CHRT Orders Accommodations for Deaf Inmate

OUTCOME: Allowed

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 19 Date: March 12, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-2770-22 Between: [NAME_1] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME_2] Respondent - and - Council of Canadians with Disabilities and Canadian Association for the Deaf Interested person Decision Member: [NAME_3] \o "1-6" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc224132764 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360034000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc224132765 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360035000000 III. ISSUE PAGEREF _Toc224132766 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360036000000 IV.

BACKGROUND PAGEREF _Toc224132767 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360037000000 V. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc224132768 \h 11 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360038000000 A. Compensation for pain and suffering (section 53(2)(e) of [NAME_5]) and special compensation (section 53(3) of [NAME_5]) PAGEREF _Toc224132769 \h 12 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700360039000000 (i) [NAME_2]’s alleged admission that the maximum amounts of damages are owed PAGEREF _Toc224132770 \h 12 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370030000000 (ii) Assessment of the quantum for pain and suffering PAGEREF _Toc224132771 \h 16 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370031000000 (iii) Assessment of the quantum for special compensation PAGEREF _Toc224132772 \h 19 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370032000000 B. Individual accommodations for [NAME_1] _Toc224132773 \h 21 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370033000000 (i) [NAME_6] for all correctional services falling under section 5 of the CCRA PAGEREF _Toc224132774 \h 21 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370034000000 (a) Methods of communication that are available PAGEREF _Toc224132775 \h 22 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370035000000 1. TTY PAGEREF _Toc224132776 \h 22 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370036000000 2. Video Relay Service ([NAME_7]) PAGEREF _Toc224132777 \h 23 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370037000000 3. Video Remote Interpreting ([NAME_8]) PAGEREF _Toc224132778 \h 24 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370038000000 4. Live (on-site) [NAME_6] _Toc224132779 \h 26 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700370039000000 5. Video visitation PAGEREF _Toc224132780 \h 26 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380030000000 (b) Services while [NAME_1] is incarcerated PAGEREF _Toc224132781 \h 27 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380031000000 1. Effective Communication PAGEREF _Toc224132782 \h 27 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380032000000 2. Meaningful Interaction PAGEREF _Toc224132783 \h 29 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380033000000 (c) Services while [NAME_1] is on conditional release PAGEREF _Toc224132784 \h 32 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380034000000 (ii) Letter of assurance of no further similar breaches PAGEREF _Toc224132785 \h 38 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380035000000 (iii) Removal of negative information and insertion of memo in [NAME_1]’s records PAGEREF _Toc224132786 \h 39 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380036000000 (iv) Application of the Tribunal’s order to future sentences PAGEREF _Toc224132787 \h 40 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380037000000 C. Systemic remedies PAGEREF _Toc224132788 \h 40 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380038000000 (i) A commitment to providing [NAME_6] for the provision of services under section 5 of the CCRA PAGEREF _Toc224132789 \h 40 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700380039000000 (ii) Meaningful interaction PAGEREF _Toc224132790 \h 43 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390030000000 (iii) Contracts with a sufficient number of [NAME_6] providers PAGEREF _Toc224132791 \h 43 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390031000000 (iv) Implementation of a [NAME_7] or [NAME_8] service equivalent to the telephone communication access that hearing inmates have. PAGEREF _Toc224132792 \h 44 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390032000000 (v) Individualized Accommodation Plans PAGEREF _Toc224132793 \h 45 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390033000000 (vi) Public policy on accommodating Deaf federally sentenced individuals PAGEREF _Toc224132794 \h 47 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390034000000 (vii) Psychological risk assessments for Deaf individuals PAGEREF _Toc224132795 \h 48 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390035000000 (viii) Awareness sessions on Deaf culture PAGEREF _Toc224132796 \h 49 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390036000000 (ix) Requirement of ASL-fluent staff at institutions with Deaf inmates PAGEREF _Toc224132797 \h 49 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390037000000 (x) A request that the Tribunal remain seized of the matter PAGEREF _Toc224132798 \h 50 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390038000000 VI.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc224132799 \h 51 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003700390039000000 A. Damages PAGEREF _Toc224132800 \h 51 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003800300030000000 B. Individual accommodation during [NAME_1]’s incarceration PAGEREF _Toc224132801 \h 51 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003800300031000000 C. Individual accommodation while [NAME_1] is on conditional release PAGEREF _Toc224132802 \h 52 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003800300032000000 D. Other individual remedies PAGEREF _Toc224132803 \h 52 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003800300033000000 E. Systemic remedies PAGEREF _Toc224132804 \h 53 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003100330032003800300034000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] The Complainant, [NAME_1], is Deaf. He filed a complaint against the Respondent, the [NAME_2] ([NAME_2]), regarding his treatment while in its care and custody at several institutions. [NAME_1] alleged that [NAME_2] failed to accommodate his disability by, among other things, not providing him with sufficient access to an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter or to technology that would enable him to communicate with others. He contends that this in turn prevented him from practising his [NAME_9] culture. He claims that after his conditional release into the community, [NAME_2] again failed to provide him necessary access to interpretation services. [ 2 ] [NAME_2] admits that it did not “completely and reasonably” accommodate [NAME_1] while he was in its care and custody during the periods of his incarceration, as well as while under its supervision in the community, contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 ([NAME_5]). [ 3 ] However, the parties do not agree on the remedies that are warranted in this case. This decision addresses the issue. [ 4 ] The Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) fully participated in the hearing and seeks remedies in the public interest. [ 5 ] I allowed a coalition composed of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (the CCD) and the Canadian Association of the Deaf (the CAD) (jointly, the “Coalition”) to be recognized as an interested person regarding the inquiry into the complaint and to make final submissions on the case. [ 6 ] As [NAME_1] explained, and as reflected in a report prepared by the CAD that was entered into evidence, “deaf” is a medical term referring to people who have little or no functional hearing. The use of the word “Deaf” (with a capital “D”) is a sociological term that denotes individuals who are medically deaf or hard of hearing and who identify with and participate in the culture, society, and language of deaf people, which is typically based on sign language.

Accordingly, I have endeavoured to follow this usage in the decision and any reference to this term is intended to encompass all individuals who so identify.

II.

DECISION [ 7 ] The remedial order contains an award of damages as well as a requirement that several individual accommodation measures be implemented for [NAME_1]. The order also includes a series of systemic remedies.

III. ISSUE [ 8 ] There is a single issue for me to decide in this case. What should the remedial order against [NAME_2] include? The legal context giving rise this remedial order is set out below. [ 9 ] Section 5(b) of [NAME_5] states that, in the provision of services customarily available to the general public, it is a discriminatory practice to differentiate adversely in relation to an individual based on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination mentioned in section 3 of [NAME_5]. [NAME_1] alleged in his complaint the ground of disability, as a Deaf person, and the grounds of national or ethnic origin, race, and colour, as a M é tis person. [ 10 ] “Services,” within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5], contemplate something of benefit being held out as services offered to the public (see [NAME_10] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2008 FCA 170 at paras 31 – 34). Not all actions in the performance of a statutory function constitute services. There must be some actual service involved, which can often be traced to the responsibilities that a respondent may have towards a complainant. The concept of “public” is defined in relational and contextual terms (see [NAME_11] v. Yukon Order of Pioneers , 1996 CanLII 231 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 571 at para 68 [ [NAME_11] ]). By this definition, the inmate and offender population for which [NAME_2] is responsible can be considered the “public” within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5]. [ 11 ] [NAME_2]’s responsibilities regarding [NAME_1] and other inmates and offenders are set out in section 5 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act , S.C. 1992, c. 20 (the CCRA), which, at the time [NAME_1] filed his complaint in August 2020, read as follows: 5 There shall continue to be a correctional service in and for Canada, to be known as the [NAME_2], which shall be responsible for (a) the care and custody of inmates; (b) the provision of programs that contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders and to their successful reintegration into the community; (c) the preparation of inmates for release; (d) parole, statutory release supervision and long-term supervision of offenders; and (e) maintaining a program of public education about the operations of the Service. 5 Est maintenu le Service correctionnel du Canada, auquel incombent les tâches suivantes : a) la prise en charge et la garde des détenus; b) la mise sur pied de programmes contribuant à la réadaptation des délinquants et à leur réinsertion sociale; c) la préparation des détenus à leur libération; d) la supervision à l’égard des mises en liberté conditionnelle ou d’office et la surveillance de longue durée de délinquants; e) la mise en oeuvre d’un programme d’éducation publique sur ses activités. [ 12 ] “Inmates,” to paraphrase the definition in section 2 of the CCRA, are persons who are in a penitentiary or only temporarily outside of one. “Offenders” encompasses not just inmates but also persons who are outside a penitentiary because of parole, a court order, statutory release, or other reasons. [ 13 ] [NAME_2] acknowledges that it has a duty to accommodate offenders with disabilities, including offenders who are deaf or hard of hearing who require [NAME_6] services. [NAME_2] further admits that it did not completely and reasonably accommodate [NAME_1] on various occasions while he was in its care and custody or under its supervision in the community, contrary to section 5 of [NAME_5]. [NAME_2] claims that since May 2021, which is about nine months after [NAME_1] filed this human rights complaint, it had “better accommodated” him. However, [NAME_2] also acknowledges that there may have been some “isolated incidents” where its measures still fell below the standard of reasonable accommodation. [ 14 ] On the facts of this case, and in light of [NAME_2]’s admission, I accept that many of [NAME_1]’s interactions with [NAME_2] fall within the scope of services under section 5 of [NAME_5]. The question of whether a given interaction constitutes a service is addressed in my reasons. This is consistent with the requirement in [NAME_11] at para 68 to identify what constitutes the service based on the specific facts of the case rather than generalities about [NAME_2]’s relationship to an inmate. [ 15 ] Based on [NAME_2]’s admissions, I find the complaint to be substantiated.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 53(2) of [NAME_5], the Tribunal may make a remedial order against [NAME_2]. [ 16 ] I note that [NAME_2] did not explicitly refer to [NAME_1]’s other grounds of discrimination (national or ethnic origin, race, and colour, as a [NAME_9] person) in its admission, which focussed on his disability. The admission is sufficient to establish that a discriminatory practice occurred. Where relevant, I [NAME_12] deal with the impact of the other alleged discriminatory grounds in assessing the remedial claims.

IV.

BACKGROUND [ 17 ] [NAME_1] is [NAME_9]. He has been deaf since he was a very young child, basically for as long as he can remember. He also has severe tinnitus and bilateral vestibulopathy, which affects his balance, memory, and ability to concentrate. [ 18 ] [NAME_1]’s first language is ASL. As explained by [NAME_13], PhD, who testified as an expert witness on the experience of Deaf people when interacting with the criminal justice system, including the prison system, ASL is a visual-spatial language used by Anglophones in Canada and the United States. It relies on the movement of hands, body, and facial expressions to convey meaning, which is distinct from the auditory and vocal nature of spoken languages like English. ASL has its own grammar, morphology, phonology, syntax, and pragmatics. The structure and flow of sentences in ASL are fundamentally different from those in English. It is thus a distinct language. For someone raised in ASL, English would be a second language. [ 19 ] [NAME_13] also explained that communicating in writing is ineffective for someone for whom ASL is their first language. For them, writing is basically conversing in their second language. It creates barriers in terms of comprehending what is written and presented to them and expressing themselves. Communicating in writing does not convey a person’s tone or their “cognitive load.” For a Deaf person, it is only appropriate to communicate in writing for simple, short requests like returning something to a store for a refund. It is inappropriate where complex language needs are present, like medical visits and legal interactions. [ 20 ] [NAME_13] noted that lipreading is also an ineffective form of communication. She testified that only up to 30 percent of a conversation can normally be lipread between people who know each other well. Becoming a good lip reader is more relevant to people who have lost hearing later in life, are fluent in spoken English, and have extensive training. [ 21 ] As I [NAME_12] explain later in this decision, [NAME_6] does not need to be done in person with the interpreter and Deaf person in the same place. Interpretation can be done remotely using various technologies. [ 22 ] [NAME_2] pointed to several inconsistencies or errors in [NAME_13]’s evidence, mostly relating to certain details about technological standards and some semantics about the terms she used, to suggest that her entire evidence not be considered for want of reliability and objectivity. [NAME_2] also submits that [NAME_13] does not have any medical expertise and that consequently any of her health-related evidence should be ignored. However, I have not relied on any evidence from her regarding health. The other issues that [NAME_2] raised are insufficient to negate her evidence overall. They do not impact on her expertise regarding Deaf people or her knowledge about ASL and the available [NAME_6] technologies generally. [ 23 ] [NAME_1] first entered the federal correctional system when he arrived at Bowden Institution (“Bowden”) near Red Deer, Alberta, in April 2018. [NAME_6] was not made available for his intake. During the four months he spent at Bowden from April to August 2018, [NAME_1] estimates that he received an interpreter only two or three times. He attended medical appointments without an interpreter. He communicated back and forth with the healthcare provider in writing using a paper pad. [NAME_1] testified that communicating this way hinders his ability to express himself as he is unable to expand on what he wants to say. [ 24 ] [NAME_1] also testified that during his time at Bowden, he did not even have access to the communication technology known as TTY, which in any event, as the evidence shows, is an unsatisfactory means of communication. [NAME_13] explained that TTY is one of the earliest forms of text-based communication. TTY machines are basically typewriters that are used to communicate typed messages from point to point through a simple electronic communications channel. Both parties must have a TTY machine to communicate. [ 25 ] Operators receive text-based calls from TTYs and place calls to hearing people relaying the messages between the deaf, hard-of-hearing or speech-impaired person and a hearing person. Everything must be typed back and forth, which is time-consuming. [NAME_1] testified that what would ordinarily be a 20-minute exchange can take one hour using TTY. There are frequent technical malfunctions causing garbled and mistake-filled text. [NAME_13] noted that since the parties do not see each other, the tone and emotional affect of the communication is absent. In 2017, the CAD submitted the findings of a national research project to the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (the CRTC), which indicated that only 37 percent of survey respondents still used TTY. [ 26 ] Thus, for his four months at Bowden without access to TTY, [NAME_1]’s ability to communicate was severely restricted. He testified that he had to rely on passing written messages to his lawyers through [NAME_2] staff. This meant that these communications were not confidential and he was reluctant to speak freely. [ 27 ] [NAME_1] was transferred to Mountain Institution (“Mountain”) near Agassiz, British Columbia, on August 14, 2018. [NAME_1] testified that he was told that there would be a staff member skilled in ASL at Mountain but this turned out not to be true. Mountain is also much farther away from available interpretive services than other institutions in [NAME_2]’s Pacific Region, making it more difficult for interpreters to attend. [ 28 ] [NAME_1] testified that during his time at Mountain, he was taken outside the institution for a medical appointment and there was an interpreter present. However, [NAME_2] staff refused to remove [NAME_1]’s handcuffs, so he was unable to communicate with the interpreter. [NAME_1] testified that this was like “putting a gag in somebody’s mouth.” [ 29 ] [NAME_1] did not have access to TTY for the first three weeks he was at Mountain because [NAME_2] had restricted the telephone relay number required to use it. Even when it was functional, [NAME_1] had problems accessing TTY due to staff not facilitating his calls. His access to ASL interpreters at Mountain was also very limited and he did not receive any interpreter services until September 2018, a month after he arrived there. [ 30 ] In response to a request for a steady supply of paper for basic communication with staff, he was told to go the institution’s canteen and buy his own paper. At Mountain, [NAME_1]’s first interview with his parole officer was without [NAME_6]. There was interpretation at his second interview. [ 31 ] [NAME_1] testified that shortly after arriving at Mountain, he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate, so he sought to be put in isolation for protection. However, as [NAME_2] failed to provide an interpreter, [NAME_1] had to communicate with the mental health worker using pen and paper and he believes that the mental health worker did not understand what had happened to him. [NAME_1] was sent back to the cell with the individual who assaulted him. [ 32 ] [NAME_1] went on a hunger strike after the assault. His medical documents indicate that he was feeling “isolated, depressed and exhausted due to the fact that he can’t communicate due to his hearing loss” and that he was suicidal while at Mountain. [ 33 ] [NAME_1] testified that he made formal requests to have [NAME_6] for an information fair for inmates but he was denied. [NAME_2]’s reason for the denial was that the fair did not involve a case management or medical issue and it was not necessary to support his integration into society. [ 34 ] On September 24, 2018, [NAME_1] was transferred to the Psychogeriatric unit at the Regional Treatment Centre (the RTC), also known as the Pacific Institution, in Abbotsford, British Columbia. Mental health monitoring notes taken shortly after his arrival state that he “continues to experience some isolation due [to his] hearing impairment.” [ 35 ] [NAME_1] testified that his access to interpreters at the RTC was again very limited. [NAME_1] sent in multiple requests for interpreters while at the RTC, many of which did not yield a response, including requests to meet with an Elder or attend cultural events in the institution, as well as events like information fairs and other activities for inmates. He described his frustration with not being able to meaningfully meet with Elders. [ 36 ] In response to a grievance related to not being provided an interpreter, [NAME_2] stated that [NAME_1] was “encouraged to communicate by writing during [his] meetings/interactions with staff.” [ 37 ] [NAME_1] also testified that his access to TTY at the RTC was limited and that when he did have access, there would often be problems using it. He was not able to use TTY on evenings and weekends, despite other incarcerated people having access to telephones at these times. [NAME_14], who is employed by [NAME_2] as Chief of Clinical Interventions at the RTC, confirmed in her testimony that TTY is a cumbersome and awkward system that often generated garbled messages when it was used by [NAME_1]. [ 38 ] [NAME_1] described the isolation and lack of communication he experienced while at RTC as “starving for any kind of interaction or communication.” [ 39 ] [NAME_1] was released on day parole in November 2020. He was required to reside in a Community-based Residential Facility (CBRF), commonly referred to as a halfway house. Section 133(4) of the CCRA states that offenders may be required to reside in a CBRF as a condition of their parole or unescorted temporary absence. [ 40 ] CBRFs provide a bridge between the correctional institution and the community. They can consist of [NAME_2]-operated Community Correctional Centres (CCCs) or privately operated CBRFs, which can include hostels, private home placements, satellite or supervised apartments, treatment centres, and independently run operations called Community Residential Facilities (CRFs). [NAME_2] explains these options on its website on a page entitled “Community-based residential facilities.” [ 41 ] [NAME_2] referred [NAME_1] to a CRF in Vancouver, British Columbia, called [NAME_16] (“Rising Sun”). [ 42 ] On December 24, 2020, a community mental health nurse completed a suicide and self-injury report at the request of [NAME_1]’s parole officer. The interview was conducted by having the mental health worker ask questions over the phone to a Rising Sun staff member who then wrote them down for [NAME_1] to read. [NAME_1] wrote down his responses and the staff member relayed them to the mental health worker over the phone. [ 43 ] [NAME_1] communicated with Rising Sun staff through pen and paper as he was not provided interpreters. He described this as very frustrating. [NAME_1] requested interpreters for meetings offered by the Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA), which is a support group for offenders who have been convicted of sexual offences. It was a program that [NAME_1] contends that [NAME_2] expected him to attend while on parole, but no interpretation was provided. COSA had no budget for interpreters. [ 44 ] [NAME_1]’s day parole was suspended in January 2021. He was briefly returned to Mountain before being moved to the Mission Institution in Mission, British Columbia. [ 45 ] [NAME_1]’s parole officer conducted her first post-suspension interview with him without interpretation because the interpreter was unable to join the meeting by video due to technical difficulties. At their next meeting, there was an interpreter present. However, the parole officer had already written her report by that point recommending that [NAME_1]’s parole be revoked. [ 46 ] [NAME_1] was released back to the community in May 2021 where he remained until January 2023, residing at a CRF in Vancouver called [NAME_17], which was run by the Salvation Army (“[NAME_17]”). [NAME_1] was provided interpreters only for his meetings with his parole officer. No interpreters were provided for his interactions with [NAME_17] staff, though they could attend and use the interpretation services reserved for the parole officers if any time was available after that meeting. He was also not provided with interpreters for community support groups such as COSA. [ 47 ] [NAME_1]’s release was suspended again in January 2023, he was sent to [NAME_18] (“[NAME_19]”) in Abbotsford, British Columbia. [NAME_1]’s intake interview was completed without an interpreter and using pen and paper. He testified that his mental health was low when he arrived at [NAME_19] and he felt exhausted, frustrated, and ready to end his life. He went on a hunger strike for five weeks. [ 48 ] [NAME_1] communicated with mental health staff at [NAME_19] through pen and paper about his hunger strike and mental health, including his desire to kill himself. [ 49 ] An Inmate Accommodation Plan (IAP) was completed for [NAME_1] at [NAME_19] by his parole officer. It stated that the institution would attempt to provide him with ASL interpreters, without requiring his request, for: i) Interviews with his case-management team, work supervisors, on-site Chaplains, Elders, and Indigenous Liaison Officers; ii) Correctional program sessions; iii) Parole meetings wherein his adherence to his correctional plan and/or disciplinary measures are discussed; iv) Parole Board of Canada hearings; v) Healthcare appointments that require ASL medical certified interpreters; and vi) Mental health appointments. [ 50 ] [NAME_1] testified that he was initially told that he would have an interpreter two times per week at [NAME_19] but that this was later switched to only one booking per week, as confirmed in his correctional documents. [NAME_1] put in a request to increase the number of minimum weekly bookings to two but was told that it had been agreed that there would only be a minimum booking of once per week. He spoke about having to choose between different activities such as communicating with his lawyer or meeting with Elders. [NAME_1] is unaware of why the amount of interpreter bookings changed from a guarantee of two bookings to one. [ 51 ] [NAME_1] says that while at [NAME_19]: i) his sign language deteriorated because of his limited ability to communicate with others in ASL; ii) he was only able to meet with the Elder at [NAME_19] usually once per month; and iii) staff would urge him to attend medical appointments without interpreters. [ 52 ] During an outside medical appointment on March 27, 2023, there was no interpreter present but the escort officers refused to remove [NAME_1]’s handcuffs, so he was not even able to write back and forth with medical staff. [NAME_1] testified again that this felt like being gagged as he was unable to communicate. [ 53 ] [NAME_1] states that he was never provided with interpreters for social purposes. He would spend most days entirely in his cell. He had no support and was unable to pick up on environmental cues, which could be dangerous because of the prison environment. He felt isolated and was “starving for communication with anybody” and to use his language. [ 54 ] [NAME_1] was given statutory release on July 18, 2024, on the condition that he reside at [NAME_17]. [ 55 ] [NAME_1] was provided an updated IAP the day after he was released to the community. [NAME_1] testified that, despite what it states, he was not consulted for the plan and there was no room for negotiation. He was simply told what he would be getting in terms of accommodation. [ 56 ] From his July 2024 release until his testimony in October 2024, [NAME_1] had only been provided with interpreters for his mandatory meetings with his parole officer and other [NAME_2] staff, for a total of nine interpreter sessions. [NAME_1] testified that his [NAME_17] caseworker had attended a few of these sessions but that the rest of his communication with his caseworker was through writing back and forth. Any meetings that [NAME_1] attended with [NAME_17]’s mental health or outreach workers occurred without interpretation.

V. ANALYSIS [ 57 ] As I already mentioned, the issue to be determined in this case is what should be included in the Tribunal’s remedial order. I [NAME_12] analyze each type of remedy that [NAME_1] and the Commission have requested. The order at the end of the decision sets out the specific remedies awarded. [ 58 ] I begin the analysis with the claims regarding compensation for pain and suffering (see section 53(2)(e) of [NAME_5]) and special compensation (see section 53(3) of [NAME_5]). There is a complication regarding these two claims because [NAME_1] contends that [NAME_2] already admitted that it owed the maximum under both categories ($20,000) and that the remedial order should reflect this. [NAME_2] contends that the discussion about a maximum award was only made in the context of settlement negotiations and that awards of slightly lesser amounts should be ordered. For the following reasons, I accept [NAME_2]’s argument. A. Compensation for pain and suffering (section 53(2)(e) of [NAME_5]) and special compensation (section 53(3) of [NAME_5]) [ 59 ] Section 53(2)(e) of [NAME_5] provides that if the Tribunal finds that the complaint is substantiated, it may order that the person found to have engaged in the discriminatory practice compensate the victim by an amount up to $20,000 for any pain and suffering that the victim experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice. [ 60 ] Section 53(3) of [NAME_5] provides that the Tribunal may order a respondent to pay up to $20,000 in compensation to the victim if it is satisfied that the respondent engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully or recklessly. [ 61 ] For brevity, I [NAME_12] refer to these claims together as claims for damages. (i) [NAME_2]’s alleged admission that the maximum amounts of damages are owed [ 62 ] [NAME_1] seeks an order for the maximum amount under both provisions with interest as of the date of his complaint. He claims that [NAME_2] admitted that it owed the maximum in its exchanges with his lawyers before the hearing started. [ 63 ] The debate over this question relates to a series of emails sent between counsel before the start of the hearing. The Tribunal had reserved dates for about four weeks of hearings to take place in fall 2023. On May 12, 2023, [NAME_2]’s counsel sent an email informing the Tribunal that it “concedes liability” in [NAME_1]’s complaint. [NAME_2] proposed that, as a result, only two weeks would be needed for the hearing on remedies, if the parties were unable to negotiate or mediate a settlement before then. [ 64 ] The parties participated in a mediation session with a Tribunal-appointed mediator on September 19, 2023. The mediation did not resolve the case. [ 65 ] On October 17, 2023, [NAME_2] emailed a letter (the “With Prejudice Letter”) to the Tribunal requesting a case management conference call (CMCC) with several proposed agenda items that included how to narrow the scope of matters requiring a hearing. [NAME_2] reminded the Tribunal that it had already admitted liability in this matter. [ 66 ] [NAME_2] then added the following: In order to facilitate the informal, expeditious and fair determination of this matter and in order to facilitate a discussion with the Tribunal and parties on how to further narrow matters that require the Tribunal’s consideration, the Respondent wishes to provide the following information to the Tribunal and the parties on a WITH PREJUDICE basis. [ 67 ] The “information” referred to in this excerpt was organized under two headings. Under the heading “With respect to liability,” [NAME_2] acknowledged that it had a duty to accommodate [NAME_1] and other offenders with disabilities, including those who are deaf and hard of hearing, requiring sign language interpretative services. [NAME_2] also reiterated its admission that it failed to reasonably accommodate [NAME_1] on multiple occasions while incarcerated, contrary to section 5 of [NAME_5]. [ 68 ] The letter then continued with five topics set out over about another three pages, all under the heading “With respect to remedies.” For item 1, [NAME_2] acknowledged that it needed to take action and improve efforts to reasonably accommodate offenders with disabilities. Under item 2, [NAME_2] then addressed the question of damages, which I further discuss below. Under item 3, [NAME_2] listed several actions that it had already taken to improve [NAME_1]’s and other offenders’ accommodation. Items 4 and 5 describe the actions that [NAME_2] “is planning to make best efforts to do” to further improve the accommodation for [NAME_1] and other offenders with disabilities. [ 69 ] Regarding item 2 involving the issue of damages, [NAME_2] articulated its position as follows: 2. [NAME_2] acknowledges and agrees the complainant should be provided compensation pursuant to ss. 53(2)(e) and 53(3) of [NAME_5]. [NAME_2] is prepared to provide the maximum amount of $40,000 in compensation pursuant to these sections. [ 70 ] I convened a CMCC one week after [NAME_2] sent this letter. The parties asked that I hold a mediation session with them on the understanding that if the case did not settle, I would continue as the member conducting the inquiry into the complaint (that is, a mediation-adjudication or “med-adj”). I held the med-adj on November 27 and 28, 2023, but the case did not settle. [ 71 ] On December 7, 2023, [NAME_2]’s counsel wrote to [NAME_1]’s counsel expressing frustration with the latter’s position in the negotiations (the “December Email”). [NAME_2] claimed that [NAME_1]’s counsel were “calling into question [[NAME_2]’s] concession of liability and [its] agreement to pay a maximum award of damages.” [NAME_2]’s counsel then wrote the following: My intention when I put the “with prejudice” offer on the table in [NAME_1] was that it was intended to stand no matter what, because we think that it is the right thing to do. [NAME_2] has committed to taking these steps on other files, so they are happening. The intention was that it would hopefully lead to settlement or in the least narrow whatever outstanding issues remain. To me that would mean no need for any evidence about pain and suffering, wilful or reckless conduct, no discussion about compensation and hopefully no discussion regarding systemic remedies. That means, the only outstanding issues would be non-financial individual remedies. [ 72 ] [NAME_1]’s counsel sent the following response the next day: Thank you for your response. We just wanted to confirm that it was [the Department of Justice’s] intention to implement these with prejudice measures regardless of whether we reached a settlement so we could ensure we were providing our client with the most accurate information. We [NAME_12] consult with our client and get back to you. [ 73 ] The record before me does not include any other correspondence on the issue until almost one year later. On September 17, 2024, [NAME_2]’s counsel sent an email to [NAME_1]’s counsel, further to [NAME_2]’s original letter of October 17, 2023. The email reads as follows: 1. [NAME_2]’s offer to settle this litigation for $40,000 expires at 5 pm on Friday, September 20, 2024. [NAME_2] continues to admit liability. This was an offer to avoid the time and expense of proceeding to hearing. If this matter proceeds to hearing, our $40,000 offer is withdrawn. [NAME_1] [NAME_12] need to establish his damages. I expect that there [NAME_12] need to be an additional 5-10 days of [NAME_1]’s testimony. We can discuss next steps at our Case Planning Conference Call scheduled for September 23, 2024, if our offer is not accepted.

2. By separate cover, on a without prejudice basis, I [NAME_12] contact [NAME_1]’s counsel and Commission counsel with the remaining terms of [NAME_2]’s settlement offer today. [ 74 ] After another unsuccessful med-adj attempt in late September 2024, the hearing opened on October 15, 2024. [ 75 ] Therefore, the question to be determined is: Do [NAME_2]’s statements regarding damages mean that an award for the maximum quantum of damages must be ordered irrespective of any assessment that the Tribunal would otherwise have made? The answer is no. [ 76 ] [NAME_2] did clearly intend to bind itself and implement some of the remedies listed in the With Prejudice Letter, as is apparent from the statement in the December Email’s statement that the “[NAME_2] has committed to take these steps and they are happening,” and that the steps would “stand no matter what.” This comment certainly applies to the actions under item 3 in the With Prejudice Letter, which [NAME_2] claimed it had already taken. Arguably, there is some commitment to implement items 4 and 5, though [NAME_2] did reserve itself an option not to follow through with them, having only promised to make best efforts to take the listed actions. [ 77 ] However, regarding the damages provision (item 2), I note a distinction in the language used. The passage is not about actions already taken or to be taken. Rather, [NAME_2] acknowledges [NAME_1]’s entitlement to damages, which is a clear admission, but then merely states that it is “prepared” to provide the maximum amount of $40,000 in damages. There is no commitment to pay the sum, just an indication of a willingness to pay it. [ 78 ] I am mindful of the context of this remark. [NAME_2] was proposing in the letter that further negotiations towards settlement be undertaken, and indeed, at the ensuing CMCC, the parties agreed to participate in the med-adj. [NAME_2] noted in the December Email that its intention was that its “’with prejudice’ offer” would “hopefully lead to a settlement” or at least narrow any outstanding issues. The word “offer” is prominently there. [ 79 ] [NAME_2]’s use of the term “with prejudice” affect the analysis? None of the parties presented any authority dealing with this term in the context of [NAME_5]. At the hearing, I referred the parties to a line of jurisprudence from the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (the BCHRT) addressing “with prejudice offers.” The BCHRT dismisses complaints under section 27(1)(d)(ii) of British Columbia’s Human Rights Code , RSBC 1996, c. 210 (the “BC Code”), if it determines that the BC Code’s purposes would not be furthered by proceeding with a complaint where respondents have made reasonable settlement offers and complainants have rejected them (see for example, [NAME_20] v. [NAME_21] , 2009 BCHRT 264 at paras 33 and following). However, as the parties correctly pointed out, this case law is specific to that BC Code provision. [NAME_5] does not have any analogous provision and thus the BC Code jurisprudence is not helpful. [ 80 ] [NAME_2] contends that the reference merely meant that the terms set out in the With Prejudice Letter were not to be treated as confidential. However, I do not see how that conclusion can be drawn just from those two words. [ 81 ] Ultimately, I can only infer the term’s meaning from the context of the With Prejudice Letter and related correspondence overall, as I have done above, and conclude that [NAME_2] was merely making a settlement offer. [ 82 ] Accordingly, I do not find [NAME_2]’s statement in item 2 of the With Prejudice Letter to be an admission that $40,000 in damages is owed to [NAME_1], nor that I am bound to issue an order for that amount. (ii) Assessment of the quantum for pain and suffering [ 83 ] The Tribunal can order the payment of up to $20,000 for any pain and suffering that [NAME_1] experienced because of [NAME_2]’s discriminatory practice. As observed in [NAME_22] v. [COMPANY_23]. , 2021 CHRT 15 at para 98, aff’d 2022 FCA 182, the Tribunal tends to reserve the maximum amount of $20,000 for the very worst cases or the most egregious of circumstances. [ 84 ] I find that [NAME_1]’s circumstances approach the worst of circumstances. The obstacles to having adequate access to [NAME_6] extended over the entire course of his interactions with [NAME_2]. While the frequency of available interpretation increased over time, the lack of communication services at the initial stages of his incarceration, whether through [NAME_6] or even TTY, was particularly acute. [ 85 ] As a Deaf inmate without the ability to effectively communicate with others, especially in his own language, the isolation that [NAME_1] experienced was significant. [NAME_2]’s healthcare professionals who assessed him observed that he was developing suicidal ideation. [NAME_1] testified that his ASL language skills began deteriorating. He maintains that [NAME_2] staff dealt with him insensitively, whether by handcuffing him at medical appointments and effectively “gagging” him, or by not even providing him a supply of paper for basic exchanges, or more concerningly, failing to understand his fears of being placed in a cell with someone who posed a danger to him. These actions were particularly impactful to him. [NAME_1] also points to the compounding effect for him as a M é tis person who was prevented from engaging with his Indigeneity through the unavailability of interpretation services for exchanges with Elders or for cultural and spiritual events. [ 86 ] [NAME_2] contends that some of the pain and suffering that [NAME_1] describes is questionable due to issues regarding his credibility. [NAME_2] referred to [NAME_1]’s criminal history as a sex offender and specific instances in his testimony where he allegedly was an uncooperative witness or contradicted himself. I find these alleged evasive answers or contradictions to be immaterial to the determination of his pain and suffering. They are for the most part minor, insignificant, or taken out of context. For instance, [NAME_1]’s contesting in cross-examination the relevance of the nature of his offences to the issue of whether he was reasonably accommodated is understandable. The references to his testimony where he allegedly deflected questions by blaming [NAME_2] for his woes, were usually in response to questions that were not relevant to the human rights complaint, and particularly to his pain and suffering. [ 87 ] [NAME_2] also argues that no medical or other expert evidence was adduced to document the pain and suffering he experienced. However, complainants are not required to provide medical evidence as to their pain and suffering (see [NAME_24] v. [NAME_25] , 2022 CHRT 18 at para 100; and [NAME_26] v. [NAME_27] Company , 2019 CHRT 28 at para 135). [ 88 ] [NAME_1]’s experience as a Deaf person who was prevented from being able to communicate is objectively observable irrespective of any biases or ill feelings that he may have towards [NAME_2] or his criminal history. [ 89 ] [NAME_2] cites in its submissions the pain and suffering or general damages awards from three cases involving human rights complaints filed by Deaf complainants ($10,000 awarded in [NAME_28] v. [NAME_29]. , 2000 CanLII 5591 (CHRT) [ [NAME_28] ]; $1,500 awarded in [NAME_30] v. University of British Columbia (No. 2) , 1993 CanLII 16516 (BCHRT); and $35,000 awarded in [NAME_31] v. [NAME_32] , 2015 BCHRT 100 [ [NAME_31] ]). I note that only [NAME_28] is decided under [NAME_5], the other cases being under the BC Code. Based on these figures, and adjusting for inflation from the time they were awarded, [NAME_2] submits that an award of $15,000 is warranted. [ 90 ] [NAME_1] argues that [NAME_31] is most analogous to his situation but that the aggravating facts in his case are more severe and that therefore, an award at the maximum amount of $20,000 is justified. However, I note that since 2002, there have not been any maximum caps under the BC Code as there are under [NAME_5], and that according to the case law under [NAME_5], the maximum pain and suffering award is reserved for the very worst cases. [ 91 ] I am aware of some other decisions under [NAME_5] regarding Deaf persons. In [NAME_33] v. [NAME_34] (Department of National Defence) , 2011 PSLRB 110 [ [NAME_33] ], the Public Service Labour Relations Board (the PSLRB) dealt with a grievance filed by a federal public servant who alleged that he was discriminated against during his employment. The grievor was “born hearing impaired,” as the decision described him, and ASL was his first language. The PSLRB found that the grievor was denied [NAME_6] at work-related meetings. Hurtful comments were made by the employer’s representative at one of those meetings. The PSLRB awarded the grievor $10,000 for pain and suffering. [ 92 ] In another more recent arbitral award ruling, Association internationale des machinistes et des travailleurs et travailleuses de l’aérospatiale (Section locale 140) v. Air Canada , 2024 CanLII 65435 (CA SA) at para 132, the arbitrator awarded an unjustifiably dismissed Air Canada employee who was profoundly hard of hearing $5,000 in pain and suffering compensation under section 53(2)(e) of [NAME_5]. The grievor was repeatedly denied sign language interpretation at the disciplinary proceedings that had led to his dismissal. He was unable to defend himself by being deprived of effective communication. [ 93 ] Returning to the present case, I find that although [NAME_1] experienced hardship and isolation from the denial of adequate interpretation services, the experience did not quite extend in the same manner over the entire period. About a third of the time from 2018 until the 2024 hearing, [NAME_1] was on conditional release, and while he was entitled to some additional interpretation services than what were provided to him during this period, he was nonetheless “at large” within the meaning of the CCRA as I explain later in this decision, and no longer subject to the isolation that he experienced while incarcerated. Furthermore, as [NAME_1] acknowledged in cross-examination, the nature and severity of his criminal offences has also contributed to some of his social isolation both in and out of prison. [ 94 ] Taking all these circumstances into account, I find that an award of $18,000 for pain and suffering is warranted, with interest as of the date of the complaint (see section 53(4) of [NAME_5]). (iii) Assessment of the quantum for special compensation [ 95 ] The Tribunal can order up to a maximum of $20,000 in special compensation if it finds that the respondent has engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully or recklessly (see section 53(3) of [NAME_5]). This is “a punitive provision intended to provide a deterrent and discourage those who deliberately discriminate” (see Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME_35], 2022 FCA 177 at para 66, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME_36] , 2013 FC 113). [ 96 ] As noted in [NAME_22] at paras 106 – 111, a finding of wilfulness requires an intention to discriminate and to infringe a person’s rights under [NAME_5]. Recklessness usually denotes acts that disregard or show indifference to the consequences, such that the conduct is done wantonly or needlessly. A finding of recklessness does not require proof of intention to discriminate. In determining the appropriate award under this section, the Tribunal must focus on the respondent’s conduct and not on the effect that the conduct has had on the complainants. [ 97 ] [NAME_2] admits that an award under this head of damages is appropriate and submits that it should be $15,000. [NAME_1] argues that the maximum sum of $20,000 should be awarded. He points out that he made it clear upon his sentencing that he needed to be accommodated while incarcerated. Yet, no accommodation was put in place upon his entry into [NAME_2]’s prison system. He claims that he faced hostility and indifference from prison staff, who dismissed his needs, having concluded that communicating with him by pen and paper was sufficient. The indifference extended to the insistence that he remain handcuffed during medical appointments, which effectively prevented him from communicating with the healthcare professional. [ 98 ] [NAME_1] contends that even after [NAME_2] admitted liability in 2023, it continued to not fully accommodate him. He still attended several appointments without interpretation being made available to him. His Residential Action Plan at the CRF said that he was supposed to meet with a mental health worker once per week, but no interpretation was provided. [ 99 ] He also points out that as of the hearing, [NAME_2] had yet to adopt a formal policy for the accommodation of prisoners with disabilities. [ 100 ] [NAME_2] submits that any analysis under this head of damages should consider the reality of the difficulty in securing [NAME_6] services, particularly at certain locations where [NAME_1] was incarcerated. [NAME_37], [NAME_2] Manager, Information Management and Administrative Services, testified that from 2018 to 2023, the supply of ASL interpreters in [NAME_2]’s Pacific Region was very limited and it was difficult to find a steady supply of ASL interpreters. [ 101 ] [NAME_2]’s decisions were also influenced by its overriding concerns for the safety and security of all persons present in prison institutions. [NAME_2] also pointed out the age of its prisons’ buildings and infrastructures, which prevent it from easily implementing some of the latest interpretation technologies as I elaborate on later in this decision. Finally, [NAME_2] submits that after 2021, [NAME_1] was given more access to [NAME_6] services than before. From May 2021 until August 2024, he was provided 176 ASL “events,” which works out to about four to five events per month. [ 102 ] There is no evidence that [NAME_2] willfully discriminated against [NAME_1], as he acknowledged through counsel in final arguments. However, [NAME_2] was unquestionably reckless in its treatment of him. It knew that he required accommodation to effectively communicate with [NAME_2] staff and others but neglected to provide those services to him, particularly upon his entry into its system. Even considering some of the structural and operational difficulties in securing [NAME_6] services, more could have been done, particularly through the use of remote interpretation tools, as discussed later in this decision. Consequently, I find that a significant award for special compensation is warranted, especially as a deterrent, though not the maximum. I set the quantum at $17,500, with interest as of the date of the complaint (see section 53(4) of [NAME_5]). B. Individual accommodations for [NAME_1] [ 103 ] [NAME_1] seeks an order directing [NAME_2] to provide him several “individual accommodations.” Section 53(2)(b) of [NAME_5] allows the Tribunal to order that a respondent make available to the victim of the discriminatory practice the rights, opportunities, or privileges denied as a result of the discrimination at the first reasonable occasion. [NAME_1] submits that these measures would accommodate his needs and effectively make him whole. (i) [NAME_6] for all correctional services falling under section 5 of the CCRA [ 104 ] [NAME_1]’s request is straightforward. He seeks an order that [NAME_6] be provided to him for “all correctional services falling under section 5 of the CCRA.” [ 105 ] [NAME_2] acknowledges its duty to accommodate [NAME_1], and by extension, other inmates like him. [NAME_2] states that it has already implemented or is in the process of implementing several remedies to accommodate individuals and prevent any further discrimination. [NAME_2] adds that it is willing to work with the Commission to further redress any systemic discriminatory practices that have emerged from this case. [ 106 ] However, it is still important to reasonably specify the services about which [NAME_2] has a duty to provide [NAME_6] to [NAME_1], and secondly, how the interpretation should be provided. [ 107 ] When [NAME_1] testified at the hearing, he was no longer incarcerated and was on conditional release. He was required to reside at a CRF. I have no knowledge of his status since then. His sentence was scheduled to end in 2025. Therefore, I [NAME_12] address these requested remedies to cover off the possibility of further incarceration or continued conditional release of [NAME_1], dealing with each circumstance separately. [ 108 ] To better understand the available remedial options, I must first elaborate on the various possible means of communication with him. (a) Methods of communication that are available [ 109 ] There are various means available for [NAME_1] to communicate with others, as I set out below.

1. TTY [ 110 ] As I mentioned earlier, TTY is an old technology based on typing messages back and forth, which in practice is ineffective. It is error-prone, slow and time-consuming, and requires specialized machines to be used at each end. [NAME_13] noted that having complex conversations can be very difficult using TTY, particularly for those who struggle to use English as a second language. She described TTY as being obsolete technology, especially in comparison to the newer available technologies described below.

2. Video Relay Service ([NAME_7]) [ 111 ] Video Relay Service ([NAME_7]) is a service that the CRTC mandates telecommunication service providers to provide. It became operational in September 2016. [NAME_7] enables people to conduct telephone calls using sign language. [NAME_7] connects a sign language user with another party via an operator who can interpret between sign language and spoken language. [ 112 ] A [NAME_7] call involves the caller and the person called, one of whom is a sign language user, as well as the relay operator (the [NAME_7] operator). The sign language user makes or receives a video call via a computer or other Internet-enabled device using video conferencing tools based on Internet technology, like a computer, a smartphone, or a tablet. The video call connects the sign language user to an operator who is connected to the other party via a voice telephone call. The operator relays the conversation from sign language to spoken language and vice versa, for example from ASL to English or from Langue des signes québécoise (LSQ) to French. [ 113 ] [NAME_7] service is free. It is administered by the Canadian Administrator of [COMPANY_39]. (CAV), a not-for-profit telecommunications services company. CAV has a mandate from the CRTC to design, implement, and oversee the delivery of [NAME_7] in Canada. [ 114 ] [NAME_7] is available seven days per week, 24 hours per day. CAV contracts with several companies to provide the actual service. People must register to use it and they must adhere to CAV’s user agreement. One of the agreement’s terms is that [NAME_7] is not to be used to converse with a hearing party who is in the same room as the Deaf person (excluding emergency 911 calls). This implies that the two persons must be at different locations. [ 115 ] This restriction may impact on [NAME_2]’s ability to use [NAME_7] in one-on-one settings with [NAME_1]. [NAME_2] suggested in its questioning of witnesses that even if the two persons are in the same building or location, the user agreement condition would be met as long as they are in separate rooms. [ 116 ] [NAME_40], who is the manager of [NAME_41], an organization that supports and advocates for Deaf persons and who is herself deaf, testified that while it is technically possible for people in two nearby rooms to use [NAME_7], it is a practice that is not “encouraged.” However, she did confirm that [NAME_7] has been known to be used for short interactions even in the same room where an ASL interpreter is not available on short notice. She explained that her understanding of the rationale for this rule is that, given the cost of interpretation services, CAV does not want [NAME_7] to become a no-cost replacement for in-person [NAME_6], such that it ends up effectively paying for this service. [ 117 ] An FAQ web page prepared by CAV was entered into evidence on which it is noted that [NAME_7] is not intended to replace “community or [NAME_8] interpreting.” [ 118 ] [NAME_13] testified that the [NAME_7] interpreters may hang up if they find out the parties are in the same room. It is also her understanding that using the service from two rooms in the same building would not be considered permitted use. She noted that in contrast, the alternate technology known as [NAME_8] allows the use of the service in the same room. However, as I explain in the next section, [NAME_8] is not free. [ 119 ] [NAME_1] was quite adamant that he would not dare test the limits of what CAV’s user agreement provides given that it clearly stipulates that a user’s account may be suspended or terminated if any of its conditions are violated. He testified that at a workshop he had recently attended, he was informed that if [NAME_7] was used in the same room, the user’s account could be revoked.

3. Video Remote Interpreting ([NAME_8]) [ 120 ] Video Remote Interpreting ([NAME_8]) is a paid service that uses a sign language interpreter to facilitate communication between a Deaf and hearing person via video using a smartphone, tablet, or computer with webcam. Using spoken language, the sign language interpreter conveys what the Deaf customer is communicating through sign language to the hearing person and vice-versa. [NAME_8] can occur in several ways, with the Deaf and hearing person in the same physical location and the interpreter remotely providing the service, or the Deaf person and interpreter can be in the same location and the hearing person be in another location, or all three parties can be in different locations. [ 121 ] In Canada, several interpreting service providers provide [NAME_8] services by appointment or on-demand, which are accessed from a smartphone, tablet, or webcam-equipped computer. [NAME_8] can be offered using a proprietary app or through public platforms such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams. [ 122 ] There was some debate in the evidence about whether [NAME_8] can also run on the Webex platform. Webex is readily used in [NAME_2]’s facilities, particularly at the video visitation kiosks that are made available for all inmates to use. However, [NAME_1] testified that his experience was very poor when using Webex at the video kiosks. [ 123 ] [NAME_13] suggested in her evidence that, from an ASL interpreter’s perspective, Zoom is preferred over Microsoft Teams or Webex, which she said do not have the same features as Zoom. On cross-examination, it was revealed that some of [NAME_13]’s assertions were based on her understanding of a 2019 standard that was replaced in 2022 with a new standard with which she was unfamiliar, all of which calls into question her opinion on this point. [ 124 ] Two witnesses familiar with [NAME_2]’s information technology, [NAME_42], [NAME_2] Director in Software Solutions and Database Management, and [NAME_44], Regional Director of Information Management Systems, Pacific Region, stated in their evidence that [NAME_2] institutions have had issues in the past with internet bandwidth limitations. Consequently, any connection quality issues using the Webex-based platform in the video visitation kiosks would have affected the Zoom and Microsoft Teams platforms in the same way. [NAME_44] notes that [NAME_2] had already begun the process to increase network connectivity and bandwidth across its institutions. Testing of [NAME_8] at the video kiosks was conducted in 2022 and 2023 at two British Columbia institutions successfully, despite certain initial technical difficulties. There were no connection or video quality problems reported. [ 125 ] Given these explanations, I am not persuaded on a balance of probabilities that Webex is any less appropriate a platform than any of the other available options. [ 126 ] According to [NAME_13], while [NAME_8] has tremendously improved communication access for Deaf Canadians, there is still a need for on-site interpretation. [NAME_8] is suitable in some contexts, for example, for routine interactions like seeking a prescription refill, or in a hospital emergency until an on-site interpreter can arrive. There are other contexts where on-site interpreting is required, for example in medical or mental health assessments, or during complex legal appointments. [ 127 ] [NAME_45], in her capacity as Regional Manager, has been involved with the contracting of interpretation services for [NAME_2]. She confirmed in her evidence her understanding that [NAME_6] is most effective for incarcerated individuals when provided in person. She stated that [NAME_2] tries to provide “live” or in-person [NAME_6] wherever possible.

4. Live (on-site) [NAME_6] [ 128 ] [NAME_6] is a service where the sign language interpreter is provided on site. [NAME_13] noted that the advantage of on-site interpreting is that the interpreter is physically present, which allows them to see all parties in the interaction, including the Deaf person using sign language. As a visual-spatial language that relies on movement of hands, body, and facial expressions, ASL’s linguistic features can be subtle and more easily understood when the interpreter is physically present. According to [NAME_13], being present in the room facilitates more effective interpreting especially for lengthier or more complex interactions, such as parole meetings, psychological assessments, psycho-social or educational programming, or medical assessments.

5. Video visitation [ 129 ] Video visitation refers to visiting times that can occur via video communication that allows those incarcerated to maintain their connection to friends and family. At [NAME_19], for instance, there are three kiosks, including one in a closed room, with a monitor and camera. Inmates may use the equipment in these kiosks to have video calls, which could range from court appearances and meetings with their lawyers to conversations with family. For Deaf inmates, video visitation allows for them to communicate with ASL-fluent persons, or alternatively, if the other person does not know ASL, access to the call can be given to an ASL interpreter who [NAME_12] interpret for the parties. [ 130 ] The video visitation systems are primarily located in kiosks within the Visits and Correspondence (“V and C”) areas of the institutions, not necessarily close to the area where inmates are usually located. According to [NAME_44], this is intentional because the V and C areas are already set up with network connections and, from a visibility and supervision standpoint, it is easier for [NAME_2] employees to monitor an inmate’s use of the system in that area. Inmates cannot have unsupervised and unrestricted access to the computers because they could potentially bypass the equipment’s security protections, which would compromise the information and data of [NAME_2] employees and inmates. [ 131 ] At the time of the hearing, the evidence was that the video visitation systems in place were using the Webex platform for video calls. [ 132 ] The video kiosks’ equipment could be used for [NAME_7] if the necessary software application was installed. However, according to [NAME_42], the application would need to first go through a security assessment and accreditation process, which could take about six months. [ 133 ] The [NAME_8] testing that occurred at two British Columbia institutions, which I mentioned earlier, was conducted on video visitation systems. (b) Services while [NAME_1] is incarcerated 1. Effective Communication [ 134 ] [NAME_2] acknowledged in its submissions that it exercises a great amount of control over inmates residing within its institutions such that prison authorities owe a duty to ensure reasonable care for the health and safety of inmates in custody. [ 135 ] To provide the services relating to this duty, effective communication with inmates is necessary, as was highlighted in [NAME_46]. v. Ontario , 2014 ONCA 900, at paras 147 – 148 [ [NAME_46]. ], a case involving the involuntary committal of a Deaf person under Ontario’s Mental Health Act , RSO 1990, c. M-7. The circumstances in [NAME_46]. are thus reasonably analogous to [NAME_1]’s case. The applicant in [NAME_46]. successfully argued that his equality rights under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “ Charter ”) were denied due to the failure to provide him adequate interpretation services. [ADDRESS] held that the authorities detaining the applicant were required to provide the necessary and appropriate communication services to ensure that the applicant’s basic and fundamental personal needs as a detainee were fully understood and addressed, and that the applicant was able to communicate effectively to access the programs offered to hearing detainees. [ 136 ] For [NAME_1], as a Deaf inmate under [NAME_2]’s care and custody, [NAME_6] should similarly be furnished for the services that [NAME_2] must provide to him. In his final submissions, his individual accommodation request asks simply that [NAME_2] be ordered to provide him with [NAME_6] for “all correctional services falling under section 5 of the CCRA.” [ 137 ] This request is too vague to be workable as a Tribunal order, which [NAME_1] effectively acknowledged. His counsel agreed in final submissions that it is impossible to list every specific instance where such services must be provided. It was not suggested that [NAME_1] be provided [NAME_6] services 24 hours per day, seven days per week. [ 138 ] However, [NAME_1] submits that there are some contexts where it is clear that effective communication is necessary to ensure that he receive services equal to hearing offenders. In his written submissions, he listed the interactions in the context of his incarceration for which, according to the evidence, effective communication was hindered because [NAME_6] was not provided:

1. Medical appointments;

2. Mental health assessments including suicide assessments;

3. Correctional programs and support groups both while in custody and outside of custody;

4. Meetings with Elders and other Indigenous cultural support staff;

5. Intake interviews and institutional orientations;

6. Post-suspension interview with his parole officer; and 7. Interviews and meetings with correctional staff, including his parole officer, related to topics such as institutional grievances, disciplinary charges, case management and release planning, and his request for Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID). [ 139 ] Interestingly, the IAP that [NAME_2] developed at [NAME_19] setting out the services that the institution would “attempt to provide” to [NAME_1] with ASL interpreters, without requiring a request from him in advance, encompasses most of the areas mentioned in his submissions. This list, which I already set out earlier in this decision, includes:

1. Interviews with [NAME_1]’s case-management team, work supervisors, on-site Chaplains, Elders, and Indigenous Liaison Officers;

2. Correctional program sessions;

3. Parole meetings wherein his adherence to his correctional plan or disciplinary measures are discussed;

4. Parole Board of Canada hearings;

5. Healthcare appointments that require ASL medical certified interpreters; and 6. Mental health appointments. [ 140 ] I am satisfied that the items in both lists constitute services within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5] that [NAME_2] provides to [NAME_1] and for which [NAME_6] must be provided. I would add to these lists an item mentioned by [NAME_1]’s counsel in final arguments — access to any meetings that could impact his liberty or legal rights, including meetings with his legal counsel. However, in contrast to the IAP, [NAME_2] must not merely be required to “attempt to provide” [NAME_6] services for these items, it must actually do so. [ 141 ] The items appearing on these lists are reflected more fully in a list that the Commission submitted in the context of the systemic remedies that it requests, discussed later in this decision. For consistency, my order regarding [NAME_1]’s individual accommodation uses the terms that I adopted for the systemic remedies.

2. Meaningful Interaction [ 142 ] During his incarceration, in [NAME_2]’s care and custody, [NAME_2] controls [NAME_1]’s ability to interact with other persons. The fact that [NAME_1] did not have access to [NAME_6] or even TTY machines meant that he could not have any effective communication with anyone for days at a time. [NAME_1] testified about the isolation that this caused for him. It was analogous to being in a completely solitary environment. He often opted to stay in his cell alone. [NAME_13] described being Deaf in prison as having a “double sentence,” with isolation from general society and then isolation from other humans in terms of regular, daily communication. [ 143 ] [NAME_1] called another Deaf inmate, [NAME_12], to testify via video from Mission Institution where he is detained. His experience has been similar to [NAME_1]’s. He explained that he spent several years in solitary confinement before this form of detention was replaced a few years ago. He described that experience as being even worse for Deaf inmates than others. Hearing inmates would still be able to hear activity outside their cells such as conversations and public address announcements. Deaf inmates do not even receive that input and are thus even more isolated than other inmates. However, [NAME_12] acknowledged that some of the isolation that he has experienced was due to the COVID-19-related lockdowns that were imposed throughout the institution. [ 144 ] [NAME_1] referred in his final submissions to the case law regarding solitary confinement, which holds that confining prisoners for 22 hours or more per day without meaningful human contact violates the Charter (see British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 BCCA 228 at para 167; and Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Canada , 2019 ONCA 243 at paras 23 – 28 and 150). [NAME_1] testified that throughout his incarceration, he never consistently received two hours per day of meaningful interaction whether through [NAME_6] or TTY. [ 145 ] Following these decisions, the Structured Intervention Unit (SIU) regime was adopted to replace solitary confinement, whereby inmates are to be provided with an opportunity for meaningful human contact (see section 32(1)(b) of the CCRA). Inmates in the SIU must have the opportunity to interact with others for a minimum of two hours per day (see section 36(1)(b) of the CCRA). [ 146 ] Given the complete isolation that [NAME_1] experiences when he is alone and unable to converse with anyone else, [NAME_2] must ensure, by analogy to the SIU rules, that he have access to some means of effective communication with other persons for at least two hours per day, subject to any exceptional or unexpected causes that may prevent this from occurring, such as universal lockdowns for health, safety, or security reasons. [ 147 ] Any of the communication means that I listed earlier would be acceptable to meet this requirement (that is, via [NAME_6], [NAME_7], or [NAME_8]). TTY is not an acceptable means for providing meaningful interactions. If [NAME_1] is afforded the opportunity to engage with someone at the institution who is fluent in ASL and can converse directly with him, be it another inmate or someone else like an Elder, those interactions should also be taken into account in the allocation of the two-hour minimum daily interaction. [ 148 ] The requirement is only that access to such communication be made available to [NAME_1]. [NAME_2] would not be in default if [NAME_1] opted not to use the available services on a given day, and any such decision cannot be used to accumulate hours on other days. [ 149 ] [NAME_1] referred in his submissions to the access that hearing inmates have to telephone systems on a fair and consistent basis for the purpose of maintaining family and community ties (see Commissioner’s Directive 085: Correspondence and telephone communication at para 15). In providing [NAME_1] access to communication by [NAME_7], [NAME_8], or the video visitation service, it is understood that [NAME_2] would be affording him the same opportunity as other inmates to maintain family and community ties. [ 150 ] [NAME_1] pointed out that the telephone systems in the medium-security institutions where he has been placed were typically located within the inmates’ living units. Video visitation kiosks are located further away, in the V and C areas, and not as easily accessible. [NAME_1] would like to have equally proximate access for his communications. However, [NAME_2] points out that security and technical concerns have prevented the installation of the needed infrastructure for Internet connections in the areas where the telephone systems are installed. I do not think it is appropriate for me to resolve the technicalities around these issues in the context of this remedial order. What is significant is that [NAME_2] must make that minimal meaningful contact available in one or the other acceptable forms and ensure that [NAME_1] has a reasonably similar opportunity to access his communication tools as the other inmates have for their telephone communications. [ 151 ] I take note of [NAME_13]'s and [NAME_45]'s evidence that [NAME_6] is preferred in some instances, particularly for medical and legal services engaging [NAME_1]’s liberty. For such significant matters, [NAME_2] should prioritize the use of Live ASL, as [NAME_45] testified [NAME_2] has already undertaken to do. However, [NAME_2] [NAME_12] now be required to implement access to [NAME_7] or [NAME_8] in some way, as a result of this order. Thus, even when [NAME_6] is not available, remote access through one of these tools must be provided as a minimum form of reasonable accommodation to [NAME_1]. (c) Services while [NAME_1] is on conditional release [ 152 ] [NAME_1] claims that the obligation to ensure effective communication through the provision of [NAME_6] extends not only to his meetings with parole officers and other [NAME_2]-associated staff, but also to all of his interactions at the CRF to which he is referred, such as meetings with mental health staff, case workers, outreach workers, and community support groups such as COSA. [ 153 ] [NAME_2] challenges this claim, arguing that there is a clear distinction in its obligations towards inmates who are in its care and custody in a federal institution (see section 5(a) of the CCRA) and offenders on conditional release in the community who are only under [NAME_2]’s supervision (see section 59(d) of the CCRA). [NAME_2] submits that the great amount of control that it has over inmates within its institutions, as expressed in the notion of “care and custody,” no longer exists when the offender is on conditional release and merely under [NAME_2]’s “supervision.” A condition requiring [NAME_1] to reside at a CRF does not put him under [NAME_2]’s care and control when he is in the community, nor does it make [NAME_2] responsible for his basic and fundamental personal needs while he resides at the CRF. In contrast to the prison setting, [NAME_2] does not exercise complete control over offenders that gives rise to a duty to ensure reasonable care for their health and safety while in custody. [ 154 ] Consequently, [NAME_2] submits that it should only be responsible for providing [NAME_6] for events that it is required to provide for [NAME_1]’s supervision but that the responsibility does not extend to other interactions including “voluntary events” that [NAME_1] wishes to attend. [ 155 ] [NAME_2] contends that several legislative and regulatory provisions provide guidance as to what this supervision consists of. Section 128 of the CCRA states that offenders are entitled to be “at large” when they are on parole, statutory release, or unescorted temporary absence, in accordance with the conditions that may have been imposed. [NAME_2] submits that, in this sense, the circumstances of offenders are no different than those of other Canadians. [ 156 ] All offenders released on parole or statutory release are subject to certain conditions that are set out in section 161 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations (SOR/92-620) (the CCRR), such as the requirement that they remain at all times in Canada within the territorial boundaries fixed by their parole supervisor, that they report to their parole supervisor as instructed, and that they obey the law and keep the peace. [ 157 ] Section 133(4) of the CCRA specifies that a releasing authority can impose the additional condition of requiring the offender to reside in a CBRF, if the circumstances of the case so justify. Releasing authorities are either the Parole Board of Canada (the PBC), [NAME_2] Commissioner, or the Institutional Head who is in charge of a penitentiary (see sections 2 and 133(1) of the CCRA). [ 158 ] Section 102 of the CCRA provides that a correctional plan must be maintained for inmates to ensure that they receive the most programs to prepare them for reintegration into the community, on release, as law-abiding citizens. [ 159 ] Read together, these legislative and regulatory provisions mean that [NAME_2] is required to support the rehabilitation of offenders through the provision of programming, the purpose of which generally is to prepare inmates within a [NAME_2] institution for their parole or statutory release into the community. Inmates in facilities operated by [NAME_2] have rights to programming, which [NAME_2] has a duty to provide. [ 160 ] Section 76 of the CCRA requires [NAME_2] to provide a range of programs designed to address the needs of offenders and contribute to their successful reintegration into the community (see William [NAME_47] v. Canada (Corrections Service) , 1993 CanLII 17020 (FC) at para 10). However, [NAME_2] points out that there are no legal obligations requiring it to provide or maintain specific programs. [ 161 ] [NAME_2] adds that there is no statutory mandate that requires it to pay for the costs of voluntary events, like the COSA program that [NAME_1] sought to attend. If an offender disagrees with a [NAME_2] decision not to provide them a given program, the offender can seek judicial review of the decision before the Federal Court. [ 162 ] According to [NAME_2], the scope of its supervisory responsibilities was explained by [NAME_1]’s parole officer supervisor, [NAME_48], in her evidence. She stated that [NAME_2]’s community parole officers manage federal offenders on conditional release and those subject to a long-term supervision order by ensuring compliance with their conditions and by supporting their reintegration into the community. [ 163 ] [NAME_48] noted that her involvement with [NAME_1] relates to his behaviour and his compliance with the parole conditions. [NAME_6] has been provided for all supervision meetings between [NAME_1] and his community parole officer and other “[NAME_2] required professionals,” which include the Indigenous Community Liaison Officer, [NAME_2], and a social worker with the Mental Health Team. Supervision meetings between [NAME_1] and his community parole officer have also occurred at [NAME_17] with CRF staff being invited (but not obligated) to attend. Once a supervision meeting is completed, [NAME_2] has allowed [NAME_1] to use the remaining time with the ASL interpreter to develop and update his Resident Action Plan with [NAME_17] staff and to meet with them as needed. [NAME_48] stated that [NAME_1] is expected to meet with a CRF case worker once per month to develop and update a Resident Action Plan, which lists an offender’s goals, what they are trying to achieve in the community, and how the CRF can support their efforts. [ 164 ] [NAME_2] submits that [NAME_48]’s evidence is consistent with [NAME_2] Commissioner’s Directive 715-1: Community supervision, which indicates that the primary responsibilities of a parole officer in supervising an offender involve developing and assisting offenders with the objectives of their correctional plans and monitoring the offender’s behaviour, release conditions, and compliance with court-ordered obligations. [ 165 ] However, are [NAME_2]’s supervisory responsibilities limited to these sorts of interactions that the offenders have with their parole officers and the other “[NAME_2] required professionals?” [ 166 ] The Commission points out that one of the purposes of the federal correctional system, as set out in section 3(b) of the CCRA, is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community. This purpose should be read together with sections 5 and 76, to understand the scope of [NAME_2]’s responsibilities. It is for this statutorily mandated purpose that [NAME_2] contracts with and provides funding to CRFs to provide accommodation, programming, counseling, and supervision of offenders. Merely because [NAME_2] hands off these elements of its responsibilities to a private CRF does not mean that they are no longer its responsibility. [ 167 ] In fact, [NAME_2] expressly sets out these elements in its standard agreement with CRFs. At paragraph 25 of the Statement of Work included in the agreement with [NAME_49], for instance, [NAME_2] stipulates that the CRF “must provide the following support services”: a) Monitor and support offender activities against the Community Strategy, [Resident Action Plan] and Correctional Plan; b) Assist residents, through ongoing support, in areas that include, but are not limited to, crisis management, personal or family problems, education, literacy, employment, budgeting, life skills, recreation, spiritual and cultural activities; c) Assist residents to secure services appropriate for their needs or for public safety requirements, such as substance abuse services, income support, employment services, medical (including mental health) and dental services; and d) Provide residents a supportive group living environment through activities such as periodic house meetings. [ 168 ] For these services and assistance to be provided, effective communication is needed, which for a Deaf person like [NAME_1] entails the use of one of the means for [NAME_6] explained earlier. [NAME_17] lacked the resources to provide [NAME_1] with [NAME_6] to the necessary extent while he was a resident there. [NAME_2] contends that the CRF bears the duty to arrange for these means of communication and that [NAME_2] should not be held “vicariously liable” for the CRF’s failures to fulfil that duty. [ 169 ] I disagree. The Commission is correct in its assertion that these “support service” responsibilities are [NAME_2]’s, under the CCRA. The use of a privately operated resource like the CRF does not relieve [NAME_2] of these responsibilities (see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada ( for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada ), 2016 CHRT 2 at para 84). Notably, had [NAME_1] been placed in a [NAME_2]-run CCC instead of a privately operated CRF, then this discussion would be unnecessary since [NAME_2] would be providing the services and no third party would have been involved. [ 170 ] In other words, [NAME_2] has passed on the delivery of these services to [NAME_17], which it funds. To prevent [NAME_1] from being denied effective communication in accessing these services, [NAME_2] needs to ensure that [NAME_6] is available, even if that means requiring its contracting party, the CRF, to provide it. [ 171 ] It is not my role to explore the details and intricacies of any given program or meeting to determine if it comes under the list of “support services” that a CRF is contractually bound to provide. It suffices for me to state that “supervision,” as the term is used in section 5(d) of the CCRA, extends to any activities that [NAME_2] assigns to privately run CRFs and compels them to provide. I am referring here to the services that CRFs must provide, such as “assistance” to obtain healthcare in the community. Of course, the CRF does not have the responsibility to provide the actual healthcare, and therefore, any [NAME_6] accommodation for that purpose would be the health services provider’s responsibility, not the CRF’s or [NAME_2]’s. [ 172 ] Fortunately, many of the technological and security challenges and restrictions arising in institutional settings are not present at CRFs. There is access to computers, tablets, and smartphones. It is [NAME_2]’s responsibility to ensure that the resources be there for a CRF to be able to access the necessary means for effective communication with [NAME_1] regarding these support services, using these technologies and traditional “live” means. [ 173 ] [NAME_2] has already made efforts in this direction. As mentioned, any extra unused time with ASL interpreters after meetings with parole officers and other [NAME_2] professionals has been made available to [NAME_1] to interact with CRF staff, for instance. It also seems that [NAME_1] has been given supervised access to [NAME_7] via the computers within the [NAME_17] five days per week for most of the day. His use of the computers is supervised because of conditions imposed by the PBC restricting his access to the Internet and communication devices. For times outside of those hours, [NAME_1] has supervised access to the [NAME_7] application on [NAME_17] staff tablets. [NAME_2] submits that if meetings between [NAME_17] staff and [NAME_1] are required, nothing prevents him from having those meetings conducted remotely via [NAME_7], as long as they are not in the same room together while the [NAME_7] call is occurring. However, this is not necessarily an appropriate option given the terms and conditions in CAV’s user agreement. [NAME_2] may need to explore with the CRF the possibility of using [NAME_8], at [NAME_2]’s cost. [ 174 ] Returning to the issue of conditions imposed on the use of electronic devices by a releasing authority, [NAME_2]’s obligation to reasonably accommodate [NAME_1] in providing [NAME_6] must take into account these restrictions, which may require the development of protocols, such as a requirement that he give sufficient advance notice for an acceptable form of [NAME_6] to be arranged. Again, it is not my role to decree rules for such possible issues that may arise in the future. The parties [NAME_12] have to work out the necessary arrangements mindful of [NAME_2]’s ultimate responsibility to ensure that [NAME_6] be available for the services it provides, within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5]. [ 175 ] Regarding access to meaningful interaction, which was a relevant issue while [NAME_1] was incarcerated, it is obvious that [NAME_2]’s responsibilities to [NAME_1] while on conditional release are not as extensive as when he is in its care and custody in prison. Offenders on conditional release are, after all, “at large,” and no longer as dependant on [NAME_2]. The concerns about meaningful interaction due to physical isolation are therefore no longer an issue and [NAME_2] bears no responsibility in that regard. [ 176 ] I note in passing that [NAME_2] claimed in its final submissions that [NAME_1] is not entitled to any remedy relating to his conditional release as he did not amend his Statement of Particulars (SOP), which he filed in May 2022, to seek specific remedies regarding [NAME_17] and the other CRFs. I am not persuaded by this argument. Extensive evidence was led regarding the entire period of [NAME_1]’s engagement with [NAME_2] from 2018 until the hearing. It is evident that there were several periods during this time when [NAME_1] was on conditional release. [ 177 ] At no time did [NAME_2] make any objection as to the scope of the case that [NAME_1] was presenting. Indeed, [NAME_2] led extensive evidence about the [NAME_6] that was provided to [NAME_1] while he was at a CRF. [NAME_2] cannot now, at the end of a long hearing that clearly dealt with [NAME_1]'s experience while at the CRFs, argue that he cannot seek remedies relating thereto. [ 178 ] Besides, [NAME_1]’s and the Commission’s SOPs clearly referenced claims for systemic remedies regarding periods when offenders are under community supervision. The remedies that [NAME_1] is seeking are encompassed in those being sought for all offenders. (ii) Letter of assurance of no further similar breaches [ 179 ] In his final submissions, [NAME_1] asked for a “letter of assurance” from [NAME_2] that it [NAME_12] not commit any further similar breaches of [NAME_5]. This letter resembles orders for the issuance of letters of apology that complainants have sought from the Tribunal in the past. The Federal Court has held that the Tribunal does not have the authority to order the issuance of apology letters (see Canada (Attorney General) v. Stevenson , 2003 FCT 341 (CanLII), at paras 27‒35), and, in my view, the same restriction would extend to the type of letter that [NAME_1] is seeking. [ 180 ] Besides, this decision’s reasons are public and should constitute sufficient direction to all the parties of their obligations under [NAME_5]. Non-compliance could trigger the enforcement mechanisms set out in [NAME_5] (see section 57). [ 181 ] This request is denied. [ 182 ] However, I note that [NAME_2] stated in its submissions that it agrees to provide a letter to [NAME_1] expressing regret for a failure to accommodate his disability. [NAME_2] [NAME_12] ensure that the letter be placed in [NAME_1]’s healthcare files and is flagged in a prominent manner. While I cannot order [NAME_2] to prepare the letter, I do order it to place any such letter in [NAME_1]’s files once it has followed up on its undertaking to prepare it. (iii) Removal of negative information and insertion of memo in [NAME_1]’s records [ 183 ] [NAME_1] asks that [NAME_2] be ordered to remove from his records within six months all negative information stemming from its failure to accommodate his disability, including any assessments for decision, correctional plans, individualized accommodation plans, and psychological risk assessments. [ 184 ] This request is too broad and vague. For instance, although [NAME_1] testified that a 2018 psychological risk assessment, which was made without any [NAME_6], allegedly contained errors, it was not entered into evidence and there is no evidence to confirm whether his claims of erroneous entries are accurate. Moreover, as [NAME_2] points out, the CCRA sets out a complaint and grievance process for contesting errors or omissions in the information in [NAME_2]’s possession, and any decisions arising therefrom can be judicially reviewed. It would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to issue orders that would circumvent this process, especially in the absence of any detailed evidence regarding these alleged errors. [ 185 ] This request is denied. [ 186 ] [NAME_1] also asks that [NAME_2] place a memo in his file that outlines the Tribunal’s findings and cautions staff about relying on information that was obtained from interactions with him that occurred without an interpreter or that is connected to the failure to understand or accommodate his disability. [ 187 ] In contrast to his other request under this heading, the instances where [NAME_1] dealt with correctional staff without the assistance of [NAME_6] appear to be discernable. A request that a notice be inserted in his file stating that the information collected during these interactions should be viewed with some caution is reasonable. [ 188 ] Furthermore, a copy of this decision should be included in [NAME_1]’s file, given its obvious relevance to his experience with [NAME_2]. [NAME_2] agreed in its submissions to ensure that the Tribunal’s decision is placed in [NAME_1]’s correctional and healthcare files and is flagged in a prominent manner. I [NAME_12] not impose a requirement that the decision be summarized. A plain-language summary of the decision may eventually be available from the Tribunal’s website, which should also be added to [NAME_1]’s file once it becomes available. (iv) Application of the Tribunal’s order to future sentences [ 189 ] [NAME_1] requests that the Tribunal’s order apply to all future sentences that he may incur resulting in his being subject to [NAME_2]’s supervision or custody. [ 190 ] My findings have not been limited to any specific offence or conviction involving [NAME_1]. They relate to all of his interactions with [NAME_2]. One would hope for him that there would not be any such occurrences in the future, but if there were, the order would still apply because it concerns his relationship with [NAME_2], not any particular offence or conviction. C. Systemic remedies [ 191 ] [NAME_1] and the Commission seek several systemic remedies, many of which are similar to the individual remedies that he sought. In those instances, my order is for the most part aligned with the individual remedial orders. (i) A commitment to providing [NAME_6] for the provision of services under section 5 of the CCRA [ 192 ] [NAME_1] asks that [NAME_2] be ordered to provide [NAME_6] to all individuals who require it in its provision of services contemplated under section 5 of the CCRA. He notes specifically that interpretation should be provided for a Deaf person’s intake interview and orientation within 24 hours after arriving at an institution. [ 193 ] The Commission similarly requests that [NAME_2] make “all reasonable efforts to provide deaf individuals who communicate with ASL or LSQ, a trained, qualified interpreter for events that impact their rehabilitation, reintegration, programming, health, safety, liberty interests, and legal rights.” The Commission proposes that these events include, but are not limited to:

1) Meetings that impact the individual’s liberty interests, their case management, or in which the person is required to make or consent to a decision;

2) Intake interviews and orientation;

3) Meetings or appointments with medical staff or health services, including mental health services, program staff, treatment staff, parole staff, Elders, and Chaplain;

4) Proceedings before administrative tribunals, including the PBC, institutional [ADDRESS], and interviews conducted under the offender grievance procedure;

5) Programs, including correctional programs identified in the individual’s correction plan, employment programs, educational programs, social programs, and recovery programs; and 6) Meetings with legal counsel. [ 194 ] The Commission also reiterates [NAME_1]’s request that [NAME_2] be ordered to ensure that sufficient [NAME_6] be contracted for, adding that [NAME_2] must ensure that all staff are aware of the interpretation services that are available. [ 195 ] [NAME_2] does not seem to disagree with many of the requested items. In its final submissions, it confirmed that it would implement the systemic remedies that it had already committed to doing, which include the creation of an Interim Policy Bulletin (IPB) related to individuals with disabilities, including offenders who are deaf or hard of hearing. [NAME_50], [NAME_2] Director General of the Offender Programs and Reintegration Branch, testified that [NAME_2] was committed to completing the IPB within one year. She explained that IPBs are formal policy instruments that [NAME_2] uses when there is an identified policy gap and [NAME_2] has been unable, given time constraints, to complete a full Commissioner’s Directive or other policy instrument process. The IPB would likely incorporate an acknowledgment that [NAME_2] has a duty to accommodate all individuals with disabilities and that all reasonable efforts would be made to assure them a barrier-free access to services. [ 196 ] The IPB would probably be based on a Memorandum issued by [NAME_2]’s Assistant Commissioner, Correctional Operations and Programs, dated April 23, 2024, entitled Duty to Accommodate Offenders (the “Memorandum”). The Memorandum states that to ensure an offender can effectively communicate, [NAME_2] may have the obligation to provide sign language interpretation services in circumstances “such as” those mentioned in items 1, 4, and 6 of the Commission’s remedial request list above. Regarding healthcare, the Memorandum refers only to non-emergency appointments. The Memorandum also only mentions programs that are identified in the offender’s correctional plan. Notably, the Memorandum’s list ends with the term “etc.,” suggesting that the list is not exhaustive. [ 197 ] Elsewhere in the Memorandum, it is indicated that an offender’s intake interview should be conducted with the assistance of an interpreter (item 2 in the Commission’s request), particularly when an individualized accommodation plan needs to be developed. [ 198 ] The Memorandum does not mention a specific time frame for the interview with [NAME_6] to occur. [NAME_1] indicated that it should be within the same 24-hour period as prescribed for all inmates, in Commissioner’s Directive 705-3: Immediate Needs Identification and Admission Interviews. Meeting this deadline may have posed a challenge to [NAME_2] when it considered [NAME_6] as its only option. But with the requirement that [NAME_2] implement additional interpretation tools, namely [NAME_8] and [NAME_7], I see no reason why the same standard cannot be applied to Deaf inmates. [ 199 ] [NAME_6] should be made available for the events listed in item 3 of the Commission’s list, though [NAME_2]’s proposed exception for urgent or emergency appointments is reasonable, mindful that even in those circumstances, with the availability of remote [NAME_6], it would be expected that [NAME_2] would use those tools as soon as possible when such events occur. [ 200 ] Overall, I am satisfied that the Commission’s requested list consists of reasonable measures to ensure that while incarcerated, Deaf inmates have access to effective communication for services that [NAME_2] provides, within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5]. [ 201 ] [NAME_1]’s and the Commission’s request referred to offenders on conditional release as well, though their submissions regarding the systemic remedy did not formally address the circumstances of offenders on conditional release residing at CRFs. However, given my findings regarding [NAME_1]’s accommodation while at CRFs, other Deaf inmates should be similarly accommodated, and my order below reflects this. (ii) Meaningful interaction [ 202 ] The remedy awarded to [NAME_1] in this regard should also apply to other Deaf inmates. They are also entitled to access the same amount of meaningful interaction each day. (iii) Contracts with a sufficient number of [NAME_6] providers [ 203 ] [NAME_1] and the Commission ask that [NAME_2] be ordered to contract with a sufficient number of [NAME_8] interpreters to ensure reliable and consistent access to interpreters for Deaf people in custody and on conditional release. The Commission adds that [NAME_2] must be required to ensure that all its staff are aware of the interpretation resources that are available. [ 204 ] [NAME_2] states that it is committed to implementing regional [NAME_8] contracts for interpretation services to provide on-demand interpretation using existing video visitation systems in [NAME_2] institutions. [NAME_50] said that [NAME_2] would make all reasonable efforts to obtain these [NAME_8] services, subject to the availability of [NAME_8] service providers to provide the contracted services, and once set up, subject to operational availability. [ 205 ] [NAME_2]’s undertaking to make “all reasonable efforts” is not satisfactory. [NAME_2] must find a way to ensure that [NAME_6] is made available for the services that it is responsible to provide, within the meaning of section 5 of [NAME_5], by whatever necessary means, be they regional, national, or any other form of contracting, whether for Live interpretation or the likely more easily accessible [NAME_8] service. The requirement extends to the services that [NAME_2] must ensure is available to offenders on conditional release. [ 206 ] Notably, [NAME_42] and [NAME_50] testified that all [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] options can technically be implemented at institutions, mindful that certain security concerns would first need to be addressed. [NAME_2] witnesses indicated that it is facing financial constraints like other sectors of the public administration. However, the evidence did not establish that implementing these measures to ensure [NAME_6] services for the handful of Deaf offenders for which [NAME_2] is responsible would cause it any undue hardship. According to an affidavit signed by [NAME_45] in October 2024, at that time, there were seven offenders in [NAME_2]’s national population who use sign language, of whom five were incarcerated in federal institutions and two were in the community under some form of supervised release. [ 207 ] I note that [NAME_2] contends that it [NAME_12] fulfil its obligations regarding incarcerated inmates by providing [NAME_8] access through the video visitation equipment. However, that is not an option for effective communication in certain circumstances such as medical visits or perhaps for participation in some in-person programs. [NAME_2] must ensure that the [NAME_6] is available in whatever form is appropriate for the circumstances. [ 208 ] [NAME_2] should of course also explore the use of [NAME_7] wherever possible. [NAME_7] is a free service, and [NAME_2] likely does not need to enter into a formal contracting process as is required to procure Live or [NAME_8] interpretation commercially. The Memorandum explicitly encourages [NAME_2] Heads to explore the feasibility of implementing both [NAME_7] and [NAME_8]. [ 209 ] Ultimately, [NAME_2] must ensure that some means of effective communication for Deaf offenders are available for the services that it is required to provide them. (iv) Implementation of a [NAME_7] or [NAME_8] service equivalent to the telephone communication access that hearing inmates have. [ 210 ] [NAME_1] and the Commission ask that [NAME_2] be ordered to implement [NAME_7] or an equivalent [NAME_8] service as an alternative to the inmates’ telephone system, to ensure equal access to the telephone communication for deaf people in custody. The Commissioner’s Directive – 085: Correspondence and telephone communication states that access to telephones through an inmate telephone system should be provided on a fair and consistent basis to help maintain family and community ties and to provide a direct link with families in the event of an emergency. [ 211 ] As I mentioned earlier, the telephone systems are typically located near the inmates’ living units. There is apparently little concern of misuse of the special telephone systems that are installed, and the phone numbers that can be called are controlled and verified. Consequently, inmates can basically walk up and use the phones at any time. [NAME_2] states that for security reasons, it cannot give the same level of access to computer equipment for [NAME_7] and [NAME_8] use. This is the reason that [NAME_1] had to make his video calls at the kiosks situated in the V and C area. [ 212 ] As I held earlier, it is not my role to assess and determine how technologically [NAME_2] [NAME_12] go about assuring Deaf inmates have reasonably equivalent access to communications. Instead, I agree with the Commission’s proposed order regarding this question with a slight variance. [NAME_2] must independently implement a communications system that provides Deaf federally sentenced individuals with access that is reasonably similar to the inmate telephone system including: · The ability for sign language users to communicate in their first language, with fluency, range of expression, ease, and speed; · cost; · regular hours of availability; · availability in cases of emergency; and · quality of service. [ 213 ] An order to this effect provides sufficient guidance. (v) Individualized Accommodation Plans [ 214 ] The Commission and [NAME_1] ask that [NAME_2] be ordered to develop meaningful accommodation plans for Deaf people who enter [NAME_2] custody or who are already in prison or on conditional release and supervision. The IAP would outline the person’s accommodation needs in relation to the disability and would be created in collaboration with the person, and with the assistance of [NAME_6]. The IAP would be reviewed at least annually and updated if needed. [ 215 ] I note that [NAME_1] sought in his submissions to extend this remedy to “all Deaf, hard of hearing or Deafblind people.” [NAME_1] filed his complaint as a Deaf person. In addressing this remedial request, I must focus on the specific disability [NAME_1] alleged in his complaint. It would seem obvious that the adoption of IAPs for persons who are deaf should logically also extend to others with similar or related disabilities. That said, my order [NAME_12] solely address [NAME_1]’s protected characteristic, as alleged in his complaint. [ 216 ] [NAME_1] further asks that when Deaf persons are on release in the community, the IAP should also provide for appropriate accommodation technologies that the person can use to communicate to hearing people in the community (such as a smartphone, a tablet, or a laptop, and access to [NAME_7] at their CRF). [ 217 ] [NAME_2] states in its submissions that it is committed to develop an IAP for offenders with a disability who require and wish to have one. The IPB is expected to provide guidance on the development, use, updates, and adherence to the terms of IAPs. [ 218 ] I take note of [NAME_2]’s commitment. It simply makes sense that, with a Deaf offender’s consent and [NAME_6], an IAP be developed collaboratively with the offender, which [NAME_12] provide clear guidance as to what the offender’s needs are. I also observe that [NAME_2] said that it had developed IAPs for [NAME_1] in consultation with him. He claims that he was not consulted, but, in any event, the parties seem to agree that a proper IAP can only be developed collaboratively, and obviously with the assistance of [NAME_6]. [ 219 ] As for the request that IAPs always contemplate the provision of appropriate communication technologies, given the range of options as well as the reality of any restrictions on the use of electronics that a court or releasing authority may have imposed, I need not include any such direction in the order. It suffices to say that [NAME_2] must ensure that the Deaf offender has access to [NAME_6] in some acceptable form considering all factors that may apply to the given individual and the circumstances of their conditional release. (vi) Public policy on accommodating Deaf federally sentenced individuals [ 220 ] The Commission and [NAME_1] ask that [NAME_2] be ordered to adopt a policy instrument that is publicly available on respecting the duty to accommodate Deaf individuals. [ 221 ] The Commission is more specific in the content of the requested policy, stating that it should include the following elements: · A description of the scope of events requiring [NAME_6] or accommodation; · The policy must be informed by consultations with various stakeholders, including the Commission, but also community disability rights organizations, experts on the experiences of people with disabilities, and other relevant stakeholders; · Guidance on the development, use, updates, and adherence to the terms of IAPs; and · A commitment that within 24 hours of notification or arrival at a federal institution, [NAME_2] [NAME_12] make all reasonable efforts to arrange for ASL interpretative services for intake interviews and orientation. [ 222 ] The Commission submits that offenders must have access to any policies regarding accommodation of disabilities. [ 223 ] [NAME_2] responded in its submissions that it is working on creating an IPB relating to individuals with disabilities, including offenders who are deaf. [NAME_2] added that it is “agreeable” to consulting with the Commission to redress any systemic discriminatory practices. [ 224 ] The Tribunal's authority to issue a policy-related order is found in section 53(2)(a) of [NAME_5], which states that it may order a respondent to take measures, in consultation with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the discriminatory practice or prevent it from recurring in the future. Consequently, there is no question that the Commission can be involved in the development of the new policy. However, there is no authority in [NAME_5] for me to order the Respondent to consult with anyone else. [ 225 ] The Commission may consult whomever it wishes as part of its consultative role, but my order [NAME_12] only require the Respondent to consult with the Commission. That said, nothing prevents [NAME_2] from consulting other stakeholders, if only to build a more comprehensive and better policy, and simply work more efficiently. [ 226 ] Aside from the third-party participation, I find the content of the Commission’s proposed policy-related order to be satisfactory and that it addresses some of the failures to accommodate [NAME_1] that are in evidence. [ 227 ] The Commission has included in its systemic remedies request a reference to the Inmate Handbook that is given to inmates upon their arrival at an institution. A copy of [NAME_19]’s handbook was entered into evidence. The handbook is intended to serve as a general information guide that defines the institution’s expectations of inmates and is meant to assist new inmates in their orientation. According to the Commission, the handbook does not include information on accommodating inmates with disabilities. There is no specific mention of the availability of interpretation services for Deaf inmates. The Commission asks that the handbooks reflect and reference any new policies that [NAME_2] implements on accommodating Deaf individuals. I find that this is a reasonable request that [NAME_12] also serve to prevent discriminatory practices in the future. (vii) Psychological risk assessments for Deaf individuals [ 228 ] [NAME_1] asks that [NAME_2] be ordered to ensure that psychological risk assessments of Deaf individuals be completed by a psychologist with expertise and experience in working with deaf and hard-of-hearing people, or, if not, that the psychologist consult with a Deaf expert who possesses this knowledge. [ 229 ] This request is denied. To begin with, this complaint is centred on the absence of means for effective communication for [NAME_1], and [NAME_6] in particular. The only evidence I have regarding psychological risk assessments was about the absence of adequate [NAME_6] during his assessments. As for the quality of the assessments themselves, and the qualifications of the experts involved, these are issues for which there is a review process to which I alluded earlier. I have no evidence regarding these issues and, in any event, they do not relate to the [NAME_6] question that is before me. (viii) Awareness sessions on Deaf culture [ 230 ] [NAME_1] and the Commission ask that [NAME_2] be ordered to provide awareness sessions on Deaf culture at all institutions where persons who are deaf or hard of hearing reside, and all parole officers who supervise such persons must attend. The Commission adds that the training should be provided by external experts on Deaf culture and should include information on how to work with interpreters to respond effectively to Deaf persons’ needs. The training should also reference the rights and obligations set out in [NAME_5], particularly in relation to the accommodation of individuals’ needs. [ 231 ] [NAME_2] agrees that awareness sessions should be given. [NAME_50] stated that [NAME_2] had already undertaken to provide mandatory awareness sessions to the staff at all institutions where Deaf or hard-of-hearing persons are incarcerated by October 2025, a year after she gave her evidence. These sessions are similar to the training previously given at [NAME_19] by [NAME_40], from the [NAME_41] program. [ 232 ] Providing training is a measure that [NAME_12] serve to prevent any similar discriminatory practice from occurring in the future. An order mandating the training is warranted. (ix) Requirement of ASL-fluent staff at institutions with Deaf inmates [ 233 ] [NAME_1] asks that [NAME_2] be ordered to ensure that there is at least one parole officer and healthcare provider who is fluent in ASL and familiar with Deaf culture at each institution where a Deaf person resides and that penitentiary placements for Deaf prisoners take into account the location of other Deaf prisoners. [ 234 ] In light of the other orders in this decision compelling [NAME_2] to provide access to effective communication tools and to enable Deaf inmates to have meaningful interaction on a daily basis, it is not necessary to specifically require the presence of two individuals at each institution who are ASL-fluent. Their presence is not necessary for Deaf persons to be reasonably accommodated given the other measures that [NAME_2] is required to take. This request is denied. [ 235 ] That said, it would certainly make sense for [NAME_2] to take into account the location of other Deaf prisoners for the purposes of placement as that would be an effective way to help fulfil its obligation to ensure that those individuals have access to meaningful interactions every day. However, an order compelling [NAME_2] to do so is not warranted, especially when considering the other factors that it must take into account such as the accessibility of the penitentiary relative to the inmate’s home community and family (see section 28(b)(i) of the CCRA). (x) A request that the Tribunal remain seized of the matter [ 236 ] The Commission and [NAME_1] ask that the Tribunal remain seized of this matter and retain jurisdiction to receive evidence and make further orders as required, until the parties confirm that the remedies ordered have been implemented. They point out that the Tribunal has the authority to retain jurisdiction (see Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME_51] , 1994 CanLII 18487 (FC) at para 32) and submit that remedial orders that address systemic discrimination can be difficult to implement and may therefore require ongoing supervision. [NAME_1] observes that [NAME_2] did not follow through with several of the items mentioned in the With Prejudice Letter. For instance, [NAME_2] had written that it would make best efforts create an IPB relating to individuals with disabilities within one year. Yet, that period had expired by the date of the hearing and an IPB had yet to be issued. [ 237 ] Given these delays or failures to implement promised remedies to date, the Commission and [NAME_1] submit that the Tribunal needs to retain its authority to “step in” where [NAME_2] fails to implement any of the remedies in the present order. [ 238 ] I disagree. [ 239 ] As Chairperson Khurana noted in [NAME_52] v. [NAME_52] , 2024 CHRT 127, at para 158 [ [NAME_52] ], section 53 of [NAME_5], while open-ended in describing the scope of the Tribunal’s discretion to order remedies that [NAME_12] stop discrimination and prevent it from happening again, does not transform the Tribunal into an enforcement body. It is neither the Tribunal’s expertise nor role to supervise the detailed implementation of its own remedial orders. [ 240 ] As [NAME_52] correctly points out, there is an enforcement mechanism built into [NAME_5], at section 57, which allows parties to file a Tribunal order made under section 53 with the Federal Court, for the purposes of enforcement. [ 241 ] [NAME_1]’s counsel acknowledged during final submissions that if a Tribunal order is sufficiently clear, there is no need for it to retain jurisdiction to ensure enforcement. I am satisfied that my order is as clear and detailed as warranted. [NAME_2] knows what its responsibilities are and it must follow through with them, failing which it risks triggering the enforcement mechanisms incorporated in [NAME_5]. [ 242 ] The request that I retain jurisdiction is denied. [ 243 ] I have delayed the application of some portions of the order below to take into account the time that [NAME_2] may need to implement some of the remedies.

VI.

ORDER A. Damages [ 244 ] Within 30 days of this decision, [NAME_2] is ordered to pay the following to [NAME_1]: $18,000 for pain and suffering experienced as a result of the discriminatory practices (section 53(2)(e)); $17,500 in special compensation (section 53(3)); and Simple interest that has accrued on these sums until payment, at a rate equivalent to the bank rate established by the Bank of Canada calculated on a yearly basis beginning August 16, 2020 (the date when the complaint was received by the Commission). The interest is not limited to the statutory caps of $20,000 (see [NAME_52] at para 144). B. Individual accommodation during [NAME_1]’s incarceration [ 245 ] [NAME_2] shall provide the following to [NAME_1] while he is incarcerated : a) [NAME_6] ([NAME_7], [NAME_8], or Live) for: i. Meetings that impact the individual’s liberty interests, their case management, or in which the person is required to make or consent to a decision; ii. Intake interviews and orientation; iii. Meetings or appointments with medical staff or health services, including mental health services, program staff, treatment staff, parole staff, Elders, and Chaplain; iv. Proceedings before administrative tribunals, including the PBC, institutional [ADDRESS], and interviews conducted under the offender grievance procedure; v. Programs, including correctional programs identified in the individual’s correction plan, employment programs, educational programs, social programs, and recovery programs; and vi. Meetings with legal counsel. b) Access to effective communication with other persons for at least two hours per day in accordance with the terms set out in paragraphs 142 to 151 of this decision. C. Individual accommodation while [NAME_1] is on conditional release [ 246 ] [NAME_2] must ensure that while [NAME_1] is on conditional release, he is provided with [NAME_6] ([NAME_7], [NAME_8], or Live) for matters relating to his supervision as well as any support services that [NAME_2] requires the CRF to provide to him, as explained in paragraphs 152 to 178 of this decision. D. Other individual remedies a) Within 30 days of this decision, [NAME_2] must insert a notice in [NAME_1]’s file stating that any information obtained from him by [NAME_2] staff during interactions without [NAME_6] should be viewed with caution. b) Within 30 days of this decision, [NAME_2] must insert a copy of this decision in [NAME_1]’s file. E. Systemic remedies A) As soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] shall provide the following to Deaf inmates while incarcerated: a) [NAME_6] ([NAME_7], [NAME_8], or Live) for: i. Meetings that impact the individual’s liberty interests, their case management, or in which the person is required to make or consent to a decision; ii. Intake interviews and orientation; iii. Meetings or appointments with medical staff or health services, including mental health services, program staff, treatment staff, parole staff, Elders, and Chaplain; iv. Proceedings before administrative tribunals, including the PBC, institutional [ADDRESS], and interviews conducted under the offender grievance procedure; v. Programs, including correctional programs identified in the individual’s correction plan, employment programs, educational programs, social programs, and recovery programs; and vi. Meetings with legal counsel. b) Access to effective communication with other persons for at least two hours per day in accordance with the terms set out in paragraphs 142 to 151 of this decision, as adapted ( mutatis mutandis ). B) As soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must ensure that Deaf offenders on conditional release who are residing at CRFs are provided [NAME_6] ([NAME_7], [NAME_8], or Live) for matters relating to their supervision as well as any support services that [NAME_2] requires the CRF to which they are referred to provide them, as explained about [NAME_1] by analogy, in paragraphs 152 to 178 of this decision. C) As soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must procure a sufficient number of [NAME_8] interpreters to ensure reliable and consistent access to interpretation for Deaf people in custody and on conditional release as elaborated in paragraphs 203 to 209 of this decision. D) As set out in paragraphs 210 to 213 of this decision, as soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must independently implement a [NAME_7]- or [NAME_8]-based communications system that provides Deaf inmates access that is reasonably similar to the Inmate Telephone System. E) As set out in paragraphs 214 to 219 of this decision, as soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must develop meaningful individualized accommodation plans for Deaf inmates and offenders in which [NAME_6] is ensured for them in an acceptable form considering all applicable factors. F) As set out in paragraphs 220 to 226 of this decision, as soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must adopt a policy instrument that is publicly available on respecting the duty to accommodate Deaf individuals, after consulting with the Commission, which includes the following elements: · A description of the scope of events requiring [NAME_6] or accommodation; · Guidance on the development, use, updates, and adherence to the terms of IAPs; and · A commitment that within 24 hours of notification or arrival at a federal institution, [NAME_2] [NAME_12] make all reasonable efforts to arrange for ASL interpretative services for intake interviews and orientation. G) As soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must ensure that its Inmate Handbooks refer to and explain any [NAME_2] policies on accommodating Deaf individuals. H) As soon as practicable and no later than 12 months after this decision, [NAME_2] must ensure that awareness sessions on Deaf culture have been provided at all institutions where persons who are deaf or hard of hearing reside, and that all parole officers who supervise such persons have attended the sessions. Signed by [NAME_3] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario March 12, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-2770-22 Style of Cause: [NAME_1] v. Correctional Service Canada Decision of the Tribunal Dated: March 12, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: October 15-18, 2024 Vancouver, British Columbia October 28 - November 1, 2024 March 14, 2025 Videoconference Appearances: [NAME_53], [NAME_54], [NAME_55], and [NAME_56], for the Complainant [NAME_57] , [NAME_58], and [NAME_59], for the Respondent [NAME_60] for the Commission [NAME_61], [NAME_62], [NAME_63], and [NAME_64], for the Interested person