Federal Court Grants Claimant's Judicial Review for Pre-Removal Risk Assessment

Date: 20260619 Docket: IMM-3149-25 Citation: 2026 FC 839 Ottawa, Ontario, June 19, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Battista BETWEEN: [NAME] ([NAME] AND [NAME]) Applicant and THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondents

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant is a Nigerian citizen who sought Canada’s protection based on his fears of persecution. He claimed to be at risk as a gay man. However, a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment ([NAME]) Officer refused his application due to the insufficiency of his evidence, without conducting an oral hearing. [ 2 ] As explained below, the denial of the [NAME] application without conducting an oral hearing breached the Applicant’s right to procedural fairness. The decision was also unreasonable for requiring corroboration of the Applicant’s allegations despite a presumption of truthfulness, and for failing to assess the Applicant’s risks as a gay man. The application for [NAME] is therefore granted.

II. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant arrived in Canada on December 15, 2024. The timing of his request for protection in Canada is not documented, but it appears to have been made after the issuance of an exclusion order against him. As a result of the exclusion order, he was ineligible for referral to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board for the determination of his claim. The assessment of his fears was instead conducted through a [NAME], which he submitted on December 23, 2024, while he was in immigration detention in Montreal. [ 4 ] In support of his [NAME] application, the Applicant submitted: - documents supporting his personal identity; - an affidavit from his brother and aunt attesting to his sexual orientation; - an affidavit from his [NAME]; - submissions from his counsel; and - a written narrative describing his experiences in Nigeria and his fears of returning to his country as a gay man. [ 5 ] No oral hearing was conducted in the assessment of the [NAME] application, and it was refused on January 27, 2025. [ 6 ] The sole basis of the refusal was that none of the Applicant’s allegations or evidence were sufficient for a positive result on his application. The Officer’s reasons are replete with findings of a lack of precise details, dates and explanations. The Officer also identified gaps in the chronology of the events asserted by the Applicant, and “vague” accounts of his relationships with his same-sex partners. The Officer made no determination regarding the Applicant’s claim to be gay, and made no assessment of country condition evidence regarding the risks faced by members of the [NAME]. [ 7 ] Removal arrangements for the Applicant began almost immediately after the refusal of his [NAME] application. The Applicant commenced this Application for [NAME] on February 4, 2025, and his first removal date was March 25, 2025. That removal was cancelled due to a lack of travel documents for him, and another removal date was scheduled for January 5, 2026. This removal was also cancelled because an Emergency Travel Certificate from the Nigerian High Commission in Canada was only received for him on January 12, 2026. The final rescheduled date set for the Applicant’s removal was January 15, 2026. [ 8 ] On December 12, 2025, Justice Allyson Whyte Nowak dismissed the Applicant’s motion for a stay of his removal. Justice Whyte Nowak accepted that the Applicant raised non-frivolous issues with the [NAME] decision, but found that there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm based on the Officer’s findings, and then found that the balance of convenience favoured the Minister in executing the Applicant’s removal. [ 9 ] The Applicant did not report for his scheduled removal. [ 10 ] On March 26, 2026, Justice Whyte Nowak granted leave to commence this application for [NAME]. The Respondent filed a motion on April 20, 2026, requesting that the [NAME] application be dismissed without consideration of its merits based on the Applicant’s lack of clean hands, namely his failure to report for removal. I directed that the motion be heard and determined on the date scheduled for the [NAME] hearing.

III. Issues and Standard of Review [ 11 ] The preliminary issue raised by the Respondent is whether this application for [NAME] should be dismissed without consideration of its merits based on the Applicant’s lack of clean hands. This issue involves the application of an equitable concept and attracts no standard of review. [ 12 ] The two issues raised by the Applicant for substantive [NAME] are the procedural fairness in the decision-making process, and the reasonableness of the decision. [ 13 ] The assessment of whether a breach of procedural fairness has taken place does not involve a standard of review. Instead, a reviewing court asks, “with a sharp focus on the nature of the substantive rights involved and the consequences to the individual, whether a fair and just process was followed” ( [NAME] Company v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54. See also [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Protection) , 2022 FC 1482 at para 4). [ 14 ] The issue of the decision’s reasonableness is considered pursuant to the reasonableness standard of review described in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ], affirmed in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21. A reasonable decision must bear the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility ( Vavilov, at para 99).

IV. Analysis [ 15 ] As explained more fully below, the doctrine of clean hands is inapplicable to this application for [NAME] for multiple reasons. [ 16 ] First, the clean hands doctrine is more appropriately applied as a discretionary basis to withhold a remedy, rather than as a preliminary objection to conducing [NAME]. Second, as a remedial concept the doctrine is inapplicable to this application because the Applicant’s misconduct — evading removal — does not relate directly to the subject matter of this application, which is the lawfulness of the decision denying him protection. Finally, even if the doctrine did apply directly to this application, on balance it should not result in the denial of a remedy given the nature of the administrative unlawfulness, the importance of the Applicant’s affected rights and the impact upon him if the impugned administrative action is allowed to stand. [ 17 ] Substantively, the Officer breached procedural fairness by failing to accept the Applicant’s evidence while also denying him an opportunity to meet the Officer’s concerns through an oral hearing. Finally, the decision is unreasonable for requiring corroboration of the Applicant’s allegations and failing to assess his risks of returning to Nigeria as a gay man. A. The doctrine of clean hands is more appropriately a remedial consideration than a preliminary objection to [NAME] [ 18 ] The Respondent argues that this application for [NAME] should be dismissed without an examination of the merits because the Applicant does not come to the Court with clean hands. Specifically, the Respondent states that the Applicant’s misconduct in failing to appear for removal should disqualify him from [NAME] of the refusal of his [NAME] application. [ 19 ] The doctrine of clean hands is an equitable doctrine under which a party may be disentitled to relief for conduct that relates “directly to the very subject matter of the claim” ( Canada (National Revenue) v [NAME] Corporation, 2019 FCA 67 [ [NAME] ] at para 37). The doctrine is to be interpreted and applied narrowly and “kept to the circle of behaviour related to the relief sought” ( [NAME] v [NAME] , 2020 BCCA 15 [ [NAME] ] at para 46). “The maxim must not be interpreted and applied too broadly as, e.g., against a plaintiff who had not led a blameless life” ( Toronto (City) v [NAME] , 1969 CanLII 339 (ONCA), [1970] 1 OR 483 [ [NAME] ] at 493). [ 20 ] I have reservations regarding the broad application of the clean hands doctrine proposed by the Respondent. Specifically, I am concerned about the proposed use of the clean hands doctrine as a preliminary objection to [NAME], preventing a determination on the merits, as opposed to the consideration of clean hands as a basis to refuse relief after the grounds for [NAME] have been established. The distinction between the two exercises of [NAME] discretion has been described by Justice Marshall Rothstein: “Relief on [NAME] is equitable. The discretion in s. 18.1(4) [of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7] recognizes that it may be inappropriate to grant equitable relief in some cases. This remedial discretion allows a reviewing judge to withhold relief in certain cases. It does not concern the review itself, however.” ( Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2009 SCC 12 [[NAME] ] at para 131) [ 21 ] Upon examination of the distinction between preliminary objections to the conduct of [NAME] versus the discretion to withhold relief ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 139 [ [NAME] ] at para 28), it can be observed that preliminary objections are predominantly related to the conservation of judicial resources. For example, if there is found to be an available alternate remedy, or if a dispute has become moot, a court may decline to consider the merits of a [NAME] application ( [NAME] v TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8 at para 54; Cooperative de transport maritime et aérien v United Steel Workers , 2015 FCA 287 at paras 3-9). By contrast, the discretionary basis for courts to refuse relief after conducting [NAME] typically involves balancing broad public interest considerations, such as the “misconduct” of parties, with an individual’s interests ( [NAME] , at paras 36, 135). [ 22 ] As described below, the balancing of factors required by the clean hands doctrine involves considerations such as the seriousness of the misconduct and the need for deterrence, with the impugned administrative unlawfulness and the impact on the applicant in light of the applicant’s rights ( Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME], 2006 FCA 14 [ [NAME] ] at para 10). This is essentially an exercise of balancing competing interests and concerns, similar to a balance of convenience. [ 23 ] In my view, this balancing exercise is most effective after the examination of the merits [NAME], when the rights of the Applicant as well as the nature of the administrative error has been fully appreciated and considered. The exercise of balancing after an applicant’s prima facie entitlement to a remedy is also consistent with the exercise of discretion in other administrative contexts such as requests for mandamus or injunctions (See e.g. [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] Review Committee) , 2026 FCA 53 at para 47; [COMPANY]. v Canada (Attorney General) , 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC) at 332-333 ). [ 24 ] Recognizing the distinction between using the clean hands doctrine at the preliminary stage of [NAME] as opposed to the remedial stage may at first appear to be academic and contrary to the goal of judicial economy. [ 25 ] However, given the increasing recognition of the role of [NAME] in ensuring accountability in public decision-making and supporting the rule of law ( Vavilov , at para 2, 14, 95), the circumstances leading to its ouster should be limited. The denial of [NAME] impacts not merely a specific applicant but accountability in [NAME]. [ 26 ] The use of the clean hands doctrine as a remedial consideration also respects the conceptual structure of [NAME] and prevents the “tail” of remedy from wagging the “dog” of [NAME] (Cristie Ford, “Dogs and Tails: Remedies in Administrative Law,” in [NAME], eds., Administrative Law in Context , 2 ed (Toronto: [NAME], 2013) at 111; [NAME] at paras 28-30; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 780 at para 25). [ 27 ] In the present case, the technical and legal requirements authorizing [NAME] have been met. The application was commenced pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 ( IRPA ), and an order was issued from the Court (per Justice Whyte Nowak) granting leave to commence [NAME]. I have concerns about the ability of an equitable doctrine such as clean hands to effectively nullify a process authorized by statute and by judicial order ( [NAME] v [NAME] (City), 2019 SKCA 92 at para 70). [ 28 ] The Respondent relies upon the Federal Court of Appeal’s (FCA) decision in [NAME] for the principle that the unclean hands doctrine can lead to a denial of [NAME], in contrast to a denial of relief. [ 29 ] However, in my view, [NAME] does not directly address that issue. The issue before the Court in [NAME] was whether discretionary rather than obligatory consequences result from a court’s finding of unclean hands ( Thanabalsingham , at para 9). [ 30 ] As noted above, in [NAME] the FCA stated that a finding of unclean hands involves the exercise of a court’s discretion, in which the individual’s interests are balanced against the broader public interest. The FCA acknowledged but did not specifically endorse previous jurisprudence which used the clean hands doctrine to block [NAME]. Ultimately, the appeal was decided on the availability of an adequate alternative remedy for the Appellant, not on the doctrine of clean hands, and the direct answer to the certified question did not involve the clean hands doctrine ( [NAME] , at para 17). The question of whether the doctrine of clean hands is more appropriately considered a remedial consideration rather than a preliminary objection to [NAME] was not directly at issue before the Court. [ 31 ] In the absence of clear appellate authority sanctioning the use of the clean hands doctrine to eliminate rights of [NAME] as opposed to withholding a remedy, I find it to be more consistent with the narrow application of the clean hands doctrine to apply it as a remedial consideration. Therefore, in this application the clean hands doctrine will be considered after assessing the Applicant’s challenge to the [NAME]’s decision. B. The [NAME] breached procedural fairness by not conducting an oral hearing [ 32 ] As stated above, the basis of the [NAME] refusal was the Officer’s determination that details regarding the Applicant’s experiences and background were missing. These are examples of information perceived to be missing: - Exact periods during which the Applicant’s relationships began and ended, - How long the Applicant knew his partners, how often he saw them, and “key moments” that would support the depth of those connections, - How each relationship developed or progressed in a hostile climate, - The precise circumstances of an alleged police raid, - Details about how the Applicant protected himself from the police. [ 33 ] The [NAME] application form completed by the Applicant instructed him to list all the significant incidents that caused him to seek protection. It did not ask him to provide the level of detail that formed the basis of the [NAME]’s refusal of his application. If the [NAME] believed that this information was necessary to accept or believe the factual propositions advanced by the Applicant, and to determine his protection needs, the Officer had the power to collect the information by arranging a hearing ( IRPA , s 113(b); Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 [ IRPR ], s 167; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 1207 [ [NAME] ] at para 29, 31).Yet the [NAME] did not even consider these provisions, which represent the codification of the principles of natural justice and fairness (( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 714 [ [NAME] ], at para 21; [NAME] , at para 21). [ 34 ] The Officer’s failure to arrange a hearing to collect the information required to address the Officer’s concerns constituted a breach of procedural fairness ( [NAME] at paras 19, 21-23). As recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, it is the duty of the examiner to determine whether the Convention refugee definition is met ( Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, 1993 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 745). [ 35 ] The Respondent relies solely on Justice Whyte Nowak’s dismissal of the stay motion to defend the fairness of the decision. This argument is misplaced. Justice Whyte Nowak dismissed the [NAME] application due to the Applicant’s failure to meet the “irreparable harm” branch of the tripartite test for a stay of the Applicant’s removal. Under that branch of the test, the Applicant was required to provide the Court with “evidence at a convincing level of particularity that demonstrates a real probability that unavoidable harm will result” ( [COMPANY] v Canada (National Revenue), 2012 FCA 255 at para 31 cited in [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 941 at para 65). This is a fact-driven analysis grounded in the specific record presented to the Court on the motion. Justice Whyte Nowak’s finding of a lack of irreparable harm was not concerned with the fairness of the [NAME] decision. Moreover, Justice Whyte Nowak specifically found non-frivolous issues with the fairness and reasonableness of the [NAME]’s decision. C. The refusal of the [NAME] application was unreasonable for imposing a duty of corroboration on the Applicant, and for failing to determine whether the Applicant’s sexual orientation would place him at risk in Nigeria [ 36 ] The allegations described by the Applicant in his [NAME] application were declared to be truthful and therefore attracted a presumption of truthfulness ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 565 at para 45). [ 37 ] Despite this presumption, and despite the absence of any adverse credibility findings, the Applicant’s evidence was not accepted because they were uncorroborated. The evidence not accepted by the Officer included the Applicant’s evidence regarding his same-sex relationships, his evidence of a police raid, his evidence of a phone call from a friend who warned him of the raid, and his evidence of a visit by the police to his father. [ 38 ] The requirement imposed upon the Applicant for corroboration of his evidence in the presence of a presumption of truthfulness was unreasonable ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 968 at para 27; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1352 at paras 55-57; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2004 FC 282 at para 38; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 870 at para 21). [ 39 ] Further, the Applicant filed evidence demonstrating serious risks for gay men in Nigeria, and his claim to be gay also attracted a presumption of truthfulness, particularly given the presence of two sworn affidavits attesting to his sexual orientation. [ 40 ] However, the [NAME] made no conclusion regarding the Applicant’s sexual orientation. Even if the [NAME] doubted the Applicant’s personal experiences in Nigeria, it was unreasonable for the Officer to refuse the [NAME] application without determining whether the Applicant’s sexual orientation would lead to risks for him in Nigeria ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 501 at para 8). [ 41 ] The Respondent’s only submission on the [NAME] decision’s reasonableness is to reiterate the Court’s reasoning in refusing the Applicant’s stay motion. However, as stated above, the stay motion was dismissed based on a lack of evidence of irreparable harm, not on the basis of the [NAME] decision’s reasonableness.

V. Conclusion and Remedy [ 42 ] The refusal of the Applicant’s [NAME] application was unfair and unreasonable. Notwithstanding these errors, the Respondent has urged the Court to apply the doctrine of clean hands based on the Applicant’s evasion of removal. As explained above, in my view the doctrine is appropriately considered at this remedial stage, rather than as a preliminary objection to the conduct of [NAME]. [ 43 ] As acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada, the discretionary power to refuse relief “must be exercised with the greatest care” due to its potential to make inroads upon the rule of law ( Mining Watch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2 at para 52). As noted above, the doctrine of clean hands is to be applied narrowly and the misconduct giving rise to an allegation of unclean hands must relate directly to the very subject matter of the claim ( [NAME], at 493; [NAME] , at para 37; [NAME], at para 6). [ 44 ] I decline to apply the doctrine to deny relief in this application because the Applicant’s evasion of removal does not relate “directly” to this application for [NAME]. [ 45 ] Illustrations of the requirement for a direct connection between the misconduct and the “very subject matter” of a proceeding can be found in the Court’s jurisprudence. For example, an Applicant was denied relief on a stay motion for lacking clean hands when the affidavit he filed in support of the stay motion was deficient to the point of being misleading ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2021 FC 158 [ [NAME] ] at para 23). [ 46 ] The “very subject matter” of this application for [NAME] is the unfairness and unreasonableness of a [NAME]’s decision to deny the Applicant protection. The relief requested is the quashing of the [NAME] decision and remitting the application for redetermination to a different officer. It has no relation to the timing or circumstances of the Applicant’s removal from Canada. No allegation of illegality or impropriety has been made against the Applicant in the conduct of his [NAME] application. Therefore, no direct connection exists between the Applicant’s evasion of removal and the relief he seeks in this application.

Accordingly, the application of the clean hands doctrine to this application is inappropriate. [ 47 ] Even if I were to find a direct link between the Applicant’s misconduct and the very subject matter of this application, I would decline to apply the doctrine after balancing the factors identified by the FCA for the consideration of a party’s lack of clean hands. This balancing exercise lies at the heart of the discretion of the clean hands doctrine. [ 48 ] The factors identified by the FCA in [NAME] factors are: ˗ the seriousness of the applicant’s misconduct and the extent to which it undermines the proceeding in question; ˗ the need to deter others from similar conduct; ˗ the nature of the alleged administrative unlawfulness and the apparent strength of the case; and ˗ the importance of the individual rights affected and the likely impact upon the applicant if the administrative action impugned is allowed to stand. ( [NAME], supra at para 21 citing [NAME] , at para 10) [ 49 ] Regarding the first two factors, there is no need to add to the previous determinations of my colleagues that the evasion of removal constitutes serious misconduct which needs to be deterred (See e.g. Ge v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 132 at para 12; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 331 at para 27; [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2018 FC 332 at para 25). However, as explained above, the misconduct of the Applicant has not had any prejudicial impact on this specific proceeding. [ 50 ] The nature of the administrative unlawfulness in this case is the unfairness and unreasonableness of the decision refusing protection to the Applicant. The unfairness deprived the Applicant of a hearing, which the [NAME] was empowered to conduct, but did not conduct, without any explanation for declining to do so. [ 51 ] The oral hearing process has been fundamental to the fair determination of refugee claims in Canada for decades, and has constitutional implications, even though the Applicant did not challenge the administrative conduct for its consistency with [NAME] of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [ Charter ] values ( [NAME] v Minister of Employment and Immigration , 1985 CanLII 65 [ [NAME] ] at paras 58-60; [NAME] v Barreau du Québec , 2012 SCC 1 at para 24). [ 52 ] An unfair process invalidates the process and resulting decision ( [NAME] v Director of Kent Institution , 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 643, at para 23). The Applicant was therefore deprived of consideration of his need for protection. [ 53 ] The Applicant’s affected rights are a significant consideration in the balancing exercise. His fears of persecution have not been fairly assessed, contrary to Canada’s non-refoulement obligations under the Charter, the IRPA and international law ( [NAME], at paras 34-74; IRPA , ss 2(b), 115; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at paras 104-117). If the administrative decision is allowed to stand, the Applicant would be returned to his country despite his fears of persecution, without a fair assessment of the well-foundedness of those fears. [ 54 ] Moreover, international law prohibits states from penalizing claimants for their illegal or improper entry or presence, and this prohibition persists until a refugee has been found not to be a refugee in a final decision following a fair procedure ( Guidelines on International Protection No. 14: Non-penalization of refugees on account of their irregular entry or presence and restrictions on their movements in accordance with Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees , UNCHR, HCR/GIP/24/14 23 September 2024 at para 10; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 2545 , art 31 as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 [the Convention ]). This prohibition recognizes the principle that refugees should not face adverse legal consequences for, in essence, taking steps to save their lives and secure safety. [ 55 ] Penalizing the Applicant’s lack of clean hands by eliminating his remedy for an unfair and unreasonable determination of his fears of persecution may therefore be contrary to the proper application of the Convention and may expose the Applicant to refoulement. Addressing the unlawfulness of one party by permitting the unlawfulness of the opposing party results in a determination that two wrongs make a right, which is not just or equitable ( [COMPANY]. v Committee against Hog factories , 2001 NBCA 11 at para 14). [ 56 ] The enforcement and removal provisions and processes in the IRPR and IRPA provide a range of options to deal with persons who are flight risks, and persons who do not comply with removal orders. The use of an equitable doctrine to deny a claimant’s statutory right to [NAME] of their first and only risk assessment — particularly when serious issues of procedural fairness are raised — is not necessary or equitable.

JUDGMENT in IMM-3149-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for [NAME] is granted, the refusal of the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment application is set aside, and the matter is referred to a different Officer for a decision consistent with these reasons. For greater clarity, the Court declares the decision dated January 27, 2025, refusing the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment to be a legal nullity, and as such the consequences of the decision are legal nullities, and the Applicant’s status is restored to that of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment applicant who has not received a final determination on his application. As such, the Applicant should benefit from the statutory stay of his removal pursuant to section 232 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227. "Michael Battista" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-3149-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] ([NAME] AND [NAME]) v THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 3, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: BATTISTA J. DATED: JUNE 19, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, [NAME]