Federal Court Dismisses Judicial Review Application Due to Lack of Legal Duty

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260609 Docket: IMM-1249-24 Citation: 2026 FC 759 Ottawa, Ontario, June 9, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the [NAME] , SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] for a writ of mandamus . The Applicant, a 41-year-old citizen of Iran, seeks an order compelling the Respondent to process his application for a multiple-entry visa facilitating his doctoral studies in aerospace engineering at [COMPANY], and to reach a decision within five days. Counsel for the Applicant alternatively referred to the underlying application as a study permit and as a visitor visa throughout the materials and argument. When asked at the hearing to clarify, counsel attested that the study permit application constituted the decision under review, while any references to temporary residence were intended to communicate generic principles of law equally applicable to visitor visas, study permits, and work permits. [ 2 ] The Applicant further seeks an order for declaratory relief that the Respondent’s delay “amounts to a breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectation.” Finally, the Applicant seeks costs for the application and $10,000 in damages for the delay. [ 3 ] The timeline is as follows: On February 23, 2022, the underlying application was filed; On March 7, 2022, the Applicant received a letter from [NAME] [[NAME]] requesting additional documents, including a copy of his resume and supplementary information; Further exchanges between the Applicant and [NAME] followed in June 2022 and August 2023. The Applicant reports visiting Canada under the auspices of a validly held visitor visa to meet with an officer of the Canada Border Services Agency in 2023 for the purpose of personally explaining his case, where the Applicant says that he was assured that his application would be determined by the end of the calendar year; On December 26, 2023, counsel for the Applicant sent a letter to [NAME] and the Minister demanding the determination of the application on or before December 31, 2024; On January 16, 2025, the Respondent filed a notice of motion to redact certain information from the Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] under section 87 of the IRPA. A redacted copy of the CTR was filed on February 6, 2025. Associate Chief Justice St-Louis, as she then was, found the redactions lawful and ordered filing of the modified CTR on March 4, 2025; On February 17, 2026, [NAME] sent a procedural fairness letter [PFL] to the Applicant setting out concerns with his field of work as an [NAME], his employer in Iran’s designation as an entity listed for “Grave Breach of International Peace and Security” under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations , SOR/2010-165, and his prior collaboration with a [NAME] from [COMPANY] who specializes in military applications of aerospace engineering technology. Altogether, the [NAME] expressed concern that the Applicant was not admissible under paragraph 34(1)(d) of the IRPA because his study or research in Canada relates to dual-use technology which could be transferred and used to further Iranian development of weapons of mass destruction, contrary to Canada’s national security interests. The letter provided the Applicant with 30 days to respond; On February 25, 2026, the Respondent sent a settlement offer in the present case which stated that the Respondent was prepared to determine the underlying application within 90 days if a notice of discontinuance was filed. [ 4 ] At the hearing, it was confirmed that the Applicant did not respond or reply to either [NAME] or the settlement offer. [ 5 ] For the reasons below, I find that the Applicant is not entitled to an order in the nature of mandamus , nor any of the other relief sought.

II. Issue and Argument [ 6 ] The sole issue is whether the Applicant is entitled to a writ of mandamus . [ 7 ] The governing law on applications for mandamus relief is found in [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 [ [NAME] ]. The eight-part test for determining the availability of mandamus is comprised of the following elements: there must be a public legal duty to act; the duty must be owed to the applicant; there must be a clear right to performance of that duty, meaning that the applicant must satisfy all conditions precedent to the duty, and there must have been a prior demand for performance of the duty along with reasonable time to comply with that demand and a subsequent refusal which is either expressed or implied; where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, further conditions must be met; there must be no other adequate remedy available to the applicant; the order sought must be of some practical value or effect; the court in the exercise of its discretion must find no equitable bar to the relief sought; the balance of convenience should favour granting mandamus . [ 8 ] In assessing whether an administrative decision-maker’s delay in reaching a decision has been unreasonable such that it amounts to an implied refusal to perform the legal duty at issue as required by the third element of the [NAME] test. Both parties agree that this Court should consider the following three requirements of the test set out in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 9097 (FC) at para 23 [ [NAME] ]: 1) whether the delay has prima facie been longer than the nature of the required process; 2) whether the Applicant and their counsel are responsible for the delay; and 3) whether the authority responsible for the delay has not provided satisfactory justification. [ 9 ] On the first element of the [APPELLANT] analysis, the Applicant states that [NAME]’s initial time estimate was six weeks at the time the application was submission, but that over 25 months had passed at the time of filing written submissions.

Accordingly, the Applicant argues that the application has taken longer than the nature of the process requires, prima facie . [ 10 ] On the second element, the Applicant says that he submitted a complete application, so it is “obvious” that neither he nor his counsel are responsible for the delay. [ 11 ] On the third element, the Applicant submits that the Respondent ignored his demand letter and failed to provide any update.

Accordingly, the Applicant submits that the Respondent has no reasonable or satisfactory justification for the delay. Further, the Applicant argued that even the time limit to respond to [NAME] had expired by the date of the hearing, so the Respondent ought to have made a final decision. The Applicant argued that this in itself makes mandamus a must. [ 12 ] The Applicant submits that the Court should reject any attempted justification from the Respondent relying on “the usual blanket excuse” of security checks in the absence of a reasonable detailed explanation, citing [APPELLANT] v Canada , 2023 FC 854 at para 36. [ 13 ] The Applicant submits that word “shall” as it appears in subsection 216(1) of the [NAME] , SOR/2002-227, imposes a public duty on the Respondent to process the pending application for a study permit. [ 14 ] The Applicant submits that requirements for mandamus that “no other adequate remedy” be available is satisfied where he has done everything possible to have his application processed but it remains delayed by [NAME]. [ 15 ] The Applicant argues that his application has been pending for approximately 62 weeks at the time of submission, and that the balance of convenience clearly favours him. [ 16 ] Finally, the Applicant submits that the requirements of procedural fairness may give rise to an individual’s legitimate expectations when a public authority makes representations relating to a procedure that will be conducted in a certain manner, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 751 at para 15. [ 17 ] The Applicant’s position is that the Respondent breached the Applicant’s legitimate expectations since the processing time on [NAME]’s website represented that similar applications were processed within six weeks. Because the Applicant was not informed that his application would be unreasonably delayed beyond that time, he alleges that this delay has demonstrated bias and bad faith in [NAME]’s dealings with the Applicant.

III. Analysis [ 18 ] The Federal Court of Appeal has recently commented that the conjunctive [NAME] test may be understood as setting out two distinct sets of four criteria, with the first four relating to whether the Applicant meets the preconditions for entitlement to mandamus and the latter four relating to whether a court should exercise its discretion to issue an order in the nature of mandamus , notwithstanding the Applicant’s satisfaction of the first four criteria ( [APPELLANT] v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee) , 2026 FCA 53 at paras 45–48 [ [NAME] ]). [ 19 ] This judicial review hinges on whether the Applicant has successfully met his burden of demonstrating that the first four preconditions for mandamus are fulfilled. I find that he has not succeeded in establishing the first or third [NAME] criterion, either of which on its own would be dispositive of this application. A. First [NAME] criterion: existence of a public legal duty [ 20 ] There is some ambiguity about the statutory basis for a legal duty owed to the Applicant to begin with. Although the record indicates that the Applicant sought a multiple-entry visitor visa, it is equally clear that the purpose of his visit to Canada was to pursue doctoral studies. Counsel for the Applicant relies, not inappropriately, on provisions governing the issuance of a study permit. [ 21 ] I agree with the Respondent that the Applicant has not established a that a public duty is clearly and unambiguously owed to him. To the contrary, section 22 of the IRPA provides that no foreign national can become a temporary resident unless a reviewing officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible. [ 22 ] Accordingly, in conducting an assessment of the Applicant’s admissibility to Canada, the Minister’s agents at [NAME] were properly performing their public duties in line with the statutory obligations imposed on them by the IRPA. Therefore, the Applicant has failed to establish that he is entitled to an order in the nature of mandamus by demonstrating that the [NAME] was obliged to reach a decision on his application in the timeline expected for the average study permit applicant from Iran. B. [NAME] criterion: clear right to performance of the duty [ 23 ] [ADDRESS] of Appeal has clarified that the three factors to properly consider in assessing whether a delay is inordinate is by considering the following three non-exhaustive factors: (1) the nature and purpose of the proceedings; (2) the length and cause of the delay; and (3) the complexity of the facts and issues in the case ( [NAME] at para 60, citing Law Society of [NAME] v [NAME] , 2022 SCC 29 at para 51 [ [NAME] ]). Nonetheless, the Court recognized that the three-part [NAME] test is basically coherent with the binding jurisprudence on unreasonable administrative delay ( [NAME] at paras 75–80). [ 24 ] I find there has been no refusal to act and no unreasonable delay. The Applicant’s file was referred for security screening on April 5, 2022. This would mean that his application was processed ahead of the processing time estimated for applicants from Iran, which was represented as 13 weeks at the time. This estimation does not include time needed for security clearances. There were redactions under section 87 of the IRPA that had to go before a designated judge of the Federal Court all of which takes time. In this case, the delay was reasonable because the Respondent has provided a satisfactory justification for it, as contemplated under the third element of the [NAME] analysis. (1) No response to procedural fairness letter [ 25 ] I find it fatal to this application that the Applicant has not responded to [NAME] or settlement offer yet has argued that it is unreasonable that a decision has not been made since the time for him to respond to [NAME] has expired. I do not agree with that logic. [NAME] was sent to allow the Applicant to answer concerns regarding his application and to provide more information required for a security assessment, which is a sufficient justification for the delay. [ 26 ] The Applicant did not avail himself of that opportunity, nor did he respond to the settlement offer. He cannot now claim that what appears to be a further window of grace which was given to allow his response to either or both is further evidence of an unreasonable delay on the part of the decision-maker. [ 27 ] With [NAME] concerns unanswered or responded to in conjunction with this decision, it may be reasonably inferred that a decision regarding the underlying application will be made soon. [ 28 ] I find the Applicant fails to demonstrate that there is no reasonable justification for the delay and thereby fails to meet the third element of the [APPELLANT] test. While at the hearing, the Applicant argued that he has missed his opportunity to complete his PhD; however, sufficient evidence was not provided to satisfy me of that claim. [ 29 ] Referring to general documents from [COMPANY] and asking the Court to draw inferences in the Applicant’s particular case is not adequate to show that this specific student cannot complete his educational goals because of processing deadlines. There was no evidence that the Applicant had made efforts to seek a deferral or exception which had been rejected. What was before the Court concerning the Applicant’s studies was that he has been able to successfully pursue his doctoral studies online since the 2022 fall semester, completing five academic terms and submitting a research paper for publication. [ 30 ] The latest delay can be attributed to the Applicant’s lack of response to [NAME] or settlement offers. With the understanding that these documents were issued only days before military actions were carried out on February 28, 2026, by the [NAME] against Iran, it may be inferred that the Applicant has simply not been able to respond. By the same token, the Respondent cannot be faulted for informally providing additional time to respond. C. No implied refusal to act [ 31 ] [NAME] posts estimations of processing times for average applications, those estimations do not include the time needed for security clearances. In this case, there was a PFL with questions related to specific security concerns regarding the nature of the Applicant’s studies, as well as his employment with a designated entity. There is no uniform time limit when assessing the reasonableness of delays in processing an application when an outstanding security clearance is required. Rather, it is case-dependent, and this Court has recognized that the context and individual facts of each application should be considered in such assessments ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 550 at paras 45–47). [ 32 ] In the present case, approximately 48 months have passed since the commencement of the application, which is not unreasonable in the circumstances given the need for [NAME] to conduct security screenings and for the Respondent to have sought proper authorization for redactions of sensitive information from the CTR earlier in this proceeding. [ 33 ] The GCMS notes indicate that [NAME] has continued to process the application and that the file is progressing but was stalled while waiting for a response to [NAME] from the Applicant. Consequently, there has been no implied refusal to act that establishes the Applicant’s clear right to the performance of the duty alleged for the purposes of the [NAME] test. D. No breach of legitimate expectations [ 34 ] The Applicant invokes the doctrine of legitimate expectations, which is a principle of procedural fairness that protects individuals who have reasonably relied upon “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” representations by a public authority relating to procedural guarantees ( [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2013 SCC 36 at paras 94–95). [ 35 ] Posted processing times on [NAME]’s website are non-binding representations which inform applicants what the expected processing time for applications of certain types in general. They do not give rise to legal entitlements for specific applicants ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 596 at para 92). [ 36 ] Declaratory relief is a narrow and discretionary remedy which may be granted where a court has jurisdiction over the issue, the dispute is real rather than theoretical, where the applicant has a genuine interest in the resolution of the issue, and where the respondent has an interest in opposing the declaration ( [NAME] v Canada , 2018 SCC 30 at para 81). [ 37 ] These criteria are not met in this case.

IV. Conclusion [ 38 ] For the reasons above, the Applicant has not established that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus , nor to the requested declaratory relief. [ 39 ] No costs will be awarded, as there are no “special reasons” to do so pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, [NAME] , SOR/93-22. [ 40 ] Even if the Applicant had been successful, counsel is reminded that damages or monetary compensation are not remedies available to applicants for judicial review under subsection 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7.

JUDGMENT in IMM-1249-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application is dismissed. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-1249-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Saskatoon, [NAME] OF HEARING: May 4, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: June 9, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] [COUNSEL] For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], [NAME] For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Saskatoon, [NAME] For The Respondent