Confidentiality Orders Protect Personal and Medical Information in Human Rights Case

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 24 Date: April 2, 2026 File Nos.: HR-DP-3104-25 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME] Respondent Ruling Member: [NAME] of Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. OVERVIEW PAGEREF _Toc226032046 \h 1 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000340036000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc226032047 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000340037000000 III. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc226032048 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000340038000000 A. Applicable law PAGEREF _Toc226032049 \h 2 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000340039000000 B. Complainant’s request for a confidentiality order is granted PAGEREF _Toc226032050 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350030000000 C. Respondent’s request for a confidentiality order over [NAME]’ medical information is granted in part PAGEREF _Toc226032051 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350031000000 D. Redactions to [NAME] are accepted with one exception PAGEREF _Toc226032052 \h 6 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350032000000 (i) The redacted information arises from communications made between a lawyer and client PAGEREF _Toc226032053 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350033000000 (ii) With one exception, the information sought to be redacted is conveying legal advice given to the Respondent by its legal counsel PAGEREF _Toc226032054 \h 8 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350034000000 (iii) No basis on which to find that the information sought to be redacted was not intended to be confidential PAGEREF _Toc226032055 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350035000000 (iv) The privilege was not waived due to the actions or inactions of the [NAME] _Toc226032056 \h 10 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350036000000 (v) Complainant’s other arguments PAGEREF _Toc226032057 \h 10 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350037000000 IV.

ORDER AND DIRECTIONS PAGEREF _Toc226032058 \h 12 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320036003000330032003000350038000000 I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] This is a follow-up to two other rulings I issued regarding the treatment, in this redetermination, of evidence from the first hearing in this case: [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2025 CHRT 114 [first ruling on the treatment of First hearing Evidence] and [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2026 CHRT 13 [second ruling on the treatment of First hearing Evidence]. [ 2 ] I have already set out the background context to this case in my two previous rulings and will not repeat it here. It suffices to say that this is a redetermination of this complaint following the Federal Court’s decision granting judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Federal Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal’s [NAME] due to apprehended bias and remanded the matter back for redetermination by a different Tribunal member. [ 3 ] In my first ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence, I found that evidence from the first hearing (the “First Hearing Evidence”) is admissible in this redetermination. However, I found that, pursuant to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME]  v.  Canada (C.A.), 2001 FCA 338, the parties retained the right to object to the admission of any specific portion of that evidence. I established a process for the parties to identify specific portions of the First Hearing Evidence to which they objected, along with submissions explaining why such evidence was tainted by [NAME]’s apprehended bias or why its admission would otherwise be unfair. I also directed the parties to specify whether they consented to the redactions made to the First Hearing Evidence and to the reissuance of confidentiality orders made by [NAME] in the first hearing. [ 4 ] In my second ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence, I found that all of the First Hearing Evidence would be admitted in this redetermination, with two exceptions, once the issue of appropriate redactions was determined. The exceptions related to the testimony of two [NAME] and documentary evidence that was admitted through them. I set out a process through which the parties could request confidentiality orders and redactions and respond to the requests made by other parties. [ 5 ] I determine the parties’ requests for confidentiality orders and redactions in this ruling.

II.

DECISION [ 6 ] I grant the parties’ requests in whole or in part as follows:

1) The Complainant’s request for a confidentiality order over certain personal information relating to him and his family is granted;

2) I grant the Respondent’s request for an order protecting the confidentiality of [NAME]’ medical evidence in all of its forms in this redetermination; and 3) The Respondent’s request that certain portions of its documents be redacted on the basis that they are subject to solicitor-client privilege is granted, with one exception.

III. ANALYSIS [ 7 ] I have read and carefully considered all of the submissions filed by the parties on the confidentiality and redactions issue. In the interest of expediting the issuance of this ruling, I do not repeat the parties’ submissions in detail below. I only refer to their submissions as necessary to support my findings. A. Applicable law [ 8 ] Human rights proceedings are intended to be public. However, the presumptive openness of Tribunal proceedings is not absolute. In certain cases, the Tribunal may take any measures or make any order necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the inquiry. One reason for doing so is if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a real and substantial risk that the disclosure of matters will cause undue hardship to the person involved. The Tribunal must also be satisfied that the need to prevent disclosure outweighs the societal interest in a public hearing (section 52(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA)). The Tribunal applies section 52 of the CHRA while also considering the generally consistent principles set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2021 SCC 25. [ 9 ] The Tribunal has a broad power to admit evidence. However, Section 50(4) of the CHRA prohibits the Tribunal from accepting evidence “that would be inadmissible in a court by reason of any privilege under the law of evidence.” This includes evidence that is subject to solicitor-client privilege. [ 10 ] All parties, including government parties, have the right to legal representation and expertise without fear that these communications will be used against them. The protection of solicitor-client communications is grounded in the fact that the relationship and communications between a solicitor and their client are vital to the effective functioning of the legal system ( Solosky v. The Queen , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 [ [NAME] ]). The Supreme Court has recognized that solicitor-client privilege privilege has gone from being a rule of evidence to a rule of substantive law ( Descôteaux et al. v . [NAME] , 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC)). [ 11 ] That said, the administration of justice also requires that the protection of solicitor-client communications only be applied to communications that can properly be considered to fall within solicitor-client privilege. Inappropriately expanding solicitor-client privilege would unfairly prevent relevant and probative evidence from being admitted by courts and tribunals. Solicitor-client privilege only applies if the following three conditions are met: 1) the communication is between lawyer and client; 2) it entails the seeking or giving of legal advice; and 3) the parties intend it to be confidential ( [NAME] at p. 837). B. Complainant’s request for a confidentiality order is granted [ 12 ] The Complainant requested that certain personal information contained in his immigration sponsorship and permanent residency applications be kept confidential. Those applications were marked as Exhibits 2 and 3 in the first hearing. Specifically, the Complainant asked that personal identifiers such as home addresses, personal phone numbers, birthdates, social insurance numbers, passport numbers, and banking and income tax records be kept confidential. The reason he gave is that he would experience a risk of of cyberattacks, phishing, identity fraud, and threats of violence if the above personal information were to be made public. [ 13 ] Neither the Respondent nor the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) opposed the Complainant’s request for a confidentiality order. [ 14 ] I agree with the Complainant that a confidentiality order over the above personal information is appropriate. Some, but not all, of the types of personal information listed above would fall within the meaning of “Personal identifiers” which the Tribunal routinely removes from documents before releasing them to the public (see Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Access to Official Records Policy, section 3 [“Official Records Policy”]). In my view, any types of personal information listed above that do not fall within the meaning of “Personal Identifiers” within the Official Records Policy satisfies the test for a confidentiality order set out in section 52(1)(c) of the CHRA. [ 15 ] There is a real and substantial risk that the disclosure of the personal information set out above will cause undue hardship to the Complainant and his family due to the risks he mentioned. In my view, the need to prevent disclosure outweighs any societal interest in that information being made public as the information is of no relevance to the substance of the issues raised in this case. [ 16 ] I find that using the redacted versions of Exhibits 2 and 3 used in the first hearing appropriately balances the need to prevent the risk of undue hardship to the Complainant and his family, and the societal interest in a public hearing. C. Respondent’s request for a confidentiality order over [NAME]’ medical information in this redetermination is granted [ 17 ] The Respondent requested an order confirming the Tribunal’s previous orders protecting the confidentiality of medical information relating to [NAME]. [NAME] was one of the Respondent’s witnesses in the first hearing whose evidence I excluded from this redetermination in the second ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence. [ 18 ] The Complainant opposed this request but the Commission did not. [ 19 ] In the first hearing, [NAME] granted a confidentiality order regarding [NAME]’ medical notes on consent of the parties. Following the first hearing, Member Singh of the Tribunal granted an order to remove a Zoom audio link that had been publicly accessible and that contained confidential information regarding [NAME]’ medical documents. In its judicial review decision, the Federal Court considered and upheld the Tribunal’s confidentiality order. It denied the Complainant’s request to file a redacted excerpt of the Tribunal hearing audio-recording and related transcription on the basis that “would make public indirectly the very same specific medical information that was directly refused and now properly covered by the Tribunal’s confidentiality Order.” ( Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 18 at para 91.) [ 20 ] In my view, the Federal Court’s judicial review decision already provides for the confidentiality of all of [NAME]’ medical evidence from the first hearing in all of its forms. While the Court specifically addressed the medical evidence contained on the hearing audio and transcript, the Court protected that evidence in recognition of the need to protect the confidentiality of [NAME]’ medical information. The Federal Court’s reasoning strongly supports continued protection of the same medical information in this proceeding. [ 21 ] Under section 52(1), I have the power to make any confidentiality orders that are appropriate to this inquiry. I understand the Complainant’s argument that a confidentiality order is unnecessary in this redetermination as I excluded [NAME]’ evidence in my second ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence. However, the Complainant himself has filed copies of [NAME]’ medical notes with the Tribunal in this redetermination. Specifically, the Complainant filed a copy of two medical notes submitted on behalf of [NAME] in the first hearing in support of his submissions seeking the exclusion of [NAME]’ evidence. The parties’ submissions on motions and attached documents become part of the Tribunal’s official record. Therefore, in the absence of a confidentiality order, [NAME]’ medical evidence would become part of the official record for this redetermination. [ 22 ] I find that it is appropriate to issue a confidentiality order under section 52(1)(c) of the CHRA to protect the confidentiality of [NAME]’ medical evidence in all of its forms in this redetermination. I am satisfied that there is a real and substantial risk that the disclosure of [NAME]’ medical evidence will cause undue hardship to him such that the need to prevent disclosure outweighs any societal interest in that information being made public. I agree with the Complainant that medical information is not presumed to be confidential. However, as the Supreme Court found in [NAME] , protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest that must be weighed when considering whether to issue confidentiality orders. [ 23 ] In my view, the disclosure of certain personal information such as the nature of a person’s medical condition may be the kind of intimate and personal details about an individual that strikes at their dignity interest in the way discussed by the Supreme Court in [NAME] (paras 68-77). On the other side of the scale, there is limited societal interest in making [NAME]’ medical evidence public in this proceeding as he is not testifying as a witness and is playing no part in this proceeding whatsoever. Moreover, by failing to protect the confidentiality of [NAME]’ medical evidence in all of its forms, I would be undermining the confidentiality order made by the Federal Court in its judicial review decision in this case. [ 24 ] For all of the above reasons, I grant the Respondent’s request for a confidentiality order over [NAME]’ medical evidence in all of its forms in this redetermination . [NAME]’ medical evidence will remain a confidential part of the Tribunal’s record. D. Redactions to [NAME] are accepted with one exception [ 25 ] The Respondent requested an order finding that certain portions of a report admitted into evidence in the first hearing may appropriately be redacted as they are subject to solicitor-client privilege. The report in question is titled “Policy Approaches for the Future of the Parents and Grandparents Category” and it was authored by [NAME] (“[NAME]”). The Respondent initially disclosed an unredacted version of the [NAME] to the other parties who filed that unredacted version as Tab 59 of their Joint Book of Documents for the first hearing. [ 26 ] At the first hearing, the Respondent sought to replace the unredacted version of the [NAME] with a redacted version, saying it had inadvertently disclosed unredacted information that was subject to solicitor-client privilege. The Respondent ended up filing two or three additional redacted versions of the [NAME]. The Tribunal marked copies of the [NAME] as Exhibits 18 and 85 of the first hearing record. The parties made submissions to [NAME] as to whether the redacted information was subject to solicitor-client privilege. Based on the record before me, it is unclear whether [NAME] ruled on the issue or reserved judgment in order to later issue a ruling that he never did issue. In any event, any ruling that [NAME] would have made on the issue is now void and without effect due to the Federal Court’s judicial review decision in this matter. [ 27 ] The Complainant opposed the Respondent’s claim to solicitor-client privilege over any of the redactions made to the [NAME]. The Commission did not oppose the Respondent’s claim to solicitor-client privilege. [ 28 ] Due to the parties’ different characterizations of the information sought to be redacted from the [NAME], I found that it was necessary for me to view an unredacted copy of the report to properly determine the appropriateness of the redactions claimed on the basis of solicitor-client privilege (see M (A) v. [NAME] , 1 SCR 157 at para 39; Letnes v . Royal Canadian Mounted Police , 2022 CHRT 32 at paras 13-14). I directed the Respondent to file an unredacted version of the [NAME] to assess whether the information it is seeking to redact is properly subject to solicitor-client privilege. I assured the Respondent that the document would remain strictly confidential and not be shared with anyone pending my determination, except as required for processing by the Registry. [ 29 ] Having reviewed the unredacted version of the [NAME], I agree with the Respondent that almost all of the information that it has redacted in the version that was identified as Exhibit 85 in the first hearing is properly subject to solicitor-client privilege. Therefore, the privileged portions of the Report are not admissible pursuant to section 50(4) CHRA and, accordingly, redactions are appropriate and necessary. (i) The redacted information arises from communications made between a lawyer and client [ 30 ] The Complainant argues that solicitor-client privilege cannot apply because there is no evidence that the author of the [NAME], is a lawyer. I do not agree. [ 31 ] I agree with the Commission’s submission that legal advice provided to an [NAME] such as a government department, is provided for the benefit of the [NAME], including its employees acting within the scope of their duties. Employees of a department or [NAME] may receive legal advice in the ordinary course of everyday operations or refer to that advice in internal documents, correspondence or email communications. Such advice is protected by solicitor-client privilege unless the privilege is waived by a person with authority to do so. [ 32 ] Therefore, [NAME] does not need to be a lawyer for solicitor-client privilege to apply. [NAME] was an employee of the client department who was, in part, relying upon legal opinions in the report which assesses the pros and cons of different policy options for the future of the parents and grandparents category. (ii) With one exception, the information sought to be redacted is conveying legal advice given to the Respondent by its legal counsel [ 33 ] The complainant argues that the information sought to be redacted cannot be found to be subject to solicitor-client privilege because it does not involve the giving or receiving of legal advice. I disagree. [ 34 ] With one exception, the information the Respondent sought to redact from the [NAME] can be characterized generally as references to legal advice. This advice was provided to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now Immigration [NAME] ([NAME])) by two lawyers regarding the legal risks and considerations of various policy options for the future of the parents and grandparents category. [ 35 ] Many portions of the [NAME] that the Respondent has sought to redact specifically quote from, or reference, three legal opinions received by the Citizenship and Immigration Canada Social Policy and Programs Division of its Immigration Branch: that is, portions of pp. 18, 19 and 20, the redaction on page 29, the redaction on page 39, the redaction on page 43, the redaction on page 44, the redactions on page 47, the redactions on page 51. In my view, with one exception, all of the other portions sought to be redacted repeat or restate the legal risks or legal considerations discussed in the sections that specifically reference the three legal opinions cited in the [NAME]. [ 36 ] The one exception is a bullet point under the “Cons” subheading in the section that discusses the option of limiting sponsorship privileges to citizens. The second bullet point under the Cons subheading on page 52 states that limiting sponsorship privileges to citizens “[m]ay be politically unsavoury”. In my view, this content does not fall within the scope of solicitor-client privilege. There is no basis on which to link it back to the legal opinions received by the [NAME]. There is also no basis on which to find that this information relates to the giving and receiving of legal advice. The comment signals a political risk or consideration rather than a legal one (see [NAME] v. [NAME] (Human Rights Commission) , 2004 SCC 31 at paragraph 19.) (iii) No basis on which to find that the information sought to be redacted was not intended to be confidential [ 37 ] The Complainant argues that there is no basis on which to find that the information sought to be redacted was intended to be confidential because it is not labeled as such. I do not agree. [ 38 ] Just as in any other solicitor-client relationship, communications between government lawyers and their client departments are generally intended to be confidential ( [NAME] v . Canada , 2011 FC 1102 at para 72). While it is true that the [NAME] itself is not labeled as confidential or privileged, the Respondent is not claiming privilege over the entire report. The Respondent is only claiming privilege over those sections that reference, rely upon, or convey information communicated in the legal opinions cited in the report. Therefore, the fact that the report is not marked privileged or confidential is not determinative. In my view, there is no basis on which to find that the [NAME] or [NAME] did not intend their discussion of the legal risks and legal considerations communicated in legal opinions produced by legal counsel to be kept confidential. (iv) The privilege was not waived due to the actions or inactions of the [NAME] [ 39 ] The Complainant argues that the Respondent waited too long to claim privilege and produced various prior versions of the [NAME] with different redactions. I have considered whether the Respondent can be said to have implicitly waived the privilege attaching to portions sought to be redacted from the [NAME]. However, I do not find that is the case. [ 40 ] Solicitor-client privilege is a privilege that belongs to the client not their lawyer. Only the client can waive solicitor-client privilege ( R. v . McClure , 2001 SCC 14 at para 37.) The holder of solicitor-client privilege in this case would be the head of the [NAME] or their delegate. [ 41 ] It is true that the [NAME] initially disclosed to the other parties an unredacted version of the [NAME]. However, when the Respondent’s previous counsel claimed privilege over certain portions of the [NAME] on the second hearing day, he indicated that he and his team neglected to make the necessary redactions. He said the document slipped through the cracks due to the volume of documents disclosed in this case which approximated 20 000 documents. Inadvertent disclosure does not waive privilege ( [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General); [NAME] v. [NAME] & [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink , 2002 SCC 61). In the circumstances of this case, there is no basis on which I can find that the [NAME] waived privileged over the [NAME]. The circumstances also do not meet the conditions for a finding of implicit waiver. (v) Complainant’s other arguments [ 42 ] I do not accept any of the other arguments made by the Complainant in relation to the redactions the Respondent seeks make to the [NAME]. (a) Argument about improperly seeking to exclude the version of the [NAME] found at Tab 18 [ 43 ] I do not agree with the Complainant’s argument that the Respondent is improperly seeking to exclude evidence contrary to a portion of my first ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence. In that ruling, I advised the parties that the process I had established for them to object to the admission of First Hearing Evidence was their final opportunity to object to the admission of any First Hearing Evidence. In that ruling, I also directed the parties to specify whether they consented to the redactions made to the First hearing Evidence and the legal basis for such redactions. In my second ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence, I set out three categories of information that were subject to confidentiality rulings or redactions in the first hearing, one of them being the Respondent’s claim to solicitor-client privilege over portions of the [NAME]. I set out a process by which the parties could file requests such redactions in this redetermination. [ 44 ] In this context, it cannot reasonably be argued that the Respondent’s claim of solicitor-client privilege over the [NAME] is untimely, an abuse of process or that it is res judicata , as argued by the Complainant. In any event, to the extent that the Complainant is troubled by the Respondent’s seeking to exclude the version of the [NAME] identified as Exhibit 18, I order below that the redacted version of the [NAME] found at Exhibit 85 of the record will appear as Exhibits 18 and 85 of the record for this redetermination. While it may seem duplicative to have the same document appear under both Exhibits, this may avoid confusion as references are made to Exhibit 18 in some of the witness testimony from the first hearing that will be readmitted in this redetermination. (b) Reference to unredacted version of [NAME] in cross-examination of [NAME] [ 45 ] The Complainant argued that it would produce an absurd result to delete the version of the [NAME] found at Exhibit 18 given that he cross-examined Respondent witness [NAME] about Exhibit 18. The audio-recording and transcript of [NAME]’s testimony will be admitted into evidence in this redetermination. This is why the Complainant argued that it would produce an absurd result to now exclude Exhibit 18. [ 46 ] As just noted, the version of the [NAME] used as Exhibits 18 and 85 of this redetermination will be the redacted version found in Exhibits 85 of the first hearing’s record. While it is true that the Complainant cross-examined [NAME] about Exhibit 18, he only did so in relation to portions of the document that the Respondent had not redacted from the version at Exhibit 85. When the Complainant sought to cross-examine [NAME], one of the [NAME] objected to the use of the unredacted version of the [NAME] (Hearing recording, Day 22, September 24, 2021, starting at 1:44:00). The Complainant stated that he did not agree that portions of the [NAME] were subject to solicitor-client privilege. However, he agreed to limit his questioning to content not covered by the Respondent’s privilege claim. In the above circumstances, I do not agree that any absurdity arises from my findings on the privilege issue. (c) Correcting Exhibit number [ 47 ] I do not agree with the Complainant that there was any procedural unfairness in my correcting the Exhibit number of the [NAME] at para. 33 of my second ruling on the treatment of First Hearing Evidence. The correction was clerical in nature. As noted in that ruling, the [NAME] had initially referred to the [NAME] in his submissions as Exhibit 87 when it was in fact Exhibit 85. The parties were aware throughout that the issue concerned the [NAME] as they made submissions in relation to the redactions that the Respondent wished to make to it in the first hearing. The correction did not alter the substance of the issue to be decided. Most importantly, I have provided the parties an opportunity to make full arguments regarding the redactions to the [NAME] sought by the Respondent. In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the correction caused any prejudice or compromised the fairness of the process.

IV.

ORDER AND DIRECTIONS [ 48 ] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders and directions:

1) The Complainant’s request for a confidentiality order over the documents at Exhibits 2 and 3 is granted. The redacted versions of Exhibits 2 and 3 used in the first hearing will be admitted in this redetermination.

2) I grant the Respondent’s request for a confidentiality order over [NAME]’ medical evidence in all of its forms in this redetermination. [NAME]’ medical evidence will remain a confidential part of the Tribunal’s record.

3) I grant the Respondent’s request to admit the redacted version of the [NAME] in part. The Respondent is permitted to make the redactions to the [NAME] that appeared in the version identified as Exhibit 85 of the first hearing except for the information discussed in paragraph 36 above. The Respondent must file a new redacted version of the [NAME] with the redaction discussed in paragraph 36 above removed when it files its documents to be relied upon in the hearing of the case. This new redacted version of the [NAME] will be admitted as Exhibits 18 and 85 of the record for this redetermination. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, [NAME] 2, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record Tribunal File: HR-DP-3104-25 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [NAME] of the Tribunal Dated: April 2, 2026 Motion dealt with in writing without appearance of parties Written representations by: [NAME] , self-represented [NAME] , for the Canadian Human Rights Commission [NAME] and [NAME] , for the Respondent