Bias Allegations Rejected: Human Rights Complaint Proceeds

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 21 Date: March 13, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-3090-25 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [COMPANY] Respondent Ruling Member: [NAME] of Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc224117521 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320031000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc224117522 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320032000000 III. ISSUES PAGEREF _Toc224117523 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320033000000 IV. CONTEXT PAGEREF _Toc224117526 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320036000000 A. Background to the motion PAGEREF _Toc224117527 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320037000000 B. The Tribunal’s previous directions and rulings PAGEREF _Toc224117528 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320038000000 1. The Tribunal’s ruling that permits [NAME] to include in its SOPs a reference to prior judicial decisions that declared [NAME] a vexatious litigant PAGEREF _Toc224117529 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500320039000000 2. The denial of [NAME]’ claim of privilege over the identity of his expert witnesses, and the decision not to issue a subpoena for witnesses from [NAME] and [NAME] _Toc224117530 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330030000000 3. The limits on the amount that human rights victims can claim in the Tribunal against respondents who subvert judicial independence and conspire to deny legal representation PAGEREF _Toc224117531 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330031000000 4. The ability of the Commission to withdraw from participating in a file before the Tribunal PAGEREF _Toc224117532 \h 10 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330032000000 V. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc224117533 \h 11 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330033000000 A. Issue 1. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings, pending the outcome of the Complainant’s judicial review of my previous directions and rulings? PAGEREF _Toc224117534 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330034000000 B. Issue 2. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings as a remedy for prior directions and rulings that were allegedly tainted with bias? PAGEREF _Toc224117535 \h 15 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330035000000 C. Issue 3. Did I err by not addressing the motion for recusal before the motion to stay the proceedings? PAGEREF _Toc224117536 \h 15 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330036000000 VI.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc224117537 \h 16 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100310037003500330037000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] This is a ruling on the motion of [NAME] (the “Complainant”) to suspend the Tribunal’s proceedings temporarily, pending the Federal Court’s decision on his application for judicial review. [NAME] filed an application for judicial review of several Tribunal directions and rulings with the Federal Court in January 2026. He argues that the Tribunal should not proceed with the existing filing deadlines and scheduled hearing dates until the Federal Court issues its decision. He also argues that I am biased and that my enforcement of the existing timelines exemplifies this bias. He is of the view that a stay of proceedings is a necessary remedy for the bias. He has also filed a separate motion asking for my recusal on the ground that he feels I have shown bias. Finally, in tandem with this motion, [NAME] filed a motion asking the Federal Court to stay the Tribunal’s proceedings. The [COMPANY] ([NAME] or the “Respondent”) opposes the present motion and argues that the case should proceed as planned.

II.

DECISION [ 2 ] The motion is dismissed. There are no exceptional circumstances that would warrant a stay of the Tribunal’s proceedings.

III. ISSUES [ 3 ] I must decide the following issues:

1. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings, pending the outcome of the Complainant’s judicial review of my previous directions and rulings? 2. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings as a remedy for prior directions and rulings that were allegedly tainted with bias? 3. Did I err by not addressing the motion for recusal before the motion to stay the proceedings? IV. CONTEXT A. Background to the motion [ 4 ] The Complainant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination by the Respondent under section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), based on his race, colour, and national or ethnic origin. He alleges that, as a Black Canadian of Caribbean background, he was treated differently than other bank customers in a variety of ways. Namely, he claims that [NAME] failed to redress fraudulent activity on his account; required him to verify his identity despite him entering his personal identification number correctly when making deposits and withdrawals; and verified and put holds on cheques that he sought to deposit and were evidently legitimate. [NAME] also alleges that, after he filed his complaint in June 2023, [NAME] retaliated against him by refusing to provide services to him. [ 5 ] The Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) referred the complaint to the Tribunal on March 6, 2025. While the Commission initially stated that it would participate in the Tribunal’s proceedings, and while it filed a Statement of Particulars (SOP), it advised the parties and the Tribunal, in early October 2025, that it reconsidered its position and was withdrawing its participation, a decision that [NAME] opposed. [ 6 ] Over the course of two lengthy case management conference calls (CMCCs) in October and November 2025, the Tribunal and the parties worked towards getting the case ready for hearing. The Tribunal addressed numerous preliminary issues, including motions to strike portions of the SOPs, disclosure issues, expert witnesses, requests to keep information confidential, and subpoenas of witnesses, to name a few. The Tribunal, in consultation with both parties, also set hearing dates and filing deadlines. [NAME] expressed frustration with the Tribunal’s decisions and directions on some of these issues. [ 7 ] During a CMCC on January 8, 2026, [NAME] indicated to the Tribunal that he would be bringing a motion to stay these proceedings, pending the outcome of his judicial review of the Tribunal’s previous directions and rulings regarding his motion to strike, his request to subpoena [NAME] and [NAME] as witnesses, and his request to maintain privilege and/or confidentiality over the identity of his expert witnesses. [NAME] also indicated that he would be filing a motion for recusal, on the basis that my previous directions and rulings demonstrate that I am biased. I advised [NAME] that the January 30 deadline for him to file his expert report remained, although I subsequently directed that, as a limitation to Rule 22(1)(a) which normally requires parties’ expert reports to set out the expert’s name, that the name of [NAME]’ expert only be disclosed to specific individuals working for the Respondent, to the extent necessary for the Respondent to be able to defend its case. [ 8 ] [NAME] filed an application for judicial review of several Tribunal directions and rulings with the Federal Court on January 16, 2026. On January 27, 2026, he filed a motion asking that I recuse myself from presiding over the case, on the ground that I am biased, and asking that a new member be assigned. He filed a “Motion for a Stay of Execution” with the Tribunal three days later, on January 30, 2026, asking for “a stay of execution and immediate adjournment of the Tribunal’s proceedings pending judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada.” [NAME] also alleged that I have been motivated by bias in seeking to expedite a timeline in the proceedings, which led to deadlines that prejudiced his right to a fair trial and led to irreparable harm. This stay motion is the subject of the present ruling. [ 9 ] [NAME] requested to be permitted to make oral submissions for both motions, a request which the Respondent did not oppose and which I granted. During oral submissions on February 25, 2026, [NAME] added that it was improper for me to rule on the stay motion before the recusal motion, and that this was not consistent with the CHRA or the customs and conventions of which he was aware. In his view, the motion for recusal needed to be addressed first. He argued that I had prejudged the stay motion because of my bias, and that I had already indicated that we needed to abide by the timetable that had been set. B. The Tribunal’s previous directions and rulings [ 10 ] In his judicial review, [NAME] applies for an order that will set aside:

1. The Tribunal’s ruling that allows [NAME] to include in its SOPs a reference to the finding made by the [NAME], in 2017, that [NAME] is a vexatious litigant;

2. The denial of [NAME]’ claim of privilege over the identity of his expert witnesses;

3. The rescinding of a subpoena being issued to [NAME] to verify whether [NAME] had improperly used [NAME] to contact [NAME]’ forensic analyst;

4. The limits on the amount that human rights victims can claim in the Tribunal against respondents who subvert judicial independence and conspire to deny legal representation; and 5. The ability of the Commission to abdicate from legal involvement in cases involving self-represented litigants. [ 11 ] [NAME]’ stay motion also appears to challenge several deadlines, which he says are now being enforced due to my being biased against him. [ 12 ] These directions and rulings are found in various direction letters and in the summaries of CMCCs. I summarize each of them below.

1. The Tribunal’s ruling that permits [NAME] to include in its SOPs a reference to prior judicial decisions that declared [NAME] a vexatious litigant [ 13 ] In the Respondent’s initial SOPs, [NAME] challenged [NAME]’ credibility by highlighting that he had been declared a vexatious litigant by the Ontario courts and alleging that he has, in the past, exhibited a pattern of accusing individuals of racism and bias when they make decisions with which he does not agree, including by bringing motions asking judges to recuse themselves. The Respondent also brought up the Complainant’s decision to self-publish two books regarding his family and a local lawyer and, at paragraph 119 of the SOPs, alleged that [NAME] had falsely represented that he was a lawyer. The Complainant sought to strike these sections of the SOPs, a motion that the Tribunal granted in part. [ 14 ] On October 23, 2025, the Tribunal provided the parties with a summary of the CMCC wherein these discussions occurred and relaying this direction: Having heard the parties’ submissions regarding the portion of the Respondent’s SOP that relates to attacks of [NAME]’s credibility, the Tribunal concluded that some of the claims in the Respondent’s SOP were not relevant to this complaint and issued the following direction: Ms. [NAME] will file an amended SOP with the following changes: • The paragraphs regarding the allegations of the Complainant’s self-published books are to be struck. Specifically, the Respondent will strike paragraphs 115, 116, 117 and 118; • The paragraphs regarding past judicial findings and comments made regarding the Complainant, as well as paragraph 119, will remain. [NAME] will have an opportunity to challenge this evidence during cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses and to make his submissions regarding the relevance and weight to be afforded to this evidence in his final submissions. [ 15 ] [NAME] subsequently reiterated his request for these portions of the Respondent’s SOPs to be struck, a request that the Tribunal denied, noting that it had already ruled on the issue. [ 16 ] In his application for judicial review, [NAME] argues that the vexatious litigant decision is outside the purview of the CHRA, and that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision declaring him a vexatious litigant was made in breach of natural justice.

2. The denial of [NAME]’ claim of privilege over the identity of his expert witnesses, and the decision not to issue a subpoena for witnesses from [NAME] and [NAME] [ 17 ] On or around September 12, 2025, the Respondent disclosed to [NAME] a copy of an audio-recording of a call said to have taken place between [NAME] and one of [NAME]’s call centre employees as part of the Respondent’s disclosure obligations. [NAME] claims that the Respondent tampered with this recording, which he says omits an important portion of the conversation, a claim that the Respondent denies. In support of this claim, [NAME] commissioned an expert report by [NAME]. He shared the report with the Respondent but did not include the resume of [NAME]. [ 18 ] On October 31, 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Tribunal, arguing that [NAME]’s report should be excluded because it did not comply with the Tribunal’s rules, because [NAME] lacked the necessary expertise, and because, the report pertained to a collateral issue that would therefore be of no assistance to the Tribunal in adjudicating the complaint. The Respondent included a copy of a [NAME] profile that appeared to match [NAME], who is described as an audio-engineer based out of Cairo, Egypt. [ 19 ] On November 2 and 3, 2025, [NAME] wrote to the Tribunal, stating that he had “reasonable and probable grounds to believe that [NAME] and its operatives subjected [NAME] to illegal threats of intimidation in these proceedings.” He alleges that, shortly after the Respondent indicated that it had found [NAME]’s profile online, [NAME] blocked [NAME]. [ 20 ] The Respondent denied any witness intimidation. [ 21 ] [NAME] indicated that, while he asked three different certified audio forensic technicians to review the audio file, in light of [NAME]’s interference with [NAME], he would only share the anticipated testimony of these technicians once he was assured that “their identities will be considered sealed from Defence Counsel and the Defendant along with their operatives and regarded as privileged information under the review by the Tribunal.” He reiterated this request in the November 3, 2025, CMCC, asking that the identity of his experts be kept confidential. As reflected in the summary of this call, the Tribunal invited [NAME] to provide the evidence that he had in order to support his allegations of evidence tampering and witness interference. [ 22 ] The Tribunal also directed as follows:

2. Allegations of witness interference […] In response to [NAME] concerns that the Respondent interfered with his expert, Member [NAME]-[NAME] is issuing the following order: Parties are ordered not to contact each other’s witnesses for the purpose of interfering with their testimony. […]

4. Disclosure a. Expert Reports, Witness Lists and Anticipated Exhibits · Parties must disclose the names of their respective witnesses and expert witnesses and a will-say statement as soon as they are identified. This information may not be kept confidential. · Parties are reminded to review Rule 22 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and ensure that their expert evidence complies with its requirements. · [NAME] is to file his final expert report (including their Curriculum Vitae and a statement indicating how their training, education and experience qualify them to produce the report), no later than January 30, 2026. [ 23 ] Despite what was directed, [NAME] did not provide any evidence in support of his claims of witness intimidation. Instead, in an email dated November 5, 2025, he requested that the Tribunal issue a subpoena so that he could call [NAME] and [NAME] as witnesses to determine whether someone from [NAME] contacted them to intimidate or coerce them, in violation of the CHRA and the Criminal Code . He also asked that the Tribunal recommend that the Attorney General of Canada and/or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police question lead counsel for the Commission to determine possible criminal interference by [NAME] against Commission lawyers, presumably regarding the Commission’s decision to withdraw from participating in the proceedings. He subsequently added that the Tribunal needed to declare his other experts’ identities as privileged information. [ 24 ] The Tribunal denied the Complainant’s requests. In a direction issued on November 26, 2025, the Tribunal directed as follows: [NAME]’ allegations appear to be raising sections 59 and 60 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which protect the Tribunal’s process against intimidation. These sections provide a Court with criminal or penal jurisdiction with the ability to impose sanctions based on these provisions. The Tribunal is no such Court and has no authority to enforce these sections. The Tribunal also has no authority to make recommendations to the Attorney General of Canada or to the RCMP. Therefore, all evidence relating to these allegations falls outside of the current proceedings.

For these reasons, the Tribunal will not accept evidence relating to [NAME]’s alleged witness tampering, nor will it issue subpoenas to obtain such evidence. [ 25 ] The Tribunal also reiterated its direction from the November 3, 2025, CMCC: Parties must disclose the names of their respective witnesses and expert witnesses and will-say statements as soon as they are identified. This information may not be kept confidential. [ 26 ] The Tribunal added the following: For the hearing to be fair, the Respondent must know the case that it has to meet. [NAME] cannot prepare to test either the qualifications or the evidence of an expert without knowing their identity. [ 27 ] The Tribunal ordered that [NAME] file his expert report with the Tribunal by January 30, 2026, and reminded the parties to review Rule 22 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure to ensure that their expert evidence complies with its requirements. [ 28 ] During a CMCC on January 8, 2026, [NAME] reiterated his request that the names and contact information of all his experts be held privileged and hidden from [NAME], to prevent [NAME] and its operatives from being in a position to contact them to perpetrate intimidation. The Tribunal advised [NAME] that this had been addressed in the Tribunal’s direction of November 26, 2025, but added the following direction, which is reflected in the CMCC summary: To be clear, insofar as the claim is now for privilege and not simply confidentiality, the Tribunal sees no basis for a claim for any kind of privilege over this information. Again, For the hearing to be fair, the Respondent must know the case that it has to meet. [NAME] cannot prepare to test either the qualifications or the evidence of an expert without knowing their identity. Regarding the consequences for intimidation of witnesses, this was addressed in response to the request for a subpoena for [NAME]. [ 29 ] In his application for judicial review to the Federal Court, [NAME] asserts that the Tribunal should have protected his expert witnesses from reprisals by the Respondent and maintained “the integrity of the applicant’s evidence.” In his view, the Tribunal failed to avail itself of the enforcement mechanisms found at section 60 of the CHRA and ensure that its process complied with section 59 of the CHRA. He also argues that the Tribunal’s decision not to issue a subpoena to [NAME] infringes on his right to a fair trial.

3. The limits on the amount that human rights victims can claim in the Tribunal against respondents who subvert judicial independence and conspire to deny legal representation [ 30 ] In his Notice of Application filed under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act , [NAME] states the following ground of judicial review at paragraph 6: The [NAME] (sic) committed a fiduciary breach of its legal obligations by abandoning the applicant’s case in the face of a multi-billion dollar respondent which has a relatively unlimited financial resource base to resist a claim. At the same time, applicants face a maximum $40,000 claim imposed in the Tribunal which is lower than the amount of money a law firm would typically charge an application which seeks to avail their rights by hiring legal counsel. The claim ceiling amount in-law (sic) is unconstitutional because it suggests a desire by governmental actors to deny applicants the benefit of legal counsel by making it uneconomical to hire legal counsel in a manner which appears designed to cynically shield government and corporations covered by the Act from experienced lawyers while also improperly preventing judges from awarding damages as a result of egregious violations which a judge may be inclined to award. [ 31 ] Presumably, this is what he is referring to when he refers to “limits on the amount that human rights victims can claim in the Tribunal,”. Specifically, the caps found at sections 53(2)(e) and 53(3) of the CHRA. [ 32 ] While this is raised in the Complainant’s application for judicial review to the Federal Court, this is not an allegation that is found in [NAME]’ submissions on this motion before the Tribunal.

4. The ability of the Commission to withdraw from participating in a case before the Tribunal [ 33 ] On October 3, 2025, [NAME] wrote to the Tribunal, requesting to file a Notice of Constitutional Question to challenge “the constitutional validity of the … letter distributed by the Office of Senior Counsel for the Canadian Human Rights Commission.” He wrote the following: I’m seeking the permission of the Tribunal to present a Notice of Constitutional Question pursuant to Rule 25 of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal regulations which I can elaborate on at the scheduled October 20, 2025 meeting, if necessary:

25 ) If a party intends to challenge the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of a statute or regulation, the party must serve notice in accordance with subsection 57(2) of the Federal Courts Act and Form 69 of the Federal Courts Rules . I seek to challenge the constitutional validity of the outrageous and perfunctory letter distributed by the Office of Senior Counsel for the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Her letter is tantamount to me fervently offering to drive you and your luggage from Ottawa to Vancouver but somewhere 100 km east of Kenora, Ontario I then decide to dump you and your luggage on the side of the road in the middle of the night. [ 34 ] In a direction dated October 9, 2025, I advised the parties as follows: The Tribunal has received the Commission’s notice that it will no longer be participating in these proceedings. The Commission is an independent body from the Tribunal. The Tribunal has no authority under the Canadian Human Rights Act to compel the Commission to participate or to review any of its decisions. Any issue that a party has with a decision made by the Commission can be taken up with the Commission directly. [ 35 ] During the CMCC that took place on October 20, 2025, [NAME] sought once again to challenge the Commission’s decision to withdraw from its participation in these proceedings. The Tribunal refused to hear the Complainant’s challenge, based on jurisdiction. This is captured in section 2 of the CMCC summary of this call, dated October 23, 2025, which reads as follows: As previously stated in Tribunal correspondence to the parties dated October 9, 2025, the Tribunal has received the Commission’s notice that it will no longer be participating in these proceedings. The Commission is an independent body from the Tribunal. The Tribunal has no authority under the Canadian Human Rights Act to compel the Commission to participate or to review any of its decisions. While the Tribunal is empowered to decide a notice of constitutional question, it can only do so regarding matters over which it otherwise possesses jurisdiction. The legality of the Commission’s exercise of discretion not to participate in an inquiry is not one of them. As such, the Tribunal cannot consider [NAME]’ constitutional challenge of the Commission’s decision. [ 36 ] It appears that [NAME] is now challenging the Commission’s decision to withdraw its participation as part of this judicial review.

V. ANALYSIS [ 37 ] As the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) put it in [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , [1989] 1 SCR 560 (see also Canada (CHRC) v. Canada (AG) , 2012 FC 445 at para 129), administrative tribunals are “masters in their own house.” This power, explains the SCC, extends to stays of proceedings. Although not expressly stated in the CHRA, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has also repeatedly recognized the Tribunal’s ability, as part of its general powers under subsections 50(2) and 50(3)(e) of the CHRA to determine questions of law or fact as well as decide procedural issues, to exercise its discretion to stay its proceedings (see [NAME] v. 2553-4330 [COMPANY]. ([NAME]) , 2018 CHRT 5 at para 39 [ [NAME] ]). [ 38 ] A stay of proceedings is an order that the proceedings stop.

Accordingly, it should not be pursued where “adequate alternative recourse” or “a lack of extraordinary circumstances or unusual urgency” exist (see CBSA v. [COMPANY]. , 2010 FCA 61 at paras 30-31 [ [NAME] ]). Since a stay of proceedings invariably causes delays in the Tribunal’s process, it often runs counter to the Tribunal’s legislated objective of proceeding “expeditiously” as stated in subsection 48.9(1) of the CHRA. For all these reasons, granting a stay is limited to “exceptional circumstances” (see Bailie et al. v. Air Canada and Air Canada Pilots Association , 2012 CHRT 6 at para 22). [ 39 ] [NAME] argues that the current circumstances warrant a stay. I understand from his submissions that a stay would, in his view, be fairer. as the parties and the Tribunal would benefit from the Federal Court’s judicial review of some of the Tribunal’s previous directions and rulings with which [NAME] has taken issue. A stay would also provide a remedy to the unfairness that he alleges to have experienced in the Tribunal’s process due to his perception that I am biased. [ 40 ] For motions seeking the suspension of an adjudicative body’s own proceedings, as is the case here, the Federal Court of Appeal has stated that what must be considered is whether, given all the circumstances, the “interest of justice” supports delaying the matter (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. , 2011 FCA 312, 426 N.R. 167 at para 14 [ Mylan ] and [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 1 at paras 24-26). This is a broader test than the demanding three-branch SCC test found in [COMPANY]. v. Canada (Attorney General) , 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), which is used when a court is staying other bodies’ proceedings pending an appeal or other matter, or for an injunction, as [NAME] also requested that the Federal Court issue in this case. [ 41 ] The Tribunal adopted the Federal Court of Appeal’s “interest of justice” approach in [NAME] and incorporated the principles of Mylan under the CHRA framework. The Tribunal recognizes that the interest of justice allows the Tribunal to examine a broad range of relevant factors when determining a motion to stay proceedings. These factors include the principles of natural justice and expeditiousness found at subsection 48.9(1) of the CHRA; whether a stay will prevent duplication of judicial and legal resources; the length of the requested abeyance; the reason for the request; the stage of the proceedings; any prejudice to the parties; as well as the public interest (see [NAME] at paras 50-60; Power To [NAME] v. Canada (Employment, Workforce and Labour) , 2019 CanLII 13579 (FC) para 20). [ 42 ] In determining a motion to stay its proceedings, the Tribunal must consider whether interest of justice considerations support granting the motion. A. Issue 1. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings, pending the outcome of the Complainant’s judicial review of my previous directions and rulings? [ 43 ] No. I do not believe that the interest of justice would be served by a stay of proceedings on this basis. [ 44 ] [NAME] requests a stay until the Federal Court determines his judicial review of my previous directions and rulings. The application for judicial review was filed in January 2026. It is reasonable to expect that this process could take a year and that the Tribunal would be unable to proceed before 2027, without consideration for the time of any appeals. Meanwhile, the Tribunal has scheduled 11 days for the hearing in this matter, set to begin on April 27, 2026, and unfold over the span of three weeks. The dates, which were challenging to find, were selected to accommodate the parties’ availability, commitments, and several religious holidays on which dates the Complainant asked that the Tribunal not sit. Since the Tribunal set these dates, parties have completed their disclosure, the Complainant has commissioned two expert reports, the Respondent has nearly finalized its expert report and has confirmed the availability of its 10+ witnesses, one of whom is no longer an [NAME] employee. The Respondent expressed that it had been “difficult to organize all these witnesses in such a compressed time period.” In other words, both the Tribunal and the parties have worked hard to ensure that they are ready to proceed. [ 45 ] For the Tribunal to adjourn these dates at this juncture would undermine those efforts and cause important delays to the adjudication of the complaint. As the courts and the Tribunal have previously recognized, with the passage of time, it becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain the truth of events. Witnesses die or cannot be located, memories fade, and evidence is lost, all of which impacts a party’s ability to make a full answer and defence and impacts the overall quality of the record on which the Tribunal must base its decision (see [NAME] v. [NAME] (Human Rights Commission) , 2000 SCC 44 at para. 102). [ 46 ] The Complainant’s position is that he is prejudiced by the Tribunal’s directions and rulings, and that they impede his ability to bring forward his case as he would like or, in the case of the motion to strike, force him to contend with allegations that he deems irrelevant. He views his application for judicial review with the Federal Court as a means by which he can rectify what he perceives as injustices. If the Tribunal proceeds before the outcome of the Federal Court proceedings, it is then moving forward with a flawed process that has infringed on his rights. If he is successful in his application and the Federal Court concludes that the process was unfair, then the time and resources spent by the parties and the Tribunal to hear the case may have been wasted. I must weigh these considerations against the impact of the delay. [ 47 ] At this point, it is unclear how the Federal Court will decide the Applicant judicial review application. However, [NAME]’ application highlights the issues of important delays and costs that can come with piecemeal forays to the courts. If, once the Tribunal has fully heard and adjudicated on the complaint, [NAME] is unsuccessful on the merits, he may commence a judicial review proceeding in respect of the final decision and could raise, at that time, the breaches of procedural fairness with which he is now taking issue. The Federal Court would then benefit from all the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions, once the administrative process has run its course, rather than turning its mind to interim decisions, in the middle of the Tribunal’s proceedings ([NAME] at para. 32). [ 48 ] On some issues raised by [NAME], the judicial review would not, in any case, meaningfully impact these proceedings. A Federal Court determination that the Tribunal erred by not proceeding with sanctioning the Respondent pursuant to sections 59 and 60 of the CHRA has no direct bearing on the Tribunal’s determination of the human rights complaint. To address [NAME]’ fears regarding the Respondent intimidating his expert witnesses, the Tribunal has since directed that the experts’ identities be revealed only as necessary for the Respondent to defend its case, specifically to the Respondent’s counsel, its office, and its expert. When combined with the absence of concrete evidence that the Respondent attempted to intimidate [NAME]’s first expert witness, these measures generously address [NAME]’ concerns. In other words, the Tribunal has no reasonable grounds to believe that the Complainant’s experts will be intimidated, and that the procedural fairness of its process is likely to be compromised such that the hearing should not proceed as planned. [ 49 ] Finally, without completing a thorough analysis of the question since it is before the Federal Court, I agree with the Respondent that administrative law shields interlocutory decisions from judicial review (see [NAME] at paras. 30-34). B. Issue 2. Is it in the interest of justice for me to stay these proceedings as a remedy for prior directions and rulings that were allegedly tainted with bias? [ 50 ] No. It is not appropriate for me to stay these proceedings on this basis. [ 51 ] I have not yet ruled on the Complainant’s motion for recusal. However, even if he is successful in this motion, I find that requesting a stay is premature. The remedy for a finding that I am biased will be for me to recuse myself and for another member to be assigned to the case by the Chairperson pursuant to subsection 49(2) of the CHRA. Any decision to amend the existing deadlines, vacate the hearing days, or suspend the proceedings would have to be made by this new member at that time. C. Issue 3. Did I err by not addressing the motion for recusal before the motion to stay the proceedings? [ 52 ] [NAME] contends that I must rule on the motion for recusal before being able to do anything else on the file, including ruling on the motion to stay. This is because, in his view, the bias that I have exemplified taints all other rulings and decisions. [NAME] provides no legal basis for this contention, beyond stating that this goes against the normal customs of which he is aware. [ 53 ] I disagree. As stated above, the Tribunal is master of its proceedings. The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedures provide that I control the conduct of the inquiry (Rule 3(2)) and that I may dispose of a motion as I consider necessary (Rule 26(3)d)), both of which I interpret as allowing me to determine which motion I should rule on first. In my view, this determination requires that I balance the principles of fairness and efficiency, and adopt an approach that secures the “informal, expeditious and fair determination” of the inquiry on its merits (Rule 5). [NAME] mentioned that he may ask for a stay of proceedings as early as November 26, 2025, he waited until January 30, 2026, to file his motion. He then took the position that he should be allowed to make oral submissions in addition to written submissions, and that the entire process should stop while I heard and ruled on his stay motion, as well as on his motion for recusal. [ 54 ] This placed the Tribunal and the parties in a period of uncertainty, as important filing deadlines loomed and the hearing approached. For this reason, I directed that deadlines would continue to run while dealing with the motions, and determined that securing the informal, expeditious, and fair determination of this matter required that I first rule on [NAME]’ stay motion. In doing so, I weighed the consequences of the potential eventuality that I find, when ruling on his motion for recusal, that I did show bias. I found that, even if this were the case and I recused myself and another member were assigned, the basis for [NAME]’ motion to stay could evolve or no longer be relevant. I concluded that in the meantime, it was more urgent that I rule on the stay motion to provide certainty, one way or another, regarding the hearing schedule already set. At this late juncture, the parties need to know, first and foremost, whether to continue preparing for the hearing or not.

VI.

ORDER [ 55 ] For these reasons, the Complainant’s motion to stay the proceedings is denied. [ 56 ] The existing timelines and scheduled hearing dates remain, as previously set. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario March 13, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-3090-25 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [COMPANY] of the Tribunal Dated: March 13, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: February 25, 2026 Via Zoom videoconferencing - Ottawa, Ontario Appearances: [NAME] , Self-represented [NAME] , for the Respondent