CPP Disability Pension Appeal Dismissed Due to Lack of Eligibility

Citation: MC  v  [NAME] , 2026  [NAME]  303 Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division – Income Security Section Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: K. C. Respondent: [redacted] [NAME] Decision under appeal: [NAME] reconsideration decision dated October 25, 2024 (issued by Service Canada) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: April 14, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Respondent’s representative Decision date: April 21, 2026 File number: GP-25-127 On this page Decision Overview What the Appellant must prove My interlocutory decision Reasons for my decision Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The Appellant, M. C., isn’t eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. This decision explains why I am dismissing the appeal. Overview [ 3 ] The Appellant is 38 years old. She has experienced several medical problems over the years, including anemia, headaches, migraines, insomnia, endometriosis, and shoulder and neck pain. To her credit, she was able to work and go to college despite these problems. It was in July 2022 that she could no longer work because of increasing digestive issues that caused her to vomit after meals. Since then, she has seen specialists, received different diagnoses, and undergone surgeries, but no one is really sure what is causing her digestive issues or how to fix them. [ 4 ] On October 6, 2023, the Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension. The [NAME] (Minister) refused her application. She appealed the Minister’s decision to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. [ 5 ] Before the Tribunal hearing, the Minister offered to settle the appeal with the Appellant. The parties did not end up agreeing to a settlement, so the appeal process continued. Footnote 1 [ 6 ] On appeal, the Minister says the Appellant should be found disabled as of January 2025 and should be granted a disability pension accordingly. Footnote 2 The Appellant says she became disabled sometime between April and July 2022. Footnote 3 [ 7 ] I find that the Appellant became disabled in July 2022. Unfortunately, she didn’t have [NAME] coverage at that time. So, she isn’t eligible for a disability pension. What the Appellant must prove [ 8 ] The Appellant must prove she has a disability that became severe and prolonged by December 31, 2018, or between January 1, 2025, and April 30, 2025. She must also prove that she continues to be disabled. Footnote 4 [ 9 ] A disability is severe if it makes a person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 5 [ 10 ] This means I must look at all of the Appellant’s medical conditions together to see what effect they have on her ability to work. I must also look at her background (including her age, education, language abilities, and experience). This is so I can get a realistic or “real world” picture of whether her disability is severe. If she is capable regularly of doing some kind of work that she could earn a substantially gainful income from, then she isn’t entitled to a disability pension. [ 11 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. Footnote 6 [ 12 ] This means the Appellant’s disability can’t have an expected recovery date. The disability must be expected to keep her out of the workforce for a long time. [ 13 ] The Appellant must prove she has a severe and prolonged disability. She must prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means she must show it is more likely than not that she is disabled. My interlocutory decision [ 14 ] The Minister takes a different view of what the Appellant must prove. The Minister argues that the Appellant only needs to prove that she was disabled at any time on or before April 30, 2025, and that she continues to be disabled. [ 15 ] On March 3, 2026, I issued an interlocutory decision explaining why I disagree with the Minister. At paragraph 3, I said: I am issuing this decision now so that the parties understand the issue under appeal before the hearing. A hearing will be scheduled to allow the parties to present evidence and arguments to support that the Appellant is or is not eligible for a disability pension based on the dates that I have outlined. [ 16 ] Under section 55 of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act , either the Appellant or the Minister could have appealed my interlocutory decision to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. The Appeal Division would then have considered whether to hear the appeal right away or wait for the appeal at the General Division to conclude first. [ 17 ] Neither the Appellant nor the Minister appealed my interlocutory decision. Instead, on March 18, 2026, the Minister advised the Tribunal that, “[g]iven the complex nature of this appeal, in relation to the issue of proration and the interlocutory decision from the Tribunal Member,” the Minister would be sending a representative to the hearing. The representative intended to “clarify the Minister’s position and to make further submissions on behalf of the Minister.” Footnote 7 [ 18 ] At the beginning of the hearing, I asked the Minister’s representative whether he was asking me to change my interlocutory decision to align with what the Minister believes the Appellant must prove. He confirmed that he was. [ 19 ] I am unaware of any case where a division of this Tribunal has issued an interlocutory decision on a substantive issue and then changed its own decision. [ 20 ] The Minister referred me to a case of the Federal Court called [NAME] to support its view that I have the authority to change my interlocutory decision and that it is appropriate for the Minister to ask me to change it. Footnote 8 I told the parties that I would review that case before deciding if I can and should change my interlocutory decision. However, for the sake of convenience, I allowed the Minister’s representative to make his substantive arguments about my interlocutory decision at the hearing. That way, if I decided that I could change my interlocutory decision, I would not have to reconvene the hearing to get the Minister’s arguments. [ 21 ] Having considered [NAME] as well as the Tribunal’s statutory authority, I have concluded that I have the authority to change my interlocutory decision, but I am not going to. I have the authority to change my interlocutory decision [ 22 ] I believe that I have the authority (or jurisdiction) to change my interlocutory decision. However, I base this conclusion on the Social Security Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Rules), not [NAME] . The [NAME] case isn’t helpful [ 23 ] The [NAME] case isn’t helpful. That case is distinguishable from this one. [ 24 ] In [NAME] , the General Division dismissed the applicant’s appeal, which meant she was denied a disability pension. She appealed to the Appeal Division. The Appeal Division granted her leave (permission) to appeal. This meant that the appeal would continue to a hearing. [ 25 ] The Minister sought judicial review of the leave-to-appeal decision at the Federal Court. Before the Court could hear the judicial review application, the Appeal Division held a hearing and issued its decision granting the applicant a disability pension. This is called a “decision on the merits.” The Minister continued the Court proceedings because it thought that, if its application for judicial review was successful, the Appeal Division’s decision on the merits would be overturned. [ 26 ] [ADDRESS] declined to hear the judicial review application. It cited the rule in [COMPANY] , which says courts should not interfere with administrative processes until after they are completed or all remedies are exhausted, unless there are exceptional circumstances. This rule is meant to “prevent fragmentation of the administrative process and piecemeal court proceedings, and to avoid the waste of hearing an interlocutory judicial review when the applicant may succeed in the end” anyway. Footnote [ADDRESS] also noted that proceedings at the Tribunal are likely to proceed more quickly than those before the federal courts. [ 27 ] The Minister argues that [NAME] means it is both possible and appropriate for the General Division to revisit its own interlocutory decisions. I disagree. This case is not like [NAME] . There, the Court declined to judicially review the leave-to-appeal decision because that decision was merely a procedural step in the appeal process. It meant that the appeal at the Appeal Division would go ahead. The parties could still argue the merits of the case at the Appeal Division hearing. If the applicant’s appeal failed, then there would have been no point to the judicial review application. On the other hand, if the appeal succeeded, the Minister could have sought judicial review. [ 28 ] My interlocutory decision is not procedural. It decides a substantive issue, namely what the Appellant must prove to succeed in her appeal. Also, the Minister’s appeal of my interlocutory decision would be to the Appeal Division, not to the federal courts. So the time that it would take to seek judicial review at Federal Court isn’t a relevant consideration as it was in [NAME] . I have the statutory authority to change my interlocutory decision [ 29 ] [NAME] not being applicable, I believe that I have the authority to change my own interlocutory decision. This is because section 8(5) of the Rules says I can decide the procedure for anything that isn’t addressed by the Rules or the Social Security Tribunal Regulations, 2022 (Regulations). Neither the Rules nor the Regulations explicitly address the matter of interlocutory decisions. [ 30 ] Furthermore, as of the hearing date, the case was still before me, so the principle of functus officio doesn’t apply. That principle says a decision-maker can’t revisit a decision once they have finally disposed of the matter. [ 31 ] I want to emphasize that it is always up to the Tribunal member hearing the appeal whether they will revisit an interlocutory decision. A party can’t continue to debate an interlocutory decision after it is made, unless the Tribunal member allows them to. As a general rule, interlocutory decisions are meant to be final decisions about an issue and should be regarded as such. I am not changing my interlocutory decision [ 32 ] Although I have the authority to change my interlocutory decision, I am not going to. I am not convinced by the new arguments that the Minister made at the hearing. [ 33 ] The Minister already made detailed written submissions about proration, which I considered in my interlocutory decision. At the hearing, the Minister repeated many of those arguments while also offering some additional arguments to support its interpretation. [ 34 ] Here is my response to the Minister’s new arguments. To keep this decision as brief as possible, I won’t repeat the Minister’s previous arguments or my response to them. For context, the following reasons should be read together with my interlocutory decision. It doesn’t matter that section 19 is relevant to more than the disability pension [ 35 ] The Minister points out that section 19 of the [NAME] sets out how to determine someone’s contributory period for multiple purposes, not only for disability pension purposes. Footnote 10 [ 36 ] This is true. But I don’t see how it advances the Minister’s argument about proration. It doesn’t matter that section 42(2)(a) is relevant to other benefits [ 37 ] Similarly, the Minister says section 42(2)(a) is relevant to determining eligibility for benefits like the post-retirement disability benefit (under section 44(1)(h)), not just eligibility for a disability pension. [ 38 ] Again, I don’t see how this advances the Minister’s argument about proration. Section 42(2)(b) isn’t about the act of making a decision [ 39 ] The Minister says section 42(2)(b) of the [NAME] is about “the act of making a decision,” not the date at which a person might have become disabled. [ 40 ] The problem with the Minister’s argument is that it doesn’t make sense when section 42(2)(b) is read as a whole. Section 42(2)(b) says “a person is deemed to have become or to have ceased to be disabled at the time that is determined in the prescribed manner to be the time when the person became or ceased to be, as the case may be, disabled ” (my emphasis). The thing being determined in section 42(2)(b) is the time when the person became disabled by meeting the definitions in section 42(2)(a). A contributory period can end more than 15 months before the application [ 41 ] The Minister says the words “in no case” in section 42(2)(b) mean that a contributory period can’t end more than 15 months before a person applies for a disability pension. The Minister says the Federal Court of Appeal decision in [NAME] supports this conclusion. Footnote 11 [ 42 ] I disagree. I’ll start by addressing [NAME] . [ 43 ] In [NAME] , the Court remarked that the applicant’s contributory period would have ended on the date when she was deemed to have become disabled—that is, 15 months before she applied. But the Court didn’t explain what it based that conclusion on. And at the same time, it quoted section 44(2)(b), which says the contributory period ends with the month in which a person is determined to have become disabled. [ 44 ] Given this conflict and the Court’s lack of reasoning on this point, I don’t take this case as authority for the proposition that the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability. Besides, the Court was merely setting out a hypothetical scenario to help illustrate the main point of the decision, which was about the application of section 44(1)(b)(ii) (which has since been replaced) to applicants for a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings. [ 45 ] For the reasons I gave in my interlocutory decision, I find that section 42(2)(b) is about when payment of a person’s disability pension begins, not about the end of their contributory period. It doesn’t say anything about the contributory period. The contributory period ends with the date a person actually became disabled, which could very well be more than 15 months before they apply for a disability pension. Nothing in the [NAME] prevents this. My interlocutory decision is consistent with [NAME] [ 46 ] In the same vein, the Minister relies on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME] to argue that the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability. Footnote 12 [ 47 ] With respect, [NAME] doesn’t say what the Minister thinks it says. At paragraph 21 of the decision, the Court says the contributory period ends with the month in which a person is determined to have become disabled. [ADDRESS] does not equate this date with the deemed date of disability in all cases. Indeed, section 42(2)(b) explains that the deemed date of disability may be the same as the date a person is determined to have become disabled, but not necessarily. [ 48 ] Let’s consider the facts in [NAME] . The applicant applied for a disability pension in September 1993. This means he could not be deemed to have become disabled earlier than June 1992 for payment purposes. Immediately after confirming that the contributory period ends with the date a person is determined to have become disabled, the Court said the applicant’s contributory period “could end no earlier than June 1992,” which was 15 months before he applied. Footnote 13 [ 49 ] I believe that the Court said the applicant’s contributory period could end no earlier than June 1992 because, if it did, then he would not have had coverage under the [NAME] when he was deemed disabled. In other words, the Court wasn’t saying that the law prevents a person’s contributory period from ending more than 15 months before they applied. Rather, the Court was saying that, unless the applicant’s contributory period continued to June 1992, he could not qualify for a disability pension without relying on the late-applicant rule in section 44(1)(b)(iv) (now section 44(1)(b)(ii)). Footnote 14 [ 50 ] Read as a whole, [NAME] actually supports my interpretation about when the contributory period ends. The [NAME] requires a single factual date of disability [ 51 ] In my interlocutory decision, I argue that “there must be a point at which you were not disabled and a point at which you became disabled (assuming you became disabled at all). This is true whether you became disabled suddenly or gradually.” Footnote 15 The Minister says the requirement for a “single factual date of disability” may disqualify applicants for other benefits, like the post-retirement disability benefit (PRDB), unless they can prove that they became disabled at a particular time. [ 52 ] The Minister is correct. In my opinion, this is the necessary result of the way the sections of the [NAME] operate. Whether a person seeks to qualify for a disability pension or a PRDB, they must prove that they became disabled when they had coverage under the [NAME] . Footnote 16 I can’t make the law say something that it does not say in order to avoid an outcome that the Minister considers undesirable. My interpretation does not cause an evidentiary problem for people who have never worked [ 53 ] To qualify for a disability pension, you must have a minimum qualifying period ( MQP ). Normally, you must have contributed to the [NAME] to establish an MQP . You contribute to the [NAME] by paying a portion of your income—usually income from work. [ 54 ] The Minister outlined a hypothetical, but possible, scenario in which a person may establish an MQP and qualify for a disability pension without ever having worked or contributed to the [NAME] . They could do this through a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings, also known as a “credit split.” A credit split allows you to share the [NAME] contributions of your [NAME] after a separation or divorce. The Minister questions how a person who has never contributed to the [NAME] themselves would be able to show that they became disabled at a specific point in time, since they could never point to a time when they stopped being able to earn a substantially gainful income. [ 55 ] This hypothetical situation doesn’t present a unique evidentiary problem. All applicants for a disability pension bear the burden of proving that their disability is severe—that they are incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. They must also prove when their disability became severe. That date could be: a) before they stopped working—for example, where the person continued working after they became disabled, but not regularly, or where their employer was benevolent b) the same date they stopped working—for example, due to a workplace injury that takes them out of the workforce c) after they stopped working—for example, where a person’s health gets worse after they stop working but while they still have [NAME] coverage [ 56 ] Assessing when someone became disabled is never as simple as looking at when they stopped earning a substantially gainful income. The focus of the disability test is on a person’s capacity to work. Applicants are assumed to be capable of working until they prove otherwise. Applicants aren’t required to first prove that they were, at one point, capable of working, as the Minister suggests. My interpretation doesn’t result in an increased administrative burden for the Minister [ 57 ] Finally, the Minister says it will face an increased administrative burden if applicants are required to prove when they became disabled in addition to proving that they were disabled at some point when they had [NAME] coverage. [ 58 ] I disagree. The same evidence showing that an applicant is disabled would necessarily support that they became disabled at a particular point in time. [ 59 ] For example: It may be that an applicant became disabled in January 2000 but only has medical evidence to show that they were disabled in January 2020. For [NAME] purposes, that means they became disabled in January 2020. If they meet the other eligibility requirements, like having [NAME] coverage in January 2020, they would still qualify for a disability pension. Their payments would be based on the date of January 2020 or a later deemed date of disability if they applied after April 2021 (15 months after January 2020). The Minister isn’t required to seek out evidence to support an earlier disability date, since it is applicants who bear the burden of proof. [ 60 ] Without a single factual date of disability, the disability pension program is unworkable. The [NAME] requires applicants to prove when they became disabled. My interpretation doesn’t add to that burden. Even if it did, the Minister hasn’t provided a compelling reason why its administrative burden should be a significant consideration in light of the text, context, and purpose of the [NAME] . [ 61 ] A single factual date of disability is also important to the operation of programs like the [NAME] retirement pension program. This is because the amount of a person’s retirement pension depends partly on their contributory period, and the contributory period ends with the date a person is determined to have become disabled. Final comments on proration [ 62 ] The Minister’s intention to make [NAME] disability pensions available to more Canadians is a laudable one. But, in my opinion, to do so in the way that the Minister proposes would require a change to the law. It can’t be accomplished through a change in the Minister’s internal policies or by reinterpreting the law in a way that isn’t supported by the law itself. Reasons for my decision [ 63 ] I find that the Appellant had a severe and prolonged disability as of July 2022 and continuously since then. But, because she became disabled outside of her coverage period, she isn’t eligible for a disability pension. I reached this decision by considering the following issues: Was the Appellant’s disability severe? Was the Appellant’s disability prolonged? Did the Appellant become disabled during her coverage period? Was the Appellant’s disability severe? [ 64 ] The Appellant’s disability was severe as of July 2022. I reached this finding by considering several factors. I explain these factors below. The Appellant’s functional limitations affected her ability to work [ 65 ] The Appellant has multiple medical conditions. But I can’t focus on her diagnoses. Footnote 17 Instead, I must focus on whether she has functional limitations that got in the way of her earning a living. Footnote 18 When I do this, I must look at all of her medical conditions (not just the main one) and think about how they affected her ability to work. Footnote 19 [ 66 ] I find that the Appellant had functional limitations by July 2022. What the Appellant says about her functional limitations [ 67 ] The Appellant says her medical conditions have resulted in functional limitations that affected her ability to work by July 2022. Footnote 20 She says her medical problems started before 2010 and have only gotten worse, especially in the middle of 2022. That is when she started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting after eating. As a result, she spent a lot of time in the bathroom. She became dependent on her family for help with basic daily activities. [ 68 ] Her application shows that she is physically limited. Her declining physical health has impacted her mentally, too. She doesn’t cope well with change, stressful situations, or being in public. She has trouble remembering things and planning her day. What the medical evidence says about the Appellant’s functional limitations [ 69 ] The Appellant must provide some medical evidence to support that her functional limitations affected her ability to work. Footnote 21 [ 70 ] The medical evidence supports what the Appellant says. [ 71 ] The medical evidence from before 2022 shows that the Appellant was already dealing with multiple medical conditions when her most recent digestive issues began. She was treated for iron deficiency anemia and had longstanding insomnia, resulting in fatigue. She had frequent headaches and migraines. She took Tylenol 3 and got injections to manage left shoulder and neck pain. She was followed by an OBGYN for endometriosis. She occasionally complained of stomach discomfort, nausea, and diarrhea. Footnote 22 [ 72 ] Despite all of these issues, a medical report states that she was “feeling well” until April 2022, when she started vomiting after eating. Footnote 23 More importantly, a report from her employer at the time supports that she was regularly capable of working until July 2022. From January 6 to July 6, 2022, she worked full-time as a receptionist for a [NAME]. Her employer reported that she was able to do her job without accommodations or help from co-workers. She missed just eight days of work during that seven-month period. Her income was substantially gainful. Footnote 24 [ 73 ] In June 2022, the Appellant was diagnosed with ulcerative duodenitis and acute gastritis. Footnote 25 On July 4, 2022, her family doctor, [NAME], told her to stop working. Footnote 26 On July 7, she had a gastroscopy to investigate the cause of her symptoms. Footnote 27 She had a second gastroscopy on July 19. Footnote 28 On July 21, she had surgery to try to dilate her gastrointestinal tract. It didn’t help. By that point, she wasn’t eating anything at all. Footnote 29 [ 74 ] [NAME] completed a medical report to support the Appellant’s disability pension application. The report indicates that the Appellant’s symptoms included constant stomach pain and vomiting. She could not eat. The report listed changing positions and any physical activity as functional limitations. She was unable to live on her own. Footnote 30 This effectively meant she could not work. [ 75 ] The medical evidence supports that the Appellant’s functional limitations prevented her from working as a receptionist as of July 2022. [ 76 ] I now have to decide whether the Appellant can regularly do other types of work. To be severe, her functional limitations must prevent her from earning a living at any type of work, not just her usual job. Footnote 31 The Appellant can’t work in the real world [ 77 ] When I am deciding whether the Appellant can work, I can’t just look at her medical conditions and how they affect what she can do. I must also consider factors such as her age, education, language abilities, and experience. These factors help me decide whether she can work in the real world—in other words, whether it is realistic to say she can work. Footnote 32 [ 78 ] I find that the Appellant can’t work in the real world. She was unable to work as of July 2022. [ 79 ] The Appellant’s personal characteristics favour employability. She is young—only in her thirties. She has a high school diploma and a nursing unit assistant certificate. She has experience as a nursing unit assistant and a receptionist. Footnote 33 She is fluent in English. [ 80 ] Unfortunately, the Appellant’s functional limitations outweigh her personal characteristics. She is unable to do any form of physical activity or even change positions without difficulty. There is no job that she can realistically do. [ 81 ] The Appellant can’t qualify for a disability pension using her regular coverage period because that period ended on December 31, 2018. That was before her disability became severe in July 2022. But a person doesn’t become disabled until their condition is both severe and prolonged. This means the Appellant could still qualify if her disability became prolonged between January 1, 2025, and April 30, 2025, which is her prorated coverage period. So, I must consider whether her disability became prolonged and, if it did, when. Was the Appellant’s disability prolonged? [ 82 ] The Appellant’s disability was prolonged as of July 2022. The Appellant’s disability has been continuously severe since July 2022 [ 83 ] The Appellant’s digestive issues became debilitating in July 2022, forcing her to stop working. Her disability has been severe since then. Footnote 34 In other words, it is long continued. The Appellant says she is largely bedridden because of low energy, pain, and her use of a feeding tube. Footnote 35 The medical evidence documents the severity of her medical condition. [ 84 ] In September 2022, the Appellant had a duodenojejunostomy and cholecystectomy. She spent a few weeks in the hospital. She returned a few days after being discharged because of lung abscesses. This time, she remained in the hospital for more than two months. Footnote 36 [ 85 ] The Appellant seemed to improve a bit in early 2023. Her strength and energy were improving and she was gaining weight on “high caloric, density-thick liquids like meal replacement drinks or soup.” She became nauseous if she ate anything more substantial, though. Footnote 37 [ 86 ] The Appellant’s vomiting worsened in July 2023. Footnote 38 Around that time, she had hernia surgery. After spending 54 days in the hospital recovering, she was told that she would have to move to a different bed. Instead, she left the hospital against medical advice. Footnote 39 Later in 2023, medical evidence shows that she was at risk of malnutrition and had low energy because she could only consume water, broth, and popsicles without vomiting. Footnote 40 [ 87 ] In 2024, the Appellant did a barium swallow test and had another gastroscopy, but these didn’t reveal any clear cause for her symptoms. Footnote 41 Nonetheless, she had another surgery (a gastrojejunostomy) in June 2024. Footnote 42 Since then, she has had a few more surgeries. Footnote 43 She receives nutrients intravenously. This is called “total parenteral nutrition” (TPN). She attended a TPN clinic in 2025 to learn how to take care of herself while on TPN. She also has a colostomy bag. As of the hearing date, she remains under the care and supervision of a hospital. Footnote 44 [ 88 ] During this time, the Appellant’s mental health declined. In February 2023, she told [NAME] that she was anxious. Footnote 45 In April 2023, she referred herself to Mental Health and Substance Use Services. At her intake appointment in May 2023, she was visibly emotional. She reported that she had trouble falling asleep and was also sleeping too much. She avoided leaving the house. Footnote 46 While in the hospital in September 2023, she was diagnosed with anxiety, adjustment disorder, and mood disturbance. Footnote 47 [ 89 ] The medical evidence after this focuses on the Appellant’s physical health rather than her mental health. But it isn’t hard to imagine that her mental health struggles have continued along with her physical ones. The Appellant’s disability is of indefinite duration [ 90 ] The Appellant’s disability will more than likely continue indefinitely. It has been years since her digestive issues kept her from working. She has undergone multiple investigations and surgeries. One of her surgeons frankly admitted that he doesn’t know the cause of her symptoms. Footnote 48 Another surgeon said he wasn’t sure what surgical options were left. Footnote 49 [ 91 ] The Appellant’s disability was prolonged as of July 2022. Did the Appellant become disabled during her coverage period? [ 92 ] The Appellant’s disability became severe and prolonged in July 2022. That is when she became disabled according to the [NAME] . She didn’t have [NAME] coverage in July 2022. Since her disability became severe and prolonged outside of her coverage period, she isn’t eligible for a disability pension. Conclusion [ 93 ] I find that the Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME] disability pension because her disability became severe and prolonged after her regular coverage period ended and before her prorated coverage period started. [ 94 ] This means the appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD9 and GD11. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See GD11 and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See GD2-74 and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See sections 19, 44(2), and 44(2.1) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of severe disability. Section 68.1 of the [NAME] says a job is “substantially gainful” if it pays a salary or wages equal to or greater than the maximum annual amount a person could get from a disability pension. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 Section 42(2)(a) of the [NAME] gives this definition of prolonged disability. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See GD22. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2022  FC  281. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See paragraph 30 of Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2022  FC  281, citing [COMPANY]  v  Canada (Border Services Agency) , 2010  FCA  61 at paragraph 31. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 All references to legislation in the rest of this decision are to the [NAME] . Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development)  v  [NAME] ([NAME]) , 2002  FCA  296 (CanLII), [2003] 2  FC  206. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 9054, [1998] 3  FC  175 ( FCA ). The case was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 2000  SCC  28 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 703. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 9054, [1998] 3  FC  175 ( FCA ) at paragraph 21. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 9054, [1998] 3  FC  175 ( FCA ) at paragraphs 23 and 24. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See paragraph 42 of my interlocutory decision. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See sections 44(1)(b) and (h) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2011  FCA  47. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 What the Appellant says about her functional limitations can be found in her application (GD2-73 to 78), in notes from a phone call with Service Canada on November 7, 2023 (GD2-99 and 100), on her appeal form (GD1-3), and on the hearing recording. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See GD2-131, 132, 137 to 150, 242, 244 to 246, 251, 256, 259 to 261, 267 to 270, 272 to 275, 277, 278, 281 to 286, 288 to 292, and 295 to 297; and GD8-30 to 36, 38, and 132 to 137. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See GD8-23 to 25. [NAME]’s clinic notes place the onset of vomiting after meals in April 2022 (GD2-151). Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 She earned $20 per hour, or $41,600 per year based on a 40-hour work week (GD2-67 to 70). A substantially gainful income in 2022 was $17,489.43. See section 68.1 of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See GD8-23 to 27. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See GD2-118 to 123. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See GD8-21 and 22. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See GD8-17 and 18. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See GD2-224 and 225, and GD8-12 to 14. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See GD2-118 to 123. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See GD2-73 and 74, and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 In the decision Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2020  FC  1093, the Federal Court said that an applicant must show a severe and prolonged disability by the end of their coverage period and continuously after that. See also [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2011  FCA  318. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See GD1-3. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See GD2-217 to 219. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See GD2-201 and 203. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See GD2-172. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 See GD2-124, 125, 191, 192, and 194. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See GD2-183 to 185 and 187 to 189. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See GD2-298 to 301. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See GD8-8 and 9. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See GD8-7 and 39 to 50. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See GD11-1 and the hearing recording. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See GD2-165. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See GD2-196 to 198. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 See GD2-124 and 125. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See GD7. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See GD2-298 to 301. Return to footnote 49 referrer