Consultation Requirements for Hours of Work Changes in Federal Public Sector

Date: 202 60409 File s: 569-34-40738, 45730, and 49606 Citation: 2026 FPSLREB 39 Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act Before a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board [NAME] of Canada [NAME] and Canada Revenue Agency Employer Indexed as [NAME] of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency In the matter of policy grievances referred to adjudication Before: [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board For the [NAME]: [NAME], counsel For the Employer: [NAME], counsel ADVANCE \y 657 Decided on the basis of written submissions, filed June 9, September 12, and October 31, 2025 .

REASONS FOR

DECISION I. Overview [ 1 ] These three policy grievances are about the hours of work at [NAME] centres run by the Canada Revenue Agency ([NAME]). [COMPANY] are represented by the [NAME] of Canada ([NAME]). [ 2 ] These grievances are in part about what the parties [NAME] and [NAME]. [NAME] work 7.5 consecutive hours a day plus an unpaid meal break, 37.5 hours a week, between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday to Friday. They earn overtime pay for working longer hours and premiums for working hours that fall outside of those periods. By contrast, [NAME] work on a rotating or irregular basis for 7.5 hours a day and an average of 37.5 hours a week over a 56-day (i.e. 8-week) period. They earn different premiums than [NAME] for working early or late hours, and they earn overtime for working longer hours. [ 3 ] Until 2021, [COMPANY] were [NAME]. [NAME]’s practice was to extend the hours of operation of its [NAME] centres during tax season. Since at least 2014, it reached an annual agreement with [NAME] about these extended hours and the compensation for them. That practice has broken down, and these three policy grievances are the consequences of that breakdown. [ 4 ] These 3 policy grievances all raise one issue in common: whether [NAME] has the right to turn [NAME] into [NAME]. I have concluded that it has that right. For the past 50 years, the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board and its predecessors (collectively, “the Board”) have held that employers have that right, and [NAME] has not persuaded me that its [NAME] agreement is different enough from the agreements that the Board dealt with in its previous decisions so that I should reach a different conclusion. [ 5 ] [NAME] also makes arguments that are specific to each policy grievance. [ 6 ] In 2018, [NAME] and [NAME] agreed on extended hours of work for the 2019 tax filing season. However, [NAME]’s Hamilton-Niagara Tax Services Office did not follow that agreement, and instead, it developed a different schedule. This is the subject of the policy grievance bearing Board file no. 569-34-40738. I have concluded that [NAME] violated the [NAME] agreement in its schedule for the [NAME]. [NAME] conceded that it did not properly consult [NAME] about the different hours in the [NAME], but it says that [NAME] filed the grievance late. I disagree. This is a classic example of a continuing grievance, so it was filed on time. I will allow this grievance. [ 7 ] In 2021, [NAME] and [NAME] did not reach an agreement about extended hours for the 2021 tax season. Then, in late 2021, [NAME] informed [NAME] that it would extend the [NAME] centres’ hours for the entire year, starting in 2022; it had actually changed those hours permanently months earlier, although the parties did not provide details about where and when. This is the subject of the policy grievance in Board file no. 569-34-45730. [ 8 ] The [NAME] agreement requires the parties to consult before making certain changes to the schedules of [NAME] and [NAME]. In this consultation, [NAME] must provide a reason of substance as to why the change in hours meets a need of the public or the efficient operation of the service. I have concluded that [NAME] did not adequately consult [NAME] before making these changes in 2021 but that its consultation on December 21, 2021, was adequate to implement these changes in 2022, going forward. It did not establish a reason of substance for the change in 2021, but it corrected that and established a reason of substance on December 21, 2021. [ 9 ] Despite that, I have concluded that [NAME] was estopped from implementing these new hours of work. The parties had a long-standing practice of reaching an agreement instead of [NAME] acting unilaterally for extended hours of work. [NAME] was estopped from changing that long-standing practice. This estoppel came to an end when the parties negotiated a new [NAME] agreement in 2023. Therefore, I have allowed this grievance. [ 10 ] Finally, in Board file no. 569-34-49606, [NAME] argues that [NAME] breached its duty to consult in 2023. I disagree. The consultation was adequate, for most of the same reasons as it was adequate on December 21, 2021, and the estoppel had come to an end. Therefore, I have denied this grievance. [ 11 ] My detailed reasons for these conclusions follow.

II. Procedural history of these policy grievances [ 12 ] [NAME] referred the grievance in Board file no. 569-34-40738 to adjudication on July 22, 2019. [NAME] objected to the timeliness of the grievance, and [NAME] filed a reply. The Board assigned a mediator for that grievance, but [NAME] declined mediation on May 6, 2022. The Board then asked [NAME] to file reply submissions about the timeliness of the grievance, which it did on January 26, 2024. [ 13 ] [NAME] referred the grievance in Board file no. 569-34-45730 to adjudication on September 16, 2022. [NAME] also made a complaint with the Board, arguing that [NAME] violated the so-called statutory freeze by implementing mandatory Saturday shifts at [NAME] centres. That complaint overlaps with the events forming the basis of this second policy grievance. The Board allowed that complaint in [NAME] of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency , 2023 FPSLREB 38 (“the Statutory Freeze Decision ”). [ 14 ] On January 29, 2024, I held two separate case management conferences with the parties about these grievances, during which I directed that both grievances be decided in writing. The grievances were not joined at that time, but the deadlines for the steps in that written submission process were set to occur in the spring of 2024 and to ensure that there was no overlap with the deadlines for submissions. [ 15 ] [NAME] referred the grievance in Board file no. 569-34-49606 to adjudication on April 22, 2024. [NAME] immediately asked that the three grievances be joined. Several months later, [NAME] also asked that the grievances be heard together. The parties then asked for time to attempt to resolve this matter, which I granted, up to November 27, 2024, at which point I asked the parties to provide a timetable to exchange written submissions. They did so and then requested numerous extensions of time, each of which I granted. [ 16 ] At the outset of my involvement in these matters, the parties asked to bifurcate the issue of remedies from their disputes over the merits of these grievances. I granted that request. Therefore, I have not said anything about the appropriate remedies in this case. [ 17 ] Finally, while the policy grievances cited articles 26, 27, and 28 of the [NAME] agreement, the parties’ submissions were based entirely on article 25.

III. Structure of this decision [ 18 ] These cases raise two main groups of issues, and I have divided this decision into those two groups. The first main issue is whether [NAME] can turn a [NAME] into a [NAME]. If it cannot, then I must allow all three grievances. If it can, then I need to move to the second group of issues, which is about whether [NAME] consulted [NAME] adequately before making the schedules that it did in 2019 and again in 2021, going forward. I will address [NAME]’s arguments about estoppel as part of that second group of issues.

IV. First issue: whether [NAME] can turn [NAME] into [NAME] A. Overview of the issue of [NAME] and [NAME] [ 19 ] [NAME] explained its position succinctly as follows: “… the Union has consistently taken the position that [COMPANY] are [NAME] and the [NAME] agreement prohibits [NAME] from unilaterally converting [NAME] to [NAME].” [ 20 ] For the past 50 years, the Board has consistently rejected [NAME]’s position and has concluded that an employer has the power to convert a [NAME] to a [NAME]. [NAME] has not convinced me to change the Board’s long-standing approach to this issue. [ 21 ] In this portion of this decision, I will begin by describing the relevant provisions of the [NAME] agreement. Then, I will go through the Board’s decisions over the past 50 years on this issue. Finally, I will address [NAME]’s arguments as to why the Board should reach a different conclusion in this case. [ 22 ] The parties’ arguments about this issue are made in the abstract, meaning that they are based on principle and do not depend on the specific facts in this case. In short, in 2021, [NAME] decided that some of the [COMPANY] (all of whom were previously [NAME]) would become [NAME]. [NAME] argues that [NAME] cannot do that. Notably, [NAME] does not argue that these [COMPANY] do not meet the definition of “[NAME]”. This is why I say this issue is being argued in the abstract. The parties are arguing about whether [NAME] can change a [NAME] into a [NAME]; they are not arguing about whether, given the schedules that [NAME] has imposed, the [COMPANY] are actually [NAME]. B. Outline of article 25 of the [NAME] agreement [ 23 ] Article 25 of the [NAME] agreement between [NAME] and [NAME] deals with hours of work. It is divided into four parts. [ 24 ] The first part, consisting of clauses 25.01 to 25.05, sets out some general rules that apply to all employees. For example, it defines a “week” to be the period beginning at 00:00 on Monday and ending at 24:00 on Sunday. These provisions are not relevant to these grievances. [ 25 ] The second part, consisting of clauses 25.06 through 25.12, is entitled “Day Work”. It sets out the hours of work for [NAME]. Those hours of work are normally 7.5 hours a day, 37.5 hours a week, between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday to Friday. Clause 25.11 allows [NAME] to change those hours after consultation with [NAME] in certain circumstances, and clause 25.12 sets out notice requirements and a late-hour premium if [NAME] must work before 7:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m. [ 26 ] The third part, consisting of clauses 25.13 to 25.23, is entitled “[NAME]”. It sets out the hours of work for [NAME]. Clause 25.23 permits [NAME] and [NAME] to negotiate a variable [NAME] schedule arrangement ([NAME]), which is a [NAME] schedule that departs from the rules set out in clauses 25.13 to 25.23. [ 27 ] Finally, the fourth part, consisting of clauses 25.24 to 25.27, is entitled “Terms and Conditions Governing the Administration of Variable Hours of Work”. It sets out some rules for VSSAs as well as for individual employees who request and are granted variable hours of work. [ 28 ] The [NAME] agreement does not define the terms “day work” or “[NAME] work”; nor does it define who is a “[NAME]” or “[NAME]”. The [NAME] agreement also does not have any express terms explaining how or when an employee becomes a [NAME] or a [NAME]. [ 29 ] The [NAME] agreement has other provisions dealing with the consequences of being a [NAME] or a [NAME]. For example, article 27 provides [NAME] premiums for “[a]n employee working on shifts”. In the context of adjudicating disputes over the eligibility for premiums that are different for [NAME] and [NAME], the Board has adopted a functional approach to distinguishing between [NAME] and [NAME]. The Board explained this approach in [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) , 2010 PSLRB 112 at paras. 61 to 65, stating that a similarly worded [NAME] agreement meant that “… the phrase ‘working on [NAME]’ apply to situations where there are at least two regular ‘shifts’ in a given 24-hour cycle [ sic ] ” (paragraph 64). [ 30 ] These grievances are not about the meanings of “day work” and “[NAME] work”, and the parties are not arguing about whether employees are [NAME] or [NAME]. Instead, the parties are arguing about whether [NAME] can change an employee’s schedule so that the employee who was hired as a [NAME] becomes a [NAME]. Therefore, I do not need to decide whether the hours worked by [COMPANY] make them [NAME] or [NAME]. The parties do not disagree in this case about what makes someone a day or [NAME]; they disagree about whether [NAME] had the right to turn some [NAME] into [NAME]. [ 31 ] I mention the premiums to help understand the broader context of this dispute. The main practical consequence of being a [NAME] or a [NAME] is in which premium they are paid for working odd hours. A [NAME] earns an early- or late-hour premium of $7.00 per non-overtime hour worked before 7:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m. (clause 25.12(b)), and a [NAME] earns a [NAME] or weekend premium of $2.50 per hour worked between 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. and on Saturdays and Sundays (clauses 27.01 and 27.02). Also, if [NAME] cannot turn a [NAME] into a [NAME], in practice, it needs to pay overtime to [NAME] who work on Saturdays. [ 32 ] These three policy grievances span three different [NAME] agreements. The first policy grievance was presented under the [NAME] agreement that expired on October 31, 2016; the second policy grievance was presented under the [NAME] agreement that expired on October 31, 2021; and the third policy grievance was presented under the [NAME] agreement that expired on October 31, 2025. The parties negotiated some changes to article 25 in the last of those [NAME] agreements; however, the changes were to clauses that are not critical to these policy grievances. [ 33 ] I have included the entire text of article 25 of the last [NAME] agreement as an appendix to this decision. I will include the text of some clauses in that article in my reasons when needed, to understand the parties’ positions and my reasons for this decision. C. Earlier Board decisions about the employer’s ability to change a [NAME] into a [NAME] [ 34 ] As I said earlier, the Board has heard and dismissed [NAME]’s argument for the past 50 years. [ 35 ] The Board’s first foray into this debate was in Zirpdji v. Canada (Treasury Board) , [1976] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 10 ([NAME]). The facts of that case are eerily similar to this one. The employees in that case were court stenographers represented by [NAME] who took transcripts of immigration hearings that took place on weekends. The employer used to pay the stenographers overtime but decided to change to [NAME] work instead. The stenographers grieved. An adjudicator denied the grievance, and following the procedure in place at the time, the stenographers applied to the Board to review that decision. The Board also denied the grievance. [ 36 ] One of the key issues in that case was [NAME]’s contention that the employer could not change [NAME] into [NAME] because doing so changed their day of rest. The Board rejected that argument. The Board’s decision reads, in part: … 19. [NAME] further argues that there is no authority under the [NAME] agreement to change the days of rest of employees covered by day work provisions, as in the case of the [NAME].… … 32. In the light of the content of the relevant clauses of article 25 of the [NAME] agreement, we come back to the argument of [NAME] that the second sentence of clause 25.03 only permits scheduled hours to be changed but not a change from day work to [NAME] work when it involves changing the days of rest from Saturday and Sunday to some other day. The adjudicator deals with this argument at page 15 of his decision. His interpretation is consistent with the wording of clause 25.03. If the words “scheduled hours … different from those specified in 25.02” are interpreted as referring only to the possibility of changing the starting time or the finishing time before 7:00 a.m. or after 6:00 p.m. on any given working day, it means that, taking into account clause 25.06, clause 25.03 allows for the establishment of [NAME] work. Any work day starting before 7:00 a.m. and/or terminating after 6:00 p.m. is not day work according to clause 25.02. As the only alternative to day work is [NAME] work, the adjudicator did not err in law when he arrived at the following conclusion: Any work which does not come under the definition of day work under clause 25.02 is in my view [NAME] work under clause 25.06 and would come within the meaning of the words “on a rotating or irregular basis” in accordance with what I deem to be the intention of the parties at the time they signed the agreement, having regard to all the provisions thereof. … [Emphasis added] [ 37 ] The Board reached the same conclusion in [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of Agriculture) , Board file nos. 166-02-8086 to 8090 (19800418). In that case, some primary products inspectors (basically, non-medical meat inspectors) were assigned to work on Saturdays. They grieved because they were not paid overtime for that work. The Board denied the grievance, for the same reasons as in [NAME] , stating: … I must say that the sweeping proposition upon which [NAME] rests, admits of no exceptions.… … For the reasons which I have given, I find the Adjudication and Board Reference in [NAME] (supra) to be controlling. “The only alternative to day work is [NAME] work.” Thus, it would seem that, however infrequent the rotation, for the Employer to schedule a worker, on a regular basis, to work on what would otherwise be a day of rest, is to transform that individual from a [NAME] to a [NAME], in the [NAME]. … … [Emphasis added] [ 38 ] The Board reached a similar conclusion in Paynter v. Treasury Board (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada) , [1997] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 86 ([NAME]), stating: … [43]… I am satisfied that under section 7 of the Financial Administration Act and section 7 of the [NAME] Staff Relations Act, together with the various clauses under article 21 of the Group [NAME] Agreement, the employer had the authority to modify working hours so as to better manage its operations vis-à-vis the clients’ requests. There was no suggestion by the grievors that the employer could not alter the [NAME] schedule; rather, their position was that the employer failed to discus [ sic ] the change as required by article 21.06. … [ 39 ] However, as can be seen in this passage, the [NAME] agent did not contest the employer’s right or ability to change a [NAME] into a [NAME], and so this case is of no precedential value; I provide it merely for context in showing for how long employers have been turning [NAME] into [NAME]. [ 40 ] The Board reached a similar conclusion in [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2001 PSSRB 94 (upheld in 2003 FCT 757) . That case involved a veterinarian, represented by a different [NAME] agent. His hours of work were changed so that he started at 4:30 a.m. instead of 6:00 a.m. He grieved, arguing that he was entitled to be paid overtime for hours worked before 6:00 a.m. The Board disagreed because it concluded that the employer had properly changed him from a [NAME] to a [NAME], stating: … [24] Subclause B2.01(a) recognizes that management has the right to modify hours of work and to change them from a non-[NAME] work to a [NAME] work basis because of operational requirement [ sic ] . The new hours of operation of the Establishment created a new operational requirement for a schedule located outside the timeframe of the “Non-[NAME]” normal workday. In imposing the schedule from 4:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on [NAME], management transferred him to a “[NAME]” schedule following Article B2 of the [NAME] agreement. … [Emphasis added] [ 41 ] Article B2.01(a) of that [NAME] agreement is similar to clause 25.13 of this one. [ 42 ] The Board’s most comprehensive treatment of this issue occurred in [NAME] v. [NAME] (Transport Canada) , 2005 PSSRB 30. In that case, the grievors were security inspectors at international airports. They used to be [NAME], but after the events of 9/11, the employer implemented [NAME] work for them. They grieved. One of their arguments was that the employer did not have the authority to change a [NAME] into a [NAME]. The Board disagreed and concluded that the employer had that authority. [ 43 ] The Board went through the case law I just outlined, along with some other cases that were not as relevant to this issue. It then turned squarely to the issue raised in this case — whether the employer has the power to change a [NAME] into a [NAME]. It stated as follows: … [ 124 ] The [NAME] ( supra ) decision and subsequent decisions under the PSSRA have not clearly articulated the source of management’s authority to change hours of work from day work to [NAME] work. The scope of management rights under the PSSRA regime has been outlined by the Federal Court as follows: the [NAME] may do that which is not specifically or by inference prohibited by the statute or the [NAME] agreement ( [NAME] v. Canada ([NAME]) , 2004 FC 277). [ 125 ] The employer relied on section 7 of the PSSRA :

7. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the right or authority of the employer to determine the organization of the [NAME] and to assign duties to and classify positions therein. [ 126 ] The employer also relied on section 7 of the FAA : 7(1) The [NAME] may act for the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on all matters relating to […] (e) personnel management in the [NAME] of Canada, including the determination of the terms and conditions of employment of persons employed therein; [ 127 ] I find subsection 11(2) of the FAA to be more specific in its application to this case: (2) …notwithstanding any other provision contained in any enactment, the [NAME] may, in the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to personnel management including its responsibilities in relation to employer and employee relations in the [NAME], and without limiting the generality of sections 7 to 10, (a) determine the requirements of the [NAME] with respect to human resources and provide for the allocation and effective utilization of human resources within the [NAME]; […]. (d) determine and regulate the pay to which persons employed in the [NAME] are entitled for services rendered, the hours of work and leave of those persons and any matters related thereto; […] [ 128 ] It is clear that the general management rights conferred on the [NAME] may be substantially circumscribed by negotiated terms and conditions of employment contained in a [NAME] agreement (e.g., see [NAME] of Canada v. Canadian Grain Commission (supra) . In this case, I have determined that the [NAME] agreement does not restrict the right of the employer to determine the hours of work such that an employee who was formerly a [NAME] becomes a [NAME]. There is still an obligation on management’s part to consult with the [NAME] agent on such fundamental changes in conditions of employment (see the joint consultation article - Article 21). … [Emphasis added] [ 44 ] [NAME] was decided under the version of the Financial Administration Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11) in force at that time. The current version is very similar, and the parts relied on by the Board in [NAME] currently read as follows: … […] 11.1 (1) In the exercise of its human resources management responsibilities under paragraph 7(1)(e), the [NAME] may 11.1 (1) Le Conseil du Trésor peut, dans l’exercice des attributions en matière de gestion des ressources humaines que lui confère l’alinéa 7(1)e) : (a) determine the human resources requirements of the [NAME] and provide for the allocation and effective utilization of human resources in the [NAME]; a) déterminer les effectifs nécessaires à la fonction publique et assurer leur répartition et leur bonne utilisation; … […] (c) determine and regulate the pay to which persons employed in the [NAME] are entitled for services rendered, the hours of work and leave of those persons and any related matters …. c) déterminer et réglementer les traitements auxquels ont droit les personnes employées dans la fonction publique, leurs horaires et leurs congés, ainsi que les questions connexes; … […] [ 45 ] That provision grants the [NAME] certain powers as an employer. In this case, the [NAME] is not the employer; [NAME] is. [NAME]’s powers as an employer are spelled out in the Canada Revenue Agency Act (S.C. 1999, c. 17), which contains a provision almost identical to s. 11.1(1) of the Financial Administration Act , as follows: … […] 51 (1) The Agency may, in the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to human resources management, 51 (1) L’Agence peut, dans l’exercice de ses attributions en matière de gestion des ressources humaines : (a) determine its requirements with respect to human resources and provide for the allocation and effective utilization of human resources; a) déterminer les effectifs qui lui sont nécessaires et assurer leur répartition et leur bonne utilisation; … […] (d) after consulting with the President of the [NAME], determine and regulate the pay to which persons employed by the Agency are entitled for services rendered, the hours of work and leave of those persons and any related matters …. d) après consultation du président du Conseil du Trésor, déterminer et réglementer les traitements auxquels ont droit ses [NAME], leurs horaires et leurs congés, ainsi que les questions connexes; … […] [ 46 ] The finding in [NAME] remained undisturbed for roughly 15 years. Then, [NAME] challenged that finding in two relatively recent decisions: [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of the Environment) , 2021 FPSLREB 42; and [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) , 2023 FPSLREB 19 (“ [NAME] ”). [ 47 ] In [NAME] , the employee was hired as a [NAME] in 2009. In August 2012, the employer told him that he had to work shifts, starting September 13, 2012. He worked on Saturday and Sunday, September 15 and 16, 2012. Then the employer changed its mind again and turned him back into a [NAME]. He grieved, asking for overtime for that Saturday and Sunday. The Board allowed the grievance. In so doing, the Board confirmed the essential principle set out in [NAME] , namely, “… no language in the [NAME] agreement explicitly bars it from changing a [NAME] to a [NAME]” (see paragraph 46). However, the Board concluded that the employee was not actually turned into a [NAME] because an employer cannot move someone back and forth between those two statuses within the course of a week. He was never, in fact, an employee “… who worked on a rotating or irregular basis” (from paragraph 53), meaning that he was not, as a matter of fact, ever turned into a [NAME]. [ 48 ] In [NAME] , the Board referred to an earlier decision called [NAME] v. [NAME] (Department of National Defence) , Board file nos. 166-02-3458 and 3459 (19780831). The Board suggested that [NAME] and [NAME] contradicted each other. However, [NAME] is actually almost the same fact scenario as [NAME] . [NAME] involved two drivers who worked Monday to Friday. The employer assigned them to work one weekend each in a summer. They claimed overtime, and the employer claimed that they were [NAME] because it had selected those weekends well in advance. The Board agreed with the employees that they were not [NAME]. The Board essentially adopted the employees’ submissions, which it summarized as this: “ Even if management can change a [NAME] to a [NAME], such did not occur here: a change only once or twice a year is stretching that right too far.” [ 49 ] Finally, [NAME] was a group grievance filed by fisheries officers. The employer scheduled them to work evenings, nights, and weekends during the summer, and then more standard hours between 06:00 to 18:00 for the rest of the year. In other words, the employer made them [NAME] most of the year but [NAME] in the summer. The Board concluded that the employer had that ability. [NAME] (representing the employees in that case) argued that [NAME] was distinguishable because it was a special situation arising from 9/11 and had near 24/7 work shifts. The Board stated the following about that issue: … [ 47 ] I cannot agree. A reading of the full [NAME] agreement does not support the assertion that clause 25.09, which states that “[f]or employees who work on a rotating or irregular basis …”, is meant to apply only to casual employees who may work only a few hours per week or only a brief time during the year, as the [NAME] agent suggested, or as only related to the 24/7 work coverage as in [NAME] . [ 48 ] Consistent with the conclusion in [NAME] , I find that the management rights granted in the FAA apply in the matter as they are not limited by the [NAME] agreement as analyzed in this decision. … [ 50 ] In short, over the past 50 years, the Board has resolutely held that the employer has the right to turn a [NAME] into a [NAME], and vice versa. The decisions in [NAME] mean that the employer cannot do that on one-off occasions to avoid paying overtime, but [NAME] does not argue that [NAME] did so in this case. D. [NAME]’s argument for distinguishing this case from the previous ones [ 51 ] [NAME] argues that that 50-year line of cases is distinguishable from this case because of differences in the wording of the [NAME] agreements. I disagree. [ 52 ] [NAME] states that management rights are subject to the [NAME] agreement. I agree entirely. However, it is still important to note that [NAME]’s right to change a [NAME] into a [NAME] does not derive from the [NAME] agreement; it derives from s. 51 of the Canada Revenue Agency Act . [NAME] needs to demonstrate that the [NAME] agreement limits [NAME]’s management rights by preventing it from turning a [NAME] into a [NAME]. [ 53 ] [NAME] distinguishes [NAME] by saying that this [NAME] agreement is different from that in [NAME] because of the wording of clause 25.06. Clause 25.06 is one of the clauses that the parties amended when negotiating the most recent [NAME] agreement but only because it used to refer to clause 25.10 (dealing with summer hours), which the parties took out of the most recent agreement. Also, the Board did not set out clause 25.04 in [NAME] , so to compare it to this case, I needed to use an archived version of that [NAME] agreement (which expired on June 21, 2000). For ease of reference, I will put clause 25.06 in the current agreement and the equivalent clause in [NAME] side by side: [This case:] [ [NAME] :] 25.06 Except as provided for in clauses 25.09, 25.10, and 25.11: 25.04 a. the normal work week shall be thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours from Monday to Friday inclusive, and (a) Except as provided for in clause 25.09, the normal work week shall be thirty-seven and one-half (37 1/2) hours exclusive of lunch periods, comprising five (5) days of seven and one-half (7 1/2) hours each, Monday to Friday. The work day shall be scheduled to fall within a nine (9)-hour period between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., unless otherwise agreed in consultation between the [NAME] and the Employer at the appropriate level. b. the normal work day shall be seven decimal five (7.5) consecutive hours, exclusive of a lunch period, between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. (b) The scheduled weekly and daily hours of work stipulated in 25.04(a) may be varied by the Employer, following consultation with the [NAME], to allow for summer and winter hours, provided the annual total is not changed. [ 54 ] The key to [NAME]’s argument rests in the phrase “[e]xcept as provided for in”, specifically what the exceptions are. In the current [NAME] agreement, clause 25.09 is about compressed work hours, and clause 25.11 is about a change in hours of work for [NAME] after consultation with [NAME]. In the [NAME] agreement, clause 25.09 was about [NAME] (i.e., it was similar to clause 25.13 in this [NAME] agreement). [NAME] argues that this means that the day work provision is not expressly subject to the [NAME] work provision. [NAME] distinguishes [NAME] in the same way, and the relevant clause in that case (clause 25.04) is the same as in [NAME] , not in this case. [ 55 ] I agree with [NAME] that that is what the [NAME] agreements say. However, I do not understand why that assists [NAME], and [NAME] does not explain why that helps it either. The [NAME] work clauses in article 25 still exist. I do not believe [NAME] is arguing that [NAME] work has been eliminated in this [NAME] agreement because clause 25.06 (spelling out the hours of work of [NAME]) says that it is subject to exceptions for the hours of work of [NAME] instead of also subject to the clauses about [NAME] work. [NAME] also does not deny the existence of [NAME]; it just denies [NAME]’s right to turn a [NAME] into a [NAME], and it says that its position “… has been that its members working in [NAME] are exclusively [NAME] …” (from its reply submissions). I do not see how the wording of clause 25.06 impacts [NAME]’s right to turn a [NAME] into a [NAME] one way or another. [ 56 ] In its reply submissions, [NAME] argues that [NAME] is distinguishable because “… there was a mechanism built right into the hours of work provisions for converting [NAME] to [NAME] .” Again, it does not say where it finds that mechanism, and I do not see one either. The [NAME] agreement in [NAME] , like this one, has separate groups of clauses dealing with [NAME] and [NAME], and like this one, it is silent about the employer’s ability to assign [NAME] work. [ 57 ] [NAME] provided examples of other [NAME] agreements that [NAME] has entered into with the [NAME] that deal specifically with the change from day work to [NAME] work, such as a clause in one [NAME] agreement expressly requiring consultation before such a change, and a clause in another [NAME] agreement expressly prohibiting certain workers from being assigned [NAME] work. [ 58 ] [NAME] argues that these other [NAME] agreements are irrelevant for the purposes of interpreting this one, and I agree. [NAME] provides no authority for the proposition that a [NAME] agreement between a [NAME] agent and one employer can serve as an aid to interpretation of a different [NAME] agreement, especially when that different [NAME] agreement is between that [NAME] agent and a different employer. I have given no weight to these other [NAME] agreements when interpreting this one. E. Conclusion about turning [NAME] into [NAME] [ 59 ] In summary, like in [NAME] , and the other cases cited earlier, this [NAME] agreement does not restrict [NAME]’s right to decide whether a particular employee is a [NAME] or a [NAME].

V. Second issue: consultation and estoppel [ 60 ] The second main basis of [NAME]’s grievances is [NAME]’s obligation to consult about scheduling. [NAME] makes a related argument that [NAME] was estopped from changing [NAME] into [NAME] for a time. [ 61 ] These are factual issues as well as issues about the interpretation of the [NAME] agreement. Therefore, I will begin with an overview of the parties’ practice leading up to the events giving rise to the grievances. Then I will then set out the facts of each of the three policy grievances in turn and assess whether [NAME] breached the [NAME] agreement in each case and, if not, whether it was still estopped from acting the way it did. A. Practice leading up to the grievances [ 62 ] As I said at the outset of this decision, these grievances are about the hours of work in [NAME] centres. The parties described the work at [NAME] centres in their agreed statement of facts as follows: … 4. The [COMPANY] (the “CCSD”) of the Assessment, Benefit, and Service Branch (the “ABSB”) provides functional direction and national traffic support to ABSB’s individual tax and business tax contact centres (herein referred to as “Contact Centres” or “[NAME]”) across Canada.

5. The Contact Centres provide a national service across all times [ sic ] zones in Canada in both official languages. … [ 63 ] Translated from bureaucratize into English, [NAME]’s [COMPANY] answer phone calls from Canadians asking questions about taxes. They do this in every time zone and in French and English. [ 64 ] [COMPANY] were [NAME] until 2021. [ 65 ] Historically, [NAME] changed the hours of employees working at its [NAME] centres during the T1 tax filing season, usually for a 10-week period, to add evening and Saturday work. Notably, [NAME] did not turn [COMPANY] into [NAME]. [ 66 ] Instead, from 2014 until the events leading to this grievance, [NAME] consulted [NAME] about these changes to working hours. Each year, [NAME] and [NAME] entered into an agreement about those changes to working hours. The parties described this process briefly in their agreed statement of facts. Each year, [NAME] provided [NAME] with a proposed schedule for its [NAME] centres, which they called the “[NAME] [COMPANY] of [NAME]” (“the [NAME]”). [NAME] and [NAME] would meet and discuss the proposed [NAME] each year. They reached an agreement on those hours every year between 2016 and 2021. They reached agreements in earlier years as well but they no longer have records of the agreements; also, they could not locate the 2020 agreement. Nothing turns on the details of those agreements; the main point is that the parties reached agreements about extended hours of work at [NAME] centres during tax season. B. Broad outline of consultation obligations for scheduling [ 67 ] The full text of the relevant clauses of the [NAME] agreement is in the appendix to this decision. In brief, there are three separate consultation clauses. [ 68 ] The first consultation clause is about day work. Clause 25.11 requires [NAME] to consult [NAME] before changing the hours of work of [NAME] that are set out in clause 25.06. If the modified hours of work existed when the [NAME] agreement was signed, [NAME] can request consultation; if [NAME] wants to change the hours of work during the life of a [NAME] agreement, it has to initiate consultation, unless there is an emergency. In both cases, the clause states that “… in such consultation [[NAME]] will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service.” [ 69 ] The second consultation clause is about [NAME] work. Clause 25.22 requires [NAME] to consult [NAME] before changing the hours of work of [NAME] that are set out in clause 25.17. The same rules apply to this consultation as in the day work consultation about who initiates it and that [NAME] must show that the changed hours are required to meet the needs of the public or the efficient operation of the service. [ 70 ] The [NAME] agreement has 2 main provisions about scheduling [NAME] work: clauses 25.13 and 25.17. Clause 25.13 sets out rules about daily hours of work, average weekly hours of work over a 56-day (i.e., 8-week) basis, and mandatory days of rest. Clause 25.17 sets out a standard [NAME] schedule of 8-hour blocks starting either at midnight or 11:00 p.m. The consultation clause (clause 25.22) applies only to the rules in clause 25.17. In other words, subject to its duty to consult, the employer can create a different standard [NAME] schedule from that set out in clause 25.17; however, it cannot violate clause 25.13 even after consulting [NAME]. [ 71 ] The third consultation is about VSSAs. In essence, consultation can take place at the local level to negotiate a mutually acceptable [NAME] that would apply in that locality. This is set out in clause 25.23 of the [NAME] agreement. [ 72 ] There used to be a fourth consultation clause about summer hours, but the parties removed that clause in the more recent [NAME] agreement. This case is not about summer hours so that consultation clause would not be relevant in any event. C. The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-40738 (2019)

1. Merits of this grievance [ 73 ] [NAME] and [NAME] followed the consultation and agreement process I described earlier for the 2019 tax season. They reached an agreement for extended hours of work during tax season. [ 74 ] The [NAME] for 2019 set out extended hours for nine [NAME] centres. One of those [NAME] centres was located in southern Ontario and was called the [NAME]. The hours of operation for the [NAME] were 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday to Friday. For the period from February 18 to April 30, the office would be open until 9:00 p.m. during weekdays and on Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with the exception of Saturday, April 20 (i.e., the Saturday in the middle of Easter weekend). [ 75 ] The memorandum of agreement reached on December 5, 2018, included the following provision: … […] The provisions of the existing [NAME] agreement, including Articles 25 and 27 on day and [NAME], continue to apply. Agents are to be remunerated based on their status as [NAME] or [NAME] as outlined in the existing [NAME] agreement. Les dispositions de la convention [NAME] existante, incluant les articles 25 et 27 sur les travailleurs de jour et de poste (quart) s’appliquent. Les agents doivent être rémunérés en fonction de leur statut de travailleurs de poste (quart) ou de travailleurs de jour, en se basant sur la convention [NAME] existante. … […] [ 76 ] The [NAME] prepared a schedule for its employees during tax season. According to that schedule, it had 394 [NAME], 41 [NAME], and 83 other workers (i.e., with variable hours, part-time hours, or other exceptions). All the employees were scheduled between 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. from Monday to Friday and 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. [NAME] filed a grievance against that schedule. [ 77 ] The basis of [NAME]’s grievance is hard to pin down. The grievance itself just says this: “The [NAME] agent grieves Canada Revenue Agency’s violation of the [NAME] agreement when establishing new work schedules. This is a violation of the [NAME] Agreement (expiry date: October 31, 2016), including Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28.” [ 78 ] Its written submissions about this policy grievance consist of only this one paragraph: … … The policy grievance in Board File No. 569-34-40738, which raises the issue of whether [NAME] violated the [NAME] agreement by scheduling employees as [NAME], was conceded by the Employer in its final-level reply. [NAME] maintains the only issue should be the remedy, a question to be decided after the decision on the merits, and the timeliness of the grievances, if the Employer intends to proceed with that objection. As a remedy, the Union is seeking a declaration the Employer violated the [NAME] agreement and compensation for all affected employees. … [ 79 ] Contrary to what [NAME] says, [NAME] did not concede that it violated the [NAME] agreement by scheduling employees as [NAME]. Its final-level grievance decision reads as follows: … Notwithstanding the above [i.e., that the grievance was late] , it is my understanding that the work schedules in question ceased as of April 30, 2019, and all employees received the appropriate compensation for the time worked. It is recognized that the Employer was required to consult with you at the local and national levels prior to implementing the “[NAME] Schedule Arrangements” in accordance with clause 25.23. The Employer apologizes for this oversight and will ensure that the requisite consultation takes place in the future. … [ 80 ] To explain [NAME]’s concession, clause 25.17 of the [NAME] agreement sets out the standard [NAME] schedule for [NAME] of 8-hour blocks starting at either midnight or 11:00 p.m. Clause 25.13(d) also requires [NAME] to provide 2 consecutive days of rest for [NAME], and clause 25.13(b) states that [NAME] work 7.5 consecutive hours each day, exclusive of a half-hour meal period. The schedule in the [NAME] did not follow those rules. [NAME] could have changed the 8-hour [NAME] blocks only after consultation under clause 25.22 (which it did not do), and it could have avoided the 2-days-of-rest and 7.5-hours-per-day rules only by negotiating a [NAME] under clause 25.23 (which it also did not do). [ 81 ] [NAME] finally explained its position in this grievance in its reply submissions as follows: … … The issue in this grievance is not whether there were consultations for extended hours of work for tax-filing season in 2021 [ sic ] . As explained at paragraphs 14 to 21 of [NAME]’s will say, the issue that, after the consultations were completed, and the parties had reached agreement on extended hours of work nationally, the Employer went ahead an [ sic ] implemented different hours of work in Hamilton than agreed. The Employer had not only changed the hours of work without any further consultation, but the hours it did implement were contrary to the [NAME] provisions of the [NAME] agreement and, as the Employer conceded, would have required a variable [NAME] scheduling arrangement to have properly implemented. … [ 82 ] [NAME]’s submissions were filed in reply to [NAME]’s argument. [NAME]’s argument states that it did not concede that it failed to consult before implementing non-standard [NAME] hours. It says that it consulted in two ways. [ 83 ] First, it relies on the general consultation that took place nationally about the 2019 [NAME]. However, there is nothing in [NAME]’s evidence to indicate that it discussed anything to do with shifts during that consultation or that it discussed what happened in the [NAME]. [ 84 ] Both parties filed will-say statements and chose not to cross-examine each other’s witnesses on those statements. [NAME]’s will-say statement is from [NAME]. He says that he represented [NAME] in these consultations. He says that [NAME] and [NAME] reached an agreement on December 5, 2018, for the 2019 [NAME], and that that was the end of the consultation. [ 85 ] One of [NAME]’s two will-say statement is from [NAME], and she provided evidence for this time period. She was a labour relations advisor during the 2018 [NAME] consultations. She says that there were consultations held by telephone on December 12, 2018, December 21, 2018, and January 3, 2019. However, she does not say whom this consultation occurred with at [NAME]. In support of her claim that there was consultation, she refers to page 8 of Tab 2 of the employer’s book of documents. I have read that tab carefully. That tab is a series of emails prepared by people other than [NAME]. It does not provide any information about consultation with [NAME]. Instead, as [NAME] points out in its reply submissions, an email by [NAME] refers to “ HR consultation on Hours of Work” [emphasis added], indicating to me that [NAME] consulted internally but not with [NAME]. I also note that the memorandum of agreement for the 2019 [NAME] was signed by [NAME] on December 5, 2018, and [NAME] does not explain why consultation occurred after that date. Finally, [NAME]’ will-say purports to explain the subject matter of that consultation, but when she does, she refers in part to the notes of a meeting that occurred on December 7, 2023, five years later. [ 86 ] [NAME]’s other will-say statement is from [NAME], but she was not involved in 2018 and only became involved in this matter in April 2021 when she became the director of the National Operations Division. She was involved through to October 2023 in that role, and remained involved after she was promoted to be the Director General, [COMPANY] at [NAME] at that time. [ 87 ] I prefer the evidence of [NAME]. His will-say is clear on this point that consultation finished on December 5, 2018. That is consistent with the fact that [NAME] signed the memorandum of agreement on that date. By contrast, [NAME] says that she participated in consultation on those other dates but has no documents that confirm that this consultation took place, does not identify anybody else that was a part of those phone calls, and refers to documents from 2023 to explain the content of those calls that supposedly took place in 2018 and 2019. Her evidence is unreliable in light of these inconsistencies. [ 88 ] For these reasons, I have concluded that [NAME] failed to consult about the change in the [NAME] schedules as required under clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement to implement a [NAME] schedule different from the one set out in clause 25.17. This was a breach of clause 25.17 as well. Additionally, [NAME] did not negotiate a [NAME], contrary to clause 25.23, which means that it violated clauses 25.13(b) and (c) as well for some of those [NAME], as [NAME] cannot create shifts that violate those rules even after consultation under clause 25.22. 2. [NAME]’s objection to the timeliness of the grievance [ 89 ] [NAME] objects to the timeliness of this grievance. In essence, [NAME] says that a local representative of [NAME] in Hamilton received a copy of the schedule for the Hamilton-[NAME] [COMPANY] on April 10, 2019. There is an email chain originating from that date in which the local president asked for a copy of the schedule and [NAME] gave her an anonymized version on April 11. [NAME] filed this grievance on April 18, 2019. [ 90 ] The parties dispute when the period to file this grievance began to run. [NAME] says that it began to run when the schedule was implemented on February 18, 2019. [NAME] says that the time limit began to run only when it became aware of the situation, which was on April 11, 2019, when the Union of Taxation Employees’ ([NAME]) National Office learned about the schedule. [ 91 ] I have decided this issue on a different basis; namely, it is a continuing grievance. A continuing grievance is “… is one in which the event being grieved is being performed successively, or the violation of the [NAME] agreement is recurring or repetitive. Each time the violation occurs, the limitation period begins to run again” (from Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (Esquimalt, B.C.) v. [NAME] of Canada , 2025 FPSLREB 67 at para. 17). As I wrote in [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] (Department of Employment and Social Development) , 2025 FPSLREB 147 at para. 8, disputes about scheduling are a “textbook example of a continuing grievance.” The violation of the [NAME] agreement was that the [NAME] work was being performed contrary to clauses 25.13 and 25.17 of the [NAME] agreement, without having been saved by a [NAME] or consultation under clause 25.22, respectively. That violation occurred each day a [NAME] attended work on a schedule that contravened those provisions. Therefore, the grievance is timely. [ 92 ] The parties also made submissions about whether the Board should grant [NAME] an extension of time to present this grievance. My conclusion means that I do not need to address those submissions. [ 93 ] Finally, as I mentioned earlier, the parties asked to bifurcate the remedy in this case from its merits. Therefore, I do not need to address whether any remedy should be capped at the 25-day period that preceded the policy grievance, in accordance with Canada (National Film Board) v. Coallier , [1983] F.C.J. No. 813 (C.A.)([NAME]), at this stage. D. The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-45730 [ 94 ] This grievance is the most important of the three, and it contains the essence of the dispute between the parties. It is about a significant change by [NAME] away from [NAME] and into [NAME] at [NAME] centres, starting in 2022. I will address it in three parts. First, I will outline the facts leading to the change and the corresponding grievance. Second, I will explain my reasons for concluding that the change violated the [NAME] agreement in 2021 but not in 2022. Finally, I will explain my reasons for also concluding that [NAME] was estopped from making that change.

1. Facts leading to the grievance in Board file no. 569-34-45730 (2021-2022) a. Background leading to the consultation on March 2, 2021 [ 95 ] The [NAME] issued a Fall Economic Statement in 2020. The Fall Economic Statement contained new funding for [NAME]. [ 96 ] On January 8, 2021, and February 1, 2021, the employer met with the [NAME] agent to provide a briefing on the Fall Economic Statement of 2020. At the meeting, the employer gave a presentation on the impact of the Fall Economic Statement on the contact centres. That presentation dealt with a number of issues that are not relevant to this grievance. However, of relevance to the grievance, the presentation included the following slide: … · [NAME] received significant new funding for next year (and ongoing) to strengthen the phone experience for Canadians · Our commitments include: · Increase the number of [NAME] agents · Starting with this tax filing season and continuing into 21/22 · Extend the hours of service · Tax filing season extended hours of service would continue for balance of the year · Achieve a new service standard · The new service level of answering 75% of calls within six minutes will be in effect during the first year of implementation · Leverage new technology · Cross - train [NAME] agents to do “live chat” services … [Emphasis added] [ 97 ] The slide deck ended with a bullet point that said that consultation with the [NAME] was one of the next steps, although whether that was for the extended hours or for the other issues covered in the slide deck was unclear. [ 98 ] Consultation over the [NAME] for 2021 started late that year and did not commence until March 2, 2021. b. There was no consultation before March 2, 2021 [ 99 ] I want to pause in this narrative to address something argued by [NAME]. [NAME] argues (at paragraph 99 of its submissions) that there was consultation about hours of work during one of those presentations, which [NAME] denies. [NAME] has not satisfied me that there was consultation during those presentations. [ 100 ] In that paragraph, [NAME] lists five things it says it consulted about, in support of its argument that it adequately consulted about a permanent change in hours (i.e., beyond tax season). It provides documents to support its claim for four of those five things. The documents do not support its claim that it consulted [NAME] about, or even mentioned, these issues. [ 101 ] It lists the things it consulted about in bullet points that read as follows (footnotes omitted): … · The standard [NAME] schedules in 25.17 restricted the Employer from meeting operational requirements as they are conducive to 24/7 operations. For example, if the Employer was required to abide by standard [NAME] schedule, then some [NAME] would be paid for hours between 1:00 am to 4:00 am and they would have limited work to do as the majority of calls are during daytime hours. Non-standard shifts were able to conform to daytime hours. This in turn would minimize overtime entitlements needed to be paid to [NAME] if they were to work outside of their hours of 7am to 6pm; · The need to fill staff schedules accordingly and reduce monetary costs as [NAME] could not work Saturday without being paid overtime, but [NAME] could work Saturdays as they are not entitled to automatic overtime; · Staffing non-standard [NAME] after 5pm allows the Employer to meet the availability of Canadian citizens after their usual work hours of 9-5 as this was when a large amount of calls were generated, rather than during the 9-5 work hours. · Safety and concern for the mental health and wellbeing of employees was also a consideration and was a desire to remove the possibility that [NAME] [COMPANY] agents would have to work six days of work if only day [NAME] were used. · Reducing health and safety concerns and the hardship on employees that had to commute long distances in traffic during the week, which increased wellbeing and moral of the workforce by lessening their travel times on Saturdays compared to weekday traffic. … [ Sic throughout ] [ 102 ] I will explain why I have concluded that consultation did not occur as described by [NAME]. [ 103 ] The first bullet point was about an increase in [NAME] volume because of COVID-19 programs. The footnote for that item was at page 283, found at Tab 6, of the joint book of documents for this grievance. That page is titled “[NAME] demand will continue to increase with tax season approaching ” [ emphasis added ] . This is about tax season and the normal increase in hours that the parties had been dealing with since 2014. [ 104 ] The second bullet point was about standard [NAME] schedules restricting [NAME] from meeting operational requirements. In support, [NAME] refers to the same page of Tab 6. That page says nothing about [NAME] schedules or [NAME]’s operational requirements. [ 105 ] The third bullet point was about the need to fill schedules and reduce monetary costs because [NAME] would be paid overtime on Saturday. [NAME] footnotes Tab 6 of its book of documents in support of that claim. Tab 6 of [NAME]’s book of documents is the handwritten notes of the grievance hearing of the grievance in Board file no. 569-34-40738. It also says that it is found at page 48 of [NAME]’s book of documents, which is in a different tab (Tab 11). Page 48 in Tab 11 of the book of documents is part of the table of contents to the Fall Economic Statement . I read page 48 of the 2020 Fall Economic Statement just in case that was what [NAME] was referring to, but that page is about support for community service organizations. [ 106 ] To try and figure out what [NAME] is trying to argue, I went back to [NAME]’ will-say statement. Her will-say statement has the same bullet points (at paragraph 16), except that she combined the first and second bullet point into a single bullet (meaning [NAME]’s third point is her second point). Her will-say has a footnote for that bullet point linked to Tab 2 of the employer’s book of documents. Tab 2 of the employer’s book of documents is an email chain from 2019, not 2021. [ 107 ] The fourth bullet point was about the need for workers after 5:00 p.m. because most Canadians work 9 to 5 and [NAME] after work. It has no footnote attached to it, and neither does [NAME]’ will-say statement. However, that bullet point is a cut-and-paste copy of what she says [NAME] consulted [NAME] about in 2018. It is also a cut-and-paste copy of what [NAME]’s will-say statement says that [NAME] consulted [NAME] about in 2023. [ 108 ] [NAME]’s fifth bullet point was about the safety and mental well-being of employees and states that [NAME] wanted to make sure that [COMPANY] would not be assigned to work six days a week. [NAME]’s footnote for this bullet point is to Tab 6 of Volume 3 of the joint book of documents, which is a document from 2023. [NAME]’ will-say statement says the same thing, referring to the same 2023 document. [ 109 ] [NAME]’s claim that it consulted [NAME] before March 2, 2021, is also inconsistent with the Board’s findings in the Statutory Freeze Decision , where it found (at paragraph 17) that “[c] onsultations on the [NAME] for 2021 did not commence until March 2, 2021.” [ 110 ] I do not accept that [NAME] consulted [NAME] before March 2, 2021. Its evidence of that consultation consists of documents from 2019 and 2023, along with other documents that have no relevance to the subjects that the alleged consultation was about. By contrast, [NAME]’s will-say is clear that there was no consultation until March 2, 2021. c. Consultation between March 2 and 12, 2021 [ 111 ] [NAME] provided [NAME] with the 2021 [NAME] shortly before the consultation occurred on March 2, 2021. The [NAME] included extended hours of work after the 2021 tax season had concluded. [ 112 ] [NAME], on behalf of [NAME], told [NAME] that he was not prepared to consult on extended hours after tax season and that consultation about that would have to be done separately. He did express his opposition to extended hours after tax season. [ 113 ] [NAME] and [NAME] reached an agreement on extended hours of work during tax season on March 12, 2021. [NAME] agreed to the 2021 [NAME] during tax season effective March 2, 2021 (i.e., the first day of consultation), and the parties backdated their signatures on the agreement to March 2, 2021. d. Consultation on extended hours after tax season after March 12, 2021 [ 114 ] [NAME] and [NAME] met to discuss extended hours at [NAME] centres outside tax season on March 30 and May 13, 2021. They also exchanged emails about the issue. [ 115 ] This time, there is no dispute that the consultation occurred. There also does not appear to be any dispute over what was said during that consultation. The discussion is most clearly set out in emails between [NAME] and [NAME] (on behalf of [NAME]) on April 6, 15, 19, and 22, 2021. Some of that discussion was over the details of [NAME]’s proposed extended hours, which evolved over the course of this consultation and later. [ 116 ] Since the parties’ main dispute is over whether [NAME] adequately justified its decision to extend hours after tax season, I will quote from [NAME]’s email dated April 19, 2021, that sets out the reasons for that decision: … It is the Employer’s view that we have clearly demonstrated by the means of the Federal Government’s direction in the Fall Economic Statement 2020 and by our Minister’s mandate letter from the Prime Minister, that these changes to the hours of work are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service as outlined in paragraph 25.11(b) of the [NAME] agreement. During the January briefing, the Employer indicated to the [NAME] that the Fall Economic Statement announced the government’s investment in an integrated approach to improving [NAME] client experience. The Employer also indicated that this initiative has many components that include improved web content and new digital services but the most significant part of this initiative is the investment in ABSB contact [COMPANY] services to hire more [NAME] agents and increase service availability. Increasing service availability to Canadians requires that the hours of work in the contact centres be modified to include longer hours of service Monday to Friday and service on Saturdays. This information was well received by [NAME] at the time.

For these reasons, the Employer strongly believes that the requirements of paragraph 25.11(b) are demonstrated and satisfied. … [ 117 ] [NAME] responded on April 22, 2021. Most of his response centred on [NAME]’s position that the parties could not set aside the [NAME] agreement during consultations. However, he also stated this: … I am sure that you will also agree that on March 30, during our consultation, I clearly articulated [NAME]’s opposition to extended hours during the filing season. I agree that I did not discuss our position that these hours were required to meet the needs of the public and/or efficient operation of the service. Instead, our consultation centred more about [NAME]’s concerns about what, in our opinion, were obvious violations of the [NAME] agreement inherent in the employer’s proposal. … [ 118 ] While the consultations up to and including May 13, 2021, led to [NAME] making some changes to its proposed extended hours and the way it would implement them, the parties did not reach an agreement. [NAME] wrote on June 8, 2021, to suggest that the parties resolve this by negotiating a [NAME]. The parties formed a task force to try and reach a [NAME], but they were unable to reach an agreement and [NAME] withdrew from the task force on December 23, 2021. e. No refusal to consult by [NAME] [ 119 ] [NAME] submits that [NAME] refused to consult with it and asks me to draw an inference from that refusal that it knew that if it consulted with [NAME], then [NAME] had the right to institute extended hours without its agreement. [ 120 ] [NAME] did not refuse to consult with [NAME]. Frankly, the suggestion that [NAME] refused to consult is ludicrous. It met with [NAME] twice, set out its position clearly by email after each meeting, and proposed solutions, including that the parties negotiate a [NAME]. It explained both its principled objections and some practical concerns. One of those practical concerns was about [NAME]’s initial proposal to force employees to work a Tuesday-to-Saturday schedule; [NAME] responded by proposing using term employees who had been told when they were hired that they may be required to work Saturdays, and [NAME] told [NAME] that was acceptable. f. Imposition of extended hours [ 121 ] The evidence is unclear about when [NAME] imposed extended hours outside tax season in 2021. There appears to be a patchwork of hours, with some locations or units using extended hours and others not or using different hours. [NAME]’s email of May 17, 2021, states that [NAME] will “… transition away from using permanent employees who volunteered to work a Tuesday to Saturday schedule …”, implying that extended hours were already in place at that time. In the Statutory Freeze Decision , the Board concluded that the decision to use extended hours after tax season was implemented after May 1, 2021 (see paragraph 97). [ 122 ] Additionally, in the Statutory Freeze Decision , the Board concluded that by May 1, 2021, [NAME] had only informed [NAME] about extended hours for the 2021 calendar year. It informed [NAME] that it intended to make that change permanent on December 23, 2021. 2. [NAME] justified the scheduling changes a. Framework to interpret the consultation clauses 25.11 and 25.22 [ 123 ] This issue turns on the meaning of clauses 25.11 and 25.22, which deal with consultation over changes to hours of work for [NAME] and [NAME], respectively. [NAME] says that clause 25.11 applies, consistent with its position that these are all [NAME] because [NAME] does not have the ability to turn them into [NAME]; [NAME] says that clause 25.22 applies because it turned them into [NAME]. I agree with [NAME] for the reasons that I set out earlier. Ultimately, however, it does not matter which clause applies because the requirement is the same in both. [ 124 ] Clause 25.22(b) provides this: … […] … Where shifts are to be changed so that they are different from those specified in clause 25.17, the Employer, except in cases of emergency, will consult in advance with the [NAME] on such hours of work and, in such consultation, will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service . … Si les postes doivent être modifiés de sorte qu’ils diffèrent de ceux qui sont indiqués au paragraphe 25.17, l’[NAME], sauf dans les cas d’urgence, doit consulter au préalable l’[NAME] à ce sujet et établir, lors des consultations, que ces postes sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins du public ou assurer le bon fonctionnement du service . … […] [Emphasis added] [ 125 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME] has not met that condition. [ 126 ] The Board’s leading decision on the meaning of that phrase is [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] (Canada Border Services Agency) , 2009 PSLRB 66 (“ [NAME] ”), and both parties rely on that decision. [ 127 ] [NAME] is such a thorough treatment of the issue that it is useful to quote it at length. The clause in that case was numbered 25.22(b), the same as in this [NAME] agreement, which makes the decision easy to follow: … 176 Clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement is a provision concerning consultation but, as urged by the [NAME] agent, it is a consultation provision with a difference. Rather than simply stating a requirement that the employer consult with the [NAME] agent “… where shifts are to be changed so that they are different from those specified in clause 25.17,” it goes further to indicate what the employer must do in consultation. The employer “… will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service.” 177 Broadly speaking, the case before me is about whether the employer engaged in meaningful consultations — again using that term in its common labour relations sense — before it implemented its new “6 and 2” schedule at [NAME] in February 2007. The case departs somewhat from others where meaningful consultation is at issue inasmuch as the parties have stipulated in their [NAME] agreement a specific standard for judging the meaningfulness of the required consultations. Should the employer not “… establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service,” the consultations undertaken by the employer fall short of what the parties have agreed must occur. The challenge for the [NAME] agent is to prove that the employer did not meet the [NAME] agreement standard. 178 Both parties at times offered evidence at the hearing that can reasonably be characterized as either challenging or supporting the merits of the “6 and 2” schedule implemented by the employer and of its component starting times. In my view, the task in this decision is not to serve as an arbiter of the merits of any or all of the shifts proposed and then implemented by the employer. My opinion about the pros and cons of any given [NAME] is irrelevant . Looking closely at the wording of clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement, I believe that the test is different in nuance. What is required is an examination of the facts to determine what the employer actually said and did in consultations in the period leading up to implementation of the new schedule. That evidence might include opinions but only those opinions that the parties actually shared with each other in the meetings and communications that occurred. Looking at the body of factual evidence, the [NAME] agent must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the statements and actions of the employer during the period relevant to the grievance did not “establish” — whatever “establish” means — that the changed shifts were required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service . 179 The words used in clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement, given their normal and ordinary meaning, and understood within the wider framework of the [NAME] agreement, cannot be interpreted to mean that the employer must secure the agreement of the [NAME] agent that the proposed non-standard shifts are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service.… … 180 With the clarification offered by the [NAME] agent during argument, the parties now agree that the employer is not precluded from relying on financial considerations when addressing “the efficient operation of the service,” as referenced in clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement. 181 What exactly the parties intended when they used the verb “establish” in clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement obviously lies at the heart of the dispute. The [NAME] agent submits that I should interpret clause 25.22(b) as requiring the employer “to put beyond doubt” or “to place beyond dispute” that the proposed shifts “… are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service.” It relies on the authority of several dictionary definitions for its interpretation of the employer’s requirement to “establish” in clause 25.22(b) as well as on comments of the adjudicator in [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] , PSSRB File No. 169-02-49 that examined a similar [NAME] agreement provision. 182 With respect, I find that the threshold standard proposed by the [NAME] agent is too high and perhaps draws too selectively from available dictionary definitions. Furthermore, in my view, the adjudication decision cited by the [NAME] agent as supporting its perspective is more persuasive to the opposite effect. 183 I note that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary , cited by the [NAME] agent, also suggests “to put on a firm basis” as a definition of “establish.” The Oxford Concise Dictionary definition, offered as well by the [NAME] agent, refers to the verb “validate” before mentioning “place beyond dispute.” Turning to other authorities, the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary includes the verbs “ascertain” and “demonstrate” alongside “place beyond dispute” and “prove” in its definition of “establish.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary does specify “make acceptable beyond a reasonable doubt” as a definition but it also includes “to provide strong evidence for,” “confirm, validate” and “to found or base securely.” With respect to the term établir in the French text of clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement, Le Petit Robert includes fonder sur des arguments solides, sur des preuves as well as démontrer, montrer, prouver among its definitions. 184 As indicated in the longer excerpt from the decision in [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] , PSSRB File No. 169-02-49, cited above at paragraph 148, the adjudicator specifically disputed giving “establish” the sense of “placing beyond dispute” or “proving” in the context of consultations where there is no decision maker who can determine whether a proposition has been proven or placed beyond dispute. The Board’s decision in [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] , PSSRB File No. 168-02-76, concurred, stating that “establish” required that the employer provide “reasons of substance” for the introduction of changed shifts. As a further precedent, I suggest that the same interpretive approach appears to underlie the adjudicator’s assessment of evidence in [NAME] of Canada v. [NAME] , PSSRB File No. 169-02-448 (19870611). 185 While none of the former decisions are binding on me, I accept that I should have good reason to depart significantly from how other adjudicators have interpreted [NAME] agreement language that is equivalent to, or similar to, clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement. I find that there are not good reasons to do so. Looking on balance at the range of definitions given to the verb “establish” in a number of dictionaries and taking into consideration the most relevant case law, the [NAME] agent’s position does not persuade me. Its argument has the flavour of demanding of the employer something approaching indisputable proof or proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” about the need for additional shifts. In my view, that cannot be what the parties intended the obligation “will establish” to mean. Within the context of a consultation process where one party attempts to persuade the other of the merits of a proposition with the hope — but not the requirement — of securing the other party’s agreement or understanding, the more appropriate sense of “establish,” in my view, revolves around notions of demonstrating, validating, justifying or providing reasons for a proposition. 186 As indicated in the case law, the position that the employer advances in consultations under clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement must be substantively based. It must disclose reasons that relate directly to “the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service.” The reasons cannot be frivolous or capricious nor, I would add, simply an expression of the employer’s preferences. The reasons should be such as to lead a reasonable and disinterested observer to conclude that the employer has outlined a basis for the position that it proposes to pursue and has been prepared to discuss it. In others [ sic ] words, did it conduct meaningful consultations? … 188 In sum, I define the issue before me as follows: Did the [NAME] agent prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the employer did not provide substantive reasons for its position that additional shifts were “… required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service” before it implemented the new “6 and 2” schedule in February 2007 that included those shifts? … [Emphasis added] [ 128 ] In short, the Board concluded that the [NAME] agent must demonstrate that the employer did not provide something substantively based that relates directly to the needs of the public or the efficient operation of the service. Later in its decision, the Board calls this an obligation to provide “a reason of substance” (see paragraph 209). Additionally, in [COMPANY]. v. COPE, Local 378 ([NAME]) , 2012 CarswellBC 3773, Arbitrator Hall summarized this decision as creating “a duty to make a business case.” That seems like a fair description of the test. The employer does not need to prove its business case, but it needs to have one. [ 129 ] I also want to point out that the subjects that [NAME] needs to provide a reason of substance for are disjunctive. It is required to provide a reason of substance for why the new hours are “… required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service” [emphasis added]. [ 130 ] The timing of the reason of substance is also important. In [NAME] , the Board wrote: … 190 … The consultation process envisaged by clause 25.22(b) of the [NAME] agreement is not a continuing process. It has a beginning and an end. It begins when “… shifts are to be changed so that they are different from those specified in clause 25.17.” It has ended once the employer has decided whether to proceed with the changes. … b. [NAME] did not provide a reason of substance for extended hours outside tax season in 2021 [ 131 ] [NAME] first advised [NAME] that it intended year-long extended hours shortly before March 2, 2021, and it informed it that it would actually do that on May 17, 2021. That sets out the relevant period to look for [NAME]’s business case. [ 132 ] So, what were the reasons of substance that [NAME] put to [NAME]? [ 133 ] [NAME] says it was this (from paragraph 99 of its written submissions): … the Employer stated that they needed to implement non-standard shifts to meet the needs of the public and operation of the service due to the following reasons: · There was an increase in [NAME] volume due to a variety of different questions about COVID-19 programs and issues relating to these programs. · The standard [NAME] schedules in 25.17 restricted the Employer from meeting operational requirements as they are conducive to 24/7 operations. For example, if the Employer was required to abide by standard [NAME] hours, then some [NAME] would be paid for hours between 1:00 am to 4:00 am and they would have limited work to do as the majority of calls are during daytime hours. Non-standard shifts were able to conform to daytime hours. This in turn would minimize overtime entitlements needed to be paid to [NAME] if they were to work outside of their hours of 7am to 6pm; · The need to fill staff schedules accordingly and reduce monetary costs as [NAME] could not work Saturday without being paid overtime, but [NAME] could work Saturdays as they are not entitled to automatic overtime; · Staffing non-standard [NAME] after 5pm allows the Employer to meet the availability of Canadian citizens after their usual work hours of 9-5 as this was when a large amount of calls were generated, rather than during the 9-5 work hours. · Safety and concern for the mental health and wellbeing of employees was also a consideration and there was therefore a desire to remove the possibility that [NAME] [COMPANY] agents would have to work six days of work if only day [NAME] were used. [ 134 ] I have already addressed this paragraph earlier in this decision, along with addressing why I do not believe the will-say of [NAME] about this alleged consultation. These bullet points do not accurately describe the consultation that took place. [ 135 ] The email exchanges on March 3 (summarizing the meeting on March 2) and between April 5 and 22, 2021, are a much better source for understanding what was said during those meetings and to find [NAME]’s business case for year-long extended hours. [ 136 ] The email of March 3, 2021, mostly discusses extended hours during tax season. On extended hours outside tax season, it identifies that [NAME] is opposed to them. There is only one bullet point about [NAME]’s reasons for extended hours: “[NAME] [[NAME]] has indicated that this is the direction that the Employer has received from the [NAME] in order to provide services to Canadians” [emphasis added]. [ 137 ] [NAME]’s email dated April 19, 2021, includes the following business case: … The Employer has met with the [NAME] on three previous occasions to discuss and consult on this topic: briefing on January 8, where the Employer briefed the [NAME] on the Fall Economic Statement 2020 and indicated that the tax season hours of work would continue for the balance of the year; official consultation on March 2, where the Employer presented the specific changes to the hours of work for each contact [COMPANY]; and, official consultation on March 30, where we focused on the [NAME]’s concerns with the post-filing season hours of work. During these meetings, you did not express any concerns about the fact that such hours are required to meet the need of the public and/or efficient operation of our services. It is the Employer’s view that we have clearly demonstrated by the means of the Federal Government’s direction in the Fall Economic Statement 2020 and by our Minister’s mandate letter from the Prime Minister , that these changes to the hours of work are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service as outlined in paragraph 25.11(b) of the [NAME] agreement. During the January briefing, the Employer indicated to the [NAME] that the Fall Economic Statement announced the government’s investment in an integrated approach to improving [NAME] client experience. The Employer also indicated that this initiative has many components that include improved web content and new digital services but the most significant part of this initiative is the investment in ABSB contact [COMPANY] services to hire more [NAME] agents and increase service availability. Increasing service availability to Canadians requires that the hours of work in the contact centres be modified to include longer hours of service Monday to Friday and service on Saturdays. This information was well received by [NAME] at the time.

For these reasons, the Employer strongly believes that the requirements of paragraph 25.11(b) are demonstrated and satisfied. … What you are proposing in your response is, in order to have employees work on Saturdays, the Employer must assign the time to [NAME] as overtime which would then mean that these employees would have to work 6 consecutive days. Beyond the fact that we do not share your interpretation, you are aware that the past year, and more specifically the last few months, have been very intense for these employees. Given this, the Employer has substantial concerns related to the impacts that this would have on the health and well-being of these employees who are already overworked . … [Emphasis added] [ 138 ] I also considered the email dated June 8, 2021, in which [NAME] proposed dealing with this issue through a [NAME]. In that email, [NAME] described the consultation that happened during the relevant period as follows: … [NAME] has also listened attentively to the employer’s concerns and needs, including but not limited to: · The impact on service delivery and extended hours of operation brought on by the Fall Economic Statement and directions by authorized representatives of the [NAME]; · The need for a combination of external recruitment and hiring and the utilization of experienced employees to deliver [NAME]’s programs; and · The desire to use experienced staff to provide technical resources and training as required. … [ 139 ] As I said earlier, the clauses are disjunctive in that [NAME] needs to show a substantive reason that its new hours meet the needs of the public or the efficient operation of the service. [ 140 ] [NAME]’s business case for why extended hours outside tax season “meet the needs of the public” comes down to this: it was told to do this in the 2020 Fall Economic Statement and the minister’s mandate letter. Most of its evidence about the consultation that took place is about that. [ 141 ] [NAME] has not filed a copy of the minister’s mandate letter. I do not know whether it provided a copy to [NAME] during consultations. However, it is available online (see the Minister of National Revenue Supplementary Mandate Letter , specifically here , when this decision was issued). The closest it comes to the topic of extended hours is a mandate to “ [w]ith more Canadians accessing services from the Canada Revenue Agency ([NAME]), with the support of the Minister of Digital Government, continue to take steps to improve their satisfaction with the quality, timeliness and accuracy of its services.” Even if [NAME] had provided [NAME] with this mandate letter, it does not provide a reason of substance for extended hours. [ 142 ] [NAME] filed a copy of the 2020 Fall Economic Statement . However, it did not point to anything in it about extended hours at [NAME] centres. In reply, [NAME] made this argument: … … In paragraph 15, [NAME] asserts the Fall Economic Statement clearly articulated the requirement for non-standardized [NAME] schedules. In fact, it did not. The Employer has not referred to any portion of the Fall Economic Statement that says this. As [NAME] emphasizes at paragraph 28 of his will say, that document may have included new funding but it did not require [NAME] to extend hours for the balance of the year or impose non-standard [NAME] schedules. It merely sought efficiencies from [NAME] and did not prescribe how to obtain them. [NAME]’s approach before the Board is the same as it was in consultations with [NAME]: it states there is a need but fails to establish there actually is one. … [ 143 ] I agree with that submission. [ 144 ] I have read the 2020 Fall Economic Statement carefully, despite [NAME] not pointing me to anything in it. There is an entry on page 58 stating that the federal government planned on spending $99 million to ensure access to [NAME] centres in fiscal year 2020-2021. [NAME] also prepared its own summary of the highlights of the 2020 Fall Economic Statement (at least from its perspective). That list of highlights included the following: … Approved for 100% of the funding requested for 2021-2022, then full funding for technology, and 50% for telephones thereafter. This will allow [NAME] to modernize and strengthen its three main service delivery channels - web, digital, and telephones - to help Canadians obtain the benefits to which they are entitled and to help them properly comply with their tax obligations. … [ 145 ] This does not suggest extending the hours of [NAME] centres; in fact, it suggests that [NAME] wants to pivot away from [NAME] centres and toward web and digital applications. [ 146 ] As for the efficient operation of the service, the only item that [NAME] raised in this round of consultation was the health and well-being of these employees who were already overworked and would be more so if asked to work overtime on Saturdays. This explanation does not address the extension of hours during the week (i.e., after 5:00 p.m., Monday to Friday). [NAME] is also just declaring this without providing any indication of the veracity of this statement. [ 147 ] I want to be clear that [NAME] is not required to “prove” its reasons of substance to [NAME] or to the Board. In this case, the burden rests on [NAME] to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that [NAME] did not provide substantive reasons for its position that additionally, it needed to redraw the [NAME] rules, to prevent employees from being overworked. [ 148 ] Finally, [NAME] argues that [NAME] admitted that consultations were adequate in an email he wrote on June 8, 2021. I disagree. That email just says that [NAME] did this: … … listened attentively to the employer’s concerns and needs, including but not limited to : · The impact on service delivery and extended hours of operation brought on by the Fall Economic Statement and directions by authorized representatives of the [NAME] .… … [ 149 ] That is not an admission that [NAME] has established reasons of substance for a revised [NAME] schedule, particularly since [NAME] goes on to state in that email that [NAME]’s proposal breaches the [NAME] agreement but could be addressed through a [NAME]. [ 150 ] I conclude that [NAME] met its burden of proof for the March through May 2021 consultation. [NAME] provided no reason of substance for there being a public need for extended hours in [NAME] centres and provided no reason of substance for why the way it went about scheduling extended hours was required in the interests of operational efficiency. c. [NAME] provided a reason of substance for permanently extending hours outside tax season starting in 2022 [ 151 ] As I said earlier, in the Statutory Freeze Decision , the Board treated the [NAME] to extended hours year-round in 2021 as different from the permanent [NAME] to extended hours in 2022. [NAME] takes the position that consultation was not required in December 2021 because the extended hours were already permanent. This position is inconsistent with the finding in Statutory Freeze Decision , and I reject it in this case as well. There is a material difference between a change in hours that was supposed to last for a year and one that is permanent; [NAME] had to consult about both. [ 152 ] However, it did consult. As [NAME] spelled out in her will-say, she did so “to cover [her] bases”. [ 153 ] That consultation took place in December 2021 and was less extensive than the consultation earlier in the year. It took place on December 21, 2021. [ 154 ] [NAME]’s will-say says that she discussed the following reasons behind the permanent extension of hours: … · Due to an uptick in [NAME] volume due to a variety of different questions about COVID-19 programs and issues relating to these programs, like the [NAME]. Non-standard shifts would allow the Employer to receive calls outside of a standard [NAME] hours in clause 25.17 and of a [NAME] hours of 7am to 6pm, which in turn would minimize overtime entitlements needed to be paid to [NAME] if they were to work outside of their hours of 7am to 6pm; · It allowed the Employer to minimize overtime entitlements to schedule non-standard [NAME] on Saturday’s because a [NAME] would have been needed to been paid overtime; and · Staffing non-standard [NAME] after 5pm allows the Employer to meet the availability of Canadian citizens after their usual work hours of 9-5 as this was when a large amount of calls were generated, rather than during the 9-5 work hours. · [NAME] centres receive thousands of calls from Canadians year-round on Saturdays, which reduces high [NAME] volume during the week, therefore leading to less unanswered calls of Canadians. … [ Sic throughout] [ 155 ] [NAME]’s will-say does not mention the content of this meeting but simply says that it occurred. [NAME] was not cross-examined. Additionally, she sent an email on December 23, 2021, outlining their discussion. Her email is less detailed than her will-say, but it does refer to the volume of calls that [NAME] was receiving on [NAME]’s views about Saturday work, i.e. the fourth bullet point. It also states that the extension of hours would be permanent, not just for 2022. That email confirms at least some of her will-say. In light of this, I am prepared to accept her evidence about the December 21, 2021, consultation. [ 156 ] [NAME] responded by email on January 10, 2022, to say that the [NAME] was opposed to the hours of work and would be filing this policy grievance and making the statutory-freeze complaint that eventually was allowed in the Statutory Freeze Decision . [ 157 ] This time, I have concluded that [NAME] has not met its burden to prove that [NAME] provided no reason of substance for there being a public need for extended hours in [NAME] centres — namely, that Canadians were actually calling on Saturdays and after hours. Unlike the consultation earlier in 2021, this involved a concrete demand for service by the public and not just an increase in funding. [NAME] also provided a reason of substance for not following the normal [NAME] rules; namely, a non-standard [NAME] schedule would allow [NAME] to handle this increase in calls after hours and on Saturdays without requiring employees to work overtime. Either explanation would have satisfied clause 25.22(b). d. Requirement to consult about each schedule [ 158 ] [NAME] also argues that [NAME] violated clause 25.22(b) because it did not consult with it about each non-standard [NAME] schedule. To explain, in [NAME] , the Board concluded at paragraphs 197 to 199 that the obligation to consult applied to each changed [NAME] or each additional starting time. [NAME] argues that [NAME] did not consult about each [NAME], contrary to that principle. [ 159 ] I disagree. The [NAME] sent by [NAME] for the 2021 year, and the permanent [NAME] starting in 2022, outlined the hours of work for several business lines in each of [NAME]’s [NAME] centres. The [NAME] in each case was the same format as the [NAME] sent in the previous years. Unlike what happened with the Hamilton-[COMPANY] in 2019, there is no indication that [NAME] departed from the schedules provided in the [NAME] sent to [NAME] for 2021 and 2022. The Board’s decision in [NAME] must be understood in the circumstances of that case — namely, consultation about discrete shifts at one airport. Finally, [NAME]’s position is inconsistent with its argument about the timeliness of this grievance — namely, the deadline to grieve was triggered only when [NAME] learned about the breach. This is consistent with [NAME]’s position that consultations must take place with him on behalf of [NAME] and not in any other forum (such as the [COMPANY]). [NAME] cannot complain about the lack of consultation about individual shifts when it was the one insisting on national-level consultation. 3. [NAME] is estopped from changing hours of work without the agreement of [NAME] [ 160 ] [NAME] also argues that [NAME] was estopped from making both the temporary and permanent changes to hours of work in 2021. [ 161 ] Estoppel is a principle of law applicable throughout the legal system that prevents a party from acting in a particular way if it would be unjust to allow it to do so. The principle of estoppel is used frequently in labour cases, and it should be applied in a manner consistent with a labour relations context (see Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals , 2011 SCC 59 at para. 60). [ 162 ] Specifically, [NAME] argues [NAME] is estopped because of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel has four elements, as set out in Mount Sinai Hospital [COMPANY] v. [NAME] (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41 at page 310: … The party relying on the doctrine must establish that the other party has, [1] by words or conduct, made a promise or assurance [2] which was intended to affect their legal relationship and to be acted on. Furthermore, the representee must establish that, [3] in reliance on the representation, [4] he acted on it, or in some way changed his position.… [ 163 ] [NAME] argues that a representation that meets the first element of this test can include a course of conduct, and [NAME] does not argue otherwise. [ 164 ] [NAME] argues that the representation in this case was the parties’ long-standing practice of agreeing on extended hours of work and compensation for [COMPANY] during tax season. This practice has been ongoing since 2014. This practice was intended to affect the parties’ relationship, and [NAME] relied on it to its detriment by not negotiating the issue in a [NAME] agreement. [ 165 ] [NAME] does not contest any of [NAME]’s submissions; nor does it cite any authorities to contradict those submissions. Its submissions on estoppel are short, and I will quote them in full: … 133. The issue of estoppel must fail as the Union is relying on inapplicable provisions of the [NAME] agreement to assert same. 134. The practices of consulting the Union and then entering into a memorandum with them, deals with the extension of a [NAME] hours pursuant to section 25.11(b). To be clear, the Employer maintains that they do not need the Union’s agreement when extending a [NAME] hours to satisfy 25.11(b), all the Employer needs to do is to consult with the Union. 135. Furthermore, these practices have only occurred during tax filing season and has never happened outside of tax filing season. 136. The issue of estoppel clearly fails as the Union is relating the longstanding practices to an extension of a [NAME]’s schedules that deal with 25.11 whereas the issues in these proceedings relate to the change of a [NAME] to a [NAME] and the change of a [NAME] hours in 25.11 to non-standard [NAME] hours. The longstanding practices are also confined to tax filing season, not all year round. 137. Lastly, a decision upholding estoppel would hurt labour relations between the parties or would have a chilling effect in the labour community because rather than unilaterally imposing their will to extend a [NAME] hours, which the Employer can do if meeting the requirements in section 25.11, the Employer and Union are building a more harmonious relationship with the memorandums they have implemented in which they can take back to their Union members and say “we have achieved this for you”. A decision upholding estoppel would have a chilling effect as employers may resist a harmonious relationship in the future that would lead to negative labour relations within the community. … [ Sic throughout] [ 166 ] I disagree with [NAME]’s submissions. [ 167 ] First, whether the agreement was reached under clause 25.11 (day work) or 25.22 ([NAME] work) is irrelevant. The practice that [NAME] relies on is the practice of agreeing to extend the hours of [NAME] and compensate them accordingly. If anything, [NAME]’s submissions show how far it departed from its past practice by, for the first time in over seven years, deciding to turn [NAME] into [NAME]. [NAME]’s submission is tantamount to arguing that it is not estopped because it made a radical change from a past practice instead of only a minor one. The key, as [NAME] submits, is that the practice was to reach an agreement on extended hours of work each year; it makes no difference under which part of the [NAME] agreement [NAME] purports to act. [ 168 ] Second, [NAME]’s submission that the [NAME] agreement does not require it to reach an agreement with [NAME] about extended hours is also beside the point. The whole point to estoppel is that a party is estopped from exercising its strict rights under the [NAME] agreement because of its representation or course of conduct tantamount to a representation that the other party relied on to their detriment. [ 169 ] Third, [NAME] argues that the past practice was only for hours of work during tax season and that its change to permanent extended hours falls outside that past practice. I reject that argument for reasons similar to the first argument — namely, [NAME] cannot avoid the operation of estoppel by making a significant change to its past practice instead of just a minor one. As [NAME] submits, the agreement in previous years covered only the tax season because [NAME] wanted to extend hours only during the tax season. [ 170 ] I agree with [NAME] that this situation is analogous to that in [COMPANY]. v. [NAME]., [NAME], 1994 CanLII 18687 (NB LA). In that case, the [NAME] agreement gave the employer the right to amend the pension plan. However, the employer had always negotiated previous changes to the pension plan with the union. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that it could not unilaterally change the pension plan without giving the union notice that it would make changes unilaterally in the future, so the union could collectively bargain the pension plan. [ 171 ] Similarly, I conclude that [NAME] was estopped from resiling from its long-standing practice of reaching an agreement with [NAME] about the extension of hours, and corresponding compensation, of [COMPANY]. [ 172 ] Finally, [NAME] argues that finding an estoppel in this case would harm labour relations. I am not entirely sure how. It seems to be arguing that employers would be less likely to try to reach agreements with [NAME] agents instead of exercising rights unilaterally if the Board concludes that the act of reaching agreements means that it can no longer act unilaterally. [NAME]’s argument is speculative. Also, as [NAME] points out, any estoppel ends after a party gives notice that they will rely on the strict wording of the [NAME] agreement, and the parties have negotiated a new [NAME] agreement. [ 173 ] [NAME]’s will-say explains that hours of work for [COMPANY] were “… a contentious issue at the [NAME] table …” during that next round of [NAME]. Ultimately, the parties did not amend the [NAME] agreement in a way that would prevent [NAME] from doing what it did, and the estoppel came to an end. I note that the parties negotiated an increase to the [NAME] and weekend premiums for [NAME], which benefited the [COMPANY] impacted by the extension of hours of [NAME] centres. [ 174 ] For these reasons, [NAME] was estopped from changing the hours of work of [COMPANY] without first reaching an agreement with [NAME], until the parties negotiated a new [NAME] agreement in 2023. E. The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-49606 (2023) [ 175 ] The third policy grievance was presented after consultation that occurred on December 7, 2023. [ 176 ] As I stated earlier, effective in 2022, [NAME] made its change in hours of work permanent. This means that the obligation to consult was slightly different for this grievance. Clause 25.22(a) requires that [NAME] consult with [NAME] about shifts in existence when a [NAME] agreement is signed “on request” of [NAME]. The parties entered into a new [NAME] agreement on June 27, 2023. This means that the obligation to consult is set out in clause 25.22(a), not clause 25.22(b), like the previous grievance. [ 177 ] With that said, clause 25.22(a) imposes the same requirement on [NAME] as clause 25.22(b) — namely, to establish that the shifts are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service. The only difference is that [NAME] has to ask for the consultation. [ 178 ] In this case, [NAME] asked for consultation on November 8, 2023. [NAME] says that it did so because [NAME] had been discussing hours of work with the wrong committee, but the reason for the consultation is not relevant to the application of clause 25.22(a). The fact remains that [NAME] requested consultation on that date. On November 14, 2023, [NAME] sent [NAME] another copy of the 2022 [NAME], as that remained the current hours of work for the [NAME] centres. [ 179 ] The consultation occurred on December 7, 2023. This time, the parties agree about what was discussed. The notes of that consultation include the following: … Management then mentioned that the hours of work being presented are permanent and there is no intention to revert to other hours of work after the upcoming filling season. There is a demand for Contact Centres to be open on Saturdays as significant [NAME] volumes have been observed on Saturdays. These hours of work are required and they meet the needs of Canadians. Management also shared that there is no indication that the Government is willing to change those hours. … Management mentioned that the decision to include Monday to Saturdays as [NAME] was not to save on budget, but rather to increase well being of employees and to remove the possibility of asking [COMPANY] agents to work 6 days a week as opposed to regular 5 days a week work schedule. Asking for continuous overtime could negatively affect employees’ mental health and work balance. Management also mentioned that the actual approach is to look for volunteers to work Saturdays. Also, when new employees are hired in the Contact Centres, they are informed about the possibility of having regular hours that include Saturday as regular [NAME]. Management shared that the wording of the [NAME] Agreement does not address these challenges adequately. The Union agreed with Management and also shared that the [NAME] Agreement is not clear on the subject as it does not define [NAME] work. The current language used in the [NAME] Agreement is not customized to todays needs. … [ Sic throughout] [ 180 ] [NAME]’s reasons of substance for the change in [NAME] schedule was the same as in late 2021 — namely, there was a public demand for [NAME] centres on Saturday, and using overtime instead of a [NAME] change would have led to excessive work for its employees. I reach the same conclusion for this grievance as for the previous one. [NAME] has provided reasons of substance for the change in shifts, as required under clause 25.22(a). F. Conclusion about the second main issue [ 181 ] In summary, I have allowed the first policy grievance because [NAME] did not consult about the change in schedule at the [NAME], and the grievance is not untimely. I have allowed the second policy grievance because [NAME] is estopped from changing the hours of work at [NAME] centres without [NAME]’s agreement. I also conclude that [NAME] did not meet its duty to consult for 2021 but that it met that duty for 2022. Finally, I have denied the third policy grievance because the estoppel came to an end, and [NAME] met its duty to consult about hours of work. [ 182 ] For all of the above reasons, the Board makes the following order: (The Order appears on the next page)

VI. Order [ 183 ] The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-40738 is allowed. [ 184 ] The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-45730 is allowed. [ 185 ] The grievance in Board file no. 569-34-49606 is denied. [ 186 ] The Board will remain seized of the grievances in file nos. 569-34-40738 and 569-34-45730, to address the issue of the appropriate remedy in those cases. April 9, 2026 . [NAME], a panel of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board APPENDIX A **Article 25 — Hours of work **Article 25 – Durée du travail General Généralités 25.01 For the purpose of this Article: 25.01 Aux fins de l’application du présent article : a. the week shall consist of seven (7) consecutive days beginning at 00:00 hours Monday morning and ending at 24:00 hours Sunday; a. la semaine est une période de sept (7) jours consécutifs qui commence à 00 h le lundi matin et se termine à 24 h le dimanche; b. the day is a twenty-four (24) hour period commencing at 00:00 hours. b. le jour est une période de vingt-quatre (24) heures qui commence à 00 h. 25.02 Nothing in this Article shall be construed as guaranteeing minimum or maximum hours of work. In no case shall this permit the Employer to reduce the hours of work of a full-time employee permanently. 25.02 Aucune disposition du présent article ne doit être interprétée comme garantissant une durée de travail minimale ou maximale. Cela ne permet aucunement à l’[NAME] de réduire en permanence les heures de travail d’un [NAME] à temps plein. … […] 25.03 The employees may be required to register their attendance in the Employer’s electronic time reporting system. 25.03 [NAME] peuvent être tenus d’enregistrer leur présence dans le système électronique de rapport de temps de l’[NAME]. 25.04 It is recognized that certain operations require some employees to stay on the job for a full scheduled work period, inclusive of their meal period. In these operations, such employees will be compensated for their half (1/2) hour meal period in accordance with the applicable overtime provisions. 25.04 Il est admis que certaines activités exigent la présence d’[NAME] au travail pendant toute la période de travail prévue à leur horaire, y compris la pause-repas. Dans ces cas, les [NAME] sont rémunérés pour leurs pauses-repas conformément aux dispositions relatives aux heures supplémentaires. … […] 25.05 25.05 a. The Employer will provide two (2) rest periods of fifteen (15) minutes each per full working day except on occasions when operational requirements do not permit. a. L’[NAME] doit assurer deux (2) périodes de repos de quinze (15) minutes chacune par journée de travail complète, sauf dans les cas où les nécessités du service ne le permettent pas. b. Subject to operational requirements, every employee who is nursing shall, upon request, have their hours of work scheduled in a way to provide for any unpaid breaks necessary for them to nurse or to express breast milk. Such request shall not be unreasonably denied. b. Sous réserve des nécessités du service, toute employée qui allaite aura, sur demande, ses heures de travail prévues de manière à fournir les pauses non rémunérées nécessaires à son allaitement ou pour extraire le lait maternel. Cette demande ne peut être refusée sans motif valable. Day Work Travail de jour 25.06 Except as provided for in clauses 25.09, 25.10, and 25.11: 25.06 Sauf indication contraire dans les paragraphes 25.09 et 25.11 : a. the normal work week shall be thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours from Monday to Friday inclusive, and a. la semaine normale de travail est de trente-sept virgule cinq (37,5) heures et s’étend du lundi au vendredi inclusivement, et b. the normal work day shall be seven decimal five (7.5) consecutive hours, exclusive of a lunch period, between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. b. la journée normale de travail est de sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures consécutives, sauf la pause-repas, et se situe entre 7 h et 18 h. 25.07 25.07 a. Employees shall be informed by written notice of their scheduled hours of work. Any changes to the scheduled hours shall be by written notice to the employee(s) concerned. The Employer will endeavour to provide seven (7) days notice for changes to the scheduled hours of work. a. [NAME] sont informés par écrit de leur horaire de travail, ainsi que des changements qui y sont apportés. L’[NAME] s’efforcera de donner un préavis de sept (7) jours lors d’un changement à l’horaire de l’[NAME]. b. When a term employee is required to report for work on a normal day of work and upon reporting is informed that they are no longer required to work their scheduled hours of work, the employee shall be paid a minimum of three (3) hours at their straight-time rate of pay, or the actual hours worked, whichever is greater. b. Lorsque l’[NAME] nommé pour une période déterminée est tenu de se présenter au travail un jour normal de travail et qu’une fois sur les lieux, l’[NAME] l’informe que ses services ne sont plus requis pour les heures cédulées, l’[NAME] touche une rémunération minimum de trois (3) heures au tarif des heures normales, ou pour les heures accomplies, la plus élevée des deux. This provision does not apply if the term employee is notified in advance not to report for work. Cette disposition ne s’applique pas si l’[NAME] nommé pour une période déterminée a été informé à l’avance de ne pas se présenter au travail. … […] 25.08 Flexible Hours 25.08 Horaire mobile Subject to operational requirements, an employee on day work shall have the right to select and request flexible hours between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. and such request shall not be unreasonably denied. The parties recognize that employees who request to start work at 6:00 am consistent with this clause shall not be entitled to the early hour premium (consistent with Article 25.12) for the period of 6:00 am to 7:00 am., nor should it result in additional costs to the Employer. Sous réserve des nécessités du service, l’[NAME] qui travaille de jour a le droit de demander de travailler selon un horaire mobile allant de 6 h à 18 h, aux heures que l’[NAME] choisit, et cette demande ne peut être refusée sans motif valable. [NAME] reconnaissent que les [NAME] qui demandent de commencer à travailler à 6h00 conformément à la présente alinéa n’auront pas droit à la prime d’heure devancée (conformément à l’article 25.12) pour la période de 6h00 à 7h00, et que ceci ne doit pas entraîner des coûts supplémentaires pour l’[NAME]. … […] 25.09 Compressed Work Hours 25.09 Heures de travail comprimées a. Notwithstanding the provisions of clause 25.06, upon request of an employee and the concurrence of the Employer, an employee may complete the weekly hours of employment in a period of other than five (5) full days provided that over a period of fourteen (14), twenty-one (21), or twenty-eight (28) calendar days, the employee works an average of thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours per week. a. Nonobstant les dispositions du paragraphe 25.06, l’[NAME] peut, s’il en fait la demande et que l’[NAME] y consent, répartir sa semaine de travail autrement que sur une période de cinq (5) jours à condition que, au cours d’une période de quatorze (14), vingt et un (21) ou vingt-huit (28) jours civils, l’[NAME] travaille en moyenne trente-sept virgule cinq (37,5) par semaine. b. In every fourteen (14), twenty-one (21), or twenty-eight (28) calendar day period, the employee shall be granted days of rest on such days as are not scheduled as a normal work day for the employee. b. Au cours de chaque période de quatorze (14), vingt et un (21) ou vingt-huit (28) jours civils, l’[NAME] doit bénéficier de jours de repos les jours qui ne figurent pas à son horaire de travail normal. c. Employees covered by this clause shall be subject to the variable hours of work provisions established in clauses 25.24 to 25.27. c. [NAME] visés par le présent paragraphe sont assujettis aux dispositions concernant les horaires de travail variables qui figurent aux paragraphes 25.24 à 25.27. … […] 25.10 Reserved for future use 25.10 Réservé pour une utilisation future 25.11 Consultation 25.11 Consultation a. Where hours of work, other than those provided in clause 25.06, are in existence when this Agreement is signed, the Employer, on request, will consult with the [NAME] on such hours of work and in such consultation will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service. a. Si les heures de travail qui existent à la signature de la présente convention diffèrent de celles qui sont prévues au paragraphe 25.06, l’[NAME], sur demande, doit consulter l’[NAME] à ce sujet et établir, lors des consultations, que ces heures sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins du public ou assurer le bon fonctionnement du service. b. Where hours of work are to be changed so that they are different from those specified in clause 25.06, the Employer, except in cases of emergency, will consult in advance with the [NAME] on such hours of work and, in such consultation, will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service. In no case shall the hours under clause 25.06 extend before 6:00 a.m. or beyond 9:00 p.m., or alter the Monday to Friday work week, or the seven decimal five (7.5) consecutive hours work day. b. Si les heures de travail doivent être modifiées de sorte qu’elles diffèrent de celles qui sont indiquées au paragraphe 25.06, l’[NAME], sauf dans les cas d’urgence, doit consulter au préalable l’[NAME] à ce sujet et établir, lors des consultations, que ces heures sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins du public ou assurer le bon fonctionnement du service. Les heures décrites au paragraphe 25.06 ne peuvent en aucun moment se prolonger avant 6 h ou au-delà de 21 h, ou modifier la semaine de travail du lundi au vendredi ou le jour de travail de sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures consécutives. c. Within five (5) days of notification of consultation served by either party, the parties shall notify one another in writing of the representative authorized to act on their behalf for consultation purposes. Consultation will be held at the local level for fact finding and implementation purposes. c. [NAME] doivent, dans les cinq (5) jours qui suivent la signification d’un avis de consultation par l’une ou l’autre partie, communiquer par écrit le nom de leur [NAME] autorisé à agir en leur nom pour les besoins de la consultation. La consultation tenue à des fins d’établissement des faits et de mise en oeuvre a lieu au niveau local. d. It is understood by the parties that this clause will not be applicable in respect of employees whose work week is less than thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours per week. d. [NAME] conviennent que les dispositions du présent paragraphe ne s’appliquent pas dans le cas des [NAME] dont la durée hebdomadaire du travail est inférieure à trente-sept virgule cinq (37,5) heures. … […] 25.12 25.12 a. An employee on day work whose hours of work are changed to extend before or beyond the stipulated hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., as provided in paragraph 25.06(b), and who has not received at least seven (7) days’ notice in advance of the starting time of such change, shall be paid for the first (1st) day or [NAME] worked subsequent to such change at the rate of time and one-half (1 1/2) for the first seven decimal five (7.5) hours and double (2) time thereafter. Subsequent days or shifts worked on the revised hours shall be paid for at straight-time, subject to Article 28, Overtime. a. L’[NAME] qui travaille de jour, dont l’horaire est modifié de sorte qu’il précède ou dépasse les heures prescrites de 7 h et de 18 h indiquées à l’alinéa 25.06b) et qui ne reçoit pas un préavis d’au moins sept (7) jours avant l’entrée en vigueur de cette modification, est rémunéré au tarif et demi (1 1/2) pour les sept virgule cinq (7,5) premières heures et au tarif double (2) par la suite pour le premier (1er) jour de travail ou le premier (1er) poste effectué à la suite de ce changement. Les jours ou les postes de travail subséquents prévus au nouvel horaire sont rémunérés au tarif normal, sous réserve des dispositions de l’article 28, Heures supplémentaires. b. Early and Late Hour Premium b. Prime d’heures devancées et tardives An employee who is not a [NAME] and who completes their work day in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 25.11(b) shall receive an Early Hour Premium of seven dollars ($7) per hour for each hour worked before 7:00 a.m., and/or a Late Hour Premium of seven dollars ($7) for each hour worked after 6:00 p.m. The Early and Late Hour Premiums shall not apply to overtime hours. L’[NAME] qui ne travaille pas par poste et qui effectue sa journée de travail selon les termes de l’alinéa 25.11b) touche une prime d’heures devancées de sept dollars (7 $) l’heure pour toutes les heures effectuées avant 7 h, et/ou une prime d’heures tardives de sept dollars (7 $) l’heure pour toutes les heures effectuées après 18 h. La prime d’heures devancées et tardives ne s’applique pas aux heures supplémentaires. [NAME] par poste 25.13 When, because of the operational requirements, hours of work are scheduled for employees on a rotating or irregular basis, they shall be scheduled so that employees, over a period of not more than fifty-six (56) calendar days: 25.13 Lorsque, en raison des nécessités du service, la durée du travail des [NAME] est répartie par roulement ou de façon irrégulière, elle doit être fixée de façon que les [NAME], au cours d’une période maximale de cinquante-six (56) jours civils : a. on a weekly basis, work an average of thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours and an average of five (5) days; a. sur une base hebdomadaire, travaillent en moyenne trente-sept virgule cinq (37,5) heures et en moyenne cinq (5) jours; b. work seven decimal five (7.5) consecutive hours per day, exclusive of a one-half (1/2) hour meal period; b. travaillent sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures consécutives par jour, sans compter la pause-repas d’une demi-heure (1/2); c. obtain an average of two (2) days of rest per week; c. bénéficient en moyenne de deux (2) jours de repos par semaine; d. obtain at least two (2) consecutive days of rest at any one time, except when days of rest are separated by a designated paid holiday which is not worked; the consecutive days of rest may be in separate calendar weeks. d. bénéficient d’au moins deux (2) jours de repos consécutifs en un moment donné, sauf quand un jour férié désigné payé qui est un jour chômé sépare les jours de repos; les jours de repos consécutifs peuvent faire partie de semaines civiles séparées. 25.14 The Employer will make every reasonable effort: 25.14 L’[NAME] s’efforce, dans la mesure du possible : a. not to schedule the commencement of a [NAME] within sixteen (16) hours of the completion of the employee’s previous [NAME]; and a. d’éviter que le poste d’un [NAME] commence moins de seize (16) heures après la fin de son poste précédent, et b. to avoid excessive fluctuation in hours of work. b. d’éviter les fluctuations excessives de l’horaire de travail. 25.15 The staffing, preparation, posting, and administration of [NAME] schedules are the responsibility of the Employer. 25.15 La dotation en personnel, l’établissement, l’affichage et l’administration des horaires des postes sont la responsabilité de l’[NAME]. 25.16 The Employer shall set up a master [NAME] schedule for a fifty-six (56) day period, posted fifteen (15) days in advance, which will cover the normal requirements of the work area. 25.16 L’[NAME] établit un horaire général des postes portant sur une période de cinquante-six (56) jours et l’affiche quinze (15) jours à l’avance; cet horaire doit répondre aux besoins normaux du lieu de travail. 25.17 Except as provided for in clauses 25.22 and 25.23, the standard [NAME] schedule is: 25.17 Sauf indication contraire aux paragraphes 25.22 et 25.23, l’horaire normal des postes est le suivant : a. 12 midnight to 8 a.m.; 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.; 4 p.m. to 12 midnight; or alternatively a . de minuit à 8 h; de 8 h à 16 h; de 16 h à minuit; ou b. 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.; 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.; 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. b. de 23 h à 7 h; de 7 h à 15 h; de 15 h à 23 h. 25.18 A specified meal period shall be scheduled as close to the mid-point of the [NAME] as possible. It is also recognized that the meal period may be staggered for employees on continuous operations. However, the Employer will make every effort to arrange meal periods at times convenient to the employees. 25.18 La pause-repas se situe aussi près que possible du milieu du poste. Il est également admis que les pauses-repas peuvent être échelonnées dans le cas des activités qui exigent une présence permanente. Toutefois, l’[NAME] fait tout en son pouvoir pour permettre aux [NAME] de prendre leurs pauses-repas à des heures qui leur conviennent. 25.19 25.19 a. Where an employee’s scheduled [NAME] does not commence and end on the same day, such [NAME] shall be considered for all purposes to have been entirely worked: a. Lorsque le poste prévu à l’horaire de l’[NAME] ne commence ni ne finit le même jour, ce poste est réputé, à toutes fins utiles, avoir été entièrement effectué : i. on the day it commenced where half (1/2) or more of the hours worked fall on that day, or i. le jour où il a commencé si la moitié (1/2) ou plus des heures effectuées tombent ce jour-là, ou ii. on the day it terminates where more than half (1/2) of the hours worked fall on that day. ii. le jour où il s’est terminé si plus de la moitié (1/2) des heures effectuées tombent ce jour-là. b.

Accordingly, the first (1st) day of rest will be considered to start immediately after midnight of the calendar day on which the employee worked or is deemed to have worked their last scheduled [NAME]; and the second (2nd) day of rest will start immediately after midnight of the employee’s first (1st) day of rest, or immediately after midnight of an intervening designated paid holiday if days of rest are separated thereby. b. En conséquence, le premier (1er) jour de repos est réputé commencer juste après minuit le jour civil pendant lequel l’[NAME] a effectué ou est réputé avoir effectué son dernier poste prévu à l’horaire; et le deuxième (2e) jour de repos commence juste après minuit le premier (1er) jour de repos ou juste après minuit un jour férié désigné payé intermédiaire si celui-ci sépare les jours de repos. 25.20 25.20 a. An employee who is required to change their scheduled [NAME] without receiving at least seven (7) days’ notice in advance of the starting time of such change in their scheduled [NAME], shall be paid for the first (1st) [NAME] worked on the revised schedule at the rate of time and one‑half (1 1/2) for the first seven decimal five (7.5) hours and double (2) time thereafter. Subsequent shifts worked on the revised schedule shall be paid for at straight-time, subject to Article 28, Overtime. a. L’[NAME] qui ne reçoit pas un préavis d’au moins sept (7) jours portant modification de son poste à l’horaire est rémunéré au tarif et demi (1 1/2) pour les sept virgule cinq (7,5) premières heures et à tarif double (2) par la suite pour le travail exécuté au cours du premier poste de l’horaire modifié. Les postes subséquents exécutés d’après le nouvel horaire sont rémunérés au tarif normal, sous réserve de l’article 28, Heures supplémentaires. b. Every reasonable effort will be made by the Employer to ensure that the employee returns to their original [NAME] schedule and returns to their originally scheduled days of rest for the duration of the master [NAME] schedule without penalty to the Employer. b. Tout effort raisonnable sera fait par l’[NAME] pour faire en sorte que l’[NAME] retourne à son horaire de travail initial et retourne à ses jours de repos prévus à l’horaire initial pour la durée de l’horaire général de travail par poste, sans pénalité pour l’[NAME]. 25.21 Provided sufficient advance notice is given, the Employer may: 25.21 Pourvu qu’il soit prévenu suffisamment d’avance, l’[NAME] peut : a. authorize employees to exchange shifts if there is no increase in cost to the Employer, and a. autoriser les [NAME] à échanger leurs postes si cela ne fait pas augmenter les frais de l’[NAME], et b. notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 25.13(d), authorize employees to exchange shifts for days of rest if there is no increase in cost to the Employer b. nonobstant les dispositions de l’alinéa 25.13d), autoriser les [NAME] à échanger leurs postes contre des jours de repos si cela ne fait pas augmenter les frais de l’[NAME]. 25.22 25.22 a. Where shifts, other than those provided in clause 25.17, are in existence when this Agreement is signed, the Employer, on request, will consult with the [NAME] on such hours of work and in such consultation will establish that such shifts are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service. a. Si les postes qui existent à la signature de la présente convention diffèrent de ceux qui sont prévus au paragraphe 25.17, l’[NAME], sur demande, doit consulter l’[NAME] à ce sujet et établir, lors des consultations, que ces postes sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins du public ou assurer le bon fonctionnement du service. b. Where shifts are to be changed so that they are different from those specified in clause 25.17, the Employer, except in cases of emergency, will consult in advance with the [NAME] on such hours of work and, in such consultation, will establish that such hours are required to meet the needs of the public and/or the efficient operation of the service. b. Si les postes doivent être modifiés de sorte qu’ils diffèrent de ceux qui sont indiqués au paragraphe 25.17, l’[NAME], sauf dans les cas d’urgence, doit consulter au préalable l’[NAME] à ce sujet et établir, lors des consultations, que ces postes sont nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins du public ou assurer le bon fonctionnement du service. c. Within five (5) days of notification of consultation served by either party, the parties shall notify one another in writing of the representative authorized to act on their behalf for consultation purposes. Consultation will be held at the local level for fact finding and implementation purposes. c. [NAME] doivent, dans les cinq (5) jours qui suivent la signification d’un avis de consultation par l’une ou l’autre partie, communiquer par écrit le nom de leur [NAME] autorisé à agir en leur nom pour les besoins de la consultation. La consultation tenue à des fins d’établissement des faits et de mise en oeuvre a lieu au niveau local. 25.23 [NAME] Schedule Arrangements 25.23 Aménagements d’horaires de postes variables a. Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses 25.05 and 25.13 to 25.22 inclusive, consultation may be held at the local level with a view to establishing [NAME] schedules which may be different from those established in clauses 25.13 and 25.17. Such consultation will include all aspects of arrangements of [NAME] schedules. a. Nonobstant les dispositions des paragraphes 25.05 et 25.13 à 25.22 inclusivement, des consultations peuvent être tenues au niveau local en vue d’établir des horaires de travail par poste qui pourraient être différents de ceux établis par les paragraphes 25.13 et 25.17. De telles consultations incluront tous les aspects des aménagements des horaires de travail par poste. b. Once a mutually acceptable agreement is reached at the local level, the proposed variable [NAME] schedule will be submitted at the respective Employer and [NAME] levels before implementation. b. Quand une entente mutuelle acceptable est obtenue au niveau local, l’horaire de travail variable proposé sera soumis aux niveaux respectifs de l’administration centrale de l’[NAME] et de l’[NAME] avant la mise en vigueur. c. Both parties will endeavour to meet the preferences of the employees in regard to such arrangements. c. Les deux parties essaieront de satisfaire les préférences des [NAME] quant à de tels aménagements. d. It is understood that the flexible application of such arrangements must not be incompatible with the intent and spirit of provisions otherwise governing such arrangements. Such flexible application of this clause must respect the average hours of work over the duration of the master schedule and must be consistent with the operational requirements as determined by the Employer. d. Il est entendu que l’application flexible de tels aménagements ne doit pas être incompatible avec l’intention et l’esprit des dispositions régissant autrement de tels aménagements. Cette même application flexible du présent paragraphe doit respecter la moyenne des heures de travail pour la durée de l’horaire général et doit être conforme aux nécessités du service telles que déterminées par l’[NAME]. e. Employees covered by this clause shall be subject to the Variable Hours of Work provisions established in clauses 25.24 to 25.27, inclusive. e. [NAME] visés par le présent paragraphe sont assujettis aux dispositions concernant l’horaire de travail variable établies aux paragraphes 25.24 à 25.27, inclusivement. Terms and Conditions Governing the Administration of Variable Hours of Work Conditions régissant l’administration des horaires de travail variables 25.24 The terms and conditions governing the administration of variable hours of work implemented pursuant to clauses 25.09, 25.10, 25.13 and 25.23 are specified in clauses 25.24 to 25.27, inclusive. This Agreement is modified by these provisions to the extent specified herein. 25.24 Les conditions régissant l’administration des horaires de travail variables mis en oeuvre conformément aux paragraphes 25.09, 25.13 et 25.23 sont stipulées aux paragraphes 25.24 à 25.27, inclusivement. La présente convention est modifiée par les présentes dispositions dans la mesure indiquée par celles-ci. 25.25 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the implementation of any variation in hours shall not result in any additional overtime work or additional payment by reason only of such variation, nor shall it be deemed to prohibit the right of the Employer to schedule any hours of work permitted by the terms of this Agreement. 25.25 Nonobstant toute disposition contraire dans la présente convention, la mise en oeuvre d’un horaire de travail différent ne doit pas entraîner des heures supplémentaires additionnelles ni une rémunération supplémentaire du seul fait du changement d’horaire, et ne doit pas non plus être réputée retirer à l’[NAME] le droit d’établir la durée du travail stipulée dans la présente convention. 25.26 25.26 a. The scheduled hours of work of any day as set forth in a variable schedule specified in clause 25.24, may exceed or be less than seven decimal five (7.5) hours; starting and finishing times, meal breaks, and rest periods shall be determined according to operational requirements as determined by the Employer and the daily hours of work shall be consecutive. a. Les heures de travail d’une journée quelconque figurant à l’horaire variable précisé au paragraphe 25.24 peuvent être supérieures ou inférieures à sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures; les heures du début et de la fin, les pauses-repas et les périodes de repos sont fixées en fonction des nécessités du service déterminées par l’[NAME], et les heures journalières de travail sont consécutives. b. Such schedules shall provide an average of thirty-seven decimal five (37.5) hours of work per week over the life of the schedule. b. L’horaire doit prévoir une moyenne de trente-sept virgule cinq (37,5) heures de travail par semaine pendant toute la durée de l’horaire. i. The maximum life of a [NAME] schedule shall be six (6) months . i. La durée maximale d’un horaire de postes est de six (6) mois. ii. The maximum life of other types of schedule shall be twenty-eight (28) days, except when the normal weekly and daily hours of work are varied by the Employer to allow for summer and winter hours in accordance with clause 25.10, in which case the life of a schedule shall be one (1) year. ii. La durée maximale des autres types d’horaires est de vingt-huit (28) jours. c. Whenever an employee changes their variable hours or no longer works variable hours, all appropriate adjustments will be made. c . Lorsque l’[NAME] modifie son horaire variable ou cesse de travailler selon un tel horaire, tous les rajustements nécessaires sont effectués. 25.27 Specific Application of this Agreement 25.27 Champ d’application particulier de la présente convention For greater certainty, the following provisions of this Agreement shall be administered as provided herein: Pour plus de certitude, les dispositions suivantes de la présente convention sont appliquées comme suit : a. Interpretation and Definitions (clause 2.01) a . Interprétation et définitions (paragraphe 2.01) “Daily rate of pay” — shall not apply. « taux de rémunération journalier » – ne s’applique pas. b. Minimum Number of Hours Between Shifts b . Nombre minimum d’heures entre les postes Paragraph 25.14(a), relating to the minimum period between the termination and commencement of the employee’s next [NAME], shall not apply. L’alinéa 25.14a) qui concerne le nombre minimum d’heures entre la fin d’un poste et le début du poste suivant de l’[NAME], ne s’applique pas. c. Exchange of Shifts (clause 25.21) c . Échange de postes (paragraphe 25.21) On exchange of shifts between employees, the Employer shall pay as if no exchange had occurred. [NAME] qui échangent leurs postes sont rémunérés par l’[NAME] comme s’il n’y avait pas eu d’échange. d . Overtime (clauses 28.04 and 28.05) d . Heures supplémentaires (paragraphes 28.04 et 28.05) Overtime shall be compensated for all work performed in excess of an employee’s scheduled hours of work on regular working days or on days of rest at time and three-quarters (1 3/4). Des heures supplémentaires sont payées à tarif et trois quarts (1 3/4) pour tout travail exécuté par l’[NAME] en sus des heures de travail prévues à son horaire un jour de travail normal ou les jours de repos. e. Designated Paid Holidays (clause 30.07) e. Jours fériés payés (paragraphe 30.07) i. A designated paid holiday shall account for seven decimal five (7.5) hours. i. Un jour férié désigné payé correspond à sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures. ii. When an employee works on a Designated Paid Holiday, the employee shall be compensated, in addition to the pay for the hours specified in subparagraph (i), at time and one‑half (1 1/2) up to their regular scheduled hours worked and at double (2) time for all hours worked in excess of their regular scheduled hours. ii. L’[NAME] qui travaille un jour férié payé est rémunéré, en plus de la rémunération versée pour les heures précisées au sous-alinéa (i), au tarif et demi (1 1/2) jusqu’à concurrence des heures normales de travail prévues à son horaire et au tarif double (2) pour toutes les heures additionnelles que l’[NAME] effectue. f. Travel f. Déplacements Overtime compensation referred to in clause 32.06 shall only be applicable on a work day for hours in excess of the employee’s daily scheduled hours of work. La rémunération des heures supplémentaires dont il est question au paragraphe 32.06 ne s’applique qu’aux heures qui dépassent le nombre d’heures prévues à l’horaire de travail journalier de l’[NAME] au cours d’une journée de travail. g. Acting Pay g. Rémunération d’intérim The qualifying period for acting pay as specified in paragraph 63.07(a) shall be converted to hours. La période ouvrant droit à la rémunération d’intérim indiquée à l’alinéa 62.07a) est convertie en heures. h. Conversion of Days to Hours h. Conversion des jours en heures All of the provisions of this Agreement, which specify days, shall be converted to hours. Where this Agreement refers to a “day”, it shall be converted to seven decimal five (7.5) hours. Notwithstanding the above, in Article 46, Bereavement Leave with Pay, a “day” will be equal to a calendar day. Whenever an employee changes their variable hours, or no longer works variable hours, all appropriate adjustments shall be made. Dans toutes les dispositions de la présente convention [NAME] où il est question de « jours », ceux-ci sont convertis en heures, un jour correspondant à sept virgule cinq (7,5) heures. Nonobstant ce précède, à l’article 46, Congé de deuil payé, le mot « jour » a le sens de jour civil. Lorsque l’[NAME] modifie son horaire variable ou cesse de travailler selon un tel horaire, tous les rajustements nécessaires sont effectués. i. Leave — General i. Congés - généralités Leave will be granted on an hourly basis and the hours debited for each period of leave shall be the same as the employee would normally have been scheduled to work on that day. Les congés sont accordés en heures, le nombre d’heures débitées pour chaque période de congé correspondant au nombre d’heures de travail normalement prévues à l’horaire de l’[NAME] pour la journée en question.