CPP Disability Pension Appeal Dismissed Due to Insufficient Proof of Severe Disability

Citation: JG  v  [NAME] , 2026  SST  301 Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division – Income Security Section Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative on file: [NAME] at the hearing: [NAME] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: [NAME] reconsideration decision dated March 6, 2025 (issued by Service Canada) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: April 13, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Decision date: April 16, 2026 File number: GP-25-887 On this page Decision Overview What the Appellant must prove Matters I have to consider first Reasons for my decision Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The Appellant, J. G., isn’t eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. This decision explains why I am dismissing the appeal. Overview [ 3 ] The Appellant is 56 years old. He had a heart attack on February 11, 2022. Shortly after that, he had surgery to have stents inserted. Footnote 1 At the time, he was working as a maintenance coordinator for a [NAME]. He hasn’t tried to work or look for work since the heart attack. Footnote 2 [ 4 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension on December 29, 2023. Footnote 3 He based his application on: ongoing heart palpitations physical and mental fatigue anxiety and panic attacks post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [ 5 ] The [NAME] (Minister) refused his application. The Appellant appealed the Minister’s decision to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. [ 6 ] The Minister says the Appellant’s health has improved with treatment and he is no longer taking any medications for his mental health. This supports that he can work. Footnote 4 [ 7 ] The Appellant says he can’t work. He tried two medications for his mental health. His family doctor, [NAME], hasn’t recommended any more. Instead, [NAME] advised him that staying home and not working is, in the Appellant’s words, “the best place I can be.” Footnote 5 [ 8 ] I find that the Appellant hasn’t fulfilled his duty to pursue treatment for his medical conditions. As a result, I must dismiss his appeal. What the Appellant must prove [ 9 ] The Appellant must prove he has a disability that was severe and prolonged by the hearing date, which was April 13, 2026. Footnote 6 [ 10 ] The [NAME] defines “severe” and “prolonged.” [ 11 ] A disability is severe if it makes a person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 7 [ 12 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. Footnote 8 [ 13 ] The Appellant must prove he has a severe and prolonged disability. He must prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means he must show it is more likely than not that he is disabled. Matters I have to consider first I accepted late documents [ 14 ] The Appellant submitted documents after the deadline. I accepted them. I gave my reasons in a letter on April 7, 2026. I gave the Minister until April 15, 2026, to respond. The Minister responded on April 13, 2026. Reasons for my decision [ 15 ] I find that the Appellant hasn’t proven he had a severe and prolonged disability by April 13, 2026. Was the Appellant’s disability severe? [ 16 ] The Appellant’s disability wasn’t severe. I reached this finding by considering several factors. I explain these factors below. The Appellant’s functional limitations affected his ability to work [ 17 ] The Appellant bases his appeal on: ongoing heart palpitations physical and mental fatigue anxiety and panic attacks PTSD [ 18 ] At the hearing, the Appellant said he doesn’t know how to distinguish among anxiety, panic attacks, and PTSD. He seemed to use these terms interchangeably to describe the same thing—essentially, he is anxious. [ 19 ] It doesn’t matter what term or terms I use, since my focus must be on the Appellant’s functional limitations, not his diagnoses. Footnote 9 I must look at all of his medical conditions (not just the main one) and think about how they affected his ability to work. Footnote 10 He must provide some medical evidence to support that his functional limitations affected his ability to work. Footnote 11 [ 20 ] I find that the Appellant had functional limitations by April 13, 2026. He has made a full physical recovery from his heart attack, except that he gets tired easily. His other limitations are related to his mental health. The Appellant physically recovered from his heart attack [ 21 ] The evidence shows that the Appellant has made a full physical recovery from his heart attack, except that he gets tired easily. He described this as physical and mental fatigue. [ 22 ] In May 2022, [NAME] (the Appellant’s cardiologist) reassured the Appellant that he was doing well physically and should resume his daily activities. Footnote 12 In June 2022, he was able to achieve high workloads on an exercise stress test. [NAME] (an internist) attributed the Appellant’s complaints of ongoing chest pain to anxiety. Footnote 13 In 2023, [NAME] confirmed that the Appellant’s heart had recovered from the heart attack. Footnote 14 That same year, the Appellant achieved good results on another exercise stress test, Footnote 15 and a Holter monitor was normal. Footnote 16 The results of a 2024 exercise stress test were also positive. Footnote 17 [ 23 ] Despite the Appellant’s objective physical recovery, he initially avoided physical activity out of fear that it might cause another heart attack. He was concerned about ongoing palpitations. Footnote 18 He thought that he had “overwhelming” physical restrictions. Footnote 19 But none of his [NAME] recommended that he avoid physical activity or found his reports of palpitations to be concerning. In fact, [NAME] wrote that his only physical restrictions were those imposed by his anxiety. Footnote 20 [ 24 ] The Appellant testified that he gets tired easily. He usually has the most energy in the morning, so that is when he does things like housework and grocery shopping. Although the objective medical evidence doesn’t explain his fatigue, I accept his testimony on this point. The Appellant has limitations related to his mental health [ 25 ] The Appellant’s remaining limitations are related to his mental health. [ 26 ] On the Appellant’s application, he said time-sensitive tasks, having to respond to emails and phone calls, and other daily situations make him anxious and give him palpitations. He identified difficulty with: Footnote 21 adjusting to change keeping at difficult tasks asking co-workers for help dealing with people he doesn’t know controlling his emotions doing what people in authority ask him to do being in public places [ 27 ] The medical evidence supports that the Appellant is anxious and that this causes behavioural limitations. This started after he had surgery. [NAME] described him as having “borderline PTSD” from the experience. He was overwhelmed by the fear of having another heart attack. On an insurance form, [NAME] endorsed limitations with social interaction, decision-making, focus, handling deadlines, and accommodating change. Footnote 22 In January 2024, the Appellant saw a psychiatrist, [NAME], for a one-time consultation. The Appellant told [NAME] that he was irritable and had trouble focusing. Footnote 23 [ 28 ] The medical evidence supports that the Appellant’s functional limitations impacted his ability to work. [ 29 ] Next, I will look at whether the Appellant fulfilled his duty to pursue treatment for his medical conditions. The Appellant didn’t do enough to treat his mental health [ 30 ] To receive a disability pension, a person must actively pursue treatment and not refuse treatment unreasonably. Footnote 24 [ 31 ] I find that, while the Appellant has taken some steps to treat his mental health, he hasn’t fulfilled his duty to pursue treatment. What does a failure to pursue treatment look like? [ 32 ] Disability pension applicants must make reasonable efforts to pursue treatment. Different Tribunal decisions have said different things about what “reasonable efforts” look like. A small sample includes these statements on the issue: “there is no way to assess [an applicant’s] inability to work unless all reasonable therapeutic options have been exhausted” Footnote 25 applicants must do “everything reasonably possible to overcome their impairments” Footnote 26 applicants don’t need to exhaust every form of treatment to be considered disabled Footnote 27 [ 33 ] In my opinion, what “reasonable efforts” look like (how exhaustive those efforts must be) will depend on the circumstances of each case. The Appellant isn’t taking any medication for his mental health [ 34 ] In this case, “reasonable efforts” must be informed by what the Appellant’s [NAME] have recommended to him. [ 35 ] In January 2024, [NAME] made these recommendations to treat the Appellant’s anxiety: 1) stop taking Effexor (which he had started in June 2022) Footnote 28 2) start taking Zoloft 3) try pregabalin if he was still anxious on the Zoloft [ 36 ] [NAME] provided specific dosing instructions and wrote that the Appellant would discuss these recommendations with his family doctor, [NAME]. Footnote 29 [ 37 ] The Appellant did talk to [NAME]. Following that discussion, he stopped taking Effexor and started taking Zoloft. He testified that he took it for three months. He stopped because he had side effects which affected his “thought process.” But he didn’t try pregabalin. [ 38 ] [NAME]’s clinical notes from this time period don’t mention a discussion about stopping Zoloft. Footnote 30 Regardless, I accept the Appellant’s testimony. [NAME]’s notes are generally quite sparse, which is not the Appellant’s fault, and there is nothing in the medical evidence to contradict what the Appellant told me. [ 39 ] The Appellant says [NAME] hasn’t told him to try pregabalin, nor has he suggested any other medications for his mental health. I asked the Appellant why. He said [NAME] was “happy with where I’m at right now.” I asked the Appellant if he was happy with the state of his anxiety. He said he has learned some techniques to help manage his anxiety, and he is coping. [ 40 ] If the Appellant is coping and [NAME] is satisfied with how his mental health is being managed, this supports that he should be able work. Based on his application and testimony, though, I don’t think it is really accurate to say he is coping. He might be coping in the sense that he is able to manage his daily activities at home. But he isn’t coping in the sense that he doesn’t believe he can work, and neither does [NAME]. Footnote 31 [ 41 ] This isn’t a case where an appellant has explicitly refused to do something that their doctor told them to do. But neither is it a case where an appellant has tried many forms of treatment without success and there is no clear path forward. Rather, it is a case where an appellant hasn’t taken advantage of the options that were made available to him to try to get better. [NAME] outlined a three-step treatment plan. The Appellant was aware of the plan but he didn’t complete it. He stopped at step two out of three. This amounts to a failure to pursue treatment. [ 42 ] The Appellant argues that he has done enough to pursue treatment because [NAME] believes that staying home and not working is “the best place” for him to be. So, from his perspective, he is following [NAME]’s recommendations. [ 43 ] This conversation isn’t reflected in [NAME]’s notes. More importantly, though, staying home and taking medication aren’t mutually exclusive options. It was possible for the Appellant to stay home while trying medication to see if it would help him return to the workforce. [ 44 ] The Appellant isn’t automatically excused from following [NAME]’s recommendations by the fact that [NAME] didn’t prescribe pregabalin or another medication. [ 45 ] If [NAME] had advised the Appellant not to try pregabalin or another medication, that would be a different matter. But there is no evidence that that is what happened here. In other words, we are not dealing with two opposing or conflicting recommendations. My understanding from the Appellant’s testimony is that [NAME] simply didn’t prescribe pregabalin or another medication, and the Appellant didn’t ask for one. In light of [NAME]’s report, this was unreasonable on the Appellant’s part. I don’t accept that his responsibility to actively pursue treatment is negated by [NAME]’s more passive approach to treatment. [ 46 ] In coming to this conclusion, I am not substituting my own opinion for the opinions of the Appellant’s [NAME]. I am relying on the professional opinion of one of his [NAME], namely [NAME]. Trying another medication might have made a difference [ 47 ] The Minister doesn’t need to prove that trying pregabalin or another medication would have made a difference to the Appellant’s disability, or even that it might have made a difference. Rather, it is up to the Appellant to prove that trying pregabalin or another medication would not have made a difference. Footnote 32 [ 48 ] I find that trying another medication might have made a difference to the Appellant’s disability, since his disability is based largely on his poor mental health. He only tried two medications; there is at least one more (pregabalin) for him to try. I can’t assume that pregabalin would be ineffective, especially since the Appellant described Zoloft as a “game changer.” Footnote 33 In other words, he has benefitted from medication in the past. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that [NAME] would not have recommended a medication unless it might have helped. I don’t have to consider the Appellant’s personal characteristics [ 49 ] When I am deciding whether a disability was severe, I usually have to consider an appellant’s personal characteristics. This allows me to realistically assess an appellant’s ability to work. Footnote 34 [ 50 ] I don’t have to do that here because the Appellant didn’t do enough to pursue treatment. This means he hasn’t proven his disability was severe. Footnote 35 Conclusion [ 51 ] I find that the Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME] disability pension because his disability wasn’t severe. Because I found that his disability wasn’t severe, I didn’t have to consider whether it was prolonged. [ 52 ] The Appellant has [NAME] coverage until December 31, 2026. If he follows through on [NAME]’s treatment plan without sufficient benefit, he could still potentially re-apply and qualify for a disability pension. [ 53 ] This means the appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD2-85, 110, and 111; and GD4-161. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See GD2-53 and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 The Appellant’s application is at GD2-40 to 56. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 The Minister’s submissions are at GD6. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See the hearing recording. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 Service Canada uses a person’s years of [NAME] contributions to calculate their coverage period, or “minimum qualifying period” ( MQP ). The end of the coverage period is called the MQP date. See section 44(2) of the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are at GD3-2 and 3. In this case, the Appellant’s coverage period ends on December 31, 2026, after the hearing date, so I must decide whether he was disabled by the hearing date. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of severe disability . Section 68.1 of the [NAME] says a job is “substantially gainful” if it pays a salary or wages equal to or greater than the maximum annual amount a person could get from a disability pension. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of prolonged disability. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33; and [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2011  FCA  47. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See GD4-176 and 177. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See GD2-141 and 142. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See GD4-121 to 123. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See GD4-121 to 123. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See GD4-125 to 127. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See GD2-266 to 268. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 See GD2-291 to 296. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See GD2-496 to 502. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See GD2-369 and 370. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See GD2-40 to 56. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See GD2-291 to 296, 376, and 377. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See GD2-241 to 244. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development ), 2002  FCA  211; [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  48; and [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2022  FCA  104. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2021  SST  410 at paragraph 17. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2022  SST  684 at paragraph 13. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2023  SST  67 at paragraph 36; [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2023  SST  65 at paragraph 75; and MC  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2023  SST  66 at paragraph 69. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See GD2-291 to 296. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See GD2-241 to 244. [NAME] wrote: “[The Appellant] will follow up with referring physician regarding medication suggestions made above.” Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See GD4-213 and 214. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 In January 2026, [NAME] completed a form for a private disability benefit. He affirmed that the Appellant was unable to work at any job for which he was, or may reasonably become, qualified by way of education, training or experience. See GD7-4 to 6. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 I considered this issue in more detail in [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2024  SST  660at paragraphs 47 to 54 and 61 to 65. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See GD4-91. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  48. Return to footnote 35 referrer