EI Benefits Denied for Voluntary Job Termination Without Just Cause

Citation: VP  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2026  SST  99 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Leave to Appeal Decision Applicant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated January 27, 2026 (GE-25-3588) Tribunal member: [NAME] Decision date: February 13, 2026 File number: AD-26-76 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] Leave (permission) to appeal is refused. [NAME].’s appeal will not proceed. Overview [ 2 ] [NAME]. is the Claimant. She resigned from her job on June 13, 2025, and gave two weeks notice to her employer indicating her last day of work would be June 27, 2025. Footnote 1 Following that, she applied for Employment Insurance regular benefits on July 2, 2025. Footnote 2 [ 3 ] The Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission) decided that the Claimant voluntarily left her job without just cause. It found there were reasonable alternatives. It concluded that she was disqualified from getting benefits from June 29, 2025. Footnote 3 [ 4 ] The General Division concluded the same and dismissed the Claimant’s appeal. Footnote 4 [ 5 ] The Claimant is now asking for permission to appeal and argues that the General Division made an important factual error. Footnote 5 [ 6 ] I am denying permission to appeal because the Claimant’s arguments don’t show that she has an arguable case upon which the appeal might succeed. So, I can’t give her permission to appeal. Footnote 6 Issue [ 7 ] Is there an arguable case that the General Division based its decision on any important factual errors when it decided that the Claimant voluntarily left her job without just cause? Analysis [ 8 ] The law says that I can consider four types of errors, and they include, a failure to follow a fair process, jurisdictional, legal, and important factual errors. Footnote 7 These errors are based on the grounds of appeal. [ 9 ] I can only give the Claimant permission to appeal if there’s an “arguable case” that the General Division made an error that gives her appeal a reasonable chance of success. Footnote 8 [ 10 ] The Claimant in this case is arguing that the General Division made an important factual error, so that’s what I will focus on. Footnote 9 [ 11 ] I’ve looked at the General Division decision, the Claimant’s Application to the Appeal Division, and all of the file documents before making my decision. I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal The Claimant’s arguments to the Appeal Division included some new evidence [ 12 ] The Claimant argues that the General Division made a factual error in paragraph 46 of its decision when it concluded that her psychological state didn’t persist beyond June 13, 2025, as the medical evidence didn’t say that. [ 13 ] The Claimant provided a letter from [NAME] explaining her psychological state for the period of June 13 to June 27, 2025. Footnote 10 She submits that the General Division’s finding was an important factual error because it didn’t fully consider this evidence. The Claimant submitted new evidence that was not before the General Division [ 14 ] New evidence is evidence that the General Division didn’t have before it when it made its decision. [ 15 ] The Appeal Division generally doesn’t accept new evidence. This is because the Appeal Division isn’t the fact finder or rehearing the case. Footnote 11 It’s a review of the General Division’s decision based on the same evidence. Footnote 12 [ 16 ] There are some exceptions where new evidence is allowed. Footnote 13 For example, I can accept new evidence if it provides one of the following: general background information only if it highlights findings made without supporting evidence shows that the Tribunal acted unfairly [ 17 ] As part of her Application to the Appeal Division, the Claimant submitted an undated letter from [NAME] to clarify her psychological functioning and decision-making capacity for the period of June 13 to June 27, 2025. Footnote 14 [ 18 ] I find that the Claimant’s letter from [NAME] at pages AD1B-1 to AD1B-3 is new evidence that was not before the General Division when it made its decision. [ 19 ] I’m not accepting the Claimant’s new evidence because it isn’t general background information, it doesn’t highlight findings made without supporting evidence and doesn’t show that the Tribunal acted unfairly. As a result, I can’t consider the letter from [NAME] at pages AD1B-1 to AD1B-3 when making my decision. [ 20 ] It’s important to know that an appeal to the Appeal Division isn’t a “redo” based on updated evidence of the hearings before the General Division. Footnote 15 Instead, they are reviews of the General Division based on the  same evidence . There is no arguable case that the General Division based its decision on any important factual errors [ 21 ] The Claimant’s main argument to the Appeal Division was based on the new evidence submitted. For the reasons outlined above, I can’t consider that new evidence. [ 22 ] Even so, I’ll review what the General Division decided and consider whether there’s an arguable case that it based its decision on any other important factual errors. [ 23 ] The General Division makes an important factual error when it reaches its decision by ignoring or misunderstanding relevant evidence. Footnote 16 [ 24 ] The  Employment Insurance Act ( EI Act) says a person is disqualified from getting benefits if they voluntarily leave their employment without just cause. Footnote 17 The law outlines a list of circumstances. Footnote 18 [ 25 ] To show just cause, the Claimant has to show that, having regard to all the circumstances, on a balance of probabilities, she had no reasonable alternative to leaving her job. [ 26 ] The General Division’s key findings on the voluntary leave issue included the following: The Claimant voluntarily left her job because she had a choice to stay or leave that job (para.18) The Claimant was attacked at home by her roommate’s cat on June 13, 2025; this was traumatic and resulted in resigning from her job on the same date (paras.17 & 31) The Claimant indicating her last day of work would be June 27, 2025 (para.18), and the employer permitted her to continue to work remotely for the two-week notice period, and she worked from her mother’s home (paras.26, 27, 33 & 49) The Claimant has been treated in the past for Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the attack from the cat triggered a trauma response that caused her to black out; and this affected her executive functioning and made the decision to resign while she was in psychological distress (para.45) The working conditions in the Claimant’s home/workspace on June 13, 2025, were a danger to her health or safety (para.53) The medical evidence doesn’t show that her psychological state persisted to the day that she left her job that she had no reasonable alternative (para.46) The Claimant had reasonable alternatives to quitting her job because she could have asked her employer to take a leave of absence, or continue working remotely, she could have also looked for a new home closer to her job or looked for another job closer to her mother’s home (paras.25 & 50–51) Lastly, the Claimant didn’t have just cause to leave her job, so she was disqualified from getting benefits (paras.2 & 56) [ 27 ] The General Division accepted that her working conditions at home were a danger to her health or safety due to the cat attack. This is one of the circumstances set out in the law. Footnote 19 Its decision also shows that it considered the totality of evidence, including the medical evidence she submitted. Despite that, if found that the evidence didn’t show that her psychological state persisted to the date that she left her job on was June 27, 2025. It explained with reasons why she had several other reasonable alternatives to quitting her job. [ 28 ] I see no arguable case that the General Division made any important factual errors. Footnote 20 Its key findings on the voluntary leave issue are consistent with the evidence. I can’t reweigh the evidence in order to provide a different or more favourable outcome for the Claimant. [ 29 ] The General Division is the trier of fact and was free to weigh the evidence before it and conclude that the Claimant voluntarily left her job and didn’t have just cause. It didn’t ignore her particular circumstances but determined there were reasonable alternatives to quitting her job. [ 30 ] The Appeal Division’s mandate is limited to determining whether the General Division made a reviewable error. Footnote 21 The Claimant may not agree with the General Division’s decision, but a disagreement with the outcome isn’t a reviewable error. [ 31 ] There is no arguable case that the General Division based its decision on any important factual errors. Footnote 22 I didn’t find any evidence that the General Division might have ignored or misinterpreted. Footnote 23 There are no other reasons for giving her permission to appeal. Conclusion [ 32 ] Permission to appeal is refused. This means that the appeal will not proceed. It has no reasonable chance of success. Footnotes Footnote 1 See Claimant’s resignation letter at page GD3-50. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See Application for EI benefits at pages GD3-3 to GD3-18. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See Commission’s initial and reconsideration decision at pages GD3-22 to GD3-23 and GD3-52. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See General Division decision at pages AD1A-1 to AD1A-11. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See Application to the Appeal Division at pages AD1-1 to AD1-7. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See section 58(2) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act ( DESD Act). Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See section 58(1) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2016  FC  11 at paragraph 12 and sections 56(1) and 58(2) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 See pages AD1B-1 to AD1B-3. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2015  FC  1300 at paragraphs 29 and 34; [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2017  FC  354 at paragraph 23. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2019  FCA  256 at paragraph 13. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 [NAME]  v   Canada (Attorney General),  2018  FCA  48 and  [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2022  FCA  157 at paragraphs 37–39. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See pages ADB1-1 to AD1B-3. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2019  FCA  256 at paragraph 13. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 This is a plain language wording of section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act, which says this happens when the General Division has “based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.” Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See section 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act ( EI Act). Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 See section 29(c) of the EI Act. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See section 29(c)(iv) of the EI Act. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See section 58(2) of the  DESD  Act;  [NAME]   v   Canada (Attorney General),  2016  FC  1367 and [NAME]   v   Canada (Attorney General),  2017  FC  354. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 The Federal Court has suggested such a review in decisions like  [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General), 2016  FC  874 and  [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General),  2016  FC  615. Return to footnote 23 referrer