CPP Disability Pension Appeal Dismissed Due to Lack of Consistent Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: AS  v  [NAME_1] , 2026  [NAME_2]  279 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] [NAME_3] and [NAME_27] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated October 21, 2025 (GP-25-530) Tribunal member: [NAME_3] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: February 12, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Respondent’s representatives Decision date: March 31, 2026 File number: AD-25-666 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis What the medical evidence says Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME_4] ( [NAME_4] ) disability pension. Overview [ 2 ] The Appellant is a 26-year-old woman who was in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) in March 2019. Police and paramedics went to the scene. The Appellant didn’t go to the hospital right away. Footnote 1 But she said she went to the hospital later that evening. That was because of pain, headache, blurred vision, and dizziness. Footnote 2 [ 3 ] At the time of the accident, the Appellant was working full-time as a medical assistant in a cosmetic procedure clinic. Footnote 3 After the accident, she took about a week off work and then returned to her regular duties and hours. Footnote 4 [ 4 ] In September or October 2019, she changed jobs. Footnote 5 She began working as a medical office administrator in a doctor’s office. She continued working there until September or October 2022. Footnote 6 She says she stopped working because she was let go due to her medical conditions. [ 5 ] The Appellant had her first child in February 2023. Footnote 7 She says that, after her first child was born, she tried two other jobs. I will talk more about those jobs later. The Appellant had her second child a few months ago, in October 2025. [ 6 ] The Appellant applied for a disability pension in March 2024. In her application, she claimed that she has been unable to work since March 2019 due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, panic attacks, and insomnia. Footnote 8 At the hearing, she said she made a mistake in her application about her date of disability. She said she has been unable to work since March 2024 (the date of application), not March 2019. [ 7 ] The [NAME_1] (Minister) denied the Appellant’s application at both the initial and reconsideration levels of review. [ 8 ] The Appellant appealed the Minister’s reconsideration decision to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. The General Division held a hearing by videoconference and dismissed the appeal. The General Division found that the Appellant didn’t have a severe disability at the time of the hearing on October 14, 2025. [ 9 ] The Appellant asked the Appeal Division for leave (permission) to appeal the General Division’s decision. In October 2025, one of my colleagues gave her permission to appeal. Issue [ 10 ] To succeed with her appeal, the Appellant must prove she has a disability that was severe and prolonged by the date of this hearing. Footnote 9 [ 11 ] A disability is severe if it makes a person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 10 A job is substantially gainful if it gives a person an income that is the same as or more than the maximum annual [NAME_4] disability pension. Footnote 11 That amount is currently about $21,000. [ 12 ] When I am assessing whether a disability is severe, I must focus on whether the Appellant’s medical conditions result in functional limitations that get in the way of her earning a living. Footnote 12 My focus isn’t on the Appellant’s particular diagnoses. Footnote 13 [ 13 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. Footnote 14 [ 14 ] This means the Appellant’s disability can’t have an expected recovery date. The disability must be expected to keep the Appellant out of the workforce for a long time. [ 15 ] The Appellant has to prove her case. She has to prove it on a balance of probabilities. This means that she has to show that it is more likely than not that she has a disability that was severe and prolonged by the hearing date. Analysis [ 16 ] The Appellant hasn’t proven her case. She hasn’t shown that her disability is likely severe. [ 17 ] The Appellant has given inconsistent evidence about her functional limitations, treatment, and work efforts. All of this undermines her credibility. The Appellant also hasn’t followed medical advice for her mental health, and she has only recently started treatment for her pain conditions. She may have tried different jobs, but not ones that suit her reported limitations. What the Appellant says about her disability [ 18 ] The Appellant says that her medical conditions prevent her from doing any kind of job. She says: She has chronic pain. This causes problems with things like lifting, bending, sitting, standing, walking, and sustaining positions. For example, sitting for 10 to 15 minutes triggers burning, pressure, and numbness in her lower back and legs. Standing leads to sharp spinal spasms. She can usually only walk about 3 to 5 minutes at a time. She has major depressive disorder and anxiety. These conditions result in social withdrawal, feelings of being overwhelmed, slowed or foggy thinking, forgetfulness, difficulty handling stress, emotional instability, low energy, low motivation, and fatigue. The medications she takes for her mental health conditions make her feel numb or flat. She wakes up with a headache almost every day. She gets migraines a couple of times a week. These migraines have been ongoing and occurring a couple of times a week since before the MVA in 2019. The migraines are “very severe” and unpredictable. When she gets a migraine, she needs to rest in a dark room. She has extreme sensitivity to things like bright lights, computer screens, and noise. These sensitivities can trigger a migraine. She has problems with concentration, focus, attention, and interacting with others. These problems are from the chronic pain, mental health conditions, and sensitivities to light, screens, and noise. She has difficulties with sleep. The Minister says the Appellant isn’t a credible witness [ 19 ] The Minister argues that I should give little weight to the Appellant’s subjective evidence. This is because the Appellant’s evidence includes multiple inconsistencies. [ 20 ] To show examples of inconsistent statements, the Minister asked to introduce excerpts of the General Division’s hearing recording. I allowed those excerpts to be played during the hearing. Footnote 15 [ 21 ] The Minister believes the excerpts show three inconsistent statements. In my view, the excerpts show one inconsistent statement. The excerpts show one inconsistent statement [ 22 ] The inconsistent statement is about a cleaning job the Appellant says she did. In the matter before me, the Appellant said that she tried to offer cleaning services “around 2024.” She said she offered the services for about two and a half months. She also said, in a recent letter, that she could not complete houses in the expected time, and this led to dissatisfied clients and loss of income. Footnote 16 But, at the General Division hearing, the Appellant testified that she only did one cleaning job. She said that job lasted about two hours and involved helping a woman declutter her home. When the Appellant was asked by the General Division member whether she did any other cleaning jobs, she said she didn’t. Footnote 17 [ 23 ] After the excerpt of the hearing recording was played, the Appellant was asked to comment on the apparent inconsistency about the number of clients she had. She was asked, for example, how she could have dissatisfied clients if she only helped one woman on one occasion declutter her home. She was also asked to explain what she meant by her inability to complete houses within the expected time if again she only had one client. [ 24 ] The Appellant said that her references to dissatisfied clients and houses included potential clients whose homes she could not clean because of things like the unpredictability of her symptoms. The Appellant didn’t admit she cleaned more than one home. [ 25 ] Later in the hearing, the Appellant was asked about her recent letter that says she “often” had to stop halfway through a cleaning job. It was here, when faced with this question, that the Appellant admitted she had cleaned more than one home. She said she had two regular clients whose homes she cleaned more than once over two and a half months. [ 26 ] I don’t know whether the Appellant only had two regular clients, as she now claims. My point here is that the Appellant has given evidence that isn’t truthful. The excerpts don’t show two other inconsistent statements [ 27 ] I will now explain why I don’t think the excerpts from the General Division’s hearing recording show two other inconsistent statements. [ 28 ] One statement again involves the cleaning job. In the matter before me, the Appellant was asked why she stopped that job. She said it was because of her chronic pain. She didn’t give any other reason. [ 29 ] At the General Division hearing, the Appellant testified that, after she helped the one client declutter her home, she didn’t take any other clients because most of them were men and she didn’t feel comfortable going to their homes and because some potential clients were either too far away or just sketchy. Footnote 18 [ 30 ] At first glance, it may appear that the Appellant gave different reasons for why the cleaning job ended. But I can’t ignore the fact that, at the General Division hearing, the Appellant also said that she had difficulty helping the one client declutter her home. She explained that it was difficult because the task involved a lot of heavy lifting, bending, and organizing. I am reluctant to find an inconsistent statement simply because the Appellant shifted her emphasis on why the job stopped. [ 31 ] The other inconsistent statement that the Minister points to is about migraine medication. In the matter before me, the Appellant testified that she recently took a prescribed medication for about three months for the migraines and then stopped taking it because of the side effects. She was then asked whether she had tried any other medication for the migraines “in the last years.” The Appellant said that she hadn’t. [ 32 ] At the General Division hearing, the Appellant testified that she took a prescribed medication for headaches for a couple of months around 2019 or 2020. Footnote 19 [ 33 ] I gave the Appellant an opportunity to comment on the apparent inconsistency. She said that she thought the question in this hearing was only about the last one year. She also said she had forgotten about the medication she tried back in 2019. [ 34 ] The Appellant’s explanation is reasonable. The question about whether she had tried another medication “in the last years” was phrased awkwardly. It is entirely plausible that the Appellant thought she was being asked only about the last one year. The Appellant wasn’t a credible witness [ 35 ] Even though I don’t agree that each of the statements the Minister relied on show inconsistencies, I do agree with the Minister that the Appellant’s evidence should be given little weight. There are plenty of other inconsistencies throughout the Appellant’s evidence. I will give some examples. [ 36 ] The first example is about when the Appellant’s symptoms began. [ 37 ] The Appellant went to college in 2018, before the MVA. Recently, the Appellant wrote that when she was in college, her attendance was very poor due to her mental health issues and her physical pain. She also said she had accommodations in college which allowed her to rewrite exams two to three times. Footnote 20 [ 38 ] This is inconsistent with what the Appellant told a psychologist in July 2019, just a few months after the accident. [ 39 ] The psychologist’s report doesn’t say, or even suggest, that the Appellant had any physical or mental limitations before the accident. In fact, the report says the Appellant denied a history of medical conditions and psychological issues. Footnote 21 [ 40 ] The report also implies that the Appellant’s limitations arose because of the accident. The Appellant told the psychologist that she went to the gym every day before the accident but could now only go two to three times a week. She also told him that, since the accident , she had been having physical pain when doing chores at home. She added that, since the accident , her physical pain had negatively impacted her enjoyment of activities. Footnote 22 [ 41 ] The next example is about functional limitations. [ 42 ] At the hearing, the Appellant said she has had difficulties with concentration, focus, and attention her whole life. Despite this, she said she didn’t start to notice the difficulties until the “severity of them” became apparent when she was in college in 2018. She said she continued to notice the difficulties in the various jobs she held after she finished college. [ 43 ] The Appellant’s testimony contradicts evidence in the file. A psychiatrist reported in March 2021 and again in April 2024 that the Appellant denied having troubles with things like focus, attention, and staying on task. Footnote 23 [ 44 ] The Minister’s representative asked the Appellant why her testimony appeared inconsistent with the reports of March 2021 and April 2024. The Appellant said that she could function with her difficulties at the times of the reports. She also said her difficulties got “really severe” later. But when the Appellant was asked to identify when her difficulties became more severe, she said it was around late 2022 or early 2023. [ 45 ] The Appellant’s response doesn’t resolve the inconsistency. The psychiatrist’s second report of April 2024 was written after early 2023. [ 46 ] Still on the topic of functional limitations, the Appellant gave inconsistent evidence about her ability to sit. In December 2025, the Appellant wrote that she had difficulties sitting when she tried to do a customer service job from home. She explained that sitting at a desk caused severe back and tailbone pain within minutes. Footnote 24 [ 47 ] According to the Appellant, the work-from-home job was from October or November 2023 to February 2024. Footnote 25 Yet, in her application of March 2024, the Appellant described her ability to sit for at least 20 minutes in a straight-back chair as “fair.” Footnote 26 [ 48 ] The next example of inconsistent evidence is about treatment. On August 16, 2024, the Appellant spoke with one of the [NAME_5]. According to the notes from that conversation, the Appellant told the adjudicator that she continued to have virtual counselling sessions with a psychologist once a month. Footnote 27 About two weeks later, the Appellant wrote about the types of treatment she was doing at the time. The treatments included seeing a psychologist. Footnote 28 [ 49 ] There is no medical evidence about the Appellant having any counselling sessions in 2024. So, she was asked about this at the hearing. She confirmed that she hasn’t had any counselling sessions since seeing [NAME_6] (or someone under his supervision) in 2020. When the Appellant was asked why she reported in August 2024 that she was seeing a psychologist, she said she was referring to the previous sessions she had had with [NAME_6]. [ 50 ] I don’t believe the Appellant. Her letter of August 27, 2024, clearly implies she was seeing a psychologist at the time of the letter. Her letter talks about her current medications and then adds, “I’m also seeing a psychologist.” Footnote 29 There is no indication in the letter that the Appellant struggles with verb tenses. The Appellant has also acknowledged she is fluent in English. Footnote 30 [ 51 ] I considered whether the Appellant may have confused the terms psychologist and psychiatrist. The medical record shows that the Appellant saw a psychiatrist about four months before her letter of August 2024. I don’t think the Appellant confused the terms. [ 52 ] First, the Appellant didn’t say she may have confused a psychiatrist with a psychologist. [ 53 ] Second, the Appellant completed a medical office administration program in 2018. Footnote 31 She has also worked in medical clinics. So, she is probably aware of the distinction between the two professions. [ 54 ] Third, the Appellant showed that she knows of the distinction between the two professions. During the telephone conversation of August 2024, she spoke about a psychiatrist and a psychologist. She reportedly told the adjudicator that she saw the psychiatrist in April 2024, and that is when a change was made to her medication. Footnote 32 [ 55 ] To summarize, the Appellant hasn’t been truthful about matters relating to her work efforts and medical treatments. She has also given inconsistent information about her functional limitations, both in terms of when the limitations began and the extent of her limitations. [ 56 ] I have considered the Appellant’s evidence of having a poor memory and being very bad with dates. But on these facts, where the Appellant has shown an inclination to misrepresent the truth, I am reluctant to attribute the inconsistencies to poor memory. Also, the Appellant often linked her evidence to specific experiences, not just dates. For example, she linked the evidence about her limitations to: before the MVA and after the MVA attending college, which other evidence shows was in 2018 doing a customer service job from home, which other evidence shows was just before she applied for a disability pension in March 2024 [ 57 ] All of the above undermines the Appellant’s credibility. So, I didn’t place much weight on her statements. What the medical evidence says [ 58 ] The Appellant was required to provide medical evidence to support a finding that her functional limitations affected her ability to work. Footnote 33 [ 59 ] The Appellant has provided some medical evidence. The medical evidence shows that the Appellant has some limitations. But it also shows that the Appellant has a history of not following up with specialists and not following treatment recommendations. It also shows that the Appellant has only recently started active treatment at a pain clinic. [ 60 ] I will start with the medical evidence about the Appellant’s mental health conditions. The Appellant’s mental health conditions [ 61 ] The earliest medical report on file is a psychological assessment from July 2019. The psychologist, [NAME_6], diagnosed mild adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. [NAME_6] said the Appellant also had features of a somatic symptom disorder due to her difficulty coping with physical pain. Footnote 34 [NAME_6] recommended 12 sessions of psychological treatment. Footnote 35 [ 62 ] [NAME_6] reassessed the Appellant on March 30, 2020. He said the Appellant’s psychological sessions had focused on cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) to target her depressed mood and anxiety. There was also an emphasis on mindfulness and relaxation strategies to address stress, physical pain, and sleep. [NAME_6] didn’t say how many therapy sessions the Appellant had had with him, but he did say her symptoms appear to have gotten worse since July 2019. He thought this was because of the protracted recovery from the accident and the recent pandemic. He recommended that the Appellant continue with therapy. Footnote 36 [ 63 ] There are no other reports on file from [NAME_6]. [ 64 ] The Appellant testified that she completed all the therapy sessions with [NAME_6] (or someone under his supervision). As I said before, I am reluctant to give the Appellant’s evidence much weight. So, I can’t confirm that the Appellant continued with therapy after March 2020, as recommended. [ 65 ] The Appellant saw a psychiatrist ([NAME_7]) in March 2021 for anxiety. At that time, the Appellant was working in a doctor’s office and was noted to be doing well there. The Appellant told [NAME_7] that she had been struggling with anxiety and recent depression due to the pandemic restrictions for a year. She wanted help with her mood, motivation, and anxiety. [NAME_7] diagnosed an adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety and made some treatment recommendations. She planned to see the Appellant again in three months. Footnote 37 [ 66 ] There is no medical evidence showing the Appellant returned to see [NAME_7] in the months after her assessment in March 2021. When I asked the Appellant about this, she confirmed she didn’t see [NAME_7] again in 2021. I will talk more about this later. [ 67 ] The Appellant’s previous family doctor ([NAME_8]) filled out the [NAME_4] medical report in March 2024. He said he had been treating the Appellant since February 2021. He identified the Appellant’s medical condition as depression, and he said it began in 2019. He explained it results in insomnia, anxiety, cognitive limitations, and anhedonia. Footnote 38 He explained the Appellant has difficulty with learning and functioning in the community and is unable to concentrate, study, or work. But he also said the Appellant had only just restarted medication (Cipralex 10 mg) that month and had just again been referred to psychiatry. Footnote 39 [ 68 ] The Appellant saw [NAME_7] again in April 2024. [NAME_7] noted the Appellant was now married with a 14-month-old baby. The baby was having some renal trouble, and the Appellant was very worried about his health. The Appellant said she had tried to go back to work but had stopped because she could not manage the stress of work while caring for her baby. [NAME_7] noted several symptoms including hopelessness, helplessness, low motivation, anxiety, panic, irritability, and some insomnia. [NAME_7] diagnosed major depressive disorder with anxious distress. She made more treatment recommendations, including a trial of Sertraline, and planned to see the Appellant again in four to six weeks. Footnote 40 [ 69 ] The Appellant didn’t return to see [NAME_7]. [ 70 ] [NAME_9] is the Appellant’s current family doctor. He began treating the Appellant on August 24, 2024. Footnote 41 That same day, he wrote a letter supporting the Appellant’s application for a disability pension. He said the Appellant can’t work because of her physical and mental symptoms. He said her mental health conditions result in poor concentration, forgetfulness, insomnia, and poor impulse control. He also said the Appellant is withdrawn at times due to PTSD. Footnote 42 [ 71 ] [NAME_9]’s letter isn’t persuasive. He wrote the letter the very same day he began treating the Appellant, and he didn’t address treatment other than to say he was referring the Appellant back to [NAME_7]. Also, [NAME_9]’s reference to PTSD is curious because [NAME_7] had reported just four months before that the Appellant denied symptoms associated with PTSD. Footnote 43 [ 72 ] The Appellant was assessed by another psychiatrist ([NAME_10]) in January 2025. There is only one report from [NAME_10] on file, and it references two appointment dates—January 2 and January 18, 2025. [NAME_10] summarized what the Appellant told him about having depression her whole life, having neglectful parents, moving from one country to another before coming to Canada at age 13, having a worsened depression at age 19, getting bad grades in school, and having difficulties with concentration, focus, mood, and sleep. [ 73 ] [NAME_10] diagnosed dysthymia and major depressive disorder. He explained this is called double depression. He said the Appellant’s symptoms are very severe and very frequent. He said she can’t work because of a very poor attention span, low energy, poor short-term memory, psychomotor slowing, and poor concentration. Footnote 44 [ 74 ] I don’t find [NAME_10]’s report useful. [ 75 ] First, [NAME_10]’s report appears to be based almost entirely on what the Appellant told him about her symptoms. He identified limitations like a “very poor” attention span and “poor” short-term memory and yet he also said the Appellant’s cognition was grossly intact and that he didn’t test her cognition. Without more, it is difficult to understand how [NAME_10] arrived at his findings. [ 76 ] Second, [NAME_10]’s opinion was given after just two appointments that happened within the same month. [NAME_10] said that he planned to provide the Appellant with psychiatric care and CBT. Footnote 45 Yet he didn’t explain or otherwise address how that treatment might help the Appellant’s symptoms. [ 77 ] Third, I can’t confirm how long the Appellant continued to see [NAME_10] after January 2025. The Appellant told me she continued to see him until April 2025, when [NAME_10] returned her to the care of [NAME_9]. But I am reluctant to accept her evidence without corroboration. But if the Appellant continued to see [NAME_10] after January 2025, then it would have been helpful to know how that treatment went. The Appellant testified that [NAME_10] prescribed Bupropion. There is a pharmacy record to confirm this. Footnote 46 But there is no medical evidence about how the Appellant responded to her adjusted medication regime. [ 78 ] In his [NAME_4] medical report of May 29, 2025, [NAME_9] reported that the Appellant has major depression and that the symptoms began in January 2019. He said the condition results in forgetfulness and poor concentration. He also said the Appellant can’t handle stress and can’t complete work tasks. He put these last two limitations in quotation marks, probably to show that this is what the Appellant told him. As for treatment, [NAME_9] said that [NAME_10] had prescribed medication, but he didn’t identify what the medication was. He also said that [NAME_10] was providing psychotherapy. Footnote 47 This contradicts the Appellant’s evidence that [NAME_10] returned her to [NAME_9]’s care in April 2025. It is unclear to me whether [NAME_9] had any follow-up reports from [NAME_10]. If he did, he didn’t mention them. As I said before, I don’t have records from [NAME_10] showing what happened after January 2025. [ 79 ] To summarize, the medical evidence about the Appellant’s mental health conditions shows the following: The Appellant had some limitations in and before March 2021, but she was able to keep working. [NAME_7] noted in March 2021 that she was doing well at her job. There is a significant gap in the medical evidence between March 2021 and March 2024. It is unclear whether the Appellant’s condition improved during that time or she simply chose not to seek medical attention. The Appellant restarted medication in March 2024 and went back to a psychiatrist in April 2024. This was around the time the Appellant was very worried about her baby’s health. The Appellant was supposed to go back to [NAME_7], but she didn’t. The Appellant began seeing a new psychiatrist ([NAME_10]) in January 2025. But there are no follow-up reports on file from [NAME_10]. So, it is unclear how long she saw him for. [NAME_10] didn’t discuss treatment recommendations. So, I don’t have a clear picture of what he recommended and provided. [ 80 ] I will now look at what the medical reports say about the Appellant’s pain conditions. The Appellant’s pain conditions There is little medical evidence about the Appellant’s pain conditions before May 2025 [ 81 ] There is little medical evidence about the Appellant’s pain conditions between March 2020 (when the Appellant was reassessed by [NAME_6]) and May 2025 (when the Appellant saw a physiotherapist about low back pain that had increased over the past week). Footnote 48 [ 82 ] This is significant, given the Appellant’s evidence that pain was a reason for having to stop work. [ 83 ] Some reports don’t even mention a pain condition at all. [ 84 ] For example, [NAME_7] reported in March 2021 and April 2024 that, aside from the mental health symptoms, the Appellant was in good health. She didn’t note anything about a pain condition. Footnote 49 [NAME_8]’s report of March 2024 doesn’t say anything about a pain condition either. He also didn’t mention headaches or migraines. Footnote 50 The same is true for [NAME_10]’s report of January 2025. Footnote 51 [ 85 ] The reports that do mention pain don’t suggest a condition that resulted in ongoing limitations that would have prevented the Appellant from working. In fact, the two main reports during this time that are about pain are dated October 2020 and June 2021—when the Appellant was still working. [ 86 ] In October 2020, the Appellant went to the hospital for back pain. She told the doctor that her symptoms had initially improved with physical therapy but had gotten worse when the therapy stopped due to the pandemic. The Appellant said the pain gets worse when she flexes (bends forward) her neck. She also said that, at times, the pain is very sharp and comes on suddenly with certain movements. The doctor said he had the “usual mechanical back pain discussion” with the Appellant and referred her for more physical therapy. Footnote 52 [ 87 ] The Appellant appears to have done some physical therapy on October 2, 2020, November 3, 2020, and December 2, 2020. Footnote 53 [ 88 ] In June 2021, the Appellant saw a physiatrist ([NAME_11]) for low back pain. The Appellant told the doctor that her pain was travelling everywhere and was “all over the place.” She described the pain as a sharp sensation with occasional tingling sensations into the lateral thighs. But the Appellant also said she was using acetaminophen or ibuprofen two to three times a week with good results. She also acknowledged being independent with her activities of daily living and said she could walk for several hours without pain. [ 89 ] [NAME_11] diagnosed mechanical low back pain (chronic flexion intolerant) with secondary myofascial pain syndrome. She stressed the importance of the Appellant having an active rehabilitation plan to improve her core and hip girdle strength. She referred the Appellant to physiotherapy and gave her basic exercises to do at home in the meantime. She also suggested the use of heat and a topical anti-inflammatory, such as Voltaren. [NAME_11] noted a history of chronic headaches and photophobia (sensitivity to light), for which the Appellant wasn’t taking any prescribed medications. The doctor said she would leave this for [NAME_8] to investigate, as needed. Footnote 54 [ 90 ] [NAME_11] planned to reassess the Appellant in three months. There is no evidence to show that the Appellant returned to see [NAME_11]. [ 91 ] After seeing [NAME_11] in June 2021, the Appellant had a few treatment sessions in 2022 and 2024. [ 92 ] For example, in 2022, the Appellant appears to have had about three physiotherapy treatments for back pain from January 26 to March 15. Footnote 55 After that, she had one physiotherapy assessment and two treatments in August 2024. Footnote 56 [ 93 ] In August 2024, [NAME_9] wrote a letter of support for the Appellant. He listed her physical conditions as lumbar spine sprain and migraines. But he didn’t provide any details about these conditions, and he didn’t identify any limitations or impairments relating to either of the conditions. He focused mainly on the mental health limitations. Footnote 57 [ 94 ] There isn’t much else on file about the Appellant’s pain conditions until May 2025. [ 95 ] This tells me that, at least until May 2025, the Appellant’s pain conditions didn’t limit her functionality in any significant way. She seems to have had difficulties with bending and intermittent flares requiring some treatment, like physiotherapy. But she appears to have been managing her symptoms with over-the-counter pain relievers. The medical evidence about the Appellant’s pain conditions since May 2025 [ 96 ] On May 21, 2025, the Appellant went to a physiotherapy clinic because of low back pain that had increased over the past week. The pain was going down her left leg, and she was having tingling in that leg and in her toes. Footnote 58 [ 97 ] When the Appellant went to the clinic the next day, she disclosed that she was 18 weeks pregnant. She told the therapist she hadn’t mentioned the pregnancy the day before because she didn’t want them to attribute her back pain to the pregnancy. Footnote 59 [ 98 ] In his [NAME_4] medical report of May 29, 2025, [NAME_9] reported that the Appellant has a lumbar spine sprain and that the symptoms began in January 2018. [NAME_9] said the condition results in low back pain that goes down the left leg. He said the condition results in an inability to walk long distances, do heavy lifting, or do repetitive bending. Footnote 60 [ 99 ] [NAME_9]’s report implies that the Appellant’s pain and limitations had been ongoing since 2018, when clearly they hadn’t. [NAME_11] had noted an ability to walk for hours without pain in June 2021. That said, I realize [NAME_9] only began treating the Appellant in August 2024 and so he may simply have been reporting on what the Appellant was telling him. He acknowledged that he didn’t have all the relevant reports. Footnote 61 [ 100 ] In June 2025, the Appellant went to a chronic pain centre and saw [NAME_12]. During that consult, she reported that she has had cervical (neck) pain, shoulder pain, and lumbar (low back) pain that goes down the left leg since 2019. She also reported a nine-year history of headaches and a history of migraines, though no timeframe or other details were noted for the migraines. [ 101 ] The Appellant described the body pain since 2019 as dull, achy, stabbing and tingling. She said it negatively affects her ability to function, do daily household tasks, work, and attend social activities. Associated symptoms included disturbances in mood, sleep and energy, depression, photophobia, phonophobia (sensitivity to sound), and nausea. [ 102 ] On physical examination, [NAME_12] noted tenderness in the cervical spine and lumbar spine but full range of motion in the neck, back, and shoulders. He also noted 16 out of 18 tender points for fibromyalgia. He diagnosed fibromyalgia, migraines, myofascial pain syndrome, and depression. [NAME_12] made some treatment recommendations and said he would see the Appellant again if needed. Footnote 62 [ 103 ] The Appellant saw a [NAME_13] on November 3, 2025. He may be an orthopedic specialist. Footnote 63 His report is a template-type form with some handwriting on it. It isn’t easy to read. He notes low back pain affecting the lower extremities and that the Appellant just had a baby. He discussed a pain clinic, yoga, and Pilates. He planned to see the Appellant again in three weeks. Footnote 64 There is no follow-up report on file from him. [ 104 ] On November 15, 2025, [NAME_9] wrote a note saying the Appellant is unable to function in any form of gainful employment or retraining. Footnote 65 [ 105 ] The Minister says that [NAME_9]’s note, as well as his previous note of August 2024, should be given little weight because they lack objective findings and portray [NAME_9] as an advocate. [ 106 ] I agree with the Minister. [ 107 ] [NAME_9]’s letter of November 2025 simply lists the Appellant’s diagnoses and concludes, without much more, that the Appellant can’t work at any type of job or retrain. [NAME_9] says the Appellant has problems coping with her activities of daily living, but he doesn’t explain the nature of the “problems,” and he doesn’t otherwise identify the limitations that prevent the Appellant from working or retraining. [NAME_9] says the Appellant is under the care of a pain specialist and a psychiatrist. But he doesn’t address what the care entails. Footnote 66 He also may be mistaken about the specialist care. It is unclear from the record whether the Appellant saw [NAME_12] between the initial consult of June 2025 and November 20, 2025. Also, the Appellant testified that [NAME_10] returned her to [NAME_9]’s care back in April 2025. [ 108 ] In December 2025, [NAME_12] reported that the Appellant’s functionality was the same as it was pre-treatment. He said the Appellant had up to 5% improvement in pain and function with nerve blocks / trigger point injections, with the results lasting one week. He said the Appellant lacked motivation and was exhausted to do home exercise. [NAME_12] also said the Appellant needed follow up with either her family doctor or a psychiatrist about post-partum depression and anxiety. Footnote 67 Summary of the Appellant’s limitations [ 109 ] Before I consider whether the Appellant followed medical advice, I will summarize what the medical evidence tells me about the Appellant’s limitations. [ 110 ] The medical evidence shows the following: The Appellant’s mental health conditions likely result in hopelessness, helplessness, low motivation, low energy, panic, irritability, and difficulty managing stress. The conditions may also result in cognitive limitations, but the lack of cognitive testing in recent years makes it difficult to know the extent of those limitations. The Appellant has some insomnia. [NAME_12] noted exhaustion in December 2025. But the Appellant had also just had her second baby at the end of October. The Appellant’s back problems make it difficult to do heavy lifting, repetitive bending, and at times lots of walking. The Appellant has headaches. The Appellant has fibromyalgia and myofascial pain syndrome, but the resulting limitations are unclear. They aren’t identified in the medical reports. [ 111 ] The medical evidence doesn’t support what the Appellant says about her migraines. She testified that she gets severe migraines about two times a week and that this has been ongoing since before the MVA in 2019. The Appellant may get migraines, but I don’t believe they happen as often as she claims. [ 112 ] The Appellant also reports extreme sensitivities to bright lights, computer screens, and noise. I don’t think the Appellant’s sensitivities are as pronounced as she described. The Appellant testified that, with the help of employment agencies, she interviewed for jobs in 2024 (the year she applied for a disability pension). She described the jobs as being data entry and/or work-from-home jobs. It is fair to say that such jobs would likely require regular use of a computer screen. It doesn’t make sense that the Appellant would look for a job like this if she had an extreme sensitivity to computer screens. The Appellant made inconsistent efforts to manage her condition and didn’t follow medical advice [ 113 ] The Minister argues that the Appellant didn’t follow recommended treatments for her physical and mental health. I will first explain why this is a relevant consideration. [ 114 ] To receive a disability pension, an appellant must make reasonable efforts to treat their disability and must follow medical advice. Footnote 68 If an appellant doesn’t do this, then they must have a reasonable explanation for not doing so. Footnote 69 If they don’t have a reasonable explanation, then I must consider what effect, if any, the medical treatment or advice might have had on the disability. Footnote 70 [ 115 ] Before I look at the issue of treatment recommendations, I will first comment briefly on the Appellant’s general approach to improving her conditions. [ 116 ] The medical evidence shows that the Appellant adopted somewhat of a relaxed approach to managing her conditions. She made occasional efforts to treat her conditions but has generally had rather poor follow-through. She appears not to have followed up with [NAME_11], and she didn’t follow up with [NAME_7] after either of the assessments in 2021 or 2024. As I said before, I can’t confirm how long she continued with [NAME_10] after January 2025. [ 117 ] The Appellant’s explanations for why she didn’t follow up with [NAME_7] don’t make sense. [ 118 ] The Appellant said she didn’t return to see [NAME_7] in 2021 because she was following up with her family doctor. There is no medical evidence showing that [NAME_8] (or any other health care provider) told the Appellant to follow up with him instead of [NAME_7]. There is also no medical evidence of follow-up visits about mental health issues with [NAME_8] in the months after March 2021. The Appellant’s visits with [NAME_8] around that time appear to have been about back pain, which likely prompted the referral to [NAME_11]. Footnote 71 [ 119 ] The Appellant said she didn’t return to see [NAME_7] in 2024 because [NAME_7] went on maternity leave. [NAME_7] may have gone on maternity leave at some point, but I don’t think it was within four to six weeks of the appointment in April 2024. It doesn’t make sense that [NAME_7] would say she planned to see the Appellant again within that timeframe if she knew she would be on leave. [NAME_7] had just recommended a new medication regime, so it makes sense that she would have wanted to see whether the medications were helping. The Appellant’s explanation is also at odds with [NAME_9]’s letter of August 2024, which says he was making another referral to [NAME_7]. Footnote 72 [ 120 ] The Minister raises concerns about a few different treatment recommendations, including whether the Appellant took medications as prescribed. [ 121 ] The medical record is incomplete. As I said before, I only have one report from [NAME_10], and that report doesn’t address treatment. This prevents me from assessing whether the Appellant complied with his treatment recommendations. [ 122 ] For example, the Appellant said that she has insomnia and that she previously tried Trazodone, which helped her fall asleep but not stay asleep. Despite getting some relief from Trazodone, the Appellant said that [NAME_10] told her she didn’t need it because it wasn’t helping her. The Appellant also said that [NAME_10] didn’t prescribe another medication for sleep. Instead, he just told her to take magnesium. Without supporting medical evidence, I can’t confirm the Appellant’s evidence about what has or hasn’t been recommended for the insomnia. [ 123 ] That issue aside, the Minister’s main argument about treatment is about the Appellant’s failure to engage in therapy for her mental health. This is the one that, in my view, is most problematic for the Appellant. The Appellant didn’t follow medical advice about counselling [ 124 ] The Appellant had some counselling sessions in 2019 and 2020. But as I said before, I don’t know whether she finished all the sessions she was supposed to do. This is because I don’t have a discharge report from [NAME_6]. [ 125 ] In any event, the medical evidence shows that two of the Appellant’s health care providers recommended counselling after 2020: In March 2021, [NAME_7] recommended a referral to a psychologist, and she recommended a website so that the Appellant could connect with a psychotherapist. Footnote 73 In April 2024, [NAME_7] again recommended psychotherapy. She also said the Appellant could try government-funded options: [NAME_14] (online CBT for generalized anxiety disorder) or [NAME_15] for psychotherapy. Footnote 74 In June 2025, [NAME_12] stressed the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to help with the pain. He recommended, among other things, psychotherapy and CBT directed at optimizing pain management. Footnote 75 [ 126 ] At the hearing, the Appellant confirmed she hasn’t had any therapy or counselling since her sessions with [NAME_6] ended. When I asked her why, she said that one of the programs that [NAME_7] suggested ([NAME_14]) is no longer available. She also said that financial constraints prevented her from accessing other therapy. Her written submissions mention long waitlists. Footnote 76 [ 127 ] I don’t find the Appellant’s explanations reasonable. [ 128 ] First, the [NAME_14] may no longer be available now, but I don’t have evidence about when it became unavailable. I am left to wonder whether the program was still available at the time [NAME_7] recommended it back in April 2024. [ 129 ] Second, [NAME_12] provided a list of four places that offer OHIP-covered CBT. Footnote 77 The Appellant said nothing about any of those places no longer being available. [ 130 ] Third, I don’t see any medical evidence of the Appellant speaking to her health care providers about difficulties accessing mental health therapy. [ 131 ] Fourth, I doubt that long waitlists are the reason the Appellant hasn’t done the therapy. Even if she did encounter long waitlists, and there’s no evidence she did, it would at most explain a delay in getting the therapy. It would not explain a decision to not get the therapy at all. [ 132 ] Participating in therapy would have made a difference to the Appellant’s disability, both in terms of her mental health and her pain condition. [ 133 ] The Appellant’s mental health conditions are a big part of why she says she can’t work. In fact, when I asked her whether she thought she could work if she only had the physical conditions, she said she didn’t know. Two different specialists recommended therapy, and it’s unlikely they would have recommended it and provided the resources for it if they didn’t think it would help. It doesn’t matter that [NAME_12] is a pain specialist. He noted that stress aggravates the pain condition, and he emphasized the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. Footnote 78 The Appellant’s physical conditions don’t amount to a severe disability [ 134 ] If I am wrong about the potential for mental health therapy to improve the Appellant’s pain conditions, I have considered whether the Appellant’s physical conditions alone would prevent her from working. In my view, they would not. [ 135 ] First, the Appellant is likely more functional than she admits. She has two young children, born in [DATE] and October 2025. It is fair to say that caring for two young children is a demanding job, both physically and mentally. The Appellant testified that her husband works from home and does most of the childcare. But she also said her oldest child is in daycare and that she does the basics for the baby, like feedings and diaper changes. Given my concerns about the Appellant’s credibility, and absent supporting evidence from, for example, the daycare provider, I am reluctant to believe what the Appellant says about the amount of childcare she provides. [ 136 ] Second, as I said before, I asked the Appellant whether she thinks she could work if she only had the physical pain, and she said she didn’t know. [ 137 ] Third, the Appellant acknowledged that her headache pain responds to Tylenol, Advil, and Naproxen. As I said before, I don’t think the Appellant gets the migraines as often as she claims. [ 138 ] Fourth, [NAME_12] hasn’t reported that the Appellant’s pain is so severe that it would prevent her from working. His report of June 2025 says the Appellant reported her pain as 7 out of 10 (current), 6 out of10 (minimum), and 10 out of 10 (maximum). Footnote 79 This is similar to how the Appellant rated her pain during a physiotherapy assessment of January 2022. At that time, she rated her overall pain as 7 out of 10, and her lower back pain as 8 out of 10. Footnote 80 And that is when the Appellant was still working. [ 139 ] Finally, although the Appellant first attended the pain clinic in June 2025, her treatment appears to have only just begun within the last few months. This may be due to the Appellant’s recent pregnancy. So, it is too soon to know what the treatment results will be. [ 140 ] The current treatment includes physiotherapy, injections, and medication. [ 141 ] The Appellant said she is now doing physiotherapy twice a week. The medical evidence doesn’t include reports from those sessions. [ 142 ] The injections also appear to be recent. In June 2025, [NAME_12] told the Appellant that she was a good candidate for nerve blocks and that they could result in a functional improvement of at least 20 to 30%. [NAME_12] said the Appellant declined the nerve blocks saying she preferred to try other options. Footnote 81 [ 143 ] The Appellant told me that she has gotten the injections every month since April 2025 and that they do little to help with the pain. The Appellant is clearly mistaken about when the injections began because she didn’t start seeing [NAME_12] until June 2025, and she declined the injections at that time. From what I see, the Appellant began the injections on November 20, 2025. Footnote 82 [NAME_12] said in December that she had up to 5% improvement in pain and function. Footnote 83 This doesn’t sound like much of an improvement. But I don’t know what the Appellant has said to [NAME_12] in recent months about the effectiveness of the injections. [ 144 ] I also see that the Appellant has only recently tried different prescribed medications, including Baclofen, Maxeran (metoclopramide), and [NAME_16] (naproxen). Footnote 84 [ 145 ] [NAME_12] appears to have prescribed the Baclofen 10 mg on October 28, 2025. Footnote 85 On November 20, 2025, he said the medication was stopped because it wasn’t helpful. Footnote 86 [ 146 ] [NAME_12] prescribed the Maxeran 5 mg on November 20, 2025. This was for the migraines. Footnote 87 The Appellant said she stopped that medication because of side effects. I don’t have medical evidence showing that the Appellant spoke to [NAME_12] about the side effects. If she did, I don’t have medical evidence about whether [NAME_12] plans to prescribe a different type of medication that is specific to the migraines. [ 147 ] [NAME_12] appears to have prescribed the [NAME_16] on November 27, 2025. Footnote 88 The Appellant acknowledged it helps with the headaches and migraines. [ 148 ] Because medication trials have just recently begun, it remains unclear what other medications may be left to try. [NAME_12] recommended Lyrica and Gabapentin in June 2025. Footnote 89 But it doesn’t seem that she has tried those yet. The Appellant’s personal characteristics strongly favour an ability to work in the real world [ 149 ] A finding about whether a person has work capacity must include a consideration of things like the Appellant’s age, level of education, language abilities, and past work and life experience. These factors help me decide if the Appellant can work in the real world. Footnote 90 [ 150 ] The Appellant is young, with almost 40 years ahead of her before the average retirement age of 65. The Appellant has a good level of education. She finished high school and completed a college program in medical office administration. Footnote 91 She is fluent in English (and Croatian). And she has varied work experience, including coffee shop work, office work within the medical sector, dispatch work, and cleaning work. [ 151 ] The Appellant has mental and physical conditions that result in limitations. She likely lost an opportunity to improve her symptoms when she chose not to follow the medical advice for counselling. Even if that treatment would not have improved her pain conditions, her resulting limitations considered alongside her favourable personal characteristics show that she can work in the real world. The Appellant didn’t show that her work efforts failed because of her medical conditions [ 152 ] When there is evidence of work capacity (as there is here), the Appellant must show that she tried to find and keep a job. She must also show that her efforts weren’t successful because of her medical conditions. Footnote 92 Finding and keeping a job includes retraining or looking for a job that accommodates her limitations. Footnote 93 [ 153 ] The evidence doesn’t show that the Appellant’s work efforts failed because of her medical conditions. [ 154 ] [NAME_7]’s report of April 2024 suggests the work-from-home job ended because of the stresses the Appellant had over her baby’s health issues. As for the cleaning job, there is no corroborating evidence about when it was, how long it lasted, or why it stopped. [ 155 ] Even if I were to accept that the work-from-home job or the cleaning job didn’t succeed because of the Appellant’s medical conditions, the Appellant’s claim would still fail. This is because she didn’t try a job that suits her limitations. [ 156 ] The Appellant says she tried to do a customer service job from home from about November 2023 to February 2024. She said she answered the phones, created work orders for elevators, and dispatched service calls. Footnote 94 But this job involved computer work and, according to the Appellant, she has difficulties with computer screens. The cleaning job is also a curious choice for someone with chronic pain and limited tolerance for things like bending. [ 157 ] There are many other jobs with demands that fall somewhere between a desk job with computers and a physically demanding cleaning job. The Appellant hasn’t tried those types of jobs since leaving her regular job in 2022. Because she hasn’t tried to work at a job that suits her limitations, I can’t find that her disability is severe. The Appellant can reapply for a disability pension if her disability gets worse [ 158 ] The Appellant’s coverage for the disability pension hasn’t ended. She can reapply for a [NAME_4] disability pension if her disability gets worse. Conclusion [ 159 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant isn’t eligible for a disability pension because she hasn’t shown that her disability is severe. Because her disability isn’t severe, there is no need to assess if it is prolonged. Footnote 95 Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD2-77 and GD2-78. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See GD2-78. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See GD2-77. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See GD2-79. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 The Appellant reported in her application for a disability pension that the job at the X began in October 2019 (GD2-24). At the hearing, the Appellant said it began in September 2019. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See GD2-24 and the Appellant’s testimony. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See GD2-25. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See GD2-25. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 The Appellant’s coverage for the disability pension extends to December 31, 2030. This is based on her contributions to the [NAME_4] and the child rearing provision. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 A severe disability is defined in section 42(2)(a)(i) of the [NAME_4] . Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See the definition of “substantially gainful” in section 68.1(1) of the [NAME_4] . Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 [NAME_17]  v  Canada ([NAME_1]) , 2008  FCA  33 at paragraph 14. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 [NAME_18]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81 at paragraph 7. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 A prolonged disability is defined in section 42(2)(a)(ii) of the [NAME_4] . Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 This was in accordance with the Tribunal’s Practice Direction called Using testimony from General Division hearings in Income Security appeals at the Appeal Division . Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See AD6-7. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 This is from the excerpt of the General Division’s hearing recording that was played by the Minister from 31:59 to about 33:26. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 This is from the excerpt of the General Division’s hearing recording that was played by the Minister, from 31:59 to about 33:26. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 This is from the excerpt of the General Division’s hearing recording that was played by the Minister. The Appellant’s explanation is at 49:48. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See AD6-13. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See GD2-79. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See GD2-79. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See GD2-68 and GD2-72. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See AD6-7. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See GD2-24 and the Appellant’s testimony. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See GD2-26. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See GD2-43 and GD2-56. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See GD2-14. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See GD2-14. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See AD6-3. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See GD2-25 and GD2-79. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See GD2-45. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 [NAME_19]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  Dean , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See GD2-83. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See GD2-83. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See GD2-85 to GD2-90. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See GD2-67 to GD2-69. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 The Minister explained in written submissions that anhedonia is a lack of interest, enjoyment, or pleasure from life’s experiences. See GD9-4. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 See GD2-62 to GD2-66. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See GD2-71 to GD2-74. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See GD4-91. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See GD2-15. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See GD2-72. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See AD6-20 to AD6-22. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See AD6-22. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See GD7-12. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 See GD4-91 to GD4-95. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See GD4-87. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See GD2-67 to GD2-69 and GD2-71 to GD2-74. Return to footnote 49 referrer Footnote 50 See GD2-62 to GD2-66. Return to footnote 50 referrer Footnote 51 See GD1-9 to GD1-11. Return to footnote 51 referrer Footnote 52 See GD7-7. Return to footnote 52 referrer Footnote 53 See GD4-2 and GD4-3. Return to footnote 53 referrer Footnote 54 See GD7-8 to GD7-11. Return to footnote 54 referrer Footnote 55 See GD5-2 to GD5-9. Return to footnote 55 referrer Footnote 56 See GD4-88 to GD4-89. Return to footnote 56 referrer Footnote 57 See GD2-15. Return to footnote 57 referrer Footnote 58 See GD4-84 to GD4-85. Return to footnote 58 referrer Footnote 59 See GD4-87. Return to footnote 59 referrer Footnote 60 See GD4-93 to GD4-95. Return to footnote 60 referrer Footnote 61 See GD4-94. Return to footnote 61 referrer Footnote 62 See GD7-2 to GD7-6. Return to footnote 62 referrer Footnote 63 See the Appellant’s note at AD6-2. Return to footnote 63 referrer Footnote 64 See AD6-18. Return to footnote 64 referrer Footnote 65 See AD6-17. Return to footnote 65 referrer Footnote 66 See AD6-17. Return to footnote 66 referrer Footnote 67 See AD6-19. Return to footnote 67 referrer Footnote 68 [NAME_20]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  48; and [NAME_21]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2022  FCA  104. Return to footnote 68 referrer Footnote 69 [NAME_21]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2022  FCA  104. Return to footnote 69 referrer Footnote 70 [NAME_22]  v  Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) , 2002  FCA  211. Return to footnote 70 referrer Footnote 71 See GD8-12 and GD8-13. Return to footnote 71 referrer Footnote 72 See GD2-15. Return to footnote 72 referrer Footnote 73 See GD2-69. Return to footnote 73 referrer Footnote 74 See GD2-73. Return to footnote 74 referrer Footnote 75 See GD7-5. Return to footnote 75 referrer Footnote 76 See AD6-14. Return to footnote 76 referrer Footnote 77 See GD7-5. Return to footnote 77 referrer Footnote 78 See GD7-2 and GD7-5. Return to footnote 78 referrer Footnote 79 See GD7-2. Return to footnote 79 referrer Footnote 80 See GD5-4 and GD5-8. Return to footnote 80 referrer Footnote 81 See GD7-5. Return to footnote 81 referrer Footnote 82 See AD6-27. Return to footnote 82 referrer Footnote 83 See AD6-19. Return to footnote 83 referrer Footnote 84 See AD6-23. Return to footnote 84 referrer Footnote 85 See AD6-32. Return to footnote 85 referrer Footnote 86 See AD6-27. Return to footnote 86 referrer Footnote 87 See the Appellant’s testimony. Return to footnote 87 referrer Footnote 88 See AD6-23. Return to footnote 88 referrer Footnote 89 See GD7-6. Return to footnote 89 referrer Footnote 90 [NAME_23]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 90 referrer Footnote 91 See GD2-25. Return to footnote 91 referrer Footnote 92 [NAME_24]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2003  FCA  117. Return to footnote 92 referrer Footnote 93 [NAME_25]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  150. Return to footnote 93 referrer Footnote 94 See GD2-24. Return to footnote 94 referrer Footnote 95 [NAME_17]  v  Canada ([NAME_1]) , 2008  FCA  33 at paragraph 10. Return to footnote 95 referrer