Federal Court Dismisses Claimant's Application for Judicial Review

Date: 20260402 Docket: IMM-18936-24 Citation: 2026 FC 431 Ottawa, Ontario, April 2, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice McHaffie BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] On this application for judicial review, [NAME] challenges the reasonableness of a finding by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada [IRB] that he could safely and reasonably seek refugee within Nigeria. [NAME] found [NAME] could avail himself of such an internal flight alternative [IFA] and was therefore neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ]. [ 2 ] [NAME] argues that in reaching this conclusion, [NAME] ignored both his testimony and the corroborative evidence in respect of the means and motivation of his agents of harm, a violent group called the [NAME]. Most centrally, he argues that [NAME] unreasonably concluded that he had not established that the [NAME] were responsible for his sister’s death, which occurred two months after he moved from his home village to live with her. He also argues that [NAME] erred in its assessment of the country condition evidence when it concluded that he could reasonably relocate to the proposed IFA city. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, I conclude [NAME]’s decision was reasonable. [NAME] did not ignore either [NAME]’s testimony or the corroborative evidence relevant to means and motivation, and in particular the evidence related to his sister’s death. Rather, [NAME] reasonably concluded that neither [NAME]’s own belief nor the other evidence established that the [NAME] were in fact responsible for his sister’s death. [NAME] argues it is highly unlikely in all the circumstances that someone unrelated to the [NAME] killed his sister, this argument effectively asks the Court to reassess the evidence and draw its own conclusions, which is not its role on judicial review. It is also not an argument that was presented to [NAME]. [NAME]’s criticisms of [NAME]’s conclusion that he could reasonably relocate to the proposed IFA also fail to identify a reviewable error. [ 4 ] [NAME]’s application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

II. Issues and Standard of Review [ 5 ] In his challenge to [NAME]’s decision, [NAME] raises the following issues: [NAME] err in finding there was no serious possibility of persecution in the IFA city, and in particular did it disregard [NAME]’s testimony or the corroborative evidence? [NAME] err in assessing whether it was reasonable for [NAME] to relocate to the IFA city, and in particular by failing to take his particular situation into consideration as it relates to the objective country condition evidence? [ 6 ] The parties agree that [NAME]’s decision on these issues is reviewable on the reasonableness standard: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 16–17, 23–25; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 459 at para 11. The reasonableness standard is a deferential standard, but it remains a “robust form of review” : [NAME] at para 13. [ 7 ] When reviewing a decision on this standard, the Court does not hold a new hearing, assessing the evidence for itself and reaching its own determinations. Rather, the Court reviews the decision that has been made by the body tasked by Parliament with making the decision—here [NAME]—to assess whether the decision is internally coherent and shows the hallmarks of a reasonable decision, namely transparency, intelligibility, and justification: [NAME] at paras 15, 83, 99, 125–128. [NAME]’s assessment of the evidence is subject to judicial review, this does not mean that the Court can conduct its own reweighing or reassessment of the evidence: [NAME] at para 125. However, if an applicant can show that the decision maker fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it on a sufficiently central issue, the decision may be unreasonable: [NAME] at paras 100, 126.

III. Legal Framework: The Two-Pronged Test for the Existence of an IFA [ 8 ] The protection Canada provides to Convention refugees and persons in need of protection is offered as a surrogate or substitute protection for those who cannot find refuge or protection in their country of citizenship: Canada (Attorney General) v Ward , 1993 CanLII 105, [1993] 2 SCR 689 at p 709. As a result, those who can safely and reasonably move to another location within their own country to avoid the dangers they face are expected to do so: [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1993 CanLII 3011, [1994] 1 FC 589 (CA) at pp 592–593, 597; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1069 at para 15. [ 9 ] The term “internal flight alternative” (IFA) is used as a shorthand way of describing such a situation, where a person may be in danger of persecution in one part of a country but not another: [NAME] at p 592. The notion of an IFA is inherent in the definition of Convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA : [NAME] at paras 592–593; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1991 CanLII 13517, [1992] 1 FC 706 (CA) at p 710. It is similarly relevant to the definition of a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA , which requires that a person be at risk “in every part of” their country of nationality: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 FCA 99 at para 16; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 502 at paras 45–46; IRPA , s 97(1)(b)(ii). As a result, a claimant who has a viable IFA will not qualify for refugee protection in Canada as either a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, regardless of the merits of other aspects of their claim: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 799 at para 7. [ 10 ] The legal framework for assessing whether a refugee claimant has a viable IFA has not changed in the 35 years since it was set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] . The assessment has two branches or “prongs” which, in essence, assess whether the IFA location is safe and reasonable. The first prong asks whether the claimant would be free from risk ( i.e. , a serious possibility of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA or a danger or risk described in section 97 of the IRPA ) in the IFA. The second prong asks whether it is reasonable for the claimant to seek refuge in the IFA in all the circumstances, including the conditions in the IFA and circumstances particular to the claimant: [redacted] [ 11 ] Both of these prongs must be met, with the burden ultimately being on the claimant to prove their claim. Thus, where the possibility of an IFA is raised, a claimant must show they would be at risk in the IFA and/or that it would be unreasonable for them to move there: [NAME] at pp 594–595; [NAME] at para 9. In assessing whether an IFA is reasonable under the second prong, the threshold is high, in that there must be concrete evidence of conditions that would jeopardize the claimant’s life or safety in travelling or relocating to the IFA: [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2000 CanLII 16789, [2001] 2 FC 164 (CA) at para 15.

IV. Analysis A. [NAME]’s decision with respect to the risk of persecution in the IFA city was reasonable (1) [NAME]’s claim for refugee protection [ 12 ] As noted at the outset, [NAME]’s refugee claim is based on his fear of a terrorist group known as the [NAME]. [NAME] testified that he worked as a security guard in the house of a prominent politician in his home village. In mid-January 2020, members of the [NAME] sought to recruit him as a member, since the information he had due to his employment could be useful to them. When [NAME] refused, the men threatened to kill him. [ 13 ] About three weeks later, in early February, men came to the house where [NAME] lived with his father, looking for him. [NAME] was at work at the time, the men shot and killed his father. The following day, the men returned and burned the Odors’ house down. After the fire, [NAME] moved to another city to stay with his elder sister. About two months later, in early April, men came to his sister’s house while he was away and killed her. [NAME] believes that the men who killed his father, burned the house, and killed his sister were all from the [NAME] group and were targeting him. [ 14 ] Following his sister’s death, [NAME] remained in his sister’s city, living with a church member. Eight months to a year later, in either January or April 2021, he received a text message from the [NAME], stating that they had a tracking device and would find [NAME] wherever he went. With the assistance of a [NAME] and the church, [NAME] raised money and fled to Guyana. He later left for Brazil where he made an initial refugee claim. However, due to other threats, he left and travelled north, through various countries including the United States. He crossed into Canada in April 2022 and filed his refugee claim in September 2022. [ 15 ] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the IRB heard [NAME]’s claim in December 2023 and April 2024. In a decision dated May 21, 2024, the RPD rejected the claim on the basis that [NAME] had a viable IFA. [NAME] appealed the RPD’s decision to [NAME]. (2) [NAME]’s conclusions on risk in the IFA [ 16 ] [NAME] adopted the RPD’s conclusion that [NAME]’s testimony was credible. However, [NAME] also agreed with the RPD’s application of the two-part test for an IFA, concluding that [NAME] had a viable IFA within Nigeria. In looking at [NAME]’s risk under the first prong of the IFA test, [NAME] accepted [NAME]’s account of the factual events that occurred. However, it did not accept the conclusions or inferences that [NAME] drew from the events in respect of the means and motivation of the [NAME] to locate him in the IFA location. [NAME] therefore found that [NAME] had not established that he faced a serious possibility of persecution or any section 97 risks in the IFA location. [ 17 ] Central to this conclusion was [NAME]’s finding that [NAME] had not established that the [NAME] had killed his sister while looking for him. As a result, [NAME] did not accept the sister’s death as evidence that the [NAME] had tracked [NAME] to a location outside his home village. [ 18 ] [NAME] noted that [NAME] himself had no direct knowledge or evidence regarding who killed his sister. Rather, he had simply testified that he thought it was the [NAME] since “there is not [any] other body or group that would have been responsible.” [NAME] found that this testimony was speculative and noted that a contemporaneous report on insecurity in the sister’s city noted a rising number of abductions and attacks at that time. [ 19 ] In reaching this finding, [NAME] rejected [NAME]’s argument that his evidence that the [NAME] had killed his sister should be accepted since no adverse credibility findings had been made about his testimony. Relying on the jurisprudence of this Court, [NAME] found that accepting a claimant’s evidence regarding the facts that they have witnessed did not require it to accept the inferences that the claimant wished to draw from those facts: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 79 at para 10; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 640 at para 11. It found that while [NAME] may have a sincere belief that he is not safe anywhere in Nigeria, there must be sufficient evidence that the belief is objectively founded. [ 20 ] Having concluded that the evidence did not establish that the agents of harm had in fact tracked [NAME] to another city, [NAME] also found that the evidence did not establish that they had the motivation or the means to do so. On the issue of motivation, [NAME] referred to the single text message sent in 2021, the absence of any further communication from the [NAME], and the fact that neither [NAME]’s siblings who live in the IFA city, nor any other family or friends in Nigeria, had been contacted concerning his whereabouts. On the issue of means, [NAME] considered the National Documentation Package [NDP] for Nigeria published by the IRB, finding that it did not indicate that the agents of harm had a network or other means to track [NAME] in the IFA location. [NAME] therefore concluded that [NAME] had not shown that he would face a risk in the IFA. (3) [NAME] did not disregard [NAME]’s testimony [ 21 ] On this application for judicial review, [NAME] argues [NAME] unreasonably dismissed his unchallenged testimony that the [NAME] wanted to kill him and would be able to locate him throughout Nigeria. He asserts that he credibly testified that he would be in danger throughout Nigeria and argues that [NAME] failed to take his testimony and personal experience with the [NAME] into consideration when considering the issues of motivation and means. [ 22 ] I am not persuaded. As [NAME] reasonably concluded, accepting that [NAME] was credible in recounting what he experienced and saw does not mean that his subjective beliefs or the conclusions he inferred from what he experienced and saw are objectively true: [NAME] at para 10; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1410 at para 16; [NAME] at para 25. It was reasonable for [NAME] not to simply accept [NAME]’s conclusion that, in his view, it must have been the [NAME] who killed his sister, particularly given [NAME]’s reference to evidence that showed increased violence from other sources in the area. Ultimately, [NAME]’s argument amounts to a request that the Court reassess the evidence and substitute its own view of the inferences to be drawn from it for those of [NAME]. As set out above, this is not the role of the Court on judicial review. [ 23 ] [NAME] asserts that his case is like that in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 252. There, the evidence demonstrated a “clear pattern of escalating threats that put [NAME] and his family in extreme danger” : [NAME] at paras 87–88. As a result, the Court concluded that the fact that one incident may have been unconnected to these events “hardly seems to matter” : [NAME] at para 88. [NAME] contends that he was similarly subject to a pattern of escalating threats and violence that put him in extreme danger, which justifies the inference that the [NAME] were responsible for his sister’s death. [ 24 ] However, in [NAME] , the evidence did establish that the same agents of harm were behind a series of escalating violent events. In the present case, the sister’s death was the only event that occurred outside [NAME]’s home village. It was therefore of particular importance to assessing whether the [NAME] were able and motivated to track [NAME] outside his village, and thus to his risk in an IFA, a matter that was not in issue in [NAME] . In other words, unlike in [NAME] , whether the sister’s death was connected to the other events clearly does matter. As a result, [NAME] had to consider whether the evidence established that the [NAME] had in fact tracked [NAME] to his sister’s house and killed her when they did not find him. [ 25 ] [NAME] also argues [NAME] should have given greater consideration to the likelihood that his sister’s death, occurring two months after [NAME] arrived to stay with her, and in the wake of the violent events in his own village, was caused by the same agents of harm, rather than being an unrelated or random event of violence. He argues that it would be an unbelievable coincidence for this string of events to have occurred independently, and that [NAME] should have considered this in reaching its conclusion. [ 26 ] I cannot accept this proposition, for two reasons. First, it again amounts to a request that the Court substitute its own assessment of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it for those of [NAME]. This is not the Court’s role, absent an indication that [NAME] fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence, which it did not do: [NAME] at paras 125–126. This is not a situation in which the evidence can only reasonably lead to one possible inference or conclusion, and it was open to [NAME] to reach the conclusion that the connection between the sister’s death and the agents of harm was not established. [ 27 ] Second, this argument was not put before [NAME] for its consideration. [NAME] did ask [NAME] to accept that the [NAME] were responsible for his sister’s death, but his arguments were limited to the submissions that (a) his testimony was found credible; (b) the RPD had accepted his evidence that the [NAME] had murdered his sister and [NAME] should similarly accept this; and (c) corroborative evidence was not required. [NAME] directly addressed these arguments in its reasons. [NAME] cannot generally be faulted for failing to consider an argument that was not put to it, such that applicants are generally precluded from raising new arguments on judicial review: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2016 FCA 272 at para 6, citing Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v [COMPANY] , 2011 SCC 61 at paras 23–25; [NAME] at paras 127–128. [ 28 ] I am therefore not satisfied that [NAME] has established that [NAME]’s decision was unreasonable in its treatment of his testimony. (4) [NAME] did not disregard the other evidence [ 29 ] [NAME] also contends that his testimony was corroborated by other evidence, and that [NAME] disregarded that evidence in reaching its conclusion on his risk in the IFA city. Again, I am not persuaded. [ 30 ] The corroborative evidence [NAME] presented came in a number of forms: death certificates in respect of his father and sister; a police report recording his statements after his sister’s death; and statements and affidavits from a number of relatives, neighbours, and friends. A number of these statements attributed his sister’s death to the [NAME] (or to “[NAME] terrorists” ). [ 31 ] Contrary to [NAME]’s arguments, [NAME] did not disregard this evidence. Rather, it assessed the evidence and found that it did not establish the inference [NAME] sought to draw, namely that the [NAME] killed his sister. [NAME] made specific reference to the evidence that pertained directly to his sister’s death—her death certificate, the police report, and an affidavit from a [NAME]. [NAME] noted that the [NAME]’s affidavit did not say how they knew, or why they believed, that those who killed [NAME]’s sister were with the [NAME] or that they were after [NAME]. Similarly, the information in the police report came directly from [NAME], who did not witness the death. [NAME] therefore found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the sister’s death demonstrated that the agents of harm had tracked [NAME] to another city. The fact that [NAME] reached a contrary conclusion to the one [NAME] argues should have been made does not mean that it disregarded the evidence. [ 32 ] [NAME] is quite right that a refugee claimant will not always have to produce corroborative evidence of every aspect of their claim, particularly where their own evidence is not doubted: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 968 at paras 24–26. However, this does not mean that it is unreasonable for [NAME] to review all of the evidence, including both [NAME]’s testimony and the corroborative evidence presented, to determine whether a central allegation has been established on the evidence or whether it is only the subject of supposition or speculative inference. [ 33 ] I therefore conclude that [NAME] did not disregard or fundamentally misapprehend the evidence before it relevant to the risk [NAME] might face in the proposed IFA: [NAME] at paras 125–126. Its conclusion with respect to the first prong of the IFA test was reasonable. B. [NAME]’s decision with respect to the reasonableness of the IFA was reasonable (1) [NAME]’s conclusions on the reasonableness of the IFA [ 34 ] [NAME] argued that his personal circumstances and the documentary evidence showed it would be unreasonable for him to relocate to the proposed IFA. He referred to the rampant unemployment and poverty in the proposed IFA and his own limited education; to housing shortages in the proposed IFA; and to the fact that he would be a non-indigene in the IFA, which would limit his access to services, housing, and employment. [NAME] recognized the challenges posed by these factors but found they did not render the IFA unreasonable within the meaning of the jurisprudence. [ 35 ] On the issue of employment, [NAME] referred to the objective evidence in the NDP and to [NAME]’s history of consistent employment, including as a vendor and security guard. It recognized that he might have difficulty finding employment but that this did not rise to the level of undue hardship. [NAME] further noted that the jurisprudence indicates that poor job prospects and a high unemployment rate were not enough to render an IFA objectively unreasonable: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1106 at para 28; see also [NAME] at paras 14–15; see also [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1418 at paras 7, 30–34. [ 36 ] Similarly, [NAME] considered the evidence in the NDP regarding housing in the IFA, but concluded that [NAME]’s housing prospects did not render relocation unreasonable. It noted that there was a transitional housing centre in the IFA where returnees can stay in the short term, and that [NAME] had two siblings there, who could assist in securing housing. [ 37 ] With respect to indigeneity, [NAME] recognized it was an important consideration, but found it did not render the IFA unreasonable, either alone or cumulatively with the other factors. [NAME] noted that all big cities in Nigeria have large migrant communities, and that according to the NDP, indigeneity facilitated settling in an area but was not a requirement and was less important in big cities. In particular, [NAME] referred to the long history of the proposed IFA accommodating non-indigenes, including those of [NAME]’s ethnic group, and to evidence in the NDP indicating that government services, employment in the civil sector, and healthcare were available without distinction based on indigeneity. (2) [NAME] did not fail to consider [NAME]’s circumstances [ 38 ] [NAME] argues that [NAME]’s analysis of the second prong of the IFA test was unreasonable, as [NAME] repeated the errors of the RPD in respect of the issues of employment, housing, and indigeneity. However, [NAME]’s arguments essentially just repeat his submissions regarding these concerns and ask the Court to reach a different conclusion on the reasonableness of the IFA. Again, this is not the role of the Court on judicial review. [ 39 ] In this regard, a number of [NAME]’s submissions—such as his assertion that non-indigenes “do not have access to employment” and “do not have access to housing” in the IFA—overstate the evidence and do not account for the elements of the NDP referred to by [NAME] with respect to the proposed IFA. Other submissions ascribe conclusions to [NAME] that it simply did not reach, such as that the possibility of working in the informal economy would resolve “[a]ll of the employment issues” identified in the objective evidence, or that the 400-bed transitional housing centre would “solve the housing crisis.” [NAME] reached no such broad conclusions. Rather, it considered the various elements of the evidence, and concluded that on balance, [NAME] had not met the high onus to demonstrate that conditions in the proposed IFA were such that they would jeopardize [NAME]’s life or safety. [ 40 ] Having reviewed the arguments made to [NAME], the evidence referred to by [NAME] and [NAME], and the arguments [NAME] now raises, I am not satisfied that [NAME] has identified any unreasonableness in [NAME]’s analysis of the second prong of the IFA test.

V. Conclusion [ 41 ] For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that [NAME] has not demonstrated that [NAME]’s decision was unreasonable in respect of either aspect of its IFA analysis. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. [ 42 ] Neither party proposed a question for certification pursuant to paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA . I agree that no question meeting the requirements for certification arises in the matter.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-18936-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is dismissed. “Nicholas McHaffie” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-18936-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: MONTREAL, QUEBEC DATE OF HEARING: September 11, 2025

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: MCHAFFIE J. DATED: April 2, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Quebec For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Montreal, Quebec For The Respondent