Federal Court Grants Judicial Review of Refugee Appeal Division Decision

Date: 20260601 Docket: IMM-24570-24 Citation: 2026 FC 708 Ottawa, Ontario, June 1 st , 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ferron BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, [NAME], seeks judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Appeal Division [[NAME]] dated December 10, 2024 [Decision], whereby the [NAME] refused the Applicants’ appeal of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] that itself refused his claim for refugee protection. The [NAME] confirmed that the RPD had correctly found that [NAME] was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ]. Both the RPD and the [NAME] found that the determinative issue was [NAME] credibility. [ 2 ] In brief, [NAME] argues that the [NAME]’s rejection of new evidence he attempted to submit and its refusal to hold an oral hearing were procedurally unfair. He further submits that the Decision is unreasonable because the [NAME] i) erred in its credibility assessment; ii) misinterpreted the evidence; and iii) failed to conduct an independent assessment of his sexual orientation. [ 3 ] The Minister replies that the [NAME] the failure to admit new evidence is not a breach of procedural fairness, but rather a matter to be addressed on the reasonableness standard. The Minister submits that since “the rejected evidence was either already before the RPD, and/or pre-dated the decision of the RPD, the [NAME]’s decision not to admit them was reasonable” . Furthermore, because the evidence was found to be inadmissible, an oral hearing was not required. [ 4 ] The Minister also submits that the decision is reasonable because i) the [NAME]’s credibility assessment is based on the totality of the evidence and the dispositive nature of the credibility findings; ii) the [NAME] reasonably assessed the evidence and concluded that [NAME] did not establish that he identifies as LGBTQ; and iii) the [NAME] properly applied the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Chairperson’s Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics by taking into account cultural differences in expressing sexual orientation. [ 5 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review will be granted. Having considered the evidence before the [NAME] and the applicable law, the Court is not satisfied that the [NAME]’s refusal of some of the new evidence meets the standard of reasonableness. The video evidence and the document “Application for Bail” should have been found admissible, and an oral hearing should have been held. Given that conclusion, [ADDRESS] does not have to deal with the other arguments raised by [NAME] challenging the reasonableness of the Decision or raising procedural fairness issues.

II. Brief summary of the fact s [ 6 ] [NAME], a citizen of Nigeria, sought asylum in Canada on June 7, 2023. He claims refugee protection under sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA , alleging risks of harm due to his sexual orientation and threats from both police and the [NAME]. [ 7 ] In his Basis of Claim [BOC], [NAME] essentially alleges the following: He became aware that he is attracted to both men and women as an adolescent, and had sexual experiences with both sexes starting in secondary school; He married his wife in February 2009, due to family pressure, but continued to have relationships with men during the marriage. In 2013, he and his male partner were assaulted by a group of men, after they held hands in public, and years later he learned that he had been reported to the police because of this incident. As rumours regarding his homosexuality spread, his employer fired him, and he later learned that the reason for the dismissal was his sexual orientation. In 2017, he was verbally and physically assaulted due to his sexual orientation, and upon reporting the incident, a friend informed him that the police wanted to arrest him. To escape police threats, he left Abuja for Lagos in November 2017 but continued to fear for his safety due to societal hostility and ongoing police harassment. While in Lagos, he sheltered his brother from members of the [NAME], a group he had already heard had killed a student because of his sexual orientation when he was at university. Ultimately, the [NAME] killed his brother. Fearing for his own safety, he went into hiding for a month without approaching the police. In 2018, he was threatened by the [NAME] for sheltering his brother, and after 2018, the police visited his home and served his wife with an arrest warrant.

III. RPD ’s decision [ 8 ] On August 16, 2024, the RPD found that [NAME] was neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 97(1)(a) or (b) of the IRPA , as it determined, on a balance of probabilities, that he lacked overall credibility because there were discrepancies, contradictions and omissions regarding both his sexual orientation and his fear of the police, the [NAME], his extended family and the people of Nigeria.

IV. The [NAME] ’s Decision [ 9 ] On December 10, 2024, the [NAME] dismissed [NAME]’s appeal and found that the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection based on credibility issues. [ 10 ] Given the Court’s findings regarding the [NAME]’s treatment of the new evidence and the need to hold an oral hearing, it is not necessary to go into the analysis of the [NAME] on the merits of [NAME]’s claims. A. New evidence and Oral hearing [ 11 ] [NAME] submitted four items as new evidence before the [NAME]: a video allegedly showing his wife being arrested by police on September 30, 2024; a document entitled “Application for Bail” , in relation to his wife’s arrest; an email from [NAME] dated October 9, 2024; and a letter entitled “Declaration” from [NAME], dated September 25, 2024. [ 12 ] To decide whether this new evidence should be admitted, the [NAME] referred to the criteria set forth in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA (which states that new evidence from an appellant will be accepted only if it is evidence that “arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available” or “ the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection” ) and to two decisions of the Federal court of Appeal that construe it: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FCA 96 and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 FCA 385. [ 13 ] Regarding the video, the [NAME] refused to admit it because it did not establish when the events took place and was unclear as to i) whether [NAME]’s wife was actually arrested or taken into custody, ii) under what charges and iii) if the individuals in the video were in fact police officers. The [NAME] also noted that the video “begins and ends abruptly” and found that even if it was to accept that the video was taken after the RPD decision, it was not relevant to their analysis based on the above findings. In reaching these various findings, the [NAME] does not address the affidavit evidence filed by [NAME], providing details on this video. [ 14 ] The document entitled “Application for Bail” was not accepted either because it was found to be illegible in several places, making it unclear i) who completed it, ii) what the charges were and iii) how it related to the [NAME]’s claim. In view of these findings, the [NAME] also found this document irrelevant. [ 15 ] The email from [NAME] was also not accepted because the events it addresses occurred prior to the RPD decision and should reasonably have been presented to the RPD, and since no identity documents were attached, the [NAME] could not assess its credibility. [ 16 ] As for the declaration from [NAME], it was not accepted because the information it contains predates the RPD decision and the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to present it to the RPD. [ 17 ] Given that the new evidence was not admitted and that the [NAME] found that this new evidence did not raise a serious issue with respect to [NAME]’s credibility, was central to the claim, or, if accepted, could have affected whether the claim should be allowed or rejected, the [NAME] applied section 110(6) of the IRPA and determined that an oral hearing was not required in this case.

V. Analysis A. Standard of review [ 18 ] [ADDRESS] finds that the appropriate standard of review is that which presumptively applies to the merits of an administrative decision: reasonableness, in accordance with Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ]. The recognized exceptions to this presumption do not apply in the present matter ( Canadian Society of Authors, [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2022 SCC 30 at paras 27-28). [ 19 ] As Justice Gascon explained in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1933: [14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( [NAME] at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” ( Vavilov at para 99, citing notably [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74). [15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ( [NAME] at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ( Vavilov at para 13). [16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence ( Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker ( Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). [17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” ( Vavilov at para 100). [ 20 ] As for the decision not to hold a hearing and to reject new evidence, [NAME] claims that it is a matter of procedural fairness. He also pleads other grounds of quashing that relate to procedural fairness. The Respondent argues that the decision not to admit new evidence is reviewable on the reasonableness standard, but it approaches the decision not to convene an oral hearing as a matter of procedural fairness. [ 21 ] In 2022, in CD v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2022 FC 1582 at paragraphs 10-12, Justice Diner noted that the Federal Court was split on whether a [NAME]’s decision regarding the admission of new evidence and regarding holding a hearing, is reviewable on a reasonableness or on a correctness standard. He concluded that reasonableness applied ( citing notably [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 324 at para 13; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1464 at paras 8 and 13; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 666 at para 15). [ 22 ] More recently, in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 616, Justice Duchesne concluded that this controversy had now been settled: [50] While there had been some unsettled jurisprudence in the past as to the standard of review applicable to the [NAME]’s decision to not hold an oral hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA , there appears be a consensus that the [NAME]’s decision whether to admit new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA , and its decision whether to hold an oral hearing because of the new evidence under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA , involves the interpretation of the specific criteria set out in the statute which is therefore assessed under the reasonableness standard ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1155; [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FCA 96, at paras 29 and 74; [NAME]. v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2022 FC 1582 at paras 6-12). When the focus of the requested oral hearing turns on questions of credibility, and on serious issues relating to credibility that are central to the decision, then the standard of review is the standard applicable to question of procedural fairness and is near the standard of correctness ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1456, at paras 31 to 38). [ 23 ] Because the Court believes that in the present matter, the Decision on whether or not to admit the new evidence and on whether or not to hold an oral hearing are determinative of the entire application, and shall be reviewed on a reasonableness standard, there is no need to discuss what standard would apply to the other alleged breaches of procedural fairness raised by [NAME]. [ 24 ] Further, and for the reasons laid out below, the Court finds that the [NAME]’s Decision not to admit the video and the bail document was unreasonable. Ultimately, whether the applicable approach as concerns the decision not to hold a hearing is reasonableness or is “best reflected in the correctness standard” which applies to procedural fairness matters ( [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [ Canadian Pacific Railway ]; see also [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2023 FCA 74 at para 57), it does not change the outcome of the present matter. A decision resulting from a failure to hold a hearing given the issues raised by the [NAME] regarding the new evidence cannot be considered correct or reasonable. B. New evidence and the need for a hearing before the [NAME] [ 25 ] Subsection 110(3) of the IRPA provides that an appeal before the [NAME] must normally proceed without a hearing: Procedure Fonctionnement 110 (3) Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal and, in the case of a matter that is conducted before a panel of three members, written submissions from a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and any other person described in the rules of the Board. 110 (3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3.1), (4) et (6), la section procède sans tenir d’audience en se fondant sur le dossier de la Section de la protection des réfugiés, mais peut recevoir des éléments de preuve documentaire et des observations écrites du [NAME] et de la [NAME] ainsi que, s’agissant d’une affaire tenue devant un tribunal constitué de trois commissaires, des observations écrites du représentant ou mandataire du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés et de toute autre [NAME] visée par les règles de la Commission. [ 26 ] In accordance with subsection 110(4) of the IRPA , the following section sets out the limited circumstances in which new evidence may be submitted on appeal to the [NAME]: Evidence that may be presented Éléments de preuve admissibles 110 (4) On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. 110 (4) Dans le cadre de l’appel, la [NAME] ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet de sa demande ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’elle n’aurait pas normalement présentés, dans les circonstances, au moment du rejet. [ 27 ] Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA establishes a conjunctive test that must be met for the [NAME] to hold an oral hearing, as follows: Hearing Audience 110 (6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) 110 (6) La section peut tenir une audience si elle estime qu’il existe des éléments de preuve documentaire visés au paragraphe (3) qui, à la fois : (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (a) soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité de la [NAME]; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (b) sont essentiels pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande d’asile; (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. (c) à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que la demande d’asile soit accordée ou refusée, selon le cas. [ 28 ] Thus, an appellant’s attempt to introduce new evidence does not automatically require the [NAME] to convene an oral hearing. Under the statutory scheme, appeals before the [NAME] proceed by default without a hearing. The first step is for the [NAME] to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA . Only if the evidence is admitted does the question of whether a hearing is necessary arise under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA . [ 29 ] As previously mentioned, the [NAME] determined that the proposed new evidence was inadmissible because it did not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA . As a result, the [NAME] determined it did not have to hold a hearing. [ 30 ] [NAME] argues that the [NAME]’s rejection of his new evidence and its refusal to hold an oral hearing were procedurally unfair, because he submitted four new exhibits which he contends were relevant and could not reasonably have been presented earlier. He pleads that an oral hearing was therefore necessary to allow him to explain omissions and inconsistencies in his BOC, including the late disclosure of his former partner and the circumstances surrounding his arrest warrant. [ 31 ] The Minister argues that the [NAME] reasonably concluded that the evidence was inadmissible, and that its decision not to hold a hearing did not breach procedural fairness because i) the evidence submitted by [NAME] was inadmissible, as it either predated the RPD’s hearing or could reasonably have been presented at that time, or because it was not reliable; and ii) an oral hearing was not required, because none of the conjunctive requirements under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA were met, the new evidence did not raise a serious credibility issue, nor was it central to the claim, and therefore the [NAME] had no discretion to convene a hearing. [ 32 ] In [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, a decision which the [NAME] cited in the case at bar, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that before accepting new evidence, the [NAME] must assess whether it meets the criteria of credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality. At paragraph 38, the Court adopted paragraphs 13-15 of [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 [ [NAME] ], and held that if evidence is not credible, relevant, new or material, the evidence need not be considered. Thus, merely filing new evidence does not entitle an appellant to a hearing. [ 33 ] This was reaffirmed in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 438 at paragraph 30 [ [NAME] ], where the Court held that the admissibility criteria from [NAME] also apply to subsection 110(4) appeals before the [NAME]. At paragraph 31, the Court explained that these criteria supplement the express wording of subsection 110(4), so that the [NAME] must determine whether the evidence satisfies credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality before admitting it. [ 34 ] Of particular importance here is the requirement of relevance. The test, as stated in [NAME] , is whether the evidence is “capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection” (see also [NAME] at para 38). If not, the evidence need not be considered. This principle was reaffirmed in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1118, where Justice Rochester held: [11] I agree with the applicant, and I find that the [NAME]’s treatment of the new evidence was unreasonable. In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that the [NAME]’s decision to refuse to admit the new evidence is based on a logical and rational analysis in respect of the facts and the law as required in Vavilov . As stated in [NAME] , the test regarding the relevance of new evidence is whether the evidence is “capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection” ( [NAME] ; see also [NAME] at paragraph 38). [ 35 ] In the case at bar, the Court finds that the [NAME]’s decision to refuse the email from [NAME] and the declaration from [NAME] was reasonable. Both related to events that predate the RPD decision and could have reasonably been submitted before the RPD. However, the Court is of the view that the [NAME]’s treatment of the video allegedly showing [NAME]’s wife being arrested by police on September 30, 2024, and of the document entitled “Application for Bail” , in relation to his wife’s arrest, especially when considered together and accompanied by the [NAME]’s Affidavit, was unreasonable. [ 36 ] First, regarding the video evidence, while it may lack probative value, given that it is unclear when it was filmed, by whom, that it is hard to determine if it depicts [NAME]’s wife and whether or not she was arrested or taken into custody, especially since what is being said is often unclear and hard to decipher; the video does show a woman being yelled at by a number of men. Further, and contrary to the [NAME]’s finding that the video did not clearly establish that the individuals depicted were police officers, the Court notes that one of them appears to be wearing a police uniform. As [NAME] submits, pictures of Nigerian Police uniforms are publicly available online and are similar to what can be seen in the video. [ 37 ] As concerns the date of the video, the Court notes that, whereas the [NAME] states that it is “dated November 12, 2024” based on the file’s title, this is not the date that [NAME]’s alleged. The [NAME] did note in passing that [NAME]’s counsel plead that the video was dated September 30, 2024, in their written submissions, but they failed to address the fact that [NAME] also claimed that this was the date of the video in their sworn statement . Except for the name of the file containing the video, the date of November 12, 2024, does not appear anywhere in the record except in a “statement of service” from the [NAME] which states that this video was transmitted to the [NAME] on that date. [ 38 ] [NAME] submits in their Reply memorandum and during the hearing that, in the video, “the police officers mentioned the applicant’s sexual orientation as the reason for their investigation and visit” , as well as the fact that the “applicant’s same-sex partner is in custody” (video allegedly at 00:08), the Court was not able to decipher this information from listening to the unclear video. [ 39 ] Had this video been submitted on its own, the Court might have found that the [NAME]’s decision to refuse it as new evidence was not unreasonable. However, this video is accompanied by the sworn declaration of [NAME], where he states: I am requesting to submit the following evidence, and for the following reasons: Video, screen shots and bail document, regarding the arrest of [NAME] (The released on bail on September 30, 2024. [NAME] was arrested and charged with assisting me to escape the country. I asked [NAME] to provide me with a letter, but she is afraid to do so because of what happened. Should she feel better I will ask to file her declaration at a later date. [ 40 ] The [NAME] does not address this testimony or why it did not find it relevant. [ 41 ] Furthermore, this video must be viewed in conjunction with the “Application for Bail” document, attached to [NAME]’s affidavit. While it is true that this document is highly illegible, one can still decipher “I hereby apply for the bail of …” with the mention of the name of [NAME]’s wife ( “[NAME]” ) and the fact that she is “in your custody for an offence of…” The Application for Bail also appears to mention [NAME] as a co-defendant alongside his wife. The date on which the document was signed by an “investigating police officer” is also very legible: it was signed on September 30, 2024, i.e. after the hearing before the RPD. The [NAME] recognized this date, but it failed to address two key facts : 1) should this document be found to be authentic and credible, the fact that it bears the September 30, 2024, date clearly corroborates [NAME]’s version of events as concerns his wife’s arrest; and 2) this document appears to be “new” for the purposes of subsection 110(4) because it arose after the hearing before the RPD ( [NAME] at para 13). This also undermines the [NAME]’s reliance on the date indicated in the title of the file containing the video. Last, one can also see that the form has been filled out by “[NAME]” as the surety for the person incarcerated. This is in direct contradiction of the [NAME]’s finding that the person who filled out the form cannot be identified. [ 42 ] When these three pieces of evidence ([NAME]’s sworn statement, the “application for bail” document and the video) are considered together rather than in isolation, the [NAME]’s decision is unreasonable. [ 43 ] [ADDRESS] takes note of [NAME]’s submission that an Application for Bail is a standard form from the Nigerian police force that does not provide details about the reason for the arrest. [ADDRESS] agrees that it is not [NAME]’s fault if the document on its face does not provide the details the decision maker was expecting to see. However, ultimately, this Court is not tasked with assessing the probative weight of the evidence. Parliament devolved this task to the decision makers of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Board. They can leverage their specialized skills and the objective country condition documents compiled in the National Documentation Package of the relevant country to determine whether this is in fact a standard form or not. That said, [NAME]’s sworn declaration provided more information about the charges which the [NAME] ignored. [ 44 ] [ADDRESS] also agrees with [NAME] that this document was “relevant to allegations that are central to the Applicant’s refugee claim” . [NAME] submits that the [NAME] “unreasonably conflated the test of credibility and relevance” because the [NAME] “examined the form and content of the document and found issues with the documents such as who filled it out, when the events happened, where it was submitted etc. which have to do with credibility and not relevance, which is a question of whether the new evidence is capable of proving or disproving an allegation that is central to the refugee claim” . Therefore, the “[NAME] unreasonably found that this evidence was not relevant and failed to address why the new evidence would be incapable of proving or disproving the allegation of the applicant’s sexual orientation and threats from the Nigerian police” . The issue of credibility is distinct from that of relevance, and the two must be assessed separately (see [NAME] at para 13). [ 45 ] In view of the above, the Court finds that, taken together, the [NAME] unreasonably concluded that the evidence failed to meet the applicable admissibility criteria. At the very least, if the [NAME] found that they lacked sufficient reliability to justify their admission, it should have held a hearing to discuss the credibility of this evidence. Where admissible evidence is accepted and the [NAME] doubts its credibility, an oral hearing becomes necessary. As held in [NAME] at paragraph 35: [NAME] had provided reasons for his belief that the attacks on his parents and son are a result of his conflict with the Taliban. If the [NAME] did not believe [NAME]’s new evidence, or if it required corroborating evidence to do so, it was incumbent upon it to convene an oral hearing to assess the credibility of his evidence ([NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147 at para 25). [ 46 ] Likewise, in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, the Court held at paragraph 25 that where credibility was central and serious credibility issues arose from the accepted new evidence, “The [NAME] erred in failing to hold an oral hearing” . [ 47 ] [ADDRESS] came to the same conclusion in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 674 [ [NAME] ] at paragraph 22: The arrest warrant and circular letter that [NAME] submitted raised a new credibility issue that was unconnected to the RPD’s and [NAME]’s negative credibility findings regarding the genuineness of his conversion from Islam to Christianity. The new evidence was central to the decision regarding his sur place claim. If the documents had been accepted by the [NAME] as authentic, then they would substantiate [NAME]’s fear of persecution by the authorities in Yemen and his sur place  claim could potentially succeed. For that reason, the criteria of s 110(6) of the IRPA were met, and the [NAME] erred in failing to convene an oral hearing. [ 48 ] Given this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to review all of the other grounds submitted by [NAME] in judicial review. The above makes the Decision unreasonable, and the process that lead to it a fortiori unfair because the failure to hold a hearing prevented [NAME] from attempting to alleviate the [NAME]’s concerns as to the credibility of the video and the “application for bail” document. This is enough to warrant quashing. [ 49 ] That said, the [NAME]’s analysis of the support letters from [NAME]’s wife and brother also warrants a few comments. C. The [NAME]’s analysis of the support letters also appears unreasonable [ 50 ] [ADDRESS] agrees with [NAME], that the [NAME] appears to focus on what the support letters from [NAME] ’s wife and brother do not speak of, instead of adequately evaluating their content (on the duty to evaluate evidence for what it says rather than what it does not say, see e.g. [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1999 CanLII 8019 (FC) au para 11; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 567 at para 21 cited in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 62 at para 18). Both expressly address [NAME]’s sexual orientation and its link to the threats he allegedly faced and faces. For instance, his brother states that [NAME] “has been ridiculed by his extended family, who think he is a cursed child because of his sexual orientation. In the same vein, my parents have forced him to go for deliverance in different churches, all in their bid to make him straight” . As for his wife’s letter, she states: “My husband has faced significant threats to his life and freedom in our home country, Nigeria, due to his sexual orientation (bisexual). He has been subjected to a mob attack twice in Abuja, and threats to his life by police and his family, who think he should be exterminated” . Therefore, while the [NAME] did assign them some weight, the reasoning appears to unreasonably limit their evidentiary value and focusses on elements that are absent instead of what they actually say.

VI. Conclusion [ 51 ] For the above reasons, the application for judicial review is granted and the matter is sent back for redetermination.

JUDGMENT in IMM-24570-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This application for judicial review is granted, without costs. The matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the [NAME] for redetermination. There is no question of general importance to be certified. “Danielle Ferron” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-24570-24 STYLE OF [NAME]: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: april 8, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: FERRON J. DATED: June 1 st , 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent