CPP Disability Pension Denied Due to Insufficient Proof of Severe Disability

Citation: AT  v  [NAME] , 2026  [NAME]  361 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: [NAME] Respondent: [redacted] [NAME] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated August 22, 2025 (GP-25-1031) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: April 21, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Respondent’s representative Respondent’s witness Decision date: June 25, 2026 File number: AD-25-749 On this page Decision Overview What I must decide Some relevant context Was the Appellant’s disability severe by the end of 2024? Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The Appellant, [NAME]., isn’t eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. Overview [ 3 ] The Appellant used to work as an educational assistant (EA). She helped students with special needs. Her job was physically demanding and included feeding and toileting duties. Footnote 1 She wasn’t a full-time employee. But she worked full-time hours. Footnote 2 She stopped working in December 2023 because she was in a motor vehicle accident (MVA). [ 4 ] The Appellant tried to return to work in April 2024, but she stopped working after four days because her employer could not provide modified duties. The Appellant hasn’t worked since then. Footnote 3 [ 5 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension in November 2024. Footnote 4 In her application, she said she can’t work because of injuries from the MVA, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and generalized anxiety disorder. Footnote 5 [ 6 ] The [NAME] (Minister) denied the application at both the initial and reconsideration levels of review. Footnote 6 [ 7 ] The Appellant appealed the Minister’s reconsideration decision to the Social Security Tribunal’s General Division. The General Division dismissed the appeal. [ 8 ] The Appellant disagreed with the General Division’s decision. So, she asked the Appeal Division for leave (permission) to appeal. In November 2025, one of my colleagues gave the Appellant permission to appeal. [ 9 ] On April 21, 2026, I held a de novo hearing. A de novo hearing means I wasn’t looking at whether the General Division made a mistake. I was taking a fresh look at the case, as if it hadn’t been decided before. What I must decide [ 10 ] The Appellant must prove she has a disability that was severe and prolonged by December 31, 2024. The date of December 31, 2024, is based on her [NAME] contributions. Footnote 7 [ 11 ] A disability is severe if it makes a person incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 8 [ 12 ] When I am assessing whether a disability is severe, I must focus on whether the Appellant’s medical conditions result in functional limitations that get in the way of her earning a living. Footnote 9 My focus isn’t on the names of the conditions or diagnoses. Footnote 10 [ 13 ] A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death. [ 14 ] This means the Appellant’s disability can’t have an expected recovery date. The disability must be expected to keep the Appellant out of the workforce for a long time. [ 15 ] The Appellant has to prove her case. She has to prove it on a balance of probabilities. This means that she has to show it is more likely than not that she was disabled by the end of 2024. Some relevant context [ 16 ] The Appellant bases her claim for disability on the MVA of December 2023. For context, and because the [NAME] program is not about causation, I will briefly summarize a work absence that happened in 2022. I will also describe the Appellant’s MVA history. The Appellant was on medical leave from September 2022 to January 2023 [ 17 ] The Appellant started her job with the [COMPANY] in March 2022. Footnote 11 She was off work in the summer of 2022 during the usual school vacation. During that summer, she spoke with her doctor about difficulties with sleep and her mental health. Footnote 12 In mid-September 2022, she asked her doctor for a note to be off work because she was having a lot of stress at home. Her doctor supported her request and noted a diagnosis of adjustment disorder on a background of severe generalized anxiety disorder. Footnote 13 [ 18 ] During her time off from her job as an EA, the Appellant got a job as a cashier at a [NAME]. The evidence includes a [NAME] ([NAME]) form showing she was bitten by a dog while working at the store in December 2022. Footnote 14 The Appellant testified that she only worked at that store for one shift. [ 19 ] The Appellant returned to her job as an EA in January 2023. Footnote 15 The Appellant testified that after her return to work she didn’t have any problems at work before the MVA of December 2023. The Appellant’s [NAME] [ 20 ] The MVA of December 2023 was the first of four [NAME]. [ 21 ] The medical evidence suggests that the MVA of December 2023 was minor. The Appellant was the driver of a vehicle that was rear-ended while she was stopped at a traffic light. The air bags didn’t deploy. She didn’t hit the car in front of her. She didn’t lose consciousness. She got out of her car and talked to the other driver. She drove her car home. She didn’t go to the hospital. Footnote 16 [ 22 ] The Appellant went to a walk-in clinic the day after the accident. She then saw her family doctor ([NAME]) four days after the accident. Her doctor diagnosed a soft tissue injury. Her doctor explained that whiplash can cause prolonged muscle tenderness and reduced range of motion in the neck. She told the Appellant to return to her normal activities and to avoid prolonged rest. Footnote 17 [ 23 ] The Appellant had another MVA on May 4, 2024. Her car was hit while she was at a stop sign. Footnote 18 She went to the hospital and was diagnosed with a neck strain. Footnote 19 Since the MVA of May 2024, the Appellant has told several [NAME] that the second MVA didn’t cause more pain or injuries. Footnote 20 [ 24 ] The Appellant had a third MVA on December 7, 2024. She testified that this accident caused some pain and put her anxiety “through the roof.” I don’t think this was a significant accident. The Appellant didn’t mention it to a psychologist she saw in February 2025. Footnote 21 She mentioned it to another doctor she saw that same month, but she didn’t report any new or worsened symptoms. Footnote 22 [ 25 ] The Appellant said she had a fourth MVA. Footnote 23 But she didn’t talk about the last accident. Was the Appellant’s disability severe by the end of 2024? [ 26 ] I will start by looking at what the Appellant said about her medical conditions and resulting functional limitations by December 31, 2024. What the Appellant said about her functional limitations [ 27 ] The Appellant said that her medical conditions resulted in functional limitations that affected her ability to work by the end of 2024. She identified her functional limitations by the end of 2024 as the following: She had chronic pain. The pain was in her lower back, middle back, upper shoulder area, neck, and knees. She could not stand or walk for a long time. This is because of the back pain and knee pain. She could not sit for a long time. This is because of the back pain and maybe the neck pain. She was “jittery”, meaning she felt a compulsion to move. This affected her tolerances for sitting, standing, and walking. She was barely able to sleep. This is because of shoulder and back pain, emotional distress, anxiety, and ADHD. She never slept more than five hours a night. Her sleep is about the same today. She had fatigue and exhaustion. She could not concentrate or focus. She had brain fog and difficulty remembering things. She felt down. She also had mood swings from time to time. She could not finish a task. This was because of the ADHD. [ 28 ] The Appellant said that because of all her limitations she would not have been able to do a different type of job by December 31, 2024. Does the medical evidence support what the Appellant said? [ 29 ] The Appellant was required to provide medical evidence to support a finding that her functional limitations affected her ability to work by the end of 2024. Footnote 24 [ 30 ] There is a lot of medical evidence on file. When I look at the medical evidence, I see many inconsistencies. I see inconsistencies between what the Appellant said at the hearing and what she told [NAME]. I also see inconsistencies in the way the Appellant reported her conditions to the various [NAME]. I will give some examples. On February 19, 2025, the Appellant had an independent assessment done by [NAME]. [NAME] is a general practitioner who practices in pain management. According to [NAME], the Appellant said that some of her pain conditions already existed before the MVA. Those pain conditions were neck pain, shoulder pain, upper back pain, and lower back pain. At the hearing, the Appellant said that [NAME]’s report isn’t accurate and that she didn’t have those pain conditions before the MVA. I find that [NAME]’s report is quite detailed in the way he summarized the Appellant’s reports of pain. He clearly distinguished between the pain conditions the Appellant said existed before the MVA and those that she said resulted from the MVA. So, it is hard for me to accept that [NAME] didn’t accurately report what he was told by the Appellant. The Appellant told a psychologist in October 2024 that the pain in her shoulders, neck, back, knees, and right elbow are tolerable and intermittent. Footnote 25 But on March 7, 2025, the Appellant reported very high levels of pain during an occupational therapy assessment. She also reported that some of her pain was not intermittent. For example, she said her knee pain is frequent and ranges in severity from 8 to 9.5 out of 10. She said her neck pain is constant and ranges in severity from 8 to 9.5 out of 10. And she said her mid-back pain is constant and ranges in severity from 8.5 to 10 out of 10. Footnote 26 There are marked differences in how the Appellant described her pain to [NAME] in February 2025 and how she described it to the occupational therapist ([NAME]) in March 2025. For example, the Appellant told [NAME] that her knee pain is intermittent and ranges in severity from 4 to 5 out of 10. Footnote 27 But she told [NAME] that her knee pain is frequent and ranges in severity from 8 to 9.5 out of 10. Footnote 28 As another example, the Appellant told [NAME] in February 2025 that her mid-back pain is intermittent and ranges in severity from 3 to 5 out of 10. Footnote 29 But she told [NAME] in March 2025 that the mid-back pain is constant and ranges in severity from 8.5 to 10 out of 10. Footnote 30 At the hearing, the Appellant said that she had memory problems by the end of 2024. But she told [NAME] in March 2025 that her memory was still pretty good. Footnote 31 [ 31 ] The inconsistencies make it difficult for me to put much weight on what the Appellant has subjectively reported about her symptoms and limitations. For this reason, I have put more weight on what objective testing has shown. What the objective testing shows about the Appellant’s physical limitations [ 32 ] The Appellant started physiotherapy within a short time of the MVA of December 2023. She was discharged at the end of May 2024. The discharge report says the Appellant’s biggest area of pain is with her right shoulder, and her main complaint is difficulty carrying heavy things and difficulty “sometimes” with sleep. The physiotherapist said the Appellant has full range of motion of her neck and shoulders without pain and lifting tolerances as follows: Footnote 32 Floor to waist: 45 pounds Waist to shoulder: 25 pounds Above the head: 10 pounds [ 33 ] On August 30, 2024, the Appellant had a functional capacity evaluation (FCE). It was done by a kinesiologist ([NAME]). [NAME] didn’t identify significant mobility or strength limitations. He said the Appellant’s abilities are as follows: Footnote 33 Activity Tolerance sitting frequent if she can have short breaks every hour standing frequent if she can have short breaks every hour walking occasional to frequent bilateral lifting from 12” from floor to waist light, 20 pounds on an occasional basis bilateral lifting from waist to shoulder light, 20 pounds on an occasional basis bilateral carry for 30 feet light, 20 pounds on an occasional basis bending / stooping occasional crouching / squatting occasional kneeling occasional twisting / spinal rotation occasional fine finger or light gripping No limitations firm grasping occasional Legend: Rare: Occasional: Frequent: Constant: Less than 5% of a workday Up to 33% of a workday 33 to 66% of a workday More than 66% of a workday [ 34 ] The results of the FCE are probably a good indicator of the Appellant’s physical tolerances by the end of 2024. The FCE was done just a few months before December 2024. Aside from some elbow pain, which I will talk about shortly, nothing significant happened between August 2024 and December 2024. The results are also generally consistent with the findings of [NAME]’s occupational therapy assessment that was done in March 2025. [ 35 ] For example, during [NAME]’s assessment, the Appellant estimated her sitting tolerance as one hour, her standing tolerance as one hour, and her walking tolerance as 15 minutes. Footnote 34 [ 36 ] The Appellant told [NAME] that she had returned to participating in all her pre-accident household duties, including dusting, sweeping, mopping, vacuuming, bed making, linen changes, bathroom cleaning, meal preparation, dishwashing, grocery shopping, laundry care, garbage removal, and gardening. Footnote 35 [ 37 ] [NAME] reported that the Appellant demonstrated functional range of motion, strength, balance, coordination, grasp, and an ability to access higher and lower levels. Footnote 36 [ 38 ] I will now talk about the right elbow pain. On September 12, 2024, the Appellant told her family doctor that she had been having right elbow pain and swelling for about one month. Footnote 37 Imaging was done the next day. The results were normal, with no fracture, soft tissue swelling, or elbow joint effusion. Footnote 38 A nerve conduction study of April 2025 was within normal limits. The neurologist noted that the elbow condition had gotten a lot better over the last little while. Footnote 39 She didn’t explain what “the last little while” means. But given that the Appellant didn’t mention right elbow pain during her testimony, it is reasonable to find that this condition was probably much improved by the end of 2024. [ 39 ] [NAME] examined the Appellant in February 2025, and his findings don’t suggest any concerns that would be inconsistent with the limitations set out in the FCE. [NAME] said the Appellant had uncomplicated soft tissue injuries and tension headaches. He noted that her neck, shoulder, and upper back pain had returned to baseline (what the pain was like before the MVA). He examined both knees and found no objective findings with either knee. He recommended home-based exercise and stretching and follow-up with her family doctor as needed. Footnote 40 What does the medical evidence say about the mental health conditions? [ 40 ] The Appellant had two psychological assessments that were done close in time to December 31, 2024. The first was done by [NAME] in October 2024. The second was done by [NAME] on February 4, 2025. Each doctor based their opinions and recommendations on clinical interview results, file material, and psychometric test results. Footnote 41 Each doctor arrived at different diagnoses. [NAME]’s assessment [ 41 ] [NAME] said the Appellant’s symptoms include mood fluctuations, a lack of desire to engage in social activities, a profound sense of loneliness, feelings of worthlessness, agitation and irritability, persistent sleep problems and overwhelming fatigue, a heightened hypervigilance about her surroundings, excessive worrying, avoidance behaviours, and anxiety about being in a vehicle. Footnote 42 [ 42 ] [NAME] said that psycho-diagnostic testing showed the Appellant has severe levels of depression, severe levels of anxiety, a provisional diagnosis of PTSD, and is troubled by physical problems, pain, and health-related issues that negatively impact her life. [NAME] also said that testing showed the Appellant isn’t malingering (faking or exaggerating). Footnote 43 [ 43 ] [NAME] concluded that, because of the MVA of December 2023, the Appellant suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life. She is unable to return to work or resume her housekeeping, social, and recreational activities. Footnote 44 [NAME]’s assessment [ 44 ] [NAME]’s assessment paints a different picture. He said the Appellant has mild depressive symptoms and some ongoing mild anxiety. Her symptoms include the following: She has low mood some of the time. She feels down a couple of times a week but not all day. She has ongoing sleep disturbance and intermittent fatigue. She estimates her energy level as 5 out of 10. She has some concentration difficulties. She has anxiety about driving in certain areas. Footnote 45 [ 45 ] [NAME] said the Appellant’s symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. [ 46 ] In terms of anxiety, [NAME] said the Appellant didn’t endorse experiencing any recurrent unexpected panic attacks or symptoms of phobias such as social phobia. He said she described a history of significant anxiety, but she didn’t describe worry per se . She gets more of a feeling of being overwhelmed with physical anxiety. Footnote 46 [ 47 ] It is difficult to explain the different conclusions reached by the psychologists. Some of the disparity could be due to some inconsistencies in the Appellant’s reporting. Some examples of inconsistencies include the following: The Appellant told [NAME] that she talks to and sees her friends on a regular basis. Footnote 47 But she told [NAME] that she lacks the desire to engage in social activities, has lost friendships, and often feels a profound sense of loneliness. Footnote 48 The Appellant told [NAME] that she has a couple of glasses of wine with dinner three to four nights a week. She also told him she smokes two packages of cigarettes a week. Footnote 49 But she told [NAME] that she drinks alcohol in social settings and occasionally smokes cigarettes. Footnote 50 The Appellant told [NAME] that she struggles with memory, focus, and concentration. Footnote 51 But she told [NAME] in March 2025 that she still has a “pretty good memory.” Footnote 52 And she described her problems with attention as a “little bit on and off” adding that it doesn’t help that she has ADHD. Footnote 53 The Appellant told [NAME] that her sleep is often interrupted by accident-related nightmares that elicit intense anxiety. Footnote 54 But when [NAME] asked her about any symptoms of PTSD related to the MVA, the Appellant didn’t mention nightmares. She said she tries to avoid the area where the accident happened. She also said she is more nervous to drive but continues to do so. Footnote 55 The Appellant told [NAME] that she has vehicular anxiety which gets worse with things like highways, being near large trucks, or travelling to unfamiliar places. Footnote 56 But the file shows the Appellant drove 19 hours to Virginia Beach about 10 days after the second MVA of May 2024. Footnote 57 [ 48 ] Because of the inconsistencies, it is difficult to prefer one report over the other. But nothing turns on this because the evidence shows the Appellant hasn’t followed medical advice for her mental health conditions. I will talk more about this later. What does the medical evidence say about the ADHD? [ 49 ] There isn’t a lot of medical evidence about the ADHD. [ 50 ] In June 2024, the Appellant told her doctor she wanted to get tested for ADHD. [NAME] said she would email the ADHD questions to the Appellant. Footnote 58 [ 51 ] There is little to no other mention of ADHD until the [NAME] medical report of November 2024. In that report, [NAME] said the Appellant was “going through[h] diagnosis” for the ADHD. Footnote 59 [ 52 ] A few months later, [NAME] included a diagnosis of ADHD in a medical form. That was in March 2025. Footnote 60 [ 53 ] I don’t know what changed between November 2024, when [NAME] suggested that the diagnosis wasn’t confirmed, and March 2025, when she reported the diagnosis on a medical form. But even if the diagnosis was confirmed during that time, the evidence shows that the Appellant hasn’t followed medical advice that could help with that condition. I will talk more about this later. The evidence about substance use is thin and vague [ 54 ] The Appellant has a history of using crystal methamphetamine ([NAME]). But it is too difficult for me to assess the extent to which the use of [NAME] may have affected her functionality and ability to work by the end of 2024. Part of the difficulty is that the Appellant hasn’t been forthright with [NAME] about her use of the drug. I will give some examples of what is noted in the medical reports: In April 2023, [NAME] reported that the Appellant “does misuse” [NAME] “for some 2 months’ time.” He also said that the methamphetamine abuse was currently in remission and that the Appellant told him she has been off it for at least one month or so. Footnote 61 In September 2024, the Appellant told a physiatrist that she didn’t have a history of recreational drug use. Footnote 62 In November 2024, [NAME] noted that her document review showed a history of [NAME] abuse which is in remission. Footnote 63 [NAME] was probably referring to [NAME]’s report. In February 2025, [NAME] said the Appellant denied using street or recreational drugs. When he pointed out to her that [NAME]’s report mentions a history of [NAME] use, the Appellant told him that wasn’t accurate. She said she may have tried it in the past but denied that she ever abused it. Footnote 64 In April 2025, the Appellant told a neurologist that she wasn’t using recreational drugs. Footnote 65 [NAME] makes little to no mention of the [NAME] in either her clinical notes or reports. [ 55 ] The other part of the difficulty in assessing the impact of the [NAME] on the Appellant’s functionality by the end of 2024 is that the Appellant’s evidence about the [NAME] was vague. At the hearing, the Appellant acknowledged that she was using [NAME] in 2024. But she described it as “here and there” and “barely.” She also said she was just using small amounts. She said she got help through a program called SOAR and hasn’t used [NAME] since before her daughter’s wedding in October 2025. [ 56 ] I acknowledge that a substance use disorder is a condition that can result in a severe disability. But that condition still needs to be supported by medical evidence. In this case, the medical evidence is too thin, and the Appellant’s evidence is too vague to fully understand the impact that the use of [NAME] may have had on the Appellant’s functionality in 2024. The Appellant didn’t follow medical advice [ 57 ] To receive a disability pension, an appellant must make reasonable efforts to treat their disability and must follow medical advice. Footnote 66 If an appellant doesn’t do this, then they must have a reasonable explanation for not doing so. Footnote 67 If they don’t have a reasonable explanation, then I must consider what effect, if any, the medical treatment or advice might have had on the disability. Footnote 68 [ 58 ] The Minister acknowledges that the Appellant is currently doing counselling with a psychotherapist. Footnote 69 The Minister also acknowledges that the Appellant saw a psychiatrist in April 2023. But the Minister says the Appellant didn’t follow medical advice to see a psychiatrist after that. [ 59 ] I agree with the Minister. [ 60 ] The Appellant saw [NAME] in April 2023. His report says she was supposed to follow up with him in two months. Footnote 70 There is no evidence to show the Appellant did that. In fact, the evidence suggests that she didn’t. For example, she told her family doctor that she wasn’t happy with [NAME]. Footnote 71 And she told [NAME] that she didn’t like [NAME] and didn’t want to see him again. Footnote 72 [ 61 ] In June 2023, the Appellant asked her family doctor for a referral to a different psychiatrist. Footnote 73 That same day, her doctor sent a referral to [NAME]. Footnote 74 The Minister’s professional witness ([NAME]) testified that [NAME] is a female psychiatrist. [ 62 ] On November 6, 2023, [NAME] sent a letter to the Appellant and invited her to call her office to schedule an appointment. Footnote 75 On November 9, 2023, the Appellant’s family doctor’s office told the Appellant she was to call [NAME]. Footnote 76 [ 63 ] Almost one year later, on September 12, 2024, the Appellant’s family doctor said the Appellant wanted a referral to a psychiatrist (as well as other specialists). This seems to have been because the Appellant’s lawyer who was handling the MVA matter asked for those referrals. [NAME] noted that the Appellant tried to see [NAME] but was unsuccessful. Footnote 77 It is unclear what that means. [ 64 ] I asked the Appellant about the referral to [NAME]. She said she doesn’t remember what happened with the referral and she doesn’t remember if she saw [NAME]. [ 65 ] I think it is reasonable to conclude the Appellant didn’t see [NAME]. [ 66 ] First, the Appellant appears to have been looking for a psychiatrist in June 2024 because [NAME] said the Appellant would research female psychiatrists who were accepting referrals. She was then to inform her doctor of what she found. Footnote 78 [ 67 ] Second, neither [NAME] nor [NAME] mentioned the Appellant seeing a psychiatrist after the MVA of December 2023. [ 68 ] On top of not seeing [NAME], there is no evidence to show that the Appellant researched other female psychiatrists and then informed [NAME] of what she found. [ 69 ] In November 2024, another doctor said the Appellant needed to see a psychiatrist. That was [NAME]. She said the Appellant needs a referral to a psychiatrist to determine appropriate treatment with medication. Footnote 79 [ 70 ] The Appellant still hasn’t seen a psychiatrist, and she hasn’t given any explanation for not seeing one. [ 71 ] Seeing a psychiatrist after the MVA of December 2023 would have made a difference to the Appellant’s disability status. [ 72 ] First, [NAME] testified that it would be reasonable to expect that the Appellant’s mental health will improve with medication. [NAME] and [NAME] must have thought so too because they both recommended the Appellant see a psychiatrist. [ 73 ] Second, the Appellant said that one of the main reasons she can’t work is because of her mental health conditions and the ADHD. The evidence shows that treatment for both conditions has been delayed because [NAME] was waiting for the Appellant to see a psychiatrist. Footnote 80 [ 74 ] [NAME] said that the Appellant would benefit from psychological intervention to prevent further deterioration of her emotional condition. This could imply that the treatment would not be expected to improve the condition. But [NAME]’s comment was made only in the context of psychological intervention. She didn’t say the same thing about psychiatric intervention. Footnote 81 [ 75 ] The Appellant didn’t follow treatment recommendations that would have made a difference to her disability status. She didn’t provide a reasonable explanation for not following the treatment recommendation. This means her disability can’t be found to be severe. The Appellant could have worked at a different job by December 31, 2024 [ 76 ] The Minister argues that the Appellant may not have been able to return to her previous job where she risked re-injury. But the Minister says the Appellant could have done a different job. [ 77 ] The Appellant argues that she could not have done a different job by the end of 2024. She said her physical injuries made it hard to sit and stand for very long, she could barely sleep, and it would have been too hard for her to function during the day without taking rests. [ 78 ] In my view, the evidence shows the Appellant probably could have worked at a job that suited her physical limitations by December 31, 2024. I will explain why. [NAME] said the Appellant could work [ 79 ] [NAME] reported that the FCE of August 2024 showed the Appellant can perform work within the light work classification levels on a full-time basis. Footnote 82 [ 80 ] In September 2024, the Appellant was assessed by a physiatrist ([NAME]). The Appellant told [NAME] that her symptoms had improved by 65% to 75% since the MVA. [NAME] said his examination supported diagnoses of sprains / strains of the shoulders, thoracic spine, and lumbar spine. He said there were no medical reasons for the Appellant to avoid her pre-accident job. This is significant because [NAME] acknowledged that the Appellant’s pre-accident job was physically demanding. Footnote 83 [ 81 ] In June 2025, [NAME] said that he didn’t think the Appellant had an “occupational disability.” He referred to his assessment of February 2025 and pointed out the following: The Appellant reported a relatively modest analgesic medication intake. The Appellant reported independence with most of her basic and instrumental activities of daily living. The Appellant demonstrated good mobility on examination. There was no evidence of secondary physical deconditioning due to disuse or avoidance of physical activity due to pain. Footnote 84 The Appellant and her family doctor previously acknowledged she could work [ 82 ] There is evidence showing that the Appellant and her family doctor thought the Appellant could work in 2024. [ 83 ] On April 3, 2024, the Appellant told her doctor she wanted to return to work on April 8, 2024, with modified duties. She wanted to work with [NAME]. Footnote 85 [ 84 ] The Appellant’s family doctor supported a return to work and wrote a letter to the Appellant’s employer saying the Appellant should not work with extremely high-risk children. Footnote 86 [ 85 ] The Appellant tried to return to work in April 2024. It only lasted a few days. But that was because the employer told the Appellant they couldn’t modify her duties. [ 86 ] On June 20, 2024 (after the second MVA), the Appellant’s family doctor said the Appellant didn’t feel ready to return to work. But that was because of the Appellant’s concern about being injured by one of her students. Footnote 87 [ 87 ] On November 28, 2024, the Appellant’s family doctor wrote that the Appellant is unable to return to her previous job with high-risk children. Footnote 88 But she didn’t say the Appellant could not do a different job. [ 88 ] In February 2025, the Appellant appears to have told [NAME] that she could not work in her full capacity as an EA for the [COMPANY], but she could work light duties. Footnote 89 The Appellant reports occasional use of pain medication [ 89 ] The evidence shows that the Appellant has treated her pain with Advil. Even then, she has only needed to take it occasionally. Footnote 90 This tells me that the pain isn’t constant or significant. The family doctor’s report of March 2025 isn’t compelling [ 90 ] The Appellant’s representative urged me to focus on [NAME]’s report of March 2025 (as well as [NAME]’s report). [ 91 ] I have concerns about the accuracy and objectivity of [NAME]’s report of March 2025. [ 92 ] It is interesting to compare [NAME]’s report of March 2025 with her earlier report of November 2024. In November 2024, [NAME] was asked, from a strictly medical standpoint, whether she expected the Appellant to return to any type of work in the future. She said she didn’t know. Footnote 91 But on March 4, 2025, [NAME] wrote about the Appellant’s medical conditions, and she suggested that the Appellant can’t work at any type of job. [ 93 ] For example, [NAME] said that the Appellant’s symptoms and limitations would make it difficult to handle deadlines, adapt to change or deal with feedback or criticism without emotional distress. She also said that the fatigue and pain symptoms could affect the Appellant’s ability to present professionally or engage consistently in any work setting. Footnote 92 [ 94 ] [NAME] didn’t explain what appears to have changed from her earlier report of November 2024, where she suggested the Appellant could work, to her report of March 2025, where she suggested the Appellant could not work. On top of that, [NAME] reported in June 2025 that she could not comment on whether the Appellant could return to work on modified hours or duties. She said it would depend on the modifications. Footnote 93 [ 95 ] [NAME] said things in her report of March 2025 that are inconsistent with other evidence on file. Some examples of inconsistencies include the following: The doctor said that [NAME] reported prolonged low mood, anxiety, poor sleep, and occasional panic attacks. The doctor also implied that [NAME] diagnosed depression of moderate to severe intensity. Footnote 94 But [NAME]’s report is on file, and it shows he didn’t diagnose depression. He diagnosed a possible generalized anxiety disorder. [NAME] didn’t mention panic attacks. In fact, he said there was no evidence of a panic disorder. [NAME] also said the Appellant denied any difficulties with sleep or fatigue. And [NAME] assigned the Appellant a GAF score of 70. Footnote 95 [NAME] testified that a score of 70 reflects mild symptoms. The doctor said the Appellant can’t safely lift objects that are heavier than about 11 pounds. Footnote 96 It is unclear where that information comes from. It could be that that is simply what the Appellant reported. The doctor said that the Appellant’s pain medications cause side effects, such as drowsiness, which further cloud her concentration. Footnote 97 But it is unclear what pain medications the doctor is referring to. The medical evidence only mentions Advil as needed, CBD oil drops (for sleep and anxiety), and a numbing cream. Footnote 98 The doctor said the Appellant was often forgetting things, like her medication doses. Footnote 99 But the Appellant wasn’t on any prescribed medications, except for perhaps inhalers. Footnote 100 [ 96 ] Because of my concerns about accuracy and objectivity, I have given little weight to [NAME]’s report of March 2025. The Appellant could work in the real world [ 97 ] I have considered the Appellant’s age, level of education, language abilities, and past work and life experience. These factors help me decide whether the Appellant could work in the real world. Footnote 101 [ 98 ] The Appellant could have worked in the real world. In December 2024, she was only 41 years old. She had almost 25 years ahead of her before the average retirement age of 65. [ 99 ] The Appellant has a good education. She finished high school and she completed an early childhood education program in college. Footnote 102 [ 100 ] The Appellant is fluent in English. So, there would be more job opportunities available to her than to someone with limited to no language abilities in either of Canada’s two official languages. [ 101 ] The Appellant’s previous job as an EA would provide many transferable skills including interpersonal skills, an ability to follow and implement program plans, patience and adaptability, and computer skills. On top of this, the Appellant has other work experience including factory work and work as an early childhood educator in daycare settings. Footnote 103 And she must have thought she could do a cashier job because she got a job at a [NAME] in 2022. [ 102 ] Based on the Appellant’s favourable employability factors, and the medical evidence of work capacity, she likely could have done a job by the end of 2024 that was not as physically demanding as her previous job. The Appellant hasn’t tried to find and keep a job that suits her limitations [ 103 ] The Minister says that the Appellant didn’t try to find and keep a suitable job. [ 104 ] I will explain why this is an important consideration. [ 105 ] When there is evidence that an appellant can work (like there is here), the Appellant must show that she tried to find and keep a job. She must also show that her efforts weren’t successful because of her medical conditions. Footnote 104 Finding and keeping a job includes retraining or looking for a job that accommodates her limitations. Footnote 105 [ 106 ] The Appellant testified that she hasn’t tried to do any work since learning in April 2024 that her employer didn’t have modified duties for her. This means that she hasn’t tried working at a job that suits her limitations. [ 107 ] Without efforts to try to find and keep a job, I can’t find the Appellant’s disability was severe by the end of 2024. Conclusion [ 108 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant’s disability wasn’t severe by December 31, 2024. Because the Appellant’s disability wasn’t severe, it isn’t necessary to consider whether it was prolonged. Footnote 106 [ 109 ] The Appellant isn’t eligible for a [NAME] disability pension. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD2-144 and AD10-81. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See AD10-35. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See GD2-115 and the Appellant’s testimony. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See GD2-86. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See GD2-88. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 The Minister’s initial decision from January 2, 2025, is at GD2-73 to GD2-75. The Minister’s reconsideration decision from March 25, 2025, is at GD2-33 to GD2-35. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are at GD2-92 to GD2-106. The contributory requirements are in section 44(2) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 A severe disability is defined in section 42(2)(a)(i) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 [NAME]  v  Canada (Social Development) , 2008  FCA  33 at paragraph 14. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2013  FCA  81 at paragraph 7. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See GD2-87. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See GD1-253 and GD1-257 to GD1-258. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See GD1-259. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See GD1-272. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See GD1-282. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See GD2-128, AD10-6, AD10-20, AD10-36 to AD10-37, and AD10-78. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See GD2-128 to GD2-129. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 See GD2-134. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See GD2-187. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See GD1-165, GD1-302, AD5-9, AD10-8, AD10-11, AD10-22, and AD10-79. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See AD10-11. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See AD10-22. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See GD1-9. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  377; Canada (Attorney General)  v  Dean , 2020  FC  206. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See AD5-9. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See AD10-21. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See AD10-21. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See GD1-153. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See AD10-52 to AD10-53. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See AD10-39. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See AD10-39. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See AD10-46. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See GD2-139 to GD2-140. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See GD2-141. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 See AD7-6. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See AD10-21 to AD10-27. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See AD10-4. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See AD5-10 to AD5-11. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See AD5-12 to AD5-14. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See AD5-15. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See AD10-9 to AD10-11. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See AD10-10. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 See AD10-8. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See AD5-8 and AD5-10. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See AD10-8. Return to footnote 49 referrer Footnote 50 See AD5-9. Return to footnote 50 referrer Footnote 51 See AD5-10. Return to footnote 51 referrer Footnote 52 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 52 referrer Footnote 53 See AD10-38. Return to footnote 53 referrer Footnote 54 See AD5-10. Return to footnote 54 referrer Footnote 55 See AD10-10. Return to footnote 55 referrer Footnote 56 See AD5-11. Return to footnote 56 referrer Footnote 57 See GD2-134. Return to footnote 57 referrer Footnote 58 See GD2-135. Return to footnote 58 referrer Footnote 59 See GD2-206. Return to footnote 59 referrer Footnote 60 See GD1-15. Return to footnote 60 referrer Footnote 61 See GD2-124 to GD2-125. Return to footnote 61 referrer Footnote 62 See AD10-80. Return to footnote 62 referrer Footnote 63 See AD5-9. Return to footnote 63 referrer Footnote 64 See AD10-8. Return to footnote 64 referrer Footnote 65 See AD7-6. Return to footnote 65 referrer Footnote 66 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  48; [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2022  FCA  104. Return to footnote 66 referrer Footnote 67 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2022  FCA  104. Return to footnote 67 referrer Footnote 68 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) , 2002  FCA  211. Return to footnote 68 referrer Footnote 69 The progress report of November 2025 is at AD4-2 to AD4-4. The report doesn’t mention when the counselling began. And the Appellant could not remember when it began. But it must have started after February 4, 2025, because [NAME] said the Appellant hadn’t had any counselling at the time of his assessment. Return to footnote 69 referrer Footnote 70 See GD2-125. Return to footnote 70 referrer Footnote 71 See GD1-291. Return to footnote 71 referrer Footnote 72 See AD10-7. Return to footnote 72 referrer Footnote 73 See GD1-291. Return to footnote 73 referrer Footnote 74 See GD1-291. Return to footnote 74 referrer Footnote 75 See GD1-295. Return to footnote 75 referrer Footnote 76 See GD1-294 to GD1-295. Return to footnote 76 referrer Footnote 77 See GD1-230. Return to footnote 77 referrer Footnote 78 See GD2-133 to GD2-134. Return to footnote 78 referrer Footnote 79 See AD5-16. Return to footnote 79 referrer Footnote 80 See GD2-204 and GD2-206. Return to footnote 80 referrer Footnote 81 See AD5-15 to AD5-16. Return to footnote 81 referrer Footnote 82 See AD10-52. Return to footnote 82 referrer Footnote 83 See AD10-74 to AD10-83. Return to footnote 83 referrer Footnote 84 See AD10-96. Return to footnote 84 referrer Footnote 85 See GD2-130. Return to footnote 85 referrer Footnote 86 See GD2-130. Return to footnote 86 referrer Footnote 87 See GD2-133. Return to footnote 87 referrer Footnote 88 See GD2-142. Return to footnote 88 referrer Footnote 89 See AD10-11. Return to footnote 89 referrer Footnote 90 See GD2-115, GD2-128, GD2-130, AD7-12, AD10-22, and AD10-37. Return to footnote 90 referrer Footnote 91 See GD2-207. Return to footnote 91 referrer Footnote 92 See GD2-121 to GD2-123. Return to footnote 92 referrer Footnote 93 See GD2-17. Return to footnote 93 referrer Footnote 94 See GD2-121 and GD2-152. Return to footnote 94 referrer Footnote 95 See GD2-124 to GD2-125 and GD2-155 to GD2-156. Return to footnote 95 referrer Footnote 96 See GD2-121. Return to footnote 96 referrer Footnote 97 See GD2-122. Return to footnote 97 referrer Footnote 98 See AD5-9. Return to footnote 98 referrer Footnote 99 See GD2-177. Return to footnote 99 referrer Footnote 100 See GD2-190 and GD1-56. Return to footnote 100 referrer Footnote 101 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248. Return to footnote 101 referrer Footnote 102 See AD5-8 and AD10-9. Return to footnote 102 referrer Footnote 103 See AD5-7 and the Appellant’s testimony. Return to footnote 103 referrer Footnote 104 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2003  FCA  117. Return to footnote 104 referrer Footnote 105 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2008  FCA  150. Return to footnote 105 referrer Footnote 106 [NAME]  v  Canada (Social Development) , 2008  FCA  33 at paragraph 10. Return to footnote 106 referrer