Appeal Division Rules Claimant Disqualified from EI Benefits Due to Misconduct

Citation: Canada Employment Insurance Commission  v  KC , 2026  SST  63 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: [NAME] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated October 14, 2025 (GE-25-2523) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: December 10, 2025 Hearing participants: Appellant’s representative Respondent Decision date: January 29, 2026 File number: AD-25-701 On this page Decision Overview Preliminary matter Issues Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The Canada Employment Insurance Commission’s appeal is allowed. The General Division made two errors. It didn’t follow binding case law from the Federal Court of Appeal and ignored or overlooked important evidence. [ 2 ] I am substituting and giving the decision the General Division should have given. The Claimant lost her job due to her own misconduct, so she is disqualified from getting benefits. Overview [ 3 ] K. C. is the Claimant. She worked as a lead flight attendant. She applied for Employment Insurance regular benefits (benefits) when she was dismissed from her job. [ 4 ] The Commission decided that the Claimant was disqualified from getting benefits because she lost her job due to her own misconduct. Footnote 1 [ 5 ] The General Division allowed the Claimant’s appeal. It found in her favour on the issue of misconduct, so she wasn’t disqualified from getting benefits. Footnote 2 [ 6 ] The Commission appealed to the Appeal Division, arguing that the General Division made several errors in its decision. Footnote 3 [ 7 ] I have found that the General Division made two errors. To fix the errors, I will make the decision the General Division should have made. The Claimant was dismissed from her job due to her own misconduct and is disqualified from getting benefits. Preliminary matter The Claimant asked for the hearing date to be expedited [ 8 ] The Claimant asked the Tribunal to expedite the hearing date because of personal and financial hardship. A case conference was held with the Claimant and Commission to discuss this. Footnote 4 [ 9 ] The parties agreed to schedule the hearing on an expedited basis for December 10, 2025, and the new deadline for submitting written arguments was December 1, 2025. Footnote 5 [ 10 ] At the same time, I discussed with the parties the limits around new evidence at the Appeal Division. This information was also summarized in a letter sent after the case conference was held. I included a copy of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2022  FCA  157, which sets out the Appeal Division’s limits around new evidence and invited them to provide further oral submissions about it at the hearing. Footnote 6 I am not accepting the new evidence submitted by the Claimant [ 11 ] The Claimant emailed the Tribunal on November 5, 2025. She explained that she had filed a grievance against her former employer for wrongful dismissal. And she noted that her former employer was now offering her a monetary settlement, a neutral employment letter, and reclassification of her dismissal to “resignation” to resolve the matter. Footnote 7 [ 12 ] Following that, the Claimant sent [NAME] email to the Tribunal dated November 27, 2025. She provided a copy of a letter from her former employer dated November 24, 2025, that simply confirms her employment start and end dates, as well as her responsibilities when she was employed. Footnote 8 [ 13 ] New evidence is evidence that the General Division didn’t have before it when it made its decision. The Appeal Division generally doesn’t accept new evidence. Footnote 9 This is because the Appeal Division isn’t the fact finder or rehearing the case. It’s a review of the General Division’s decision based on the same evidence. Footnote 10 [ 14 ] There are some exceptions where new evidence is allowed. Footnote 11 For example, I can accept new evidence if it provides one of the following: general background information only, or if it highlights findings made without supporting evidence, or shows that the Tribunal acted unfairly. [ 15 ] The parties agree and I accept that the information and letter submitted by the Claimant is new evidence that wasn’t before the General Division when it made its decision. [ 16 ] I asked the parties whether I should accept the new evidence and if it met any of the exceptions set out in the [NAME] decision. [ 17 ] The Commission says that the new evidence doesn’t fall under any of the exceptions, including general background information. Although it acknowledges that even if it were accepted, the employer’s settlement offer to the Claimant isn’t determinative on the issue of misconduct and EI  benefits. Footnote 12 [ 18 ] The Claimant says the new evidence she submitted should be accepted because it falls under the general background exception and wouldn’t have an impact anyway. [ 19 ] I am not accepting the Claimant’s new evidence, specifically her emails dated November 5, 2025, and November 27, 2025, which includes the letter from her former employer. The Claimant wants to submit this new evidence to indirectly support her position that there was no misconduct on her part as the employer has now decided to make a settlement offer and write a neutral employment letter. [ 20 ] The new evidence is not general background information which would help me understand the issues, but rather it is evidence that goes to the merits of the misconduct issue decided by the General Division. So, it does not meet the general background information exception, or any other exceptions either. As a result, I will not be considering the new evidence submitted by the Claimant. Issues [ 21 ] The issues in this appeal are: a)  Did the General Division make a legal error by not following binding case law from the Federal Court of Appeal? b)  Did the General Division ignore or overlook important evidence about the Claimant’s disciplinary history at work? c)  If so, how should the error or errors be fixed? Analysis Misconduct in the context of the Employment Insurance Act ( EI Act) [ 22 ] The EI Act says that a person is disqualified from receiving benefits if the person lost any employment because of their “misconduct.” Footnote 13 Misconduct is not defined in the  EI Act, but the court has provided a settled definition. [ 23 ] The Federal Court of Appeal ( FCA ) defines misconduct as conduct that is wilful, which means that the conduct was conscious, deliberate, or intentional. Footnote 14 Misconduct also includes conduct that is so reckless that it is almost wilful. Footnote 15 [ 24 ] There is misconduct if the Claimant knew or ought to have known the conduct could get in the way of carrying out their duties to the employer and that dismissal was a real possibility. Footnote 16 [ 25 ] The  FCA  also says that a person doesn’t have to have wrongful intent for their behaviour to be misconduct under the law. Footnote 17 [ 26 ] As well, the Tribunal doesn’t have to consider whether a dismissal by the employer was proper or decide if a person was dismissed justifiably under labour law principles when it is considering misconduct under the EI Act. Footnote 18 The General Division made a legal error because it didn’t follow binding case law [ 27 ] The General Division makes a legal error when it ignores or misinterprets the law, uses an incorrect legal test, doesn’t follow a court decision it has to follow, or its reasons for decision aren’t adequate. If the General Division made a legal error, then I can intervene. Footnote 19 [ 28 ] The Commission argues that the General Division didn’t follow the Federal Court of Appeal’s decisions in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2004  FCA  100 and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-352-94. And submits that these decisions say that there doesn’t need to be wrongful intent for an act to amount to misconduct. [ 29 ] The Commission argues that the General Division erred by incorrectly focusing on the Claimant’s intent and unpacking her motives behind her conduct when it determined there was no misconduct. [ 30 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division didn’t make a legal error because misconduct requires deliberate, wilful or reckless conduct. She submits that her conduct wasn’t misconduct. [ 31 ] The General Division had to decide whether the Commission had proven that the Claimant was dismissed from her job due to misconduct based on the meaning within the EI  Act and relevant case law. [ 32 ] The General Division found that the Claimant lost her job because her conduct went against section 6.6 of the employer’s policy as sexual comments are identified as unwanted behaviours. Footnote 20 It determined that the Claimant had committed the conduct because she made sexual comments which included using crude language to talk about her own sexual preferences with other employees during a flight while she was working. Footnote 21 [ 33 ] The General Division concluded that the Claimant’s conduct did not amount to misconduct because the Commission hadn’t shown her conduct was intentional. Footnote 22 It found the evidence indicated that she didn’t intend to make sexual advances or make sexual comments to her colleague (who was the complainant). But that she had an operational need to share the presence of passengers who had been seen performing a sex act on a previous flight that occurred three weeks prior. [ 34 ] The General Division reasoned that the Claimant was on her fourth “redeye” flight in five days, she was experiencing anxiety about her grandfather’s health and had a condition that could result in oversharing personal information. Footnote 23 [ 35 ] The General Division then stated that the Claimant was a heterosexual woman with no interest in pursuing a sexual relationship with her female colleague. It found that her conduct was limited to making sexual comments about two passengers and about herself. Footnote 24 And it found that the Commission hadn’t shown the Claimant knew or should have known her conduct could lead to her dismissal. Footnote 25 It concluded that the Claimant’s conduct did not amount to misconduct, so she wasn’t disqualified from getting benefits. [ 36 ] I find that the General Division correctly stated the legal provision and relevant case law for misconduct in its decision. Footnote 26 But it made a legal error because it didn’t follow binding case law from the Federal Court of Appeal. Footnote 27 [ 37 ] The [NAME] and [NAME] decision say that a person doesn’t have to have wrongful intent for their behaviour to be misconduct under the law. And that it is sufficient if the act is willfully, meaning "consciously, deliberately or intentionally." Footnote 28 [ 38 ] The General Division incorrectly focused on the Claimant’s intent and motives behind her conduct. Namely that she hadn’t intended to make sexual comments or advances to her colleague, that she was a heterosexual woman, along with other personal reasons that might have caused her to behave the way she did. But in doing so, it was essentially finding that the Claimant didn’t have wrongful intent for her conduct. [ 39 ] According to the above decisions, wrongful intent isn’t required for her behaviour to be misconduct under the law. So, the Claimant may not have intended to breach the employer’s policy when she made sexual comments to her colleagues, but that doesn’t mean that the conduct itself didn’t amount to misconduct in the context of the EI Act and case law. The General Division ignored or overlooked important evidence about the Claimant’s prior disciplinary history [ 40 ] The Commission argues that the General Division ignored important evidence about the Claimant’s disciplinary record at work that shows she had been subject to previous investigations for bullying and harassment. [ 41 ] The Commission points out that there was evidence before the General Division about this. It noted that the Claimant testified that the employer undertook an investigation into bullying and harassment in April 2024, following several incidents during a deployment to Australia. Footnote 29 She testified about receiving a letter of expectation in 2023 for leaking company information, investigating employees and was accused of bullying & harassment. She was also once late for a flight. Footnote 30 [ 42 ] The Commission submits that the Claimant’s previous disciplinary record was relevant to the General Division’s assessment of whether she knew or ought to have known she could be dismissed for her conduct. Footnote 31 And it didn’t consider this evidence before concluding that she didn’t know and could not have known her conduct might lead to her dismissal. [ 43 ] The Claimant argues that the Australia incident was grieved and she won that case. She says there was no investigation, and it no longer exists on her workplace file. She maintains that she didn’t know she could be dismissed for making one crude comment during a 13-hour flight. [ 44 ] The General Division decided that the evidence hadn’t shown the Claimant knew or ought to have known that making a crude comment during a 10-minute conversation with two flight attendants in an isolated section of the plane could lead to her dismissal. Footnote 32 [ 45 ] The General Division makes an important factual error if it bases its decision on a factual finding it made by ignoring or misunderstanding relevant evidence. Footnote 33 In other words, there is evidence before it that goes squarely against or doesn’t support a factual finding the General Division made to reach its decision. [ 46 ] I find that the General Division ignored or overlooked important evidence in the file that revealed the Claimant had previous disciplinary history before she was dismissed by the employer on February 7, 2025. [ 47 ] For example, some of that evidence before the General Division included the following: a) The employer told the Commission the Claimant had prior progressive discipline, including a suspension. Footnote 34 b) The Claimant told the Commission that she was previously written up for gossiping. Footnote 35 c) The Claimant also told the Commission about the following three previous incidents at work: Footnote 36 The first incident happened in February 2023. She was accused of bullying a colleague because she sent a text message to [NAME] colleague asking them to stop bullying. She says the employer refused to remove this incident from their file, even though they didn’t have any evidence of her bullying. The second incident happened in September 2023 where she was accused of yelling at her manager, but this never happened and she had audio evidence. She says the employer deleted this incident from their file. The third incident happened in February 2024. She was suspended without pay for bullying. She says this case was “dismissed” because there was no evidence and she never got a chance to tell her side of the story. o  She maintains that she was never informed that any of the above incidents would lead to her termination. d) The employer told the Commission that the Claimant received a “letter of expectation” in February 2023 for a confidentiality breach about discussing performance discipline to other employees. And that she got her first warning in February 2023 for absenteeism resulting in an operational delay. Footnote 37 e) The employer also told the Commission that there was one case which had been grieved and was completely removed from the system, so there was no further information available. Footnote 38 f) There was evidence from the employer about the prior documented incidents. Footnote 39 g) The employer suspended the Claimant on January 17, 2025, to investigate the allegations, and that led to her dismissal on February 7, 2025. Footnote 40 [ 48 ] The General Division doesn’t have to address every piece of evidence and can be presumed to have considered all of the evidence. Footnote 41 But I have to set aside that presumption in this case because there was a lot of evidence about previous disciplinary incidents at work that the General Division didn’t grapple with in its decision. [ 49 ] Its decision doesn’t mention any of the prior disciplinary incidents. In my view, the Claimant’s disciplinary history was relevant as to whether she knew or ought to have known dismissal was a real possibility. This was relevant evidence that it ignored or overlooked, which went against its finding that said the Claimant didn’t know or could not have known she would be dismissed for her conduct. [ 50 ] Since I have already found two errors made by the General Division, I don’t have to address any further errors made by the parties. Fixing the error I will substitute with my own decision [ 51 ] There are two options for fixing an error made by the General Division. Footnote 42 The first option is to send the file back to the General Division for reconsideration. And the second option is to give the decision that the General Division should have given (this is also called a substitution). [ 52 ] The Commission says that I should give the decision that the General Division should have given. It says that the Claimant’s conduct amounted to misconduct, so she is disqualified from getting benefits. [ 53 ] The Claimant says that I should return the file back to the General Division for reconsideration. She explained that it might be better to get [NAME] chance to present her case again. Although she agrees that she got a full and fair opportunity to present her case before the General Division. [ 54 ] I will make the decision the General Division should have given. I am satisfied that the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their cases and that the record is complete. In doing so, I can make any necessary findings of fact. Footnote 43 The Claimant was dismissed from her job because of her own misconduct [ 55 ] I find that the Claimant was dismissed from her job on February 7, 2025, because of her conduct on a work flight on December 18, 2024. More specifically, the employer’s termination letter says she was dismissed for “engaging in conversations and asking questions that are sexual in nature creating an uncomfortable environment for team members.” Footnote 44 [ 56 ] The Claimant’s conduct went against the employer’s “Harassment and Violence in the Workplace Policy” (policy) specifically section 6.6 — “Engaging in unwanted physical contact, making sexual comments or advances.” Footnote 45 [ 57 ] I am not persuaded that the Claimant was dismissed as reprisal for her diversity and inclusion activities. It’s clear that she was dismissed because of her conduct at work on December 18, 2024. So, I am adopting the General Division’s findings on this particular issue only. Footnote 46 The Claimant committed the conduct because she made sexual comments to colleagues that would reasonably be considered unwelcome and offensive [ 58 ] The evidence shows that the complainant (a colleague) told the employer that the Claimant asked her frequently and repeatedly about her sexual preferences and then shared her own sexual preferences within an earshot of passengers. Footnote 47 [ 59 ] The complainant also told the employer that she called in sick for a multi-day pairing where the Claimant was “in-charge” because she didn’t feel comfortable being a confined hotel space for several days. Footnote 48 [ 60 ] [NAME] (a colleague) told the employer that the Claimant was openly talking about her favourite sexual positions and made a sexual remark about the complainant. Footnote 49 [ 61 ] The evidence also shows that when the Claimant spoke to the Commission, she didn’t admit to all the conduct alleged but agreed that she used crude sexual language in a conversation with her colleagues. Some of which she says there was an operational need to share that information about two passengers on a flight that happened a few weeks prior. Footnote 50 [ 62 ] I find that the Claimant committed the conduct. She made sexual comments while speaking with her colleagues on a work flight on December 18, 2024. Her comments went beyond an operational need to share what two other passengers did on a previous flight weeks before but also included her own sexual preferences. That kind of commentary at work would be reasonably be considered unwelcome by any person. [ 63 ] For the purposes of my decision, it isn’t necessary for me to restate exactly what the Claimant said, except to say that she made sexual comments at work to the complainant and a witness (both of whom were colleagues). Footnote 51 The Claimant’s conduct breached the employer’s harassment and violence in the workplace policy [ 64 ] Section 6 of the employer’s Harassment and Violence in the Workplace Policy identifies specific types of “prohibited conduct.” It says that “No Employee shall subject any other person to workplace harassment and violence or intentionally use any of the known factors that contribute to harassment and violence in the workplace.” Footnote 52 [ 65 ] Section 6.6 of the policy identifies that prohibited conduct includes “Engaging in unwanted physical contact, making sexual comments or advances.” Footnote 53 [ 66 ] The consequences for non-compliance under this section 6 says that “An employee who subjects [NAME] to harassment or violence in the workplace will be subject to disciplinary action appropriate to the severity of the incident, up to and including dismissal.” Footnote 54 [ 67 ] I find that the Claimant breached section 6.6 of the employer’s policy when she made sexual comments while speaking with her colleagues during a work flight on December 18, 2024. The policy clearly identifies that making sexual comments is prohibited conduct. It also outlines the potential consequences. [ 68 ] I am not persuaded by the Claimant’s counter-argument that the complainant and witness ought to have followed [NAME] section of the employer’s policy and reported the unwelcome conduct to her directly, or the pilots. [ 69 ] The policy at section 11.1(c) says that employees have the responsibility to report incidents of workplace harassment and violence, experienced or observed, to the employer. Footnote 55 It also says at section 13.1 that employees have to inform the person inflicting the behaviour that is an unwanted/unwelcome behaviour. [ 70 ] The complainant did make an official complaint to the employer and they started an investigation shortly after it happened, so there wasn’t a significant delay in reporting the conduct to the employer. Footnote 56 [ 71 ] Even so, this case isn’t about what the complainant and witness did or didn’t do. And I don’t have to decide whether they followed the employer’s policy. It is the Claimant who has applied for and is asking for benefits. The Commission decided that she was disqualified from getting benefits because she lost her job due to her own misconduct. So, my focus is on the Claimant’s conduct and whether it amounts to misconduct based on the EI Act and relevant case law. The Claimant knew or ought to have known she could be dismissed for her conduct [ 72 ] I find that the Claimant knew or ought to have known that making sexual comments at work would breach the employer’s policy and could result in her dismissal. [ 73 ] I don’t accept that the Claimant’s assertion that she didn’t know or couldn’t have known that she could be dismissed for her conduct. Let me explain. [ 74 ] The Claimant was employed for approximately 5 years with this employer. She worked as the lead flight attendant. The employer told the Commission that she had received onboarding training and annual training on policies. Footnote 57 This tells me that she was aware of the policy at the outset and had received regular training. [ 75 ] I’ve also considered that the Claimant had been previously disciplined for other conduct breaches. Because of that, she would have been familiar with the employer’s policy and likely aware of any potential consequences. The Claimant told the Commission there were previous disciplinary incidents at work. Footnote 58 The employer also told the Commission that they issued a letter of expectation in February 2023, and a first warning in July 2024. Footnote 59 She had also been previously suspended in 2024. Footnote 60 This tells me that the Claimant worked for an employer who applied progressive discipline when necessary. [ 76 ] I acknowledge her argument that some of the prior incidents were grieved and removed from her record at work. This is consistent with what the employer told the Commission as well. Footnote 61 However, the fact that she had prior incidents at work and had already been disciplined, she was more likely than not, familiar with the employer’s policies and potential consequences, including the possibility of dismissal. [ 77 ] The Claimant submitted character letters for consideration. Footnote 62 I don’t find them helpful and haven’t given them any weight at all because they don’t address the main issues that I have to decide. The Claimant’s conduct was misconduct, and she is disqualified from getting benefits [ 78 ] I find that the Claimant’s conduct amounts to wilful misconduct in this case. She deliberately and consciously chose to make sexual comments at work on December 17, 2024. This went beyond an operational need to share information about passengers. Her conduct led to the loss of her employment on February 7, 2025. [ 79 ] The Claimant may not have had wrongful intent when she made sexual comments to her colleagues, but this was a serious mistake that caused her to lose her job. Given her disciplinary history, she knew or ought to have known that making sexual comments at work could lead to her dismissal. Conclusion [ 80 ] The Commission’s appeal is allowed. The General Division made a legal error because it didn’t follow binding case law from the Federal Court of Appeal. It also ignored or overlooked important evidence about her prior disciplinary history at work. [ 81 ] I am giving the decision the General Division should have given. The Claimant lost her job due to her own misconduct. She is disqualified from getting benefits. Footnotes Footnote 1 See Commission’s initial and reconsideration decision at pages GD3-49 to GD3-50 and GD3-100, and section 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act ( EI Act). Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See General Division decision at pages AD1-8 to AD1-21. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See Application to the Appeal Division at pages AD1-1 to AD1-21. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See pages AD0- to AD0-2. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See pages AD0A-1 to AD0A-3. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See pages AD5-1 to AD5-3. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See new evidence at pages AD3-1 to AD3-2. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See new evidence at pages AD7-1 to AD7-2. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2015  FC  1300 at paragraphs 29 and 34 and [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2017  FC  354 at paragraph 23. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2019  FCA  256 at paragraph 13. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2022  FCA  157 at paragraphs 37–39. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 There is case law that says the Tribunal isn’t bound by how the employer, or employee or third party might characterize the grounds on which an employment has been terminated. For example, see Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-291-98, Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-45-96 and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-309-81. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See section 30(1) of the  EI  Act. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2007  FCA  36 at paragraph 14. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 [NAME]  v  Her Majesty the Queen , A-402-96. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2007  FCA  36 at paragraph 14. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See  Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-352-94 and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2004  FCA  100. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2024  FCA  7 and Kuk  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2023  FC  1134. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See section 58(1)(b) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See paragraphs 19 and 24 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See paragraphs 25 and 34–35 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See paragraphs 37 and 45 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See paragraph 45 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See paragraph 50 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See paragraph 46 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See paragraphs 2, 18 and 38–40 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See section 58(1)(b) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 [NAME] at paragraphs 9–10. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 Listen to audio recording of the General Division hearing at 1:04:20 to 1:05:24 and page GD3-96. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 Listen to audio recording of the General Division hearing at 1:01:00 to 1:04:20 and page GD3-71. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See page AD8-7. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See paragraph 53 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See page GD3-26. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See page GD3-38. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See pages GD3-66 to GD3-67. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See pages GD3-71 to GD3-72. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See pages GD3-71 to GD3-72. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 See pages GD3-95 and GD3-96 Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See pages GD3-75, dismissal letter at GD3-28 to GD3-29 and Record of Employment at GD3-23 to GD3-24. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 [NAME]   v   Canada (Attorney General) , 2012  FCA  82 and  [NAME]   v   Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FC  498. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See section 59(1) of the  DESD  Act. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See section 64(1) of the  DESD  Act. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See termination letter at pages GD3-28 to GD3-29. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See pages GD3-30 to GD3-36. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See paragraphs 19–24 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 See page GD3-89. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See page GD3-42. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See page GD3-80. Return to footnote 49 referrer Footnote 50 See page GD3-66. Return to footnote 50 referrer Footnote 51 And it’s already been identified in the General Division’s decision at paragraphs 20 and 30 and in the file record at pages GD3-25, GD3-66, GD3-80 and GD3-89. Return to footnote 51 referrer Footnote 52 See employer’s policy at pages GD3-30 to GD3-36. Return to footnote 52 referrer Footnote 53 See page GD3-31. Return to footnote 53 referrer Footnote 54 See page GD3-31. Return to footnote 54 referrer Footnote 55 See page GD3-33. Return to footnote 55 referrer Footnote 56 It appears that the employer started their investigation sometime in early to mid-January 2025. See pages GD3-40, GD3-78, GD3-85 and GD3-87. Return to footnote 56 referrer Footnote 57 See page GD3-25. Return to footnote 57 referrer Footnote 58 See pages GD3-66 to GD3-67. Return to footnote 58 referrer Footnote 59 See pages GD3-71 to GD3-72. Return to footnote 59 referrer Footnote 60 See page GD3-66. Return to footnote 60 referrer Footnote 61 See pages GD3-71 to GD3-72. Return to footnote 61 referrer Footnote 62 See pages GD3-58 to GD3-62. Return to footnote 62 referrer