Federal Court Declares Litigant Vexatious Litigant

Date: 20260323 Docket: A-111-25 Citation: 2026 FCA 60 CORAM: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. BETWEEN: [NAME] Appellant and [COMPANY] ([NAME]) Respondent Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on March 11, 2026. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 23, 2026.

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: [NAME] J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. Date: 20260323 Docket: A-111-25 Citation: 2026 FCA 60 CORAM: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. BETWEEN: [NAME] Appellant and [COMPANY] ([NAME]) Respondent

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT [NAME] J.A. [ 1 ] [NAME] appeals a decision of the Federal Court: 2025 [NAME] 504. The Federal Court declared [NAME] to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 40 of the Federal Courts Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.

Accordingly, the Court regulated [NAME]’s access to the Court by prohibiting him from instituting or continuing litigation and from filing documents in that Court without leave. The Federal Court also dismissed an action that [NAME] had commenced against the [COMPANY]: [NAME] Decision at para.

55.

I. Background [ 2 ] [NAME] and his brother [NAME], who is not a party to this proceeding, are directors of [COMPANY]. The Sandhus were licensed immigration consultants until the [COMPANY]’s Discipline Committee found them liable for professional misconduct and revoked their licences: Appeal Book at 158–84, 212–26. The Committee ordered the Sandhus to notify their clients and the public of the revocation, and to issue refunds to clients who were provided inadequate services: Appeal Book at 224–25. The disciplinary proceedings spanned over two years, during which the Sandhus brought numerous proceedings challenging the authenticity of the [COMPANY]’s evidence. These include five unsuccessful motions in the Committee’s proceedings, one action against the [COMPANY] in the Federal Court and three judicial review applications also in the Federal Court: [NAME] Decision at paras. 7–10, 14–17, 19, 21; Appeal Book at 77–79, 112–13, 116–17, 121–23, 136–43, 187–94, 238–46, 336–54. The action and judicial review applications were either dismissed or discontinued: Appeal Book at 197–205, 432, 436. [ 3 ] Following the revocation of his licence, [NAME] continued to bring a barrage of legal proceedings to the Federal Court. With his brother, he applied for judicial review of the final decision by the Committee in the disciplinary proceedings, including the revocation of their licences: [NAME] Decision at para. 23; Appeal Book at 440–48. [NAME] also brought an action against the [COMPANY] and an application seeking an order in the nature of mandamus against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Attorney General of Canada: [NAME] Decision at paras. 25–26; Appeal Book at 504–37, 677–83. He also filed motions and sent letters to the Federal Court that are too numerous to mention: see for instance [NAME] Decision at para. 26; Appeal Book at 253–56, 286–289, 357–360, 451–53, 591–95, 642–47, 800–07, 1906–09, 1914–15, 1924–28, 1933, 1942–45. [NAME] also unsuccessfully asked this Court to set aside one of the Federal Court’s orders: [NAME] v. Attorney General of Canada (27 November 2024), Ottawa A-322-24 (FCA); [NAME] Decision at para. 24; Appeal Book at 760–68, 1992–96. [ 4 ] As mentioned, the Federal Court allowed the [COMPANY]’s application for a vexatious litigant order. It also dismissed [NAME]’s remaining action against the [COMPANY] (T-1428-24), the other action having been discontinued. Of note, the Federal Court did not dismiss [NAME]’s and his brother’s judicial review application of the Discipline Committee’s decision to revoke their licences (T-983-23): [NAME] Decision at para. 55. [ 5 ] On appeal, [NAME] criticizes the Federal Court for having: 1) misapplied the vexatious litigant legal test; 2) dismissed his action without considering its merits; 3) breached his right to procedural fairness by failing to rule on his motion to admit a letter from the Privacy Commissioner; and 4) undermined judicial integrity by making prejudicial comments in respect of his ongoing judicial review application. [ 6 ] I disagree.

II. Analysis [ 7 ] The Federal Court’s decisions to declare a person a vexatious litigant under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act and to dismiss an action for lack of merit are discretionary: [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2025 FCA 66 at para. 4, citing [NAME] v. Canada , 2022 FCA 190 at para. 4 and other decisions. As such, this Court may overturn the Federal Court only if it erred in law or committed a palpable and overriding error on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law: [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2002 SCC 33; Hospira Healthcare Corporation v. [NAME] of Rheumatology , 2016 FCA 215 at paras. 28, 72, 79. [ 8 ] There were no such errors. A. No misapplication of the legal principles on vexatious litigants [ 9 ] Regarding the vexatious litigant test, the Federal Court properly identified the overarching question before it—whether [NAME]’s ungovernability or harmfulness to the court system and its participants justify regulating his court access—and the “hallmarks” of vexatiousness that have been repeatedly affirmed by this Court: [NAME] Decision at paras. 42–43 citing [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FCA 28 at para. 18 and Canada v. [NAME], 2017 FCA 42 at paras. 32–34. [ 10 ] [NAME] is right that vexatiousness “comes in all shapes and sizes” : Appellant’s Corrected Memorandum at para. 15, citing [NAME] at para.

32. And so, the Federal Court considered [NAME]’s particular circumstances to determine whether they bore the hallmarks of vexatiousness. [ 11 ] These circumstances included [NAME]’s pattern of continuously relitigating and seeking investigation into his claim that the [COMPANY] and its affiliates have forged signatures: [NAME] Decision at para.

48. They also included [NAME]’s “continued and repeated allegations against the [COMPANY] regarding forgery, fraud, tampering with evidence, unethical practices, and ‘serious criminal violations’” : [NAME] Decision at paras. 49–50. The Federal Court found these allegations, raised in proceedings and motions where they were irrelevant to the issues at play, to be scandalous, frivolous, unsupported and damaging to the [COMPANY], the Discipline Committee, individual staff, adjudicators and counsel: [redacted] [ 12 ] There are no discernible errors in the Federal Court’s assessment of the facts, let alone any that are palpable and overriding. [ 13 ] [NAME] resists this conclusion and says the Federal Court focused too much on the number of proceedings that he brought instead of considering their merits. This argument cannot succeed. [ 14 ] The Federal Court considered the merits of the proceedings. It said that the merits of [NAME]’s allegations regarding the authenticity of the [COMPANY]’s evidence may be relevant to his judicial review application of the Discipline Committee’s decision: [NAME] Decision at para.

49. Since this application is ongoing, it will be for the Federal Court to consider whether the allegations are relevant and, if so, determine the weight to give them. However, the Federal Court found that continuously and frivolously raising these allegations in a series of proceedings and motions where these allegations are irrelevant should not be allowed to go on: [NAME] Decision at paras. 49, 53. B. No error in dismissing [NAME]’s action [ 15 ] In the action that the Federal Court dismissed (T-1428-24), [NAME] claimed the [COMPANY] was engaged in “very serious criminal violations” involving the forgery of documents and signatures. He sought a declaration that his Charter rights had been violated and claimed damages totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, among other relief: Appeal Book at 2072, 2095, 2101–03; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. [ 16 ] [NAME] argues that the Federal Court failed to consider the merits of his action before dismissing it. Again, the Federal Court did consider the merits: it found that the action had no merit and dismissed it for this very reason: [NAME] Decision at para.

55. Given that [NAME] cannot point to an error of law or a palpable and overriding error that tainted this decision, this Court cannot overturn it. C. No breach of procedural fairness resulting from absence of ruling on the motion [ 17 ] To appreciate [NAME]’s argument that the Federal Court breached his right to procedural fairness by failing to rule on his motion to admit the Privacy Commissioner’s letter, it is helpful to provide context. [ 18 ] Subsection 40(2) of the Federal Courts Act says that an application for an order declaring a person a vexatious litigant “may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada” . Here, the [COMPANY] twice obtained the Attorney General’s consent: on May 3, 2024, that is, a few months before July 19, 2024, when the [COMPANY] filed its application, and again on August 14, 2024. The [COMPANY] filed both consents with the Federal Court: Appeal Book at 60–63. [ 19 ] Ever since the consents were served and filed, [NAME] has been challenging their validity and seeking the information the [COMPANY] communicated to the Attorney General to obtain them: Appeal Book at 644–69, 696–99. For this purpose, [NAME] brought motions and wrote various letters to the Federal Court. For instance, in February 2025, he brought a motion seeking disclosure of “all records, documents, communications, and materials” relied upon by the Attorney General in issuing its consents. The motion also sought an order that the consents be quashed on the grounds they were improperly obtained and because of “the lack of disclosure” : Appeal Book at 1924–28. The Federal Court rejected [NAME]’s motion because the rules [NAME] relied on do not allow for the disclosure sought, and because neither the Federal Courts Rules nor the Federal Courts Act provides the authority to quash the Attorney General’s consents: Appeal Book at 2038–42. [ 20 ] Shortly after the Federal Court rejected [NAME]’s motion, and a few days before the hearing of the [COMPANY]’s application, he served another notice of motion on the [COMPANY]. This time, the motion was for “an order granting [[NAME]] leave to file the Privacy Commissioner’s March 7, 2025 Letter” and “requesting the [Federal] Court [to] take judicial notice of the findings contained in the … Letter” : Appeal Book at 1942–45. [ 21 ] The decision under appeal does not discuss this motion. [ 22 ] [NAME] says by failing to rule on this second motion, the Federal Court breached his right to procedural fairness. He adds that the Privacy Commissioner’s letter “confirmed [the Department of Justice’s] unlawful refusal to disclose the evidentiary basis of the consents” and that “[t]his raised serious doubt as to whether the consents were lawfully obtained” : Appellant’s Corrected Memorandum at para. 11. [ 23 ] This argument fails for the following reasons. [ 24 ] First, there is no evidence before this Court that the motion was filed with the Federal Court nor is there evidence as to the content of the Privacy Commissioner’s letter. In this regard, in the order dated August 22, 2025 determining the content of the appeal book, this Court wrote that the Privacy Commissioner’s letter could not be included because [NAME] had not brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence under Rule 351 of the Federal Courts Rules . [NAME] did not bring such a motion afterwards. [ 25 ] Without the Privacy Commissioner’s letter, this Court cannot entertain [NAME]’s arguments about the lawfulness of the Attorney General’s actions. [NAME] is essentially asking this Court to find the Attorney General’s consent was invalid without bringing any evidence to support that conclusion. It is an error of law for a court to draw a factual conclusion based on a total absence of evidence: R. v. J.M.H. , 2011 SCC 45 at para. 25, citing Schuldt v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 592 at 604. Therefore, [NAME]’s argument must be rejected. [ 26 ] Second, section 40 requires the Attorney General to consent. While subsection 40(2) states that the Attorney General “is entitled to be heard on the application” , he is not required to participate in the hearing or explain why he consented to the application. [ 27 ] Third, a compelling argument can be made that the Attorney General’s decision to consent to an application is not amenable to judicial review: see, for example, [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 [NAME] 924   at paras. 11–14. The Attorney General’s consent does not affect the legal rights of someone who is the subject of a vexatious litigant application, does not impose legal obligations on this person and does not cause this person prejudicial effects: Empire Company Limited v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FCA 34 at para. 7 and cases there cited. Rather, a person’s legal rights are affected by a section 40 application only after the court hears the application on its merits and grants the order. [ 28 ] Finally, the Attorney General’s reason for consenting to the [COMPANY]’s application for a vexatious litigant order is irrelevant to the issue that was before the Federal Court: whether [NAME]’s ungovernability or harmfulness to the court system and its participants justify regulating his access to the Court. To answer that question, the Federal Court was required to consider [NAME]’s circumstances. This is what the Federal Court did. In this context, [NAME]’s argument that the Federal Court violated his right to procedural fairness by not hearing his motion to admit the Privacy Commissioner’s letter must be rejected. D. No undermining of judicial integrity [ 29 ] The fact the Federal Court cast some doubt on the merits of [NAME]’s and his brother’s ongoing judicial review did not “undermine the integrity” of proceedings or risk creating a reasonable apprehension of bias, as [NAME] claims: Appellant’s Corrected Memorandum at paras. 19–20. [ 30 ] The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is well-established: whether a reasonable, right-minded, and informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would conclude the deciding judge—whether consciously or unconsciously—is unable to decide the matter fairly and impartially: [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FCA 64 at para. 7, citing Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al. , [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394. The onus is on the party making the allegation to show a “real likelihood or probability of bias” : Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General) , 2015 SCC 25 at para. 25. [ 31 ] Here, it is premature for [NAME] to say his judicial review application will not be fairly treated merely because the Federal Court, in the decision under appeal, expressed concerns about its merits without dismissing it. A reasonable and right-minded person would not think the Federal Court could not subsequently hear [NAME]’s judicial review application with an open mind.

III. Disposition [ 32 ] In light of the above, I would dismiss [NAME]’s appeal. [ 33 ] With respect to costs, [NAME] argues the $10,822.37 in costs awarded to the [COMPANY] in the Federal Court was excessive and unfairly disadvantaged him as a self-represented litigant bringing “bona fide Charter-based claims” : Appellant’s Corrected Memorandum at para.

22. Rule 400(1) of the Federal Courts Rules gives the Court “full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs” . Absent an error of law, a costs order will only be set aside where there is a palpable and overriding error: [NAME] at para. 18, citing Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers , 2013 SCC 6 at para. 247, citing [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. , 2004 SCC 9 at para. 27; [NAME] v. Canada , 2025 FCA 25 at para. 44. [NAME] does not allege any error of law, and I see no palpable and overriding error in the Federal Court’s costs order. [ 34 ] With respect to the costs of this appeal, the [COMPANY] has filed a bill of costs, accompanied by an affidavit of service, requesting $5,220 in fees. At the hearing, [NAME] made no submissions on costs, leaving it to the Court’s discretion. Given the outcome of the appeal, I would award costs to the [COMPANY] in the fixed amount requested. “[NAME]” J.A. “I agree. [NAME] J.A.” “I agree. [NAME] J.A.” FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-111-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v. [COMPANY] ([NAME]) PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: March 11, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: [NAME] J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. DATED: MARCH 23, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Appellant ON HIS [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY], Ontario For The Respondent