Federal Court Allows CERB Eligibility Dispute

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260622 Docket: T-2899-25 Citation: 2026 FC 850 Ottawa, Ontario, June 22, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Fothergill BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] [NAME] [APPELLANT] seeks judicial review of a decision by an officer [Officer] with the Canada Revenue Agency [[NAME]]. The Officer found her to be ineligible to receive the Canada Emergency Response Benefit [CERB] for two periods, each of four weeks, between July 5, 2020 and August 29, 2020. The CERB was one of the temporary income support measures provided by the [NAME] for workers who were adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. [ 2 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] moved to the United Kingdom [UK] in October 2022. She was not represented by counsel in this application, and she asked to make oral submissions to the Court by videoconference from the UK. [ 3 ] Shortly before this matter was scheduled to be heard, the Court issued a direction to the parties advising them that they should be prepared to address whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear oral submissions from an [NAME] located outside Canada. Both parties briefly addressed the question at the hearing, and counsel for the Attorney General of Canada [[NAME]] provided the Court with additional written submissions on May 14, 2026. [ 4 ] [ADDRESS] permitted Ms. [APPELLANT] to make oral submissions by videoconference from the UK, while reserving its decision on the jurisdictional question. [ 5 ] For the reasons that follow, the Court has a discretion to permit Ms. [APPELLANT] to make oral submissions by videoconference from the UK. In the circumstances of this case, it is in the interests of justice to do so. [ 6 ] The Officer’s decision to find Ms. [APPELLANT] ineligible to receive the CERB for two four-week periods between July 5, 2020 and August 29, 2020 was unreasonable. The application for judicial review is therefore allowed.

II. Background [ 7 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] applied for the CERB in April 2020. At that time, she was employed by both a [NAME] and a [NAME]. She received CERB payments from March 15, 2020 to June 6, 2020, and from July 5, 2020 to September 26, 2020. [ 8 ] On March 25, 2022, the [NAME] sent Ms. [APPELLANT] a letter asking her to provide documents to verify her eligibility for the CERB payments. Receiving no response, the [NAME] sent a letter to Ms. [APPELLANT] on March 13, 2024 informing her that she was ineligible to receive the CERB for all the periods during which it had been paid. [ 9 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] became aware of the [NAME]’s initial contact letter and subsequent decision on March 27, 2024, when she received a text message from her mother advising her to check her [NAME] account. Following her move to the UK, the contact information in Ms. [APPELLANT]’ [NAME] account listed her mother’s address. [ 10 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] spoke with a [NAME] by telephone on July 4, 2024. She then submitted documents to support her eligibility for the CERB, including paystubs and bank statements. [ 11 ] On August 13, 2024, the [NAME] again found Ms. [APPELLANT] to be ineligible for the CERB for all the periods it had been paid. The [NAME] concluded that Ms. [APPELLANT] earned more than $1,000 of employment income during the applicable periods, and she did not stop working or reduce her working hours for reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. [APPELLANT] requested a second review. [ 12 ] On September 10, 2024, Ms. [APPELLANT] submitted additional paystubs and records of her employment with the [NAME]. On July 7, 2025, the Officer found that she was eligible to receive the CERB during the first, second and third periods from March 15, 2020 to June 6, 2020, as well as the seventh period from August 30, 2020 to September 26, 2020. However, the Officer held that she was not eligible during the fifth and sixth CERB periods, from July 5, 2020 to August 29, 2020. The Officer found that she earned more than $1,000 in employment income during these periods, and she did not stop working or have her hours reduced for reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

III. Legislative Framework [ 13 ] The CERB is governed by the Canada Emergency Response Benefit Act , SC 2020, c 5, s 8 [CERB Act]. The eligibility criteria are specified in s 6(1): 6 (1) A worker is eligible for an income support payment if (a) the worker, whether employed or self-employed, ceases working for reasons related to COVID-19 for at least 14 consecutive days within the four-week period in respect of which they apply for the payment; and (b) they do not receive, in respect of the consecutive days on which they have ceased working, (i) subject to the regulations, income from employment or self-employment, (ii) benefits, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, or an employment insurance emergency response benefit referred to in section 153.7 of that Act, (iii) allowances, money or other benefits paid to the worker under a provincial plan because of pregnancy or in respect of the care by the worker of one or more of their new-born children or one or more children placed with them for the purpose of adoption, or (iv) any other income that is prescribed by regulation. 6 (1) Est admissible à l’allocation de soutien du revenu le travailleur qui remplit les conditions suivantes : a) [NAME] cesse d’exercer son emploi — ou d’exécuter un travail pour son compte — pour des raisons liées à la COVID-19 pendant au moins quatorze jours consécutifs compris dans la période de quatre semaines pour laquelle [NAME] demande l’allocation; b) [NAME] ne reçoit pas, pour les jours consécutifs pendant lesquels [NAME] cesse d’exercer son emploi ou d’exécuter un travail pour son compte : (i) sous réserve des règlements, de revenus provenant d’un emploi ou d’un travail qu’[NAME] exécute pour son compte, (ii) de prestations, au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’assurance-emploi, ou la prestation d’assurance-emploi d’urgence visée à l’article 153.7 de cette loi, (iii) d’allocations, de prestations ou d’autres sommes qui lui sont payées, en vertu d’un régime provincial, en cas de grossesse ou de soins à donner par lui à son ou ses nouveau-nés ou à un ou plusieurs enfants placés chez lui en vue de leur adoption, (iv) tout autre revenu prévu par règlement. [ 14 ] Section 1 of the Income Support Payment (Excluded Nominal Income) Regulations , SOR/2020-90 [CERB Regulations] states: 1 Any income received by a worker for employment or self-employment is excluded from the application of subparagraph 6(1)(b)(i) of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit Act if the total of such income received in respect of the consecutive days on which they have ceased working is $1000 or less. 1 Sont soustraits à l’application du sous-alinéa 6(1)b)(i) de la Loi sur la prestation canadienne d’urgence les revenus du travailleur provenant d’un emploi ou d’un travail qu’[NAME] exécute pour son compte, à condition que le total de tels revenus soit de mille dollars ou moins pour les jours consécutifs pendant lesquels [NAME] cesse d’exercer son emploi ou d’exécuter un travail pour son compte.

IV. Issues [ 15 ] This application for judicial review raises the following issues: A. Does this Court have jurisdiction to permit Ms. [APPELLANT] to make oral submissions by videoconference from the UK? B. Was the [NAME]’s decision reasonable? V. Analysis A. Does this Court have jurisdiction to permit Ms. [APPELLANT] to make oral submissions by videoconference from the UK? (1) Adjudicative jurisdiction [ 16 ] There are three forms of jurisdiction: prescriptive (also called legislative or substantive jurisdiction), enforcement, and adjudicative. Adjudicative jurisdiction includes the authority to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions that carry binding force ( R v [NAME] , 2007 SCC 26 [ [NAME] ] at para 58). [ 17 ] [ADDRESS]’s territorial jurisdiction is limited to Canada. When a party participates in a hearing from outside Canada, the Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute but may face challenges in exercising personal jurisdiction over the [NAME] ( Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2020 FC 570 [ [NAME] ] at para 59). [ 18 ] This has implications for the Court’s ability to control its own process, including the power to find a person in contempt or impose costs. It should be noted, however, that similar limitations apply if a person departs Canada before the Court’s processes can take effect ( [NAME] at para 59). (2) Address for service within Canada [ 19 ] A party before the Court may act in person or be represented by a solicitor (Rule 119(1), Federal Court Rules , SOR/98-106 [Rules]). This Rule “permits an individual to represent himself or herself in the Federal Courts or to be represented by a solicitor” ( [NAME] v Canada (Justice) , 2017 FCA 246 at para 4). [ADDRESS]’s extensive use of videoconferencing during and following the COVID-19 pandemic, including for final hearings of matters on their merits, confirms that an [NAME] is not restricted to appearing before the Court in person. [ 20 ] A party who is not represented by a solicitor must have an address for service in Canada (Rule 126.1(1)(a)). This may suggest that the Rules require an [NAME] to be physically present within Canada. However, when Rule 126.1 was promulgated in 2021, the accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement [RIAS] in Part II of the Canada Gazette explained that the new Rule was intended to facilitate limited-scope representation: a party’s documents may be served on another party directly ( i.e ., at an address for service in Canada), or on a solicitor acting within a limited mandate ( Rules Amending the Federal Courts Rules (Limited-Scope Representation) , SOR/2021-246). The RIAS said nothing about an [NAME]’s location. Nor did it address electronic service or service at an address outside of Canada. [ 21 ] To the extent that the Rules may limit the appearance of an [NAME] remotely from outside Canada, the Court has a discretion to vary or dispense with a Rule in “special circumstances” (Rule 55). However, the application of the Rules should not generally be varied to accommodate a litigant who chooses to proceed without the benefit of counsel ( [NAME] v [NAME] of Canada , 2001 FCT 1261 at para 24, aff’d 2002 FCA 246, leave to appeal to SCC refused (29296, 23 January 2003)). [ 22 ] In [NAME] v The Queen , 2001 FCT 732, [NAME] held that the Court cannot substitute an alternative procedure for one required by the Rules (at para 6, citing [COMPANY] v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) , 1996 CanLII 21923 (FC), aff’d 1996 CanLII 21841 (FCA)). Rule 55 is not intended to serve as a mechanism to amend the Rules ( [COMPANY] v [NAME] (The)([NAME]) , 1998 CanLII 9120 (FC)). The Rules do not currently permit a party to have an address for service outside of Canada. [ 23 ] It is not necessary in this application to definitively resolve whether the requirement of an address for service in Canada implies that [NAME] parties may make oral submissions to the Court only from within Canada, or whether the Court may authorize a departure from this Rule. Ms. [APPELLANT]’ Notice of Application indicates that her address for service is that of her mother in Kelowna, British Columbia, and also notes that her home address is in London, UK. She has therefore satisfied the requirement in Rule 126.1 of providing an address for service within Canada. (3) International comity [ 24 ] In [NAME] , the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the need for courts to respect the sovereignty of foreign states and the principle of non-intervention ( per LeBel J at para 45): In order to preserve sovereignty and equality, the rights and powers of all states carry correlative duties, at the apex of which sits the principle of non-intervention. Each state’s exercise of sovereignty within its territory is dependent on the right to be free from intrusion by other states in its affairs and the duty of every other state to refrain from interference. This principle of non-intervention is inseparable from the concept of sovereign equality and from the right of each state to operate in its territory with no restrictions other than those existing under international law. [ 25 ] Justice LeBel continued in [NAME] (at para 65): While extraterritorial jurisdiction – prescriptive, enforcement or adjudicative – exists under international law, it is subject to strict limits under international law that are based on sovereign equality, non-intervention and the territoriality principle. According to the principle of non-intervention, states must refrain from exercising extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction over matters in respect of which another state has, by virtue of territorial sovereignty, the authority to decide freely and autonomously. [ 26 ] In the brief additional written submissions filed on May 14, 2026, counsel for the [NAME] did not identify any Canadian jurisprudence that addresses the legal implications of permitting [NAME] litigants to give evidence or make oral submissions from abroad. The following survey of cases from other common law jurisdictions is based upon the Court’s own research and may not be comprehensive. It nevertheless serves as a useful starting point. [ 27 ] In Secretary of State v [NAME] , [2011] UKUT 00443 (IAC), and again in Secretary of State v [NAME] , [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) [ [NAME] ], the UK Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [UKUT] held that this issue implicates the laws of each country, and is not solely a matter of domestic law ( [NAME] at para 19, citing [NAME] and others v [NAME] and others , [2023] EWHC 539 (Pat)). In [NAME] , the UKUT found that it was not for any court or tribunal “to form its own view of what may, or may not, damage the United Kingdom’s relations with a foreign State.” The UKUT concluded that permission from a foreign state is not required when a party wishes to make submissions from abroad, but if the party ventures into giving evidence, this is no longer permissible ( [NAME] at para 23). [ 28 ] In 2024, the UK First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) issued a Guidance Note [UK Guidance Note] which included the observation that [NAME] persons abroad may not be able to draw the line between submissions and evidence (UK, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Practice Guidance on Procedure for Applying to Give Evidence, Represent or Observe Hearing From Abroad in the Health, Education and Social Care Chamber (Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2024) by Judge Mark Sutherland Williams, 2024). Given the diplomatic issues at stake, the Guidance Note cautions against permitting an [NAME] to make submissions from abroad, separate and apart from giving evidence (at para 7): There has long been an understanding among Nation States that one State should not exercise the powers of its courts within the territory of another without having the permission of the latter State to do so. Any breach of that understanding by a court or tribunal in the UK risks damaging UK’s diplomatic relations with other States and is contrary to the public interest. [ 29 ] The UK Guidance Note states at subparagraph 55(b): In compliance with the overriding objective set out in rule 2 of the [Tribunal Procedure Rules], and bearing in mind the risk that a litigant in person or [NAME] may stray into the giving of evidence rather than making pure submissions, only in exceptional circumstances will participation from abroad be permitted. [NAME] cases, litigants in person, or cases where the representative is not legally qualified are unlikely to be permitted to make representations from abroad, unless there are genuine and exceptional reasons for so allowing. Permission will only be considered where a judge has evaluated the individual circumstances of the case. This does not prevent the individual from observing the hearing, unless there is good reason to preclude them. […] [ 30 ] The UK Guidance Note prescribes a process that must be followed by parties who wish to testify or make submissions from abroad. This includes the requirement that the party satisfy the domestic court or tribunal that the country in which they are located has consented, or not objected, to their participation in the UK legal proceeding. [ 31 ] The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office [[NAME]] has published advice on the taking of evidence from abroad, including a list of states with which the UK has diplomatic relations. According to the [NAME]’s list of countries: “[NAME] in Canada can voluntarily give evidence from Canada by video link in UK civil, commercial and administrative tribunals (either as a witness or when appealing a case)” . Other countries, including India and Iran, have not given their consent. Many countries have neither granted nor refused consent. [ 32 ] The UK Guidance Note is consistent with the advice contained in the [ADDRESS] Toolkit developed by the Pacific Judicial Strengthening Initiative, which requires consideration of the “relevant legislation, case law, regulations and treaties in both the home jurisdiction and the foreign country, or states within the foreign country, in which the party or witness is located” before a party is permitted to give evidence or make submissions from abroad (Pacific Judicial Strengthening Initiative, [ADDRESS] Toolkit (New Zealand: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2021), s 9.7.1). The Pacific Judicial Strengthening Initiative was funded by the Government of New Zealand and encompassed 15 member states, including Australia. [ 33 ] The Courts in Australia do not require the formal consent of a foreign state before hearing evidence from abroad, but have noted that prohibitions by foreign states may mean “that problems arise” ( [NAME] v [NAME] ([NAME]) [COMPANY] [2011] FCAFC 95 at paras 60-61). [ 34 ] Considering the principles recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] , the approach taken by the UK, Australian and New Zealand courts provide useful guidance regarding the circumstances in which this Court should permit an [NAME] to provide evidence or make submissions from abroad. [ 35 ] According to the additional written representations of counsel for the [NAME] received on May 14, 2026: The Respondent has been advised by the Ministry of Justice of the United Kingdom that there is no restriction in law or in practice on the voluntary giving of evidence from England and Wales to a foreign court in such matters. The Respondent understands that, in so advising, the Ministry of Justice consulted the Senior Master of the Kings Bench Division, who is the justice responsible for the Central Authority in England and Wales under the Hague Evidence Convention. [ 36 ] I am satisfied that the Court has a discretion to permit Ms. [APPELLANT] to make submissions to the Court by videoconference from her home in the UK. A person who comes before this Court to contest a demand by the [NAME] to repay pandemic benefits is unlikely to be represented by counsel. Given the importance of the proceeding to Ms. [APPELLANT], the remedy sought ( i.e ., redetermination by a different decision maker), and the assurances received from the UK authorities, it is in the interests of justice to permit her to do so. [ 37 ] In reaching this conclusion, I express no view on whether [NAME] parties should ordinarily be permitted to give evidence or make submissions to the Court remotely from outside Canada. This is a question to be determined on a case-by-case basis, following a request by the party and the Court’s consideration of the relevant legislation, jurisprudence, regulations and treaties in both Canada and the foreign country, or states within the foreign country, in which the party or witness is located. B. Was the [NAME]’s decision reasonable? [ 38 ] The merits of the Officer’s decision are subject to review by this Court against the standard of reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ] at para 10). [ADDRESS] will intervene only where “there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” ( [NAME] at para 100). [ 39 ] The criteria of “justification, intelligibility and transparency” are met if the reasons allow the Court to understand why the decision was made, and determine whether the decision falls within the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and law ( [NAME] at paras 85-86, citing [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9 at para 47). [ 40 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] says that the [NAME]’s method of calculating the income she earned during each of the CERB periods was flawed. She notes that the [NAME] relied on her payslips and bank statements to calculate her average income per day and then multiplied this by the number of days during each CERB period. The [NAME]’s rationale for this approach was to account for the fact that Ms. [NAME] pay periods did not align with the CERB periods. [ 41 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues that the [NAME]’s method was based on the false assumption that her income was earned evenly throughout the month, when in fact she worked sporadically. She maintains that the [NAME] should have used the timesheets from her employment at the [NAME] to determine exactly how much income she earned on each day. Since the timesheets for her employment at the [NAME] were no longer available, she says that only income from pay periods that fell completely within a CERB eligibility period should have been included. [ 42 ] The [NAME] responds that it was reasonable for the Officer to fill gaps in the factual record and make necessary inferences in the absence of sufficient evidence. The [NAME] also argues that the missing timesheets would not have affected the outcome, since Ms. [APPELLANT] would still have surpassed the $1,000 ceiling. [ 43 ] For the fifth CERB period (July 5 to August 1, 2020), the Officer allocated $317.72 of income from Ms. [APPELLANT]’ employment at the [NAME], and $787.98 of income from her employment at the [NAME], calculated as follows: $177.32 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from July 1 to 15; $123.76 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from July 16 to 31; $16.64 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from August 1 to 15; $251.73 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from June 28 to July 11; $360.00 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from July 12 to 25; and $176.25 from the [NAME] payslip accounting for work from July 26 to August 8. [ 44 ] The Officer calculated Ms. [APPELLANT]’ average income from the [NAME] by taking the total income indicated on each payslip and dividing it by the number of days during the pay period. For example, the payslip for July 1 to July 15 showed income of $241.80. There were 15 days in this pay period. According to the Officer, this produced an average income per day of $16.12 ($241.80 / 15 = $16.12). The Officer then allocated this income to a CERB period by calculating the number of days of the pay period that fell within the CERB period. Eleven days fell within the fifth CERB period (July 5 through July 15 = 11 days). The Officer multiplied the average income per day by the number of days in the CERB period ($16.12 x 11 = $177.32). Thus, $177.32 of income from this payslip was allocated to the fifth CERB period, causing Ms. [APPELLANT] to exceed the $1,000 ceiling of permissible income. [ 45 ] The problem with this methodology is that it unreasonably assumes that Ms. [APPELLANT] earned $16.12 every day during the period, when in fact she worked sporadically. It is possible that she earned all $241.80 of her paycheck between July 1 and July 4, 2020, and did not work between July 5 and July 15, 2020. If so, then $0 should have been allocated to the fifth CERB period, and all $241.80 should have been allocated to the fourth CERB period between June 7 and July 4, 2020. This would have the effect of keeping Ms. [APPELLANT]’ income below the $1,000 threshold of permissible income for the fifth CERB period. [ 46 ] The Officer applied the same methodology to the sixth CERB period (August 2 to August 29, 2020). The Officer allocated $544.96 of income from Ms. [APPELLANT]’ employment at the [NAME] and $776.25 of income from her employment at the [NAME], for a total of $1,321.21. Ms. [APPELLANT] received two payslips from the [NAME] during this period. The first was for August 1 to August 15, when she was paid a total of $246.60. The second was for August 16 to August 31, when she was paid a total of $312.00. The Officer allocated 14 days of averaged income from the first pay slip and 15 days of averaged income from the second payslip. Once again, it is possible that the Officer’s methodology may have caused the income to be allocated incorrectly. If Ms. [APPELLANT] earned most of this income outside of the sixth CERB period, she may not have surpassed the $1,000 ceiling. [ 47 ] The [NAME] notes that Ms. [APPELLANT] did not provide the Officer with the timesheets that would have allowed for the precise allocation of her income to the days on which she worked. The income averaging methodology chosen by the Officer was therefore reasonable and is owed deference by this Court. I disagree. [ 48 ] [NAME] requires transparency. The record suggests that Ms. [APPELLANT] was never informed that the Officer would use an income averaging methodology, nor what evidence she might have submitted to counter this approach. The initial contact letter, the decision letter, the review decision letter, and the second review decision letter gave no indication that income would be allocated using this method. [ 49 ] In her final telephone call with the [NAME] on June 26, 2025, the Officer informed Ms. [APPELLANT] that her income surpassed the $1,000 ceiling. The notes of the telephone call state that the Officer “explained how the calculations are done” , but the remainder of the notes do not clarify whether the Officer clearly communicated that an income averaging method would be used. Importantly, the Officer told Ms. [APPELLANT] that “we do not need no [ sic ] more documentation.” This was after Ms. [APPELLANT] told the Officer that she worked irregular hours and “picked up some cover shifts when [she] was called for.” Although the Officer promised to “re-look to see if anything will change due to the hours worked” , there were no discernable changes to the Officer’s calculations. The second review decision letter was sent shortly afterwards. [ 50 ] The proper allocation of income to each CERB period is not only a matter of fairness to an applicant but is also mandated by s 1 of the CERB Regulations. The CERB Regulations require a worker to have received $1,000 or less in income during the periods when the CERB was received. This threshold is applied rigidly ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2026 FC 177 at para 20). The accurate allocation of income to each CERB period is therefore essential for the statutory scheme to be applied correctly. [ 51 ] According to the [NAME], even if Ms. [APPELLANT]’ income decreased during either the fifth or sixth CERB periods, this would not bring her below the $1,000 ceiling. This may be true, but it would not be appropriate for this Court to perform its own calculations to determine whether Ms. [APPELLANT] was eligible for the CERB. [NAME] has assigned this task to an officer of the [NAME], acting as the Minister’s delegate. The [NAME] has considerable expertise in assessing relevant evidence and performing the requisite calculations. [ADDRESS] must refrain from conducting the assessment anew ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1522 at para 3). The appropriate remedy is to remit the matter for redetermination by a different [NAME]. [ 52 ] The [NAME] concedes that it was unreasonable for the Officer to find that Ms. [APPELLANT] did not stop working or have her hours reduced for reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This finding is inconsistent with the determination that she was eligible for the CERB during the other periods. The [NAME] maintains that the error did not materially affect the merits of the Officer’s decision. In light of my conclusion that the Officer’s income averaging methodology was unreasonable, it is unnecessary to consider this aspect of the decision further.

VI. Conclusion [ 53 ] [ADDRESS] has a discretion to permit Ms. [APPELLANT] to make oral submissions by videoconference from the UK. In the circumstances of this case, it is in the interests of justice to do so. [ 54 ] The application for judicial review is allowed, and the matter is remitted to a different [NAME] for redetermination. Ms. [APPELLANT] should be given 30 days to submit any additional documentation that she considers relevant to the officer’s reassessment of her eligibility for the CERB.

JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is allowed, and the matter is remitted to a different [NAME] for redetermination. “Simon Fothergill” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-2899-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF [APPELLANT] OF HEARING: by videoconference DATE OF HEARING: April 27, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [APPELLANT] J. DATED: June 22, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] [APPELLANT] (on her own behalf) For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Attorney General of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent