Federal Court Grants Judicial Review, Remands Immigration Case

Date: 20260629 Docket: IMM-8071-25 Citation: 2026 FC 878 Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [NAME] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is the judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division [[NAME]] which found that the Refugee Protection Division [[NAME]] was correct in finding that the Applicant is excluded from making a claim for refugee protection because, pursuant to Article 1F(b) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees , July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137, Can TS 1969 No 6 [ [NAME] ], there are serious reasons to believe that he committed a serious crime, and dismissed his appeal. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, I am granting this application for judicial review. Background [ 3 ] The Applicant is a citizen of Türkiye. [ 4 ] As a result of an incident in 2008, he was convicted in Türkiye for the offences of intentionally injuring two persons in a restaurant with gunfire and possessing an unlicensed firearm. He was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment. [ 5 ] In April 2015, having first travelled through multiple countries, the Applicant entered the United States [US]. There he made a claim for asylum. He was held in immigration detention for three months and, upon release, he abandoned his US claim for protection. The Applicant entered Canada without authorization on July 18, 2015. In Canada, he made a claim for refugee protection based on his claim of a fear of persecution from local police in Türkiye because of his Kurdish ethnicity and his political opinion. [ 6 ] This was the beginning of what has become a very long procedural history. [ 7 ] In summary form, that history is as follows. The [NAME] [[NAME]] rejected the Applicant’s refugee claim on May 2, 2016, finding that the Applicant’s allegations were not credible [[NAME] Decision]. On July 18, 2017, the [NAME] [First [NAME]] upheld the [NAME]’s decision [First [NAME] Decision]. On February 14, 2018, this Court granted the Applicant’s application for judicial review of the First [NAME] Decision and remitted the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 175). [ 8 ] On June 4, 2018, the [NAME] [[NAME]] dismissed the Applicant’s appeal, finding that the Applicant was excluded under Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] [[NAME] Decision]. On June 20, 2018, the Applicant applied for leave and judicial review of the [NAME] Decision but later discontinued that application. [ 9 ] On September 6, 2018, the Applicant’s application to re-open his appeal before the [NAME] was dismissed. The Applicant brought an application for leave for judicial review of the refusal to re-open his appeal. That application was granted by this Court on May 30, 2019 ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 762). [ 10 ] On August 4, 2019, the [NAME] allowed the Applicant’s appeal to be reopened. On July 28, 2021, the [NAME] [[NAME]] granted the appeal and remitted the decision back to the [NAME] for redetermination on the issues of exclusion and inclusion [[NAME] Decision]. [ 11 ] On April 18, 2023, the [NAME] [[NAME]] rejected the Applicant’s claim, finding that he was excluded under Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] [[NAME] Decision]. The Applicant appealed the [NAME] Decision to the [NAME]. On November 23, 2023, the [NAME] [[NAME]] dismissed the appeal [[NAME] Decision]. [NAME] Decision is the subject of this judicial review. Decision under review [ 12 ] [NAME] noted that after the [NAME] hearing concluded on February 28, 2023, the [NAME] issued a notice to Applicant’s counsel and to the Minister requesting written submissions on sections 267 and 268 of the Criminal Code of Canada , RSC 1985, c C-46 [ Criminal Code ]. The Applicant made submissions in response to the notice. The Applicant argued before [NAME] that the [NAME] erred in failing to reconvene the hearing to address the application of sections 267 and 268. [NAME] found that the [NAME] did not breach procedural fairness in failing to reconvene the hearing. [ 13 ] The Applicant also argued that the [NAME] breached procedural fairness by failing to adopt the findings of the [NAME] Decision regarding exclusion. [NAME] acknowledged that the [NAME] had conducted a full Article 1F(b) analysis and found that the Applicant should not be excluded. However, the [NAME] also determined that it could not finalize the appeal and, therefore, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ], that it must be remitted back to the [NAME] for a de novo determination with directions. [NAME] found that the [NAME] followed the directions by proceeding with a fresh hearing and, therefore, that there was no breach of procedural fairness. [NAME] also found that the [NAME] was not obliged to adopt the findings of the [NAME] Decision outside of the directions provided. [ 14 ] After conducting its own exclusion analysis, [NAME] agreed with the [NAME] that there are serious reasons for believing that the Applicant committed a serious crime. In that analysis, [NAME] considered the legal framework for Article 1F(b) exclusion. [NAME] then considered whether there were serious reasons to believe that the Applicant committed the crime. In that regard it noted that the synopsis provided by the [NAME] indicated that the Applicant and his [NAME] had an argument over the phone regarding a child custody matter. The two agreed to meet at a restaurant. The Applicant brought an unlicensed gun with him and fired his gun at his [NAME] as the latter entered the restaurant. The [NAME] was not injured but two bystanders were incidentally shot and had non-life-threatening injuries. Further, upon conviction, the Applicant ultimately received a total sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment. [NAME] considered various factors surrounding the offence and conviction and concluded that the [NAME] was correct in finding the Applicant’s actions met the threshold for “serious reasons for considering” that he committed the crimes in question. Whether his [NAME] should also have been convicted was not a relevant consideration. [ 15 ] [NAME] next considered whether the Applicant’s crime met the threshold of being a “serious crime” by reviewing the factors identified in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FCA 404 [ [NAME] ]. [NAME] identified these as being: the elements of the crime; the mode of prosecution; the penalty prescribed; the facts; and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances underlying the conviction. [NAME] assessed each factor in turn. [ 16 ] [NAME] then addressed the sentencing range, stating that in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 SCC 68 [ [NAME] ] at para 62, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a ten-year or more sentence of imprisonment is a good indication of the seriousness of the crime and creates a rebuttable presumption. However, the ten-year rule is not to be applied in a mechanistic, decontextualized, or unjust manner. [NAME] noted that the Applicant had received a three-and-a-half-year sentence from the [NAME], which was well below the ten-year yardstick. However, this was not the only factor to be considered. [NAME] stated that in [NAME] it was held that the harm caused to the victim or to society and the use of a weapon would be relevant factors in assessing the seriousness of a crime and, in the matter before it, that each of those aggravating factors were present. [NAME] found that the aggravating factors far outweighed any mitigating factors. [NAME] concluded that the Applicant’s actions met the threshold of being a serious crime. [ 17 ] [NAME] found that the Minister met their onus, and there were serious reasons for considering that the Applicant committed a serious crime.

Accordingly, [NAME] found that the Applicant is excluded under Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] and the [NAME]’s decision was correct and was upheld. Given this finding, [NAME] found it did not need to consider the merits of the Applicant’s refugee claim. Issues and standard of review [ 18 ] The sole issue in this matter is whether [NAME] Decision was reasonable. [ 19 ] The parties submit and I agree that the standard of review on the merits of the [NAME]’s decision is reasonableness. On judicial review the Court “asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 at para 99). The decision was not reasonable [ 20 ] The Applicant makes two main submissions as to why [NAME] Decision is unreasonable. First, that [NAME] erred in failing to consider where in the sentencing range the Applicant’s criminal conduct would fall. Second, that [NAME]’s analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors was unreasonable. Analysis i. Sentencing Range Applicant’s position [ 21 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME]’s failure to consider where in the Canadian sentencing range the criminal conduct would fall ignores the relevant jurisprudence concerning the determination of whether a crime is serious as contemplated by Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] . This is because considering the sentence that an individual would have received in Canada is an integral consideration of the analysis of whether a crime is serious. [ 22 ] [NAME] Decision includes a section titled “Sentencing range” , the Applicant submits that it contains no analysis of the applicable sentence under Canadian law. It instead weighs aggravating and mitigating factors – which is a separate analysis for determining seriousness. The Applicant submits that it was unreasonable for this analysis to focus solely on the maximum sentence under Canadian law without considering what sentence within the applicable sentencing range the Applicant was likely to receive in Canada (citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 843 [ [NAME] ] at para 44). That is, that [NAME] erred in failing to assess the seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct in light of the range of sentences available ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 709 [ [NAME] ] at para 21). [ 23 ] The Applicant submits that in this matter the provisions of the Criminal Code relied upon by [NAME], sections 88 and 92, carry no minimum sentences and section 88 is also a hybrid offence. The Applicant’s actual sentence of three and a half years was significantly lower than the ten-year yardstick. Further, the Minister presented no evidence to establish that if the Applicant were convicted of either offence in Canada, he would have received a sentence close to the maximum of ten years. As held in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 464 [ [NAME] ], the wide sentencing range and the actual low sentence is a relevant factor in determining whether the crime was serious (citing [NAME] at paras 45-46). The Applicant submits that [NAME]’s failure to meaningfully grapple with whether the sentence would fall at the less serious end of the range is an egregious error (citing [NAME] at para 48) and renders the decision unreasonable. Respondent’s position [ 24 ] The Respondent submits that [NAME] did not simply rely on the maximum ten-year sentence as sufficient on its own to warrant exclusion for serious criminality, even though such a sentence creates a rebuttable presumption of seriousness. Rather, the [NAME]’s acknowledgement that the sentence could be “up to” ten years’ imprisonment accepted there is a range of sentences available in Canada. The [NAME] also noted the actual sentence the Applicant had received in Türkiye. The Respondent submits that [NAME] considered that range alongside the aggravating factors and found that this rendered the crime to be serious. [ 25 ] The Respondent also submits that the [NAME] was not required to determine with precision where in a sentencing range the Canadian comparable crime falls, but was required to meaningfully grapple with where in the sentencing range the crimes would fall (citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1329 [ [NAME] ] at paras 33-34). [NAME]’s consideration of the [NAME] factors to determining the crimes were serious was reasonable and satisfied its obligation (citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1612 [ [NAME] ] at paras 34-38; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1775 [ [NAME] ] at para 43; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 981 [ [NAME] ] at para 29; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1353 [ [NAME] ] at para 47). [ 26 ] The Respondent submits that the Applicant failed to rebut the presumption regarding the seriousness of the offences. He neither referred to jurisprudence nor addressed the aggravating factors in his case to support his position that his crime would fall in the lower sentencing range. Analysis [ 27 ] A non-political crime is presumptively serious under Article 1F(b) if a maximum sentence of ten years or more could have been imposed if the acts had been committed in Canada ( [NAME] at para 62; [NAME] at para 44; [NAME] at para 34; [NAME] at para 43). [ 28 ] However, this presumption can be rebutted based on a consideration of the factors set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] : [ 44 ] I believe there is a consensus among the courts that the interpretation of the exclusion clause in Article 1F(b) of the Convention, as regards the seriousness of a crime, requires an evaluation of the elements of the crime, the mode of prosecution, the penalty prescribed, the facts and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances underlying the conviction: see S. v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority ; S. & [NAME] v. Secretary of State for the Home Department , [2006] EWCA Civ 1157; [NAME] v. [NAME] , 500 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007), August 29, 2007, at pages 945 and 946-947. In other words, whatever presumption of seriousness may attach to a crime internationally or under the legislation of the receiving state, that presumption may be rebutted by reference to the above factors. There is no balancing, however, with factors extraneous to the facts and circumstances underlying the conviction such as, for example, the risk of persecution in the state of origin: see [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2004 FCA 250 (CanLII), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 304 (F.C.A.), at paragraph 38; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. [NAME] , at page 427; T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department , [1995] 1 W.L.R. 545 (C.A.), at pages 554-555; [NAME] v. Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs , at paragraph 24. [ 29 ] This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] : [62] The Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2000 CanLII 17150 (FCA), [2000] 4 F.C. 390 (C.A.), and [NAME] has taken the view that where a maximum sentence of ten years or more could have been imposed had the crime been committed in Canada, the crime will generally be considered serious. I agree. However, this generalization should not be understood as a rigid presumption that is impossible to rebut. Where a provision of the Canadian Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, has a large sentencing range, the upper end being ten years or more and the lower end being quite low, a claimant whose crime would fall at the less serious end of the range in Canada should not be presumptively excluded. Article 1F( b ) is designed to exclude only those whose crimes are serious. The UNHCR has suggested that a presumption of serious crime might be raised by evidence of commission of any of the following offences: homicide, rape, child molesting, wounding, arson, drugs trafficking, and armed robbery ([NAME], at p. 179). These are good examples of crimes that are sufficiently serious to presumptively warrant exclusion from refugee protection. However, as indicated, the presumption may be rebutted in a particular case. While consideration of whether a maximum sentence of ten years or more could have been imposed had the crime been committed in Canada is a useful guideline, and crimes attracting a maximum sentence of ten years or more in Canada will generally be sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion, the ten-year rule should not be applied in a mechanistic, decontextualized, or unjust manner. (See also: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1100 [ [NAME] ] at paras 26-27; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 906 at para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1268 at para 23; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 603 at para 53). [ 30 ] On the heels of [NAME] , this Court decided [NAME] . In that decision Justice de Montigny (then of this Court) considered the impact of [NAME] and held that, while it endorsed the presumption, it also stressed the importance of a contextual analysis, and cautioned against a mechanistic, rigid application of the presumption. Justice de Montigny found that paragraph 62 of [NAME] “adds a new factor – the Canadian sentencing range – into the mix of considerations to be taken into account” ( [NAME] at para 38). He concluded that: [ 48 ] At the end of the day, however, the most egregious error of the Board member was her failure to take into account what the Supreme Court considered a critical factor in [NAME] , namely the wide Canadian sentencing range and the fact that the crime for which the Applicant was convicted would fall at the less serious end of the range. This consideration was quite relevant in the case at bar: the Canadian sentence for fraud over $5,000 has a large sentencing range (0 to 14 years), and the Applicant’s crime – fraud of $50,000 with a 10 month sentence – prima facie falls at the low end of this range. The wide sentencing range and the Applicant’s low actual sentence (not only was the actual sentence only two years but it was suspended and the only jail time was 165 days pre-trial custody) were clearly a most relevant factor in determining whether the crime was serious. [ 49 ] On that basis alone, the decision of the Board ought to be quashed and the matter returned for reconsideration by a different panel of the Board. [ 31 ] Similarly, in [NAME] (then of this Court) held that as the [NAME] in that matter had “failed to undertake the type of analysis that the Supreme Court mandated is required in [NAME] and failed to assess the seriousness of the applicant’s conduct in light of the range of sentences available, the Board’s decision must be set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration as occurred in [NAME] ” (para 21). [ 32 ] In [NAME], Justice Brown held that in the matter before him the [NAME] had failed to meaningfully grapple with what penalty the applicant might have received if he was charged in Canada and that this failure offended the reasoning in [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 31). Or, put otherwise, that the [NAME] acted unreasonably in failing to meaningfully grapple with whether the applicant’s sentence would “fall at the less serious end of the range” (or, conversely, at the more serious end of that range) as set out in [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 32). Justice Brown concluded: [ 33 ] Given these authorities, I conclude the [NAME]’s failure to meaningfully grapple with the large sentencing range and the associated failure to consider whether the Applicant would “fall at the less serious end of the range” or, conversely, at the more serious end of that range is a reviewable error. [ 34 ] I wish to add there is no need for the [NAME] to determine with precision where in a sentencing range the Canadian comparable crime falls. The [NAME] is not a criminal court for the purpose of finding guilt or innocence: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),  2007 FC 943 [Hughes J] at para 11 citing to [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),  2005 FCA 125 at para 23 [per Pelletier JA]. For the same reason, the [NAME] is not a criminal court for the purpose of determining the appropriate sentence. [ 35 ] However, in my respectful opinion and to comply with [NAME]  and [NAME] , the [NAME] must meaningfully grapple with whether the crime falls within the less serious, or the more serious range of the Canadian criminal provision. I am not persuaded the [NAME] should be asked to do more. Because the [NAME] did not make this required determination, I am unable to agree the [NAME] complied with constraining law. [ 33 ] In [NAME], Justice Favel stated that in [NAME] the Supreme Court added to the [NAME] factors the consideration of the Canadian sentencing range to determine where the alleged crime would fall in the sentencing spectrum. “Though the [NAME] may not determine the sentence with ‘precision’, it must grapple with the lower and higher ends of the sentencing range given the factual matrix of the case ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1329 [ [NAME] ] at para 34)” ( [NAME] at para 44). [ 34 ] Further, in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 113, the applicant argued that in assessing whether he had engaged in serious criminality, and in the absence of a conviction and sentence, the [NAME] was required to consider if he would have received a sentence at the low, medium or high end of the spectrum if convicted of the offences. The respondent argued that the [NAME] had canvassed the factors prescribed by [NAME] and, while not explicitly addressing the sentencing ranges for the crimes in issue, there was no indication that the [NAME] was unaware of the wide sentencing spectrums. [ADDRESS] agreed with the respondent that many factors will influence a sentence, but found that this did not alleviate the [NAME] of its obligation to grapple with whether the applicant’s conduct would result in a sentence at the low end of a wide sentencing range. The jurisprudence required the [NAME] to consider and address whether the applicant’s sentence would fall at the lower end of a large sentencing range. The failure of the [NAME] to expressly address this issue, which was central to the matter before it, rendered the decision unreasonable (at paras 18-25). [ 35 ] Given the above, I agree with the Applicant that the jurisprudence is clear that [NAME] was required to meaningfully grapple with the question of where in the sentencing range the comparable crimes under sections 92 and 88 of the Criminal Code would likely fall in the Applicant’s circumstances. This did not require a precise determination, but it did require an analysis. [ 36 ] Here, however, under the heading “Sentencing range” [NAME] states (footnotes omitted): [56] The [NAME] considers the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)'s leading decision in [NAME] , where the court noted that a ten year or more yardstick is a good indication of the seriousness of the crime and creates a rebuttable presumption. The SCC also noted that this ten-year rule should not be applied in a mechanistic, decontextualized, or unjust manner. [57] In this case, the Appellant received a three- and half-year prison sentence from the [NAME]. The [NAME] considers that the length of the Appellant's sentence is well below 10 years. However, the [NAME] also considers that the length of the sentence is not the only factor to consider in this analysis. [58] In [NAME] , the Federal Court considered that the harm caused to the victim or to society and the use of a weapon would be relevant factors in assessing the seriousness of a crime. In this case before the [NAME], each of these aggravating factors are present. The [NAME] finds that the aggravating factors far outweigh any mitigating factors. [ 37 ] [NAME] then went on to state that in [NAME] , the Federal Court considered that the harm caused to the victim or to society and the use of a weapon would be relevant factors in assessing the seriousness of a crime. In the Applicant’s case, each of these aggravating factors were present and [NAME] found that the aggravating factors far outweighed any mitigating factors. [ 38 ] [NAME] did acknowledge the ten-year yardstick and that [NAME] had imposed sentences that were well below that yardstick. But [NAME] did not go further. It did not acknowledge that [NAME] and subsequent jurisprudence require consideration of where, within the Canadian sentencing range, the crimes would fall and it did not conduct such an analysis. Even though it set out the text of sections 92 and 88 of the Criminal Code , the latter of which is a hybrid offence as conviction can be by way of indictment or summary conviction (which is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the crime, see [NAME] at para 46; AB v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 1385 at para 75; [NAME] at para 43), [NAME] did not grapple with the issue of where in the sentencing range the offences would fall. [NAME] did consider the [NAME] factors, this was not sufficient. It was required to also consider whether the crime falls within the less serious or more serious range of the Canadian criminal provision. [NAME]’s failure to do so renders the decision unreasonable. [ 39 ] I would also note here, as the Applicant submits, that [NAME] failed to consider any Canadian cases to determine on what end of the sentencing range the Applicant would likely fall. [NAME] did not do so is not apparent from its reasons. [ 40 ] However, on that point, the [NAME] found that the Minister did not cite any Canadian sentencing case law to support the opinion that the offences were serious from the perspective of Canadian criminal law. Although the Applicant had admitted to having carried an unlicensed firearm, which would also be an offence in Canada, the Minister cited no Canadian sentencing decisions in support of the submission that this offence is serious enough to be described in Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] . On the other hand, counsel for the Applicant had filed jurisprudence from [NAME], which ranged from non-custodial sentences to terms of imprisonment under two years, with one year being common. The [NAME] found that the Minister had failed to meet the onus of providing serious reasons for considering that the Applicant committed crimes in Türkiye, which were sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion. [ 41 ] Similarly, on redetermination, the [NAME] reviewed the relevant jurisprudence and noted that the [NAME] had requested and had received from counsel for the Applicant jurisprudence concerning Canadian sentencing ranges while the Respondent had taken the position that this was not required. The [NAME] rejected the Respondent’s position, based on the jurisprudence. The [NAME] then stated that the question before it was how to "meaningfully grapple" with sentencing provisions when neither party had provided any Canadian jurisprudence to the [NAME] on whether the crime falls within the less serious or more serious range of the Canadian criminal provisions. The [NAME] found that where the Applicant was actually charged and sentenced (to a sentence in the mid-range of sentences prescribed in Türkiye) to possessing an unlicensed firearm, that was probative evidence to assist it in complying with the [NAME] direction. [ 42 ] My point here is simply that the [NAME] and the [NAME] both recognized the need to assess where the Applicant’s crimes fell within the Criminal Code ranges. Thus – rightly or wrongly – they did grapple with the issue. This is unlike [NAME], which failed to address the factor and whose reasons provide no explanation or justification for failing to do so. [ 43 ] Given my finding that [NAME] acted unreasonably in failing to meaningfully grapple with where in the sentencing range the Applicant’s crimes would likely have fallen if prosecuted under the comparable Criminal Code offences, I need not consider the Applicant’s other arguments. Regrettably, the matter must – yet again – be remitted to the [NAME] for redetermination.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-8071-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is granted; The decision is set aside and the matter shall be remitted to a different [NAME] panel for redetermination; There shall be no order as to costs; and No question of general importance for certification was proposed or arises. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-8071-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: June 25, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: june 29, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent