CPP Disability Pension Appeal Dismissed Due to Incorrect Onset Date

Citation: BR v [NAME] , 2026  SST  79 Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division – Income Security Section Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: [NAME] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: [NAME] reconsideration decision dated April 8, 2025 (issued by Service Canada) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: January 12, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Decision date: January 23, 2026 File number: GP-25-631 On this page Decision Overview What the Appellant must prove Reasons for my decision Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The Appellant, [NAME]., isn’t eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. This decision explains why I am dismissing the appeal. Overview [ 3 ] The Appellant worked as a production operator on an automobile assembly line. She stopped working because of neck pain. [ 4 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension on November 15, 2021, Footnote 1 and again on December 6, 2023. Footnote 2 The [NAME] (Minister) refused both applications. The Appellant appealed the Minister’s decision on her second application to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. [ 5 ] The Minister says the Appellant isn’t eligible for a disability pension because diagnostic imaging doesn’t show a serious problem with her neck. And her medical condition was conservatively managed until she had neck surgery, over a year after her [NAME] coverage ended. Footnote 3 [ 6 ] At the hearing, the Appellant’s representative argued that the Appellant’s testimony was credible and supports that she is disabled. Her medical condition wasn’t managed successfully, which is why she required surgery. She was disabled long before the surgery took place. [ 7 ] I agree with the Appellant’s representative. However, I still find that the Appellant isn’t eligible for a disability pension. This is because she didn’t have [NAME] coverage when she became disabled in November 2018. What the Appellant must prove [ 8 ] To succeed, the Appellant must prove she has a disability that became severe and prolonged when she had [NAME] coverage—in other words, during her coverage period. The coverage period is called the “minimum qualifying period” ( MQP ). The MQP is based on your contributions to the [NAME] . Footnote 4 [ 9 ] The Appellant has two [NAME]. [ 10 ] Her first MQP ended on December 31, 2007. [ 11 ] Her second MQP (known as a prorated MQP ) was from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2019. This MQP relies on her contributions in 2019. Since her contributions in 2019 were below the amount that the [NAME] accepts, the rule about prorated [NAME] steps in and gives her a partial year of coverage. There are two interpretations of the rule about prorated [NAME] [ 12 ] The rule about prorated [NAME] is in section 44(2.1) of the [NAME] . It says: For the purpose of determining the minimum qualifying period of a contributor referred to in subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), the basic exemption for the year in which they would have been considered to have become disabled, and in which the base unadjusted pensionable earnings are less than the relevant Year’s Basic Exemption for that year, is an amount equal to that proportion of the amount of that Year’s Basic Exemption that the number of months that would not have been excluded from the contributory period by reason of disability is of 12. [ 13 ] The Minister’s written submissions contain two different interpretations of the rule. Footnote 5 [ 14 ] In its first submissions to the Tribunal ([NAME]), the Minister said the Appellant had to prove she became disabled at any time before July 2019. In other words, she could qualify for a disability pension even if she became disabled between 2008 and 2018, when she didn’t have [NAME] coverage. The Minister provided further submissions explaining its position (GD9). [ 15 ] The Minister’s third batch of submissions ([NAME]) seems to alternate between this view and the view that the Appellant had to become disabled during one of her [NAME]. [ 16 ] The following statement from paragraph 6 of [NAME] aligns with the view that the Appellant could become disabled at any time before July 2019: The Appellant’s MQP of December 31, 2007, “can be extended by prorating her 2019 earnings and contributions to the end of June 2019. For an explanation of [the Appellant’s] MQP , please see [[NAME]].” Footnote 6 As I mentioned, [NAME] asserts that the Appellant could qualify for a disability pension if she became disabled at any time before July 2019. [ 17 ] By contrast, the following statement from paragraph 2 of [NAME] aligns with the view that the Appellant had to become disabled during one of her [NAME]: The Appellant wasn’t “incapable of performing any and all work activity on or prior to December 31, 2007, or in 2019, by the end of June and continuously thereafter.” [ 18 ] This statement from paragraph 22 of [NAME] could be consistent with either view: “The evidence does not suggest the presence of a severe medical condition that would have precluded [the Appellant] from performing any and all types of work on or prior to December 31, 2007 or by the end of June 2019, and continuously thereafter.” [ 19 ] A complication arises in paragraph 39 of [NAME], where the Minister states: “Should the Tribunal determine that [the Appellant] does, in fact, meet the legislative criteria, regardless of when the disability manifests, the established date of onset must be no later than the MQP of December 31, 2007 or between January 1st and the end of June 2019, the prorated MQP .” [ 20 ] This statement is in line with GD9, where the Minister argues that an applicant can become disabled between the end of their MQP and the beginning of their prorated MQP . But for payment purposes , an applicant can’t be considered disabled until the beginning of their prorated MQP . [ 21 ] In its final submissions (GD15), the Minister adopts the more restrictive interpretation of prorated [NAME] with this statement in paragraph 9: If the Appellant isn’t disabled by December 31, 2007, then … it must be determined if she became disabled … in 2019 by the end of June. If it is determined that she became disabled in 2019 by the end of June, then her earnings and contributions could be prorated as per subsection 44(2.1) of the [NAME] and her MQP can be extended to June 2019. [ 22 ] The Minister didn’t explain why its position apparently changed. [ 23 ] I asked the Appellant’s representative for his perspective (GD12). He wrote in GD13: “We conclude by agreeing with the Minister’s position [in [NAME]] regarding the prorated MQP . Specifically paragraph 39 of the submission confirms that the date of onset must be no later than the MQP of December 31, 2007 or between January 1 and the end of June 2019, the prorated MQP .” It is still unclear, though, if the Appellant’s representative believes the Appellant could become disabled at any time before July 2019, provided that her date of onset for payment purposes is within one of the [NAME]. My interpretation of the rule about prorated [NAME] [ 24 ] The outcome of this appeal depends on which interpretation of the rule about prorated [NAME] I adopt. If I adopt the view that the Appellant could become disabled at any time before July 2019, then she is eligible for a disability pension. If I adopt the view that she had to become disabled during one of her [NAME], then she isn’t eligible. [ 25 ] I adopt the second view. I believe it is the only view that is consistent with the text, context, and purpose of section 44(2.1). In coming to this conclusion, I agree with the reasons of my colleague in a case called [NAME] . Footnote 7 Briefly, I agree with the second view for the following reasons:

1) The rule says it applies “for the year in which [a person] would have been considered to have become disabled” (my emphasis). This tells me that the rule only applies to the year in which you become disabled—in this case, 2019.

2) You can only rely on [NAME] contributions that you made during your contributory period to qualify for a disability pension. Once you become disabled, your contributory period ends. Footnote 8 If the Appellant became disabled before 2019, then the contributions that she made in 2019 could not be used to give her a prorated MQP . [ 26 ] To ensure that the Appellant and her representative understood the legal test to be met, at the outset of the hearing, I explained that I would be deciding if she became disabled by December 31, 2007, or between January 1, 2019, and June 30, 2019. What “severe” and “prolonged” mean [ 27 ] The [NAME] defines “severe” and “prolonged.” [ 28 ] A disability is severe if it makes you incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 9 [ 29 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. Footnote 10 [ 30 ] The Appellant must prove she has a severe and prolonged disability. She must prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means she must show it is more likely than not that she is disabled. Reasons for my decision [ 31 ] The Minister argues that the Appellant isn’t disabled. The Appellant’s representative argues that the Appellant became disabled in January 2019. I find that the Appellant became disabled from her own job in August 2018 and from any job in November 2018. For [NAME] purposes, this means she became disabled in November 2018. Because she became disabled after her first MQP ended and before her prorated MQP began, she isn’t eligible for a disability pension. I reached this decision by considering the following issues: Was the Appellant’s disability severe? Was the Appellant’s disability prolonged? Was the Appellant’s disability severe? [ 32 ] The Appellant’s disability became severe in November 2018. I reached this finding by considering several factors. I explain these factors below. The Appellant’s functional limitations affected her ability to work [ 33 ] When I look at whether the Appellant is disabled, I can’t focus on her diagnoses. Footnote 11 Instead, I must focus on whether she has functional limitations that get in the way of her earning a living. Footnote 12 She must provide some medical evidence to support that her functional limitations affect her ability to work. Footnote 13 [ 34 ] The Minister argues that the medical evidence is insufficient because diagnostic imaging doesn’t show a serious problem with the Appellant’s neck. I disagree with this argument. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that chronic pain can be disabling even if it doesn’t show up on tests. Footnote 14 I find that there is ample medical evidence to support severe functional limitations. [ 35 ] The evidence shows that the Appellant fell and hurt her neck while walking her dog around the beginning of April 2018. Her neck was painful and her spine was tender. Footnote 15 In August 2018, she saw a nurse practitioner, [NAME], about a tingling sensation in her fingers, as well as pain in her shoulders and hips. Footnote 16 [NAME] completed an insurance form one week later. The form documents limitations with bending, reaching, lifting, and walking. Footnote 17 A week after that, [NAME] wrote that the Appellant was unable to fulfil her work duties due to her symptoms. Footnote 18 The Appellant could not do her usual job as of August 2018 [ 36 ] The Appellant’s representative says the Appellant became disabled in January 2019 because, according to her second application, she stopped working on January 20, 2019. Footnote 19 She also testified that she stopped working in the first or second week of January 2019. [ 37 ] But the evidence shows that she probably stopped working in August 2018. That is when she could no longer do her usual job. [ 38 ] Indeed, [NAME] and [NAME] (another nurse practitioner) said the Appellant was unable to work as of August 2018 after trying modified duties and shorter shifts. Footnote 20 [NAME] also said the Appellant reported working until August 2018. Footnote 21 In her first application, she gave August 2019 as the date she stopped working. Footnote 22 It is more likely that she meant to write August 2018 than January 2019. And her recollection of when she stopped working would have been more reliable when she filled out her first application than when she filled out her second application or testified at the hearing. [ 39 ] Most significantly, her employer completed a questionnaire for Service Canada which gave August 7, 2018, as her last day of work. After that, she received short-term disability benefits and then long-term disability benefits. Footnote 23 Her short-term benefits are the likely source of her minimal [NAME] contributions in 2019. [ 40 ] Even if the Appellant worked after August 2018, it is clear to me that she wasn’t regularly capable of doing her job. She testified that she started working part-time in August or September 2018, doing modified duties—she “put brackets on sleeves” on the assembly line. Yet she estimates that she missed multiple days of work each week because she “couldn’t do it.” [ 41 ] I now have to decide whether the Appellant can regularly do other types of work. To be severe, her functional limitations must prevent her from earning a living at any type of work, not just her usual job. Footnote 24 The Appellant could not do any other job as of November 2018 [ 42 ] When I am deciding whether the Appellant can work, I can’t just look at her medical conditions and how they affect what she can do. I must also consider factors such as her: age level of education language abilities work and life experience [ 43 ] These factors help me decide whether the Appellant can work in the real world—in other words, whether it is realistic to say she can work. Footnote 25 [ 44 ] I find that the Appellant was unable to work in the real world as of November 2018. Her personal characteristics are relatively positive. She was nearly 50 years old at the time, with a high school diploma. She is fluent in English. She has experience working in [NAME] and on an [NAME]. Footnote 26 [ 45 ] Unfortunately, the Appellant’s functional limitations outweigh these positive factors. Medical evidence from September to November 2018 described worsening pain that impacted the Appellant’s sleep. She depended on her mother to drive her places because she could not turn her neck. She had trouble sitting, standing, walking, lifting, bending, pushing, and pulling. She also had trouble gripping, typing, and writing. Footnote 27 [ 46 ] As a result of these extensive limitations, she could do neither a physical nor a sedentary job as of November 2018. She wasn’t able to keep a predictable work schedule, even part-time. [ 47 ] I find that the Appellant’s disability was severe as of November 2018. Was the Appellant’s disability prolonged? [ 48 ] Even though the Appellant’s disability became severe in November 2018, she could still qualify for a disability pension if her disability didn’t become prolonged until sometime between January 1 and June 30, 2019. This is because you aren’t considered disabled for [NAME] purposes until your disability is both severe and prolonged. Footnote 28 So, I must also consider when her disability became prolonged. [ 49 ] I find that the Appellant’s disability became prolonged in November 2018. [ 50 ] The Appellant’s medical conditions kept her from working at any job in November 2018 and didn’t improve until after surgery in October 2020. Even then, she didn’t improve enough to regain work capacity. The Appellant’s limitations continued from November 2018 to October 2020 [ 51 ] The medical evidence from November 2018 to October 2020, when she had neck surgery, Footnote 29 supports that the Appellant had ongoing severe limitations, despite trying physiotherapy and medication. Her limitations remained much the same as they were earlier in 2018. Footnote 30 [ 52 ] There are two pieces of evidence from this period which could suggest that the Appellant’s limitations improved. I will explain why I don’t find them convincing. [ 53 ] First, [NAME] (a family doctor) completed an insurance form in February 2019. Footnote 31 He endorsed limitations with heavy lifting and activities that required the Appellant to bend her neck. He didn’t check the boxes for limitations with sitting, standing, walking, operating machinery, driving, focusing or using fine motor skills. He didn’t check the box indicating issues with energy or stamina. [ 54 ] However, [NAME] said on April 13, 2020, that he didn’t know the Appellant’s current limitations because she had mainly been seen by [NAME]. Footnote 32 He likely wasn’t as familiar with the Appellant’s limitations as [NAME] was in February 2019, either. Indeed, between April 2018 and February 2019, the Appellant saw [NAME] six times and [NAME] only twice. Footnote 33 Between February 2019 and April 13, 2020, the Appellant saw [NAME] twice and didn’t see [NAME] at all. Footnote 34 [ 55 ] Importantly, [NAME] did endorse limitations with sitting, standing, walking, operating machinery, driving, lifting, pushing, pulling, climbing ladders, gripping, writing, and typing. She also wrote that the Appellant was fatigued. Footnote 35 I prefer [NAME]’s evidence. [ 56 ] Second, [NAME] (a neurosurgeon) wrote in October 2019 that the Appellant was only limited by pain and that, after receiving appropriate treatment, she should be able to return to work. Footnote 36 I recognize that [NAME] didn’t tell her to avoid certain activities (she had no restrictions ). At the same time, I accept that pain, while not itself a limitation, can cause limitations. Footnote 37 Based on the other medical evidence, which emphasizes the impact of the Appellant’s pain on her daily functioning, I believe that is the case here. The Appellant’s recovery from surgery wasn’t enough to let her work [ 57 ] At first, the Appellant seemed to be slowly recovering after surgery. Footnote 38 Unfortunately, her improvement plateaued. She continued to have pain and reduced range of motion in her neck. She complained of weakness in both hands, poor sleep, and poor balance. Footnote 39 Her mother and a friend moved in with her to help her with daily tasks. She still can’t drive because she can’t turn her neck. Footnote 40 [ 58 ] In his follow-up report from October 2021, [NAME] (the surgeon) doubted that the Appellant could return to work. Footnote 41 In January 2022, [NAME] said she “really cannot do any gainful employment. I think this is permanent.” Footnote 42 He reiterated this opinion in March 2022. Footnote 43 [NAME], who took over [NAME]’ practice, agreed with [NAME]. Footnote 44 [ 59 ] The appeal file contains no medical evidence after August 2022. [NAME] closed her practice, leaving the Appellant without a family doctor. She goes to the hospital when she needs medication. Footnote 45 [ 60 ] Notwithstanding the lack of recent medical evidence, I accept that the Appellant’s disability has been continuously severe from November 2018 to the hearing date. I base this on: the duration of her symptoms (documented up to August 2022) the extent of her treatment (physiotherapy, medications, and surgery) her testimony about ongoing limitations [ 61 ] For the same reasons, I find that her disability is long continued and likely to be of indefinite duration. So, it is prolonged. Conclusion [ 62 ] I find that the Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME] disability pension because she became disabled in November 2018, after her first MQP ended and before her prorated MQP began. [ 63 ] This means the appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD2R-173 to 185. Return to footnote 1 Footnote 2 See GD2R-1047 to 1070. Return to footnote 2 Footnote 3 [NAME] and GD15. Return to footnote 3 Footnote 4 See sections 19, 44(2), and 44(2.1) of the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are at [NAME]-28. Return to footnote 4 Footnote 5 The Minister didn’t send a representative to the hearing. Return to footnote 5 Footnote 6 Paragraph 5 contains an almost identical statement. Return to footnote 6 Footnote 7 [NAME] v Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2025  SST  152 at paragraphs 39 to 57. Return to footnote 7 Footnote 8 See section 44(2)(b) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 8 Footnote 9 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of severe disability. Section 68.1 of the [NAME] says a job is “substantially gainful” if it pays a salary or wages equal to or greater than the maximum annual amount you could get from a disability pension. Return to footnote 9 Footnote 10 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of prolonged disability. Return to footnote 10 Footnote 11 [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81. Return to footnote 11 Footnote 12 [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 12 Footnote 13 [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME] , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 13 Footnote 14 See Nova Scotia (WCB) v Martin , [2003] 2 SCR. Return to footnote 14 Footnote 15 See GD2R-467. Return to footnote 15 Footnote 16 See GD2R-465. Return to footnote 16 Footnote 17 See GD2R-511 to 513. Return to footnote 17 Footnote 18 See GD2R-463. Return to footnote 18 Footnote 19 See GD2R-1059 and GD13. Return to footnote 19 Footnote 20 See GD2R-462 to 464. Return to footnote 20 Footnote 21 See GD2R-436 to 438. Return to footnote 21 Footnote 22 See GD2R-436 to 438. Return to footnote 22 Footnote 23 See GD2R-184. Return to footnote 23 Footnote 24 [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 24 Footnote 25 [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 25 Footnote 26 See GD2R-1060 and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 26 Footnote 27 See GD2R-461, 462, and 501 to 503. The Appellant explained at the hearing why her mother has to drive her. Return to footnote 27 Footnote 28 See section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 28 Footnote 29 See GD14-6 and 7. Return to footnote 29 Footnote 30 See, for example, GD2R-418 to 422, 444, 445, 447 to 449, 454 to 457, 611, 612, 617 to 619. The Appellant could walk for a while but her arms would hurt the next day (GD2R-328). Return to footnote 30 Footnote 31 See GD2R-454 to 457. Return to footnote 31 Footnote 32 See GD2R-425 to 427. Return to footnote 32 Footnote 33 See GD2R-459, 461 to 463, 465, 611, 612, 617, and 618. Return to footnote 33 Footnote 34 See GD2R-619 and 622. Return to footnote 34 Footnote 35 See GD2R-501 to 503 and 505 to 507. Return to footnote 35 Footnote 36 See GD2R-436 to 438. Return to footnote 36 Footnote 37 Limitations are things that you are unable to do or have trouble doing because of a medical condition. Return to footnote 37 Footnote 38 See GD2R-285, 680, GD14-4 and 5. Return to footnote 38 Footnote 39 See GD2R-270, 271, 275, 685, and GD14-3. Return to footnote 39 Footnote 40 See the hearing recording. Return to footnote 40 Footnote 41 See GD14-3. Return to footnote 41 Footnote 42 See GD2R-685. Return to footnote 42 Footnote 43 See GD2R-270 and 271. Return to footnote 43 Footnote 44 See GD2R-609 and 610. Return to footnote 44 Footnote 45 See the hearing recording. Return to footnote 45