CPP Disability Pension Application Denied for Insufficient Evidence

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: RO v [NAME_1] , 2026  [NAME_2]  85 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] [NAME_4] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated June 13, 2025 (GP-24-1893) Tribunal member: Neil Nawaz Type of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: January 27, 2026 Hearing participant: Respondent’s representative Decision date: February 6, 2026 File number: AD-25-585 On this page Decision Overview Preliminary matter Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] I am dismissing this appeal. The Appellant is not entitled to a [NAME_5] ( [NAME_5] ) disability pension. Overview [ 2 ] The Appellant is a 55-year-old former high school shop teacher who has been diagnosed with Charcot-Marie-Tooth (CMT) disease, a nerve condition that leads to progressive muscle weakness in the legs and feet, arms and hands. He hasn’t worked since September 2007. [ 3 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME_5] disability pension in October 2023. Footnote 1 Service Canada, the Minister’s public facing agency, refused the application after determining that the Appellant didn’t have a severe and prolonged disability during his [NAME_5] disability coverage period, which ended on December 31, 2010. Among other things, it found that some of the Appellant’s medical conditions didn’t become serious until after that date. [ 4 ] The Appellant appealed the Minister’s refusal to the Social Security Tribunal. The Tribunal’s General Division held a hearing by teleconference and dismissed the appeal. It found that, while the Appellant might be currently disabled, there wasn’t enough medical evidence to show that he was regularly incapable of substantially gainful employment during his coverage period. It also found that the Appellant hadn’t made sufficient effort to find suitable work. [ 5 ] The Appellant then applied for permission to appeal to the Appeal Division. In October, one of my colleagues allowed his appeal to go ahead. Earlier this month, I held a fresh hearing to consider the merits of the Appellant’s disability claim. Preliminary matter [ 6 ] The Appellant didn’t join the teleconference hearing at the appointed date and time. Having satisfied myself that he had received the notice of hearing, I decided to proceed in his absence. Issue [ 7 ] For the Appellant to succeed, he had to prove that, more likely than not, he had a severe and prolonged disability during his [NAME_5] disability coverage period, formally known as a minimum qualifying period ( MQP ): A disability is severe if it makes a claimant incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 2 A claimant isn’t entitled to a disability pension if they are regularly able to do some kind of work that allows them to earn a living. A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death. Footnote 3 The disability must be expected to keep the claimant out of the workforce for a long time. [ 8 ] The parties agreed that the Appellant’s MQP ended on December 31, 2010. Footnote 4 As a result, I had to decide whether the Appellant had a severe and prolonged disability as of that date and whether he has had one ever since. Analysis [ 9 ] I have applied the law to the available evidence and concluded that the Appellant is not entitled to the [NAME_5] disability pension. The Appellant suffers from several medical conditions, but there isn’t enough evidence to show that they prevented him from working before December 31, 2010. The Appellant didn’t have a severe disability during his MQP [ 10 ] [NAME_6] bear the burden of proving that they had a severe and prolonged disability during their MQP . Footnote 5 I have reviewed the record, and I have concluded that the Appellant did not meet that burden according to the test set out in the [NAME_5] . The Appellant rated his functional abilities highly [ 11 ] In his application for benefits, the Appellant said that, since 2007, he had been unable to work because of CMT, depression, and anxiety. Footnote 6 The application asked the Appellant to rate his physical, behavioural, emotional, communication, thinking, and other daily abilities on a scale from poor to excellent. He rated all of his abilities as good, very good or excellent. He rated none of his abilities as fair or poor. He added, “I have good days and bad days—some days I can, and some days I cannot … I have had a lot more bad things, depending on my life.” Footnote 7 [ 12 ] I found it surprising that a person seeking disability benefits would rate his functional abilities so highly. However, if I understand the Appellant, he is claiming that his ups and downs make him incapable of regular employment. That factor is indeed a key part of the [NAME_5] ’s test for disability, and I reviewed the relevant medical evidence with it in mind. The Appellant’s CMT didn’t become a significant problem until after the MQP [ 13 ] A [NAME_5] disability claimant must provide objective medical evidence supporting a claimed mental or physical disability, including reports about its nature, extent, and prognosis. Footnote 8 At least some of the medical evidence must “relate to the date of the  MQP  and show that the disability has been occurring continuously since that date.” Footnote 9 [ 14 ] The Appellant has submitted a large volume of medical evidence, but only some of it relates to his MQP , which is now more than 15 years in the past. As a result, I focused on reports that were either prepared before or shortly after December 31, 2010. I also gave more weight to post- MQP evidence prepared by treatment providers who had first-hand knowledge of the Appellant’s condition during the relevant period. [ 15 ] CMT is an inherited condition that causes damage to the peripheral nerves, mainly in the arms and legs. It is a lifelong condition that gets worse with time, although symptoms vary from individual to individual. Footnote 10 This means I can’t just focus on the diagnosis; I also have look at whether CMT caused the Appellant limitations that affected his ability to work. [ 16 ] The Appellant was apparently diagnosed with CMT as a child. In October 2008, [NAME_7], his new family physician, referred him to [NAME_8], a neurologist, after he complained of numbness in his hands. Footnote 11 [NAME_8] diagnosed the Appellant with moderate to severe carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) in both wrists and advised him to continue wearing splints. He also sent the Appellant for genetic testing to confirm that he had CMT and advised him to book an appointment in a few months to discuss the results: “At that time, we will decide whether or not he is a candidate for surgical treatment.” Footnote 12 [ 17 ] That appointment apparently never happened. Over the next few years, the Appellant’s extensive medical file documented frequent consultations with [NAME_7] as well as with various specialists, mostly about his mental health. However, the file was silent about any problems with his hand or wrist until November 2016, when the Appellant again began complaining of numbness. Footnote 13 In December 2016, [NAME_7] said that the Appellant’s “carpal tunnel did very well with bracing.” Footnote 14 The Appellant didn’t see [NAME_8] again until May 2017, when he was again diagnosed with “significant” bilateral CTS. Footnote 15 [ 18 ] It is not clear to me how wrist numbness by itself could have significantly contributed to any impairment during the Appellant’s MQP . And however debilitating the numbness may have been, I have to wonder about how severe or prolonged it was since, at the time, the Appellant had yet to explore standard treatment options such as surgery. Then there is the fact that the Appellant didn’t mention any hand or wrist problems to [NAME_7] for nearly eight years. The gap suggests that symptoms related to CTS or CMT probably weren’t much of a problem by the end of the MQP or for several years after. The medical evidence didn’t point to debilitating mental health problems during the MQP [ 19 ] The Appellant has a history of anxiety and depression, and when he first started seeing [NAME_7] in 2008, he was going through an extremely contentious divorce that saw him charged with assault and cut off from his children. Footnote 16 At the time, he was also on stress leave from his teaching job. [ 20 ] In October 2008, [NAME_7] referred the Appellant to a psychiatrist, [NAME_9], who reported that the Appellant was unfocused, unmotivated, and socially withdrawn. Footnote 17 He said the Appellant had been divorced for a year and had not seen his children for some time, which was very upsetting to him. [NAME_9] diagnosed the Appellant with depression and an adjustment disorder and recommended changes to his medications. [ 21 ] In a “To Whom It May Concern” letter from December 2008, [NAME_7] wrote that the Appellant suffered from situational depression that had initially left him unable to even defend himself against false accusations levelled by his former wife. Footnote 18 However, [NAME_7] added that the Appellant was now responding well to treatment and his depression was stable. [ 22 ] In an April 2009 disability certificate, [NAME_7] wrote that that the Appellant was totally disabled by severe generalized anxiety and depression, but he also said that the Appellant was expected to make a full recovery by April 2010, although he might require lifelong treatment. Footnote 19 Later that month. [NAME_7] wrote, “I am happy with his medical progress vis a vis the depression which was situational [emphasis added] and has been appropriately treated with good results.” Footnote 20 [ 23 ] The Appellant had earlier undergone an independent psychiatric examination at the request of his private disability insurer. In July 2009, Dr. [NAME_10] issued a follow-up report, in which he reiterated his previous diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression, triggered by relationship and financial difficulties. Footnote 21 He found that the Appellant’s mental health symptoms were mild and would not prevent him from returning to teaching or another job to which he might be suited. [ 24 ] In October 2009 and again in May 2010, [NAME_7] attempted to refer the Appellant to another psychiatrist, Dr. [NAME_11], regarding his “grief reaction over the loss of his family through the divorce process.” Footnote 22 However, there is no indication that the Appellant ever saw Dr. [NAME_11]. [ 25 ] The Appellant regularly saw [NAME_7] throughout 2010. However, the family physician’s detailed office notes don’t contain any specific mention of complaints from the Appellant about his mood. The entries from December 2010, the last month of his MQP , are mostly about the Appellant’s thyroid medication, although he mentioned that he had left arm numbness that he thought was related to back pain. Footnote 23 He also disclosed that he was getting free family counselling through family services. [ 26 ] In May 2011, Dr, [NAME_7] completed a medical certificate declaring the Appellant totally disabled with no clear date of recovery expected. Footnote 24 However, [NAME_7] did not specify the cause of the disability. [NAME_7]’s notes for 2011 said little about the Appellant’s mental health, although they detailed his progress in several difficult and protracted legal proceedings with his ex-wife. [ 27 ] Even so, a few months later, [NAME_7] wrote that the Appellant was probably capable of returning to teaching: Footnote 25 I would have to say that when I met [NAME_3]. in September of 2008, in my professional opinion he was not capable of working in any capacity. I would say that since that time, he has gradually improved to the point where I would currently state that while I do not believe he could work as a teacher in the setting in which he used to work, he could as we have discussed possibly at least try to return to teaching in another venue removed from this one. [ 28 ] Here, contrary to some of his previous statements, [NAME_7] held out the possibility of the Appellant returning to work as a teacher in another school. This makes sense, given indications elsewhere in the file that his wife, who was a teacher at the same school where he worked, had an affair with a colleague. Footnote 26 It also reinforces [NAME_7]’s point, which he repeatedly makes in his notes, that the Appellant’s depression and anxiety were, at least in part, situational — the product of passing circumstances. [ 29 ] In the end, I found that the Appellant’s mental health condition as of December 31, 2010 was both situational and treatable: It was situational because much of the Appellant’s emotional distress was the result of the break-up of his marriage and the legal battles that followed. But those types of crises, while undoubtedly extremely stressful in the moment, tend to resolve or at least subside. It was treatable because, as [NAME_7] noted several times, the Appellant’s condition improved with the use of anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications, as well as psychotherapy from [NAME_9], although it is not clear how many sessions he attended. [ 30 ] I am satisfied that the Appellant’s depression and anxiety did not contribute to a severe disability during the MQP . The evidence indicates that the Appellant’s mental health was at a low point in 2008−09 but that it rebounded to some extent with treatment and the passage of time. This also suggests that the Appellant’s mental health condition, however debilitating it might have been during the MQP , was not prolonged. I see evidence to support this belief when I look at the Appellant’s medical file in the several years after 2010 and observe that it was almost entirely concerned with physical, not psychological, problems. There wasn’t a significant reference to anxiety and depression until 2017, when [NAME_12], the Appellant’s new family physician, filled out a disability certificate on his behalf. Footnote 27 The Appellant’s condition, looked at as a whole, didn’t prevent him from working in the real world [ 31 ] I find that, despite the Appellant’s psychological and physical conditions, he still had some ability to work as of his MQP . I am reinforced in this belief when I look at his overall employability at the time. [ 32 ] The leading case on the interpretation of “severe” is [NAME_13] , which requires the Tribunal, when assessing disability, to consider a disability claimant as a “whole person” in a real-world context. Footnote 28 Employability is not to be assessed in the abstract, but rather in light of all circumstances. Those circumstances fall into two categories: The claimant’s medical condition — this is a broad inquiry, requiring that the claimant’s condition be assessed in its totality; Footnote 29 and The claimant’s background — matters such as age, education level, language proficiency and past work and life experience are relevant. [ 33 ] In this case, the Appellant had problems related to CTS and depression and anxiety during his MQP , However, examination of the available medical evidence as a whole leads me to doubt that the combined effect of these two conditions prevented the Appellant from regularly pursuing suitable employment before 2011. Looked at in their totality, the Appellant’s medical conditions didn’t appear to rule out all forms of work. [ 34 ] During the MQP , the Appellant had numbness in his hands that required splinting and no other intervention. He experienced situational depression in the midst of a tumultuous divorce that cost him his job and his children. The Appellant’s medical file in the following five to six years revealed minimal complaints or interventions concerning the two conditions that formed the basis of his disability claim. [ 35 ] My doubts about the Appellant’s disability are reinforced when I consider his background and personal characteristics. The Appellant has a college diploma and experience as a skilled tradesperson and schoolteacher. At the end of his MQP , he was only 40 years old—young enough to still be marketable to potential employers and, if necessary, to go back to school and learn new skills. Even with his medical conditions, he had the residual capacity to attempt another job or retrain for one. As we will see, that capacity imposed upon him an obligation. The Appellant didn’t attempt suitable alternative employment [ 36 ] A Federal Court of Appeal decision called [NAME_14] says that disability claimants must do what they can to find alternative employment that is better suited to their impairments: Consequently, an applicant who seeks to bring himself within the definition of severe disability must not only show that he (or she) has a serious health problem but where, as here, there is evidence of work capacity, must also show that efforts at obtaining and maintaining employment have been unsuccessful by reason of that health condition. Footnote 30 [ 37 ] This passage suggests that, if a claimant retains at least some work capacity, the General Division must conduct an analysis to determine (i) whether they attempted to find another job, and (ii) if so, whether their impairments prevented them from getting and keeping that job. [ 38 ] On top of that, disability claimants must make meaningful attempts to return to work. Footnote 31 They cannot limit their job search to the type of work that they were doing before they became impaired. That is because they must show that they are regularly incapable of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 32 Claimants who fail to pursue alternative forms of employment may be ineligible for benefits. [ 39 ] In this case, the Appellant had at least some work capacity — enough to trigger the obligation to pursue employment that might have been better suited to his limitations. I am not convinced that the Appellant fulfilled that obligation. [ 40 ] [NAME_7] presumably had the greatest insight into the Appellant’s overall condition as his primary treatment provider. He foresaw the Appellant resuming work as a teacher, provided that he did not return to the school where he had been previously employed. I don’t see evidence that the Appellant has ever attempted to look for a job in another school or, for that matter, any job at all. I understand that teaching children can be a stressful occupation at the best of times, but there are other jobs that might have been better suited to someone prone to anxiety and depression. There’s no indication that the Appellant ever tried any. [ 41 ] The Appellant hasn’t shown that his impairments caused him to fail at a potentially suitable job. As such, he has not fulfilled his obligation under [NAME_14] and, for that reason, his claim must fail. I don’t have to consider whether the Appellant had a prolonged disability [ 42 ] A disability must be severe and prolonged. Footnote 33 Since the Appellant has not proved that his disability is severe, there’s no need for me to assess whether it is also prolonged. Conclusion [ 43 ] The Appellant had medical problems during his MQP , but they didn’t amount to a severe disability. The Appellant suffered from no more than hand numbness before December 31, 2010, but it appeared to be well managed with splinting, and he apparently did not think it necessary to pursue surgery. He was also depressed and anxious due to situational factors, but his condition appears to have improved in the years in the years after his MQP . Above all, the Appellant did not fulfill his duty to at least attempt alternative employment, despite having the residual capacity to do so. [ 44 ] The appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See Appellant’s application for the [NAME_5] disability pension dated October 23, 2023, GD2-55. Return to footnote 1 Footnote 2 [NAME_5], section 42(2)(a)(i). Return to footnote 2 Footnote 3 [NAME_5] , section 42(2)(a)(ii). Return to footnote 3 Footnote 4 Under section 44(2) of the [NAME_5] , an MQP is established by making threshold contributions to the [NAME_5] . The Appellant’s [NAME_5] contributions are listed on his record of earnings at GD2-86. Return to footnote 4 Footnote 5 [NAME_5] , section 44(1). Return to footnote 5 Footnote 6 See the Appellant’s application for benefits, GD2-58. Return to footnote 6 Footnote 7 See the Appellant’s application for benefits, GD2-62. Return to footnote 7 Footnote 8 In [NAME_15] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2008/2008fca377/2008fca377.html), the Federal Court of Appeal said there must be some objective medical evidence of a disability. Return to footnote 8 Footnote 9 See Canada (Attorney General) v Dean , 2020  FC  2026 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2020/2020fc206/2020fc206.html) and  Canada (Attorney General) v Angell , 2020  FC  1093. (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2020/2020fc1093/2020fc1093.html) Return to footnote 9 Footnote 10 The Minister produced a professional witness, [NAME_16], a general practitioner who had reviewed the Appellant’s medical file. She testified about, among other things, CMT and its symptoms and prognosis. Return to footnote 10 Footnote 11 See office note dated October 8, 2008 by [NAME_7], family physician, GD2-192. Return to footnote 11 Footnote 12 See report dated November 24, 2008 by [NAME_8], neurologist, GD2-198. Return to footnote 12 Footnote 13 [NAME_7]’s office note dated November 2, 2016, GD2-332. Return to footnote 13 Footnote 14 [NAME_7]’s office note dated November 2, 2016, GD2-332. Return to footnote 14 Footnote 15 [NAME_8]’s report dated May 29, 2017, GD2-351. Return to footnote 15 Footnote 16 [NAME_7]’s office note dated September 18, 2008, GD2-188. Return to footnote 16 Footnote 17 See report dated October 18, 2008 by [NAME_9], psychiatrist, GD2-194. Return to footnote 17 Footnote 18 [NAME_7]’s office note dated December 3, 2008, GD2-201. Return to footnote 18 Footnote 19 See disability certificate completed by [NAME_7] on April 2, 2009, GD2-206. Return to footnote 19 Footnote 20 [NAME_7]’s letter dated April 30, 2009, GD2-207. Return to footnote 20 Footnote 21 See addendum to independent medical examination report dated July 20, 2009 by [NAME_10], psychiatrist, GD2-208. Return to footnote 21 Footnote 22 [NAME_7]’s office notes dated October 12, 2009 (GD2-215) and May 20, 2010 (GD2-222). Return to footnote 22 Footnote 23 [NAME_7]’s office note dated December 15, 2010, GD2-229. Return to footnote 23 Footnote 24 See medical certificate completed by [NAME_7] on May 20, 2011, GD2-232. Return to footnote 24 Footnote 25 [NAME_7]’s office note dated August 3, 2011, GD2-241. Return to footnote 25 Footnote 26 [NAME_7]’s letter to the London Family Court dated August 17, 2009, GD2-211. Return to footnote 26 Footnote 27 See ODSP health status report completed by [NAME_12], general practitioner, on April 24, 2017, GD2-337. Return to footnote 27 Footnote 28 [NAME_13] v Canada (Attorney General) 2001  FCA  248. (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2001/2001fca248/2001fca248.html?resultId=50a3a1a9f40d4fa9a71bf4d9554d5762&searchId=2026-01-29T15:37:06:581/18ddb8b8e9954593bb3992eb03809c94) Return to footnote 28 Footnote 29 [NAME_18] v Attorney General of Canada ,2011  FCA  47. (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2011/2011fca47/2011fca47.html?resultId=c97608eeaec0408aa230770322962ace&searchId=2026-01-29T15:38:13:721/ee5bc3bcd1104709be41835f4af62fc5) Return to footnote 29 Footnote 30 [NAME_14] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2003  FCA  117. (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2003/2003fca117/2003fca117.html) Return to footnote 30 Footnote 31 [NAME_19] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015  FC  1300 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2015/2015fc1300/2015fc1300.html?resultId=134b9af4854d4b3ca85d2e34a612afc6&searchId=2026-01-29T15:32:14:062/7018ef877ab34744b1996a15b53a324f), in which the Federal Court stated that the onus is on claimants to show that they made “sincere” efforts to meet the employment efforts test. Return to footnote 31 Footnote 32 See Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME_20] ,2008  FCA  164. (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2008/2008fca164/2008fca164.html?resultId=3688227c877142b2aa3daa3168540eab&searchId=2026-01-29T15:32:51:295/6700a5a4190446bfb429db87dacf595d) Return to footnote 32 Footnote 33 [NAME_5] , section 42(2)(a). Return to footnote 33