Eligibility for CPP Disability Pension Based on Date of Disability

Citation: MC  v  [NAME] , 2026  SST  150 Social Security Tribunal of Canada General Division – Income Security Section Interlocutory Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: K. C. Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: [NAME] reconsideration decision dated October 25, 2024 (issued by Service Canada) Tribunal member: [NAME] Decision date: March 3, 2026 File number: GP-25-127 On this page Decision How do you qualify for a disability pension? Applying the rules to the Appellant The Appellant is only eligible for a disability pension if she became disabled during her MQP or her prorated MQP Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The [NAME] (Minister) believes that the Appellant, M. C., is eligible for a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension if she became disabled at any time before April 30, 2025, and continues to be disabled. [ 2 ] I disagree with the Minister. I find that the Appellant is only eligible for a disability pension if she became disabled when she had [NAME] coverage. In other words, she must prove that she became disabled by December 31, 2018, or between January 1, 2025, and April 30, 2025. She isn’t eligible for a disability pension if she became disabled between January 1, 2019, and December 31, 2024, or after April 30, 2025. Footnote 1 The rest of this interlocutory decision explains why. [ 3 ] I am issuing this decision now so that the parties understand the issue under appeal before the hearing. A hearing will be scheduled to allow the parties to present evidence and arguments to support that the Appellant is or is not eligible for a disability pension based on the dates that I have outlined. How do you qualify for a disability pension? [ 4 ] According to section 44(1)(b) of the [NAME] , to qualify for a disability pension: Footnote 2 1) you must be under 65 years old 2) you must not be getting a [NAME] retirement pension 3) you must be disabled as defined by the [NAME] 4) you must meet the contributory requirements [ 5 ] The first two requirements are straightforward, and the Appellant meets them. The last two require more explanation. What does it mean to be disabled under the [NAME]? [ 6 ] The [NAME] uses a few phrases when it talks about being disabled, such as: considered to be disabled determined to be or to have become disabled deemed to have become disabled [ 7 ] When interpreting laws, the same words are presumed to mean the same thing, whereas different words are presumed to mean different things. Footnote 3 To figure out what the words “considered,” “determined,” and “deemed” mean, I must consider the purpose of the [NAME] as well as the text, context, and purpose of the particular sections of the [NAME] in which these words appear. Footnote 4 The purpose of the [NAME] [ 8 ] The Supreme Court of Canada describes the purpose of the [NAME] like this: Footnote 5 The [NAME] was designed to provide social insurance for Canadians who experience a loss of earnings owing to retirement, disability, or the death of a wage-earning spouse or parent. It is not a social welfare scheme. It is a contributory plan in which [NAME] has defined both the benefits and the terms of entitlement, including the level and duration of an applicant’s financial contribution. [ 9 ] The [NAME] (the law) establishes [NAME] benefits that may be available to Canadians. It also establishes the requirements that Canadians must meet in order to qualify for those benefits. So, when looking at particular sections of the [NAME] , I should expect that they will work harmoniously together to do one or both of those two things. The text, context, and purpose of particular sections of the law [ 10 ] Section 42(2)(a) says you are considered to be disabled if you are determined in prescribed manner to have a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability. [ 11 ] Section 42(2)(b) says you are deemed to have become disabled at the time that is determined in prescribed manner to be the time when you became disabled—but you can’t be deemed to have become disabled earlier than 15 months before you applied. What does it mean to be considered to be disabled? [ 12 ] To be considered to be disabled means to be disabled for the purpose of meeting the third requirement in section 44(1)(b). It relates to the question: Are you disabled? [ 13 ] This interpretation is supported by the word “if” in section 42(2)(a) (you are “considered to be disabled only if …”). What does it mean to be determined to be disabled? [ 14 ] To be determined to be disabled means to be found disabled as a matter of fact. It relates to the question: How do we determine that you are disabled? [ 15 ] This interpretation is supported by the fact that the word “determined” is immediately followed by the words “in prescribed manner” in sections 42(2)(a) and (b). The words “prescribed manner” are meant to point us to sections 68 to 70 of the [NAME] (Regulations), where [NAME] prescribed (set out) matters like what evidence you must file with your application to support that you are, in fact, disabled. [ 16 ] Notably, the French version of section 42(2)(a) uses the word “ déclarée ” (“declared”) whereas section 42(2)(b) uses the word “ déterminée ” (“determined”). But they are both followed by the words “ de [NAME] manière prescrite ” (“in prescribed manner”), just like in the English version. This supports that both terms are meant to point us to the Regulations and that they relate to the fact of being disabled. What does it mean to be deemed to have become disabled? [ 17 ] To be deemed to have become disabled means to be considered disabled for payment purposes. It relates to the question: When did you become disabled for payment purposes? [ 18 ] This is supported by the words “at the time” in section 42(2)(b), and by the fact that the word “deemed” is immediately followed by the words “to have become.” Section 69 says payment of a disability pension generally begins with the fourth month after you “became” disabled. The purpose of distinguishing between the date you are considered to be disabled under section 42(2)(a) and the date you are deemed to have become disabled under section 42(2)(b) is therefore to limit how far back a disability pension can be paid. The payment date is based on the deemed date of disability, not the actual date of disability. [ 19 ] It makes sense that the word “deemed” is used to establish the payment date. The online [NAME] defines “to deem” as “to consider or judge something in a particular way” (my emphasis). Footnote 6 This definition suggests that to deem something is to make a legal judgment about something. So, whereas “determine” relates to a factual finding, “deem” relates to a legal finding. Putting the rules together [ 20 ] By putting sections 44(1)(b), 42(2)(a), 42(2)(b), and 69 together, we can summarize the law this way:

1) If you became disabled within 15 months before you applied, then (for payment purposes) you are deemed to have become disabled when it is determined that you had a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability. The date you are considered to be disabled for eligibility purposes will be the same as the date you are deemed to have become disabled for payment purposes.

2) If you became disabled more than 15 months before you applied, then (for payment purposes), you are deemed to have become disabled 15 months before you applied. This is true regardless of when it is determined that you had a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability. The date you are considered to be disabled for eligibility purposes will be earlier than the date you are deemed to have become disabled for payment purposes. [ 21 ] It is useful to illustrate these rules with some examples: Example 1 —You became disabled in July 2020. This is your “considered” (or actual) date of disability. You applied for a disability pension in October 2021, 15 months after July 2020. Your deemed date of disability is also July 2020. Payments begin four months later, in November 2020. Example 2 —Again, you became disabled in July 2020. This is your actual date of disability. But you didn’t apply for a disability pension until November 2021, 16 months after July 2020. In this case, your deemed date of disability for payment purposes is August 2020. Payments begin four months later, in December 2020. [ 22 ] So far, I have explained what it means to be disabled under the [NAME] . Now I will explain what it means to meet the contributory requirements. What does it mean to meet the contributory requirements? [ 23 ] There are three options for meeting the contributory requirements under section 44(1)(b), but only the first two are relevant to this decision. They both essentially say you must have made base contributions for not less than the minimum qualifying period ( MQP ) at the time you were disabled. This means you must have contributed to the [NAME] for a certain number of years during your contributory period on earnings that are not less than the year’s basic exemption . Footnote 7 I will discuss the contributory period and then the year’s basic exemption in more detail. What is the contributory period? [ 24 ] Your contributory period is when you can contribute to the [NAME] : Footnote 8 It begins on January 1, 1966, or when you turn 18 years old, whichever is later. It ends with the month in which you are determined to have become disabled. It excludes any month that was excluded “by reason of disability.” [ 25 ] As we have seen, you are determined to have become disabled when you are found to be disabled as a matter of fact. [ 26 ] I believe that the words “by reason of disability” are meant to capture the situation where you became disabled and then ceased to be disabled, before becoming disabled for a second time. Otherwise, these words would be redundant, since the law already says the contributory period ends when you are determined to have become disabled. Footnote 9 [ 27 ] Again, it is useful to look at an example: You became disabled in January 2010. This is when you were determined to have become disabled, so this is when your contributory period ended. You applied for a disability pension in January 2012. Your deemed date of disability was October 2010 (15 months before you applied). Your payments began four months after that, in February 2011. You ceased to be disabled in January 2015. Footnote 10 This is when your contributory period resumed. Your payments stopped after January 2015. Footnote 11 You became disabled for a second time in July 2020. This caused your contributory period to end again. [ 28 ] In this example, your contributory period would exclude February 2010 to January 2015, and end in July 2020. What is the year’s basic exemption? [ 29 ] The amount of the year’s basic exemption is a dollar amount set by a formula. Footnote 12 Section 19 sets out some exceptions to this formula. One exception is that the year’s basic exemption is prorated based on the number of months left in a year after the month in which your contributory period ended “by reason of disability.” Footnote 13 Your contributory period ends by reason of disability with the month in which you are determined to have become disabled—in other words, the month in which you became disabled as a matter of fact. [ 30 ] If you apply after you last met the contributory requirements, section 44(2.1) sets out another exception, with the same result. It says the basic exemption for the year in which you would have been considered to have become disabled is prorated. The word “considered” is meant to point us back to section 42(2)(a), which uses the same word in the context of whether you are factually disabled. It refers to the actual date of disability, not the deemed date of disability. [ 31 ] Under both sections 19 and 44(2.1), the proration rule only applies to the year in which you actually became disabled, not the year in which you were deemed to have become disabled. In other words, the proration rule only helps you if you became disabled in your prorated year. [ 32 ] I will have more to say about this later. For now, I will consider how these rules apply to the Appellant. Applying the rules to the Appellant [ 33 ] The Appellant made contributions above the year’s basic exemption (“valid contributions”) in every year from 2005 to 2016, and then again in 2020, 2021, and 2022. She earned $2,400 in 2025, which was below the year’s basic exemption of $7,100. Footnote 14 [ 34 ] The Appellant’s MQP is based on the last time she made valid contributions in four years within a six-year period. Footnote 15 She did that in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016—the six-year period ended on December 31, 2018. That was the end of her MQP . [ 35 ] The Appellant had three years of valid earnings after that, in 2020, 2021, and 2022. Normally, she would need four years of valid earnings to extend her MQP . In this situation, though, the proration rule gives her a prorated MQP . Her earnings of $2,400 in 2025 buy her four months of coverage, from January 1, 2025, to April 30, 2025. This is her prorated MQP . The Appellant is only eligible for a disability pension if she became disabled during her MQP or her prorated MQP [ 36 ] I find that the Appellant is only eligible for a disability pension if she became disabled during her MQP or her prorated MQP —in other words, when she had [NAME] coverage. The Minister’s arguments [ 37 ] The Minister says the Appellant is eligible for a disability pension as long as she was disabled at the same time that she met the contributory requirements. She didn’t have to become disabled at that time. Since (in the Minister’s view) the Appellant was disabled in January 2025, when her prorated MQP started, she should be eligible for a disability pension. [ 38 ] I disagree. I will explain why by addressing each of the Minister’s arguments. Footnote 16 The use of the present tense in section 44(1)(b) [ 39 ] First, the Minister emphasizes the use of the present-tense words “is disabled” in section 44(1)(b) of the [NAME] : “a disability pension shall be paid to a [NAME] … who is disabled.” [ 40 ] The Minister goes on to highlight section 10 of the Interpretation Act : “The law shall be considered as always speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.” [ 41 ] According to the Minister, the words “is disabled,” read in light of the Interpretation Act , mean the emphasis of the legal test is on whether you are (or are not) disabled—not on when you became disabled. [ 42 ] This argument can’t succeed. Factually, there must be a point at which you were not disabled and a point at which you became disabled (assuming you became disabled at all). This is true whether you became disabled suddenly or gradually. [ 43 ] In her application, the Appellant says she became disabled in April 2022. Footnote 17 If I accept that she became disabled in April 2022, then because of section 44(2)(b), her contributory period stops with that month. This means any [NAME] contributions that she made after that were outside of her contributory period and, therefore, invalid. They can’t be used to establish a prorated MQP . [ 44 ] In a sense, the Minister’s statement is accurate: The Appellant only had to be disabled at the same time that she met the contributory requirements. But if the Appellant’s contributory period ended when she says she became disabled (in April 2022), there was never a time after that when she also met the contributory requirements. Put another way, there was never a time when she was simultaneously disabled and met the contributory requirements. When the contributory period ends [ 45 ] The Minister tries to get around this problem by asserting two things: 1) the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability, not the actual date of disability 2) the deemed date of disability can be any date as long as it isn’t earlier than 15 months before the application date [ 46 ] In the Appellant’s case, this means she could be deemed to have become disabled in January 2025, the first month of her prorated MQP , regardless of when she actually became disabled. She would then be disabled and meet the contributory requirements at the same time, making her eligible for a disability pension. [ 47 ] I will explain why I reject the Minister’s assertions. The section 44(2.1) proration rule [ 48 ] To support its position that the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability, the Minister points out that section 44(2.1) says the proration rule applies to the year in which you “would have been considered to have become disabled.” The Minister believes that the word “considered” is a reference to the deemed date of disability. Alternatively, if there is any ambiguity about what section 44(2.1) means, it should be resolved in favour of [NAME]. Footnote 18 [ 49 ] I disagree with the Minister. [ 50 ] I have already explained that the word “considered” (as in section 42(2)(a)) relates to the question: Are you disabled? More specifically, it relates to the question: Are you disabled for the purpose of meeting the third eligibility requirement for a disability pension? You are “considered” to be disabled when you are “determined in prescribed manner” to be disabled. So, the word “considered” is tied to a factual finding of disability. [ 51 ] The conditional tense (“would have been considered”) is used because section 44(2.1) relates to an event that has not, in fact, happened—namely, the applicant applying when they still met the contributory requirements. Section 44(2.1) is about what would have happened if the applicant had applied when they still met the contributory requirements. [ 52 ] I see no ambiguity in section 44(2.1) to be resolved in favour of applicants or otherwise. The section 19 proration rule [ 53 ] The Minister says the words “by reason of disability” in the section 19 proration rule are also a reference to the deemed date of disability, but it doesn’t explain why. [ 54 ] Again, I disagree with the Minister. [ 55 ] In reaching this conclusion, I am aware that at least three Tribunal decisions have found that the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability, Footnote 19 while others have found that it ends with the actual date of disability. Footnote 20 Although I am not bound to follow any of those decisions, I considered them, and I will explain why I disagree with the first set of decisions. [ 56 ] First, I should note that those decisions weren’t directly about the [NAME] disability pension or the sections of the [NAME] that I am dealing with here. Instead, they were about section 49, which explains how to determine your contributory period for the purposes of calculating eligibility for, or the amount of, other benefits—like the [NAME] retirement pension, survivor’s pension, and death benefit. Those decisions are still relevant, though, because section 49 says to exclude from your contributory period any month that was excluded “by reason of disability.” These are the same words that appear in section 19, and they should be interpreted the same way. [ 57 ] One of the Tribunal decisions that found the contributory period ends with the deemed date of disability focused on explaining why the contributory period doesn’t end with the date of payment. It didn’t explain why the contributory period can’t end with the actual date of disability, beyond simply referencing section 42(2)(b). Footnote 21 [ 58 ] The other two Tribunal decisions did explain why the contributory period can’t end with the actual date of disability. Their analysis rests largely on the following three premises: Footnote 22 1) Months are excluded from your contributory “by reason of disability” when you are determined to be disabled.

2) You are determined to be disabled when you are actually disabled or, if you applied late, when you are deemed to have become disabled (that is, no earlier than 15 months before you applied for a disability pension).

3) This is because the deeming provision (section 42(2)(b)) is prefaced by the phrase “For the purposes of this Act,” indicating that it doesn’t just apply for payment purposes. [ 59 ] I agree with the first premise, but not the other two. [ 60 ] Regarding the second premise, I think it is an error to treat the words “determined” and “deemed” as if they refer to the same thing. The full text of section 42(2)(b) says: For the purposes of this Act … [NAME] is deemed to have become or to have ceased to be disabled at the time that is determined in the prescribed manner to be the time when the person became or ceased to be, as the case may be, disabled, but in no case shall [NAME]—including a [NAME] referred to in subparagraph 44(1)(b)(ii)—be deemed to have become disabled earlier than fifteen months before the time of the making of any application in respect of which the determination is made. [ 61 ] This section makes it clear that being determined to be disabled and being deemed to have become disabled are two different things, even if the dates might be the same . As I explained before, you are determined to be disabled when you are actually disabled as a matter of fact. You are deemed to have become disabled for payment purposes. [ 62 ] Regarding the third premise, it is important to note that the preface “For the purposes of this Act” applies to section 42(2)(a) as well as to section 42(2)(b). I believe this is because each of these sections relates to different sections elsewhere in the [NAME] . Section 42(2)(a) is about being found disabled under section 44(1)(b), whereas section 42(2)(b) is about payment under section 69. Considering the context, I am not convinced that the preface is there to expand the applicability of the deeming provision beyond payment purposes. [ 63 ] Furthermore, I agree with the observation of the Appeal Division in [NAME] that the primary reason for excluding months from a contributory period “by reason of disability” is to not further disadvantage people for being disabled. Footnote 23 Generally, a shorter contributory period makes it easier to qualify for [NAME] benefits, and it potentially increases the value of benefits like the [NAME] retirement pension. The underlying logic is that you should not be expected to contribute to the [NAME] when you are unable to work due to disability. [ 64 ] It makes more sense that your contributory period would end when you actually became disabled because it is the fact of actually being disabled, not being deemed to have become, which impacts your ability to work and contribute to the [NAME] . There are only two options for the deemed date of disability [ 65 ] The Minister also asserts that the deemed date of disability can be any date as long as it isn’t earlier than 15 months before the application date. I disagree. I find that the deemed date of disability must be either: a) the date you actually became disabled (if you applied on time) b) the 15th month before you applied (if you applied late) [ 66 ] There are no other options. [ 67 ] To support its position, the Minister relies on the plain wording of section 42(2)(b): “in no case shall [NAME] … be deemed to have become disabled earlier than fifteen months before the time of the making of any application in respect of which the determination is made.” [ 68 ] Indeed, if [NAME] meant to make the deemed date of disability the 15th month before you apply, [NAME] could have said that more directly. For example, [NAME] could have said, “if [NAME] applies more than 15 months after they are determined in prescribed manner to have a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability, they are deemed to have become disabled in the 15th month before they applied.” [NAME] didn’t say that. [ 69 ] I acknowledge that the plain wording of section 42(2)(b) could allow for the Minister’s interpretation. But the broader context does not. [ 70 ] The words “in no case” show that the emphasis of the deeming provision is on restricting the Minister’s authority, not on expanding it. The purpose of the deeming provision, then, is to limit how far back a disability pension can be paid. The purpose isn’t to signal that, if you apply late enough, the Minister can choose a deemed date of disability from a range of possible dates. If the Minister could do that, I would expect the [NAME] to provide some guidance about what date the Minister should choose. Yet apart from section 42(2)(b), the [NAME] is completely silent on the timing of the deemed date of disability. [ 71 ] The Minister’s interpretation must be rejected for another reason: It leads to an absurd outcome. Laws should not be interpreted in a way that leads to an absurd outcome. Footnote 24 [ 72 ] In the Appellant’s case, the Minister wants me to deem the Appellant disabled in January 2025, which is to her advantage. But if I follow the Minister’s argument to its conclusion, the Minister could just as easily choose a date that is not to her advantage. The [NAME] doesn’t put any constraints on the Minister’s discretion. [ 73 ] So, the Minister could choose a deemed date of disability between the Appellant’s MQP and her prorated MQP , or even a date after her prorated MQP , making her ineligible for a disability pension altogether—all because she applied more than 15 months after she became disabled. Or the Minister could choose April 2025 as the deemed date of disability, ensuring that the Appellant is eligible for a disability pension, but minimizing the number of months of payments she gets. This can’t be what [NAME] intended. [ 74 ] It is true that the common law and Charter values do constrain the Minister’s discretion, even in the absence of any explicit constraints in the [NAME] . For example, the Minister can’t act in bad faith, for an improper purpose or motive, or in a discriminatory manner. Footnote 25 But it is at least debatable to what extent these constraints could keep the Minister from doing something that, based on the Minister’s logic, the [NAME] plainly allows it to do. The fact that the Minister’s argument would lead to so much uncertainty undermines the argument itself. Absurd outcomes and [NAME]’s intention [ 75 ] The Minister’s final argument is that my interpretation of the law has the effect of restricting eligibility to a disability pension based on when you became disabled. The Minister thinks this is absurd and contradicts [NAME]’s intention. [ 76 ] The Minister says, “[t]here is no evidence that [NAME]’s intention was to limit proration to only people who became disabled within a prorated period. … the intent of [NAME] disability benefits has always been to pay Canadians who are unable to work due to a disability, and who have made sufficient contributions to the Plan. The Minister’s interpretation aligns with this intent.” [ 77 ] The Minister’s argument is circular. The text of the proration rules, at least as I interpret them, is the evidence that [NAME] did intend to limit the benefits of proration to only those who became disabled during their prorated year. [ 78 ] The Minister adds, “[w]hile the intention of the contributory requirements … was to create a ‘recency requirement’ for contributions, it was not intended to limit benefits to only individuals who stopped working directly as a result of a disabling event.” Footnote 26 [ 79 ] The Minister cites no authority to support this statement. As I mentioned previously, the [NAME] “is not a social welfare scheme. It is a contributory plan in which [NAME] has defined both the benefits and the terms of entitlement, including the level and duration of an applicant’s financial contribution.” Footnote 27 [ 80 ] Given this, I do not find it absurd that your eligibility for a disability pension depends partly on when you became disabled. Conclusion [ 81 ] The Appellant is only eligible for a [NAME] disability pension if she became disabled by December 31, 2018, or between January 1, 2025, and April 30, 2025. [ 82 ] The Tribunal will contact the parties to schedule a hearing. Footnotes Footnote 1 To succeed in her appeal, the Appellant must also prove that she continues to be disabled. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 All sections of law that are referenced in this decision are from the [NAME] unless otherwise indicated. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 [NAME]  v  [NAME] , 2025 TCC 145 at paragraph 65. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 [COMPANY] (Re) , [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 ( SCC ). Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 2000  SCC  28 at paragraph 9. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See https://dictionary.[NAME].org/dictionary/english/deem. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See section 44(2)(a). Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See section 44(2)(b). Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2020  SST  631. This decision isn’t binding on me, but I agree with its reasoning at paragraphs 33 and 34. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 Section 42(2)(b) says you are deemed to have ceased to be disabled at the time that is determined in prescribed manner to be the time when you ceased to be disabled. There is no distinction between the date you actually ceased to be disabled and the date you are deemed to have ceased to be disabled. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See section 70(1)(a). Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See sections 2(1), 20, and 44(2)(a). Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See section 19(a). Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See GD13. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See section 44(2)(a)(i). Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 The Minister’s arguments are in GD14. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See GD2-74. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 This argument is based on the fact that the [NAME] is benefits-conferring legislation, which is to be interpreted in a large and liberal manner. [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2001  FCA  248 at paragraph 28. In fact, this same principle applies to all federal legislation. See section 12 of the Interpretation Act . Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See the General Division’s decision in [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2019  SST  1229. The Appeal Division overturned this decision, but not on this point. [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2020  SST  631. See also IQ  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2017 CanLII 97154 ( SST ). Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See the General Division’s decision in [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2018  SST  1207, which was upheld by the Appeal Division in Minister (Employment and Social Development)  v  [NAME] , 2019  SST  965. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See IQ  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2017 CanLII 97154 ( SST ) at paragraphs 31 to 36. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See the General Division’s decision in [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2019  SST  1229 at paragraph 42, and the Appeal Division’s decision in [NAME]  v  Minister (Employment and Social Development) , 2020  SST  631 at paragraphs 47 to 49. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See Minister (Employment and Social Development)  v  [NAME] , 2019  SST  965 at paragraphs 42 to 47. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 [COMPANY] (Re) , [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 ( SCC ). Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See Canada (Attorney General)  v  Purcell , [1996] 1  FC  644, 1995 CanLII 3558 ( FCA ). Regarding Charter values, see Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du [NAME]  v  [NAME] (Education, Culture and Employment ), 2023  SCC  31 at paragraphs 76 and 77; and Doré  v  Barreau du Québec , 2012  SCC  12. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See GD14-16 and 18. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 [NAME]  v  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 2000  SCC  28 at paragraph 9. Return to footnote 27 referrer