CPP Disability Pension Application Denied

Citation: [NAME]  v  [NAME] , 2026  [NAME]  362 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] [NAME] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated October 6, 2025 (GP-24-1328) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: April 22 and 28, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Respondent’s representative Decision date: June 26, 2026 File number: AD-25-774 On this page Decision Overview Preliminary matters Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant isn’t entitled to a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. Overview [ 2 ] The Appellant was 42 years old as of the hearing into the present matter. She completed one year of university, as well as training as a hairstylist. She last worked as a hairstyling apprentice and then part-time as a senior administrator. [ 3 ] The Appellant explains that she has autism spectrum disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and a pubic bone condition known as osteitis pubis. Footnote 1 She says her severe disability began in March 2023. Footnote 2 [ 4 ] This appeal is from the Appellant’s third application for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. Footnote 3 The Minister refused this application, initially and on reconsideration. Footnote 4 [ 5 ] The Appellant appealed the Minister’s decision to the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal (Tribunal). Footnote 5 The General Division held a hearing on August 15 and October 1, 2025, and dismissed her appeal. Footnote 6 The Appellant asked for permission to appeal that decision to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. Footnote 7 The Appeal Division granted the Appellant permission to appeal on December 10, 2025. Preliminary matters [ 6 ] During the hearing, the Appellant made the argument that her earnings – as alluded to by the Minister as being over the threshold of a substantially gainful occupation - could have possibly reflected payouts following dismissals and not have been true employment income. [ 7 ] I allowed the Appellant 10 days to file any and all slips that could attest to such payouts, instead of employment income. Footnote 8 The Appellant filed this evidence on the same day of the last day of the hearing. Footnote 9 [ 8 ] Finally, I allowed the Minister ten days to address this evidence with written submissions. Footnote 10 The Minister indicated they would make no further submissions. Footnote 11 Issue [ 9 ] To be eligible for a [NAME] disability pension, a person has to prove they had a severe and prolonged disability by the end of their minimum qualifying period ( MQP ). The Appellant’s MQP was December 31, 2026; therefore, the Appellant must prove she had a severe and prolonged disability by the hearing into this matter. Footnote 12 [ 10 ] The issue in this appeal is the following: Did the Appellant have a severe and prolonged disability by the date of the hearing into this matter? And if so, when do her disability pension payments start in accordance with the [NAME] ? Analysis [ 11 ] I have considered the law and the evidence and concluded that Appellant did not have a severe and prolonged disability by the hearing into this matter. I find that the Appellant was not incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation by this date. The Appellant wasn’t disabled by the hearing date [ 12 ] A person is considered to have a severe disability if they are incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 13 A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death. Footnote 14 [ 13 ] The severity test must be analyzed in a real-world context. Footnote 15 This means that, when deciding whether a person’s disability is severe, I must consider their overall medical condition as well as factors like age, level of education, language proficiency, and past work and life experience. Footnote 16 [ 14 ] I also note the following important information from the Federal Court of Appeal: The severity of the disability isn’t based on a claimant’s incapacity to perform their regular job, but rather any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 17 The severity of the disability under the [NAME] is determined by the capacity to work, not by the diagnosis or description of the illness. Footnote 18 In cases where there is evidence of work capacity, a claimant must show that they have made efforts to obtain and maintain a job but have been unsuccessful because of their health condition. Footnote 19 [ 15 ] Finally, the Appellant has the burden of proving she is disabled. She has to prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means that she has to show that it is more likely than not that she is disabled. I will first look at whether the Appellant’s medical conditions caused functional limitations for her work capacity and, if so, how. The Appellant has medical conditions which cause limitations as to work [ 16 ] I carefully assessed the evidence – the testimony provided at the hearing as well as the medical evidence. I believe it supports the existence of some limitations before the date of the hearing. [ 17 ] The Appellant indicated in her summations that her current diagnoses are the following: Autism Spectrum Disorder (from birth); Hypermobility Spectrum Disorder (Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, also from birth); Adenomyosis (from puberty); Chronic pain (from childhood); Migraines (from puberty); Whiplash (since 2022); Concussion (since 2022); Degenerative Disc Disease; Depression (since puberty); Generalized Anxiety Disorder (since preschool); Osteitis pubis (since 2015); Six Cervical Herniations (since 2022); IBS and chronic constipation. [ 18 ] However, as I said above, it is not so much the diagnoses or medical conditions that are important in disability cases. It is rather how these impact one’s ability to work. [ 19 ] The Appellant testified poignantly at the hearing about how her medical conditions have an impact on her ability to work. She has not been able to work full-time since 2023. And since around that time, the Appellant has been in three motor vehicle accidents – in February 2022, December 2022, as well as April 2024. [ 20 ] These are a few excerpts of the Appellant’s testimony regarding how her medical conditions have impacted her ability to work: Being on the autism spectrum has made it difficult for the Appellant to keep jobs. She has been let go of a few jobs, and she has filed evidence of settlements that were provided to her upon being let go from three jobs; Footnote 20 t is difficult for her to sit-stand-walk for extended periods of time; Her mental health issues sometimes make it difficult for her to get to work, even if she is able to do so from home; Her anxiety prevents her from working in an office, and her chronic pain also impedes her ability to work; She has an inordinate number of medical appointments to attend in any given week, which complicates things for her work schedule; She attends these appointments to help her get through her work schedule and life: “All these things that I try to do to make sure that I can be gainfully employed”; “I am trying everything and anything to be a regular human being, fully employed and functional”; [ 21 ] The Appellant testified that it is necessary for her to work in order to support her family: she forces herself to work because she has two disabled children to support, and it is necessary for her to have medical benefits that come with employment. [ 22 ] The Appellant made clear in her testimony that working is difficult for her: “I can do work. I just can’t do it for long and it’s not sustainable.” [ 23 ] Furthermore, it has long been held that medical evidence is always necessary to support a claimant’s claim for disability benefits. Footnote 21 I believe that there is medical evidence of the Appellant’s conditions on file, among which: A November 2017 report by [NAME] substantiates the diagnoses of osteitis pubis and depression and anxiety; Footnote 22 There are letters by [NAME] substantiating the diagnoses of osteitis pubis; Footnote 23 Reports by psychologist [NAME] and psychiatrist [NAME] validate the diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. Footnote 24 There were also previous reports on file by Drs. [NAME] and [NAME]; Footnote 25 A March 2026 report by neuropsychologist [NAME] substantiates the diagnosis of Somatic Symptom Disorder; Footnote 26 A March 2026 report by [NAME]’s [NAME] substantiates the Appellant’s difficulties related to hypermobility; Footnote 27 [ 24 ] The file also contains evidence regarding the treatment sought and obtained by the Appellant regarding her medical conditions. She testified to this at the hearing as well. [ 25 ] I believe that the evidence – testimonial and medical - supports the existence of some functional limitations by the hearing held in this matter. I will say this clearly - it is not easy for the Appellant to work. However, it is important to note that the medical evidence also supports the Appellant being able to work part-time, which she has been doing in recent years. [ 26 ] A September 2023 report by psychologist [NAME], did not recommend the Appellant stop working, but “recommend that she only work part-time.” Footnote 28 [NAME] indicated as follows: Footnote 29 [The Appellant] is currently working part-time (15-20 hrs). She has repeatedly attempted to work full time, but these attempts consistently result in mental health relapses and sometimes have resulted in being let go. Her current part-time work represents a significant challenge for her and I recommend that she continues to work part-time. [ 27 ] A February 2024 report by [NAME], psychiatrist, concurs. He also indicated that he did not recommend that the Appellant stop working. Footnote 30 To the question as to whether she is expected to return to any type of work in the future, [NAME] indicated “part-time work”: Footnote 31 Currently L. F.is working 15-20 hr per week largely from home doing independent computer-based work. She finds this manageable. She has not been able to manage to maintain full time hours in previous attempts to do so. Her difficulties managing interpersonal relationships has resulted in her losing jobs in the past. She is motivated to succeed but is limited by her impairments. [ 28 ] There is also more recent medical evidence about this. In May 2024, [NAME] approved a “gradual return to normalized domestic and occupation activities”. Footnote 32 In August 2025, [NAME] indicated that the Appellant is “at work” and that she has “the required capacity to perform required duties”. Footnote 33 [ 29 ] I must now look at the Appellant’s capacity to work in the real world by the hearing. The Appellant can work in the real world as she did work [ 30 ] When I am deciding whether the Appellant can work, I can’t just look at her medical conditions. I must also consider factors such as her age, level of education, language abilities, and past work and life experience. [ 31 ] The Federal Court of Appeal has indicated that, in disability cases, I must analyze whether a person can work “in the real world.” Footnote 34 I have to consider how their background and personal characteristics might affect their employability. These are known as the [NAME] factors. [ 32 ] The Appellant has considerable work experience. She worked in an administrative role in [NAME] for many years. She worked in a court setting for the [NAME]. She also worked in administrative roles for a few private companies. She was able to seek re-training as a hairstylist, though she did not practice as a hairstylist for very long. [ 33 ] The Appellant has also never really stopped working. I note that the [NAME] associate the notion of “substantially gainful” with a specific dollar value, which varies from year to year. Any earnings that exceed that threshold – which is the maximum yearly amount that a person can receive as a disability pension – are deemed to be substantially gainful. Footnote 35 Of note, part-time work can constitute a substantially gainful occupation (SGO). Footnote 36 [ 34 ] The Appellant’s earnings since 2021 have been the following: Year Appellant’s earnings from work Footnote 37 s. 68.1 substantially gainful amount Meets s. 68.1 SGO threshold? 2021 $24,640 $17,025 Yes 2022 $35,197 $17,610 Yes 2023 $23,396 $18,508 Yes 2024 $18,279 $19.339 No 2025 $60,003 $20,153 Yes [ 35 ] The Minister’s position on this is as follows: Footnote 38 Even if the Appellant came close to reaching this benchmark in 2024, her capacity to perform part-time work or activities restricts her from meeting the severe criterion. The focus is not how difficult a claimant finds a job, but rather whether she can perform it on a sustained basis and whether that job is substantially gainful. In any case, the Appellant had the highest earnings following this year, which indicates that her condition did not worsen and did not meet the definition of “severe” under the [NAME] . [ 36 ] In only one of the last five years has the Appellant been short of the regulatory threshold for a substantially gainful occupation – and she was just short in that one year, 2024. I believe that the Appellant’s earnings over the last five years clearly show that she has held substantially gainful occupations. [ 37 ] [NAME] further underscored in her oral summations at the hearing that the Appellant could not use her personal attributes under [NAME] as preventing her from working. [ 38 ] I agree with this. I don’t see any of the foregoing [NAME] factors as indicating the Appellant cannot work in the real world. The question isn’t whether the Appellant could work in the real world because it is quite apparent that she did. Footnote 39 [ 39 ] I said above that the legal test for [NAME] disability is whether one is incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. I have just concluded that the Appellant has been holding substantially gainful occupations since 2021. I will therefore now turn to the second part of the test, whether the Appellant was incapable regularly of pursuing such substantially gainful occupations. The Appellant’s limitations do not make her regularly incapable of work [ 40 ] Before I address whether the Appellant was incapable regularly of working, I will note that I believe that the Appellant’s earnings on the previous page were employment income. This is fairly important to note, as 1) the Appellant indicated in her testimony that on many occasions in years past, she received settlements after she was let go from her employment; and 2) the Appellant had earnings in 2025 – at $60K - that largely exceeded the regulatory threshold for a substantially gainful occupation. [ 41 ] First, the Appellant’s 2025 earnings, as noted in the file, seem to come from one T4 slip. Footnote 40 I note that the employer for this T4 slip seems to be that of her latest job, that she has held since 2023. Footnote 41 Second, these $60K earnings were addressed in both the Minister’s written submissions and oral submissions at the hearing. Footnote 42 The Appellant could both read and hear those submissions about those earnings being employment income and she did not address this in rebuttal, both in her own written submissions and in her own oral submissions at the hearing. Footnote 43 [ 42 ] Finally, at the hearing, I allowed the Appellant 10 days to file any and all slips that could attest to payouts following dismissals, instead of employment income. Footnote 44 The Appellant filed such evidence for years 2020 and 2023, but none regarding 2025. Considering the foregoing, I conclude that the Appellant’s $60K earnings in 2025 were employment income. [ 43 ] The Minister asked me to give great weight to these 2025 employment earnings. I will return to this below. [ 44 ] For the years 2021 to 2024, the Appellant’s average employment earnings were $25,378, while the average regulatory threshold amount for a substantially gainful occupation was $18,121. The Appellant’s average income exceeded the average SGO threshold, but not by a very large margin. [ 45 ] The Appellant filed a letter from her present employer, her employer since July 2023. Footnote 45 It is worth reproducing much of the letter, which I will do below: Although [the Appellant’s] skills and performance are very strong when she is able to work, her ability to maintain regular and reliable employment has been significantly affected by her ongoing physical and mental health conditions. In order to accommodate her needs, we allow her to work from home with flexible hours, typically averaging between 15-25 hours per week. Despite these accommodations, [the Appellant’s] illnesses frequently prevent her from completing even reduced workloads on a consistent basis. Over the past several months in particular, her attendance has become increasingly sporadic. She often has multiple medical appointments each week, and there are many occasions when her symptoms prevent her from working at all. Even with maximum flexibility and support, she is unable to consistently fulfill her responsibilities, which creates challenges for workflow, project timelines, and company operations. It is important to emphasize that [the Appellant’s] difficulties with work consistency and reliability have been ongoing and have worsened over time. Despite our best efforts to adapt her role and schedule to her health circumstances, she has not been able to sustain regular employment. From my perspective as her employer, her health challenges are both severe and prolonged, and they prevent her from being able to engage in substantially gainful employment on a predictable basis. [ 46 ] The letter seems to make a strong argument for the Appellant being incapable regularly of occupying what has essentially been, as I said above, a substantially gainful occupation. The letter could fit well with the Appellant’s earnings in 2023 and 2024. [ 47 ] With the Appellant’s many medical appointments, with the Appellant’s medical conditions leading to some limitations as to work, and with the employer’s letter, there could have been a credible argument to be made that before 2025, the Appellant was incapable regularly of work. [ 48 ] I am not saying that I would have necessarily ruled in that manner. I don’t have to, because the Appellant’s 2025 $60K earnings blow this argument out of the water. It is simply impossible for me to reconcile much of what is said in the employer’s letter with the Appellant’s earnings in 2025. If the legal test holds that it is the incapacity as to employment that must be regular, regular attendance can clearly be evidence to the contrary. [ 49 ] With earnings of $60K in 2025, one of two things has to have happened, or both: the Appellant got a substantial increase from her $20 hourly wage (she testified to this wage in cross-examination), or there was a substantial increase in the hours that she worked. Or, as I said, both of these statements could be true. These two possibilities, and the Appellant’s highest-ever earnings with this employer, seem completely incompatible with the following statements in the employer’s letter: The Appellant not being able to complete even reduced workloads on a consistent basis; She is unable to consistently fulfill her responsibilities; Her attendance becoming increasingly sporadic; Her difficulties with work consistency and reliability have been ongoing and have worsened over time; [ 50 ] These statements are contrary to the important increase in the Appellant’s employment earnings in 2025. They can’t be true in the face of $60K earnings, her highest-ever with this employer, by far. I simply cannot give any weight to the employer’s letter. [ 51 ] In light of this, it is not possible for me to conclude that the Appellant was incapable regularly of a substantially gainful occupation. This is further supported by the fact that the medical evidence allows for the Appellant working part-time. [ 52 ] I greatly sympathize with the Appellant, it seems that working is difficult for her, and she works for the best reason I can think of – to support her family. She testified in a forthright manner at the hearing and I found it easy to like her – she is bright, articulate, and hard-working. But I cannot use my sympathy for the Appellant to conclude that she is incapable regularly of work. [ 53 ] [NAME] said in her oral submissions at the hearing that the Appellant could not argue that her conditions prevented her from working, because she is. [NAME] further said that the Appellant’s only remaining argument is that she had a [NAME]. I will now address this. The Appellant does not have a [NAME] [ 54 ] A [NAME] is an employer that accommodates an employee, while modifying the expectations of this employee in keeping with their limitations. Footnote 46 When a [NAME] accommodates such an employee, the work product expected from that employee is considerably less than what is expected from other employees. [ 55 ] Two reasons lead me to this conclusion. First, the employer’s letter I alluded to above did indicate the Appellant was accommodated in some respects: she works from home and she has a flexible schedule. However, the employer also lists what seem to be important tasks related to the Appellant’s work, and the employer says that her “skills and performance are very strong when she is able to work.” Footnote 47 [ 56 ] There is no evidence that the employer’s expectations are truly under the norm. There is no evidence that the Appellant’s work product is expected to be considerably less than that of other employees. There is no evidence that the accommodations that the employer provides the Appellant cause the employer hardship. There is no evidence that the employer is receiving work product from the Appellant that is not commensurate with the salary paid to her. [ 57 ] Second, the above is underscored by the fact that in 2025, the employer increased both the Appellant’s salary, hours, or both, so much so that the Appellant’s employment income reached $60K. It would make little sense for the Appellant’s employer to have effectively doubled down on her and her work product if the employer had been benevolent. [ 58 ] I conclude that the Appellant does not have a [NAME]. The Appellant submitted case law that is not persuasive [ 59 ] Finally, the Appellant submitted Appeal Division case law in support of her claim. Footnote 48   I reviewed this case law, and unfortunately, I do not find it to be relevant to the present case. The Appellant submitted a number of cases where the appeal was allowed and the diagnoses were the same or similar to the Appellant’s. [ 60 ] However, this is where the similarities to the present case end. This particular case turns on the Appellant’s ability to work and having worked to the extent of this being opposite of being incapable regularly of working. Almost all of the cases submitted by the Appellant did not turn on work performed by the appellants in those cases. [ 61 ] In fact, there was only one case where work performed by the appellant was relevant to the Appeal Division’s finding. Footnote 49 In that case, the appeal was allowed because the appellant had had a [NAME]. I did not find this to be the case in this instance. Conclusion [ 62 ] I have found that the Appellant isn’t entitled to a [NAME] disability pension. [ 63 ] This means that the appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 Page GD2-26. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 Page GD2-23. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 The Minister received this application on April 18, 2023; see page GD2-23. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See the initial decision dated January 31, 2024, at GD2-17; and the reconsideration decision dated July 25, 2024, at GD2-6. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 On August 1, 2024; see GD1-1. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See the General Division decision dated October 4, 2025, made by Tribunal Member [NAME], at pages AD1A-1 and following. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 On December 1, 2025; see AD1-1. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 I also allowed her the opportunity for her to file a medical report related to her hypermobility. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 Page AD15-1 and following. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 Page AD16-1. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 Page AD17-1. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 Service Canada uses an Appellant’s years of [NAME] contributions to calculate their coverage period, or “minimum qualifying period” ( MQP ). The end of the coverage period is called the MQP date. See section 44(2) of the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are on page AD9-16 and following. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See section 42(2)(a)(i) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See section 42(2)(a)(ii) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2011  FCA  47 at para 8. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248; and  [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2009  FCA  178. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Canada (Social Development) , 2008  FCA  33. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2003  FCA  117 at para 3. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 These is evidence on file for settlements from [NAME] (at pages GD6-52 and following), the [NAME] (pages AD6-37 and following), as well as [NAME] (pages AD3-20 and following). Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 Page GD2-226. There is also a February 2016 report by [NAME] at page GD2-283. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 From April 2 and May 1, 2024, at pages GD10-1 and GD10-4. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 Page GD2-73 and GD2-55. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 A February 2018 assessment by [NAME] is at page GD2-142. An August 2020 assessment by [NAME] is at page GD2-84. There is also a March 2016 psychiatric assessment by [NAME] and [NAME] at page GD2-254. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 Page AD12-5. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 Page AD15-4. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 Page GD2-80. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 Page GD2-80. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 The report starts on page GD2-55. This is from page GD2-62. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 Page GD2-62. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 Page AD8-13. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 Page AD8-9. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See Section 68.1 of the [NAME]. Specific substantially gainful amounts have been set by the Regulations since 2014. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 [NAME]  v  [NAME] (October 17, 2007), CP 24673 ( PAB ). Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See AD9-16 and AD9-17. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See AD9-10. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2011  FCA  316, where the Federal Court of Appeal substantiates this approach. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 Page AD9-18. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 The employer number, at 797925403RP0001, is the same for the Appellant’s earnings in 2023, 2024, and 2025. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 Page AD9-10 and following. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 The Appellant’s written submissions in rebuttal are at AD12-1. At no point does she address her $60K earnings from 2025. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See paragraphs 6 and 7 above. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 This letter is dated August 26, 2025, and is found at GD17-2. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2014  FCA  187. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 Page GD17-2. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See pages AD12-1 and AD12-2. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See SI  v  [NAME] , 2022  [NAME]  1237, also referred to as AD-22-228. Return to footnote 49 referrer