Claimant Denied Permission to Appeal EI Benefits Decision

Citation: CS  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2026  [NAME]  10 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Leave to Appeal Decision Applicant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated December 8, 2025 (GE-25-3132) Tribunal member: [NAME] Decision date: January 12, 2026 File number: AD-26-10 On this page Decision Overview Issues I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] I am refusing leave (permission) to appeal. The appeal will not proceed. Overview [ 2 ] C. S. is the Appellant. I will call him the Claimant because this application is about his claim for Employment Insurance ( EI benefits). The Respondent is the Canada Employment Insurance Commission, which I will call the Commission. [ 3 ] The Claimant left his job for a variety of reasons. He told the Commission that he left because he was feeling stressed due to the pace of his work and his expectation of staff reductions. He said this was causing him to become sick. He also said that the repetitive motions of his work were also affecting him physically. [ 4 ] When he applied for EI benefits, the Commission approved his reason for separation. However, the Claimant’s employer asked the Commission to reconsider. In response, the Commission changed its decision and found that the Claimant did not have just cause for leaving his employment. [ 5 ] The Claimant appealed to the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal, but the General Division dismissed his appeal. The Claimant appealed the General Division decision to the Appeal Division, which allowed his appeal. The Appeal Division returned the matter to the General Division to consider all the circumstances, including whether his work conditions were a danger to his health or safety. [ 6 ] The General Division once again found that the Claimant had reasonable alternatives to leaving. It dismissed his appeal. [ 7 ] The Claimant is asking the Appeal Division for permission to appeal. [ 8 ] I am refusing permission to appeal. The Claimant has not made out an arguable case that the General Division made any of the errors that I can consider. Issues [ 9 ] Is there an arguable case that the General Division acted unfairly? [ 10 ] Is there an arguable case that the General Division made an error of law a) by not considering whether the identified alternatives to leaving were realistic or viable? b) by not considering the cumulative effect of his circumstances? c) by failing to follow relevant case law? [ 11 ] Is there an arguable case that the General Division made an important error of fact a) in how it weighed the evidence? b) by making “perverse or capricious” findings of fact? Footnote 1 c) in how it assessed credibility? I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal [ 12 ] For the Claimant’s application for leave to appeal to succeed, his reasons for appealing would have to fit within the “grounds of appeal.” The grounds of appeal identify the kinds of errors that I can consider. [ 13 ] I may consider only the following errors: a) The General Division hearing process was not fair in some way. b) The General Division did not decide an issue that it should have decided. Or, it decided something it did not have the power to decide (error of jurisdiction). c) The General Division based its decision on an important error of fact. d) The General Division made an error of law when making its decision. Footnote 2 [ 14 ] To grant this application for leave and permit the appeal process to move forward, I must find that there is a reasonable chance of success on one or more grounds of appeal. Other court decisions have equated a reasonable chance of success to an “arguable case.” Footnote 3 Procedural unfairness [ 15 ] There is no arguable case that the General Division made an error of procedural fairness. [ 16 ] “Procedural fairness” is concerned with the fairness of the process. Parties before the General Division have a right to be heard and to know the case against them, and the right to an unbiased decision-maker. [ 17 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division unfairly preferred the employer statements over his sworn testimony. He disagreed with how the General Division evaluated inconsistency in his own statements and said that it did not assess his credibility fairly. [ 18 ] However, the Claimant did not say that he did not have a fair chance to present his case at his hearing, or to respond to the Commission’s case. I understand that he does not agree with how the General Division evaluated his testimony or assessed his credibility, but he has not suggested that this was a result of the member’s bias or that she had already prejudged the matter. [ 19 ] The Claimant also believes that the General Division’s understanding of any inconsistency and its assessment of his credibility failed to consider the entire context. I will revisit the question of credibility when I consider whether the General Division made an important error of fact. Error of law [ 20 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division misapplied the legal test for “reasonable alternatives,” in how if found certain alternatives to leaving to be reasonable. He argued that the alternatives were not realistic or viable and that the General Division failed to assess the cumulative effect of his circumstances on the availability of alternatives to leaving. Do the alternatives need to be realistic or viable? [ 21 ] The EI Act says only that a claimant has just cause for leaving their job when they have no reasonable alternative to leaving. Footnote 4 But it is up to the General Division to determine what is reasonable. There is no legal test that compels it to expressly analyze the reasonableness of alternatives in terms of their “realism” or “viability.” [ 22 ] Having said that, I agree with the Claimant that an alternative to leaving would likely not be reasonable if it were not “realistically” available or if it had no potential to reduce or eliminate the conditions or circumstances that would be just cause if there were no such alternative. [ 23 ] However, there is no arguable case that the General Division made an “error of law” in finding the alternatives to be reasonable. When the General Division decides that a particular alternative is, or is not, reasonable, it is applying the settled law to the facts before it. This is what is known as a question of mixed fact and law. The Appeal Division has no jurisdiction to review questions of mixed fact and law. Footnote 5 It is up to the General Division alone to decide whether an alternative is “reasonable” in the circumstances. [ 24 ] The Claimant may be meaning to argue that the General Division made an error of fact. If he could show that the General Division ignored or misunderstood evidence that could have been important to its finding that some alternative, or alternatives, was reasonable, this would be an error of fact. Likewise, if he established that the General Division’s finding (that an alternative is reasonable) did not follow rationally from the evidence, this could be an error of fact. I will come back to this argument when I consider errors of fact later in my decision. Cumulative effect of circumstances [ 25 ] The Claimant is correct that the General Division should evaluate the cumulative effect of the Claimant’s circumstances when identifying reasonable alternatives. I agree that alternatives to leaving are only “reasonable” if they have the potential to relieve or alleviate all the conditions that would otherwise compel the Claimant to leave their employment. [ 26 ] However, there is no arguable case that the General Division made an error of law by failing to consider the cumulative effect of the circumstances that influenced the Claimant’s decision to leave. [ 27 ] The General Division accepted that the Claimant left due to a “combination” of the physical effects of sealing pouches, production pressures, the effect of working the evening shift on his sleep patterns, and how he had to rely on ridesharing to get to work. [ 28 ] The General Division had regard to this combination of circumstances when it identified reasonable alternatives. It addressed the Claimant’s physical symptoms by saying that the Claimant could have sought a medical note to identify the accommodations he required, or to justify a request for a leave of absence. It said he could have asked for a change of shifts to address the effects of his work on his sleep pattern. To address his commuting difficulties, it said he could have sought another job closer to home, and kept his job until he found one. [ 29 ] The Claimant could have addressed each of his concerns with the strategy that was appropriate to that concern. Perhaps no individual alternative strategy would have addressed all of the circumstances, but the proposed reasonable alternatives were not mutually exclusive. Before quitting, the Claimant could have done more to locate other work closer to home, while seeking a medical excuse for a leave or modified duties and, at the same time, he could have formally requested a shift change or any other required accommodations supported by a medical note. The Claimant’s authorities [ 30 ] The Claimant argued that the General Division failed to apply established jurisprudence, and he cited two decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal. Footnote 6 [ 31 ] There is no arguable case that the General Division made an error of law by failing to apply relevant case law. [ 32 ] It is unclear how either of the two decisions cited by the Claimant bear on the decision, or how they support the Claimant’s appeal. [ 33 ] In [NAME] , the Court said that the claimant had the burden of establishing that they had no reasonable alternative to leaving on a balance of probabilities, and that she should have kept her job until she found suitable employment. [ 34 ] [NAME] says that a claimant cannot assert just cause for leaving because their work was unsuitable and that the claimant in that case could have searched for work locally before leaving his employment to move where they were more likely to find suitable work. [ 35 ] Neither of these decisions established a legal principle that could have assisted the Claimant’s appeal. Error of fact How the General Division weighed the evidence [ 36 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division failed to properly consider and weigh critical evidence, “regarding his physical pain, mental strain, and the cumulative impact of repetitive work, production pressure, shift-related sleep disruption, and transportation limitations.” [ 37 ] He also argues that the identified alternatives were not realistic or viable. [ 38 ] It is apparent that the General Division considered the circumstances raised by the Claimant. If the General Division ignored or misunderstood some particular piece of evidence that could have helped it to properly understand the Claimant’s circumstances, the Claimant has not identified that evidence. [ 39 ] This would include evidence to suggest that the reasonable alternatives are not realistic or viable. But to make out an arguable case that the General Division made an error, the Claimant would need to show how that there was evidence—ignored or misunderstood by the General Division—that could have ruled out the proposed alternatives as being unrealistic or non-viable. [ 40 ] The Claimant had the burden of establishing just cause at the General Division, which means that he had to show that it was more likely than not that he had no reasonable alternative to leaving. Footnote 7 Since he believes that the proposed alternatives to leaving were not realistic or viable, it was up to him to establish this in his appeal to the General Division. It is the role of the General Division to weigh and evaluate the evidence. The Appeal Division has no authority to re-weigh or reevaluate the evidence. Footnote 8 [ 41 ] That means that I cannot simply substitute my own judgment for that of the General Division when it comes to the existence of alternatives to leaving, or the reasonableness (or realism or viability, if you like) of those alternatives. “Perverse or capricious” findings [ 42 ] The General Division may make an error of fact by misunderstanding or ignoring relevant evidence that could be important to its findings. But it may also make an error of fact by making a finding that is not rationally connected to the evidence, which is described as a “perverse or capricious” finding. [ 43 ] The Claimant says that the General Division’s assessment of his circumstances relies on assumptions, so he may be arguing that the General Division’s conclusions were “perverse or capricious.” [ 44 ] However, he cannot assert that the General Division relied on assumptions without identifying the assumptions and showing how they are contrary to, or unsupported by, the evidence. [ 45 ] The General Division did not find that the Claimant could “reasonably obtain medical documentation,” as the Claimant asserts. Instead, it said he could have seen a doctor about his pain in his hands, and could have asked for a note. [ 46 ] And there was evidence to support this statement: The Claimant testified that he saw a doctor on one occasion but only talked about his fever. He went to a walk-in clinic to see a doctor on a second occasion, but abandoned the effort because the queue was too long. [ 47 ] As far as “extended accommodation,” the General Division said that the employer would likely accommodate the Claimant for a longer period if he provided a medical note, because it had accommodated him in the past. [ 48 ] The General Division is entitled to draw inferences that are supported by evidence, or facts that are universally accepted. There was some evidence to support the inference that the employer would have accommodated the Claimant if he had a medical note. The Claimant told the Commission that the employer had accommodated him for one or two weeks at one point, and he told the General Division that he had been switched from sealing to packing after a fall at home. He said that the employer had never refused to give him other duties. The General Division also referred to the employer’s evidence that the Claimant could have taken a leave of absence for medical issues. [ 49 ] The Claimant may believe the evidence was insufficient to support the General Division’s inference that the employer would have accommodated him for a longer period. But, as I have said, it is not my job to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Credibility findings [ 50 ] The Claimant says that the General Division made an error in how it assessed his credibility. He disagreed with how the General Division evaluated an inconsistency in his evidence, and said that it discounted his own evidence while giving the employer’s evidence too much weight. [ 51 ] There is no arguable case that the General Division made an error of fact in how it assessed the General Division’s credibility. [ 52 ] It is up to the General Division to assess credibility. This is one way it weighs evidence, and weighing evidence is the General Division’s job. [ 53 ] Where the General Division makes a finding against a party’s credibility, it has an obligation to explain why it did so. However, the General Division did not make a finding against the Claimant’s credibility in this case. It identified a single inconsistency in his testimony, noting that the Claimant first said that he spoke only to his supervisor and team lead, and later, that he also spoke to HR. It could not accept that both were true, so it had to decide which version was more likely. But the General Division did not use the inconsistency it discovered to challenge the Claimant’s credibility generally, or to prefer the evidence of the employer to his own. Footnote 9 [ 54 ] Where the General Division relied on the employer’s evidence, such as its evidence that the Claimant could have taken a leave of absence for medical issues or evidence that the Claimant could have expected guidance if he raised his concerns with HR, it was evidence that was essentially unchallenged by the Claimant. Footnote 10 There was no evidence that the employer would have refused to give the Claimant a medical leave, or that its HR would not have responded to his concerns. Summary [ 55 ] The Claimant has not made out an arguable case that the General Division made an error of procedural fairness, an error of law, or an important error of fact. His appeal has no reasonable chance of success. Conclusion [ 56 ] I am refusing permission to appeal. This means that the appeal will not proceed. Footnotes Footnote 1 Section 58(1)(c) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act ( DESDA ) says that an error of fact is where the General Division “based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.” Another way to think of this is that a finding does not follow rationally from the evidence before the General Division. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 This is a plain-language version of the grounds of appeal. The full text is in section 58(1) of the ( DESDA ). Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development)  v  [NAME] , 2007  FCA  41; and [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2017  FC  259. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See section 29(c) of the EI Act. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  21. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2011  FCA  190; Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2008  FCA  10. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2010  FCA  95. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See, for example: [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2017  FC  439, [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2017  FC  354, [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2016  FC  1254, [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2016  FC  1367. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See para 37 of the General Division decision. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 See GD3-27, see also the General Division decision at paras 34 and 38. Return to footnote 10 referrer