acceptance of the appellant’s political prominence and his presence at the [NAME]’s abduction with its rejection of the subsequent detention. The [NAME] instead focused on 6

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 discrete discrepancies without considering the corroborative weight of the evidence in the round. 38.As emphasised in Mibanga, the [NAME] must consider all evidence before reaching a rejection, rather than reaching a negative view and then seeking confirmatory support for that rejection. The treatment of the documentary evidence relating to the criminal cases was similarly flawed. The [NAME] relied heavily on a single typographical error (“23.09.25”), whilst ignoring verification evidence directly addressing this point. 39.Taken cumulatively, these failures disclose a pattern of selective analysis inconsistent with the required holistic assessment. This constitutes a material error of law. Ground 4 – Misapplication of section 8 of the 2004 Act 40.The [NAME] relied on the delay between the appellant’s arrival in the UK (October 2019) and his asylum claim (January 2021) as an adverse credibility factor under section 8. However, the [NAME] did not engage with the appellant’s explanation for this delay, as set out in his witness statement, nor did it address the fact that the Secretary of State did not rely on section 8 in the refusal letter in relation to delay in claiming asylum. 41.Section 8 does not mandate an adverse finding simply because delay exists; the Tribunal must consider the explanation and then assess its significance in light of the evidence as a whole. The [NAME] did not conduct such an evaluative exercise. Its treatment of delay was therefore incomplete and legally flawed. Grounds 5–7 – Inconsistent reasoning, irrational reliance on minor discrepancies, and failure to assess sur place activity properly 42.The [NAME] accepted that the appellant was a senior [NAME] activist, the President of the [COMPANY], the personal assistant to [NAME] [NAME], and a witness to the [NAME]’s abduction. Yet, without adequate explanation, it rejected the natural consequences of such a profile—namely, that he would have been targeted for detention and ill-treatment. 43.It does not necessarily follow from the findings about the appellant’s work as an activist that he is entitled to a grant of asylum or humanitarian leave. 44.However, the [NAME] placed considerable weight on minor or explicable inconsistencies such as perceived imprecision in timelines. It did not grapple directly with the extensive corroboration supporting the detention narrative. Cumulative assessment 45.Even if some individual errors might not, taken alone, be material, their combined effect is to undermine the [NAME]’s adverse credibility findings which formed the foundation of the decision. The [NAME]’s acceptance of the appellant’s 7

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 significant political profile renders the errors particularly consequential. The determination cannot stand. 46.I therefore find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of errors of law and must be set aside.

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSAL 47.Having found material errors of law, I must determine whether to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal or retain it for re-making. 48.The [NAME] [APPELLANT] several positive findings that are not the subject of any challenge by the Secretary of State, including that the appellant held leadership positions within [NAME] and [NAME]; served as the personal assistant to [NAME] [NAME]; was present at the [NAME]’s abduction; and has engaged in sur place political activity in the UK. These facts are unaffected by this judgment. 49.The adverse findings, which are infected by error, cannot safely be preserved. However, the preserved findings represent a substantial evidential foundation. The appellant’s credibility must be reassessed, but not from a standing start. 50.Given the nature of the errors and the wide-ranging factual inquiry which needs to be undertaken, this is a case that falls within paragraph 7.2 of the Presidential Guidance on remittal. The fact-finding necessary is extensive and best conducted by the First-tier Tribunal. 51.This judgment should not be understood as indicating any view about the ultimate outcome of the case, and in particular should not be taken to suggest that the appeal should be allowed. It may well be that the judge who determines the appeal refuses it. 52.Accordingly, the appropriate course is to: a. set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal; b. preserve the positive findings identified above; and c. remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (not before Judge Ketteley) for a complete re-hearing on the remaining issues. Notice of Decision The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law. I set aside the decision. The appeal will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal [NAME] Judge of the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber 8

Appeal Number: UI-2025-004122 First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65197/2023 LP/09371/2024 18 March 2026 9