Federal Court Grants Judicial Review Over Procedural Fairness Breach

Date: 20260602 Docket: IMM-16090-24 Citation: 2026 FC 716 Ottawa, Ontario, June 2, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicants, [NAME] [the Principal Applicant or [NAME]] and his spouse, [NAME], are citizens of Russia. An immigration officer [the Officer] with [NAME] [[NAME]] refused their temporary resident visa [TRV] applications on August 9, 2024, finding the [NAME] had submitted an altered bank statement and had therefore engaged in misrepresentation. [ 2 ] The Applicants seek judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] of the August 9, 2024 decisions, arguing the Officer (1) provided no supporting evidence or justification to support the misrepresentation finding, (2) failed to provide them with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the concerns raised, and (3) failed to consider any of their corroborating evidence. The Respondent submits the Officer’s reasons offer sufficient justification for the misrepresentation finding, and that there was no breach of procedural fairness. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is granted.

II. Background [ 4 ] The Applicants’ TRV applications submitted in September 2023 were supported by: a letter dated September 29, 2023, detailing the purpose of their visit, their means of financial support, and their ties to Russia; an invitation letter dated September 20, 2023, from their son, a Canadian permanent resident; and documents submitted as proof of identity, family composition, ownership of property in Russia, and finances. [ 5 ] As proof of sufficient funds for their visit, the Applicants each submitted bank statements from their banking institution, [NAME], dated August 31, 2023. The [NAME]’s bank statement disclosed a total balance in the amount of 4,600,000 Russian rubles [Bank Statement]. The bank balance for the [NAME]’s spouse was approximately 1,900,000 Russian rubles. [ 6 ] On January 24, 2024, a procedural fairness letter [PFL] was sent to the [NAME] informing him of [NAME]’s concern that he may not meet the requirements for a TRV, including the obligation under subsection 16(1) of the IRPA to answer truthfully, and stating: “In support of your application, you submitted a bank statement from [NAME]. Upon investigation, this document has been determined to be fraudulent.” The PFL also informed the [NAME] of the consequences resulting from a finding of inadmissibility for misrepresentation under section 40 of the IRPA. [ 7 ] The [NAME] received the PFL on March 18, 2024, and provided a response that [NAME] received on March 26, 2024. In responding to the PFL, the [NAME] asserted that the Bank Statement was a “genuine document,” that he had compressed the document several times to meet [NAME]’s file size limitations, which resulted in the document’s quality being significantly reduced, and that the poor quality of the document may have led to [NAME]’s authenticity concerns. The [NAME] also provided another copy of the Bank Statement, a new bank statement dated March 22, 2024, from the same [NAME] account disclosing a balance in the amount of 4,260,000 Russian rubles, and a letter dated March 22, 2024, and proof of finances from his son who would be willing to support the Applicants during their visit.

III. Decision Under Review [ 8 ] The Applicants’ TRV applications were refused on August 9, 2024. The Officer found the [NAME] inadmissible to Canada for misrepresentation under paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA because he had “submitted documentation that lacks authenticity as part of [his] application… [which] has diminished the overall credibility of [his] submission” and specifically, because he had included “altered balances in the [NAME] document” as part of his application. [ 9 ] The relevant portions of the [NAME] notes, which form part of the decision, state: Applicant submitted a [NAME] banking document with an altered balance. the real document contains 600k RUR, however the altered document shows 4.6 million RUR. A PFL was sent. Applicant claims that the document is a genuine document and blames the quality of compression. However, this does not contradict or overcome the fact that digital verification of the [NAME] code on the bank statement is inconsistent with the balance shown. This inconsistency is unheard of in genuine [NAME] documents, and as such it is a highly reliable way to determine whether a document is fake or not. I have not been disabused of the concern that the applicant submitted altered documents. Applicant’s response has not allayed my concerns. I am satisfied applicant has engaged in misrepresentation, or may have used a hidden representative that was undeclared. Refused for A40 for the inclusion of altered [NAME] documents. [ 10 ] The Officer refused the TRV application of the [NAME]’s spouse on the basis of the misrepresentation finding with respect to the [NAME] – “[y]our spouse included fake documents in their application.” IV. Issues and Standard of Review [ 11 ] The Applicants submit the Officer’s treatment of the [NAME]’s response to the PFL and their corroborating evidence was unreasonable and that the Officer erred because the PFL expressed nothing more than a general concern with respect to the Bank Statement. Although the Applicants identify a single issue – whether the Officer’s decision is unreasonable – the arguments as advanced also raise an issue of procedural fairness. I have therefore framed the issues as follows: Was there a breach of fairness because the PFL failed to adequately set out the Officer’s misrepresentation concerns? Did the Officer err in failing to consider relevant evidence? [ 12 ] Questions of procedural fairness require the Court to ask whether the procedure followed by the decision-maker was fair and just having regard to all the circumstances ( Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [ Canadian Pacific ]. The ultimate question is whether the party knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond ( Canadian Pacific at para 56). [ 13 ] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [ Vavilov ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 8). The party challenging a decision has the burden of demonstrating to a reviewing court “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” ( Vavilov at para 100). [ 14 ] While strictly speaking no standard of review is applied where issues of fairness arise, the correctness standard best reflects the Court’s reviewing role ( Canadian Pacific at para 54). Issue A, the procedural fairness issue, will therefore be reviewed against the standard of correctness or akin to correctness, and the substantive decision will be reviewed against the reasonableness standard. That said, as noted by Justice Sébastien Grammond, an unreasonable substantive decision may flow from an inadequate and therefore unfair PFL, and in these instances there is no clear demarcation between the process followed and the substantive decision ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 66 at para 26).

V. Analysis A. Procedural fairness [ 15 ] The Applicants argue the PFL did not properly detail the Officer’s specific concerns – that the bank balance provided by the [NAME] was inconsistent with that disclosed upon investigation. Instead, the PFL only disclosed that the Officer believed the Bank Statement was inauthentic, thereby denying the Applicants the ability to know the case to meet and to meaningfully respond to the Officer’s concerns. [ 16 ] The Respondent submits that the PFL did provide an adequate understanding of the “gist” of the Officer’s concerns and that the weight of this Court’s jurisprudence holds this to be sufficient notice in the context of a TRV application ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 524 at para 3 [ [NAME] ], citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 1183 at para 26, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 86 at para 20, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2021 FC 957 at paras 28–36, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1190 at para 5). The Respondent further argues that to the extent recent decisions of this Court conclude otherwise, those decisions are outliers that should not be followed. [ 17 ] It is not controversial that the duty of procedural fairness owed in the context of a TRV application is at the lower end of the spectrum ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1170 at para 36), nor that the duty is higher in the TRV context where an issue of misrepresentation arises ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 171 at paras 26–27; [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2017 FC 606 at para 17). This because of the significant consequences that flow from a misrepresentation finding – inadmissibility to Canada for a five-year period. However, there is some divergence in the jurisprudence as to whether a “higher” duty of fairness is owed where misrepresentation is in issue or whether the duty owed in those cases is at the “high end” of the fairness spectrum. [ 18 ] Two recent decisions of this [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 30 [ [NAME] ] and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 49 [ [NAME] ] – have held that the duty of fairness in all cases of misrepresentation is situated at the high end of the spectrum. In both cases, my colleague, Justice Michael Battista first concludes that where a misrepresentation finding is challenged on judicial review, the operative issue in considering the level of procedural fairness owed is not the nature of the underlying decision but rather the misrepresentation finding itself ( [NAME] at paras 18–23). This being so, Justice Battista concludes the standard of fairness owed must be the same in all misrepresentation cases. [ 19 ] After considering the factors identified in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [ [NAME] ], Justice Battista then concludes that in all cases of misrepresentation, the duty of fairness owed is situated at the high end of the fairness spectrum ( [NAME] at paras 17, 32, 45, 92; [NAME] at para 10). This is so regardless of the nature of the matter or the type of application underlying the misrepresentation finding ( [NAME] at paras 17, 92; [NAME] at para 10). Justice Battista also finds that the high standard of procedural fairness in misrepresentation cases specifically requires the full disclosure of the decision-maker’s concerns, reflected in their file notes, and the disclosure of extrinsic evidence giving rise to the misrepresentation concerns, with justification provided for any extrinsic evidence that is withheld ( [NAME] at paras 47, 60, 63, 92; [NAME] at para 10). He further concludes the decision-maker’s reasons must reflect and respect the high level of fairness owed ( [NAME] at paras 46, 73–80). [ 20 ] The consequences of a misrepresentation finding, where considered in isolation and divorced from the underlying decision-making context, may situate the duty of fairness at the high end of the fairness spectrum. However, I do not believe [NAME] is supportive of this approach. [NAME] teaches that the content and requirements of the duty of fairness vary with context and are to be assessed having regard to all the circumstances of a particular case ( [NAME] at paras 21–28; Canadian Pacific at paras 54, 56). Excluding the nature of the decision and consideration of the statutory, institutional and social context in which the decision is being made, and instead focusing solely on one factor – misrepresentation – in undertaking a [NAME] contextual analysis, overlooks the well-established principle that the duty of procedural fairness is “eminently variable,” inherently flexible, and context-specific ( Vavilov at para 77; [NAME] at paras 21–28). [ 21 ] A TRV application arises in the immigration law context and within a legal framework that reflects, as a fundamental principle, that non‐citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2005 SCC 51 at para 46). It is within this context that the weight of the Court’s jurisprudence has characterized the duty owed in misrepresentation cases as either being “higher” than that otherwise owed in the given context, or at a high level (see [NAME] at para 15). The characterization of the heightened degree of procedural fairness owed in cases of misrepresentation, while perhaps not consistent throughout the jurisprudence, does differ from a finding that the degree of fairness owed in all cases of misrepresentation is situated at the high end of the procedural fairness spectrum. [ 22 ] The heightened duty of fairness owed in misrepresentation cases has been described as requiring the notice to be given an applicant disclose the “gist” of a decision-maker’s misrepresentation concerns. This is normally effected by way of a PFL. The “gist” approach (see [NAME] at para 4, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 773 at para 74) accords with the principle that the duty of procedural fairness is variable, flexible, and context-specific; however, I recognize it may convey to decision-makers the notion that a minimalist approach to the duty will always be sufficient in the immigration context. In this regard, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 1173 [ [NAME] ] is instructive. [ 23 ] In [NAME] , Justice John Norris describes the purpose of a PFL as being to provide enough information to allow for a meaningful response to the decision-maker’s misrepresentation concerns. This requires that in those cases where a specific concern has been identified, a PFL must state more than a general concern – it must disclose the specific concern with sufficient clarity to allow a meaningful response to be provided ( [NAME] at para 32). [ 24 ] In this case, the PFL limits itself to identifying a general concern – that the Bank Statement had been determined to be fraudulent – in circumstances where the specific concern was the account balance reported on the document. In these circumstances, the higher duty of fairness owed to the Applicants required that the Officer identify the specific concern with sufficient clarity to allow a meaningful response. The Officer did not do so. This was a breach of fairness. [ 25 ] The breach of procedural fairness is determinative of the application; I therefore need not consider the Applicants’ reasonableness submissions.

VI. Conclusion [ 26 ] For the above reasons, the application for judicial review is granted. [ 27 ] The Parties have not identified a question for certification, and I agree that none arise.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-16090-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that :

1. The application for judicial review is granted.

2. The matter is returned for redetermination by a different decision-maker.

3. No question is certified. “Patrick Gleeson” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-16090-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: May 25, 2026

REASONS and judgment: GLEESON J. DATED: JUNE 2, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicants [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] and Solicitors Vancouver, British Columbia For The Applicants Attorney General of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent