Federal Court Awards Lump Sum Costs for Complex Commercial Litigation

Date: 20260428 Docket: T-1292-15 Citation: 2026 [NAME] 561 Toronto, Ontario, April 28, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Diner BETWEEN: [COMPANY] Plaintiff and [COMPANY] Defendant

ORDER AND

REASONS [ 1 ] On November 25, 2025, I issued a decision on the merits of this action in 2025 [NAME] 1868 [ [NAME] v. [NAME] ] and directed that if the parties were unable to agree on costs, they were to file written costs submissions. After being unable to reach an agreement, both sides provided their costs submissions to the Court, each accompanied by supporting materials including their bills of costs and disbursements, explanations, and legal arguments. [ 2 ] The Plaintiff, [COMPANY] [[NAME]], seeks a lump sum costs award totalling $1,516,647.38, which is comprised of two sums: legal fees ($1,220,579.77) plus disbursements ($296,067.61). The legal fees are calculated in two tranches: fees incurred up to January 11, 2023, when [NAME] made its first offer to settle, calculated at 40% of actual legal fees billed, and after that date, at 80%, to which [NAME] claims entitlement pursuant to Rule 420 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [ [NAME] ]. [ 3 ] In the alternative, [NAME] seeks costs fixed under the recently amended (December 21, 2025) Tariff B of the [NAME] , at the high end of Column III, together with recovery for second and third counsel, along with full disbursements. However, the Plaintiff contends that Tariff-assessed costs will not provide a just award based on the approximately $1.86 million it spent on legal fees over the course of the litigation. [ 4 ] The Defendant, [COMPANY] [[NAME]], concedes that [NAME], as the successful party, is entitled to certain costs. However, [NAME] submits that this is not an appropriate case for the enhanced lump sum costs which [NAME] claims. Rather, [NAME] argues that costs should be fixed by reference to Tariff B at the high end of Column II, yielding legal fees of $362,527.20, plus reasonable disbursements in a range of either $99,625.68 or $197,846.65, depending on the extent to which the Court allows [NAME]’s expert and document management disbursements. [NAME]’s proposed total costs award thus falls in a range totalling between $462,152.88 and $560,373.85. [ 5 ] As a result of the two parties’ opposing versions of an appropriate costs order, a substantial delta of approximately $1,000,000 divides the parties’ awards sought. In my view, the costs dispute in this matter turns on four questions, namely whether (i) Tariff B provides adequate indemnification in the circumstances of this case; (ii) a lump sum award is warranted; (iii) Rule 420 should operate; and (iv) the disbursements claimed by [NAME] are reasonable and sufficiently established. [ 6 ] After considering the respective positions advanced, I am satisfied that Tariff B, even as amended, would not yield an adequate or proportionate contribution towards [NAME]’s reasonable litigation expenses. As a result, I will award a lump sum of $1,303,045.93 payable by [NAME] to [NAME], comprised of legal fees and disbursements and inclusive of tax, along with 5% post-judgment interest from the date of this Order until it is paid.

I. Background and Parties’ Positions [ 7 ] This action culminated in judgment largely in favour of [NAME], which sought damages from [NAME] of $25,477,921.90 CAD and $3,175,726.60 USD, plus interest. I awarded [NAME] damages for (a) lost profit damages of $21,641,943 CAD, and (b) demurrage fees of $167,893.90 CAD and $1,857,863.30 USD. However, I dismissed [NAME]’s additional claim for $3,500,000 in reputational damages. Pre- and post-judgment interest was set at 5% per annum. [ 8 ] [NAME] accounts for legal fees of $1,865,991.97 CAD, inclusive of tax, in taking the matter to trial, but excluding certain categories of fees such as those relating to (i) [NAME]’s successful motion to amend, (ii) the motion to strike for want of jurisdiction for which costs had already been addressed, and (iii) post-trial preparation of the present costs materials. [NAME] also incurred disbursements of $296,067.61 CAD. [ 9 ] This was not a simple or routine proceeding. The action concerned a significant commercial dispute spanning many years. The trial itself lasted 15 days, not to mention pre-trial matters including lengthy case management, a pre-trial motion (2024 [NAME] 832), and prior decisions (including 2017 [NAME] 783 and 2019 FCA 9). The parties led extensive documentary, factual, and expert evidence. [NAME] notes that it collected more than one million electronic documents requiring review for relevance and production. The parties produced well over 36,000 documents during the course of the action. More than 2,000 documents were tendered as exhibits at trial. [NAME] was represented at trial by three counsel and an articling student. [NAME] was represented by four counsel. [ 10 ] On January 11, 2023, [NAME] delivered a Rule 420 offer to settle for $19 million, together with mutual releases, and dismissal of the action on a without costs basis, with each party to bear its own legal costs. On November 1, 2023, in response to [NAME]’s counteroffer of $2.675 million, [NAME] made a second Rule 420 offer on the same terms, lowering the settlement amount to $17 million. [NAME] offer was withdrawn or accepted by [NAME]. [NAME] relies strongly on the effect of Rule 420 on the costs outcome in these proceedings. [ 11 ] [NAME] acknowledges that it is appropriate for [NAME] to receive double costs after January 11, 2023. [NAME] submits, however, that the offer to settle does not entitle [NAME] to the doubling of enhanced costs. The starting point remains Column II of Tariff B. [NAME] places significant emphasis on the recent December 21, 2025 amendments to Tariff B ( Rules Amending the Federal Courts Rules and the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/2025-232 ( Canada Gazette , Part II, Volume 159, No 25), submitting that these amendments reflect a policy choice favouring predictability, and a greater reliance on tariff-based awards. [NAME] posits, on the other hand, that the amendments were intended to increase recoverability and promote pre-trial resolution, not reduce costs recovery for successful litigants.

II. Analysis: The Legal Framework [ 12 ] At a high level, costs are intended to provide a reasonable contribution to the successful party’s litigation expense while maintaining proportionality ( [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] ([NAME]) , 2020 [NAME] 862 [ Bauer Hockey ] at paras 13–16). Given the parties’ positions, I will provide a brief overview of the key issues and the [NAME] raised by them. A. Rule 400 and Recent Amendments to Tarriff B [ 13 ] Rule 400(1) of the [NAME] provides full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs ( [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2017 FCA 25 [ [NAME] ] at para 10). This broad discretion must be exercised to achieve the intended purposes of costs awards which include encouraging a settlement, indemnifying the successful party for costs incurred, sanctioning behaviour that increases the expense of litigation, and in certain cases, seeking to ensure access to justice ( British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v [NAME] , 2003 SCC 71 at para 27; [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2021 [NAME] 186 [ [NAME] ] at para 19). [ 14 ] Rule 400(4) expressly permits the Court to fix all or part of costs by reference to Tariff B or to award a lump sum in lieu of - or in addition to - assessed costs. The continued availability of lump sum costs is not in dispute: this Court may continue, post amendments, to award lump sum costs, where appropriate. [ 15 ] Turning to those recent amendments, the amended Tariff B seeks to improve predictability and provide more meaningful indemnification than it had previously provided. The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement [RIAS], which accompanies the official publication of the amendments in the Rules Amending the Federal Courts Rules and the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/2025-232 ( Canada Gazette , Part II, Volume 159, No 25) helpfully explains: … For many years, it has been recognized that costs awards based on Tariff B fall far short of the actual litigation costs incurred by parties, particularly in certain commercial or business practice areas such as intellectual property or maritime law. As a result, there has been an increasing trend, particularly in these commercial cases, for the Court not to rely on Tariff B when issuing a costs award, but instead to issue a “lump sum” award. This widespread “lump sum” practice therefore forms a baseline for the new tariff structure. The amendments will increase Tariff B costs awards by approximately 25%, thereby aligning the tariff more closely with the amounts typically awarded under the “lump sum” approach. This will help address the shortfall in tariff-based costs awards and provide a more consistent and predictable regime. Nevertheless, the Court retains full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs and the determination of who must pay these costs.

Accordingly, it is not possible to determine the number of cases where tariff-based rather than lump sum costs will be awarded, or the number of cases where the amount of the award will increase on account of the new tariff structure. As a result, a monetized benefits and costs assessment is not feasible. However, it is acknowledged qualitatively that these changes could result in increased costs for some parties. [ 16 ] Thus, Tariff B will not always provide adequate indemnification in every case: the question will always remain as to whether, on the facts of the case, tariff costs provide adequate indemnification, and particularly so in the circumstances of lengthy, complex litigation. [ 17 ] Since the coming into force of the amendments on December 21, 2025, there has been scant judicial commentary on them. Of the three cases which have mentioned the impact of the new regime, the costs outcome was still pending in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2026 [NAME] 421 (at paras 57, 73) at the time of Associate Justice Cotter’s decision. [ 18 ] Associate Justice Horne recently discussed the impact of the amendments in E.E. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 [NAME] 392 (at paras 68, 71,74-78), albeit in the different costs context of immigration law (see para 72). [ 19 ] Finally, in [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2026 [NAME] 253, Justice Duchesne assessed costs under the new Tariff B, even though the Respondent had not accounted for the changes (at paras 12-13). [ 20 ] Given the dearth of jurisprudence to date on the context of this case as described above, and the very different approach to costs of the two parties, I see nothing indicating that the assessment under Tariff B must be de rigueur in all situations, nor rejecting the prior approach of awarding lump sum costs where Tariff B would not provide a reasonable level of indemnification ( [NAME] at paras 16-18). Indeed, as noted above, Rule 400(4) remains unamended, continuing to allow for lump sums in stating that the “Court may fix all or part of any costs by reference to Tariff B and may award a lump sum in lieu of, or in addition to, any assessed costs” . [ 21 ] Rule 407, on the other hand, was amended on December 21, 2025. It now reads that “[u]nless the Court orders otherwise, party-and-party costs shall be assessed in accordance with column 2 of the applicable tables to Tariff B” , whereas the previous Rule 407 had read “column III of the table to Tariff B” (my underlining). [ 22 ] I find that the present case is one of those instances in which Rule 407 should not apply, in favour of a lump sum award. I will briefly address other key purposes of cost awards, before moving onto the quantification of costs in this matter. B. The Key Objectives of Costs Awards [ 23 ] We have already seen that the three key purposes of costs awards are (i) providing indemnification for costs associated with successfully pursuing a valid legal right or defending an unfounded claim, (ii) penalizing a party who has refused a reasonable settlement offer, and (iii) sanctioning behaviour that increases the duration and expense of litigation or is otherwise unreasonable or vexatious. Having already discussed the first objective - indemnification through a lump sum award - I will now turn to the second objective: the impact of settlement offers. C. Rule 420 and Settlement Offers [ 24 ] Rule 420 is central to encouraging settlement. As Justice McHaffie stated in [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2024 [NAME] 1954 [ Tekna ] at paragraphs 27 to 28:

27. As a particular incentive to encourage parties to resolve litigation, Rule 420 provides for cost consequences if a party does not accept a written offer to settle that would have yielded terms more favourable than those they obtain at trial. […]

28. Where a plaintiff makes such an offer, and obtains a judgment as or more favourable than its terms, it is entitled to party-and-party costs to the date of the offer, and to costs calculated at double that rate, but not double disbursements, from that date to the date of judgment, unless the Court orders otherwise: Federal Courts Rules , Rule 420(1). Similarly, if a defendant makes such an offer, and the plaintiff fails to obtain judgment, the defendant is entitled to party-and-party costs to the date of the offer, and double those costs after the offer: Federal Courts Rules , Rule 420(2)(b). […] [ 25 ] Where a lump sum approach is adopted, the effect of Rule 420 may be reflected through an increased percentage applied to post-offer fees ( Tekna at para 41; [NAME] v [NAME] , 2020 [NAME] 610 at para 36; [NAME] at paras 56-57), the approach that I will adopt in this case given the two unsuccessful settlement offers made by the Plaintiff. [ 26 ] I note that the third broad principle has no application in these circumstances, as I find no dilatory or otherwise abusive conduct of counsel in this matter. The action, while fiercely but professionally contested by both sides preceding and during the trial, did not raise concerns that would merit sanctioning through costs. D. Analysis of Costs in these Proceedings [ 27 ] Rule 400(3) of the [NAME] provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered in awarding costs. The most germane to this action are explored next. E. Result of the Proceeding and Amounts Claimed and Recovered (Rule 400(3)(a) and (b)) [ 28 ] The result of this action strongly favours a substantial costs award to the Plaintiff. [NAME] succeeded on the core of the action. It obtained judgment in an amount that exceeded its principal lost profit claim. [NAME] was not successful on every head of damages advanced, costs analysis is discretionary and does not proceed through a mechanical issue counting exercise ( [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2021 FCA 54 [ [NAME] ] at para 16). On any practical analysis, [NAME] prevailed. [ 29 ] The amounts in issue were substantial. This was not a case in which modest sums were pursued at disproportionate cost. The monetary stakes were significant from the outset, as was the result obtained, as summarized in paragraph 7 above. That reality informs not only the importance of the proceeding to the parties, but also the reasonableness of committing significant resources to it. [ 30 ] [NAME] accepts that these considerations justify an award of costs to [NAME] but submits that they do not justify enhanced costs. I agree only in part: in my view, while these factors do not on their own compel a lump sum award, they strongly support an award above what would ordinarily be expected in a routine case, and adjudicated according to the recently revised Tariff B. F. Importance and Complexity of the Issues (Rule 400(3)(c)) [ 31 ] [NAME]’s argues that the case was not legally complex because liability had already been determined previously, and the sole issue before this Court in this action was the quantification of damages. [NAME] submits that this places the matter in the realm of average legal complexity. [ 32 ] I disagree with that characterization. It is true that the proceedings before this Court did not require a fresh determination of liability. However, that reality does not meaningfully reduce the complexity of what the parties were required to litigate. Indeed, it understates the nature of what the parties were required to litigate. That should be clear merely from the length of the closing legal submissions of each party, the evidence introduced, number of witnesses called by each side, and ultimately the resulting decision in [NAME] v. [NAME] which needed to address the issues raised at trial – not to mention the various other decisions issued by this Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, along with substantial case management. [ 33 ] Quantification of damages in a significant commercial matter will often be factually dense, technically demanding, and legally complex. This case was no exception. The damages quantification involved the analysis of lost profits, demurrage charges, and interest payable, all against the backdrop of an extensive evidentiary record, fact witnesses and expert opinions. The action required the Court to understand broad operational and commercial realities in the grain transportation system and to assess how those realities impacted on the loss claimed with respect to the specific commodities in issue. [ 34 ] I also do not interpret Rule 400(3)(c) as [NAME] submits. Even if the Court were to distinguish sharply between legal complexity and factual or technical complexity, the latter remains relevant elsewhere in Rule 400(3), including factors: (a) the result of the proceeding; (b) the amounts claimed and recovered; (d) the apportionment of liability; (g) the amount of work; (n.1) the role of expert evidence; and (o) other matters the Court considers relevant. [ 35 ] In sum, I find that this was a complex commercial damages trial. It demanded significant factual development, documentary review, expert engagement, witness preparation, and trial management. It is not fairly characterized as a case of average complexity merely because the principal issue at trial was damages. G. The Amount of Work (Rule 400(3)(g)) [ 36 ] The amount of work performed in this action was substantial. [NAME]’s submissions break down the work across various categories, including case analysis, case management, pleadings, document production, review of [NAME]’s productions, examinations for discovery and follow-up work on undertakings and particulars, expert evidence activities, several motions, trial preparation, trial attendance, and closing submission preparation. Of these, the largest components included more than half a million dollars in trial preparation fees, trial attendance, and closing submission preparation (approximately $500,000, $200,000 and $235,000 respectively). [ 37 ] The record confirms a highly labour-intensive proceeding. There were extensive productions, multiple conferences, motions, expert steps, and a 15-day trial spread over several weeks in 2024-2025. In my view, this factor strongly supports moving beyond a purely tariff-driven outcome. Even with the revised tariff, the scale of the work here materially exceeded what Tariff B is intended to capture. [ 38 ] [NAME] submits that because both sides devoted substantial time and resources, that fact does not necessarily justify enhanced costs. I disagree. The key question in determining whether to award lump sum costs that the Plaintiff requests, is not whether both parties worked hard. Clearly, they both did, and both performed admirably throughout the trial in presenting their cases. The question is rather whether the successful party’s reasonable legal expenditure was such that tariff recovery would produce an unsatisfactory result. Here, it would. H. Rule 420 and settlement (Rule 400(3)(e)) [ 39 ] Settlement conduct weighs heavily in [NAME]’s favour. The Rule 420 offers were substantial, clear, and open well before trial. The first, at $19 million, was made on January 11, 2023; the second, at $17 million, on November 1, 2023. Both were materially less favourable to [NAME] than the result obtained at trial. [NAME] responded to the first with an offer of $2.675 million and did not improve its position meaningfully thereafter. [ 40 ] Rule 420 is designed to attach real consequence to a party’s refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer. To ignore its application would undermine the purpose of the rule. [NAME] correctly notes that the Court has discretion in applying Rule 420 ( [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2022 [NAME] 269 at para 7; [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2024 [NAME] 1887 at para 86). [ 41 ] In my view, the matter at hand is precisely the type of case in which Rule 420 must have meaningful operation. There is nothing about this action that suggests the rule should be diluted. Here, within the context of a major commercial dispute between sophisticated parties, [NAME] had a clear opportunity to settle on terms substantially better than the judgment ultimately rendered but elected to continue to trial. [ 42 ] I do not accept [NAME]’s submission that doubling should only attach to tariff costs in a case such as this. Rule 420 is not confined in that way by its text ( Tekna at para 41). Nor would such an approach necessarily give the rule meaningful effect where the Court is otherwise satisfied that tariff costs are inadequate. At the same time, [NAME]’s proposed doubling to 80% post-offer requires scrutiny to ensure the resulting award remains anchored to the Rule’s intended principles. [ 43 ] I accept [NAME]’s submission that this was not public interest litigation in the ordinary sense, and I do not find that either party engaged in conduct that would independently justify punitive or solicitor-client consequences. [NAME] also points out that both parties served requests to admit and that neither side’s procedural conduct was vexatious or improper in a manner engaging Rule 400(3)(k). [ 44 ] While I also agree with and accept those submissions, they do not alter my conclusion on either the application of Rule 420, or the award of lump sum costs. As has been made evident from my summary of their arguments, [NAME] does not seek solicitor-client costs on the basis of reprehensible conduct. Its contention is instead that the scale, complexity, and settlement history of the proceeding justify a substantial lump sum award, the quantification of which I turn to next.

III. The Lump Sum Award [ 45 ] As is now clear, the central dispute in the cost positions of the two parties is whether Tariff B provides adequate indemnification in the circumstances of this case: [NAME] claims that it does, particularly in light of the 2025 amendments. [NAME] states that it does not and submits that the amended tariff would leave it bearing an unjustly large shortfall despite having succeeded and after making reasonable settlement offers. [ 46 ] I agree with [NAME]. [NAME]’s high-end Column II proposal would yield legal fees of $362,527.20, approximately 19.5% of [NAME]’s actual fees. Even if [NAME]’s higher disbursement figure were to be added, the total recovery proposed by [NAME] remains dramatically below the reasonable litigation expenditure required to obtain judgment in over a decade of litigation that has taken place. [ 47 ] I acknowledge that the Federal Court of Appeal has cautioned against an increased costs award solely on the basis that a successful party’s actual fees are significantly higher than the Tariff amounts ( [NAME] at para 13). However, in my view, that degree of under-indemnification that would result from the tariff does not appropriately reflect the nature of the proceeding, amount at stake, quantity of work performed, and settlement history, nor does it reflect the threefold principle objectives of costs of providing compensation, promoting settlement and deterring abusive behaviour (see explained at para 23 above; see also [NAME] v [NAME] , 2007 FCA 115 at para 24). A. Appropriate Cost percentages in these proceedings [ 48 ] [ADDRESS] must determine the percentage of [NAME]’s legal fees that should be awarded. [NAME] asks for 40% pre-offer and 80% post-offer. [NAME] submits that even if a lump sum were ordered, the proper range would be much lower - in the area of 10% to 20% pre-offer, and 20% to 40% post-offer. [ 49 ] I do not accept [NAME]’s proposed range. In my view, it understates the commercial scale and intensity of the litigation and does not give Rule 420 the significance it deserves. Nor do I accept the proposition that because some lump sum authorities arise in intellectual property matters, substantial lump sums are somehow confined to that context (such as [COMPANY] v [COMPANY], 2020 [NAME] 299 and [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2008 [NAME] 1070). I disagree with the suggestion that lump sums should be confined to any given area of the law. [ 50 ] As stated above, the considerations of whether to award lump sum or Tariff B costs are broader: adequate indemnification, fairness, efficiency, and the conduct the Rules seek to encourage and discourage within the litigation process writ broadly, rather than pertaining to any given area of the law. [ 51 ] Turning to [NAME]’s position, I am not persuaded that 80% post-settlement offers is an appropriate percentage. A post-offer percentage at that level approaches near full indemnity. [NAME] is correct that Rule 420 doubling is conceptually distinct from solicitor-client costs, but that does not allay the practical concern that the resulting award not become disproportionate. Rather, the appropriate approach is to select a robust but restrained percentage that reflects the complexity and importance of the case, the substantial work required, [NAME]’s success, [NAME]’s rejection of reasonable settlement offers, and the need for proportionality. [ 52 ] Considering the principles reviewed above, I award [NAME] a lump sum equal to 33% of its reasonable legal fees incurred up to January 11, 2023, and 66% of its reasonable legal fees incurred thereafter as a result of Rule 420. These percentages are within the norm for lump sum awards (see, for instance, [NAME] at para 22; [NAME] at paras 15, 22; [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2015 FCA 9 at para 6). [ 53 ] The dual approach I am adopting of 33% and 66% meaningfully distinguishes the pre-offer and post-offer periods, gives real effect to Rule 420, and avoids the significant under-compensation that would result from a tariff B cost award. It also better reflects the fact that a substantial portion of [NAME]’s fees were incurred after the first offer to settle. [NAME] note that $680,534.50 of its fees were incurred before January 11, 2023, and $1,185,457.47 thereafter. [ 54 ] Applying the percentages yields the following costs award: Pre-offer fees: $680,534.50 × 33% = $224,576.39 Post-offer fees: $1,185,457.47 × 66% = $782,401.93 Total lump sum legal fees adding these two fees: $1,006,978.32 [ 55 ] This lump sum figure represents a fair and proportionate contribution to [NAME]’s legal fees taking into account all the circumstances. It provides a meaningful contribution without approaching full indemnification.

IV. Assessment of Disbursements [ 56 ] [NAME] seeks recovery of its disbursements in the amount of $296,067.61, supported by affidavit evidence and detailed schedules. [ 57 ] [NAME] does not dispute that reasonable disbursements are recoverable but challenges certain categories, and in particular, expert fees and document management expenses. [NAME] submits that these amounts should be reduced or denied on the basis that they are insufficiently supported by evidence or were not reasonably incurred. [ 58 ] Indeed, disbursements must be both reasonable and justified expenditures in relation to the issues at trial ( [NAME] at para 20). The question is not whether the expense ultimately proved determinative at trial, but whether it was reasonably incurred in light of the nature of the proceeding ( Maison des [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 1999 CanLII 7495 ([NAME]) at para 25). With these principles in mind, those expenses fall under three broad categories: (A) expert fees, (B) document hosting and management, and (C) residual disbursements. A. Expert Fees [ 59 ] [NAME] claims $101,277.35 in expert fees for their expert, [NAME]. [NAME] submits that this amount should be reduced or disallowed because [NAME] did not produce underlying invoices and did not explain the increase in the expert’s hourly rate. [ 60 ] I do not accept [NAME]’s submission. In my view, it does not reflect the evidentiary record. While supporting documentation is relevant, the absence of invoices is not determinative where the disbursement is otherwise supported by sworn evidence, and its necessity is evident from the record ( [NAME] at para 20). [ 61 ] Expert evidence was central to the issues before the Court. The quantification of damages, particularly [NAME]’s lost-profit claim required specialized economic and industry expertise. I considered both of [NAME]’s expert reports, heard his compelling testimony, and relied on his convincing evidence in determining damages. [NAME] was an experienced and knowledgeable, highly specialized expert, whose opinion was integral to the Court’s analysis. Given the industry in question and the issues raised at trial, the retention of an expert and his associated costs for this action were both very necessary, and reasonable. [ 62 ] [NAME]’s concerns regarding the expert’s hourly rate do not establish that the fees were unreasonable. [NAME]’s uncontradicted evidence is that the expert’s rates remained below those of senior counsel, a benchmark this Court has previously recognized as relevant in assessing reasonableness ( [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2007 [NAME] 708 at para 10). [ 63 ] I am therefore satisfied that the expert fees were reasonably incurred and should be allowed in full. B. Document Hosting and Management [ 64 ] [NAME] claims $70,520.96 for third party document hosting and management, together with $24,643.62 for in-house document hosting. The use of document management systems and third-party hosting services for e-discovery included [NAME]’s: day-to-day purchase and sale of grain; prevailing wheat and canola prices; [NAME]’s costs of purchasing, processing, marketing, and transporting grain; vessel terminal operations; railcar movements; ocean vessel movements; vessel demurrage charges; and competitor and customer information. [ 65 ] [NAME] submits that these expenses are unreasonable, emphasizing that only a small subset of documents reviewed by [NAME] was ultimately relied upon at trial. In my view, [NAME]’s contention reflects an incorrect focus on the documents ultimately used at trial, which is not an appropriate measure of whether document-related costs were reasonably incurred. Documentary disclosure obligations are governed by Rules 222 and 223 of the [NAME] and the established Peruvian Guano test, which requires parties to disclose not only documents directly relevant to the issues, but also those that may lead to a train of inquiry (see discussion of these principles in [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2008 FCA 287 at paras 16-19). [ 66 ] In a case of this nature, namely with an underlying significant commercial dispute spanning an extended period of time and touching on multiple aspects of [NAME]’s grain trading operations, compliance with those obligations necessarily required the review and processing of a large volume of documents. It is trite to state that the wide scope of document review is a routine and invariably necessary feature of commercial litigation of this scale. The types of technological tools utilized by the Plaintiff enable parties to comply efficiently with their disclosure obligations and to manage large evidentiary records. [ 67 ] In short, [NAME] has not demonstrated that [NAME]’s disbursements were unreasonable, unnecessary, or disproportionate. I am therefore satisfied that the document hosting and management expenses were reasonably incurred and should be allowed in full. C. Remaining Disbursements [ 68 ] The remaining disbursements include witness travel expenses, transcript costs, research charges, and administrative expenses. They, too, are typical of complex commercial litigation. [NAME] does not identify any specific item that is excessive or improperly claimed. On the record before me, these disbursements appear entirely reasonable and proportionate to a proceeding that culminated in a 15-day trial involving extensive documentary and expert evidence gathered through a decade of litigation. D. Conclusion on Disbursements [ 69 ] In light of the foregoing, I am satisfied that [NAME]’s disbursements were reasonably and necessarily incurred and are supported by the evidence. [NAME] is therefore entitled to recover its disbursements in full in the amount of $296,067.61.

V. Post-Judgment Interest [ 70 ] [NAME] seeks post-judgment interest on the costs award at 5% per annum, commencing from the date of the costs Order. I find that request to be reasonable, given the commercial nature of the dispute, and my earlier treatment of interest (at paras 419-434 of [NAME] v. [NAME] , explaining the 5% interest rate selected in that judgment). Post-judgment interest shall accordingly accrue on the costs award at 5% per annum from the date of this Order.

VI. Conclusion [ 71 ] [NAME] was the successful party in this complex commercial action. The monetary stakes were substantial. The proceeding required extensive factual development, expert evidence, intensive document management, numerous procedural steps, and a lengthy trial. Tariff B, even as amended, would not provide adequate indemnification in these circumstances. A lump sum award is appropriate. [NAME] had the benefit of two settlement offers, both materially more favourable to it than the result ultimately obtained at trial. Rule 420 must have meaningful impact in the circumstances. At the same time, the award must remain within a reasonable range for lump sum costs. [ 72 ] A lump sum award of 33% of pre-offer fees and 66% of post-offer fees appropriately balances these considerations. [NAME] is awarded lump sum legal fees of $1,006,978.32, disbursements of $296,067.61, for a total costs award of $1,303,045.93, together with post-judgment interest at 5% per annum from the date of this Order.

ORDER in T-1292-15 THIS COURT ORDERS that : The plaintiff, [COMPANY], is awarded costs payable by the defendant, [COMPANY], in the total amount of $1,303,045.93 inclusive of tax, comprised of: $1,006,978.32 for legal fees, fixed on a lump sum basis; and $296,067.61 for disbursements. Post-judgment interest shall accrue on the total costs award at a rate of 5% per annum from the date of this Order, until paid. "Alan S. Diner" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1292-15 STYLE OF CAUSE: [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] IN WRITING PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURTS RULES, WITHOUT THE PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE PARTIES

ORDER and

REASONS: DINER J. DATED: April 28, 2026 WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY : [NAME] For The Plaintiff [NAME] FOR THE DEFENDANT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY] and Solicitors Vancouver, British Columbia For [COMPANY] and Solicitors Saskatoon, Saskatchewan For The Defendant