Claim of Employment Discrimination Based on National Origin Dismissed

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 41 Date: April 29, 2026 File No. : HR-DP-3059-24 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [COMPANY]. Respondent Decision Member: [NAME] \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc228359063 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360033000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc228359064 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360034000000 III. ISSUES PAGEREF _Toc228359065 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360035000000 IV. CREDIBILITY PAGEREF _Toc228359066 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360036000000 V.

REASONS PAGEREF _Toc228359067 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360037000000 A. Legal Framework PAGEREF _Toc228359068 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360038000000 B. Issue 1: [NAME] proven a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA? PAGEREF _Toc228359069 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000360039000000 (i) [NAME] qualify for protection from discrimination because he has a protected characteristic? PAGEREF _Toc228359070 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000370030000000 (i) [NAME] differentiate adversely in relation to [NAME] with respect to his employment, or terminate him, contrary to section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA? PAGEREF _Toc228359071 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000370031000000 (ii) And if so, was [NAME]’s national or ethnic origin a factor in the adverse treatment or termination he experienced under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA? PAGEREF _Toc228359072 \h 5 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000370032000000 VI.

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc228359073 \h 10 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320038003300350039003000370033000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] [NAME], the Complainant, lived and worked in Europe before he came to Canada to work for the Respondent, [COMPANY] ([NAME]). He immigrated to Canada in April 2019 as a temporary foreign worker on a closed work permit and immediately started working for [NAME]. [NAME] alleges he experienced discrimination in employment contrary to sections 7(a) and (b) and also under section 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA) because of his national and ethnic origin. He says that [NAME] adversely differentiated against him by forcing him to drive commercial trucks that were unreliable, by not paying him for mandatory rest periods when other drivers were compensated, and by yelling at him and pressuring him to sign a ‘last chance agreement’ after he was involved in a driving incident. He also alleges that [NAME]’s decision to terminate his employment is discriminatory. [ 2 ] [NAME] is represented in this case by [NAME]. He purchased [NAME] from [NAME] before the complaints were referred to the Tribunal by the Canadian Human Rights Commission. [NAME] filed a motion after case management began, and he asked that [NAME] be removed as the respondent in this case since he was not the owner at the time of the alleged discrimination. I denied his motion (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY] ., 2025 CHRT 38) and ordered [NAME] to file its Statement of Particulars (SOP). [NAME] filed its SOP, and after hearing dates were set, [NAME] filed a second motion asking that I dismiss the complaint, because [NAME] was dissolved as a corporation in May 2025 and because one of its witnesses had died before the hearing. I heard this motion at the hearing. [ 3 ] At the start of the hearing, [NAME] confirmed that he was not planning to present evidence or make allegations regarding section 10 of the CHRA. [NAME] testified but called no other witnesses. [NAME] did not call any witnesses as part of its case. The parties provided submissions orally at the end of the hearing and neither relied on any statutory or jurisprudential authorities to support their case.

II.

DECISION [ 4 ] [NAME]’s complaint is dismissed because he has not established on a balance of probabilities that he experienced discrimination under sections 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA.

III. ISSUES [ 5 ] The issues for decision are: 1) [NAME] established on a prima facie basis that [NAME] terminated his employment within the meaning of section 7(a) of the CHRA, or adversely differentiated against him in the course of his employment under section 7(b) of the CHRA? 2) If the answer is yes, has [NAME] established a valid justification for the discrimination? 3) If not, should this case be dismissed because [NAME] no longer exists as a corporation and because one of its key witnesses died before the hearing? 4) If liability is established and the motion for dismissal is denied, what remedies flow from the findings of discrimination? IV. CREDIBILITY [ 6 ] [NAME] was the only witness in this case. I assessed his credibility based on the test in [NAME] v. [NAME] , 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA). He was candid and forthcoming about what happened to him while he worked for [NAME] and thereafter. In recounting the facts comprising his allegations, he sometimes failed to provide sufficient details. He told the Tribunal his motivation for filing the complaint was not money, but rather to ensure that what happened to him does not happen to other employees of [NAME]. In his cross-examination he provided candid answers to the questions that were asked of him but, again, did not always provide details to explain his answers. Overall, I found [NAME]’s account of the events was in harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in the circumstances ( Starr et al. v. [NAME] , 2024 CHRT 127 (CanLII) at para 32, [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2024 CHRT 109, paras 44-45).

V.

REASONS A. Legal Framework [ 7 ] National and ethnic origin is a prohibited ground of discrimination under section 3 of the CHRA. Section 7 of the CHRA makes it a discriminatory practice to, directly or indirectly, differentiate adversely in relation to an employee in the course of employment on a prohibited ground of discrimination (s. 7(b) of the CHRA). The provision also makes it a discriminatory practice to, directly or indirectly, refuse to continue to employ any individual on a prohibited ground of discrimination (s. 7(a) of the CHRA). [ 8 ] In this case, [NAME] has the onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, meaning that he needs to prove that it is more likely than not that he experienced discrimination under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA. The use of the expression prima facie means that [NAME] has an obligation to satisfy the tribunal in accordance with the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities ( Québec (C.D.P.D.J) v. [COMPANY].,  2015 SCC 39, at para 65 [ [NAME] ]). [ 9 ] In determining whether a prima facie case has been established, the Tribunal may consider the evidence of all parties ( [NAME], para 64, [NAME] v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2018 CHRT 23, paras 60-61 [Emmet]). The Tribunal must examine all of the circumstances, including circumstantial evidence, that support and undermine the allegations of discrimination to determine if there is what is called “a subtle scent of discrimination” ( [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2023 CHRT 33 at para 69, citing [NAME] at paras 40–41; [NAME] v. [NAME] , 1988 CanLII 108 (CHRT)). [ 10 ] To establish discrimination, the prohibited ground does not need to be the sole or even the primary reason for a respondent’s adverse differentiation or its refusal to continue to employ a person ( Holden v. Canadian National Railway (1990) CanLII 12529 (FCA), see also  Ottawa (City) v. [NAME] , 2022 FC 579 at para 85). [ 11 ] In order to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7, [NAME] must show that 1) he has a characteristic protected from discrimination under section 3 of the CHRA – in this case, national or ethnic origin; 2) he experienced adverse differential treatment in the course of his employment or that his employment was terminated; and, 3) that his national or ethnic origin was at least a factor in his termination, or the adverse treatment he experienced ( [NAME] v. [NAME] (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para 33 [ [NAME] ]). The protected characteristic need not be the only factor in the adverse treatment or termination, and a causal connection is not required ( First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada ( for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2016 CHRT 2 [ FNCFCSC ] at para. 25). It is sufficient to simply establish a connection between the treatment and the prohibited ground ( [NAME], paras 44-52). [ 12 ] If the complainant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify its decision or conduct based on the exemptions set out in the CHRA or developed by the Courts ( [NAME] at paras 37, 61, 63). The respondent can either present evidence to refute an allegation of prima facie discrimination, put forward a defence justifying the discrimination under s. 15 of the CHRA, or do both ( [NAME] at paras. 64; [NAME] at paras 63-67). B. Issue 1: [NAME] proven a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA? [ 13 ] No, [NAME] did not prove on a balance of probabilities that he experienced discrimination according to the allegations he made under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA. (i) [NAME] qualify for protection from discrimination because he has a protected characteristic? [ 14 ] Yes, [NAME] established that he has the protected characteristic of national or ethnic origin under section 3(1) of the CHRA. He came to Canada as a temporary foreign worker from Europe. This was not disputed by [NAME]. (i) [NAME] differentiate adversely in relation to [NAME] with respect to his employment, or terminate him, contrary to section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA? (ii) And if so, was [NAME]’s national or ethnic origin a factor in the adverse treatment or termination he experienced under section 7(a) or (b) of the CHRA ? (a) Unpaid road resets [ 15 ] [NAME] has not established that he suffered adverse differentiation under section 7(b) of the CHRA because of his national or ethnic origin when he was not paid for road resets while he worked for [NAME]. [ 16 ] Road resets are mandatory 36-hour rest periods drivers need to take after 5 consecutive days of driving. [NAME] alleged he was not paid for road resets because of his national and ethnic origin. He told the Tribunal that most drivers at [NAME] had different contracts and that many were from Europe. He said that some drivers were paid for each mile they drove, whereas others, including himself, were paid $20/hour while driving. He said that he raised the issue with management but was told the resets would not be paid. [ 17 ] On cross-examination [NAME] confirmed he was hired under the specific terms of a Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) program which dictated the terms of his contract with [NAME]. Those terms set his hourly wage at $20/hour. When he was asked if he ever contacted a representative from the LMIA program to confirm that his income was based on a per-hour wage, he said “no”. He told the Tribunal that he never contacted the program because he trusted management at [NAME]. [ 18 ] The Federal Court of Appeal defined the notion of adverse treatment as “something harmful, hurtful or hostile” ( [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2010 FCA 192 at para 12 [ [NAME] ]). However, a fairly broad and permissive definition of “adverse” is still in keeping with the scheme of the CHRA ( [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2019 CHRT 51 at para 114). [ 19 ] Even if I consider a broad and permissive approach to what constitutes adverse treatment, I do not find that [NAME] demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that not being paid for road resets was adverse differentiation. In [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. and [NAME] , 2025 CHRT 69, paras 58-59 [ [NAME] ], the Tribunal found adverse treatment when the respondent failed to pay the complainant for his work based on contracts between the parties. [NAME] can be distinguished from this case, because [NAME]’s own evidence is that he agreed to an employment contract under a LMIA program whereby he would be paid $20/hour while driving and would not be paid any premiums such as those paid for road resets. [ 20 ] [NAME] did not provide any evidence, such as his contract with [NAME], to support his allegation that not being paid for resets was adverse treatment. Insofar as [NAME] alleges adverse differentiation in relation to other drivers, he did not adduce sufficient evidence about the way other drivers were compensated. He chose to not call any other witnesses who may have had knowledge or information to suggest that he was treated differently than other drivers. There is no evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that not being paid for resets was adverse treatment contrary to section 7(b) of the CHRA. (b) Driving an unreliable commercial truck and requesting training [ 21 ] [NAME] made allegations that he was forced to drive unreliable commercial trucks that had high mileage. He described one incident where a truck broke down and he was forced to wait at the side of the highway for roughly 8 hours in the winter without any heat. He told the Tribunal that inside one truck there was no power adapter, and the power converter did not work. This meant he could not cook or make coffee while he was driving on the road for weeks at a time. He also said that he was forced to drive this truck in extremely hot summer conditions because the air conditioner did not work. He described the physical symptoms he experienced as a result of being exposed to extreme heat. [ 22 ] [NAME] said there was also a safety issue with the truck because the driver’s side door would lock with his keys still inside. He raised these concerns with [NAME]. Even though he had five years of experience driving long-haul trucks, he asked for additional training. He made this request because he said the truck was unreliable. He told the Tribunal he never received any additional training after he made the request. [ 23 ] [NAME] called no evidence in response. [ 24 ] Regardless of whether or not the decision to assign him unreliable trucks and to deny his training request was adverse treatment, I have no evidence to suggest his national or ethnic origin played any role in this treatment. [NAME] did not tell the Tribunal why he thinks any of these things happened to him. He explained that he asked management to get a different truck with air conditioning, but he would always get a different response. What that response was, he did not share. He also failed to present any documentary evidence or call any witnesses to establish a connection between being assigned an unreliable truck, or being denied training, and his national origin or ethnicity. While I found him to be credible, this is an instance where he has not provided sufficient evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to show that [NAME]’s decision to assign him the various trucks was linked to his national or ethnic origin ( [NAME] at para 69). He failed, in respect of this allegation as well, to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7(b) of the CHRA. (c) Pressured to sign a Last Chance Agreement [ 25 ] [NAME] was involved in a serious driving incident in April 2020. He rolled a long-haul truck and the two trailers he was pulling while driving on a gravel road. The police were called. [NAME] was issued a $580 summons for failing to pay attention while driving. Shortly thereafter, he was called to a meeting with [NAME]. At this meeting, he was presented with a document called a “Last Chance Agreement” (the Agreement). In it, [NAME] noted that [NAME] had failed to meet safety standards and performance targets. The Agreement said there were grounds for just cause discipline. However, it noted that given the investment of time and money into training [NAME], and bringing him to Canada, and considering his desire to remain in Canada for his children, he was not terminated from his position with [NAME]. [ 26 ] The Agreement set out conditions he needed to meet in order to remain employed with [NAME], which included him being on a 90-day probation period, repaying the summons, and repaying deductible premiums that resulted from the incident. The Agreement also said that the lost days of pay resulting from the accident were considered suspension days and noted that his work would be on a rotation schedule. Any breach of this agreement would lead to his termination for just cause. [NAME] told the Tribunal that he did not sign the Agreement because he did not agree with what it said. He told the Tribunal that “[the police] could have written anything” on the summons. He says that being pressured to sign the Agreement was adverse treatment. [ 27 ] This Tribunal has acknowledged that proving discrimination by way of direct evidence is often difficult, as overt discrimination is rare. The evidence led in this case establishes that [NAME] disagreed with the content of the Agreement but does not establish on a balance of probabilities that he experienced adverse treatment by being pressured to sign it. As the complainant, the burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination is his ( [NAME] at para 65). He did not call any witnesses or have any evidence to corroborate his testimony that he experienced pressure to sign the Agreement. While corroboration is not a legal requirement for proving discrimination, in this case it would have been helpful because, further in his testimony he told the Tribunal that despite never signing the Agreement, he continued working for [NAME]. This begs the question of whether he was ever truly pressured to sign the Agreement, given that there appears to have been no consequences for his not doing so. Absent any additional evidence of pressure to sign, I cannot conclude that he experienced adverse treatment contrary to section 7(b) of the CHRA. [ 28 ] I also have no evidence on which to draw any links between [NAME]’s national or ethnic origin and the alleged pressure he felt with regard to signing the Agreement. Based on the severity of the incident [NAME] was responsible for, [NAME] appears to have taken steps to address the situation as any responsible employer would. I heard no testimony and saw no written evidence that suggests there was any other basis for the Agreement and requesting [NAME]’s signature on it. [NAME] failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a connection between the treatment in question and the asserted prohibited ground. (d) Being yelled at and not being allowed to associate with a former colleague [ 29 ] [NAME] told the Tribunal that [NAME], the owner of [NAME] at the time, yelled at him during a meeting and took his anger out on him following one of his driving incidents. [NAME] also allegedly told [NAME] that he could not associate with a former colleague. [ 30 ] I have no difficulty concluding that yelling at a person and telling them they cannot associate with a former colleague could constitute adverse treatment. This type of behaviour is hurtful, harmful and hostile. But in this case, [NAME] provided so few details about the incident that I cannot conclude on a balance of probabilities that he experienced adverse treatment. At the hearing, I asked [NAME] why [NAME] yelled at him. He told the Tribunal that he did not know for sure but said that he heard rumours that [NAME] was known for this type of behaviour. [NAME] did not need to say word for word what [NAME] yelled at him, he did not tell me what [NAME] said and having that information was necessary for me to assess the allegation of being forbidden to associate with a former colleague. In this case, I also have no evidence whatsoever suggesting that anything [NAME] said or did was connected at least in part to [NAME]’s national or ethnic origin. [NAME] did not establish in respect of this allegation that he experienced adverse differential treatment contrary to section 7(b) of the CHRA. (e) Termination of employment [ 31 ] [NAME] did not contest the allegation that it terminated [NAME]’s employment. However, [NAME] failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his employment was terminated because of his national or ethnic origin, which is an essential element of section 7(a) of the CHRA ( [NAME] at para 33). [ 32 ] The evidence shows that [NAME] got a phone call asking him to present himself at the [NAME] offices on September 8, 2020. When he arrived, he met with [NAME], and another person who worked in human resources (whose name he did not know). [NAME] presented [NAME] with a letter terminating his employment with [NAME]. That letter was entered as evidence at the hearing. The letter said that he was fired for “inappropriate conduct”. The letter alleges three incidents. Namely, [NAME] was late to deliveries, [NAME] received customer complaints about him, and he continued to challenge management regarding paid road resets. [ 33 ] [NAME] did not point me to any direct or circumstantial evidence that his ethnic or national origin played any role in [NAME]’s decision to terminate his employment. At the hearing, though [NAME] disputed the content of his termination letter, he admitted that he continued to raise the issue about premiums for road resets with management and stated if he was late to a delivery, it was because his truck was broken. While he did not deny that customers complained about his work, he said that the incident the customer complained about was minor and only caused $20-30 in damage, and that he explained this to [NAME]. [ 34 ] [NAME] own testimony was lacking in detail and did not address the connection with a prohibited ground of discrimination. He also made the decision to not call any witnesses at the hearing. [NAME] had the onus of proving a prima facie case of discrimination, but he did not do so. There is simply no evidence to suggest [NAME]’s decision to terminate his employment had any connection with his national or ethnic origin and I am unable to draw such an inference from the limited evidence I heard at the hearing. After considering the totality of the evidence, I find that [NAME] has not proven on a balance of probabilities that his national or ethnic origin was a factor in the termination of his employment, within the meaning of section 7(a) of the CHRA ( [NAME] at para 65).

VI.

ORDER [ 35 ] The complaint is dismissed. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario April 29, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File No. : HR-DP-3059-24 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. Decision of the Tribunal Dated: April 29, 2026 Date and Place of Hearing: April 13,14, 2026 By videoconference Appearances: [NAME] , Self-represented [NAME] , for the Respondent