Claimant's CPP Disability Pension Appeal Rejected by SSTC

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: DE  v  [RESPONDENT[NAME] , 2026  [NAME]  208 Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division – Income Security Section Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: M. A. Respondent: [redacted] [RESPONDENT[NAME] reconsideration decision dated July 24, 2025 (issued by Service Canada) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: May 5, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Decision date: May 26, 2026 File number: GP-25-1483 On this page Decision Overview What the Appellant must prove Matters I have to consider first Reasons for my decision Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The Appellant, D. E., isn’t eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. This decision explains why I am dismissing the appeal. Overview [ 3 ] The Appellant is 63 years old. She last worked as a prep cook for a [NAME]. She stopped working on March 9, 2017, when she injured herself while lifting a box of frozen fish. Footnote 1 She had been working at the [NAME] for six to eight hours per day, five days per week, for the previous five months. Footnote 2 [ 4 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension on June 27, 2024. Even though her injury happened in March 2017, she said she had been unable to work since October 2017. Footnote 3 The [RESPONDENT[NAME] (Minister) refused her application. The Appellant appealed the Minister’s decision to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. [ 5 ] The Appellant says she has fibromyalgia which causes widespread pain. Before her injury, she was already dealing with endometriosis, seizures, and migraines. She can’t work. She doesn’t understand how the Minister could refuse her application, considering that she provided hundreds of pages of medical records. [ 6 ] The Minister acknowledges that the Appellant has longstanding health conditions. But the Minister argues that she could still work as of December 31, 2012, which is when her [NAME] coverage ended. Indeed, she did work after that. What the Appellant must prove [ 7 ] The Appellant must prove she has a disability that was severe and prolonged by December 31, 2012 , and continuously since then. This date is called the minimum qualifying period ( MQP ). It is based on her contributions to the [NAME] . Footnote 4 The Tribunal explained the significance of the MQP to her in a letter dated November 3, 2025. I also reviewed the significance of the MQP with her at the hearing. [ 8 ] The [NAME] defines “severe” and “prolonged.” [ 9 ] A disability is severe if it makes a person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 5 [ 10 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. Footnote 6 [ 11 ] The Appellant must prove she has a severe and prolonged disability. She must prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means she must show it is more likely than not that she is disabled. Matters I have to consider first I didn’t issue a non-publication order [ 12 ] On May 7, 2026, after the hearing, the Appellant emailed the Tribunal to ask me not to publish my decision because she doesn’t want her personal information to be public. She says the Tribunal should respect her privacy. Footnote 7 Essentially, she asked for a non-publication order. [ 13 ] By default, hearings and appeal records, including appeal decisions, are open to the public. This is called the “open court principle.” Although the Tribunal isn’t a court, the principle still applies to it. Footnote 8 [ 14 ] Despite this principle, the Tribunal may hold a hearing in private and restrict public access to all or part of an appellant’s appeal record if it determines that reasonable alternative measures can’t adequately mitigate a serious risk that could result from a public hearing and public access. [ 15 ] There are four types of serious risk that I can consider: Footnote 9 1) a serious risk that the disclosure of personal information would cause undue hardship to a person that outweighs the societal interest that the hearing and appeal record be public 2) a serious risk to the life, liberty or security of a person 3) a serious risk to the fairness of the proceeding that outweighs the societal interest that the hearing and appeal record be public 4) a serious risk to public security [ 16 ] Before the Tribunal grants access to an appeal record or publishes a decision, it removes personally identifying information. Personally identifying information includes names, dates of birth, addresses, contact information, social insurance numbers, driver’s licences, passports, and bank account numbers. Footnote 10 [ 17 ] I explained all of this to the Appellant in a letter, which was sent to her by email and regular mail. I told her that, if she wasn’t satisfied that these measures would protect her privacy, she must write to the Tribunal to explain why not, and identify which of the four serious risks outlined above could result if I didn’t grant her request. She didn’t respond by the deadline. So, I didn’t issue a non-publication order. Reasons for my decision [ 18 ] I find that the Appellant hasn’t proven she had a severe and prolonged disability by December 31, 2012, and continuously since then. Was the Appellant’s disability severe? [ 19 ] The Appellant’s disability wasn’t severe by December 31, 2012. [ 20 ] The Appellant based her application on an injury to her brachial plexus (nerves in her neck and shoulder area). Footnote 11 In her request for reconsideration, she again emphasized the impact of her injury, which occurred in 2017. Footnote 12 In her appeal paperwork, she mentioned having fibromyalgia. Footnote 13 At the hearing, she mentioned having endometriosis, seizures, and migraines. [ 21 ] The Appellant’s representative (her husband) suggested that the Appellant had endometriosis, seizures, and migraines by 2012, and that those conditions were the beginning of fibromyalgia. Alternatively, the Appellant’s fibromyalgia might have been triggered by a traumatic event that occurred when she was six years old. Unfortunately, she wasn’t diagnosed with fibromyalgia until much later. [ 22 ] But as I explained to the Appellant and her representative at the hearing, the [NAME] ultimately defines a disability in terms of a person’s work capacity , not in terms of when a person’s symptoms first arose or when a medical condition was diagnosed. I must focus on whether the Appellant had functional limitations that kept her from working by December 31, 2012. Footnote 14 She must provide some medical evidence to support that her functional limitations affected her ability to work by that date. Footnote 15 [ 23 ] I acknowledge that the Appellant did submit hundreds of pages of medical evidence. Footnote 16 But none of it points to the presence of a disabling medical condition around December 2012. This means her appeal can’t succeed, even if she is unable to work now. [ 24 ] The medical evidence from around December 2012 indicates that the Appellant was dealing with minor, short-term health issues at that time. She saw a doctor twice in December 2012 regarding acute bronchitis. This lasted about a month. Her next doctor’s visit wasn’t until June 2013, when she had another bout of bronchitis. The doctor prescribed antibiotics. Footnote 17 There was no further follow-up about bronchitis, which tells me that it probably resolved with the use of antibiotics. The Appellant doesn’t base her appeal on bronchitis. [ 25 ] The Appellant referenced letters from her current family doctor, Dr. [NAME], to support that she was disabled by December 31, 2012. Those letters were written in 2025, many years after 2012. They don’t support the Appellant’s claim. Dr. [APPELLANT] wrote that he only became the Appellant’s family doctor in 2017, so he had no direct knowledge of the Appellant’s medical history before that. Even based on his indirect knowledge, [NAME] thought that the Appellant’s fibromyalgia, seizures, and endometriosis probably weren’t a problem until 2015, which was still years after December 31, 2012. Footnote 18 [ 26 ] In fact, the medical evidence shows that the Appellant did have endometriosis before December 31, 2012. But she had surgery for it in 2005, resulting in “remarkable improvement” that lasted until at least 2013. Footnote 19 So, the medical evidence doesn’t support that endometriosis caused functional limitations that impacted the Appellant’s ability to work around December 2012. [ 27 ] In addition to letters, Dr. [APPELLANT] provided a [NAME] medical report. Like the Appellant’s application, Dr. [APPELLANT] report emphasizes the 2017 injury as the reason why the Appellant can’t work. Dr. [APPELLANT] didn’t tell her to stop working until April 2017. Footnote 20 [ 28 ] The medical evidence doesn’t support that the Appellant had functional limitations that affected her ability to work by December 31, 2012. As a result, she hasn’t proven she had a severe disability by then. [ 29 ] When I am deciding whether a disability is severe, I usually have to consider an appellant’s personal characteristics. Factors like age, education, language abilities, and experience may affect whether an appellant can work in the real world. Footnote 21 [ 30 ] But I didn’t consider the Appellant’s personal characteristics. This is because a person can’t qualify for a disability pension based on their personal characteristics alone. There must still be medical evidence to support a finding of disability. Footnote 22 I disagree with a recent decision of the Tribunal’s Appeal Division [ 31 ] A recent decision of the Tribunal’s Appeal Division held that any medical evidence triggers the Tribunal’s obligation to consider an appellant’s personal characteristics, if it could potentially support a pre- MQP medical condition. The Appeal Division didn’t appear to consider it relevant that the evidence was dated after the MQP and was prepared by someone who neither treated the appellant before the MQP nor reviewed their pre- MQP medical records. The Appeal Division said such medical evidence might not have much weight, but it still meets the legal requirement to provide medical evidence. Footnote 23 [ 32 ] The Appeal Division relied on a Federal Court case called [NAME] , specifically paragraph 11, to support its conclusion. Footnote 24 Paragraph 11 says: There can be little question that evidence of [the appellant’s] medical condition after the MQP , save in exceptional circumstances, establishes little about her condition prior to the MQP . Here, however, the [Tribunal] discounted medical evidence because it was obtained after the MQP but failed to consider that it specifically reversed the expert’s previous medical opinion expressed in reports during her MQP . Such evidence cannot be rejected out of hand. It needs to be considered and weighed for its probative value. This is especially so when the [Tribunal] relies on earlier reports which are subsequently changed by their authors. [ 33 ] I disagree with the Appeal Division’s decision. Respectfully, [NAME] doesn’t say what the Appeal Division thinks it says. [ 34 ] [APPELLANT] concerned an appellant whose appeal was denied by the General Division. The General Division found that her disability wasn’t severe by her MQP of December 31, 2014. She appealed to the Appeal Division. The Appeal Division refused to give her leave (permission) to appeal. She then appealed to the Federal Court. [ 35 ] The Federal Court ruled that the Appeal Division should have given the appellant leave to appeal. This is because the General Division only considered medical evidence from before the MQP , even though the author of a pre- MQP report wrote a post- MQP report that changed the author’s pre- MQP opinion. The post- MQP evidence “may have had a significant impact on the decision,” had it been properly considered. Footnote 25 [ 36 ] In [NAME] , there was pre- MQP medical evidence. While it might not have supported functional limitations, the post- MQP medical evidence could have supported pre- MQP functional limitations. But that is only because the author of the post- MQP report had treated the appellant before the MQP . [ 37 ] That is not the case here. This case is more like [NAME] , where the Appeal Division recognized that there was medical evidence both before and after the MQP , but found it less than compelling. So, the Appeal Division didn’t consider the appellant’s personal characteristics. Footnote 26 [ 38 ] Likewise, in the Appellant’s case, there is medical evidence from before the MQP . But it fails to support the presence of functional limitations that could have impacted her ability to work in 2012. Since there is no relevant medical evidence, there is no reason to consider her personal characteristics. Conclusion [ 39 ] I find that the Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME] disability pension because her disability wasn’t severe by December 31, 2012. Because I found that her disability wasn’t severe, I didn’t have to consider whether it was prolonged. [ 40 ] This means the appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD1-19 and GD6-12. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See GD2-432. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See GD6-3. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See section 44(2) of the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are at GD4-3 and 4. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of severe disability. Section 68.1 of the [NAME] says a job is “substantially gainful” if it pays a salary or wages equal to or greater than the maximum annual amount a person could get from a disability pension. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of prolonged disability. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See GD9. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See SL  v  Canada [RESPONDENT] Commission , 2017 SSTADEI 115. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See section 3 of the Social Security Tribunal Regulations, 2022 . Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 See the Tribunal’s Open Justice and Privacy Policy (https://www.[NAME] Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See GD6. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See GD2-34. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See GD1-56 and 57. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33; and F erreira  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 In particular, see GD1, GD2, and GD5. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See GD2-255 to 258, 261, and 262. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 See GD1-43 and 44; and GD2-121. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See GD5-933. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See GD1-31 to 40. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] says a person is disabled only if they have a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability. See also [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248 at paragraph 50, where the Court said that “[m]edical evidence will still be needed …” Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 The Appeal Division’s decision is PL  v  Minister ([RESPONDENT[NAME]) , AD-25-539. It has not yet been published on the Tribunal’s website. I provided a copy of this decision to the parties and gave them a chance to comment on it. The Appellant didn’t respond. The Minister’s response is at GD12. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 The full case name is [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FC  308. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FC  308 at paragraphs 9 and 10. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See Minister ([RESPONDENT[NAME])  v  [NAME] , 2026  [NAME]

8. Return to footnote 26 referrer