Employer's Denial of Family Status Accommodation Found Discriminatory

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 22 Date: March 16, 2026 File No.: T2644/2021 Between: [NAME] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME] Respondent Decision Member: [NAME] \o "1-3" \h \z \u I. INTRODUCTION PAGEREF _Toc224304294 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390034000000 II.

DECISION PAGEREF _Toc224304295 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390035000000 III. WITNESSES PAGEREF _Toc224304296 \h 3 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390036000000 IV. WITNESS CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY PAGEREF _Toc224304297 \h 4 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390037000000 V. FACTS PAGEREF _Toc224304298 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390038000000 A. Background PAGEREF _Toc224304299 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003200390039000000 B. [NAME]’s family status accommodation process PAGEREF _Toc224304300 \h 7 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300030000000 C. [NAME] requests accommodation PAGEREF _Toc224304301 \h 9 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300031000000 [NAME] denies [NAME]’s accommodation request PAGEREF _Toc224304302 \h 11 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300032000000 [NAME] reaches out to [NAME] to request accommodation PAGEREF _Toc224304303 \h 13 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300033000000 F. [NAME] arranges for [NAME] to approve [NAME]’s accommodation request PAGEREF _Toc224304304 \h 14 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300034000000 G. [NAME] and HR express concern over the approval of [NAME]’s accommodation request PAGEREF _Toc224304305 \h 15 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300035000000 [NAME] investigates [NAME] _Toc224304306 \h 16 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300036000000 I. Medical evidence regarding [NAME] _Toc224304307 \h 19 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300037000000 (i) Diagnoses PAGEREF _Toc224304308 \h 19 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300038000000 (ii) Impact of work-related matters on [NAME]’s mental condition PAGEREF _Toc224304309 \h 21 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300300039000000 VI. ANALYSIS PAGEREF _Toc224304310 \h 22 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310030000000 [NAME] discriminated against [NAME] based on family status PAGEREF _Toc224304311 \h 22 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310031000000 (i) Test for discrimination PAGEREF _Toc224304312 \h 22 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310032000000 (ii) Test for discrimination in family status cases PAGEREF _Toc224304313 \h 24 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310033000000 B. [NAME]’s accommodation request PAGEREF _Toc224304314 \h 24 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310034000000 C. [NAME]’s race was not a factor in [NAME]’s denial of accommodation PAGEREF _Toc224304315 \h 28 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310035000000 [NAME] was granted a modified work schedule after the initial denial PAGEREF _Toc224304316 \h 30 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310036000000 (i) Weekend accommodation PAGEREF _Toc224304317 \h 30 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310037000000 (ii) Late departure time from work PAGEREF _Toc224304318 \h 31 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310038000000 [NAME] was not subject to harassment based on race or family status PAGEREF _Toc224304319 \h 32 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300310039000000 [NAME]’s allegations regarding her first child are unsubstantiated and outside the scope of her complaint PAGEREF _Toc224304320 \h 35 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320030000000 [NAME]’s policies are not discriminatory PAGEREF _Toc224304321 \h 36 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320031000000 VII. REMEDIES PAGEREF _Toc224304322 \h 38 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320032000000 A. Pain and suffering PAGEREF _Toc224304323 \h 39 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320033000000 B. Wage loss PAGEREF _Toc224304324 \h 40 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320034000000 C. Special compensation PAGEREF _Toc224304325 \h 40 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320035000000 D. Expenses PAGEREF _Toc224304326 \h 41 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320036000000 (i) Legal fees PAGEREF _Toc224304327 \h 42 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320037000000 (ii) Childcare expenses PAGEREF _Toc224304328 \h 42 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320038000000 (iii) Medical expenses PAGEREF _Toc224304329 \h 43 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300320039000000 (iv) Union dues PAGEREF _Toc224304330 \h 43 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300330030000000 E. Interest PAGEREF _Toc224304331 \h 44 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300330031000000 F. Training PAGEREF _Toc224304332 \h 44 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300330032000000 VIII.

CONCLUSION AND

ORDER PAGEREF _Toc224304333 \h 45 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F0054006F0063003200320034003300300034003300330033000000 I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] [NAME] (the “Complainant”), a single mother of two who identifies as Black, alleges that [NAME] (“[NAME]”) treated her in an adverse differential manner on the basis of race and family status contrary to sections 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA). Specifically, [NAME] says that [NAME] denied her a modified work schedule compatible with her childcare obligations. [NAME] also says that once modified hours were provided to her, [NAME] management retaliated against her by engaging in race and family status related harassment. This includes conspiring to wrongfully accuse her of criminal activity and fabricating documents to implicate her in wrongdoing. [ 2 ] The Tribunal held an 18-day hearing between February 2024 and February 2025 into [NAME]’s allegations. Written closing submissions were completed in October 2025. The Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) participated at the hearing.

II.

DECISION [ 3 ] [NAME]’s complaint is allowed, in part. [ 4 ] [NAME] initially denied [NAME] a modified work schedule for childcare purposes in May 2017. It later granted the accommodation in June 2017. I find that [NAME]’s initial denial of the accommodation request constitutes discrimination on the basis of family status contrary to section 7 of the CHRA and award remedies accordingly. [ 5 ] The remainder of the complaint is dismissed. This includes a dismissal of [NAME]’s allegation that [NAME] engaged in race-based discrimination when it initially denied her request for a modified work schedule, and a dismissal of [NAME]’s allegation of harassment related to her race and family status.

III. WITNESSES [ 6 ] Seven witnesses testified at the hearing. [NAME] testified on her own behalf and called no witnesses. [ 7 ] [NAME] called the following six following: · [NAME], a psychiatrist who was retained by [NAME] as an independent medical expert. He examined [NAME] twice (in 2021 and 2022) and provided two expert reports which were entered into evidence; · [NAME], who is employed in [NAME]’s human resources (HR) department and held the position of human resources manager in 2017; · [NAME], a senior consultant in [COMPANY]; · [NAME], an investigator with [NAME]; · [NAME], a team leader at [NAME] in the Household Loyalty Team; and · [NAME], a senior manager at [NAME] in the Consumer Loyalty Team.

IV. WITNESS CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY [ 8 ] The Tribunal must assess the credibility and reliability of each witness and make findings of fact based on these assessments. It is well established that a trier of fact is entitled to accept all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony (see R. v. Francois , [1994] 2 SCR 827 at 837) - they are not required to adopt an “all-or-nothing” approach to the evidence (see R. v. Le , [2019] 2 SCR 692 at para 266). [ 9 ] When assessing the credibility and reliability of witnesses, I have considered [NAME] v. [NAME] , 1951 CanLII 252 (BCCA), in which Justice O'Halloran stated as follows: …Opportunities for knowledge, powers of observation, judgment and memory, ability to describe clearly what he has seen and heard, as well as other factors combine to produce what is called credibility. The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanor of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of the witness in such a case must be in harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions (…) Again a witness may testify to what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may honestly be mistaken. (pg. 356-357) [ 10 ] I have also considered R. v. Morrissey , 1995 CanLII 3498 (ONCA), in which Justice Doherty stated as follows: Testimonial evidence can raise veracity and accuracy concerns. The former relates to the witness’s sincerity, that is his or her willingness to speak the truth as the witness believes it to be. The latter concerns relate to the actual accuracy of the witness’s testimony. The accuracy of a witness’s testimony involves considerations of the witness’s ability to accurately observe, recall and recount the events in issue. When one is concerned with a witness’s veracity, one speaks of the witness’s credibility. When one is concerned with the accuracy of a witness’s testimony, one speaks of the reliability of that testimony. Obviously a witness whose evidence on a point is not credible cannot give reliable evidence on that point. The evidence of a credible, that is honest witness, may, however, still be unreliable (p. 205). [ 11 ] On considering the factors set out above, I found the witnesses called on [NAME]’s behalf to be credible and reliable. Their evidence was reasonable, believable, and internally consistent. Their evidence was also consistent with contemporaneous records and harmonious with each other’s evidence. [NAME]’s witnesses also candidly conceded facts not necessarily helpful to [NAME] ’s position. [ 12 ] [NAME], however, did not present as a reliable witness. Her evidence was often contradicted by contemporaneous records. When this was pointed out to her, she often alleged that the records had been forged or altered by [NAME], of which there was no supporting evidence. [ 13 ] [NAME] also tended to exaggerate, contradict herself, advance unsubstantiated and irrelevant positions, engage in frequent distraught behaviours and outbursts, and unnecessarily and excessively attack the integrity of [NAME]’s witnesses and counsel. I provided wide latitude for [NAME], as a self-represented litigant, to put forth her case and gave her ample opportunity to cross-examine each of [NAME]’s witnesses, despite her inappropriate conduct. This was done to ensure she had a meaningful opportunity to be heard, although it resulted in the hearing being unnecessarily protracted. [ 14 ] [NAME]’s improper conduct continued into written closing submissions. Her closing submissions comprised over 1,600 pages, most of which were wholly irrelevant and inflammatory. She referred, without justification, to doctors who assessed her during her disability leave as “[NAME]’s racist Nazi doctors,” referred to [NAME]’s managers as “white supremacists,” said [NAME] treated her as a “Negro slave,” referred to the [NAME] organization as a “powerful white supremacy” organization that can “get away with anything,” referred to her doctors’ assessments as “medical apartheid” and a “public lynching,” called [NAME]’s witnesses “racists and liars,” called [NAME]’s counsel “lying lawyer [NAME],” accused doctors of trying to “kill” her, and accused [NAME] of “fraud” and “fabricating documents.” [ 15 ] [NAME], a psychiatrist tendered by [NAME] as an expert witness, testified that [NAME]’s diagnoses include paranoid delusional disorder. He wrote in his report that “her delusions are paranoid and centered on her workplace. There is no doubt she is psychotic… These delusions are all encompassing and likely affect her ability to assess reality when it comes to transacting with the world.” [ 16 ] As explained below, I accept [NAME]’s evidence as it is consistent with contemporaneous medical records. [NAME]’s paranoia was apparent throughout the hearing as she advanced meritless allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and retaliation. The evidence suggests that [NAME] was inclined to make assertions disconnected from reality which require treating her testimony with a degree of caution and skepticism. [ 17 ] On considering the above, and unless indicated otherwise, where there was a material inconsistency between [NAME]’s testimony and the testimony of [NAME]’s witnesses that could not be resolved through contemporaneous records, I preferred the evidence of [NAME]’s witnesses.

V. FACTS A. Background [ 18 ] [NAME] was first hired by [NAME] in October 2008 as a temporary employee before becoming a permanent employee in 2010. She has two children — a son born in 2002 and a daughter born in 2015. [ 19 ] As of 2013, and until she went on disability leave in December 2017, [NAME] worked as a Direct Marketing Associate (Consumer Market) in Toronto, Ontario, at [NAME]’s Eglington location. In this role, [NAME]’s tasks included handling calls from customers who wished to disconnect from various [NAME] services in order to propose solutions and resolve customer issues. [ 20 ] As a permanent employee, [NAME] is a member of Unifor Local 6007 (the “Union”) and is subject to the [NAME] collective agreement (the “Collective Agreement”). [ 21 ] [NAME] reported to [NAME] who in turn reported to [NAME]. [ 22 ] [NAME] had part-time status with [NAME], the records show that she worked full-time hours. Prior to the accommodation of her work schedule, [NAME]’s normal weekday schedule was from about 12 p.m. to 8 p.m., five days per week. This was subject to changes arising from the operational needs of her team in accordance with the Collective Agreement. In addition, [NAME] also worked the weekend shift from 9 [NAME]. to 5 p.m., which was the only shift available during weekends. B. [NAME]’s family status accommodation process [ 23 ] [NAME]’s HR manager, testified about [NAME]’s accommodation process. She stated that all employees have access to [NAME]’s policy relating to human rights accommodation (the “Policy”). The Policy is available through [NAME], which is [NAME]’s intranet portal for employees. She stated that a search on [NAME] using key words such as “human rights” would direct employees to the Policy. [ 24 ] On my review of the Policy, I note that it contains specific sections for different types of accommodations, including family status accommodation, where employees are guided through a step-by-step process to request an accommodation. [ 25 ] When accessing the family status accommodation section of the Policy, employees are notified that they may be entitled to an accommodation due to family-related obligations which prevent them from meeting their work duties. Employees who want to request a family status accommodation are provided a link to the relevant forms on [NAME]. [ 26 ] The section on family status accommodation on [NAME] references the four-part legal test established by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME] 2014 FCA 110 [ [NAME] ] (discussed further below) and states the following: Family accommodation If you have a substantial family-related obligation which prevents you from meeting your duties, you can request a family status accommodation. To meet the threshold of a substantial family-related obligation, you must demonstrate: · The child/dependant is under your care and supervision; · The child/dependant obligation is your legal responsibility, as opposed to a personal choice; · You have made reasonable efforts to meet and balance your family and workplace obligations through reasonable alternative solutions, and no alternate solution is readily accessible; and · Your workplace requirement interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. [ 27 ] [NAME] testified that, in 2017, when employees clicked on the link in that section, they would be redirected to the Policy and the family status accommodation form that they were required to fill out. [ 28 ] In addition, [NAME] testified that the [NAME] of Business Conduct (the “Code”) contains sections dealing with “Discrimination and Harassment” and with “Reasonable Accommodation.” The latter section directs employees who want to make an accommodation request towards the Policy on [NAME]. [ 29 ] [NAME] testified that all [NAME] employees are required to review the Code annually and confirm that they have read it by signing it. In [NAME]’s case, she signed the Code in October 2016, a few months prior to her accommodation request in May 2017. [ 30 ] [NAME] testified about the family status accommodation process at [NAME]. First, the employee completes the accommodation form and submits it to their team leader, who then forwards it to the appropriate HR consultant. Alternatively, the employee may elect to send the form directly to HR themselves. [ 31 ] The HR consultant reviews the form with a Workplace Practices team member to determine whether additional information is required. If so, the HR consultant goes back to the employee that requested the accommodation or to their team leader to indicate which additional information will be required to better evaluate the request for family status accommodation. Once the necessary information is obtained, the HR consultant and the Workplace Practices team member evaluate the request to determine if the accommodation will be granted. C. [NAME] requests accommodation [ 32 ] In May 2017, [NAME] submitted a request for family status accommodation to [NAME]. She emailed [NAME] on May 10, 2017 to request an accommodation for a modified weekday work schedule because of childcare obligations. She informed [NAME] of the following in her email: · It took [NAME] about two hours to drive home after work depending on traffic, due to a recent move; · [NAME]’s weekday shift ended around 8 p.m. She required a modified schedule that ended by 4 p.m. so she would have enough time to pick up her daughter from the daycare which closed at 6 p.m.; · The father of [NAME]’s daughter used to pick her up from daycare but has since left the family. He no longer provides financial or other support and [NAME] is now responsible for all expenses as a single mother; · [NAME] was forced to pay for a babysitter to pick up her daughter and to care for her until [NAME] returned from work. However, she could no longer afford to do this as she was “financially bankrupt”; · [NAME]’s daughter, who was only one year old at the time, was frequently getting sick and the babysitter could not provide proper care to an ill child; · [NAME] came home from work as late as 10 p.m. and did not have enough time to care for her daughter; and · [NAME] suffered from “post-partum depression” from “always being at work and never seeing [her] family.” [ 33 ] On May 12, 2017, [NAME] provided [NAME] with a family status accommodation form which [NAME] completed and submitted back to [NAME] on May 15, 2017. [ 34 ] The form noted that an employee requesting family status accommodation must demonstrate that: · a child or dependent is under their care and supervision; · the childcare obligation engages the individual’s legal responsibility, as opposed to a personal choice; · the employee has made reasonable efforts to meet and balance their family and workplace obligations through reasonable alternate solutions, and no alternate solution is readily accessible; and · the workplace requirement interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. [ 35 ] There were six questions on the form which reflected the above-noted considerations. In response to the questions, [NAME] wrote that: · she is a single mother and that the father of the child walked out on the family and no longer provided any financial or other support; · she was unable pick her child up from daycare, which closed at 6 p.m., based on her then-current schedule; · she was unable to find a babysitter on a consistent basis and also could not afford a babysitter because she is solely responsible for all financial obligations for her family and was in “dire poverty”; · her inability to see her daughter due to her work schedule caused her daughter to become frequently ill and the doctor recommended that she be home with her daughter more; · the situation was taking a toll on her mental and physical health; · she required a modified work schedule that ended at 4 p.m. so she would have sufficient time to pick her daughter up by 6 p.m.; · she was fined one dollar per minute if her daughter was not picked up by 6 p.m., and if she was not picked up by 6:30 p.m., the daycare would call child services, which put her at risk of losing her child; and · she had documentation to prove that her daughter was enrolled in a daycare that closed at 6 p.m. and could also obtain a doctor’s note regarding her daughter’s illnesses. [ 36 ] On May 15, 2017, [NAME] forwarded the completed form to [NAME]. [NAME] denies [NAME]’s accommodation request [ 37 ] [NAME] testified that she received the form and the email exchanges between [NAME] and [NAME] on May 15, 2017. After receiving the form, [NAME] discussed the matter with a Workplace Practices team member. They determined that they required additional information from [NAME]. The additional questions were provided to [NAME] who then communicated them to [NAME] by email. They included the following questions: · What is the situation with the father: is he helping to pay for childcare? Can he pay his part for babysitters and daycare? · Have you contacted [NAME] [[NAME]’s internal employee and family assistance program] about your situation? If so, what did they advise you to do? If not, can you please call them for discussion and let us know what they say? · Are there other alternatives to help support you - mother, father, friend, etc.? [ 38 ] [NAME] testified that the purpose of these questions was to better understand [NAME]’s situation to determine if [NAME] had an obligation to accommodate. While the questions may vary, [NAME] stated that follow-up questions are almost always asked in the accommodation process. [ 39 ] In response to the questions, [NAME] repeated details she previously provided, and wrote that: · her child’s father was no longer in the picture and did not provide any financial support; · she was paying for all expenses on her own, including rent and daycare costs, and could not afford a babysitter to pick her daughter up from daycare and care for her until she arrived home; · she had no friends or family living in the area that could fulfill her childcare obligations; · her daughter continued to get sick because [NAME] did not have time to care for her due to her shift schedule; · her doctor stated she needed to spend more time caring for her daughter to address her daughter’s illnesses; and · she contacted the helpline but they could not provide assistance - their advice was for her to contact her manager and HR to seek accommodation. [ 40 ] On May 17, 2017, [NAME] informed [NAME] by email that, after consulting with the Workplace Practices team member, [NAME]’s request for accommodation was denied. [NAME] asked [NAME] to propose some other options to [NAME] and wrote: “we would not accommodate her schedule but when meeting with her, we need to still show that we are open to help her in other ways.” The options included finding another job at [NAME], contacting [NAME] for legal and financial aid, and suggesting that [NAME] use “shift swap, [vacation] days, personal days” when her kids were sick. [ 41 ] [NAME] emailed these options to [NAME], who wrote back and noted that she had already considered and exhausted them. [NAME] sent an email to [NAME] on May 18, 2017, asking whether [NAME] had a chance to receive accommodation if she could prove she exhausted all her options since “[[NAME]’s] worry now is [[NAME]] is just going to end up going out on sick leave.” In the email, [NAME] noted that it felt like [NAME] was “blaming the company.” [ 42 ] On May 19, 2017, [NAME] wrote to [NAME], stating: “I also get the same impression as you, that she is blaming the company more than taking ownership of the problem.” [NAME] stated that [NAME] had “not supplied any proof for anything she stated and if she does [[NAME]] could reevaluate but there are no guarantees [[NAME]] will accommodate.” In her testimony, [NAME] confirmed that she did not request any additional proof from [NAME] and simply left it to her to provide additional documents and information of her own volition. [ 43 ] [NAME] testified that for the purposes of family status accommodation, an employee having access to a babysitter is considered a reasonable alternative, and financial obligation is generally not a criterion considered by [NAME] in family status accommodation requests. [NAME] reaches out to [NAME] to request accommodation [ 44 ] [NAME] testified that the denial of her accommodation request affected her mental health and she had a breakdown at the office. Shortly after the denial, [NAME], the Director of the Loyalty and Retention group at [NAME], visited from Montr é al, Quebec, to award top performers at an “All-Star” meeting. The top performers included [NAME], who testified that she was avoiding the award ceremony and was “walking around crying.” She stated she did not want an award but rather wanted to fulfill her obligations to her children. [ 45 ] [NAME] employees found [NAME] and brought her to the ceremony. [NAME] testified that [NAME] noticed that she was upset and asked why. [NAME] took this opportunity to explain the situation and asked [NAME] to accommodate her because she was a top-performing employee. [NAME] stated that [NAME] told her not to worry and that she was going to make sure her top performers were accommodated. [ 46 ] [NAME] subsequently wrote an email to [NAME] on May 31, 2017, to request accommodation. She reiterated the information she previously provided to [NAME] and wrote “help me please and hear me out when I beg.” [NAME] requested that [NAME] “consider [her] situation as a single mom with a sick child for special accommodation.” She promised she would “go harder at work than ever before” and “will surely make more positive impacts for our entire center as a whole.” She explained that her weekday “7-8 [p.m.] shift hour end times” made her “unable to pick up my baby from Daycare (which closes at 6 [p.m.])” and requested “special accommodation 8 [[NAME].]-4 [p.m.] shift hours.” F. [NAME] arranges for [NAME] to approve [NAME]’s accommodation request [ 47 ] [NAME] inquired with [NAME], a senior HR consultant at [NAME], about [NAME]’s accommodation request. [NAME] asked [NAME] to respond to [NAME]. [NAME] informed [NAME] that she understood that [NAME] had a babysitter in place to pick her child up from daycare.

Accordingly, because the basis of [NAME]’s request was financial, [NAME] was not obligated to accommodate her. [ 48 ] On June 16, 2017, [NAME] informed [NAME] that [NAME]’s request for accommodation was to be approved for the next three months, and that it could subsequently be reviewed based on the steps [NAME] had taken to help herself. [NAME] informed [NAME] of [NAME]’s decision and asked her to inform [NAME]. [ 49 ] [NAME] testified that [NAME]’s new accommodated schedule consisted of 8 [NAME]. to 4 p.m. weekday shifts from Monday to Friday. She also stated that [NAME]’s accommodation was extended after the initial three-month period and ultimately continued until she went on disability leave in December 2017. G. [NAME] and HR express concern over the approval of [NAME]’s accommodation request [ 50 ] In response to [NAME] approving [NAME]’s accommodation request, [NAME] stated in internal email exchanges that HR did not recommend accommodation for her and that [NAME] has a well-established process that defines the accommodation requests. She noted that [NAME]’s Eglington location had about 12 to 14 accommodation requests, most of which had been or would be denied. On June 19, 2017, [NAME], Vice-President of the Loyalty Team, notified [NAME], and [NAME] by email that he approved “taking the very small risk with [[NAME]’s] case for the 3-month accommodation.” [ 51 ] Additionally, when informing [NAME] about [NAME]’s decision, [NAME] explained in an email that despite being given the reasons as to why [NAME]’s accommodation was denied, [NAME] “would still like to accommodate the employee.” [NAME] notified [NAME] that at the All-Star awards, [NAME] indicated that she wanted to do things to protect their top performers. [NAME] stated: “it may make our jobs harder [because] [people] think they can just go to [[NAME]] now to get approval.” [ 52 ] [NAME] testified that HR did not support [NAME]’s decision to accommodate [NAME], and that “what happened in this case should not have happened.” [NAME] testified that she would make the same denial decision on [NAME]’s accommodation request again if presented with the same facts. [NAME] investigates [NAME] [ 53 ] On June 20, 2017, [NAME], a team leader at [NAME], received an email alert from a [NAME] case manager requesting additional coaching for one of the agents on her team (referred to as “[NAME].”). This was due to a customer complaint against [NAME]. The email stated: Hello, [[NAME].] has CANCELLED a Local Migration order…Residential orders are not to be cancelled without calling BRS… OR using the BLUE PRINT/SBM DIGITEK… The remarks clearly state ***DO NOT CANCEL THIS

ORDER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES***. We would appreciate that the appropriate steps be taken to address this in the future. [ 54 ] That same day, [NAME] forwarded the email to [NAME]. and wrote: “Please see coaching feedback below.” Later that day, [NAME]. emailed [NAME] and stated: “…This is not my customer, and I have not spoken to this customer. If you see interaction this customer was spoken to by [NAME], bccs.cd6040408, yesterday.” [NAME] testified that “bccs.cd6040408” was [NAME]’s employee identification number. [ 55 ] The matter was referred to [NAME] and [NAME] investigated it. [NAME] provided a chronology of events in his contemporaneous investigation report which was entered into evidence. The chronology included the following entries: · June 21, 2017: “[NAME] [Local Management] held a conference call and advised that employee [NAME] [misspelled throughout] used a fellow employee ID # in the [NAME] Application for a deactivation call she handled. [NAME] advised that by her doing this it lowers her deactivation KPI which in turn increases her monthly bonus. In return, the employee whose ID was used would have his monthly KPI increased and bonus decreased. [NAME] [Corporate Security] requested that they review all [NAME] calls for the past few weeks to see if there are any other incidents where [NAME] used another employees ID for deactivations. [NAME] requested screen shots of the incident in question.” · June 26, 2017: “[NAME] provided a breakdown of two incidents were [NAME] used another employee’s ID to process deactivations…” · July 5, 2017: “[NAME] was advised by [NAME] of a policy breach involving [NAME] advised that [NAME] would handle that concern. [NAME] requested [NAME] conduct a further review on all [NAME] calls.” · July 17, 2017: “[NAME] requested a few of all of [NAME]’s calls back to March of 2017 to see how many more incidents where she used someone else ID to process deactivations. [NAME] also requested what the impact would have been to [NAME] and bonus if this was processed the correct way. [NAME] advised that an employee reported that [NAME] approached them to process a deactivation in BCRIS under [NAME] number.” · August 24, 2017: “[NAME] provided an update of which accounts they were able to review and which ones they were not able to confirm…They also advised there could have been a loss to [NAME] and bonus. [NAME] advised that we required the information, as if there was no loss to the corporation due to this then [NAME] should be handling the conversation…” · September 7, 2017: “…[NAME] advised that they have spent a lot of time on this, and if there was any loss to the corporate it would be minimal, so they would proceed with the recommendation from [NAME] and deal with the incidents at an operational level…Investigation referred to Local Management.” [ 56 ] Testimony from [NAME], and [NAME] was consistent with the information contemporaneously recorded by [NAME], and included the following evidence: · Employees, including [NAME], are trained and made aware of the importance of [NAME]’s “Blueprint” process to handle customer calls; · An investigation was triggered in June 2017 when a customer made a complaint regarding a call which was attributed to [NAME]. The complaint was received directly by [NAME]; · [NAME] testified that she had no connection to or involvement with [NAME]’s accommodation request; · When [NAME] received notice of the complaint, she contacted [NAME]. who notified her that he had not been involved in the call and that [NAME] had been. The discrepancy revealed that [NAME] used [NAME].’s employee ID to process a deactivation call which was a violation of the Blueprint process. Corporate Security was contacted, and an investigation was initiated by [NAME]; · Ultimately, [NAME] management determined that the reported incidents had limited financial impact, and that the situation did not warrant investigation by Corporate Security. The matter was referred to [NAME] management, who proceeded to review some of [NAME]’s calls as a matter of quality control. [NAME] was notified of this; · [NAME]’s direct supervisor, conducted a review of her call history and identified other instances where the Blueprint process had not been followed between June and August 2017, resulting in call avoidance.

Accordingly, a written warning was issued to [NAME] in October 2017; · [NAME] testified that it is standard practice for [NAME] to issue written warnings to employees who fail to adhere to company procedures; and · The warning letter dated October 17, 2017, stated the following: This letter serves as a warning for failing to follow company directives between June 9, 2017 and August 30, 2017. Specifically, you failed to follow the Blueprint process and therefore avoided calls resulting in deactivation avoidance. As previously communicated, this type of behaviour is inconsistent with your obligations as an employee of [NAME] and the expectations for someone in your role. As an Employee of [NAME] you are expected to demonstrate a consistently high standard of professionalism. I need your assurance that you will demonstrate immediate and sustained improvement in your behaviour in order to meet the standards that are required for your position. Any new recurrence of reprehensible behaviour will result in additional disciplinary measures up to and including termination of your employment. I continue to offer my support and I am confident that you understand and will be able to meet our expectations going forward. Sincerely, [NAME], Team Leader Residential Loyalty · The warning letter was removed from [NAME]’s disciplinary file two years later, pursuant to the terms of the Collective Agreement. No additional disciplinary action was taken against [NAME]. [ 57 ] [NAME] testified that the investigation was baseless and fraudulent, that it was in retaliation for her bypassing management’s authority and obtaining accommodation approval from [NAME], and that it was initiated to harass her because she is Black. [ 58 ] [NAME] filed four grievances through the Union regarding [NAME]’s investigation, its warning letter, and the alleged harassment by its management. In July 2018, the Union notified [NAME] that it would not be proceeding with her grievances. [ 59 ] In June 2019, [NAME] filed a complaint with the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the CIRB) against the Union. In the complaint, she alleged that the Union acted in a discriminatory and bad faith manner for not addressing her grievances. The CIRB dismissed her complaint in April 2020 (2020 CIRB LD 4316).

I. Medical evidence regarding [NAME] (i) Diagnoses [ 60 ] [NAME] went on disability leave in December 2017 and continues to be on disability leave. She has not returned to work at [NAME] (or anyplace else) since then. [ 61 ] [NAME] conducted an independent medical examination (IME) of [NAME] on May 23, 2018, for [NAME]’s disability management provider. [ 62 ] In his report dated May 29, 2018, [NAME] noted a history of three motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) on September 26, 2016, July 29, 2017, and April 3, 2018. He stated the most significant was the one on April 3, 2018, which involved a “hit and run” as a result of which [NAME] “may have sustained a TBI [traumatic brain injury].” [ 63 ] [NAME] noted that [NAME] believed that “[NAME] is sending cars to hit her” and that she believed “a [NAME] van was involved in the pedestrians who were run over on [ADDRESS] recently.” [NAME] noted that [NAME] exhibited paranoia and may suffer from bipolar disorder. He stated that [NAME] was completely disabled from any type of work. [ 64 ] In a psychological assessment report dated May 30, 2018, [NAME] noted that, based on clinical interview and psychometric testing, [NAME] suffered from significant psychological impairment resulting from the motor vehicle accident of April 2018. The following is noted in his report: Both her clinical interview and her psychometric testing indicated significant psychological impairment that resulted from the abovementioned motor vehicle accident. Specifically, [NAME]’s interpersonal, psychological and occupational functions have been compromised. [ 65 ] [NAME] conducted an IME for [NAME] on January 19, 2021, and March 7, 2022, and prepared reports dated January 22, 2021, and March 11, 2022. [NAME] also testified at the hearing. [ 66 ] [NAME] noted in his January 22, 2021, report that: “[w]hen asked about the clinical history and causes for her being away from work… [h]er theme was that everything that happened, including the MVAs that she was in, was all related to [NAME] and her former manager trying to destroy her. She voiced a specific paranoid delusion about these accidents.” [NAME]’s diagnoses included paranoid personality disorder, and he recommended that [NAME] be treated with antipsychotic medication, rather than antidepressants. He noted that [NAME] was disabled from doing any occupation and it was her severe mental illness that was affecting her capacity to work. [ 67 ] In his report dated March 11, 2022, [NAME] stated that “[NAME] is clearly delusional. Her delusions are paranoid and centered on her workplace. There is no doubt she is psychotic… I would entertain the following differential diagnosis: Bipolar Disorder with a current Mixed State and Paranoid Delusions or Paranoid Delusional Disorder.” [NAME] again noted that [NAME] was totally disabled from any occupation. [ 68 ] When asked whether [NAME]’s medical condition was related to work-related matters, her three MVAs, or a fire at her neighbor’s house which was a source of stress for her, [NAME] reported that these “psychosocial situations would not be the cause of her current condition, but the psychological stress caused by them would worsen the symptoms of her mental illness.” [ 69 ] [NAME] also noted that [NAME]’s “perception of her employer is caused by her current mental illness that is currently causing her to have paranoid delusions centered on her employer’s treatment of her.” [NAME]’s conclusion on prognosis was that “…in the short and near terms it is very poor. [NAME] is suffering with a psychotic mental illness that is causing her to have paranoid delusions entering around her employer, [NAME]. These delusions are all encompassing and likely affect her ability to assess reality when it comes to transacting with the world. She has no insight into her illness, does not see herself as sick and is therefore unlikely to engage in active treatment and particularly antipsychotic medication”. (ii) Impact of work-related matters on [NAME]’s mental condition [ 70 ] As noted above, the medical evidence indicates that [NAME]’s mental condition was not caused by work-related matters. To the extent that any work-related matter may have exacerbated [NAME]’s mental condition prior to her disability leave in December 2017, the medical evidence indicates that it was [NAME]’s investigation of her. The evidence includes the following: · [NAME], a general practitioner, first saw [NAME] on December 14, 2017, and on numerous occasions since then. In his medical report dated February 15, 2018 to [NAME], he noted that [NAME]’s psychological disorder was precipitated by “accusations against her at her workplace”; · In [NAME]’s report dated July 11, 2019, he noted that “[w]hen I saw her in December 2017, she was enraged. She said that her employers accused her of criminal activity in September 2017 and that she had been so harassed by her supervisor she was forced to take “stress leave” on November 30, [2017]”; and · In [NAME]’s report dated May 29, 2018, he noted that “[NAME] stated that her problems occurred when she was wrongfully accused at work.” VI. ANALYSIS [NAME] discriminated against [NAME] based on family status (i) Test for discrimination [ 71 ] [NAME] alleges that [NAME] discriminated against her during her employment on the prohibited grounds of family status and race. Specifically, she brings her complaint under sections 7 and 10 of the CHRA. [ 72 ] Section 7 states: It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, (a) to refuse to employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee on a prohibited ground of discrimination. [ 73 ] Section 10 states: It is a discriminatory practice for an employer, [NAME] or [NAME] (a) to establish or pursue a policy or practice, or (b) to enter into an agreement affecting recruitment, referral, hiring, promotion, training, apprenticeship, transfer or any other matter relating to employment or prospective employment, that tends to deprive an individual or class of individuals of any employment opportunities on a prohibited ground of discrimination. [ 74 ] Prohibited grounds of discrimination include family status and race, national or ethnic origin, and colour (see section 3(1) of the CHRA). [ 75 ] The Tribunal must use a two-step approach when adjudicating human rights complaints (see Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse v. [COMPANY]. ([COMPANY]) , 2015 SCC 39 at paras 34 – 38 [ [COMPANY] ]). [ 76 ] At the first step, [NAME] must prove on a balance of probabilities that she has a characteristic protected from discrimination under the CHRA, that she experienced an adverse impact in her employment, and that her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact (see [NAME] v. [NAME] (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para 33; and [COMPANY] at paras 44–52). [ 77 ] This is referred to as the prima facie case for discrimination. To assess whether the prima facie case has been proven, the Tribunal must consider all the evidence, including the evidence presented by [NAME] to refute [NAME]’s allegations (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2019 CHRT 22 at para 64; and [COMPANY] at paras 58 – 59). [ 78 ] If a prima facie case is established, then, at the second step, [NAME] can put forward a defense to justify the discriminatory practice on the basis of the exemptions provided in the CHRA or in the jurisprudence (see [COMPANY] at para 37). For instance, it will not be considered a discriminatory practice if [NAME] proves that there is a bona fide occupational requirement for its actions (see section 15(1)(a) of the CHRA). [ 79 ] If [NAME] does not establish a justification, proof of the prima facie elements of discrimination on a balance of probabilities will be sufficient to conclude that [NAME] engaged in a discriminatory practice (see [COMPANY] at para 64). [ 80 ] Further, a protected characteristic need only be one factor in the adverse treatment, and not necessarily a significant or only factor (see [NAME] v. [NAME] ., 2017 SCC 30 at para 46). In addition, discrimination does not require intent - rather, the focus is on the effect of a respondent’s actions on the complainant (see Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at para 18). [ 81 ] As this Tribunal and the courts have recognized, it is difficult to prove allegations of discrimination by way of direct evidence. As stated by the Tribunal in Basi v. Canadian National Railway , (1988) 9 CHRR D/5029 at D/5038 [ [NAME] ]: “discrimination is not a practice which one would expect to see displayed overtly, in fact, there are rarely cases where one can show by direct evidence that discrimination is purposely practiced.” Therefore, the Tribunal must consider all the circumstantial evidence to determine what was described in [NAME] as the “subtle scent of discrimination.” [ 82 ] However, it is not enough that circumstantial evidence is simply consistent with an inference of discrimination. An inference of discrimination may only be drawn “where the evidence offered in support of it renders such an inference more probable than the other possible inferences or hypotheses” (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2008 CHRT 41 at para 73). (ii) Test for discrimination in family status cases [ 83 ] Childcare obligations fall within the scope of family status as set out in the CHRA. This flows from the legal relationship between a parent and a child and the parent’s legal responsibility to the child. In other words: “a parent cannot leave a young child without supervision at home in order to pursue his or her work, since this would constitute a form of neglect, which in extreme examples could even engage subsection 215(1) of the Criminal Code ” (see [NAME] at paras 70 – 71). [ 84 ] The Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] identified the factors applicable to the test for prima facie discrimination in family status cases arising from childcare obligations, as follows: 93. … in order to make out a prima facie case where workplace discrimination on the prohibited ground of family status resulting from childcare obligations is alleged, the individual advancing the claim must show (i) that a child is under his or her care and supervisions; (ii) that the childcare obligation at issue engages the individual’s legal responsibility for that child, as opposed to a personal choice; (iii) that he or she has made reasonable efforts to meet those childcare obligations through reasonable alternative solutions, and that no such alternative solution is reasonably accessible, and (iv) that the impugned workplace rule interferes in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial with the fulfillment of the childcare obligation. B. [NAME]’s accommodation request [ 85 ] [NAME] concedes that [NAME] satisfies the first two elements of the [NAME] test. There is no dispute that she has a child under her care and that the childcare obligation at issue engages her legal responsibility for that child, as opposed to a personal choice. [NAME] also does not dispute that the fourth element is satisfied, as [NAME]’s shift schedule clearly interfered with her obligation to pick up her child from daycare in a manner that was more than trivial. [ 86 ] The issue before the Tribunal is whether [NAME] satisfies the third element - that is, whether she adequately explored reasonable alternatives for her childcare issue. [ 87 ] [NAME] testified that [NAME] denied [NAME]’s accommodation request on the basis that she had a reasonable alternative solution — namely access to a babysitter. [NAME] stated that since [NAME]’s inability to employ a babysitter was financially related, [NAME] was not obligated to accommodate her. [NAME] also stated that [NAME] did not identify reasonable efforts to secure other childcare options and did not provide sufficient proof for her accommodation request. [ 88 ] [NAME] has a duty to disclose sufficient information to [NAME] to enable it to fulfill its duty to accommodate (see Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. [NAME] , [1992] 2 SCR 970 [ [NAME] ]). The question of what information may be deemed sufficient for a complainant to establish their need for accommodation is a fact-specific determination. While an employer must have enough information to understand the extent of the need for accommodation, this does not require the full disclosure of every fact (see Air Canada v. [NAME] , 2024 FC 1639 at para. 65). [ 89 ] In this case, I find that [NAME] provided sufficient information to allow [NAME] to engage in the accommodation process. As set out in her emails to [NAME] and in her completed accommodation form: i. [NAME] explained the reason for the request: · It took her about two hours to drive home after work depending on traffic, due to a recent move; and · Her shift ended around 8 p.m. She required a modified schedule that ended by 4 p.m. so she could pick up her daughter on time from the daycare which closed at 6 p.m. ii. [NAME] explained the problem if she did not arrive to the daycare on time: · She would be fined one dollar per minute by the daycare if her daughter was not picked up by 6 p.m., and if she was not picked up by 6:30 p.m., the daycare would call child services, which put [NAME] at risk of losing her child. iii. [NAME] explained why a babysitter was not a reasonable option to pick up her child from daycare: · She was unable to find a babysitter on a consistent basis; · She could no longer afford to hire a babysitter as she was in “dire poverty.” This was because she had to assume all family expenses since the father of her child left the family and no longer provided financial or other support; · Her child was only one year old at the time and was frequently getting sick. [NAME] arrived home from work as late as 10 p.m. because of the long drive from work. She did not have enough time to care for her child with her then-current shift schedule, and the babysitter could not provide proper care to a sick child; and · [NAME]’s doctor recommended that she be home earlier to provide sufficient care to her sick child. iv. [NAME] explained why there were no other options available to her: · She had no friends or family living in the area that could help her with her childcare obligations. Her child’s father used to help but has since left and provides no help or financial support; and · She contacted the [NAME] helpline ([NAME]). They could not provide assistance, but rather directed [NAME] to seek accommodation from HR. v. [NAME] explained the impact the situation was having on her: · The situation was taking a heavy toll on her mental and physical health. She was suffering from “post-partum depression” from “always being at work and never seeing my family.” vi. [NAME] explained that she could provide documentation, if requested: · She had documentation to prove that her daughter was enrolled in a daycare centre that closed at 6 p.m. and could also obtain a doctor’s note about her daughter’s frequent illnesses. [ 90 ] [NAME]’s evidence that [NAME] did not provide sufficient proof regarding her accommodation request is not persuasive to the Tribunal. In her family status accommodation form, [NAME] stated she was prepared to provide additional documentation and information. However, neither [NAME] nor [NAME] requested any specific documentation or proof from [NAME]. [ 91 ] [NAME] has an obligation to engage in a multi-party inquiry to determine the suitability of [NAME]’s accommodation request (see [NAME] ). This includes requesting information that it believes is lacking prior to making a determination. I find it was unreasonable for [NAME] to disregard the detailed explanation for accommodation provided by [NAME], to not request further proof for the explanation, and then to deny accommodation because adequate proof was not provided. [ 92 ] Similarly, I find [NAME]’s evidence that [NAME] was not obligated to accommodate [NAME] because her inability to employ a babysitter was financial in nature is also unreasonable. [NAME]’s inability to employ a babysitter was more than simply financial in nature since she expressly stated in the accommodation form that she was “unable to get a babysitter on a consistent basis.” In addition, [NAME] explained that her financial inability to employ a babysitter arose from exceptional circumstances that were clearly relevant to her accommodation request — namely that the father of her child had abandoned the family, which put her in “dire poverty.” [ 93 ] If [NAME] did not accept [NAME]’s explanation that she was unable to get a babysitter on a consistent basis or that she was experiencing financial difficulty, it could have requested proof or particulars of same but elected not to do so. [ 94 ] Finally, I also find [NAME]’s evidence that [NAME] was not obligated to accommodate [NAME] because she had not explored reasonable childcare alternatives to be unreasonable. [NAME] reasonably explained that she had no friends or family in the area that could assist her, that her child’s father was no longer available to assist her, and that she contacted the [NAME] helpline but they could not assist. Again, if [NAME] did not accept [NAME]’s explanation, it could have requested proof or particulars of same but elected not do so. [ 95 ] Accordingly, I am satisfied that [NAME] meets the third element of the [NAME] test - she made reasonable efforts to meet her childcare obligations through reasonable alternative solutions, and that no such alternative solution was reasonably accessible. [ 96 ] I find, therefore, that [NAME] has satisfied all four elements of the [NAME] test and has established a prima facie case of discrimination. [ 97 ] [NAME] did not put forth a statutory defence of a bona fide occupational requirement as set out in section 15 of the CHRA, or other defence for its actions.

Accordingly, I find that [NAME] discriminated against [NAME] on the basis of family status contrary to section 7 of the CHRA when it denied her accommodation request in May 2017. C. [NAME]’s race was not a factor in [NAME]’s denial of accommodation [ 98 ] [NAME] alleges that her race was a factor in [NAME]’s decision to deny her accommodation request. [NAME] denies this. [ 99 ] Courts and tribunals have recognized that racism (including anti-Black racism) is not a practice which is ordinarily displayed overtly, and the subtle and pervasive manifestation of racism is well recognized in Canadian jurisprudence (see, for example , R. v. Spence , 2005 SCC 71 at para 5). [ 100 ] In cases involving allegations of racial discrimination, there need not be direct evidence of discrimination, and it will more often be proven by circumstantial evidence and inference. In addition, racial stereotyping will usually be the result of subtle unconscious beliefs, biases, and prejudices (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY] , 2014 CHRT 34 at para 199). However, even where circumstantial, evidence of discrimination “must nonetheless be tangibly related to the impugned decision or conduct” (see [COMPANY] at para 88). [ 101 ] In this case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that [NAME]’s denial of [NAME]’s accommodation request was related to HR’s conclusion that she did not adequately explore alternative options for childcare and did not provide adequate proof of same. There is no credible evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that race played any role in the assessment or outcome of [NAME]’s accommodation request. [ 102 ] At no time in any of the written exchanges (or other documents) within [NAME] regarding [NAME] was her race ever discussed directly or indirectly. [NAME] extensively cross-examined [NAME]’s witnesses on this issue, there was no testimony which emerged to suggest that her race was a factor. [NAME] testified, and I accept, that [NAME]’s race was not even known to her at the time she handled her accommodation request. [ 103 ] [NAME] entered HR file information into evidence regarding several non-Black employees at [NAME]. She says [NAME] treated these employees’ accommodation requests differently than hers, which she says is indicative of racial discrimination. [ 104 ] The information pertaining to these employees is of limited probative value to the Tribunal. [NAME] did not call any of these witnesses to testify and their circumstances are readily distinguishable from [NAME]’s situation: · Employees C.S., [NAME]., [NAME]., and [NAME]. did not request accommodation based on family status. Their accommodations were medical in nature based on health-related conditions; · Employee [NAME]. did not request accommodation based on family status, or any accommodation at all. [NAME]. had children who were frequently ill and opted to take personal unpaid days off; and · Employee [NAME]. requested a leave of absence to take care of their partner following a stroke. [NAME]. did not seek an accommodation based on family status, nor did they request any other form of accommodation. [ 105 ] Accordingly, [NAME]’s allegation that race was a factor in [NAME]’s initial denial of her accommodation request has no merit and is dismissed. [NAME] was granted a modified work schedule after the initial denial (i) Weekend accommodation [ 106 ] As noted above, about one month after [NAME]’s initial request was denied, [NAME] overrode HR’s decision and arranged for her accommodation to be granted. [ 107 ] [NAME] says that the accommodation that was granted was not sufficient. She says her accommodated weekday schedule of 8 p.m. to 4 p.m. was not always respected because she sometimes had to leave work after 4 p.m. In addition, she says that the accommodation was insufficient because it only addressed her weekday needs and not her weekend needs. [ 108 ] [NAME] did not raise the issue of weekend accommodation in her Statement of Particulars (SOP) and raised this issue for the first time at the hearing. In her SOP, she explained her accommodation request as: “[I] really need a shift that would allow me to pick up my daughter from daycare. Preferably 8-4 [p.m.] Mon-Friday…” [ 109 ] In [NAME]’s communications with [NAME] in May 2017, which included her email exchanges and completed accommodation form, she did not mention any need for weekend accommodation. She specifically requested a modification to her weekday schedule of noon to 8 p.m. to allow her to pick up her daughter from daycare before 6 p.m. [NAME] also testified that subsidized daycares of the type her daughter attended were not open on weekends, so daycare pick-up on weekends was not at issue. [ 110 ] In [NAME]’s written request to [NAME] after HR denied her accommodation request, she requested modification to her weekday shifts only and not to her weekend schedule. [ 111 ] [NAME] initially admitted in her testimony that she never requested not to work on weekends, stating instead that such an accommodation “goes without saying.” [NAME] later stated that she had made such a request - however, she was unable to produce any contemporaneous records supporting her assertion. Given my concerns with the reliability of [NAME]’s testimony, I do not accept her assertion. [ 112 ] An employer’s duty to accommodate arises only once it becomes aware of an employee’s need for accommodation. Before an employer’s duty to accommodate is triggered, the person seeking accommodation must make their needs known. An employer cannot accommodate a need about which it is unaware (see [NAME] ). [ 113 ] In this case, [NAME] reasonably responded to [NAME]’s request for a modified weekday schedule in the unambiguous manner in which it was presented. [ 114 ] The Commission submits that [NAME]’s family status accommodation form did not allow her to specify that she required accommodation on weekends and that is why she did not do so. [ 115 ] I am not persuaded by this submission. Question 4 of the family status accommodation form provided a reasonable opportunity for [NAME] to share this information. Question 4 reads:

4. What work duties and/or tasks or work conditions limit the ability for the team member to attend to the family obligation? Describe how or why the individual believes that this limits their ability to attend to his/her family obligation. (ii) Late departure time from work [ 116 ] [NAME] and the Commission also submit that the accommodation was insufficient because she was sometimes required to leave work after 4 p.m. [ 117 ] Even assuming this was the case, there was no credible evidence presented to show that this prevented [NAME] from picking up her daughter from daycare on time, which was the reason for the accommodation. [ 118 ] In her initial request for accommodation, [NAME] stated that being late for daycare pick-up at 6 p.m. would result in a fine of one dollar per minute and that after 30 minutes, child services would be contacted. There was no suggestion that a fine was ever imposed or that child services were ever contacted due to [NAME] leaving work after 4 p.m. on some occasions. The accommodation need not be perfect, it need simply be reasonable, which, in this case, it was (see [NAME] v.  Syndicat des employé‑e‑s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’[NAME], section locale 2000, 2008 SCC 43 at para 14 – 16; [NAME] v. [NAME] et al. , 2017 CHRT 24 at para 109). [NAME] was not subject to harassment based on race or family status [ 119 ] [NAME] testified that after her accommodation was approved, [NAME] management engaged in harassment based on her race and family status by initiating an unwarranted investigation. [NAME] says the investigation was initiated because she bypassed management’s authority to get approval from [NAME] for her accommodation request, which management was not pleased with. [ 120 ] Harassment in employment is addressed in section 14(1)(c) of the CHRA. There are three parts to establishing that harassment is a discriminatory practice under section 14(1)(c): · the conduct is harassment; · the conduct is connected to a prohibited ground of discrimination; and · the conduct occurred in matters related to employment. [ 121 ] In Starr et al. v. [NAME] , 2024 CHRT 127, the Tribunal describes harassment under the CHRA as follows: [ 40 ] The Act states that it is a discriminatory practice to “harass” an individual but it does not define the words “harass” or “harassment”. The courts have provided examples of harassment, which can often consist of sexualised conduct, but which need not necessarily include such conduct to qualify as harassment. [ 41 ] In general terms, harassing conduct under s.14 is behaviour that is unwelcome and unsolicited, and that detrimentally affects the victim’s environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for victims. It includes insults, degrading comments, jokes or innuendos, physical assault, and any conduct that is hostile, intimidating, or offensive to the victim, or demeaning and humiliating to them. ( [NAME] v. Canada (A.G.), 2005 CHRT 41 , para 246 ; [NAME] v. [COMPANY]., 1989 CanLII 97 (SCC) , [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 at 1284 [ [NAME] ]). [ 42 ] In order to determine if the conduct is unwelcome, the Tribunal can look at the complainant's reaction at the time the incident occurred and assess whether they expressly, or by their behaviour, demonstrated that the conduct was unwelcome. A verbal no is not required in all cases ( Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. [NAME] , 1999 CanLII 7907 (FC) , [1999] 3 F.C. 653 (T.D.) at para. 36 [ [NAME] ]). [ 43 ] Determining whether conduct was unwanted or unwelcome will require considering the perspective of the alleged victim, including their identity-based characteristics, such as their gender. Context matters. Thus, while the appropriate standard against which to assess the conduct will be that of the reasonable person, in the circumstances the reasonable person is not some monolithic construct. The trier of fact, in judging the propriety of an interaction, must be sensitive to stereotyped norms of what constitutes acceptable social conduct and consider the context in which the impugned conduct took place when determining how the reasonable person would react in similar circumstances ( [NAME] , para. 36 ; [NAME] v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission) , 2000 CanLII 15796 (FCA) at para. 25 [ [NAME] ]). [ 44 ] Harassment generally requires an element of persistence or repetition, although in certain circumstances a single incident may be enough to create a hostile or poisoned environment. The reasonable person standard, as described above, will also apply to the assessment of whether the conduct is sufficiently severe or persistent to create a poisoned environment. ( [NAME] at paras 43-46 ; [NAME] at para. 25 ). [ 122 ] [NAME] alleges that [NAME] and others at [NAME] harassed her by falsely reporting her to Corporate Security for using another employee’s ID, repeatedly accusing her of criminal activity, and wrongfully issuing a warning letter. [ 123 ] [NAME] denies harassing [NAME] and [NAME]’s witnesses gave evidence that the allegation that she wrongfully used other employees’ IDs were based on valid call logs and were unrelated to her request for accommodation or her race. [ 124 ] I find that there is no credible evidence whatsoever to suggest that [NAME]’s investigation was related in any way to [NAME]’s race or family status. [ 125 ] Rather, there are uncontroverted, contemporaneous documents and correspondence which indicate that [NAME]’s investigation was initiated by a customer complaint that involved [NAME]. [NAME] management reasonably investigated the matter, followed the recommendation of Corporate Security to review [NAME]’s past calls, found that she had engaged in call avoidance on several occasions contrary to the Blueprint process, and issued a written warning as a result. [ 126 ] Specifically, when [NAME] received notice of a customer complaint, she contacted [NAME]., who notified her that he had not been involved in the call and that [NAME] had been. The discrepancy revealed that [NAME] used the other agent’s employee ID to process a deactivation call which was a violation of the Blueprint process. [NAME] was contacted and an investigation was initiated by [NAME]. [ 127 ] As noted in [NAME]’s investigation report, it was Corporate Security that recommended to [NAME] management that they review [NAME]’s prior calls to see if there were other incidents of [NAME] using another employee’s ID for deactivations. This is contrary to [NAME]’s allegation that [NAME] management harassed her by deciding to review her prior calls. There is no credible evidence to suggest that [NAME] or anyone else at Corporate Security had any prior involvement with [NAME]’s accommodation request such that her family status influenced their investigation or recommendations. [ 128 ] [NAME] conducted a review of [NAME]’s call history and identified other instances where the Blueprint process had not been followed between June and August 2017. The contemporaneous records entered into evidence describe these discrepancies. [ 129 ] A written warning was issued to [NAME] in October 2017. The letter was removed from her disciplinary file two years later, pursuant to the terms of the Collective Agreement. No additional disciplinary action was ever taken against [NAME]. [ 130 ] [NAME] makes repeated allegations that [NAME] accused her of criminal activity in order to harass her. I reject these allegations. [NAME]’s witnesses deny doing so and there are no contemporaneous records or correspondence to suggest that [NAME] was ever accused of criminal activity. A simple warning letter was the only discipline issued to [NAME]. [ 131 ] [NAME] also makes repeated allegations that [NAME] management conspired to fabricate or alter documents to demonstrate that she engaged in misconduct. [NAME] witnesses deny doing so. I reject these allegations as there is no credible collateral evidence to support them. [ 132 ] [NAME] also disputes [NAME] management’s finding that she had, in fact, engaged in call avoidance. She spent significant time at the hearing questioning [NAME] witnesses on this issue and spent significant time arguing in closing submissions that she disagreed with the findings of the investigation. [ 133 ] However, this issue is of limited relevance to the matter the Tribunal must decide. The Tribunal is not the appropriate forum for [NAME] to challenge the findings of the investigation or the discipline that was issued. Rather, the Tribunal’s role is to determine whether her race or family status was a factor in the investigation and whether it constitutes discriminatory harassment. It is clear that it does not. [ 134 ] The credible testimony of [NAME]’s witnesses, supported by contemporaneous records, demonstrates that there was a reasonable basis for [NAME] to initiate the investigation into [NAME] and a reasonable basis to issue the warning letter. [NAME] disagrees with the outcome of the investigation, there is no credible evidence to suggest it was discriminatory in nature. [ 135 ] Accordingly, [NAME]’s allegations of harassment based on race and family status are dismissed. [NAME]’s allegations regarding her first child are unsubstantiated and outside the scope of her complaint [ 136 ] [NAME] testified that, in addition to [NAME]’s failure to accommodate her childcare needs regarding her second child (born in 2015), [NAME] also failed to accommodate her for several years starting in 2008 regarding childcare obligations for her first child (born in 2002). [ 137 ] [NAME] did not submit any supporting documents or witness evidence to corroborate that she requested and was denied accommodation for her first child. [ 138 ] [NAME] and [NAME] both testified that [NAME] submitted only one request for accommodation in May 2017 and did not make any prior requests. [ 139 ] Given my concerns regarding the reliability of [NAME]’s testimony, and in the absence of supporting evidence, I do not accept [NAME]’s evidence that she requested and was denied accommodation for her first child. [ 140 ] In any event, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited by the content of the original complaint filed with the Commission and the Commission’s decision when referring the complaint to the Tribunal for inquiry (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2019 CHRT 6 at para 28). [ 141 ] In her complaint filed with the Commission in 2018, [NAME] alleges that [NAME]’s discrimination began in May 2017 when [NAME] failed to accommodate her childcare needs for her second child and management later harassed her by accusing her of misconduct. [NAME] makes no allegation regarding accommodation for her first child, and no such allegation was referred by the Commission to the Tribunal for inquiry. [ 142 ] Similarly, the allegations in [NAME]’s SOP are limited to [NAME]’s failure to accommodate childcare needs for her second child in May 2017 and management’s subsequent harassment. [ 143 ] In these circumstances, [NAME]’s allegations raised at the hearing regarding her first child are outside the scope of the Tribunal’s inquiry. [NAME]’s policies are not discriminatory [ 144 ] [NAME] and the Commission allege that [NAME]’s policies and practices concerning family status accommodation are inherently discriminatory, contrary to section 10 of the CHRA. The Commission characterizes them as reflecting a “fundamental and systemic flaw in [NAME]’s workplace culture and the administration of its accommodation policies.” [ 145 ] However, the limited evidence before the Tribunal does not demonstrate that [NAME]’s policies are inherently discriminatory, nor does it reveal any fundamental or systemic flaw in its workplace culture or accommodation process. [ 146 ] Information on employees’ human rights, including the right to family status accommodation, is set out in [NAME]’s Policy and Code. This information is not only available to all employees but also specifically brought to their attention on a yearly basis as part of an annual compulsory review process. Employees must attest that they have read and understood the Code. [ 147 ] There is no dispute that [NAME] signed the Code in October 2016. Consequently, all relevant information regarding family status accommodation was not only available to her through [NAME] at the time of her accommodation request, but she also confirmed through her signature that she had read the Code only a few months prior to her accommodation request in May 2017. [ 148 ] The Commission points to emails from [NAME] as emblematic of systemic issues within [NAME]. In response to [NAME] approving [NAME]’s accommodation request, [NAME] stated in emails that HR did not recommend accommodation for [NAME] and that it has a well-established process that defines the criteria for accommodation requests. She noted that the Eglington location had about 12 to 14 family status accommodation requests, a majority of which had been or would be denied. [ 149 ] I am not persuaded that [NAME]’s mere mention that other family status accommodation requests may be denied is sufficient to show a systemic flaw in [NAME]’s processes. [ 150 ] There is an absence of evidence regarding the other accommodation requests referenced by [NAME] and whether they were ultimately granted or not. There is also an absence of empirical data regarding the granting of different types of accommodation at [NAME]. [ 151 ] The evidence before the Tribunal does not support the Commission’s position that [NAME] treats other types of accommodations (such as medical accommodations) as more important than family status accommodations. Rather, I accept [NAME]’s evidence that medical accommodation requests are subject to a completely different process overseen by [COMPANY]. [ 152 ] [NAME] reasonably explained that medical accommodations are generally not limited to a three-month period as they often involve longer-term leaves that remain in place over time. In most cases, doctor’s notes establishing limitations and the required accommodations will establish a timeline. In contrast, family status accommodations are subject to change as an employee’s circumstances may change. [NAME] reasonably explained that [NAME]’s standard practice is to [NAME] family status accommodation for an initial period of three months. After three months the matter is reviewed, and the accommodation is extended if circumstances warrant it. [ 153 ] Accordingly, I cannot find that [NAME]’s policies and practices concerning family status accommodation are discriminatory contrary to section 10 of the CHRA.

VII. REMEDIES [ 154 ] The Tribunal’s remedial powers are found in sections 53(2) and (3) of the CHRA. [ 155 ] If the Tribunal finds that a complaint is substantiated, it can make an award against the party found to have engaged in a discriminatory practice. The purpose of the remedial provisions found in section 53 of the CHRA is to make a victim of discrimination whole to the extent possible and to put the complainant back in the position they would have been had the discrimination not occurred (see Public Service Alliance of Canada v. [NAME] , 2010 FCA 56 at paras 299-301). [ 156 ] In addition to compensating victims of discrimination, the Tribunal’s remedial authority serves another important societal goal: preventing discrimination and acting as a deterrent and an education tool (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2013 ABCA 238 at para 31, citing Canada (Treasury Board) v. Robichaud , [1987] 2 SCR 84). The Tribunal has broad discretion to make any order it considers appropriate in furtherance of that goal (see section 53(2)(a) of the CHRA). A. Pain and suffering [ 157 ] [NAME] seeks damages for pain and suffering but does not provide an amount she is seeking. [ 158 ] The Tribunal can order up to $20,000 for any pain and suffering that a complainant experienced because of the respondent’s discriminatory practice (see section 53(2)(e) of the CHRA). The Tribunal tends to reserve the maximum amount of $20,000 for the very worst cases or the most egregious of circumstances (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY] ., 2012 CHRT 10 at para 115). [ 159 ] In assessing damages for pain and suffering, the Tribunal looks at the objective seriousness of the conduct and the effect on the particular complainant who experienced discrimination (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. , 2021 CHRT 15 at paras 104 -105). [ 160 ] As noted above, the uncontradicted medical evidence indicates that [NAME] had serious underlying mental conditions that were not caused by work-related matters. The medical evidence further establishes that if any work-related factor significantly exacerbated [NAME]’s mental condition prior to her disability leave in December 2017, it was [NAME]’s investigation of her. While the investigation may have been stressful for [NAME], I have found that it was not discriminatory. [ 161 ] [NAME] did not submit any medical evidence to establish a causal link between [NAME]’s discriminatory action (that is, its failure to accommodate her for a one-month period from when her request was initially denied in May 2017 to the time it was approved in June 2017) and the pain and suffering she alleges. However, while medical evidence may be helpful, it is not required (see [NAME] v. [COMPANY] , 2019 CHRT 28 at para 135). [ 162 ] In this case, I accept [NAME]’s uncontradicted evidence that she was understandably upset by [NAME]’s initial denial of her accommodation request. However, that denial was short-lived and any damages for pain and suffering will necessarily fall on the lower end of the range. [ 163 ] Accordingly, I award [NAME] $5,000 in damages for pain and suffering. B. Wage loss [ 164 ] [NAME] claims $336,000 for wage loss from 2018 to 2024. This claim appears to be based on her calculation of the difference between her disability benefits and the salary that she estimates she would have received for that period. [ 165 ] In an employment context, the Tribunal can compensate a complainant for all losses that flow from discriminatory conduct, including lost wages (see [NAME] v. Canada 2019 FC 1026 at para 36 [ [NAME] ]; and section 53(2)(c) of the CHRA). However, there must be a causal link between the discrimination and the wage loss claimed (see [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2007 FCA 268 at paras 32 and 37). The onus is on the complainant to establish that it is more likely than not that this causal connection exists. [ 166 ] In this case, the medical evidence establishes that during the period from 2018 to 2024, [NAME] was totally disabled from working due to serious underlying mental conditions. Any precipitating work-related factor which may have exacerbated [NAME]’s mental condition prior to her disability leave in December 2017 was [NAME]’s investigation of her, which I have found not to be discriminatory. [ 167 ] Accordingly, [NAME] has not proven a causal link between [NAME]’s discriminatory actions and the disability which rendered her unable to work. As such, she is not entitled to an award for wage loss. C. Special compensation [ 168 ] [NAME] claims special compensation but does not provide an amount she is seeking. [ 169 ] The Tribunal can award up to $20,000 in special compensation if it finds that the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice willfully or recklessly (see section 53(3) of the CHRA). [ 170 ] Special compensation is punitive and intended to provide a deterrent and discourage those who deliberately discriminate. A finding of wilfulness requires an intention to discriminate and to infringe upon a person’s rights under the CHRA. Recklessness usually denotes acts that disregard or show indifference to the consequences, such that the conduct is done wantonly or needlessly (see Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME] , 2013 FC 113 at para 155). A finding of recklessness does not require proof of intention to discriminate (see [NAME] at para 89). [ 171 ] In determining an appropriate award under this section, the Tribunal must focus on the respondent’s conduct, and not on the effect that the conduct had on the complainants (see [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2019 CHRT 45 at para 210). [ 172 ] In this case, [NAME]’s initial accommodation request in May 2017 was denied because [NAME] concluded that she had a reasonable alternative option for childcare and that she had not provided sufficient proof to justify her request. While the Tribunal ultimately rejected the basis for [NAME]’s conclusion, there is no credible evidence to suggest it was based on [NAME]’s race or was otherwise reckless or wilful. [ 173 ] The Tribunal’s finding that [NAME] incorrectly applied human rights law cannot, without more, justify an award for special compensation under section 53(3) of the CHRA.

Accordingly, I find no basis to make an award for special compensation. D. Expenses [ 174 ] [NAME] requests reimbursement for various out-of-pocket expenses including medical expenses, childcare expenses, union dues, and legal fees. [ 175 ] The Tribunal may compensate a victim of discrimination for any expense they incurred as a result of the discriminatory practice (see section 53(2)(c) of the CHRA). (i) Legal fees [ 176 ] [NAME] requests reimbursement of $540,000 in legal fees. [ 177 ] [NAME] did not establish a factual basis for this claim. She was self-represented throughout the Tribunal proceedings and did not submit any documentary evidence to suggest that she incurred legal fees in relation to the proceedings. [ 178 ] In any event, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award legal costs (see Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2011 SCC 53). [ 179 ] Accordingly, [NAME] is not entitled to reimbursement of legal fees. (ii) Childcare expenses [ 180 ] [NAME] requests reimbursement of $33,000 for childcare expenses for her two children from October 2008 to November 2017. [ 181 ] As I have found that [NAME]’s discrimination against [NAME] lasted one month from May to June 2017, she is entitled to reasonable childcare expenses incurred during this period. [ 182 ] [NAME] provided no receipts or other documentation to support her claim for childcare expenses. She testified that she paid childcare expenses in “cash” to babysitters and that the babysitters did not provide receipts. She stated that she did not insist on getting receipts because doing so would have presented a barrier to finding a babysitter. [ 183 ] In [NAME]’s initial request for accommodation submitted to [NAME] in May 2017, she stated that her expenses were $100 per week for a babysitter to pick up her daughter from daycare at 6 p.m. and care for her until 9 p.m. [NAME] did not refute the expense at the time and I accept the estimate provided by [NAME], given its reasonable and contemporaneous nature. [ 184 ] Accordingly, I make an award of $400 for estimated childcare expenses incurred by [NAME] over the course of one month from May to June 2017. (iii) Medical expenses [ 185 ] [NAME] requests reimbursement of $3,567 for medical expenses. She submits that these are out-of-pocket expenses for medications she purchased from a pharmacy from 2017 to 2022. [ 186 ] The only document submitted by [NAME] which shows out-of-pocket expenses is a printout from a pharmacy for medications she purchased between October 2017 and April 2018. The medications include anti-depressants and sleep aids. The printout shows that she paid $278.71. [ 187 ] I find that there is no credible evidence to prove a causal link between [NAME]’s discriminatory action over the short one-month period between May and June 2017 and any medical expenses claimed by [NAME]. As noted earlier, any precipitating work-related factor which may have exacerbated [NAME]’s mental condition was [NAME]’s investigation, which I have found not to be discriminatory. [ 188 ] Accordingly, [NAME]’s claim for medical expenses is denied. (iv) Union dues [ 189 ] [NAME] requests reimbursement of $6,000 for union dues she has paid since 2008. [ 190 ] [NAME] says that reimbursement is warranted because the Union “never protected” her against [NAME] and was “not able to stop the ongoing false accusations” by [NAME]. [ 191 ] [NAME] submits, and I accept, that union dues are not payments that [NAME] received from [NAME] and it therefore has no obligation to reimburse her for these payments. Union dues are amounts withheld from an employee’s wages that are remitted to the union, who is the bargaining agent for the employee. Any amounts paid by [NAME] for union dues were paid to the Union and not to [NAME]. [ 192 ] In any event, I find no credible evidence to show a causal link between [NAME]’s discriminatory action and [NAME]’s incurrence of union dues. [ 193 ] Accordingly, [NAME]’s claim for reimbursement of union dues is denied. E. Interest [ 194 ] The Tribunal can make an award of interest on an order to pay compensation (see section 53(4) of the CHRA). Any award of interest shall be simple interest calculated on a yearly basis, at a rate equivalent to the Bank of Canada rate (monthly series), set by the Bank of Canada. Interest accrues from the date on which the discriminatory practice occurred until the date of payment of the award for compensation (see Rule 46 of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2021, SOR/2021-137). [ 195 ] Accordingly, I order interest on the above-noted terms payable to [NAME] on the award for damages for pain and suffering and childcare expenses from May 17, 2017 (the date of the initial denial of [NAME]’s accommodation request) to the date of payment. F. Training [ 196 ] The evidence before the Tribunal indicates that while information on employees’ human rights, including family status accommodation requests, is available to [NAME] employees through [NAME], there are inconsistencies in its understanding and administration by [NAME] managers and team leads. This is evident in [NAME]’s case where [NAME] stated in internal emails with HR that [NAME] was “blaming the company” despite [NAME] providing ample information to justify her accommodation request. This is also evident in file information pertaining to [NAME] employee [NAME]. [ 197 ] [NAME]. did not testify at the hearing, her file information was entered into evidence and the material facts regarding her situation are not in dispute. [ 198 ] In December 2016, [NAME]. required family status accommodation and contacted [NAME]. [NAME] did not provide [NAME]. with a family status accommodation form or refer the matter to HR for consideration. Rather, [NAME] directly denied [NAME].’s request. [ 199 ] Subsequently, [NAME]. found the accommodation form on [NAME] and wrote to [NAME] asking why she was not “given a fair opportunity to submit this form to [[NAME]] and HR.” [NAME] testified that she did not inform [NAME]. about the form but that she applauded [NAME]. for being able to find it on her own. [ 200 ] [NAME] testified that [NAME] should have given [NAME]. an opportunity to complete the family status accommodation form and that [NAME].’s accommodation request should have been sent to HR for consideration in accordance with [NAME]’s standard process. [NAME] agreed that the process followed in [NAME].’s case should not have happened. [ 201 ] In addition, the form provided to [NAME] in May 2017 was different than the form used by [NAME]. and there was confusion amongst [NAME] witnesses as to why the forms were different. [NAME] believed that the correct form was the one [NAME]. found on [NAME]. However, [NAME] stated that she believed that the form she sent to [NAME] was the standard one being used at the time. [ 202 ] [NAME] also testified that there is no specific training for management and team leads on human rights and the workplace accommodation process. Given the situation with [NAME]., [NAME] acknowledged that there could have been other accommodation requests that were denied by managers before getting to HR. [NAME] agreed that managers and team leads would benefit from training on the process. [ 203 ] To address inconsistencies in the administration and understanding of accommodation requests by [NAME], the Tribunal orders that within 18 months from the date of the Tribunal’s decision, [NAME] provide training to all managers and team leads. The training is to encompass the rights and obligations owed to employees under the CHRA, including requests for family status accommodation. The training is also to encompass the process to be followed in the event of a request for accommodation from an employee.

VIII.

CONCLUSION AND

ORDER [ 204 ] For the reasons set out above, I find that [NAME]’s initial denial of [NAME]’s accommodation request in May 2017 constitutes discrimination on the basis of family status contrary to section 7 of the CHRA. The remainder of [NAME]’s complaint is dismissed. [ 205 ] I make the following orders: A) [NAME] is ordered to pay the following amounts to [NAME]: i. $5,000 for pain and suffering; ii. $400 for childcare expenses; and iii. interest on the above-noted amounts calculated in accordance with section 53(4) of the CHRA from May 17, 2017 to date of payment. B) Within 18 months from the date of the Tribunal’s decision, [NAME] is ordered to provide training to its managers and team leads. The training is to encompass the rights and obligations owed to employees under the CHRA, including requests for family status accommodation. The training is also to encompass the process to be followed in the event of a request for accommodation from an employee. Signed by [NAME] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario March 16, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record Tribunal File: T 2644/2021 Style of Cause: [NAME] v. [NAME] of the Tribunal Dated: March 16, 2026 Dates of Hearing: February 19, 2024 to February 20, 2025 (18 days) Written closing submissions completed: October 22, 2025 Appearances: [NAME] , for herself [NAME], Khizer Pervez for the Canadian Human Rights Commission [NAME] , Sixtine Rayon for the Respondent