CPP Disability Survivor's Pension Appeal Dismissed Due to Lack of Continuous Relationship

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: FV v [NAME_1] and DT, 2026  [NAME_2]  32 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] [NAME_4] [NAME_5]: D. T. Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated February 21, 2025 (GP-23-2083) Tribunal member: [NAME_4] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: November 26, 2025 Hearing participants: Appellant Respondent’s representative [NAME_5] Appellant’s witness [NAME_5]’s witnesses Decision date: January 20, 2026 File number: AD-25-383 On this page Decision Overview Preliminary matter Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant is not entitled to a [NAME_6] ( [NAME_6] ) survivor’s pension for the late [NAME_7]. She did not have a continuously conjugal relationship with him for the last year of his life. [NAME_5] is entitled to that pension instead. Overview [ 2 ] I will refer to the Respondent, the [NAME_1], as the “Minister” in this decision. I will refer to the deceased [NAME_7]. as the “[NAME_7].” [ 3 ] The [NAME_7] married [NAME_5] in August 1985. Footnote 1 They last resided together in July 2014 in Nova Scotia. The [NAME_7] then moved to Ontario, where he led a much less settled life for several years. However, he was still in contact with [NAME_5]. They never divorced. [ 4 ] The [NAME_7] met the Appellant around 2019. They started a relationship. He moved in with her around March  2020. Footnote 2 I will call their Scarborough residence the “[NAME_8].” [ 5 ] The [NAME_7] died on November 4, 2021. Footnote 3 He was still living in the [NAME_8]. However, the Appellant and [NAME_5] disagree on whether the [NAME_7] and the Appellant were still common-law partners when he died. That dispute is at the heart of this appeal. My decision on that relationship dictates who will receive the [NAME_6] survivor’s pension from the [NAME_7]. [ 6 ] Both the Appellant and [NAME_5] applied for the [NAME_6] survivor’s pension. The Minister awarded the pension to [NAME_5] initially, but later reversed that decision and awarded it to the Appellant instead. The Minister upheld that decision on reconsideration. [NAME_5] appealed to the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal (Tribunal). The Minister changed its position again, and supported [NAME_5]. The Tribunal’s General Division allowed [NAME_5]’s appeal. [ 7 ] The Appellant obtained leave to appeal that decision to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. I need to decide who is entitled to the [NAME_6] survivor’s pension for the [NAME_7]. The [NAME_7] was still married to [NAME_5] when he died. I must therefore decide whether the [NAME_7] was the Appellant’s common-law partner when he died. The Minister no longer takes a position on this issue. [ 8 ] For the reasons set out below, I find that the [NAME_7] was not the Appellant’s common-law partner when he died. This means that [NAME_5] is entitled to the [NAME_6] survivor’s pension for the [NAME_7]. Preliminary matter [ 9 ] The hearing in this matter was first scheduled for October 1, 2025. I converted that to a case conference. Several preliminary matters were discussed and resolved at that time. Footnote 4 However, I deferred one minor preliminary matter. I will address that now. [ 10 ] The filing deadline in the appeal was September 22, 2025. The response deadline (to materials filed by the filing deadline) was October 22, 2025. The Appellant filed three items early in the morning on September 23, 2025. Footnote 5 None were in response to materials filed by the September 22, 2025, deadline.

Accordingly, these three items were late. I had to decide whether I could consider them under s. 42 of the Social Security Tribunal Rules of Procedure ( [NAME_2]). [ 11 ] I elected to consider the items under the  [NAME_2]. All were filed less than nine hours after the filing deadline. I see no delay arising from the items, as the hearing was being adjourned anyway. [NAME_5] would not have been prejudiced by the brief time that passed after the filing deadline, especially as the Tribunal would not have processed the items any earlier than it did. The items were potentially relevant. One item was forwarded to the Tribunal less than a day after the Appellant received it. Footnote 6 Issue [ 12 ] The issue in this appeal is whether the Appellant is entitled to a [NAME_6] survivor’s pension as the deceased [NAME_7]’s common-law partner. In other words, was she the [NAME_7]’s common-law partner for having cohabited with him for one year continuously at the time of his death? The issue is not whether any of the parties is a good person or is more deserving of that pension. Footnote 7 Analysis [ 13 ] The [NAME_6] says a survivor’s pension shall be paid to the survivor of a deceased [NAME_7] who made sufficient [NAME_6] contributions. Footnote 8 All parties appear to agree that the [NAME_7] made enough [NAME_6] contributions. But they disagree on who is the [NAME_7]’s survivor. [ 14 ] The [NAME_6] says that a deceased [NAME_7]’s survivor is the [NAME_7]’s common-law partner at the time of the [NAME_7]’s death. However, if the [NAME_7] did not have a common-law partner at the time of his death, the [NAME_7]’s survivor is the person who was married to the [NAME_7] at the time of the [NAME_7]’s death. This means that [NAME_5] is entitled to a survivor’s pension unless the Appellant was the [NAME_7]’s common-law partner on November 4, 2001. Footnote 9 [ 15 ] The [NAME_6] defines a [NAME_7]’s common-law partner this way: Footnote 10 [A] person who is cohabiting with the [NAME_7] in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having so cohabited with the [NAME_7] for a continuous period of at least one year. For greater certainty, in the case of a [NAME_7]’s death, the relevant time means the time of the [NAME_7]’s death [.] [ emphasis added] [ 16 ] This means the Appellant must show that she continuously cohabited with the [NAME_7] in a conjugal relationship for at least a one-year period ending on November 4, 2021. She must prove this on a balance of probabilities. This means she must show it is more likely than not that, during this period, she continuously cohabited with the [NAME_7] in a conjugal relationship. If she does not prove this, then she will not succeed in this appeal. Footnote 11 Did the [NAME_3] continuously cohabit in a conjugal relationship for the one-year period ending on November 4, 2021? [ 17 ] For the reasons set out below, I find that the [NAME_3] did not continuously cohabit in a conjugal relationship for the stated one-year period. [ 18 ] The [NAME_6] does not define “cohabitation in a conjugal relationship.” However, a 2012 Federal Court decision called [NAME_9] set out the factors that are indicative of a conjugal relationship. I will call these the “[NAME_10].” The [NAME_10] are: Footnote 12 1) Shelter. This includes considerations of whether the parties lived under the same roof, slept together, and whether anyone else occupied or shared the available accommodation.

2) Sexual and personal behaviour. This includes whether the parties have sexual relations, maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other, communicate on a personal level, eat together, assist each other with problems or during illness, or buy each other gifts.

3) Services. This includes the roles they played in meal preparation, doing laundry, shopping, conducting household maintenance, and other domestic services.

4) Social. This includes whether they participated together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities and their relationship with respect to each other’s family members.

5) Societal. This includes the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them as a couple.

6) Support. This includes the financial arrangements between the parties for the provision of necessaries and acquisition and ownership of property.

7) Attitude and conduct concerning any children. [ 19 ] All parties appear to agree that, when he died, the [NAME_7] lived in the [NAME_8]. The Appellant also lived there, although she had been away for several weeks. However, the Appellant and [NAME_5] differ on the relationship between the [NAME_3] in the year before his death. [ 20 ] The Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] were in a conjugal relationship since March 2020 and remained in one until the [NAME_7]’s death. [NAME_5] said the [NAME_7] merely shared living space at the [NAME_8] with the Appellant. In the alternative, [NAME_5] said any conjugal relationship between the [NAME_7] and the Appellant had ended before November 4, 2021. The Minister has taken various positions in this matter, but is now neutral. [ 21 ] Applying the [NAME_10] is difficult in this case. The Appellant and [NAME_5] have very different interpretations of what happened. This is complicated by the unusual series of events shortly before the [NAME_7]’s death. The Appellant also was in western Canada from early October 2021 until after the [NAME_7] died. [ 22 ] First, however, I want to expand on an important aspect of the cohabitation test: what does “continuous” mean? The meaning of “continuous” [ 23 ] The meaning of “continuous” was explored in a series of recent decisions in a case called Redman . In 2020, the Federal Court of Appeal found it unreasonable to allow interruptions in cohabitation. However, that was mainly because the previous decision maker had not done a proper statutory interpretation. As a result, the Federal Court of Appeal instructed the Tribunal’s Appeal Division to hear Redman again in accordance with the Court’s directions. Footnote 13 [ 24 ] The Tribunal’s Appeal Division then heard Redman again in 2021. The Appeal Division decided that the two people had to live in a marriage-like relationship during the whole year just before the [NAME_7]’s death. Footnote 14 The Appeal Division also found that when one party considered the relationship to be over, they were no longer common-law partners. They could only re-establish that partnership by spending another year living together in a marriage-like relationship. Footnote 15 [ 25 ] The Appeal Division in Redman acknowledged that the relationship break in that case was relatively short. They had even reconciled. But one of the partners died before they had lived together long enough again to re-establish their shared rights and responsibilities. Footnote 16 [ 26 ] Appeal Division decisions can be persuasive. I find the Appeal Division decision in Redman persuasive, and I also agree with the interpretation that it carried out. [ 27 ] The Appellant suggested that separations of 90 days or less were irrelevant. Footnote 17 However, the only time a brief separation can be overlooked is in the context of a [NAME_6] credit split. Footnote 18 That does not apply to a [NAME_6] survivor’s pension. Findings on cohabitation [ 28 ] I find that the [NAME_3] cohabited in a conjugal relationship for at least a year up to October 2021. However, the evidence shows that they broke up for at least a brief period that month. This means their cohabitation was not continuous for the last year of the [NAME_7]’s life. I will now explain how I made these findings. Applying the [NAME_10] up to October 2021 [ 29 ] For the period up to October 2021, I will review the [NAME_10] in the order set out above.

1. Shelter [ 30 ] This factor considers whether the [NAME_7] and the Appellant lived under the same roof and slept together. It also considers whether anyone else occupied or shared the available accommodation. [ 31 ] I find that this factor favours a conjugal relationship from March 2020 until October 2021. In fact, it continued until the [NAME_7]’s death on November 4, 2021. I will now explain why. [ 32 ] The [NAME_7] moved into the (one-bedroom) [NAME_8] in early 2020. The Appellant told the [NAME_8] manager that she and the [NAME_7] wanted to join households and move to a two-bedroom apartment in the same building. She also said the [NAME_7] would apply for [NAME_8] membership. Footnote 19 [ 33 ] The [NAME_8] manager later confirmed that the [NAME_7] began living officially with the Appellant on June 1, 2020. He became a long-term guest of the Appellant on July 7, 2020. He became a member of the [NAME_8] on August 4, 2021, and continued to live in the same unit as the Appellant until his death. Footnote 20 [ 34 ] The [NAME_7] and the Appellant were never able to move into a larger unit at the [NAME_8]. But I also see no evidence that either of them moved from their unit. Nor do I see any evidence that anyone else occupied or shared the [NAME_8]. A letter sent to the [NAME_7] after his death was addressed to the [NAME_8]. Footnote 21 The Appellant confirmed that she lived together with him until his death. Footnote 22 [ 35 ] The [NAME_7]’s sister P. suggested in April 2024 that he had put his name on a [NAME_8] waiting list. She said he had told her that his relationship with the Appellant was very volatile. Footnote 23 I will discuss other similar evidence later. [ 36 ] However, for this factor , I place little or no weight on the [NAME_7]’s apparent desire to move out. The objective evidence makes clear that he had not moved out by the time he died. The reasons for such a potential move would be reflected elsewhere anyway, such as under the “Sexual and Personal Behaviour” factor. [ 37 ] The only other aspect to consider for this factor is whether the [NAME_7] and the Appellant slept together. I find that they usually did. [ 38 ] In April 2024, the Appellant said an argument between her and the [NAME_7] (about his communication with [NAME_5]) led to him spending only one night on the couch during the spring of 2021. She said they otherwise continued to sleep in the same bed. In July 2024, she again said they slept in the same bed. Footnote 24 I see no persuasive evidence to the contrary.

2. Sexual and personal behaviour [ 39 ] This factor considers whether the [NAME_7] and Appellant had sexual relations, maintained an attitude of fidelity to each other, communicated on a personal level, ate together, helped each other with problems or during illness, or bought each other gifts. [ 40 ] I find that this factor supports a conjugal relationship until October 2021. [ 41 ] I see a lot of evidence about this factor. Most is from long after the [NAME_7]’s death, once the Appellant and [NAME_5] were competing for his [NAME_6] survivor’s pension. I do not completely discount all of that evidence. However, I place much more weight on the evidence that arose spontaneously before his death. That evidence is much more candid and reliable. Nobody was thinking about pension entitlement. [ 42 ] I have no doubt that the [NAME_7] and the Appellant’s personal and sexual behaviour supports a conjugal relationship up to at least July 2021. [ 43 ] At that time, [NAME_5] told the [NAME_7] that she had been very respectful of the relationship between him and the Appellant. Footnote 25 In response, he said the Appellant had read some of the e-mails between him and [NAME_5]. The Appellant had not reacted well, partly because of the considerable affection expressed in those e-mails. He thought his relationship with the Appellant could have ended. Footnote 26 That evidence suggests an ongoing relationship, albeit one with challenges. [ 44 ] In July 2021, the [NAME_3] booked a January 2022 trip to Jamaica. They paid a $500.00 deposit, with the balance due in December 2021. Footnote 27 I saw no evidence that this trip was cancelled before the [NAME_7]’s death. In April 2024, the Appellant wrote that, despite their “difficulties,” they never cancelled because they “were determined to go together.” Footnote 28 But as the balance was not yet due when the [NAME_7] died, this deposit has little additional probative value beyond July 2021. [ 45 ] In August and early September, the [NAME_7] began to consider a trip to Nova Scotia to deal with his car, some other items, and getting his driver’s license back. But this would also involve seeing [NAME_5]. This, in itself, is not unusual. However, the affection level expressed between the [NAME_7] and [NAME_5] at this time would likely raise an eyebrow for most. Footnote 29 It caused more than that for the Appellant. [ 46 ] Around this time, the Appellant set out her concerns in detail. She was not comfortable with the new division of the [NAME_7]’s affections between her and [NAME_5]. But then she appeared to encourage him to try reconciling with [NAME_5]. The Appellant said he had changed, and encouraged him to show that to [NAME_5]. The Appellant even said [NAME_5] might change her mind. Footnote 30 [ 47 ] The Appellant also said the use of pet names between the [NAME_7] and [NAME_5] made her, “want to leave you both alone.” Footnote 31 However, despite these very serious concerns, the Appellant and [NAME_5] continued to attend family events. This appeared to continue until her departure for western Canada in early October 2021. Their personal behaviour therefore still supported an ongoing conjugal relationship until then, although it was getting even shakier. [ 48 ] After the [NAME_7]’s death, I see a lot of retrospective comments about the personal and sexual behaviour of him and the Appellant. I prefer to rely on the evidence from before his death. Most of the retrospective comments are unsupported by timely objective evidence. For others, the exact timing is unclear. [ 49 ] However, at least some of the Appellant’s later comments clearly deal only with the period before she left for western Canada. For example, in July 2024 she said she and the [NAME_7] shared intimacy, gifts, and vacations. In September 2025, she described their sexual relationship in detail. This included the intimacy procedures they used for their relatively advanced age and health conditions. She said they would have had a “dozen kids” if they had met when they were younger. Footnote 32 3. Services [ 50 ] This factor considers the roles of the [NAME_7] and the Appellant in providing services to each other. This includes preparing meals, doing laundry, shopping, and conducting household maintenance and other domestic services. [ 51 ] The evidence on this factor is fairly sparse. It generally supports a conjugal relationship until at least October 2021. [ 52 ] In April 2024, the Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] continued to do domestic duties together even when she expressed concern about his contact with [NAME_5]. She also drove him to and from work. Footnote 33 [ 53 ] In July 2025, the Appellant said she did most of the household chores and drove the [NAME_7] to and from work. She said he did the barbecuing. She said they did their volunteer obligations (gardening and grass cutting) for the [NAME_8]. Footnote 34 [ 54 ] At the Appeal Division hearing, the Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] did most housework and shopping together. But she also said she did most of the chores because he worked full-time. She said they did their volunteer work independently.

4. Social [ 55 ] This factor considers the social aspects of the [NAME_7] and the Appellant. This includes whether they participated together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities. It also considers relationships with each other’s family members. [ 56 ] I find that this factor favours a conjugal relationship until at least October 2021. The [NAME_7] and the Appellant appeared to be accepted by their respective families, and they attended activities together. [ 57 ] In July 2021, for his 60th birthday barbecue, the [NAME_7] and the Appellant were photographed together with his sister P. The Appellant said P. advised her to get herself on the [NAME_7]’s work insurance. The Appellant said they saw P. and her husband 3-4 times over 2½ years. Footnote 35 [ 58 ] The Appellant’s daughter, son, and daughter-in-law said the [NAME_7] often was at family functions. He had bonded with the Appellant’s friends and family. Footnote 36 Several videos support this. They appear to be of the Appellant’s grandchildren. The [NAME_7] made these in November 2020, August 2021, September 2021, and early October 2021 Footnote 37 . He shared some of them with P. on October 3,  2021. Footnote 38 [ 59 ] In July 2025, the Appellant set out multiple family events that she attended with the [NAME_7]. She also said he was “beginning” to volunteer with the live music organization she had been with for years. The organization’s leader confirmed this. Footnote 39 5. Societal [ 60 ] This factor includes a consideration of the attitude and conduct of the community toward the [NAME_7] and the Appellant as a couple. [ 61 ] I find that this factor favours a conjugal relationship up to at least October 2021. [ 62 ] The [NAME_7]’s obituary, written by P., said he was the Appellant’s partner. Footnote 40 The community may have viewed them as partners at the time he died. [ 63 ] In July 2024, the Appellant said everyone still considered her and the [NAME_7] to be a couple. She said their relationship wasn’t “on and off”, but rather “up and down” due to the complicated nature of their issues. Footnote 41 At the Appeal Division hearing, the Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] would introduce each other as their “partner.” [ 64 ] In September 2025, P. said the [NAME_7] still referred to [NAME_5] as his wife. P. said he referred to the Appellant as his “girlfriend”, not as his common-law spouse. Footnote 42 She affirmed this at the Appeal Division hearing. [ 65 ] The evidence from P. and the Appellant on this factor appears to support an ongoing conjugal relationship. P.’s reference to the Appellant being a “girlfriend,” rather than a common-law partner, is of no real importance.

6. Support [ 66 ] This factor considers how the [NAME_7] and the Appellant supported each other. This includes the financial arrangements between them for the provision of necessaries. It also includes the acquisition and ownership of property. [ 67 ] I find that this factor does not strongly support or contradict a conjugal relationship. The [NAME_7] and the Appellant gave each other some financial support. But this was sometimes “qualified,” and in some other ways they did not support each other. One could reasonably interpret their support as what friends or roommates, as opposed to spouses, would do for each other. I will now explain this in more detail. [ 68 ] The [NAME_7] had been financially supportive of [NAME_5], to the Appellant’s apparent detriment. In January 2021, he put through a benefit claim for [NAME_5]’s eyeglasses, despite living with the Appellant. Footnote 43 [ 69 ] I acknowledge that the [NAME_7] had named the Appellant as a beneficiary for his workplace life insurance policy. She received $30,000.00 from it. Footnote 44 However, P. said the Appellant was not the only beneficiary of that policy. P. and [NAME_5] were also beneficiaries. Footnote 45 [ 70 ] The [NAME_7] never named the Appellant as his executor. His sister P. eventually filled that role, acting on behalf of [NAME_5] (who lived in Nova Scotia and could not do it). Footnote 46 P. handled the funeral, cancelled his health card, and closed his bank account. Footnote 47 [ 71 ] After the [NAME_7]’s death, the Appellant signed a statutory declaration about a common-law union with him. She said they had a joint lease. However, they did not have any other joint property. They did not have joint bank, trust, credit union, or charge card accounts. She did not have life insurance that named him as a beneficiary. Footnote 48 [ 72 ] In July 2024, the Appellant said the [NAME_7] “bought us a car” in June 2020. She said they also shared expenses. Footnote 49 In July 2025, she said he put the car in her name, and it was the only real asset either of them had. She said she did not have a life insurance policy. They each had their own bank accounts. Footnote 50 [ 73 ] In September 2025, P. said the [NAME_7] had his own bank accounts and debts. He and the Appellant did not merge assets or liabilities. P. said he paid the Appellant $500 each month for rent. P. also said he had no assets, just an old car that was in the Appellant’s name because he did not have a driver’s licence. Footnote 51 As acting executor, P. would have known about these things.

7. Attitude and conduct concerning any children [ 74 ] The [NAME_7] and the Appellant did not have any children together. I did not see references to the [NAME_7] and [NAME_5] having children. However, the Appellant had adult children from her previous relationship. [ 75 ] I see little evidence relevant to this factor that isn’t already set out in the “Social” factor above. As noted, the [NAME_7] appeared to be part of the Appellant’s children’s lives. This may have been even truer for the Appellant’s grandchildren.

Accordingly, this factor supports a conjugal relationship up to at least October 2021. The October 2021 change [ 76 ] Up to October 2021, almost all of the [NAME_10] support a conjugal relationship between the [NAME_3]. However, for the reasons set out below, the circumstances had changed by October 19, 2021. [ 77 ] The “Shelter” factor continued to favour a conjugal relationship until the [NAME_7] died. However, for the last month of his life, I see little compelling evidence either way for most of the other [NAME_10]. One of the reasons for this was the Appellant’s extended trip to western Canada. She went in early October and did not return until after the [NAME_7] died. This meant they had no opportunity to demonstrate, for example, the “Societal” and “Services” factors. But I see some evidence about the “Support” and “Sexual and Personal Behaviour” factors. The “support” factor from October 2021 onward [ 78 ] On October 20, 2021, the Appellant sent the [NAME_7] an e-transfer of $1,900.00. At the time, she did not say what it was for. However, in April 2024, she said it was, “for the settlement of car repairs from the accident or if he wanted to go to Nova Scotia to see his x, figure out what he wanted and to get his licence.” Footnote 52 [ 79 ] While this was financial support, the Appellant was encouraging him to see if he wanted to resume a relationship with his wife. As a result, the apparent “support” is not clearly consistent with an ongoing relationship between the [NAME_3]. It might even contradict such a relationship. The “sexual and personal behaviour” from October 2021 forward [ 80 ] Unlike the other factors, I see a lot of evidence about the “Sexual and Personal Behaviour” factor in the last few weeks of the [NAME_7]’s life. [ 81 ] I find that this factor does not support a continuous conjugal relationship through November 4, 2021. And this factor is ultimately determinative of the appeal. I will now explain why. [ 82 ] On October 19, 2021, [NAME_5] sent the Appellant a critical electronic message. This responded to an unhappy message from the Appellant to [NAME_5] about the Appellant’s relationship with the [NAME_7]. While the Appellant’s messages are unavailable, [NAME_5]’s messages back to the Appellant still provide a lot of detail. The most relevant aspects are as follows: Footnote 53 I’m not sure what you want me to say to this. The one thing I want to make clear is I have had nothing to do with your break up . I only have contact with him a few times a year to say Happy Birthday or tell him of what has happen to people we know unfornately it is usually someone has passed away or ill…[ sic ] There was a reason we broke up love does not solve everything. Just because we still care for one another does not take away the past… I will always love [[NAME_7]] and be there for him that does not mean that I am going to try again. I haven’t seen him in 7 years yes I would like to see him again. We have a lot of history and good and bad memories. I appreicate you thought on what I should do but at the end of the day it is my life and my choice. [ sic ] You seem very hurt by this and for that I am sorry. [ emphasis added ] [ 83 ] Later that day, the [NAME_7] e-mailed [NAME_5] about the same thing: Footnote 54 … That’s how I feel too. You can’t change 30 plus years of life… it’s like I’m an idiot for having a wonderful, beautiful relationship that didn’t work… And as for the drinking, I have been sober, completely, for months at a time… But when things started to unwind I found a couple of bars. But getting out of here was impossible . I’ve listened to every family problem, been to Birthdays and Hospitals. Worked and kept my mouth shut… I don’t know how it came to this… But I didn’t want you dragged into this. I’m going to have to get out of here. I want to hold off for an apartment, but this is getting to be too much . And I don’t want you dragged in, it’s not fair to you. I love you. And yes I can’t wait to see you… And don’t worry Baby, I don’t need you to send an answer, I think all of this has worn everyone out… … Love always… [ emphasis added ] [ 84 ] I do not see any response from [NAME_5] to the [NAME_7]. [ 85 ] A Supreme Court of Canada decision called [NAME_11] set out when a common-law relationship ends. It ends, “when either partner regards it as being at an end and, by his or her conduct, has demonstrated in a convincing manner that this particular state of mind is a settled one.” Footnote 55 [ 86 ] In my view, the October 19, 2021, messages show that the conjugal relationship between the [NAME_3] had ended by October 19, 2021. [NAME_5] told the Appellant that she had, “nothing to do with your break up.” I cannot see why [NAME_5] would say this unless the Appellant (or possibly the [NAME_7]) had also mentioned a break-up. In either case, it shows that at least one of them (the [NAME_7] or the Appellant) considered the relationship to be at an end. [ 87 ] This interpretation is supported by what the [NAME_7] said later that day. He described an “unwinding” of his relationship with the Appellant. He had previously found it impossible to leave, and he preferred to hold out until he secured an apartment, but now he had to get out. [ 88 ] I cannot say precisely when the break-up occurred, but it was likely in or just before the early morning of October 19, 2021. [ 89 ] While I do not need to rely on it, I also note that the Appellant said she “offered” the [NAME_7] to [NAME_5] “on a silver platter” around that time. Footnote 56 This may be further evidence that she saw the relationship as being at an end, as she was encouraging the [NAME_7] to explore a relationship with someone else. [ 90 ] The Appellant later gave retrospective evidence that largely sought to minimize the apparent events of October 19, 2021. [ 91 ] In January 2024, the Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] never separated after March 2020. But she admitted they had two outstanding issues “in his past” (an apparent reference to his alcoholism and his relationship with [NAME_5]) that left them at “an impasse” in August 2021 and September 2021. However, she said they “reconciled” in October 2021 before his sudden death. Footnote 57 Even if I accept these at face value, they still point to at least a temporary break in the relationship. [ 92 ] In April 2024, the Appellant said she was in “constant contact” with the [NAME_7] when she was out west in October 2021. She said he had “finished it” with [NAME_5] and was proceeding with a divorce. The Appellant said she and the [NAME_7] “reconciled instantly” and “looked forward to a happy reunion.” But I saw no persuasive evidence of an “instant” reconciliation. Further, on October 20, 2021, she sent him $1,900.00 to possibly see [NAME_5] and “figure out what he wanted.” Footnote 58 [ 93 ] In July 2024, the Appellant said her previous reference to an “impasse” was about the [NAME_7]’s communications with [NAME_5]. She said the “reconciling” occurred when he “finished it” with [NAME_5] by text about a week before he died. Footnote 59 However, I saw no texts from him in the evidence. [NAME_5] also testified that she did not have a cell phone then. In any case, the “reconciling” did not happen immediately. [ 94 ] The Appellant made several other similar statements shortly before the Appeal Division hearing and at the hearing itself. In general, she suggested that the [NAME_7] had agreed to divorce [NAME_5] and to move forward with the Appellant. Footnote 60 However, as with many of the Appellant’s retrospective comments, she never produced any compelling objective evidence that her relationship with the [NAME_7] was uninterrupted. She said she had lost all the relevant texts. [ 95 ] In September 2025, the Appellant explained why she encouraged the [NAME_7], and gave him cash, to see [NAME_5] in Nova Scotia. She said she even paved the way with a one-time text to remove any guilt [NAME_5] might have had. She said, “If it meant that [he] reconciled with [[NAME_5],] so be it.” Footnote 61 [ 96 ] At the Appeal Division hearing, the Appellant said she had sent the cash to the [NAME_7] before their “reconciliation.” She wanted to make sure, “he had everything he needed.” However, she insisted that she did not consider their relationship over when she encouraged him to go to Nova Scotia. She said they were still together, but he was making a “serious determination” about going forward. Nonetheless, any reconciliation must have been after the cash transfer on October 20, 2021. [ 97 ] I asked the Appellant about [NAME_5]’s reference to a “break-up” on October 19, 2021. She said she did not know where that came from. She said she only gave the [NAME_7] a “chance to rekindle” his relationship with [NAME_5]. She also denied ever receiving that message from [NAME_5]. But I have difficulty with the Appellant’s evidence. The October 19, 2021, message about a break-up was followed that same day by several others between the Appellant and [NAME_5]. Footnote 62 [ 98 ] I asked [NAME_5] about this message too. She said the Appellant’s original message, which probably was sent earlier that day, couldn’t be displayed due to threats made against her by the Appellant. But [NAME_5] said the Appellant had declared the break-up because the [NAME_7] was still in love with [NAME_5]. [ 99 ] Similarly, when I asked the Appellant about her use of the word “reconcile” when discussing October 2021, she said she did not use the right word. She said this was an “emotional” reconciliation, in which they agreed on their perspectives. She also said they were now “on the same page.” She said the [NAME_7] texted her around October 22, 2021, and looked forward to her return. Once again, she did not produce this text. [ 100 ] Some witnesses gave retrospective evidence about the nature of the relationship between the [NAME_7] and the Appellant. Some retrospective evidence contained contradictions. Footnote 63 In other cases, it did not appear to be based on direct knowledge of what had happened. Footnote 64 I prefer to rely on firsthand and objective evidence, especially when that evidence was from before the [NAME_7]’s death. [ 101 ] But one piece of retrospective evidence merits a closer look. In April 2024, P. said she took the [NAME_7] to a doctor’s appointment four days before he died. He allegedly told her that the Appellant had given him an ultimatum about his contact with [NAME_5]. He felt he had no choice but to suspend communication with [NAME_5] due to the Appellant’s “unstable and volatile behaviour.” Footnote 65 [ 102 ] This message from P. gives a very specific date and account of events. It suggests the [NAME_7] may have been committed to the Appellant on or about October 31, 2021. Alternatively, his desire to satisfy the Appellant may only have been for self-protection. [ 103 ] P.’s April 2024 statement is hard to reconcile with what she said later. In September 2025, she said the [NAME_7] told her in July 2021 of significant trouble with the Appellant. He apparently said he had no choice but to move out and said he’d applied for his own apartment in the [NAME_8]. Footnote 66 P. affirmed that July 2021 discussion at the Appeal Division hearing, noting the [NAME_7] feared for his safety with the Appellant. She believed that was when the relationship fell apart. [ 104 ] Despite P.’s apparently contradictory evidence, the obituary she wrote for the [NAME_7] suggests that he may have resumed a conjugal relationship with the Appellant around October 31,  2021. Footnote 67 While they may have resumed such a relationship, this does not affect my finding that an interruption occurred around October 19, 2021. Once an interruption occurs, a reconciliation does not change anything unless it lasts for at least one year. [ 105 ] As a result, the two e-mails sent by the [NAME_7] to the Appellant on October 22, 2021, and November 4, 2021, are ultimately irrelevant. This is the only evidence created by the [NAME_7] after October 19, 2021. Each e-mail consisted only of a link to a [NAME_12] music video: there was no text. Even the Appellant’s eventual response on October 28, 2021, is irrelevant. Footnote 68 If they had reconciled, it needed to last for a full year before it could affect the outcome of this appeal. Conclusion about the [NAME_10] from October 2021 forward [ 106 ] I found earlier that the [NAME_10] favour a conjugal relationship until the month of October 2021. However, I am not persuaded that they favour a conjugal relationship continuously through October 2021 and until the [NAME_7]’s death in November 2021. [ 107 ] The “Shelter” factor supports a conjugal relationship throughout. But from October 2021 forward, the other factors become either neutral or unsupportive. [ 108 ] To the extent that there is any doubt, I place the most weight on the “Sexual and Personal Behaviour” factor. The facts of this case demand that. In particular, that factor includes an assessment of their behaviour toward each other. And that personal behaviour includes a break-up that occurred on or shortly before October 19, 2021. That is critical. In my view, an actual break-up compels a finding that the conjugal relationship was not continuous. [ 109 ] In making this finding, I acknowledge that the [NAME_7] and the Appellant may have had a reconciliation before he died. This may have happened by October 31, 2021, based on P.’s evidence and the obituary. The Appellant suggests that it could have happened as early as October 22, 2021. But the fact remains that there was a break-up, although it may only have been a few days long. [ 110 ] Applying the [NAME_10] shows that the conjugal relationship between the [NAME_7] and the Appellant was not continuous for the last year of his life. This means the requirements for a common-law partnership were not satisfied. In turn, this means the Appellant cannot succeed in her claim for the [NAME_6] survivor’s pension. [ 111 ] This result may seem harsh. However, I must apply the law as written. The [NAME_6] does not allow for even brief periods of separation in the last year when determining whether a common-law partner is entitled to a survivor’s pension. [ 112 ] The break between the [NAME_3] was even shorter than in Redman , especially if they had reconciled. Ultimately, however, the length of the break does not matter. It also does not matter whether they reconciled before the [NAME_7] died. Even if they did reconcile, they had an interruption in their conjugal relationship in the year before he died. That is enough to defeat the Appellant’s appeal. Conclusion [ 113 ] The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant is not entitled to a [NAME_6] survivor’s pension with respect to the [NAME_7]. The Appellant was not his common-law partner when he died, as their conjugal relationship over his last year was not continuous. Footnotes Footnote 1 See GD2-16. Return to footnote 1 Footnote 2 See, for example, GD2-44, GD2-45, GD16-15, and AD20-2. Return to footnote 2 Footnote 3 See GD2-15. Return to footnote 3 Footnote 4 See AD38-1. Return to footnote 4 Footnote 5 See AD34, AD35, and AD36. Return to footnote 5 Footnote 6 See AD34-1. Return to footnote 6 Footnote 7 [NAME_13] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2010 FC  34, at paragraphs 48 to 49. Return to footnote 7 Footnote 8 See section 44(1)(d)(ii) of the [NAME_6]. Return to footnote 8 Footnote 9 See section 42(1) of the [NAME_6] . The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed this in decisions such as [NAME_14] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2009 FCA  90. Return to footnote 9 Footnote 10 See section 2(1) of the [NAME_6]. Return to footnote 10 Footnote 11 See, for example, [NAME_11] v Minister of Human Resources Development , 2004 SCC  65, at paragraph 6; and [NAME_15] v [NAME_16]. , (2001) CP 11654 (Pension Appeals Board), at paragraph 6. Decisions of the Pension Appeals Board are not binding on the Tribunal, but they can be persuasive. Return to footnote 11 Footnote 12 [NAME_9] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2012 FC  556, at paragraph 15. Return to footnote 12 Footnote 13 See Canada (Attorney General) v Redman , 2020 FCA  209, at paragraphs 19-23. Return to footnote 13 Footnote 14 [NAME_17] v [NAME_1] , 2021 [NAME_2]  113, at paragraphs 46, 80, and 83. Return to footnote 14 Footnote 15 [NAME_17] v [NAME_1] , 2021 [NAME_2]  113, at paragraphs 54-56 and 84. Return to footnote 15 Footnote 16 [NAME_17] v [NAME_1] , 2021 [NAME_2]  113, at paragraph 70. Return to footnote 16 Footnote 17 See GD11-1. Return to footnote 17 Footnote 18 This is also known as a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings. See section 55.1(2)(b)(ii) of the [NAME_6] . Return to footnote 18 Footnote 19 See GD7-6. Return to footnote 19 Footnote 20 See GD2-48 and AD8-3. Return to footnote 20 Footnote 21 See AD33-13. Return to footnote 21 Footnote 22 See GD2-28 and GD2-45. Return to footnote 22 Footnote 23 See GD8-1. Return to footnote 23 Footnote 24 See GD7-2 and GD16-1. Return to footnote 24 Footnote 25 See GD11-3. Return to footnote 25 Footnote 26 See GD11-4. Return to footnote 26 Footnote 27 See GD7-7. Return to footnote 27 Footnote 28 See GD7-3. Return to footnote 28 Footnote 29 See GD11-2 and AD25-5 to AD25-9. Return to footnote 29 Footnote 30 See AD22-1. Return to footnote 30 Footnote 31 See AD22-1. Return to footnote 31 Footnote 32 See GD16-1 to GD16-2 and AD26-1. Return to footnote 32 Footnote 33 See GD7-2. Return to footnote 33 Footnote 34 See AD3-7. Return to footnote 34 Footnote 35 See GD7-3 and GD7-18. Return to footnote 35 Footnote 36 See GD16-4, AD8-5, AD26-5. Return to footnote 36 Footnote 37 See AD27 to AD32, with clarification at AD39-1 and AD43-1. Return to footnote 37 Footnote 38 See GD7-11. Return to footnote 38 Footnote 39 See AD3-7 and AD8-4. Return to footnote 39 Footnote 40 See GD16-6. Return to footnote 40 Footnote 41 See GD16-2. Return to footnote 41 Footnote 42 See AD25-2. Return to footnote 42 Footnote 43 See AD22-2 to AD22-3. Return to footnote 43 Footnote 44 See GD2-50 and AD33-9. Return to footnote 44 Footnote 45 See AD25-2. Return to footnote 45 Footnote 46 See GD2-43, GD5-2, GD8-1, and AD33-10. Return to footnote 46 Footnote 47 See GD8-1. Return to footnote 47 Footnote 48 See GD2-46. Return to footnote 48 Footnote 49 See GD16-2. Return to footnote 49 Footnote 50 See AD3-6. Return to footnote 50 Footnote 51 See AD25-1. Return to footnote 51 Footnote 52 See GD7-3. Return to footnote 52 Footnote 53 See AD9-11 and AD12-1. Return to footnote 53 Footnote 54 See AD9-6 to AD9-7. Return to footnote 54 Footnote 55 [NAME_11] v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) , 2004 SCC  65, at paragraph 42. Return to footnote 55 Footnote 56 See GD9-2. Return to footnote 56 Footnote 57 See GD5-1. Return to footnote 57 Footnote 58 See GD7-2, GD7-3, and GD7-9. Return to footnote 58 Footnote 59 See GD16-2. Return to footnote 59 Footnote 60 See, for example, AD3-5 to AD3-7 and AD26-3. Return to footnote 60 Footnote 61 See AD26-3. She gave similar evidence at the Appeal Division hearing. Return to footnote 61 Footnote 62 See AD9-11 and AD12-1. Return to footnote 62 Footnote 63 See, for example, GD1-4, GD2-22, GD4-1, and GD4-2. This evidence minimized or denied a relationship. But it was inconsistent with earlier evidence from the same witness. The witness’s evidence at GD7-5 and GD11-3 acknowledged the relationship between the [NAME_3]. Return to footnote 63 Footnote 64 See, for example, GD16-5. Similarly, the witness who made the statements at AD10-1 admitted at the Appeal Division hearing that she lived in Nova Scotia and had little contact with the [NAME_7]. Return to footnote 64 Footnote 65 See GD8-1. Return to footnote 65 Footnote 66 See AD25-1. Return to footnote 66 Footnote 67 See GD16-6. Return to footnote 67 Footnote 68 See GD7-12 and GD7-14. Return to footnote 68