Federal Court dismisses PRRA judicial review

Date: 20260529 Docket: IMM-13559-25 Citation: 2026 FC 701 Ottawa, Ontario, May 29, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of a Senior Immigration Officer’s (the “Officer” ) decisions (the “Decisions” ) refusing the Applicants’ Pre-Removal Risk Assessment ( “PRRA” ) applications based on alleged risk on return to India. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicants, [NAME] and [NAME], are citizens of India. The Applicants entered Canada on July 24, 2018. [ 4 ] The Applicants previously sought refugee protection in Canada. Their refugee claim was based on fear of harm from [NAME] in India because of [NAME]’s (the “[NAME] Applicant” ) [NAME]. They also alleged that the police were unwilling to protect them because of police links to the drug trade. The Refugee Protection Division ( “RPD” ) rejected that claim on August 18, 2022, finding that the Applicants had viable internal flight alternatives ( “IFA” ). The Refugee Appeal Division ( “RAD” ) upheld the finding that Delhi was a viable IFA and dismissed the Applicants’ appeal on February 9, 2023. [ 5 ] The Applicants later applied for a PRRA, alleging a different risk. They alleged a new risk connected to support for Sikh rights, the [NAME] movement, and participation in [NAME]-related activities in Canada. They submitted that [NAME] had accused the [NAME] Applicant of supporting [NAME] and participating in anti-national activities from abroad. [ 6 ] The Applicants relied on several alleged events in India after the RAD decision. They alleged that: a) a threatening poster appeared on the [NAME]’ home (the “Parents’ Home” ) in July 2023; b) police attended the Parents’ Home in August and December 2023, and the [NAME] was detained and mistreated; c) the [NAME] Applicant’s brother was attacked in February 2024; d) the [NAME] were attacked in June 2024; and e) police again attended the Parents’ Home in July 2024. [ 7 ] The Applicants’ PRRA submissions included affidavits from the [NAME] Applicant, the [NAME] and village figures, medical records, photographs, voter registration cards for [NAME] referendum events, country condition documents, and submissions from counsel. [ 8 ] The Applicants also submit that their counsel sent additional PRRA materials on or about May 21, 2025. They say those materials described further incidents in January, March, and April 2025 involving the [NAME] and alleged police mistreatment, reporting conditions, and later police attendance at the Parents’ Home. [ 9 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer had no obligation to consider the May 21, 2025 materials because the PRRA reasons were completed on March 28, 2025 and the Applicants had already been notified of the negative PRRA result through notice letters dated April 24, 2025.

III. The Decisions [ 10 ] The Decisions refusing protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 ( “IRPA” ) and written PRRA reasons are dated March 28, 2025. The notice letters are dated April 24, 2025 and state that the PRRA applications were rejected on March 28, 2025. The Applicants assert that the full contents of the Decisions were communicated to them in person by the Canada Border Services Agency ( “CBSA” ) on June 9, 2025. [ 11 ] The Officer found that the statutory bars did not prevent the assessment from proceeding. The Officer then considered paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA , which limits the evidence that may be considered in a PRRA by an applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected. The Officer accepted that some evidence post-dated the RPD and the RAD decisions and could be treated as new evidence. The Officer declined to consider evidence relating to the [NAME]’s political stance and opposition activities since 2020, finding that evidence was reasonably available at the time of the RPD and the RAD proceedings. [ 12 ] The Officer accepted the Applicants’ identities as citizens of India. The Officer also accepted that the alleged risk as [NAME] supporters had a nexus to political opinion and therefore engaged section 96 of the IRPA . The Officer also considered whether the evidence established a risk under section 97. [ 13 ] The Officer gave moderate weight to the affidavit of the [NAME]. The Officer noted that the affidavit corroborated aspects of the Applicants’ narrative, but also found that it provided little detail about the Applicants’ own [NAME]-related activities in Canada, including when those activities began, where and how often they occurred, the Applicants’ role in them, and how those activities came to the attention of [NAME]. [ 14 ] The Officer gave some weight to the affidavit of [NAME]. The Officer noted that the affiant was not a first-hand witness to many of the events described, though [NAME] stated that he was present when police attended the family home on July 14, 2024. The Officer gave little weight to the affidavit of [NAME] because it was largely not first-hand evidence and provided limited detail about the Applicants’ own activities. [ 15 ] The Officer accepted that medical reports from India showed that the [NAME] attended a hospital with injuries. The Officer assigned those records some weight, but found that they did not establish how the injuries occurred. [ 16 ] The Officer considered photographs of police officers, individuals, injuries, and the Applicants at [NAME]-related events. The Officer found that many of the photographs lacked accompanying information, including dates, locations, identification of people depicted, and explanation of what was occurring. The Officer also considered voter registration cards issued by Sikhs for Justice. The Officer accepted that the Applicants may have attended referendum events and may support Sikh interests, but found insufficient evidence of continued political engagement or a public profile likely to attract adverse attention from [NAME]. [ 17 ] The Officer considered country condition evidence, including National Documentation Package ( “NDP” ) materials and the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report on India. The Officer accepted that the Indian government is hostile toward organizations and members of the [NAME] movement and assigned considerable weight to the country condition evidence. However, the Officer found that the Applicants had not established that they personally would face a serious possibility of persecution, a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [ 18 ] The Officer concluded that the Applicants had not met the statutory thresholds under section 96 or section 97 of the IRPA and refused the PRRA applications.

IV. Issues [ 19 ] The issues are as follows: Did the process meet the requirements of procedural fairness? Are the Decisions reasonable? V. Standard of Review [ 20 ] The standard of review with respect to the Applicants’ procedural rights is correctness or a standard with the same import ( Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at paras 34-35 and 54-55, citing [NAME] v [NAME] , 2014 SCC 24 at para 79). The standard of review with respect to the Officer’s substantive findings is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ] at para 25).

VI. Analysis A. The Statutory Framework [ 21 ] Sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA define the risk to be assessed in a PRRA. Section 96 of the IRPA applies to a person with a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground, including political opinion. Section 97 of the IRPA applies to a person whose removal would subject them personally to a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, subject to the limits in that provision. [ 22 ] Section 112 of the IRPA permits a person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1) of the IRPA , to apply for protection, subject to statutory exceptions. Because the Applicants are failed refugee claimants, paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA applies, which limits the PRRA to evidence that arose after rejection of the refugee claim, was not reasonably available at the time of rejection, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [ 23 ] A PRRA is not an appeal from the RPD or RAD; it is a prospective risk assessment conducted within the statutory limits set by Parliament ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 135 at paras 15-18). [ 24 ] Sections 113(b) and 113.01 of the IRPA and section 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 ( “IRPR” ), govern oral hearings in this context. An oral hearing is not automatic, and under section 167 of the IRPR , the relevant considerations include whether the evidence raises a serious issue of an applicant’s credibility, is central to the decision, and would justify allowing the application if accepted. B. Procedural Fairness (1) May 21, 2025 Further Materials [ 25 ] The Applicants submit that the Officer breached procedural fairness by failing to consider further materials sent on May 21, 2025. They argue that the Decisions were not final until CBSA physically gave it to them on June 9, 2025. The Respondent argues that a PRRA officer must receive relevant evidence until a decision has been made and notice of the decision has been delivered to the applicant ( [NAME] v Canada , 2005 FC 1073 [ [NAME] ] at paras 18-19). [ 26 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer had no obligation to consider the May 21, 2025 materials because the Officer completed the reasons on March 28, 2025 and the Applicants were notified of the negative result through letters dated April 24, 2025. [ 27 ] In [NAME] , Justice Hughes held that a PRRA officer must receive evidence that may affect the decision until the decision has been written and signed and notice of the decision, even if not its contents, has been delivered to the applicant ( [NAME] at para 19). The question is whether the Applicants have shown that the May 21, 2025 materials were submitted before notice of the Decisions. [ 28 ] The record includes PRRA refusal letters dated April 24, 2025, which state that the PRRA application was refused on March 28, 2025. While the Applicants assert that CBSA provided the full contents of the Decisions on June 9, 2025, the record does not establish that June 9, 2025 was the first notice of the Decisions. On the record before the Court, it is therefore not established that the Officer remained seized of the applications when the Applicants submitted their May 21, 2025 materials. [ 29 ] Further, the Applicants’ July 4, 2025 request to reopen, which postdated even the asserted June 9, 2025 hand delivery, does not affect this judicial review. This application concerns the PRRA refusal, not a later reopening request. [ 30 ] The Applicants’ procedural fairness argument on this point is therefore dismissed. (2) Oral Hearing Determination [ 31 ] The Officer considered whether an oral hearing was required and found that it was not. The Decisions did not turn on a serious issue of credibility. The Officer accepted some evidence, assigned reduced weight to other evidence, and found that the record did not establish the statutory risk thresholds. [ 32 ] The Applicants’ argument that the Officer made a veiled credibility finding fails. The Officer’s reasoning concerned probative value, corroboration, detail, and the link between the evidence and the alleged prospective risk. Those were matters of sufficiency and weight, not a disguised adverse credibility finding. C. Reasonableness [ 33 ] The Applicants argue that the Officer conducted a selective analysis and failed to assess the evidence cumulatively. They submit that the Officer separated the affidavits, photographs, medical records, transcript, and country condition evidence, then discounted each item for not proving the whole claim by itself. [ 34 ] The Applicants also submit that the Officer improperly minimized the risk faced by [NAME] supporters in India. They argue that the Officer was wrong to describe conditions as “less than ideal” and that the country condition evidence shows monitoring, detention, abuse, false charges, police corruption, and state hostility toward perceived separatists. [ 35 ] The Applicants further argue that the Officer treated sworn evidence as insufficient without giving proper effect to the presumption that sworn evidence is true. They argue that the Officer made credibility findings in substance while avoiding the safeguards attached to credibility determinations. The Applicants also argue that an officer must consider corroborative evidence cumulatively and must not assess risk factors in discrete silos, and here the Officer failed to reasonably consider the factual matrix. [ 36 ] The Respondent submits that the Officer reasonably assessed the record and made sufficiency findings, not credibility findings. The Respondent argues that the Applicants disagree with the weight the Officer assigned to the evidence, but disagreement with weight is not a basis for intervention on judicial review. The Respondent further submits that the Officer accepted the general country evidence but reasonably found that the Applicants had not established a sufficiently individualized risk. [ 37 ] I agree with the Respondent. [ 38 ] The Officer did not misunderstand the legal nature of the claim. The Officer expressly accepted that support for [NAME] could have a nexus to political opinion under section 96 of the IRPA . The Officer also considered the claim under section 97 of the IRPA . The Officer did not dismiss the claim on the basis that [NAME]-related political opinion could not engage sections 96 or 97 of the IRPA . [ 39 ] The Officer also did not reject the country condition evidence. The Officer accepted that the Indian government is hostile toward [NAME] organizations and members of the [NAME] movement. The Officer gave considerable weight to the country condition materials. The dispositive issue was not whether some [NAME] supporters may face serious mistreatment in India; rather whether these Applicants established an individualized prospective risk. [ 40 ] A PRRA officer must assess individualized, forward-looking risk. General country condition evidence can support a claim, but it does not automatically establish that a particular applicant faces risk. The Officer had to decide whether the Applicants’ evidence established their profile, the visibility of their activities, the likelihood of state awareness, and the resulting risk. The Officer found that it did not. [ 41 ] The Officer’s assessment of the Applicants’ political activity in Canada was transparent. The Officer accepted that the Applicants may have attended [NAME]-related events and held voter registration cards. The Officer did not impose a requirement that the Applicants be leaders, organizers, or formal members of an organization. The Officer’s concern was that the evidence did not show the timing, frequency, visibility, or significance of the Applicants’ activities, and did not explain how those activities came to the attention of [NAME]. [ 42 ] The Applicants’ theory required more than proof that they personally support [NAME]. It required a sufficient basis to find that [NAME] knew or would likely know of their support, would attribute a political profile to them, and they were at risk because of it. The Officer found that this chain had not been established. That conclusion was reasonably open to the Officer on the record. [ 43 ] The Applicants submit that the [NAME] mentioned in the Sikh temple that the Applicants had not secured status in Canada and might return to India, explaining how attention was drawn to the Applicants. The Officer was not required to treat that evidence as establishing state knowledge of the Applicants’ [NAME]-related activities. The Applicants’ failed refugee claim concerned [NAME] and [NAME], not [NAME]. The asserted spread of news that the Applicants had not secured status in Canada did not compel the inference that [NAME] knew of, or targeted the Applicants because of, [NAME]-related political activity in Canada. [ 44 ] The Applicants argue that grassroots political activism is informal and that ordinary participants do not keep documentary records for later legal proceedings. That submission may explain why the Applicants’ evidence may be incomplete, but it does not make the Decisions unreasonable. The Officer did not demand perfect documentation. The Officer considered the documentation that the Applicants provided and found that it did not establish the degree of political engagement or state awareness alleged. The Applicants bore the burden of establishing the facts on which their PRRA claim depended, and where the evidence is insufficient, an applicant bears the consequence of that insufficiency ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 464 at para 5). [ 45 ] The Officer’s treatment of the affidavits was also reasonable. The Officer did not reject the [NAME]’s affidavit (the “Father’s Affidavit” ); the Officer assessed it and gave it moderate weight. The Officer accepted that it described incidents affecting the family in India. The Officer’s concern was that the Father’s Affidavit provided little detail about the Applicants’ own activities in Canada and how those activities came to the adverse attention of [NAME], which was a finding reasonably available on the record. While the Father’s Affidavit could corroborate that certain events were alleged to have occurred in India, it did not necessarily establish the Applicants’ political profile in Canada, the public visibility of their actions, or state knowledge of those actions. [ 46 ] The Officer assigned reduced weight to the affidavits of [NAME] and [NAME] because they were not first-hand witnesses to much of what they described and because they added little specific information about the Applicants’ Canadian activities. A decision maker may assess whether evidence is first-hand, detailed, internally consistent, and corroborative when assigning weight, which the Officer did here. [ 47 ] While the Applicants submit that the affiants were community figures whose evidence should have been treated with greater respect because of their social role, the Officer was not required to treat social role as determinative. The Officer acknowledged the evidence and explained why it did not sufficiently establish the facts necessary to allow the Applicants’ PRRA application. [ 48 ] Regarding the medical records, the Officer accepted that the [NAME] attended a hospital with injuries. The Officer found that the medical records did not explain how the injuries occurred and therefore had limited value in proving the alleged causal link between the injuries and the Applicants’ [NAME]-related profile. The Applicants argued that errors identified in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1362 [ [NAME] ] are similar to those in the Decisions. In [NAME] , Justice Pentney found the officer’s reasoning unreasonable because the officer ignored sworn evidence linking the medical reports to alleged racist attacks and treated the reports’ silence on causation as dispositive. That case is distinguishable. Here, the Officer found that the medical records, considered in context, did not sufficiently establish that those injuries were caused by persons acting because of the Applicants’ political opinion or because of a state-directed interest in the Applicants. [ 49 ] The Applicants also rely on [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 26 [ [NAME] ], which is also distinguishable. In [NAME] , the officer failed to consider the medical evidence as a whole and made an illogical comment about the absence of any statement in the medical reports that the applicant would face risk because of asthma in another part of the world ( [NAME] at paras 27-30). Here, the Decisions contain no such error. The Officer did not impose an unreasonable expectation on the medical records, but instead assessed the extent to which they corroborated the Applicants’ allegations and assigned them limited weight on that basis. [ 50 ] The Applicants also argue that the document index identified the photographs as showing police raids, injuries, and a threatening poster. They also point to the Father’s Affidavit as providing narrative context. However, the Officer acknowledged the photographs and affidavit evidence, and the Officer’s concern was that the photographs themselves, and the accompanying material, did not provide enough reliable detail about dates, locations, identities, or the events depicted to prove the alleged risk, or provide the necessary nexus to the Applicants’ alleged risk. While labels in an index and narrative assertions in an affidavit may provide context, they do not compel the Officer to assign the photographs substantial weight. The Officer analyzed whether the photographs meaningfully corroborated the alleged incidents and the claimed causal link to the Applicants’ political activities. [ 51 ] The Applicants further state that the Officer did not expressly mention the submitted transcript of a conversation between the [NAME] Applicant and his father. However, a decision maker is not required to mention every piece of evidence. The question is whether the omitted evidence was sufficiently important and directly contradictory to a decision maker’s finding that the Court may infer from the decision maker’s silence that the finding was made without regard to that evidence ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2010 FCA 177 (CanLII) at para 38, citing [NAME] v Canada , 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC) at para 17). The transcript does not meet that threshold. The threatening poster, the attack on the brother, and police inquiries, were matters before the Officer through the affidavits and narrative evidence. The transcript did not squarely contradict the Officer’s core finding that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the Applicants’ political profile, state awareness, and individualized forward-looking risk. [ 52 ] The Applicants argue that police corruption, refusal to register complaints, and bribery explain why official records were unavailable. The Officer was aware of allegations of corruption and lack of police protection but found that the record did not establish the alleged forward-looking risk. [ 53 ] The Applicants also argue that the Officer ignored NDP materials concerning treatment of suspected [NAME] supporters, monitoring, detention, torture, false criminal charges, and police abuse. I do not accept that submission. The reasons set out that the Officer assessed country conditions, were using the NDP and expressly accepted hostility toward [NAME] organizations and members. [ 54 ] Further, some of the Applicants’ submissions refer to NDP material dated May 30, 2025. That material postdates the March 28, 2025 reasons and April 24, 2025 notice letters and cannot show that the Decisions were unreasonable when made. [ 55 ] One passage in the Officer’s reasons warrants comment. The phrase that conditions for [NAME] supporters in India may be “less than ideal” understates the seriousness of some country condition evidence. However, the Decisions must be read as a whole and the Officer accepted that the Indian government is hostile toward [NAME] organizations and members and gave country evidence considerable weight. The dispositive finding remained the insufficiency of evidence connecting these Applicants personally to a forward-looking risk. [ 56 ] [ADDRESS]’s task on judicial review is not to determine whether it would have weighed the evidence differently; it is to determine whether the Officer’s assessment was justified, transparent, and intelligible in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints ( [NAME] at paras 83, 99, 105, 125-126). On that question, the Decisions meet the standard. The Officer: a) identified the correct risk framework; b) considered the new evidence restriction under paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA ; c) accepted that support for [NAME] could have a nexus to political opinion; d) reviewed the central items of evidence; and e) explained why the evidence did not establish a sufficiently visible political profile, state awareness, or an individualized forward-looking risk [NAME]. [ 57 ] The Decisions are reasonable.

VII. Conclusion [ 58 ] The application for judicial review is dismissed. [ 59 ] No question for certification was proposed, and none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-13559-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application is dismissed. There is no question for certification. "Michael D. Manson" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-13559-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: May 13, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: MANSON J. DATED: May 29, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] and Solicitors Winnipeg, [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent