Federal Court Grants Judicial Review Over Unreasonable Decision

Date: 20260603 Dockets: IMM-9771-24 Citation: 2026 FC 722 Ottawa, Ontario, June 3, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Fuhrer BETWEEN: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant [NAME] is a citizen of Nigeria. He arrived in Canada in September 2018 and filed a claim for refugee protection. His claim was denied by both the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] and the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Both the RPD and the RAD determined that [NAME] had viable flight alternatives in Abuja and Ibadan. [ADDRESS] dismissed [NAME]’s application for leave to commence a judicial review of the RAD decision. [ 2 ] [NAME] subsequently filed an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate [[NAME]] grounds, based on establishment and the best interests of his then-unborn child. He also pursued a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA], claiming a forward-facing risk of persecution in Nigeria at the hands of the Black Axe gang and the government. A senior immigration officer [Officer] of [NAME] [[NAME]] refused the applications. Representing himself before the Court, [NAME] now seeks judicial review of both decisions. Although the judicial review applications were not consolidated, the matters were heard together. [ 3 ] This judgment concerns the judicial review of the [NAME] decision. Another judgment, issued contemporaneously, involves the PRRA decision: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 723. [ 4 ] For the reasons below, [NAME]’s judicial review application of the [NAME] decision will be granted because the decision is unreasonable, which the Respondent has conceded. [NAME] initially consented to judgment, he subsequently withdrew his consent, arguing that the Respondent cannot unilaterally concede the [NAME] matter (or, as asserted by [NAME], one party cannot render the matter moot acting alone) and that both matters should be settled on the same basis because they involve the same facts, evidence and arguments. As I will explain, I disagree in this case. [ 5 ] This overview belies the procedural complexity leading up to the judicial review hearing which I will address next, followed by a summary of the applicable issues and an analysis of why and on what terms the [NAME] judicial review will be granted.

II. Procedural History [ 6 ] There are several outstanding motions brought by the parties in the weeks before the hearing. First, the Respondent brought a motion in writing for consent judgment to which [NAME] responded late. [ADDRESS] refused the late response for filing. [NAME] then brought a motion on consent for an extension of time to serve and file his submissions. In his response submissions, [NAME] consented to the Respondent’s motion but with a request that the Court order the redetermination of the [NAME] application to take place within 15-19 days of the Court granting the [NAME] judicial review. Before the Court dealt with these motions, [NAME] filed a letter with the Court, a short time later, indicating that he was withdrawing his consent. Taking this step made the motion for an extension of time moot. [ 7 ] [NAME] has requested consistently that redetermination occur within 15-19 days of this Court’s judgment. I note, for example, that his further memorandum of arguments in each matter already requests that the Court order a short turnaround of 15-19 days for the redetermination of the challenged decisions. I add that the Court did not accept for filing another motion that [NAME] attempted to file, on the basis that the motion was duplicative and unnecessary, because it essentially reiterated the request for a turnaround of 15-19 days for the redetermination of the challenged decisions. [ 8 ] [NAME] next brought a motion to strike the Respondent’s further affidavit of [NAME] dated March 30, 2026 [[NAME]] following [NAME]’s cross-examination of the [NAME]. At the same time as his motion to strike, [NAME] also brought a motion seeking relief from his reporting obligations to the Canada Border Service Agency or [NAME], further to his removal order. In response to a direction from the Court regarding these motions, the Respondent filed responding submissions. The direction indicated that the Court would address these issues at the judicial review hearing and directed that no further motions be brought without leave of the Court. [ 9 ] Having already filed his Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Argument on April 17, 2026 (for both the [NAME] proceedings), I note that [NAME] also attempted to file a second “Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Argument” on the [NAME] matter, having Court File No. IMM-9771-24, as well as a document titled “Applicant’s Further-Reply Argument.” He did not seek leave of the Court to file these materials, nor did he make any submissions about why they should be accepted. The Registry thus forwarded these documents to the Court under rule 72 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [ Rules ], for disposition. [ 10 ] This matter was further complicated by the fact that, although [NAME] did not request consolidation of the [NAME] judicial review applications, he nonetheless treated them as if they were by filing materials that, often but not always, covered both matters. That [NAME] did so does not result in consolidation, absent an informal motion on consent (i.e. with the consent of the other party) or a formal motion, neither of which was brought.

III. Issues [ 11 ] With the above in mind, I determine that this matter raises the following issues: Whether to accept, reject, or accept with conditions, [NAME]’s second “Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Argument” and “Applicant’s Further-Reply Argument” [collectively, Irregular Documents]; Whether to strike the [NAME]; Whether the Court can consider [NAME]’s motion seeking relief from his asserted [NAME] reporting obligations: Whether to grant the [NAME] judicial review application, given the Respondent’s concession of unreasonableness, separate and apart from the Court’s determination of the PRRA judicial review; Whether to order that the redetermination of [NAME]’s [NAME] application will occur in 15-19 days.

IV. Analysis A. [NAME]’s Irregular Documents will be rejected [ 12 ] I am satisfied that the Irregular Documents are unacceptable and, therefore, they will be rejected for filing, pursuant to paragraph 72(2)(a) of the Rules . [ 13 ] In my view, [NAME]’s second Further Memorandum document is unacceptable because it is duplicative of arguments contained both in his withdrawal of consent letter and the first Further Memorandum. [ 14 ] The Further-Reply document is unacceptable because further reply written submissions generally are not permitted on judicial review applications; an applicant’s further memorandum of argument replaces an applicant’s memorandum and reply memorandum. Here, this is explained at paragraph 10 of the February 23, 2026 order of (former) Justice Elizabeth Heneghan granting leave in Court File IMM-9771-24. In addition, an applicant can make oral submissions in reply to a respondent’s further written submissions at the oral hearing. B. The [NAME] will not be struck [ 15 ] I am not persuaded that the [NAME] should be struck. To some extent, in light of the Respondent’s concession that the [NAME] decision is unreasonable, the motion to strike is of greater relevance to the PRRA judicial review where a substantially similar affidavit of [NAME] is of record. Having regard to [NAME]’s withdrawal of his consent to judgment, however, I will deal with the motion here, noting that the outcome may have implications for the PRRA matter in particular. [ 16 ] The [NAME] is described as a Program Assistant with the intake team of [NAME]’s Humanitarian Migration Unit in Vancouver, British Columbia. She attests to reviewing [NAME]’s [NAME] application file, which includes the supporting documentation he provided to [NAME] in support of his [NAME] application. According to the [NAME], Exhibits “A” and “B” to [NAME]’s affidavit dated March 13, 2026 cannot be found in the [NAME] application file. Further, based on the [NAME]’s review of the [NAME] application file, she expressed the view that the certified tribunal record [CTR] is a complete record of the material before the [NAME] decision-maker on this matter. [ 17 ] Exhibit “A” to [NAME]’s March 13, 2026 affidavit on this matter is a letter from the Atikokan Congregation confirming his regular religious participation, volunteer activities, moral character, and integration into the community. Exhibit “B” to [NAME]’s affidavit is a letter from [NAME] [ sic ] who, according to [NAME], corroborated his employment history, volunteer activities, and other personal circumstances relevant to his [NAME] application. [NAME] asserts that these letters were not included in the CTR provided to him by the Respondent. [ 18 ] I pause to note that [NAME]’s March 13, 2026 affidavit on the PRRA matter is substantially similar to his affidavit on the [NAME] matter, except that the above exhibits are Exhibits “B” and “C,” instead of Exhibits “A” and “B.” [ 19 ] [NAME] cross-examined [NAME] on her affidavit in writing. In my view, the questions essentially focus on whether the [NAME] could confirm, what was in the [NAME] application file when it was reviewed by the Officer, and what in fact was reviewed by the Officer. In her written responses, the [NAME] agreed that she could attest only to what was in the file at the time she conducted her review, that is, after the [NAME] decision issued, and further, that she could not speak to what the Officer actually reviewed. [ 20 ] The Applicant argues that the [NAME] is inadmissible because it is based on hearsay, lacks personal knowledge, is biased and litigation-driven, and improperly attempts to supplement the Officer’s reasoning. [ 21 ] The Respondent argues that the discretion to strike an affidavit should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. According to the Respondent, the [NAME] responds to the Applicant’s procedural fairness submissions about the two letters the Applicant asserts were missing from the CTR and, hence, not considered by the decision-maker. More concerningly, in my view, the Respondent takes issue with the case law on which [NAME] relies, noting the [NAME] obligation on litigants to disclose to the Court their use of artificial intelligence [[NAME]] to generate content filed with the Court. [ 22 ] I agree with the Respondent that [NAME]’s motion to strike the [NAME] must be dismissed, substantially for the reasons provided by the Respondent in the Response Brief in their responding motion record. Starting with the issue of [NAME]-generated content, [NAME] answered affirmatively when asked by the Court at the oral hearing if he used [NAME] to prepare his materials. [ 23 ] Pursuant to the Court’s “Notice to the Parties and the Profession: The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Proceedings” dated May 7, 2024 [ [NAME] Notice ], where [NAME] was used to generate the content of materials submitted to the Court for litigation purposes (with some exceptions that do not apply here), the materials must contain a declaration that [NAME] was used to do so. As recently observed by this Court, the [NAME] Notice “confirms both the importance of checking documents and material generated by artificial intelligence (i.e., that there be a “human in the loop”), and that a party signing a document bears responsibility for the accuracy and veracity of its contents” : [NAME] v Canada (Revenue Agency) , 2026 FC 651 at para 91. This responsibility applies regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel or self-represented because the obligations on the Court to maintain the integrity of judicial proceedings, safeguard public confidence in the justice system, and uphold the rule of law, are constant, and do not depend on whether a party is represented. [ 24 ] The Respondent submits the following about the jurisprudence on which [NAME] has relied on this motion, with which I agree: Cited Case and Applicant’s Stated Proposition Respondent’s [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2006 FC 1283: [NAME] based on GCMS and hearsay cannot rebut AFFIRMED evidence. There is no mention of affidavit evidence in this decision, and it does not stand for the principles alleged by the Applicant. [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FC 593: Affidavits from [NAME] employees with no personal knowledge are unreliable and inadmissible. The citation provided (2009 FC 593) is to a different decision: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FC 593. There is no assessment of affidavit evidence in this decision, and it does not stand for the principles alleged by the Applicant [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC): Biased, litigation-driven affidavits must be given little or no weight. There is no mention of affidavit evidence in this decision, and it does not stand for the principles alleged by the Applicant. [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1103: Missing documents and inability to confirm completeness is a breach of fairness. The citation provided (2019 FC 1103) is to a different decision: [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2019 FC 1103. There is no mention of affidavit evidence in this decision, and it does not stand for the principles alleged by the Applicant. [ 25 ] I add that [NAME] also has relied on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ], for the proposition that post-hoc rationalizations from non-decision-makers are inadmissible. Although the proposition is not found in Vavilov , it is a generally accepted administrative law principle that nonetheless, in my view, depends on the particular circumstances: [NAME] v Canada (Minister of [NAME]) , 2008 FCA 255 at paras 45-47 [ [NAME] ]. The situation here is distinguishable. The matter before me does not involve an affidavit from the decision-maker attempting to bolster their findings, as occurred in [NAME] (at para 45). The [NAME] is simply a factual recounting of what the [NAME] observed in reviewing [NAME]’s [NAME] file. [ 26 ] While there is other jurisprudence of this Court not cited by [NAME] standing for the proposition that an incomplete CTR, if established, may warrant the Court’s intervention, again it depends on the circumstances. See, for example , [NAME] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2020 FC 207 [ [NAME] ] at para 13, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 581 at para 16. [NAME]’s argument on this point cannot succeed because he has not provided evidence that establishes what he filed on his [NAME] application. Neither his supporting affidavit on his motion to strike, nor his supporting affidavit in his [NAME] judicial review application record contains a copy of what he submitted to [NAME] and a receipt for the materials submitted. The onus is on [NAME] to show, with convincing evidence as opposed to bald assertions, what he submitted to the [NAME]: [NAME] , above at para 12. [ 27 ] I add that, notwithstanding [NAME]’s admission that he used [NAME] to prepare his materials, he reiterated his reliance, in oral submissions, on the above case law impugned by the Respondent and did not offer any reply to the Respondent’s written challenges. [ 28 ] In the end, [NAME]’s motion to strike is without legal merit and cannot succeed. It therefore will be dismissed. The issue of weight to be assigned to the [NAME] will be addressed in the Court’s decision on the PRRA judicial review. C. [ADDRESS] has no jurisdiction in this matter to order relief from reporting obligations [ 29 ] I similarly determine that [NAME]’s motion for relief from his monthly reporting obligations to the [NAME] is without merit and, therefore, cannot succeed. [ 30 ] [NAME]’s supporting affidavit on this motion states that he is subject to a removal order and required to report monthly to the [NAME]. He argues that the reporting obligations cause irreparable harm and should be suspended because the [NAME]’s consent to judgment on the [NAME] judicial review destroys the factual foundation of the PRRA refusal. [ 31 ] The Respondent counters that the Applicant has not provided any evidence of the reporting requirements in issue and, further, neither judicial review concerns, directly or indirectly, the Applicant’s reporting conditions to the [NAME]. More to the point, argues the Respondent, the Applicant has not met the applicable test for injunctive relief. [ 32 ] I agree with the Respondent that [NAME]’s motion to suspend his reporting obligations must be dismissed, substantially for the reasons articulated by the Respondent in the Response Brief in their responding motion record. [ 33 ] The Respondent points to the tripartite [NAME] test for assessing whether interlocutory injunctive relief is warranted. To satisfy the test, an applicant must show that: (1) a preliminary assessment of the merits discloses a serious issue to be tried; (2) the applicant would suffer irreparable harm, that is not quantifiable and non-compensable in damages, if the injunction were not granted, and (3) the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction: [COMPANY] v Canada ([NAME]) , 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC) [ [NAME] ], citing Manitoba ([NAME]) v [COMPANY] , 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC). The elements of the test are conjunctive, meaning that all three must be established in order to obtain an injunction: [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2014 FCA 112 [ [NAME] ] at para 14. [ 34 ] A starting point for the Court’s assessment would be the details of [NAME]’s reporting obligations. He has not provided any details or supporting evidence to show what those obligations entail, except to assert that they are monthly. Further, I agree with the Respondent that, in any event, [NAME] has not shown how the relief he seeks on this motion bears any relation to the [NAME] or PRRA decisions. As this Court previously has held, “[a] motion for interlocutory injunction brought within an application for judicial review can pertain only to the decision that is the subject of the application” : [NAME] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2019 FC 456 at para 26. [ 35 ] I note that the Court has discretion to make any order that would prevent prejudice pending the Court’s determination of a controversy, so that the Court later can make a meaningful and effective judgment: [NAME] , above at 329; Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7, s 44. That said, [NAME] has failed to show how the reporting obligations under his removal order have any bearing on the Court’s ability to make a meaningful and effective decision in the [NAME] judicial reviews. In my view, [NAME] thus is not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks because a stay of his reporting obligations would have no bearing on the issues at play in the underlying [NAME] or PRRA judicial reviews. [ 36 ] In any event, even if I were to accept, that the injunctive relief sought were available to [NAME], which I do not, he has failed to demonstrate all three elements of the [NAME] test. Given the Respondent’s concession that the [NAME] decision is unreasonable, I am prepared to find that there is a serious issue with the [NAME] decision, such that the first branch of the test is satisfied. [ 37 ] [NAME] asserts that harm and hardship will come to his family because of the reporting obligations, he has failed to provide any evidence demonstrating his assertions, nor has he provided any evidence about his reporting obligations, apart from an unsupported statement that they are monthly. Noting that allegations of irreparable harm must be based on clear, convincing and non-speculative evidence, [NAME]’s lack of evidence means that he cannot succeed on this motion: [NAME] , above at para 24; [COMPANY] v Canada (National Revenue) , 2012 FCA 255 at para 31. [ 38 ] In the circumstances, I find that the balance of convenience favours the Minister. [ 39 ] Because he has not met the applicable test, [NAME]’s motion to suspend his reporting obligations therefore will be dismissed. D. The [NAME] will be granted in light of Respondent’s concession of unreasonableness [ 40 ] I find that the judicial review application will be granted because the Officer’s failure to consider [NAME]’s spouse’s then pregnancy and then unborn child as relevant factors for [NAME] relief under section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27, was unreasonable. [ 41 ] As a preliminary matter, I note that the Respondent’s motion for consent judgment remains outstanding. When asked at the oral hearing, the Respondent took no firm position about whether the motion should be determined finally (and which could render the judicial review moot, notwithstanding that it no longer was on consent of the parties), or whether the judicial review should proceed in the normal course. Regardless, the parties essentially argued the judicial review application. Because the determinative issue in either case, in my view, is the same, the outcome is substantially the same whether the motion or the judicial review application is granted, namely, that judgment will issue setting aside the [NAME] decision and sending the matter back for redetermination by a different officer. The question that remains is the additional relief [NAME] seeks. [ 42 ] I pause to note that this Court recently found, in the context of a motion for consent judgment, that disagreement on the appropriate remedy is sufficient to indicate that the matter is not moot, such that a live controversy remains between the parties: [NAME] et al. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (22 May 2025), Toronto IMM-23229-24 (FC), per Justice Michael Battista, who dismissed the motion and granted leave. The judicial review was determined subsequently by Justice Andrew Brouwer in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 222 [ [NAME] ]. [ 43 ] [NAME] withdrew his consent to judgment, nonetheless there is no disagreement that the [NAME] decision was unreasonable because the Officer did not account for [NAME]’s then unborn child and the expected birth. Acknowledging the pregnancy, the Officer held that an unborn child has no interests and, therefore, the Officer gave no weight to the best interests of the unborn child. In reaching this conclusion, the Officer relied on this Court’s decision in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] ; 2021 FC 1070. [ 44 ] In their written representations on the motion for consent judgment, the Respondent conceded specifically that pregnancy and the likely birth of a child are proper [NAME] factors to consider and, hence, the Officer’s reasons did not grapple meaningfully with the evidence about these factors. In support of this submission, the Respondent relies on this Court’s decision in [NAME] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2017 FC 549 at para 5. [ 45 ] In the circumstances, I accept the Respondent’s concession and find it unnecessary to address other issues of unreasonableness and procedural unfairness asserted by [NAME] but not conceded by the Respondent: [redacted] [ 46 ] I turn next to the additional remedies [NAME] seeks. E. [ADDRESS] will not order that redetermination occur in 15-19 days from judgment; however, removal will be stayed until the redetermination is completed and the outcome communicated to [NAME] [ 47 ] In his application for leave and judicial review of the [NAME] decision [ALJR], [NAME] requested several remedies, including that this matter be presented to a different panel for reconsideration. Below is a summary of the other relief sought in the ALJR, along with the reasons why they will not be ordered: a stay of his removal on July 20, 2024, which the Court granted in connection with his PRRA application; that the Court direct [NAME] to grant him permanent residence, which generally is not the Court’s role on judicial review but rather lies with the administrative decision-maker ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 163 at para 51); and that the Court direct [NAME] to provide logic and reasons regarding the decision made, which has been done and which reasons the Respondent has conceded were unreasonable. In the circumstances, I find it unnecessary to address any of the above remedies further. [ 48 ] In subsequent submissions, including in his Formal Withdrawal of Consent to Judgment, [NAME] requests that the redetermination of his [NAME] application occur within 15-19 days. He also submits that because of the same facts, evidence and arguments in the [NAME] applications, if one decision is found unreasonable, this means that the other must be found unreasonable as well and, therefore, both decisions should be sent back for redetermination. [ 49 ] In this judicial review decision, I will deal primarily with the timeline request for redetermination. Regarding the implications of the ordered redetermination of the [NAME] decision on the outcome of the judicial review of the PRRA decision, I deal with the issue in the context of the Court’s contemporaneous decision on the PRRA judicial review. Here, I simply note that the Applicant’s choice to submit the same evidence and make the same arguments in his [NAME] applications does not dictate their outcome. They are different administrative processes with different purposes. [ 50 ] [NAME] requests that his [NAME] application be redetermined in 15-19 days because of asserted urgent and ongoing hardship to his spouse and newborn child. In support of his submissions, [NAME] relies on several decisions of this Court listed in his list of case law and citations. As pointed out by the Respondent, however, the list of case law on which [NAME] relies in respect of this issue is unreliable. For example, regarding “[NAME] v Canada (C&I), 2019 FC 1254,” there is no decision associated with this neutral citation in the online CanLII database or on the Federal Court’s online database. [ 51 ] Regarding “[NAME] v Canada (C&I), 2016 FC 1300,” the case associated with this citation is [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 1300, and the Court did not direct any applicable timeline to the ordered redetermination (of the RPD decision in that case). While there are several decisions involving a party with the surname “[NAME]” or “[NAME],” it is not the role of the Court to determine which of these decisions [NAME] might have meant but rather it was his responsibility to check all the citations on which he chose to rely. [ 52 ] Regarding “[NAME] v Canada (C&I), 2017 FC 1021,” the case in fact associated with this citation is [NAME] v Canada , 2017 FC 1021, which involved a rule 51 appeal from the decision of a prothonotary (now called an associate judge) about whether to strike an expert report. The citation for the listed case “[NAME] v Canada (C&I), 2011 FC 130” resolves to [COMPANY] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2011 FC 130, which provides no support for [NAME]’s submissions. While the listed case “[NAME] v Canada (C&I), 2014 FC 714” is an existing case that involves a judicial review of an [NAME] decision, the case does not deal with directed timelines. [ 53 ] The above cases represent about half of those listed in [NAME]’s list of case law under the heading “Support of a 15-19 day timeline.” I am prepared in the circumstances to accept the Respondent’s submission that none of them assists [NAME], noting that it was his responsibility to check them all before relying on them, which he does not appear to have done. [ 54 ] While I accept the Court has discretion to order redetermination with instructions, which includes redetermination within a specified timeframe, such discretion must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2017 FCA 48 at para 16. Given my findings above regarding the jurisprudence on which [NAME] relies, I am not satisfied that there is any legal justification for a shortened timeline for the redetermination of his [NAME] application. [ 55 ] That said, I am cognizant that he has benefited from a stay of removal while the judicial review of his PRRA application was outstanding by reason of the July 12, 2024 order of Justice Heneghan on Court File IMM-9588-24 staying his removal to Nigeria until the longer of twelve months or the disposition of leave and if leave is granted (which it was), until the final disposition of the judicial review application. Following the example in [NAME] , I am prepared to direct that [NAME] not be rescheduled for removal until the redetermination of his [NAME] application has been completed, depending on the outcome of the redetermination.

V. Conclusion [ 56 ] Concluding that the [NAME] decision was unreasonable because the Officer failed to consider the pregnancy and unborn child factors, which the Respondent conceded, the judicial review application will be granted. The [NAME] decision will be set aside and remitted to a different officer for redetermination; [NAME]’s removal will not be rescheduled until the redetermination has been completed. [ 57 ] Neither party proposed a serious question of [NAME] importance for certification. I find that none arises in the circumstances.

VI. Costs [ 58 ] Generally, no costs are awarded in immigration or refugee protection judicial reviews, unless there are special reasons: Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22, s 22. While the Respondent has not requested costs in this matter, I find that they are nonetheless warranted. [ 59 ] At several points during the oral hearing, [NAME] accused the [NAME] of attempting to mislead the Court. This is a serious matter, and accusations of this nature must be made with the utmost case and on a solid foundation. In my view, [NAME]’s accusations were baseless and without merit. At most, the [NAME] advocated vigorously on behalf of her client, which, I note, it is her professional responsibility to do. Further, I find that the [NAME] treated [NAME] and the Court fairly and with respect. [ 60 ] In addition, it is not lost on the Court that [NAME] made these accusations against the backdrop of his undeclared use of [NAME] to prepare his materials, contrary to the Court’s [NAME] Notice , and his reliance on irrelevant or non-existent case law in support of his arguments. The latter conduct does not aid the Court’s work. [ 61 ] In my view, the above considerations, taken together, warrant a finding of special reasons, resulting in a modest costs award of $200 against [NAME] in favour of the Respondent.

JUDGMENT in IMM-9771-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Respondent’s motion for judgment and this judicial review application are granted, subject to the Court’s directions in point 2 below. The April 19, 2024 decision of a senior immigration officer of [NAME] refusing the Applicant’s application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is set aside. The matter will be remitted to a different officer for redetermination. The redetermination decision shall be completed before the Applicant is rescheduled for removal from Canada, depending on the outcome of the redetermination. The Applicant’s motion to strike the affidavit of [NAME] dated March 30, 2026 is dismissed. The Applicant’s motion for relief from his reporting obligations to the Canada Border Services Agency is dismissed. Costs in the amount of $200 are awarded in favour of the Respondent, payable by the Applicant. The style of cause is amended to identify the Applicant as [NAME] instead of [NAME] "Janet M. Fuhrer" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-9771-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: halifax. nova scotia DATE OF HEARING: may 13, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: FUHRER J. DATED: june 3, 2026 APPEARANCES: [NAME] For The Applicant (ON THEIR OWN BEHALF) [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: [NAME] of Canada Halifax, Nova Scotia For The Respondent