Federal Court Dismisses H&C Permanent Residence Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260603 Docket: IMM-5506-25 Citation: 2026 FC 720 Montréal, [COMPANY_49], June 3, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME_1]: [NAME_2] Applicant and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, [NAME_2], brings an application for judicial review of a decision dated February 25, 2025 [Decision], made by an Officer [Officer] of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada [IRCC], rejecting his application for permanent residence from within Canada based on humanitarian and compassionate [[NAME_8]] grounds pursuant to section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001 c 27 [ IRPA ]. [ 2 ] According to the Applicant, the Officer made two serious errors in their Decision: 1) the hardship analysis was unreasonable in that it failed to adequately consider the hardship that he would face should he return to Egypt, relying instead too heavily on the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] and Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] decisions, and 2) the Officer failed to give sufficient weight to his establishment in Canada, turning positive establishment factors into negative ones, and holding the Applicant to unreasonable expectations regarding his integration. [ 3 ] In response, the Attorney General of Canada [Respondent] submits that the Decision “is reasonable, and that the Applicant has not demonstrated that the decision is affected by shortcomings or flaws that are sufficiently central to render it unreasonable” (citing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ] at para 100). The Respondent further submits that the Applicant is simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence, which is not the role of the Court in a judicial review. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, the application will be dismissed. The Decision is reasonable. The Officer’s detailed reasons show responsiveness to all the evidence and arguments submitted by the Applicant. It was open to the Officer to conclude that although some of the facts established by the Applicant weighed in his favour, they remained insufficient to demonstrate the sort of exceptional circumstances required for granting the relief sought. The Applicant is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence that the specialized administrative decision maker considered in the exercise of their highly discretionary power. This is not the role of the Court in a judicial review.

II. Brief Summary of the Facts [ 5 ] The Applicant is a citizen of Egypt. He is divorced and does not have any children. He has family members residing in Egypt, namely his mother, three sisters and one brother. Additionally, he has two brothers residing in Saudi Arabia. The Applicant resided in Riyadh, United Arab Emirates, from April 2008 to January 2014. After returning to Egypt, he relocated to the United States and resided in Arlington, Virginia, for about 3.5 years until August 2017. He entered Canada on September 8, 2017, and submitted a refugee claim. He has since remained in Canada. His refugee claim was refused by the RPD on October 25, 2018. The RAD upheld the RPD decision on May 24, 2019. The determinative issue before both the RPD and the RAD was credibility. Currently, he works in the food service industry in Montréal. [ 6 ] On August 6, 2020, the Applicant submitted a first application for permanent residence from within Canada on [NAME_8] grounds. This first application was dismissed on or about May 4, 2021. The Applicant then submitted a second [NAME_8] application, which was also refused on June 22, 2023. The Applicant filed for judicial review of the refusal decision of June 22, 2023. On July 16, 2024, this first application for leave and judicial review was discontinued and the matter was sent back for redetermination by a different officer with both parties’ consent. [ 7 ] The Applicant based his [NAME_8] application primarily on two grounds: (1) his establishment and ties in Canada, and (2) the hardship of returning to Egypt. On February 25, 2025, the Officer tasked with the redetermination issued the Decision refusing to grant permanent residence to the Applicant on [NAME_8] grounds.

III. The Decision Under Review [ 8 ] The decision maker’s reasons for the Decision, which span eight pages, show meaningful engagement with the Applicant’s submissions. The Officer stated that even though they may not have referenced each piece of evidence individually, they had reviewed all of evidence and the submissions in this application, including the additional submissions provided as part of the redetermination. Nonetheless, the Officer did explicitly address nearly all of the exhibits submitted. [ 9 ] To be precise, the documents that the Applicant provided are described as follows: Initial submissions Proof of Employment from [NAME_9], vice-president of [NAME_13] (with T4 for 2020); Pay stubs from [NAME_13] from May 24, 2021-August 1, 2021; Notice of assessment for 2020; Copy of lease for apartment; [COMPANY_14] statement from June 1, 2021-August 24, 2021; Letter of support from [NAME_16]; Letter of support from [NAME_19]; Letter of support from [NAME_22]; Letter of support from [NAME_25]; Letter of support from [NAME_29]; Letter of support from [NAME_33]; Letter of support from [NAME_36]; Letter of support from [NAME_39]; Letter of support from [NAME_42]; Letter of support from [NAME_45]. Additional submissions in the context of the redetermination Letter from current employer [COMPANY_48]; Service Canada Record of Employment from April 23, 2023-April 22, 2024; [COMPANY_14] statements from April 1 2024-July 1, 2024; Revenu Quebec Notice of Assessment from 2021-2023; Pay stubs from August 19, 2-24-September 1, 2024; Confirmation of employment letter from previous employer [NAME_12]; Letter of support from [NAME_50]; Letter of support from [NAME_53]; Letter of support from [NAME_33]; Letter of support from [NAME_56]. [ 10 ] In the Decision, the Officer explicitly mentioned all of the letters from the Applicant’s former and current employers, by name. The details given in some of them were discussed, including the fact that the Applicant is described as having “a strong team spirit, appreciated by his colleagues, highly adaptable, demonstrating great professionalism” . The Officer also mentioned the “letters from friends and colleagues” and the “numerous letters of support” highlighting again some of the qualities attributed to [NAME_59], and they cited the letter from [NAME_33] directly. The Officer also expressly mentioned “pay stubs, T4s and Notices of Assessments” , “bank statements” , and the “record of employment” from [COMPANY_60] and detailed the contents of many of these documents. [ 11 ] The Applicant also submitted documents (including reports and articles) related to the conditions of the Nubian ethnic minority in Egypt. Those were not listed in [NAME_61]’s submissions to the Officer and the Officer did not attempt to list them either. But the Officer still identified several of them explicitly and also referred to “articles” and “reports” . In total the Officer spent nearly four pages discussing these. [ 12 ] The Officer highlighted that the task at hand was to determine whether the Applicant would face hardship if he were required to apply for permanent residency from abroad. [ 13 ] Regarding the Applicant’s establishment in Canada, the Officer gave this factor some weight. They noted that the Applicant has been residing in Montréal, [COMPANY_49], since September 2017, a considerable amount of time, and has worked hard to become economically self-sufficient in Canada, steadily increasing his income since 2021. Pointing to the multiple letters of support, the Officer also noted the Applicant’s commitment to supporting his colleagues and employers, and that his friends describe him as a valuable asset. The Officer also acknowledged that the Applicant has established a degree of integration into [COMPANY_62]. However, the Officer was not satisfied that the Applicant’s ties are characterized by any significant inter-dependencies, such that either the Applicant or his Canadian friends would be likely to suffer hardship from physical separation should his [NAME_8] application be refused. The Officer indicated that the Applicant could maintain those relationships through the use of digital communication technologies, noting that this is how he already keeps in touch with his family members who are all living abroad. The Officer also concluded that, besides a letter from his church, which provided “few details about the Applicant’s activities” , and support letters from friends and colleagues, there was little evidence of volunteer or community activities. [ 14 ] The Officer also noted that the Applicant had not provided any evidence that he had tried to apply through another immigration stream and had been unsuccessful, or that he could not be found to be eligible for permanent residency through an economic stream or under an in-Canada pathway, or even for a temporary resident status. In fact, the Officer included links to the [NAME_63]’s Web pages that describe programs under which the Applicant might be able to apply for permanent residence as a foreign worker. The Officer then noted that the hardship inherent to having to leave Canada alone “will not generally be sufficient to warrant relief on [NAME_8] grounds under section 25(1) of the IRPA, nor is section 25 an alternative immigration scheme” . [ 15 ] The decision maker also noted that the Applicant was found to be neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection by the RPD and the RAD. The Officer rightfully stated that their role is not to determine whether a well-founded fear of persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment has been established as those determinations are made under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA . However, they also rightfully noted that underlying facts may be taken into account in determining whether the Applicant’s circumstances warrant [NAME_8] relief. The Officer then summarized the decisions of the RPD and RAD, highlighting that the main issue was credibility. [ 16 ] The Officer then stated that the matter before them was whether the Applicant would face hardship due to his ethnicity and the colour of his skin as a member of the Nubian minority ethnic group. The decision maker noted that they had reviewed all the country condition documents in support of the [NAME_8] application and stated that this evidence indicates that there is a spectrum of possibilities for the hardship that any individual Nubian may experience. While the Officer recognized that [NAME_64] are historically discriminated against, they determined that there was little before them indicating that the Applicant or his family belonged to the groups impacted or lived in one of the villages affected by flooding, forced displacement, or relocation. The Officer noted that the Applicant had not provided sufficient information or evidence pertaining to his personal circumstances when he resided in Egypt to establish the degree of hardship he would be likely to face based on his identity as a Nubian, which prevented the Officer from “establish[ing] where he is on the spectrum of hardship” . [ 17 ] The Officer then considered the Applicant’s submissions and the evidence provided regarding anti-Black racism and general insecurity in Egypt, including in relation to Muslim Brotherhood supporters and the rise of authoritarianism in Egypt. The decision maker balanced these factors against a lack of personalized evidence to establish how likely the Applicant was to face hardship. They found that the Applicant had not provided sufficient evidence of probative value regarding the discrimination he faced while living in Egypt. They further concluded that the Applicant’s family members, whose profiles most closely align with his, continue to reside in Egypt, and that there was little information regarding their personal circumstances or experiences including as they relate to discrimination. The Officer found that the Applicant had not explained how he personally faced hardship due to the generalized country conditions of Egypt; they therefore did not give significant weight to this factor. [ 18 ] The Officer was also not satisfied that the Applicant would be unable to secure employment in Egypt. They noted that the Applicant has siblings currently residing in Egypt and he had not provided evidence that his family, or individuals whose profiles closely align with his, had experienced economic hardship. The Officer also did not have any reason to believe that [NAME_61]’s family members would be unable or unwilling to support him as he reintegrates into Egyptian society, which he has himself been able to do in multiple countries. [ 19 ] The Officer concluded by a summary of his detailed findings: Overall, I grant some weight to the applicant’s establishment in Canada; he has been residing since 2017, has a stable history of employment and earnings, particularly since 2021, and has established some ties in Canada. I also give some weight to country conditions as I sympathize with the unjust treatment of [NAME_64], historic and present. While there will be some difficulty in separating from his ties in Canada and re-establishing himself in Egypt, I have considered that the applicant’s closest ties, his mother and 4 of his siblings continue to reside in Egypt, a place where he grew up and attended school and would reasonably has some social ties in addition to his familial ties, and a place where he would have some familiarity with the language and culture of society. While I sympathize with his fears about securing employment, the applicant has traveled to Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Canada, and secured employment in all of these places. He could reasonably leverage his international experience, skills, and education to secure employment in Egypt. If there are any particular factors the applicant would like to have considered, such as his personal economic situation in Egypt when he resided there, the onus is on the applicant to put forth his claims and provide sufficient evidence to support his claims. I acknowledge that [NAME_65] have dispossessed [NAME_64], and the current government has yet to follow through on its promises of ensuring the return of [NAME_64] to their land and appropriate compensation; yet, there has been some movement towards compensation, which is enshrined in the Constitution. Reports indicate Nubian activists are advocating and securing rights, though much more needs to be done. If there are any particular circumstances the applicant would like to have considered, he must put his best foot forward to establish the hardship he would face with evidence that would meet the evidentiary and legal burden. Having conducted a global assessment, and considered and weighed all relevant factors, I am not satisfied that the humanitarian and compassionate considerations before me justify an exemption under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act . The applicant’s request is refused.

IV. Analysis A. Standard of Review [ 20 ] Both parties submit, and I agree, that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. Reasonableness is the presumptive standard of review for the merits of all administrative decisions ( Vavilov at para 16; [NAME_66] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 7), and none of the circumstances warranting a departure from that presumption arise in the case at bar ( Vavilov at paras 17, 53; [NAME_67]. v Canadian Union of Postal Workers , 2019 SCC 67 at para 27; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v [COMPANY_68] , 2022 SCC 30 at paras 26-28; [NAME_69] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1687 at para 4 [ [NAME_69] ]). [ 21 ] As Justice Gascon explained in [NAME_70] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1933: [14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( [NAME_71] at para 46; [NAME_66] at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” ( Vavilov at para 99, citing notably [NAME_72] v [NAME_73] , 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74). [15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ( [NAME_71] at paras 46–47; [NAME_66] at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ( Vavilov at para 13). [16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence ( [NAME_66] at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker ( Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; [NAME_74] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). [17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” ( Vavilov at para 100). [ 22 ] Decisions that dispose of [NAME_8] applications attract considerable deference for indeed their highly discretionary nature means that there exists a “wider scope of possible reasonable outcomes” ( [NAME_75] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1253 at para 21 citing [NAME_76] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 335 at para 30; [NAME_69] at para 6; [NAME_77] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1313 [ [NAME_77] ] at para 16). B. The law on [NAME_8] applications [ 23 ] Humanitarian and compassionate exemptions are an exceptional discretionary remedy meant to mitigate the rigidity of the law in appropriate cases ( [NAME_78] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 SCC 61 [ [NAME_78] ] at para 19; [NAME_79] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1878 at para 15; [NAME_80] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1394 at para 14). As the Officer correctly pointed out, because “there will inevitably be some hardship associated with being required to leave Canada. This alone will not generally be sufficient to warrant relief on humanitarian and compassionate grounds” ( [NAME_78] at para 23). [ 24 ] As Justice Saint-Fleur noted in Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Brutus , 2025 FC 895 at para 37, it is “fundamental to reassert that [NAME_8] exemptions are exceptional and represent a discretionary remedy (citation omitted) and should therefore remain available for exceptional cases in order to avoid becoming an ‘alternative immigration stream or an appeal mechanism’” (citing notably [NAME_78] at para 90; see also [NAME_77] at para 16). [ 25 ] As the Respondent noted and as the Officer mentioned at the end of their reasons, [NAME_81] bear the onus of adducing proof “of any claim on which their [NAME_8] application relies” and of adducing sufficient evidence to establish that an [NAME_8] exemption is warranted (see [NAME_82] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2004 FCA 38 at paras 5 and 8 [ [NAME_82] ], [NAME_83] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FCA 189 at para 45 [ [NAME_83] ], cited in [NAME_84] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 160 at para 26). Further, as the Respondent again pointed out, Officers are not required to highlight weaknesses in the application or request further submissions or provide an opportunity to fill gaps in the evidence. Applicants “omit pertinent information from their written submissions at their peril” ( [NAME_82] at para 8; [NAME_83] at para 45; [NAME_85] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 664 at paras 26-27 citing [NAME_86] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1242 at paras 31-32. See also, more generally [NAME_87] v [COMPANY_88] , 2001 SCC 44 at para 18). [ 26 ] Applicants bear the burden of proving that the strict application of the law would put them in circumstances which “would excite in a reasonable [person] in a civilized community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of another” ( [NAME_78] at para 21; [NAME_77] at paras 15-16). In this context, since [NAME_78], it is clear that decision makers must consider all relevant factors and not only the hardships that removal would cause; no specific checklist is to be followed ( [NAME_89] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 386 at paras 23-24 cited in [NAME_90] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1188 at para 31). In fact, the Federal Court has followed the Supreme Court’s guidance in rejecting the preexisting “hardship-centric analysis” ( [NAME_91] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 72 at paras 29-38 [ [NAME_91] ]). [ 27 ] In [NAME_92] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 265 at paragraphs 20-25, Chief Justice Crampton, as he was then, wrote a complete and nuanced summary of the applicable law that bears repeating here: [20] Put differently, applicants for [NAME_8] relief must “establish exceptional reasons as to why they should be allowed to remain in Canada” or allowed to obtain [NAME_8] relief from abroad: [NAME_93] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 SCC 3, at para 90. This is simply another way of saying that applicants for such relief must demonstrate the existence of misfortunes or other circumstances that are exceptional, relative to other applicants who apply for permanent residence from within Canada or abroad: [NAME_94], v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 142, at paras 49 and 57; [NAME_95] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 327, at para 67. [21] I recognize that in [NAME_96] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 762, at para 23, this Court suggested that it would be an error to deny an [NAME_8] application based on the absence of “exceptional” or “extraordinary” circumstances. To the extent that this statement is inconsistent or in tension with the principles quoted in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, and with other jurisprudence that can be fairly read as having adopted a similar approach, I consider that it does not accurately reflect the existing state of the law: see, e.g., [NAME_97] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2018 FC 187 at paras 25-26; [NAME_98]. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 930, at paras 37-38; [NAME_99] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1281, at para 31; [NAME_100] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1137, at paras 14-15; [NAME_101] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration , 2018 FC 806, at paras 19-20; [NAME_102] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1229, at para 25; [NAME_103] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 27 at para 29. [22] In the absence of any requirement to demonstrate the existence or likely existence of misfortunes or other [NAME_8] considerations that are greater or more significant in nature than those typically faced by persons who apply for permanent resident status in this country, s. 25 would risk becoming the alternative immigration scheme that the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly sought to avoid: [NAME_78] , above, at para 23. To the extent that this would also increase both the degree of subjectivity in the application of s. 25 and the divergence across decision-makers, it could also be expected to reduce certainty, predictability, and eventually public confidence in the IRPA. [23] In assessing whether an applicant has established sufficient [NAME_8] considerations to warrant a favourable exercise of discretion under s. 25 of the IRPA, all of the relevant facts and factors advanced by the applicant must be considered and weighed: [NAME_78] , above, at para 25. In this regard, the words “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship” should be seen as instructive, but not determinative: [NAME_78] , above, at para 33. [24] However, “since ‘children will rarely, if ever, be deserving of any hardship,’ the concept of ‘unusual and undeserved hardship’ is presumptively inapplicable to the assessment of the hardship invoked by a child to support his or her application for [[NAME_8]] relief”: [NAME_78] , above, at para 41, quoting [NAME_104] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 FCA 475, at para 9 [ [NAME_104] ]. Instead, the assessment of the best interests of such an applicant, and of other directly affected children, must be highly contextual and must be responsive to each child’s particular age, capacity, needs and maturity. While a child’s best interests must be “well identified” and given “substantial weight,” they are not necessarily determinative, and can therefore be outweighed by other considerations: [NAME_78] , above, at paras 35, and 38-39. [25] In determining their best interests, the views of the child should be “given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child”: [NAME_104] , above, at para 48; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can TS 1992 No 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, ratified by Canada 13 December 1991), at Article 12. [ 28 ] In [NAME_105] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 852, at paragraph 86, Justice Kane also provided a helpful summary of the key teachings of this Court’s jurisprudence on the burden of proof that [NAME_81] face , which reads as follows: · An [NAME_8] exemption is discretionary and exceptional relief; · Reviewing courts must not substitute their discretion for that of the Officer; · While undue, undeserved and disproportionate hardship is not required, hardship can be considered; · Some hardship is the normal consequence of removal and, on its own, does not support the exemption; · Applicants must demonstrate with sufficient evidence that the misfortunes or hardships they will face are relatively greater than those typically faced by others seeking permanent residence in Canada; · The BIOC [Best Interest of Children] is an important consideration but is not necessarily determinative of an [NAME_8] application; and All relevant factors must be considered and weighed. As Justice Roy noted in [NAME_77] (at para 16), more than a sympathetic case is required. C. The Decision is reasonable [ 29 ] As previously mentioned, the Applicant submits that the Officer erred both in their analysis of the hardship [NAME_61] would face in Egypt and in giving insufficient weight to his establishment in Canada, ultimately holding [NAME_61] to unreasonable expectations regarding his integration. (1) The hardship analysis was reasonable [ 30 ] The Applicant contends that, in their hardship analysis, the Officer focussed too heavily on the decisions of the RPD and the RAD. The Applicant further asserts that the persecution and risk analysis in a refugee claim is not the same as an analysis of hardship and adverse country conditions in the [NAME_8] context. The Applicant advances that the Officer performed a section 96 and section 97 of the IRPA analysis rather than an analysis of hardship and adverse country conditions in the [NAME_8] context under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA , contrary to the teachings of the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME_78] . [ 31 ] The Applicant further argues that the Officer failed to take into consideration the extensive proof of the hardship he would face in Egypt. He submits that the Officer overlooked or misconstrued substantial evidence on file concerning the systemic discrimination of [NAME_64] in Egypt. Instead, the Officer focused on the lack of personal evidence. He submits that this Court has provided extensive guidance showing that evidence demonstrating conditions faced by an entire population may be relevant and that tying hardship directly to an applicant is not necessary in an [NAME_8] application. In support of this argument, the Applicant cites [NAME_108] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 1018; [NAME_109] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 73 [ [NAME_109] ] at para 20-22; [NAME_110] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1623 at paras 23-24 [ [NAME_110] ]; [NAME_112] c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration) , 2025 CF 1994 at paras 52-53 [ [NAME_112] ] [decision currently available only in French]; [NAME_113] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1510 at para 41 [ [NAME_113] ]. The Applicant takes issue with the fact that the Officer acknowledged the historical hardship faced by [NAME_64] in Egypt, but then proceeded to give more weight to the fact that his “application has not provided sufficient information or evidence regarding [his] personal circumstances to establish the degree to which he is likely to be impacted, or the nature of hardship he may face” . [ 32 ] Therefore, the Applicant argues (1) that the Officer erred in insisting that he provide evidence tying the risk of hardship back to him specifically, and (2) that the Officer failed to acknowledge the sworn testimony he provided, where he describes the risks he faces in Egypt (citing [NAME_114] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 742 [ [NAME_114] ]). [ 33 ] In response, the Respondent notes that those hardships were given some weight by the Officer but did not constitute sufficient grounds to justify a positive exemption. To reach this conclusion, the Respondent notes that the Officer took into consideration the following points: The Applicant is not a social or political activist for [NAME_64]; [NAME_64] experience discrimination and unfair treatment by [NAME_115]; The Egyptian government has stepped back from commitments it had made to [NAME_64] for constitutional promises such as a right to return, assistance in resettlement and compensation for displacement and is moving closer towards authoritarianism; Anti-black racism is a serious issue in Egypt; The Applicant has not resided in Egypt for many years and may experience some challenges in integrating into the Egyptian economy; The Applicant has international work experience in the food industry, has language skills and has family in Egypt; and The Applicant’s evidence is insufficient to establish how the situation in Egypt has affected him or will affect him in light of his personal circumstances. [ 34 ] Furthermore, the Respondent argues that contrary to the Applicant’s argument, the Officer did not dismiss the adverse country condition evidence of discrimination that the Applicant could face because of his lack of personal evidence. Rather, the Officer conducted the necessary “forward-looking” assessment and assessed the evidence as a whole in the context of the Applicant’s submission. The Respondent further argues that the Officer accorded weight to the factors regarding his identity as Nubian but balanced those factors against the Applicant’s personal circumstances. [ 35 ] First, the Applicant’s submission regarding the undue importance that the Officer allegedly attributed to the RPD and RAD decisions is ill-founded. Although the Officer did say that they gave “considerable weight to the findings of the IRB” , their analysis of the hardship the Applicant would allegedly face upon return to Egypt is detailed and discusses the Applicant’s evidence regarding the discrimination, harassment and forced displacement of [NAME_64] at length. [ 36 ] Regarding the submission that the Officer performed an analysis under section 96 and 97 of the IRPA , this argument cannot succeed. Even a narrow reading of the Decision shows that the Officer only provided a general summary of the facts and the conclusions reached by the RPD and the RAD. The Officer was free to consider those decisions in his [NAME_8] determination given that they form part of the record before him and shed light on the Applicant’s allegations regarding his own experience in Egypt, which lay at the heart of his [NAME_8] application. The Officer specifically stated that “[i]n an [NAME_8] application, an officer does not determine whether a well-founded fear of persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment has been established as those determinations are made under Sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA” . Furthermore, while the Officer statement that “underlying facts may be taken into account in determining whether the applicant’s circumstances warrant humanitarian and compassionate relief” [underlining added], in the present matter, his analysis shows that it followed the applicable jurisprudence ( [NAME_78] at para 51). In this regard, the Applicant’s file is comparable to [NAME_116] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 300 at paragraphs 28-32). [ 37 ] As [NAME_118]’s argument that the Officer overlooked or misconstrued substantial evidence on file concerning the systemic discrimination of [NAME_64] in Egypt because there was no evidence tying hardship directly to his personal situation, citing [NAME_110], [NAME_112] and [NAME_113], the Applicant appears to read those decisions narrowly in order to advance the broader proposition that no connection between the alleged hardship and the applicant is ever required. In fact, [NAME_61]’s reliance on paragraph 41 of [NAME_113] to assert that a lack of hardship cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an applicant has not proven that their family members were subject to discrimination ignores the very following paragraph. The relevant excerpt of [NAME_113] reads as follows: [41] Even more troubling is the officer’s dismissal of evidence of discrimination and gender-based violence because of a lack of evidence regarding how they have affected [NAME_119]’s sisters and sisters-in-law. The assessment that the officer was required to make was the extent to which the evidence showed risks of hardship to [NAME_119], and the extent to which that contributed as a factor to her [NAME_8] application. [NAME_119]’s sisters and sisters-in-law have experienced gender-based violence or discrimination is not relevant to that determination. I agree with [NAME_119]’s submission that “[w]here an applicant or applicant’s immediate family group has not presented evidence that they have been discriminated against, it cannot be inferred that discrimination does not exist.” Effectively creating a requirement that family members have been subjected to discrimination or gender-based violence before evidence of pervasive discrimination and violence are given weight is unreasonable. [42] This is not to say that a lack of evidence that family members have suffered from adverse country conditions will invariably be irrelevant. Much will depend on the nature of hardship identified and the risks asserted by an applicant. For example, Justice Mactavish of this Court accepted that where evidence showed that the treatment of widows in Nigeria varied depending on matters such as tribe, sub-clan, geographical location and socio-economic status, it was reasonable to consider whether a family member living in the same geographical location and of the same tribe and sub-clan had encountered difficulties : [NAME_120] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 577 at paras 11-13. [Underlining added] [ 38 ] Further, as Justice McHaffie eloquently articulated in [NAME_123] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 617 [ [NAME_123] ]: [16] … the relevant inquiry on an [NAME_8] application is not whether the applicants will suffer a greater degree of discrimination than others, or hardship that is different from the remainder of the population, but whether they would likely be affected by adverse conditions such as discrimination: [NAME_78] at para 56; [NAME_109] at para 33. However, I do not believe that this precludes an officer from assessing how an applicant’s particular circumstances relate to the broader country condition evidence, in terms of the degree of risk or extent of harm they may be facing. In other words, if country condition evidence presents a range of risks or hardship that may be faced by returning nationals, it is appropriate for an officer to assess where on that spectrum the [NAME_8] applicant lies in order to conduct the “meaningful, individualized analysis” that is required : [NAME_78] at para 56, citing [NAME_124] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 714 at para 12. This may include noting that while the [NAME_8] applicant is on the spectrum of risk of hardship described in the evidence, they are not at the top end of that spectrum . [Underlining added] [ 39 ] It should be noted that, in this passage, Justice McHaffie explicitly addresses why [NAME_109] , which the Applicant relies upon, cannot stand for the idea that evidence related to an individual’s personal circumstances is not relevant. The same is true for [NAME_108] , another decision of Justice McHaffie, where an officer’s conclusion regarding the absence of evidence proving the applicants did not personally experience hardship in the past was found not to contradict the teachings of [NAME_109] (see paras 12-23). [ 40 ] The above passage from [NAME_123] is also highly relevant to the present matter because it shows why evidence related to the [NAME_61]’s individualized experience matters when there is a “spectrum of risk”. The Officer specifically found that the “evidence indicates there is a spectrum of possibilities for the hardship that one may face” in Egypt as a Nubian. [underlining added] They noted that while the evidence “indicates that a reasonable percentage of [NAME_64], about 15%, have suffered from forced displacement, I have also considered that there is little before me indicating the applicant or the applicant’s family were among the groups impacted, or lived in one of the villages that were flooded or were forcibly displaced and relocated”. The Officer then proceeded to conduct a meaningful individualized analysis. As part of their analysis, the Officer drew comparisons between the Applicant and members of his immediate family residing in Egypt to have a more personalized portrait of the risk that the Applicant may face in Egypt should he be removed from Canada. The Officer ultimately concluded as follows: This application has not provided sufficient information or evidence pertaining to the applicant’s personal circumstances when he resided in Egypt to establish the degree of hardship he is likely to face based on his identity as a Nubian. This application has also provided little detail or evidence regarding the personal circumstances of his family who are residing in Aswan, Al Nuba, or information about their experiences, or discrimination or displacement they have experienced. While I empathize deeply with the situation for [NAME_64] as an indigenous and ethnic minority group, the onus was on the applicant to clarify his situation for me, or that of his family, and provide sufficient evidence of probative value to establish the hardship he is likely to face. I find there is a spectrum of possibilities for the conditions, and though the applicant could be exposed to hardship, I find I do not have sufficient information or evidence to establish where he is on the spectrum of hardship to warrant the granting of an exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. [Emphasis added] [ 41 ] In other words, the Officer found that a Nubian’s position in the spectrum of possible hardship depended on different factors, such as geographical location. They concluded that the record did not allow them to know where, on this spectrum, the Applicant belonged. This analysis was compassionate, individualized and reasonable. [ 42 ] As [NAME_118]’s argument that the Officer overlooked or misconstrued substantial evidence on the file concerning the discrimination that [NAME_64] individuals face in Egypt, it too must fail. Essentially, the Applicant is asking that this Court reweigh the evidence that a specialized decision maker already considered more favourably, which is not its role on judicial review ( Vavilov at para 125). There is no basis on which this Court could find that relevant evidence regarding the situation of [NAME_64] in Egypt was ignored by the Officer. In addition to “acknowledging” the existence of anti-Black racism in Egypt as well as the “loss of socio-economic rights and marginalization” that [NAME_64] suffer, and the “discrimination and unfair treatment by [NAME_115]” they experience, the Officer also directly cited some of the articles that the Applicant had submitted in details , including the United States Department of State report, university papers and other country condition evidence. They also explicitly referred to the Applicant’s counsel submissions. [ 43 ] Finally, with respect to the Applicant’s sworn statement, while it is true that the Officer failed to explicitly address it, this omission is not a fatal flaw in the circumstances. While the Applicant’s counsel’s submissions regarding adverse country conditions for [NAME_64] are substantial and refer to several documents, [NAME_125]’s sworn statement in support of his [NAME_8] application is very short. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:

9. I am of the Nubian ethnicity from Egypt, and as a group we face systemic discrimination from the [NAME_115].

10. The current situation is Egypt for [NAME_64] is very difficult and I do not want to leave in a country where I am a second class resident due to the color of my skin. I want to be treated with dignity and respect as a human being. [ 44 ] While the plea for relief in these paragraphs is moving, they can barely be said to be evidence of anything concrete, except for the systemic discrimination that the Officer did in fact explicitly state they took into account. In this context, the Applicant’s reliance on [NAME_114] for the idea that an applicant’s sworn statement cannot be disregarded without the articulation of a clear reason to do so is ill-advised. In [NAME_114] , the officer’s failure to address the sworn statement of the Applicant was material because she testified to the fact that her children’s father was not involved in their upbringing whereas the officer concluded the opposite (see paras 41, 45). Here, not only is there no contradiction between the Officer’s conclusions and the Applicant’s sworn evidence, but the Officer did find that the systemic discrimination alleged did, in fact, exist. (2) The Officer’s analysis of the Applicant’s establishment in Canada was reasonable [ 45 ] The Applicant also submits that the Officer erred in their analysis of his establishment in Canada. For one, the Applicant disagrees with the Officer’s finding that he would be able to secure employment in Egypt because he was able to do so in Canada, Saudi Arabia and the United States. In the Applicant’s view, the Officer turned positive establishment factors, such as his international work experience, his language skills, and his adaptability to secure employment, into negative ones to justify not granting his request for an [NAME_8] application, citing [NAME_127] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 655 at paras 36, 39 [ [NAME_127] ]. [ 46 ] The Applicant submits that the factors showcasing his establishment in Canada were not given enough weight. [NAME_118], the Decision also lacks clarity concerning what “sufficient integration” would be. He relies on [NAME_128] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 258 at para 80 [ [NAME_128] ] and on [NAME_129] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 871 at para 14 [ [NAME_129] ] to support his assertion that it is unreasonable for Officers to rule that there is insufficient establishment without first determining what the benchmark is. [ 47 ] The Applicant also submits that he has many relationships in Canada that are important to him and that he did not lead evidence to demonstrate that his family ties in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are closer than those he has developed in Canada. He states that he has been in Canada for almost a decade and it is therefore reasonable to assume that these newer relationships are his closest. [ 48 ] As noted by the Respondent, the following factors were considered by the Officer regarding the Applicant’s establishment, and they did give this factor some weight: The Applicant has been in Canada for over seven years; He is appreciated and valued by his employers and colleagues in the food service industry; He has been working and is self-supporting: he has earned a total income of $38,431 in 2021, $48,391 in 2022 and $53,225 in 2023; The Applicant has made efforts to integrate and has formed friendships and ties with his workplace and community; The Applicant did not establish that, should he leave Canada, himself or his ties in Canada will suffer hardship; The Applicant will be able to maintain his relationships through modern digital communication technologies; and The Applicant’s mother and siblings reside in Egypt. [ 49 ] With respect to the issue of turning positive factors into negative ones, the Court finds that the present case is distinguishable from [NAME_127] cited by the Applicant and is more closely aligned with [NAME_130] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 163. In that case, Justice Locke, as he then was, explained that: [17] I recognize the principle set out in Lauture , and I accept that, in assessing the applicants’ hardship upon return to China, the Officer considered their activities since arriving in Canada. However, I am not convinced that the Officer strayed into impermissible reasoning. The Officer has not turned an otherwise positive factor into a negative factor. In fact, in discussing the applicants’ establishment in Canada, the Officer accepted that “the applicants have several positive elements towards their establishment and integration into [COMPANY_62].” In the concluding paragraph of the impugned decision, the Officer repeated that she gave positive weight to the applicants’ establishment and integration in Canada. However, that positive weight was balanced against the RAD’s negative credibility findings and the applicants’ familiarity with China. In my view, despite concluding that the applicants’ establishment and integration in Canada was a positive factor, it remained open to the Officer to consider that some of the skills the applicants had acquired in Canada could reduce the potential hardship of their return to China. The Officer’s assessment of the applicants’ establishment was not improperly “filtered through the lens of hardship” as it was in [NAME_91] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 72 at para 35. [ 50 ] In the case at bar, the Officer gave some weight to the Applicant’s establishment in Canada. They acknowledged that the Applicant has been residing in Canada since 2017, has a stable history of employment and earnings and has established some ties in Canada. The Officer even “commended” the Applicant for working hard to become self-sufficient in Canada. However, that positive weight was balanced against the limited degree of interdependence of his relationships in Canada and the Applicant’s familiarity with Egypt. Furthermore, as in [NAME_130] , it was opened to the Officer to consider that some of the skills the Applicant acquired in Canada could mitigate the hardship associated with his return to Egypt. It was also open to the Officer to infer, based on the evidence in the file, that the Applicant’s family members residing in Egypt had profiles similar to his, did not appear to face economic hardship, and would be able and willing to support him upon his return.

Accordingly, the Applicant’s argument on this point cannot succeed. [ 51 ] Regarding the failure to clearly define the benchmark that would constitute establishment warranting [NAME_8] relief, the jurisprudence related to [NAME_128] ’ teachings on this point was discussed by Justice Locke in [NAME_131] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 924 at paragraphs 13-20. Justice Locke notably cites [NAME_132] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1070, where Justice Gascon distinguished [NAME_128] including by highlighting that the fact that the officer “did not turn his mind to whether applying for permanent residence from outside Canada in those circumstances would impose hardship going beyond that which is inherent in having to leave Canada” was key to the Court’s ultimate conclusion in [NAME_128] . In the case at bar, it is clear that the Officer’s enquiry into establishment was led by the question of which hardship would be visited upon the Applicant should he have to leave Canada. This is blatantly obvious from the Officer’s following conclusion: “I am not satisfied that the applicant’s ties are characterized by any significant inter-dependencies, or that his ties to Canada are so strong such that either the applicant or his Canadian resident ties would be likely to suffer hardship if this application were refused” . [ 52 ] [NAME_129] , the Applicant points the Court to paragraphs that stand for the proposal that it is inadmissible to demand that applicants who have all been “very active in various organizations” prove the kind of community involvement (including volunteering and building friendships) that is never demanded of Canadian citizens and permanent residents because [NAME_81] are not “compulsorily required to do anything” (at paras 14-15). [ADDRESS] agrees that the Applicant was not obliged to prove an intense degree of volunteering and community involvement in his [NAME_8] application. In fact, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court is to the effect that whereas [NAME_8] relief is an exceptional remedy, applicants need not prove “exceptional establishment” ( [NAME_133] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1039 at para 28 [ [NAME_133] ]; [NAME_134] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1482 at paragraphs 1-2). However, unlike in [NAME_129] , there is no evidence that [NAME_61] was very active in community organizations. Instead, the Officer noted that the letter from the priest of the parish he attends does not detail his involvement with the church and no other evidence of volunteering is in the file. Either way, the ultimate question is whether the Officer “substantively and cumulatively” considered and weighed “all relevant facts and factors raised” ( [NAME_133] at para 28 citing [NAME_78] at paras 25, 28 and 31; see also [NAME_135] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 394 at paras 21-24). Here, the Court finds that the Officer did consider all the facts raised by the Applicant as they relate to his establishment and weighed them in a compassionate manner. The fact that the Officer highlighted elements that could have demonstrated even greater establishment but were absent from the file does not lead to the conclusion that an unduly heightened threshold was applied. [ 53 ] In light of the above, the Court agrees with the Respondent that the Officer did a reasonable analysis of the Applicant’s establishment and that the Applicant is merely asking the Court to reweigh the evidence regarding establishment, which is not the role of the Court in a judicial review.

V. Conclusion [ 54 ] [ADDRESS] finds that the Decision is transparent, justified and intelligible. The Applicant failed to identify any fatal flaw warranting quashing. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

JUDGMENT in IMM-5506-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. No question of general importance is certified. “[NAME_136]” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-5506-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_2] v MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 12, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME_1] J. DATED: June 3, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_139] [NAME_118] [NAME_141] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_145] Montréal, [COMPANY_49] [NAME_118] of Canada Montréal, [COMPANY_49] For The Respondent