EI Benefit Appeal Denied for Lack of Good Cause

[TRANSLATION] Citation: CB  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2026  SST  115 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Leave to Appeal Decision Applicant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated January 21, 2026 (GE-25-3057) Tribunal member: [NAME] Decision date: February 19, 2026 File number: AD-26-92 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] Permission to appeal is refused. The appeal won’t go ahead. Overview [ 2 ] The Applicant (Claimant) made a claim for Employment Insurance ( [NAME] ) regular benefits on July 26, 2022. She was paid during the period from July 31, 2022, to November 19, 2022. [ 3 ] On May 13, 2024, the Claimant asked the Respondent (Commission) to extend her benefit period so that she could receive additional benefits—specifically sickness benefits—as of November 20, 2022. The Commission denied her request. On reconsideration, the Commission upheld its initial decision. The Claimant appealed to the Tribunal’s General Division. [ 4 ] The General Division found that the Claimant’s period of delay was from November 20, 2022, to May 13, 2024. It found that she was able to contact the Commission or make a claim for benefits during that period. She didn’t show good cause for the entire period of the delay in applying for additional sickness benefits. It dismissed the appeal. [ 5 ] I have to decide whether there is an arguable case that the General Division made a reviewable error based on which the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. [ 6 ] I am refusing permission to appeal because the Claimant hasn’t raised a ground of appeal based on which the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. Issue [ 7 ] Does the Claimant’s appeal have a reasonable chance of success based on a reviewable error the General Division may have made? Analysis [ 8 ] The law specifies the only grounds of appeal of a General Division decision. Footnote 1 These reviewable errors are the following: The General Division hearing process wasn’t fair in some way. The General Division didn’t decide an issue that it should have decided. Or, it decided something it didn’t have the power to decide. The General Division based its decision on an important error of fact. The General Division made an error of law when making its decision. [ 9 ] An application for permission to appeal is a preliminary step to a hearing on the merits. It is an initial hurdle for the Claimant to meet, but it is lower than the one that has to be met at the hearing of the appeal on the merits. At the permission to appeal stage, the Claimant doesn’t have to prove her case; she has to instead establish that her appeal has a reasonable chance of success. This means that she has to show that there is arguably a reviewable error based on which the appeal might succeed. [ 10 ] I will give permission to appeal if I am satisfied that at least one of the Claimant’s stated grounds of appeal gives the appeal a reasonable chance of success. Does the Claimant’s appeal have a reasonable chance of success based on a reviewable error the General Division may have made? [ 11 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division didn’t analyze in an individualized and reasoned way whether the delay after March 19, 2024, was proportionate. She argues that the General Division decision: doesn’t say when exactly the impediment would have ended doesn’t include a separate analysis of the period from March 19 to May 13, 2024 doesn’t explain why a delay of about eight weeks after gradually going back to work would be inconsistent with good cause doesn’t relate the concept of gradually going back to work to the actual administrative ability [ 12 ] The Claimant argues that this missing analysis amounts to either of the following errors: an error of law because the good cause test was applied in a non‑individualized way; or an important error of fact since the finding of ability after March 19, 2024, isn’t explicitly supported. [ 13 ] The Employment Insurance Act  ( [NAME]  Act) says that, when you make a claim for benefits—other than an initial claim—after the time prescribed for making it, the claim is considered to have been made on an earlier day. This is if you show that there was good cause for the delay throughout the period beginning on the earlier day and ending on the day when the claim was made. Footnote 2 [ 14 ] To establish good cause under the law, you have to show that you did what a reasonable person in your situation would have done to learn about your rights and obligations under the [NAME]  Act. [ 15 ] Good cause has to be shown throughout the entire period of the delay . [ 16 ] As the General Division noted, you are required to take “reasonably prompt” steps to understand both your entitlement to [NAME]  benefits and your rights and obligations under the [NAME]  Act. [ 17 ] You also have to take reasonable steps to confirm with the Commission your personal beliefs. This obligation involves a duty of care that is both demanding and strict. Footnote 3 [ 18 ] The General Division found that the Claimant hadn’t shown that her medical situation prevented her from applying or trying to get information about her rights for the entire period of the delay. [ 19 ] The General Division found that the Claimant’s medical condition in November 2022 was similar to that of July 2022. At that time, she was able to contact the Commission to understand her rights and make a claim for benefits. It found that nothing prevented her from contacting the Commission or making a claim for benefits in November 2022. [ 20 ] The General Division found that, during the period from November 2022 to May 2024, the Claimant had been able to deal with the legal and administrative procedures that were burdening her. Nothing was preventing her from contacting the Commission or making a claim for benefits during that period. [ 21 ] The General Division found that the Claimant had been able to look for a job, and that she had gone back to work as a substitute on March 19, 2024. Nothing prevented her from contacting the Commission during that period, rather than waiting until May 2024 to find out whether she was entitled to other benefits. [ 22 ] The General Division found that the Claimant hadn’t proven good cause for the delay in making her claim for benefits throughout the entire period of the delay. It also found that there were no exceptional circumstances for the delay. If exceptional circumstances did exist, they weren’t present throughout the entire period of the delay. So, her claim could not be treated as though it was made earlier. [ 23 ] As the General Division noted, good faith and not knowing the law don’t in themselves constitute good cause for the delay in making a claim for benefits. [ 24 ] It is well established that a delay in making a claim for benefits because of an erroneous belief that wasn’t confirmed with the Commission doesn’t constitute good cause under the law. Footnote 4 This includes believing that you weren’t entitled to benefits. [ 25 ] The Claimant accuses the General Division of not finding that her gradually going back to work during the period from March 19 to May 13, 2025, was good cause for the delay. Specifically, she accuses the General Division of not explaining why a delay of about eight weeks after gradually going back to work would be inconsistent with good cause. [ 26 ] I note that the Claimant asked to have her claim antedated to November 2022. I have to reiterate that there has to be good cause for the entire period of the delay, not just for the period from March 19 to May 13, 2024. In any case, as the General Division found, the fact that the Claimant was able to look for and start a job in March 2024 shows that she could have contacted the Commission or made a claim for benefits then—rather than waiting until May 2024. [ 27 ] The Claimant was required to take “reasonably prompt steps” to ask the Commission whether she was entitled to [NAME] sickness benefits, especially since she had already made a claim for those benefits in the past. She wasn’t able to show before the General Division that she had done what any reasonable person in her situation would have done to learn about her rights and obligations under the law. [ 28 ] The Claimant didn’t show before the General Division that she had good cause for the delay in making a claim for benefits for the entire period of the delay—that is, from November 20, 2022, to May 13, 2024. So, there was no reason to grant the antedate request. [ 29 ] I see no reviewable error made by the General Division based on which the appeal might succeed. I have to reiterate that the Appeal Division isn’t permitted to make a different finding from the General Division based on the same facts, given the extent of its jurisdiction and the absence of an error of law, a breach of a principle of natural justice, or an arbitrary finding of fact. Footnote 5 [ 30 ] After reviewing the appeal file, the General Division decision, and the arguments in support of the application for permission to appeal, I am of the view that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success. The Claimant hasn’t raised any issue that could justify setting aside the decision under review. Conclusion [ 31 ] Permission to appeal is refused. The appeal won’t go ahead. Footnotes Footnote 1 See section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act . Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See section 10(5) of the Employment Insurance Act . Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME], 2012  FCA  8; Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME], 2011  FCA  266; Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2010  FCA  341; Canada ( Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2010  FCA  335; Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2005  FCA  367; Canada (Attorney General)  v  Larouche (1994), 176 NR 69 ( FCA ) at para 6; Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2008  FCA  118; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 1985 CanLII 5582 ( FCA ), [1985] 1  FC  710 (CA). Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2010  FCA  341. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  21. Return to footnote 5 referrer