Federal Court Grants Judicial Review for Work Permit Refusals

Date: 20260507 Docket: IMM-28284-25 Citation: 2026 FC 606 Ottawa, Ontario, May 7, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] The Respondent brings a motion in writing pursuant to Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106, [ Rules ] for an Order: Granting the application for leave and for judicial review [ALJR] and setting aside the November 13, 2025 decisions regarding application numbers W312518907 and W312518909 respecting the Applicants, [NAME] and [NAME], who sought a work permit and a visa as an accompanying spouse respectively; Remitting the matter back to a differently constituted panel for redetermination; and Awarding no costs to either party. [ 2 ] The Applicants oppose the motion. Noting the history of work permit refusals and redeterminations, the Applicants request that any Order granting the ALJR, setting aside the November 13, 2025 decisions, and remitting the matters for redetermination be done with directions, and that the Applicants be awarded costs. [ 3 ] The Respondent takes the position that there is no live controversy between the Parties, that the remedy sought by the Applicants has been offered, that there is no “merry-go-round of decision and [judicial] review” demonstrated, and that the Applicants need not consent for the Respondent to succeed on this motion. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, the Respondent’s motion is granted.

II. Request for oral hearing [ 5 ] By way of letter dated April 19, 2026, the Applicants requested a special sitting pursuant to Rule 35, on the basis that a hearing would assist in resolving procedural and evidentiary issues. [ 6 ] Rule 369(4) does contemplate that, when a party requests a hearing, the Court may dispose of the motion in writing or after an oral hearing. Where a request is made, it is in the Court’s discretion to determine whether the motion will be disposed of in writing. That discretion is not limited by Rule 369; in exercising it, the Court will consider whether, in all of the circumstances, the motion can be determined without the delay or expense of an oral hearing ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2006 FCA 279 at para 12). [ 7 ] In this instance, there is no real factual dispute, and the Parties’ positions have been ably set out in their written submissions. I therefore see no advantage to an oral hearing. The Applicants’ request is refused.

III. Procedural history [ 8 ] The Primary Applicant [[NAME]], [NAME], has made three separate applications for a work permit and has been refused on four occasions: First refusal – Application W310103509 was refused on June 4, 2024. [NAME] did not initiate an ALJR of the refusal. Second refusal – Application W309149452 was refused on November 19, 2024. The refusal cited departure risk under paragraph 200(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] and the absence of a Labour Market Impact Assessment. An ALJR was filed but discontinued on February 12, 2024, after the Parties agreed that the matter be redetermined. Third refusal – Application W309149452 was refused on redetermination on April 8, 2025, on different grounds, the decision-maker not being convinced [NAME] was an owner/shareholder of an Indian company, that the employment letter relied on failed to fully demonstrate the experience required, and concerns with the business plan. An ALJR of the refusal was not pursued, [NAME] being of the view that a fresh application would be a more economically efficient option. Fourth refusal – A fresh application (W312518907) was submitted on August 18, 2025, together with a spousal application (W312518909) for [NAME]’s wife. The applications were refused on November 13, 2025. Those refusals are the subject of this proceeding. [ 9 ] The second and fourth refusals relied on substantially the same reasoning and language – departure risk, [NAME]’s immigration status in the Gulf, the existence of similar companies in the Canadian market, and the Officer not being convinced that the proposed business would provide significant benefit under subsection 205(a) of the IRPR. [NAME]’s November 13, 2025 refusal identified two additional grounds for refusal: (1) the absence of significant family ties outside Canada; and (2) [NAME]’s failure to demonstrate financial establishment in his country of residence.

IV. Issues [ 10 ] The Parties agree that in the absence of justification supporting the work permit refusal, the decision that is challenged in the underlying ALJR is unreasonable. They also agree that as a result, the Court should grant both leave and the application for judicial review, quashing the decisions and remitting the matter for redetermination by a different decision-maker. [ 11 ] Despite agreement on granting the motion for judgment, the Applicants rely on [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 39 [ [NAME] ], a case where the motion for judgment was refused on the basis that granting the motion, in any form, would leave unresolved an issue that would be “key to an officer’s assessment of the individual Applicants’ application on redetermination” (at para 7). [ 12 ] The Applicants’ reliance on [NAME] is misplaced and inconsistent with the position that the motion should succeed. The only dispute is whether, in granting the motion, directions should issue and costs be awarded to the Applicants. I have framed the issues raised as follows: In granting the ALJR and remitting the matter for reconsideration, should the Court issue directions and remain seized of the matter to ensure compliance with any direction? Should the Applicants be awarded costs? V. Analysis A. Direction not warranted [ 13 ] The Applicants concede that this is not a case where a directed verdict is warranted. However, they do take the position that in granting the Respondent’s motion, direction is warranted and that the Court should retain supervisory jurisdiction over the redetermination. The Applicants argue the circumstances are exceptional, the Respondent having twice conceded the decisions reached in considering [NAME]’s work permit applications have been unreasonable. [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1633 at para 21 [ [NAME] ], the Applicants argue they find themselves in a state of déjà vu and that having the Court remaining seized of the matter will allow them to return to the Court should a further refusal be rendered on grounds already conceded as insufficient, without having to commence a fresh ALJR. [ 14 ] The Respondent submits that there is no reason to believe that remitting the matter for redetermination by a different decision-maker with the opportunity to make further submissions would not secure a meaningful reconsideration. The Applicants’ history demonstrates that prior determinations were not “boilerplate refusal[s]” relying on the same grounds and that a refusal on reconsideration is not evidence that the application was not meaningfully considered. [ 15 ] In the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over federal boards, commissions, or other tribunals, the Court may refer matters back with “such directions as it considers to be appropriate” ( Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(3)(b)). Recognizing Parliament’s intent in enacting a scheme where administrative decision-makers are to determine matters at first instance, the Court should nonetheless use this discretion sparingly. [ 16 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has further recognized that Parliament’s intent cannot give rise to an endless merry-go-round of judicial reviews and subsequent reconsiderations. Where asked to exercise their discretion, courts are to consider factors such as delay, fairness to the parties, the urgency of providing a resolution to the dispute, the nature of the regulatory regime, whether the administrative decision-maker had a genuine opportunity to weigh in on the issue in question, costs to the parties, and the efficient use of public resources ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at para 142). [ 17 ] The Respondent accurately notes that reconsideration does not entitle an applicant to their preferred result. However, an applicant should expect that in undertaking a court-ordered reconsideration, a decision-maker will not commit similar or identical errors. This is what occurred in [NAME] where in granting the ALJR, the Court also issued directions to the decision-maker undertaking the reconsideration. However, that is not what has occurred here. [ 18 ] The Applicants rely on the substantial similarity between the decision now under review with respect to [NAME] and the November 2024 decision (see Exhibit “A” to the Affidavit of [NAME] sworn on April 16, 2026). The Respondent has conceded both decisions were unreasonable. However, the decision under review (the November 2025 decision with respect to [NAME]) was not the result of the reconsideration of the November 2024 decision. The November 2024 decision was redetermined in April 2025. As the Applicants acknowledge, in reconsidering the November 2024 decision, the decision-maker detailed a different rationale for the refusal. [ 19 ] [NAME] elected not to challenge the April 2025 reconsideration decision. Instead, [NAME] brought a fresh application, the third he has submitted, which resulted in the November 2025 refusal decision now in issue. [ 20 ] Contrary to the Applicants’ position, the circumstances do not disclose an endless merry-go-round of judicial reviews and subsequent reconsiderations. Therefore, I am not prepared to exercise the Court’s discretion to issue directions in granting this motion. B. Costs not warranted [ 21 ] Costs are only awarded in proceedings undertaken pursuant to the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22 [FCCIRPR] where the Court is persuaded there are special reasons to so order (FCCIRPR, r 22). The threshold is high ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 2072 at para 23). [ 22 ] In arguing the threshold has been satisfied in this instance, the Applicants point to the use of boilerplate reasoning, a circular pattern of applications and decisions, and the structural prejudice resulting from repeated refusals. [ 23 ] As I have set out above, the circumstances in this matter do not disclose a circular pattern or a merry-go-round of refusals and reconsiderations. [NAME] has not challenged each of the refusals. [NAME] has challenged two of the refusal decisions by way of judicial review, each of those decisions related to a new or fresh application. [ 24 ] That separate decision-makers dealing with separate and distinct work permit applications may have similarly erred by failing to link the use of boilerplate language to the evidence does not disclose special reasons warranting an award of costs. Similarly, refusal decisions that were never challenged cannot be relied upon to justify special reasons for an award of costs as the Applicants argue.

VI. Conclusion [ 25 ] The Respondent’s motion will be granted. [ 26 ] [ADDRESS] will not issue directions in remitting the matter for reconsideration and there shall be no award of costs.

JUDGMENT in IMM-28284-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Respondent’s motion is granted. Leave is granted in the underlying Application for Leave and for Judicial Review filed on December 18, 2025, the application for judicial review is granted, and the November 13, 2025 decisions are set aside. The matters are remitted for redetermination by a different decision-maker. No costs. “Patrick Gleeson” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-28284-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION MOTION IN WRITING CONSIDERED AT OTTAWA, ONTARIO PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURTS RULES judgment AND

REASONS: GLEESON J. DATED: MAY 7, 2026 WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY : [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] and Solicitors Toronto, [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent