Federal Court Grants Judicial Review of PRRA Decision

Date: 20260713 [NAME] : IMM-3747-25 Citation: 2026 FC 935 Montréal, Québec , July 13, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF [NAME] Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The applicant, [NAME], seeks judicial review of a decision rendered on December 10, 2024 [Decision] by a senior immigration officer [Officer] of [NAME] [[NAME]] refusing his application for a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA] under section 112 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. In the Decision, the Officer found that [NAME] would not be subject to persecution, to a danger of torture, to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to his country of nationality and habitual residence, Pakistan. [ 2 ] [NAME] asks this Court to quash the Decision and return the matter to [NAME] for redetermination. He argues that the Officer failed to exercise their jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of his PRRA application, that the Decision lacks reasons and that the Officer did not consider the credible evidence and objective country conditions that were submitted. The Minister of Immigration and Citizenship [Minister] responds that the Officer’s findings are reasonable as [NAME]’s re-availment to Pakistan in 2017 and 2018 was determinative of his PRRA application and that the general documentary evidence adduced was insufficient to demonstrate a personalized risk upon return. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, [NAME]’s application for judicial review will be granted. I find that, in the Decision, the PRRA Officer unreasonably focused on [NAME]’s re-availment to Pakistan and failed to exercise their statutory duty to assess [NAME]’s forward-looking risk upon return. Indeed, while the Officer relied heavily on [NAME]’s prior conduct as undermining his subjective fear, their reasons do not show that they meaningfully engaged with the evidence concerning the current conditions in Pakistan for homosexuals and do not explain why the evidence adduced by [NAME] did not establish a present risk. Considering these deficiencies in the Officer’s reasons, the Court’s intervention is warranted.

II. Background A. Factual context [ 4 ] [NAME] is a now 50-year-old Pakistani national. He first left Pakistan for the United States of America in September 2013. He then entered Canada in February or March 2014. Shortly after his arrival, he made a refugee claim based on his fear in Pakistan on account of his sexual orientation, namely, for being a homosexual man. In June 2014, his claim was accepted by the Refugee Protection Division [RPD]. In June 2016, [NAME] was granted permanent resident status in Canada. [ 5 ] In March 2017, [NAME] returned to Pakistan to marry his now wife, through an arranged marriage. He stayed there for 28 days before returning to Canada in April 2017. Prior to his trip, he was issued a new Pakistani passport and used that passport to enter and exit Pakistan. In August 2017, he initiated a spousal sponsorship application for his wife to immigrate to Canada. In April 2018, [NAME] again returned to Pakistan using his passport, this time to visit his sick mother. He stayed there for 32 days before returning to Canada in May 2018. [ 6 ] [NAME]’s arranged marriage had no bearing on his declared homosexuality. Indeed, according to [NAME]’s June 1, 2023 affidavit filed in support of his PRRA application, he went back to Pakistan and agreed to the arranged marriage to alleviate his mother’s concerns and to allow her to convince the religious authorities and society in Pakistan that he was not homosexual. [ 7 ] In March 2019, the Minister, through the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA], filed an application before the RPD to cease and/or vacate [NAME]’s refugee protection, pursuant to sections 108 and 109 of the IRPA. In June 2022, the RPD rejected the vacation application but allowed the cessation application [Cessation Decision]. [NAME] filed an application for leave and judicial review of the Cessation Decision, but leave was denied by this Court in February 2023 in Court file number IMM-6832-22. [ 8 ] By the effect of the law, [NAME]’s refugee claim was deemed rejected as a result of the Cessation Decision, in accordance with subsection 108(3) of the IRPA. Moreover, the final determination of the cessation of [NAME]’s refugee status also resulted in the loss of his permanent resident status (paragraph 46(1)(c.1) of the IRPA). [ 9 ] In May 2023, [NAME] filed a PRRA application, again based on his fear in Pakistan on account of his sexual orientation. Evidence in support of his PRRA application included his affidavit and an affidavit from his brother, which both attested to [NAME]’s homosexuality and his continuing fear to return to Pakistan. [ 10 ] In December 2024, the Officer rejected [NAME]’s application for a PRRA for the reasons outlined in the Decision. The Decision was handed to [NAME] by the CBSA in February 2025. B. The PRRA Decision [ 11 ] In the PRRA Decision, the Officer starts by outlining [NAME]’s immigration history and stating the relevant provisions (paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA and subsection 161(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227) and case law ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 FCA 385 [ [NAME] ]). The Officer sets out the evidence adduced, notably [NAME]’s affidavit “wherein he describes the facts and circumstances that preclude his return to Pakistan” and various articles of documentary evidence on Pakistan that describe the practice of conversion therapy in the country. The Officer then discusses the applicable test to be granted refugee protection pursuant to the PRRA process, that is, whether the applicant has a “well-founded fear of persecution in their country of nationality” , which refers to both a subjective and an objective component. The Officer explains that both elements must be satisfied. The Officer proceeds in stating that “[a]n applicant’s return to the country where they allegedly face persecution can call their subjective fear into question” . The Officer acknowledges the RPD’s Cessation Decision with respect to [NAME]’s re-availment to Pakistan, where [NAME] was found to have obtained and travelled on a Pakistani passport to Pakistan in March 2017 and April 2018 “during which time he made appearances at public venues in the presence of a large number of relatives and friends and made contact with civil authorities and religious officials all without incident” . [ 12 ] The Officer’s cursory analysis, in considering both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA, reads as follows: I do not find these aforementioned actions taken by the applicant are consistent with an individual who has expressed a fear of returning to Pakistan based on his sexual orientation. I find the applicant re-availment to the country where he faced harm makes it unlikely, on balance, that he has a subjective fear of that harm. His procurement of a Pakistani passport and his subsequent return to Pakistan on multiple occasions suggests that he no longer fears persecution or harm on the basis of his homosexuality and a willingness to entrust his personal safety to the Pakistani state. Having considered all the submissions and evidence filed and based on the above analysis, I do not find that the applicant would face more than a mere possibility of persecution, nor do I find the applicant is more likely than not to face a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to Pakistan. C. The applicable standard of review [ 13 ] The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [ [NAME] ]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of one of the recognized exceptions to this presumption ( Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v [COMPANY] , 2022 SCC 30 at para 28; Vavilov at paras 33–64, 69–72). [ 14 ] [NAME] argues that the issue of whether the PRRA Officer exercised their jurisdiction should be reviewed on the standard of correctness, I agree with the Minister that all issues raised as part of this application for judicial review are to be assessed under the reasonableness standard. It has indeed been long recognized that the reasonableness standard applies to the merits of PRRA decisions ( The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v [NAME] , 2008 FCA 94 at para 36; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 494 at para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 821 at para 10; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 363 at para 12; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 202 at para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 570 at para 11; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 437 at para 15; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 749 at para 20). [ 15 ] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( [NAME] at para 46; [NAME] at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility” ( Vavilov at para 99, citing notably [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74). [ 16 ] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention” , seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ( [NAME] at paras 46–47; [NAME] at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ( Vavilov at para 13). [ 17 ] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence ( [NAME] at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker ( Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). [ 18 ] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” ( Vavilov at para 100).

III. Analysis A. Relevant principles [ 19 ] At issue in this judicial review is the relationship between the RPD’s findings in a cessation matter and allegations of new risk on a PRRA. [ 20 ] It is well established that the purpose of a PRRA application is to assess new risk developments that have occurred since the rejection of the refugee protection claim. As the Federal Court of Appeal held in [NAME] at paragraph 12, “[a] PRRA application by a failed refugee claimant is not an appeal or reconsideration of the decision of the RPD to reject a claim for refugee protection” . Because there may be a “gap” between the time that a RPD decision (or a Refugee Appeal Division [[NAME]] decision) is issued and the actual date of removal of a failed refugee claimant, a PRRA application allows eligible failed claimants to have their changed conditions and circumstances assessed by an [NAME] officer prior to their removal. However, given that the result of a successful PRRA application is generally to confer refugee protection to the applicant (paragraph 114(1)(a) of the IRPA), it results that a claim determined by the RPD (or the [NAME]) and a PRRA by an [NAME] officer may require consideration of similar factual and legal issues. As such, there is an obvious risk of wasteful and potentially abusive re-litigation ( [NAME] at para 12). That is why only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection, is admissible on a PRRA application (paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA). [ 21 ] In cessation matters, when the RPD allows the Minister’s application for cessation of refugee protection pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the IRPA, the refugee claim is deemed to be rejected (subsection 108(3) of the IRPA). In turn, this means that, for the application of paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA in the context of PRRA applications, the “time of the rejection” is the date of the cessation decision. In the case of [NAME], that date is June 8, 2022. [ 22 ] As Justice Judith A. Snider expressed in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 FC 176, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate to the PRRA officer that there has been a change of circumstances since the rejection of the refugee claim by the RPD: [4] … It follows that, if country conditions or the personal situation of the claimant have not changed since the date of the RPD decision, a finding of the RPD on the issue of state protection – as a final, binding decision of a quasi-judicial process – should continue to apply to the claimant. In other words, a claimant who has been rejected as a refugee claimant bears the onus of demonstrating that country conditions or personal circumstances have changed since the RPD decision such that the claimant, who was held not to be at risk by the RPD, is now at risk. If the applicant for a PRRA fails to meet that burden, the PRRA application will (and should) fail. B. The Decision is unreasonable [ 23 ] [NAME] first argues that the Officer simply repeated the RPD’s conclusion in the Cessation Decision and thus failed to exercise their jurisdiction and conduct an independent assessment of his forward-looking risk of persecution should he return to Pakistan. [NAME] claims that, if the Officer’s reasoning is upheld, “all PRRA applications would automatically be rejected on the basis of the RPD’s cessation decision” . In his case, because the RPD did not consider [NAME]’s forward risk of persecution, and more particularly so given the time elapsed since the 2022 Cessation Decision, the Officer ought to have conducted that assessment, and failed to do so. [ 24 ] Second, [NAME] contends that the impugned Decision lacks reasons and that the Officer “briefly” rejected his PRRA application. He is of the view that the Decision contains no analysis of the ongoing persecution that homosexuals face in Pakistan as well as no analysis as to whether he faces a well-founded fear of persecution under sections 96 or 97 of the IRPA. [NAME] further argues that the reasons lack sufficient details to allow him to determine whether these issues were addressed at all and whether the Officer properly considered the evidence. In sum, says [NAME], he was ultimately denied the right to know why his PRRA application was rejected. [ 25 ] In the circumstances of this case, I agree with those two arguments advanced by [NAME]. [ 26 ] It bears noting that, in the June 2022 Cessation Decision, the RPD did not evaluate [NAME]’s prospective risk in returning to Pakistan in 2022; the RPD rather focused on [NAME]’s actions in 2017 and 2018 when he returned to Pakistan. Indeed, the RPD expressly declined to “determine whether there remains risk should [[NAME]] be subject to the consequences of an unfavourable cessation decision” (Cessation Decision at para 65). In other words, the RPD did not assess [NAME]’s forward-looking risk upon return to Pakistan at the time. The RPD’s position that “this [was] not relevant to a cessation hearing” aligns with the current case law from this Court ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1840 at para 14, appeal filed A-427-25; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 934 au para 40; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 533 au para 46; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 365 at paras 22‒24; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 4 at paras 27, 40‒41; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 884 at para 59; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 387 at para 23; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 800 at para 66; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 545 au para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 104 at para 34; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 29 at para 20; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2015 FC 765 at para 19). [ 27 ] This, in turn, renders the [NAME] for an applicant’s removal to be compliant with section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, as their forward-looking risk upon return is not assessed at the cessation decision stage. This triggers a heightened duty to properly address this question in the PRRA process given the serious consequences at stake ( Vavilov at para 133). [ 28 ] The Minister argues that it was open for the Officer to find that [NAME]’s multiple returns to Pakistan indicated that he no longer feared persecution and thus, lacked the required subjective fear of persecution. The Minister also submits that [NAME] in fact went to Pakistan and returned safely without incident. As such, says the Minister, [NAME]’s re-availment was, in and of itself, determinative of his PRRA application (citing notably [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1677 at para 7; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 701 at para 19; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1437 at para 34; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 142 at para 19; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1007 at para 25; [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2017 FC 18 at para 27). [ 29 ] With respect, I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments. [ 30 ] At the outset, I observe that most if not all of the cases cited by the Minister relate to applications for judicial review of decisions rendered by the [NAME] in instances where the refugee claimant returned to their country of origin at some point prior to the determination of their claim by either the RPD or the [NAME]. This is different from the present case, where there was the Cessation Decision, and then the PRRA Decision. [ 31 ] Here, the central task and statutory duty of the PRRA Officer was to evaluate whether [NAME] would face risk under section 96 or section 97 of the IRPA   if he were to return to Pakistan today , in a context where such risk has not yet been assessed and having regard to the new evidence arising since the last rejection of the claim. The RPD’s 2022 finding that [NAME] lacked subjective fear when he travelled to Pakistan in 2017 and 2018, while relevant, is certainly not determinative of his PRRA application. My reading of the PRRA Decision leads me to conclude that this is the position the Officer unreasonably and erroneously took in this case. The Officer relied solely on the Cessation Decision to conclude that [NAME] lacked a subjective fear and then, on that basis, rejected his PRRA application. [ 32 ] The Minister contends that the PRRA Officer “clearly examined the evidence before him when reaching his conclusion that [[NAME]] did not submit any evidence of a new personalized risk” . The problem with that proposition is that I cannot find, in the reasons for the Decision, where the Officer undertook such an analysis. Quite the contrary, the Officer’s reasons are cursory and only briefly address the contents of [NAME]’s affidavit and the documentary evidence about conversion therapies in Pakistan — without truly analyzing them. For example, there is no indication as to how the Officer factored in [NAME]’s explanation that, while he was not persecuted during the instances he returned to Pakistan, this was due to the short duration of his trips and that, if he was to return on a permanent basis, he would face persecution. The Decision also ignores [NAME]’s sworn evidence — in his affidavit — about his continued fear upon return to Pakistan because of his sexual orientation. [ 33 ] I find that the Officer unreasonably relied too heavily on the RPD’s findings about the re-availment of [NAME] and failed to conduct an appropriate forward-looking risk assessment. In fact, if the Officer’s approach was endorsed by the Court, it would mean that, for refugee claimants who receive an adverse cessation decision and see their claim deemed rejected pursuant to subsection 108(3), a PRRA application would be useless and serve no real purpose. This is clearly not what Parliament has contemplated in the IRPA, as there is no specific provision excluding, from the PRRA process, applicants whose refugee protection was previously ceased for one or any of the grounds listed in subsection 108(1). [ 34 ] The Minister submits that the documentary evidence adduced by [NAME], in itself, was clearly insufficient to establish a well-founded fear and that claimants must show how their personal circumstances place them at risk in their home country. I agree with the general proposition that the onus is on applicants to establish a link between the general documentary evidence and their personal situations, and that general documentary evidence alone is typically not enough to establish a well-founded and personalized risk ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 821 at para 29; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 419 at para 52; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1517 at para 34; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 696 at para 44; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 450 at para 22; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 426 at para 46; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 596 at paras 23, 26; [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2021 FC 796 at para 22; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 672 at para 17; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 24 at para 46; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 1395 at para 22). [ 35 ] However, I note that neither the RPD in the Cessation Decision nor the Officer in the PRRA Decision challenged [NAME]’s contention that he is a homosexual man. On the contrary, the RPD in the Cessation Decision determined that “[t]here is no document to establish [[NAME]] is not a homosexual; or that he did not face persecution in Pakistan as alleged in his original narrative” (at para 24). As such, it seems to me that there is a clear link between [NAME]’s personal circumstances — that is, his identity as a homosexual man — and the articles submitted regarding the practice in Pakistan to attempt to “cure” homosexuality through conversion therapies. The main problem is that the Officer failed to address this documentary evidence or its relevance in the Decision. [ 36 ] I further agree with [NAME]’s contention that reasons in administrative decision-making are crucial and the case law he cites in that support ( [NAME] v Canada (Indigenous Services) , 2021 FC 650 at para 14; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2008 FC 476 at para 9; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2005 FC 565 at paras 14, 20). In fact, this is precisely the essence of the “culture of justification” now underpinning Canadian administrative law, as emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov ( Vavilov at para 14). Indeed, it is no longer enough for the outcome of an administrative decision to be justifiable . The administrative decision maker must also justify its decision ( Vavilov at para 86). The rationale for this is clearly set out in Vavilov : “reasons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that they have actually listened to the parties” [italics in original] ( Vavilov at para 127). [ 37 ] In the present case, the reasons, even when read in conjunction with the record, do not make it possible to understand the Officer’s reasoning and logic on the critical issue at stake, that is, [NAME]’s risk upon return to Pakistan. The Officer did not offer any explanation on their weighing of the evidence and on their reasons for ignoring the evidence adduced by [NAME] in his affidavit or the country condition documentary evidence. [ 38 ] I agree with the Minister that extensive reasons are not required for administrative decisions to be reasonable — brief reasons may indeed suffice. In addition, [NAME] officers are certainly entitled to considerable deference given the level of expertise they bring to matters such as PRRA applications. However, the institutional context of this decision-making process does not relieve PRRA officers of the obligation to provide transparent, justified and intelligible reasons as per the Supreme Court’s teachings in Vavilov . It is crucial for an applicant to understand the basis on which their PRRA application is refused, even more so given the stakes ( Vavilov at para 133). In the case of [NAME], I find that the reasons for the Decision fall well short of providing an adequate justification for the Decision. To borrow the words used by counsel for the Minister at the hearing, the Court is indeed left with a sense of incompleteness — “ est laissée sur sa faim ” . [ 39 ] This absence of justification relates to the very heart of the Decision and amounts to a sufficiently serious shortcoming to render it unreasonable ( Vavilov at para 100). In other words, my review of the Officer’s reasoning (or absence thereof) with respect to [NAME]’s alleged risk of persecution upon return to Pakistan causes me “to lose confidence in the outcome reached” by the decision maker ( Vavilov at para 122).

IV. Conclusion [ 40 ] For the above-mentioned reasons, the application for judicial review of [NAME] is granted. [NAME] has discharged his onus to demonstrate that the Decision lacks the hallmarks of reasonableness prescribed by Vavilov and does not meet the heightened duty of justification applicable to a PRRA decision given the significant interests at stake. While the Officer was entitled to consider [NAME]’s re-availment to Pakistan in 2017 and 2018, that factor was not determinative of his PRRA application, which was filed in 2023 and assessed in 2024. Even when read holistically, the reasons fail to meaningfully assess [NAME]’s forward-looking risk upon return to Pakistan. This constitutes a sufficiently serious shortcoming to warrant the Court’s intervention. [ 41 ] There is no question of general importance to certify.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-3747-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This application for judicial review is granted, without costs. The December 10, 2024 decision by a senior immigration officer of [NAME] [[NAME]] refusing the applicant’s application for a pre-removal risk assessment is set aside. The matter is referred back to [NAME] for redetermination on the merits by a different officer, in accordance with these reasons . The applicant shall be given a fair opportunity to update his application if needed. There is no question of general importance to be certified. blank "Denis Gascon" blank Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF [NAME] : IMM-3747-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF [NAME] OF HEARING : MONTRÉAL, qUÉBEC DATE OF HEARING: JULY 7, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT : GASCON J. DATED: July 13, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] FOR THE APPLICANT [NAME] FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Solicitor Montréal, Québec FOR THE APPLICANT Attorney General of Canada Montréal, Québec FOR THE RESPONDENT