Employer Found Guilty of Violating Section 50(a) of Canada Labour Code

Reasons for decision Public Service Alliance of Canada, complainant, and [COMPANY]., respondent . Board File: 038686-C Neutral Citation: 2026 [NAME] 1229 February 20, 2026 The panel of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the Board) was composed of [NAME], Chairperson, and [NAME] and [NAME], Members. Parties’ Representatives of Record Mr. [NAME], for the Public Service Alliance of Canada; [NAME], for [COMPANY]. These reasons for decision were written by [NAME], Chairperson .

I. Nature of the Complaint [ 1 ] The Public Service Alliance of Canada ([NAME] or the union) filed an unfair labour practice complaint, pursuant to section 97(1) of the Canada Labour Code (the Code ), alleging violation of sections 50(a), 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code by [COMPANY]. (the employer). [ 2 ] [NAME] alleges that the employer refused to sign a collective agreement that it negotiated and agreed to with the union. It also alleges that, at a meeting held on April 29, 2025, the employer communicated directly with and made false statements to [NAME], with the purpose of undermining the bargaining agent and frustrating the collective bargaining process. [ 3 ] After considering the evidence and submissions presented by the parties, and for the reasons explained below, the Board has determined that the part of the complaint alleging violation of section 50(a) of the Code is well founded. The Board has found that the employer did not violate sections 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code and dismisses those parts of the complaint .

II. Factual Background [ 4 ] [NAME] is the bargaining agent that has been certified to represent certain employees of the employer (or its corporate predecessors) since 1989. The employees work primarily in Kanata, Ontario. [ 5 ] The employer is a [NAME] located in Ottawa, Ontario. It manufactures medical devices such as radiation therapy equipment, cyclotrons as well as radiation and X-ray based irradiators, among other medical devices. [ 6 ] The previous collective agreement between the parties expired on March 31, 2023. On March 14, 2023, the union served notice to bargain. On May 10, 2024, the [NAME] went on strike. [ 7 ] In prior proceedings involving the same parties (see [COMPANY] ., 2025 [NAME] 1181), the Board concluded, on February 27, 2025, that the employer had violated sections 50(a), 94(1)(a), 94(3)(e) and 96 of the Code. Specifically, the Board found that the employer had: violated section 50(a) of the Code by failing to cause representatives to have authority to bargain on its behalf and by failing to meet to bargain with designated representatives with authority to bargain on its behalf since March 25, 2024; bargained in bad faith by disseminating false and misleading communications clearly designed to influence the bargaining process; and violated sections 94(1)(a), 94(3)(e) and 96 of the Code in its communications to employees. [ 8 ] On February 25, 2025, very shortly before the above decision was issued, the parties resumed bargaining. [ 9 ] On March 7, 2025, the parties reached a comprehensive tentative agreement covering all collective agreement matters and return-to-work issues. The tentative agreement, formalized in a Memorandum of Settlement (MOS), included new wage rates, some amendments to the collective agreement and a return-to-work protocol (RTWP). The MOS was signed on March 7, 2025, by [NAME], union negotiator, and Mr. [NAME], employer representative. The signed MOS was subject to ratification by the [NAME]. [ 10 ] On March 16, 2025, the tentative agreement was ratified by the [NAME]. The strike ended, and the employees returned to work in the following days. [ 11 ] [NAME] then proceeded to incorporate the new agreed language into a copy of a new collective agreement. On March 20, 2025, it provided a copy of the draft of the new collective agreement to [NAME], employer representative. [ 12 ] In an email dated March 31, 2025, [NAME] acknowledged receipt of the draft of the new collective agreement and asked the union to confirm that vacation entitlements and sick leave credits did not accrue during the strike period. [NAME] advised the union that agreement to this understanding was required before the collective agreement could be signed. [ 13 ] On the same day, [NAME], national negotiator for [NAME], informed [NAME] that, in the union’s view, the RTWP specified that striking employees accrued vacation and sick day credits during the strike. The provision in question reads as follows:

6. VACATION AND SICK DAY CREDITS 6.1 Employees will return to work with their full paid vacation as per the collective agreement and sick day credit entitlement as per the collective agreement. For clarity, employees will suffer no loss of paid vacation or sick day credits because of the strike. [ 14 ] On April 1, 2025, [NAME] responded to [NAME], indicating that it was clear that vacation and sick leave credits were not being accumulated during the strike period, based on discussions at the bargaining table. [NAME] indicated that once [NAME] accepted this understanding, the employer would sign and return the new collective agreement. [ 15 ] On the same day, [NAME] expressed [NAME]’s disagreement, indicating that there was no dispute between the parties regarding the content of the new collective agreement and that the employer was obliged to sign it. In light of the disagreement, [NAME] proposed that the interpretation of the RTWP be a matter for the grievance process. [NAME] asked [NAME] to proceed with signing the new collective agreement. [ 16 ] On April 4, 2025, [NAME] sent another email, informing [NAME] that he was travelling for the next two weeks and would review again and respond upon his return. [ 17 ] On April 22, 2025, [NAME]’s counsel wrote to [NAME], requesting that he forward a copy of the signed collective agreement by no later than April 24, 2025, failing which [NAME] would file an unfair labour practice complaint with the Board. [ 18 ] In response, [NAME] indicated to [NAME]’s counsel on April 23, 2025, that the employer would sign the agreed collective agreement “once it has been corrected to what was agreed to and reflexed during negotiations and ongoing phone conversations during the bargaining process.” [ 19 ] On April 25, 2025, [NAME] specified that the RTWP, presented during collective bargaining, was never agreed to between [NAME] and the employer. [ 20 ] On April 29, 2025, a Step 1 grievance meeting was held to discuss ten grievances filed by the union. [NAME] and [NAME], Human Resources Manager, represented the employer at the meeting. Mr. [NAME], President of the [NAME], and Mr. [NAME], union official, attended the meeting on behalf of the union. During that grievance meeting, the parties expressed their respective positions regarding the interpretation of the contractual language found in the MOS on whether employees accrued vacation and sick day credits while the strike was ongoing. [ 21 ] In its complaint, the union alleges that, during the April 29, 2025, meeting, [NAME] accused [NAME] of slipping language into the agreement before presenting it to the [NAME] for ratification. [ 22 ] In an affidavit submitted to the Board, Mr. Watters explains that, during the April 29, 2025, meeting, he presented the union’s position indicating that the parties had signed the RTWP that clearly stated, at section 6.1, that “employees [would] suffer no loss of paid vacation or sick day credits because of the strike” and that such document could not be disputed. Mr. Watters indicates that [NAME] responded by explaining that the employer had not signed the contract yet and that [NAME] had misrepresented to the [NAME] what the employer had agreed to when the members voted to ratify the tentative agreement. Mr. Watters added that both [NAME] and Mr. [NAME] stated that they were unsure how the language in section 6.1 had gotten into the RTWP. Mr. Watters refers to an email exchanged between the parties after the meeting, representing the minutes of the meeting, in which [NAME] wrote: “We are not accusing, we were clear that we are unsure how they came to stating we’ve agreed to vacation and sick day accumulations, unless they’ve decided to add it last minute.” Mr. Watters indicates that [NAME] stated that he did not agree to the language found in section 6.1 of the RTWP regarding the accumulation of vacation and sick day credits during the strike. [ 23 ] Supported by affidavits signed by [NAME], the employer explains that the two employer representatives never asserted that language had been “slipped” into the agreement. The employer indicates that, during the Step 1 meeting held on April 29, 2025, the parties expressed their positions regarding the contractual language at issue and the employer representatives explained that, in their view, employees would not lose vacation or sick day credits accumulated in their banks but would not accumulate such benefits during the strike. [ 24 ] On May 20, 2025, the same union and employer representatives attended a Step 2 grievance meeting to further discuss the grievances filed on the accumulation of vacation and sick day credits during the strike. During that meeting, the parties reiterated their respective positions on the grievances. The emails they exchanged on May 21, 2025, as proposed minutes of the meeting, indicate an account from the union that the employer representatives insinuated that the union had sneakily inserted the disputed language into the agreement and a response from the employer that it had made no such accusation. The annotations from the employer on the proposed minutes indicate that it could not understand where the language found in section 6.1 of the RTWP had come from.

III. Positions of the Parties A. [NAME] [ 25 ] [NAME] alleges that by refusing to sign a collective agreement that it negotiated and that was agreed to with the union, the employer failed to make every reasonable effort to reach a collective agreement. [ 26 ] [NAME] also contends that the employer violated the Code in communicating directly with [NAME] on April 29, 2025. [NAME] argues that the employer’s accusation that [NAME] slipped language into the RTWP before presenting the agreement to the employees for ratification was designed to diminish the union in the eyes of its members and undermine its representation of the [NAME]. [ 27 ] [NAME] maintains that the employer’s communications with the two local members crossed the line and were improper and unlawful, contrary to section 94(1)(a) of the Code . [NAME] argues that [NAME] made inappropriate comments to [NAME]. [NAME] about [NAME]’s representation during collective bargaining and ratification, with the objective of damaging the union in the eyes of those in the [NAME]. [NAME] also contends that the comments from the employer representatives suggest that [NAME] acted improperly, in a manner designed to undermine the union. [ 28 ] Finally, [NAME] states that the employer’s refusal to sign the collective agreement is causing [NAME] to lose confidence in the union, especially after a lengthy and contentious strike during which the Board already found that the employer violated the Code . B. The Employer [ 29 ] The employer argues that the collective agreement is yet to be signed because there is still a dispute as to whether the employees accrued vacation and sick day credits during the strike period. It is the employer’s view that vacation and sick day credits would not accrue during the term of the strike but that the employees would retain the vacation and sick day credits already accrued before the start of the strike. [ 30 ] The employer states that it never refused to sign a collective agreement that was previously agreed to. According to it, the union attempted to add unreasonable language related to the accumulation of vacation and sick day credits that no employer would agree to, especially under the present circumstances surrounding the strike. [ 31 ] The employer explains its interpretation of section 6.1 of the RTWP and argues that it would only agree to the same provisions as those negotiated with Unifor, the bargaining agent for another group of its employees. [ 32 ] Based on its disagreement with [NAME]’s interpretation of section 6.1 of the RTWP, the employer argues that this is not a situation in which it can be said that the employer is deliberately refusing to sign an agreed-upon collective agreement. [ 33 ] In respect of the April 29, 2025, meeting, the employer argues that its representatives made no disparaging comments about the union and that [NAME] did not accuse [NAME] of “sneaking” vacation and sick leave payout into the RTWP. C. [NAME]’s Reply [ 34 ] In its reply, [NAME] submits that the employer has made several inconsistent arguments but has conceded the main point, that is, that it refused to sign the collective agreement, the content of which was agreed to by the parties. [ 35 ] The union submits that the real issue is how the disputed contractual language should be interpreted. It argues that this is a matter for arbitration, not a valid reason to refuse to sign the collective agreement. D. The Employer’s Sur-Reply [ 36 ] The employer argues that it would be futile and self-defeating for it to sign an agreement when all parties know that they are interpreting an important provision differently. According to the employer, forcing a party to sign an agreement, despite a material disagreement between the parties on a particular clause, is contrary to the principles of contract formation and enforcement. [ 37 ] The employer considers that [NAME] wants it to sign an agreement that does not represent a “meeting of the minds” between the parties.

IV. Analysis and Decision [ 38 ] Section 16.1 of the Code provides that the Board may decide any matter before it without holding an oral hearing. Having reviewed all of the material on file, the Board is satisfied that the documentation before it is sufficient for it to determine this complaint without an oral hearing. A. Allegation of Bad Faith Bargaining: Section 50(a) of the Code [ 39 ] In the first part of its complaint, [NAME] seeks a declaration that the employer’s refusal to sign the collective agreement constitutes a violation of section 50(a) of the Code . It also seeks an order directing that the employer sign the collective agreement. [ 40 ] Section 50(a) of the Code sets out obligations to be met after notice to bargain has been given by one of the parties to the bargaining relationship: 50 Where notice to bargain collectively has been given under this Part, (a) the bargaining agent and the employer, without delay, but in any case within twenty days after the notice was given unless the parties otherwise agree, shall (i) meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain collectively in good faith, and (ii) make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement. [ 41 ] The Supreme Court of Canada explained the framework for assessing a complaint of bad faith bargaining under section 50(a) of the Code in Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) , [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369. [ 42 ] Section 3 of the Code defines a “collective agreement” as: “an agreement in writing entered into between an employer and a bargaining agent containing provisions respecting terms and conditions of employment and related matters.” [ 43 ] Once it has been entered into, the collective agreement is binding on the bargaining agent, every employee in the [NAME] and the employer (see section 56 of the Code ). [ 44 ] Pursuant to section 16(p)(vi) of the Code , the Board has the power to decide whether a collective agreement has been entered into, in relation to any proceeding before it. [ 45 ] A collective agreement will be found to exist where there has been a so-called “meeting of the minds” with respect to the contents of the agreement between the parties (see [COMPANY] ., 2005 [NAME] 330, at paragraph 18; and Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, N.B. & P.E.I. Division, Inc. , 2008 [NAME] 404, at paragraph 27). [ 46 ] The Board has held that an official signature is not essential to the existence of a collective agreement under the Code (see [COMPANY] ., 2000 [NAME] 87, at paragraphs 22–23; [COMPANY]. , 2013 [NAME] 699, at paragraphs 30–32; [COMPANY]. , 2006 [NAME] 354, at paragraph 69; and [COMPANY] (1976), 13 di 54; [1976] 1 Can LRBR 314; and 76 CLLC 16,002 (CLRB no. 53)). [ 47 ] In the present case, there can be no doubt that an agreement to renew the collective agreement between the parties was concluded. [ 48 ] Specifically, the Board is satisfied that the MOS entered into between the parties meets all the conditions of a collective agreement, as defined by the Code , and that the MOS ratified by the employees on March 16, 2025, is binding on all parties. [ 49 ] In its recitals, the MOS indicates that the parties have bargained collectively to renew the collective agreement. The MOS stipulates that it constitutes a full settlement of all matters related to the renewal of the collective agreement between the parties, subject to ratification by the [NAME] members. The MOS sets out that the new collective agreement will be in effect from April 1, 2023, to March 31, 2027. It contains all amendments to the collective agreement agreed to by the parties, as well as revised wages and the RTWP. The MOS specifies that all provisions of the prior collective agreement that were not altered by the terms of the MOS would remain and be carried forward into the renewed collective agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the MOS, all matters agreed to between the parties would be effective on the date of ratification, unless otherwise stated. [ 50 ] The MOS was signed by representatives of [NAME] on March 7, 2025. Its Schedules A, B and C were also signed by the parties’ representatives. Specifically, [NAME] signed the RTWP that is found at Schedule C of the MOS, on March 7, 2025. The employer has not claimed that the signatures of the employer representatives are invalid or that it did not sign the MOS. [ 51 ] Subject to its ratification by the [NAME], the MOS contains all the required ingredients to constitute a valid collective agreement within the meaning of the Code . Having been ratified on March 16, 2025, the Board finds that the MOS constitutes a valid and binding collective agreement. [ 52 ] This means that the new collective agreement is effective as per the terms of the MOS. [ 53 ] That said, the Board finds that the employer’s insistence on having the union agree with its interpretation of section 6.1 of the RTWP, or on modifying its contractual terms as a condition of signing the new collective agreement, was intended to put into question the validity of the agreement duly negotiated and signed by the parties. In the Board’s view, such insistence is inconsistent with the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith, pursuant to section 50(a) of the Code . [ 54 ] In the emails that the parties exchanged following ratification, it is apparent that the employer representative required that the union agree with the employer’s interpretation of section 6.1 of the RTWP before the new collective agreement could be signed. The employer representative requested that the language in section 6.1 be corrected “to what was agreed to.” The employer representative even persisted by contending that the language found in the RTWP was never agreed to between the union and the employer. By its position, the employer attempted to negate the MOS signed between the parties. [ 55 ] In the Board’s view, the employer’s actions constitute a reneging on the language found in section 6.1 of the RTWP that was negotiated and signed by the parties and an attempt to convince the union to revise the language in question by threatening to not sign the new collective agreement. The Board finds that these actions constitute a breach of the employer’s obligation to bargain in good faith and are contrary to the Code ’s objective of encouraging the constructive settlement of disputes. [ 56 ] The Board’s predecessor stated the following in [COMPANY]. (Nationair Canada) et al. (1992), 89 di 94 (CLRB no. 960): The Code requires the parties to bargain in good faith and to make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement. In this sense, it does not force them to come to an agreement. However, once an agreement is reached , a party cannot refuse to sign the collective agreement for reasons such as those alleged here, or subject the signing of the agreement to conditions not previously negotiated. (page 121; emphasis added) [ 57 ] In the present case, by insisting that changes be made to the contractual language negotiated in section 6.1 of the RTWP prior to signing the new collective agreement, the employer used a tactic that undermined the collective bargaining process, as an attempt to avoid recognizing the collective agreement. As such, the Board considers that the employer’s conduct falls within the framework of the collective bargaining process, even though it occurred after the MOS was ratified by the employees. [ 58 ] The duty to bargain in good faith imposed by the Code is aimed at preserving the integrity of the collective bargaining process. In this case, the employer’s conduct undermined the integrity of that process. [ 59 ] The Board cannot encourage parties that wish to retract from what they consider unacceptable in their negotiated deals to refuse to sign a new collective agreement as an attempt to defeat its negotiated clauses. [ 60 ] When the employer signed the MOS, it was fully aware of its contents. [ 61 ] The difficulties in the interpretation of contractual clauses already agreed to in the MOS cannot be relied upon as a deliberate attempt to reopen the duly negotiated MOS. [ 62 ] If the employer disagrees with the union’s interpretation in respect of clauses contained in the RTWP, the proper forum to advance its position is at arbitration, in response to the grievances filed by the union on that issue. It is not open to the employer to exert pressure on the union to seek a modification to the duly negotiated contractual clauses found in the signed MOS by threatening to refuse to sign the new collective agreement. [ 63 ] The employer had the option to refuse the contractual language of section 6.1 of the RTWP and to continue bargaining. That is not what it elected to do. As they have signed the MOS, it is clear that a collective agreement is now in effect between the parties. [ 64 ] The Board therefore finds that the MOS, including its RTWP, is a valid collective agreement within the meaning of section 3 of the Code. Once entered into, the employer is not authorized to retract from it by making its signature on the new collective agreement conditional upon the union accepting to change the deal that was agreed to. As such, the employer’s conduct constituted a clear attempt to reopen the collective agreement. Such conduct constitutes a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith. [ 65 ] As remedy, the Board declares that the employer violated section 50(a) of the Code by requiring, as a precondition to signing the new collective agreement, that the union agree to modify section 6.1 of the RTWP or agree to the employer’s interpretation. [ 66 ] Pursuant to sections 16(p)(vi) and 56 of the Code , the Board also declares that the MOS, with all its terms and conditions, constitutes a valid collective agreement that is binding on the union, the employer and every employee in the [NAME]. [ 67 ] Pursuant to its powers under section 99 of the Code , the Board orders that the employer provide a copy of this decision to each employee in the [NAME] and that it post copies in conspicuous locations throughout the workplace. The employer is to confirm to the Board and the union when these steps have been taken. [ 68 ] Given the above finding that the absence of a signature on the new collective agreement does not make it less valid pursuant to the Code , the Board will not issue an order compelling the employer to sign the collective agreement. [ 69 ] In respect of the monetary remedies sought in the complaint, the Board considers that they fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to assess and determine. B. Allegation of Violation of Sections 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code [ 70 ] The second question raised by the complaint is whether the employer violated sections 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code in respect of its communications to employee representatives during the April 29, 2025, meeting. [NAME] alleges that the employer made false statements to [NAME] at that meeting, with the purpose of undermining the bargaining agent and frustrating the collective bargaining process. [ 71 ] Sections 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code state as follows: 94 (1) No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall (a) participate in or interfere with the formation or administration of a [NAME] or the representation of employees by a [NAME]; … … 96 No person shall seek by intimidation or coercion to compel a person to become or refrain from becoming or to cease to be a member of a [NAME]. [ 72 ] When examining employer communications, consideration must also be given to section 94(2)(c) of the Code , which provides that an employer is deemed not to contravene section 94(1)(a) if it only expresses a personal point of view, so long as it does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue influence. [ 73 ] The Board must find a balance between the employer’s right to communicate and the bargaining agent’s role to represent its members free of interference (see [COMPANY] ., 2005 [NAME] 317). [ 74 ] The Board relies on three factors in assessing whether an employer has crossed the line in terms of acceptable direct communications with employees: the labour relations context within which such communications took place, the content of the communications themselves and the consequences that the communications have on the bargaining agent’s authority (see [NAME] , 2001 [NAME] 131; and [NAME] (1996), 101 di 127 (CLRB no. 1167)). [ 75 ] In the present case, the disputed communications occurred in the context of the Step 1 grievance meeting, in the presence of union officials only. Although the union officials are also employees of the [NAME], the communications were not directed to the general population of employees. [ 76 ] The labour relations context within which such communications took place was a grievance meeting held to discuss the parties’ respective positions on the grievances in question, in an attempt to settle them. In such a context, it is not uncommon for parties to frankly and freely express their points of view, to gain a comprehensive understanding of their respective positions. The limitations that the Code imposes on an employer’s direct communications with employees are not aimed at restricting the parties from expressing their perspectives on labour relations issues at grievance procedure meetings. [ 77 ] Regarding the contents of the communications, the evidence does not disclose comments that were coercive, intimidating or threatening or that otherwise exerted undue influence on the employees. In its comments, the employer insinuated that the union had inserted language into the MOS that the parties had not agreed to. Although this is not supported by the evidence — as the employer clearly signed the language found in the MOS after having had the opportunity to refuse it or to negotiate other terms — these comments were directed to employee representatives, in their role as union officials. They were not directed to [NAME] at large. As such, the Board does not see these comments as having exerted undue influence on the employees, particularly in a context where the tentative agreement had already been ratified the month prior. [ 78 ] Finally, the Board does not find that the employer’s comments undermined the union’s ability to represent its members or that they undermined the employees’ trust in [NAME]. [ 79 ] As indicated, when the comments were made on April 29, 2025, the ratification process had already concluded, and the employees had voted in favour of the tentative agreement. The Board recognizes that the parties had experienced a long and difficult strike situation for many months prior to the conclusion of the new collective agreement. However, the union has not demonstrated that the employer’s comments at the Step 1 grievance meeting had the negative consequence of undermining its authority vis-à-vis the [NAME]. [ 80 ] The union refers to the resignation of employees during the strike and following ratification, alleging that the remaining employees had a serious loss of confidence in the union due to the employer’s intransigence. The union asks the Board to direct the employer to offer re-employment to all employees who resigned after March 7, 2025, and to be compensated for the loss of union dues for employees who resigned, for a period of one year. However, no evidence was presented to the Board regarding the precise reasons that led each of these employees to resign from their employment with the employer. In the absence of such evidence, the Board cannot draw a conclusion that these employees resigned because of the comments the employer made to union officials at the Step 1 grievance meeting or because of the position it took regarding the signature of the new collective agreement. [ 81 ] In sum, applying the three factors set out above, the Board does not find that the employer’s comments at the April 29, 2025, meeting interfered with the union or undermined its representational capacity.

Accordingly, the Board finds that the employer did not violate section 94(1)(a) of the Code . [ 82 ] The Board also finds that the employer did not “seek by intimidation or coercion to compel a person to become or refrain from becoming or to cease to be a member of a [NAME]” contrary to section 96 of the Code . No facts have been submitted to support this allegation. [ 83 ] For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the employer did not violate section 94(1)(a) or 96 of the Code .

V. Conclusion [ 84 ] After considering all the submissions and evidence before it, the Board declares that the employer violated section 50(a) of the Code. The Board also declares, p ursuant to sections 16(p)(vi) and 56 of the Code , that the MOS constitutes a valid collective agreement that is binding on the union, the employer and every employee in the [NAME]. [ 85 ] The Board dismisses the part of the complaint alleging violation of sections 94(1)(a) and 96 of the Code . [ 86 ] Pursuant to section 99 of the Code , the Board orders that, within ten days of receipt of this decision, the employer must provide a copy of this decision to each employee in the [NAME] and post copies in conspicuous locations throughout the workplace. The employer must confirm to the Board and the union when these steps have been taken. [ 87 ] This is a unanimous decision of the Board. _______ _____________ [NAME] __________ __________ [NAME] Member ____________________ [NAME] Member