Federal Court Grants Partial Confidentiality Under Competition Act

OUTCOME: Allowed in Part

Date: 20260505 Docket: T-2455-24 Citation: 2026 FC 578 Montréal, Quebec , May 5, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon IN THE MATTER OF the Competition Act , RSC 1985, c C-34; AND IN THE MATTER OF an inquiry under section 10 of the Competition Act into conduct by The Canadian Real Estate Association [[NAME_1]] reviewable under Part VIII of the Competition Act ; AND IN THE MATTER OF an ex parte application by the Commissioner of Competition for an Order requiring [NAME_1] to produce records pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(b) of the Competition Act and to make and deliver written returns of information pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(c) of the Competition Act . BETWEEN: THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION Applicant and THE CANADIAN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION Respondent PUBLIC

ORDER AND

REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] The Canadian Real Estate Association [[NAME_1]] moves under section 151 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 for an order sealing from the public record certain information arising from its response to a Court order dated October 2, 2024 [Section 11 Order]. [ 2 ] In that order issued pursuant to section 11 of the Competition Act , RSC 1985, c C-34, I granted the Commissioner of Competition’s [Commissioner] [1] ex parte application and compelled [NAME_1] to produce records and make and deliver written returns of information to the Commissioner. The Section 11 Order was issued in the context of an inquiry commenced by the Commissioner with respect to [NAME_1]’s commercial practices [Inquiry]. More specifically, the Commissioner stated he had reason to believe that [NAME_1] has engaged or is engaging in conduct that impedes the ability of real estate agents to compete, contrary to Part VIII of the Competition Act , in particular section 79 on abuse of dominance and section 90.1 on agreements between competitors. [ 3 ] The impugned information consists of an index of privilege claims provided by [NAME_1] with respect to some 26,000 records either redacted or withheld from [NAME_1]’s production to the Commissioner [Privilege Log], a list of titles and positions of individuals mentioned in the Privilege Log [Individuals’ Titles List], and those portions of the Commissioner’s and [NAME_1]’s motion materials that directly or indirectly disclose the contents of these two documents. [NAME_1]’s motion for confidentiality is brought in the context of a motion for directions filed by the Commissioner regarding the sufficiency of the information provided by [NAME_1] in the Privilege Log, which is the subject of a separate order also issued today [Order on Directions]. [ 4 ] On October 8, 2025, I issued an interim sealing order [Interim Sealing Order] protecting certain materials already filed with the Court in this matter — namely, exhibits to the affidavit of [NAME_2] that contained the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List — and allowing for the interim sealed filing of motion materials containing what [NAME_1] termed “Claimed Confidential Information.” [ 5 ] In its motion, [NAME_1] now seeks to replace that interim regime with a permanent sealing order that will cover all confidential materials it produced to the Commissioner further to the Section 11 Order and will govern the treatment of the Privilege Log, the Individuals’ Titles List, and any other material that would, directly or indirectly, reveal their contents. [NAME_1] also proposes a structured redaction protocol for all other materials, including its own filings. [ 6 ] [NAME_1] bears the onus of demonstrating that the order sought satisfies the demanding constitutional and common law requirements governing departures from the open court principle. In sum, t he Court must be satisfied that the test articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v [NAME_7] , 2021 SCC 25 [ Sherman Estate ] is met in the circumstances. The issue for determination is whether, on the evidentiary record, [NAME_1] has established a serious risk to an important public interest that cannot be mitigated by lesser measures. [ 7 ] For the reasons that follow, I find that [NAME_1] has met its onus only in part under Sherman Estate , read in light of Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance) , 2002 SCC 41 [ Sierra Club ] and the statutory confidentiality regime in sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act . The record demonstrates that the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List contain certain instances of genuinely sensitive information that deserves confidentiality protection, including certain subject-line entries revealing commercially or competitively sensitive matters, as well as personal identifiers and private information for numerous individuals who are not public-facing decision makers. However, the Commissioner’s submission that the bulk of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List is administrative and presents no harm also finds some support in the evidence. [NAME_1] has not established that the disclosure of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List as a whole would create the type of serious risk as contemplated in Sherman Estate . [ 8 ] The Interim Sealing Order will therefore be vacated and replaced by a tailored confidentiality order that protects the limited categories of information meeting the Sherman Estate threshold while preserving public access to the structure, privilege categories, and other entries in the Privilege Log, the Individuals’ Titles List, and the portions of the Commissioner’s and [NAME_1]’s motion materials that mirror those same categories .

II. Factual background A. [NAME_1] and the Inquiry [ 9 ] [NAME_1] is a national trade association comprised of more than 160,000 REALTOR® members across Canada, operating through 59 real estate boards and associations. Its mandate centres on advocacy, member success and growth, and the promotion of REALTOR® professionalism, supported in part through its proprietary listing marketplace, REALTOR.ca. [ 10 ] In June 2024, the Commissioner notified [NAME_1] that the Inquiry had been initiated pursuant to section 10 of the Competition Act . Subsection 10(3) provides that “[a]ll inquiries under this section shall be conducted in private.” [NAME_1] understood, and was entitled to understand, that it was participating in a confidential investigative process, subject to the statutory safeguards of the Competition Act . [NAME_1] reaffirmed this understanding in several correspondences with the Commissioner during the response process to the Section 11 Order, from January 2025 onward. B. The Section 11 Order and [NAME_1]’s production [ 11 ] On October 2, 2024, I issued the Section 11 Order requiring [NAME_1] to produce records pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(b) of the Competition Act and to make and deliver written returns of information pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(c). [NAME_1] complied, delivering extensive records and returns on January 9, 2025, within the 90-day deadline set out in the Section 11 Order. [ 12 ] [NAME_1]’s production was accompanied by a detailed cover letter from its counsel. In that letter, [NAME_1] expressly stated that all information provided in response to the Section 11 Order was confidential and competitively sensitive; that it should be treated as such under section 29 of the Competition Act and the Competition Bureau’s policies; that [NAME_1] did not consent to disclosure to third parties; and that the production included personal information to be handled in accordance with applicable privacy laws. [ 13 ] In response to specific paragraphs of the Section 11 Order, [NAME_1] also provided the Commissioner with the Privilege Log identifying records responsive to the Order that were withheld or redacted on the basis of privilege, and a corresponding list of the names, titles, and positions of the authors and recipients of those records — namely, the Individuals’ Titles List —. [ 14 ] The Privilege Log notably includes, for each record, the date, title or email subject line, author or sender, recipients, the description of the privilege claimed, the “basis” for the privilege, and the Section 11 Order specification to which the record responds. The Individuals’ Titles List maps each author and recipient to known names, email addresses, titles, or positions. Together, they form a granular, structured depiction of [NAME_1]’s internal and external communications. C. The Commissioner’s motion materials and the Interim Sealing Order [ 15 ] On September 16, 2025, the Commissioner filed a notice of motion and supporting affidavit concerning the Privilege Log, in which he seeks directions from the Court concerning the enforcement of the Section 11 Order [Motion for Directions]. Those materials contained embedded links to extracts of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List. On September 17, 2025, the Commissioner filed revised public motion materials that went further to include the full Privilege Log and the full Individuals’ Titles List as exhibits, without any redactions. [ 16 ] [NAME_1] applied urgently for interim relief, which was unopposed by the Commissioner. On October 8, 2025, I issued an Interim Sealing Order that stated:

1. The following documents filed by the Commissioner in Court File No. T-2455-24 shall be sealed from the public Court record on an interim basis: a) Exhibits G and H of the Affidavit of [NAME_4] sworn September 16, 2025, filed by the Commissioner on September 16, 2025, in Court File No. T-2455-24; and b) Exhibits F (items (c) and (d)), G and H of the Affidavit of [NAME_4] sworn September 17, 2025, filed by the Commissioner on September 17, 2025, in Court File No. T-2455-24.

2. A motion record, transcript, or any other document that contains Claimed Confidential Information that is to be filed with the Court in support of, or responding to, a motion before the Court may be filed in sealed envelopes as part of the motion materials and will be segregated from the public record, and the material shall be treated as confidential, in accordance with Rule 152 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-206 [ sic ], without the need for a motion or order pursuant to Rule 151, subject to determination of its confidentiality by the Court.

3. A public version of any motion record filed in a sealed envelope pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be filed with the Claimed Confidential Information redacted from it and indicated as such.

4. Each sealed envelope and redacted motion record shall be accompanied by a solicitor’s certificate attesting that the solicitor has read this Interim Sealing Order and confirms that the contents of the sealed envelope(s) and redactions comprise Claimed Confidential Information and that such material is filed pursuant to the Interim Sealing Order. 5. [ADDRESS] shall retain its discretion as to the terms and conditions of use of such Claimed Confidential Information and the maintenance of the confidentiality thereof during the hearing of the motion(s) and in resulting Orders or Reasons for Order, subject to the parties being given a reasonable opportunity to speak to and provide evidence supporting the need to maintain its confidentiality. III. [NAME_1]’s motion [ 17 ] [NAME_1] now requests a final confidentiality order. In its motion, [NAME_1] seeks to protect its sensitive and confidential information in connection with the Inquiry, arguing that public disclosure of this information would undermine the public interest in the statutory protections provided under the Competition Act over confidential information submitted to the Commissioner in connection with her investigations. [NAME_1] submits that all records and information it submitted to the Commissioner in response to the Section 11 Order should be treated as confidential [Confidential Information]. This Confidential Information notably includes the contents of the Privilege Log and of the Individuals’ Titles List. [ 18 ] [NAME_1]’s evidence on this motion consists mainly of the affidavit of [NAME_8], [NAME_1]’s Senior Competition Counsel, and the affidavit of [NAME_8], a law clerk at [COMPANY_10], [NAME_1]’s external counsel. [NAME_8] describes in detail the nature of the Confidential Information, [NAME_1]’s expectations of confidentiality arising from sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act and the Competition Bureau’s own bulletins and public statements, and the harm that would result from disclosure. Ms. [NAME_9] provides, among other things, examples of confidentiality orders issued in Competition Tribunal proceedings and Competition Bureau publications on access to case files and the protection of confidential information. [ 19 ] The Commissioner’s responding record challenges the sufficiency and credibility of those assertions, and [NAME_1]’s evidence must therefore be examined in light of that opposition. A. [NAME_1]’s evidence of harm [ 20 ] [NAME_8] defines the Confidential Information to include: (a) all information [NAME_1] submitted to the Commissioner in response to the Section 11 Order, including the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List; (b) the underlying records that would be confidential had they been produced without redactions; and (c) personal identifiable information and commercially sensitive data contained in the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List. [ 21 ] More concretely, [NAME_8] identifies the following categories of confidential data embedded in the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List: (a) names of [NAME_1] employees and members; (b) names and contact information of members of the public, titles and positions of those individuals, email addresses; and (c) email subject lines that reveal, often in coded form, [NAME_1]’s priorities, strategies, responses to competitive pressures, and engagements with specific stakeholders and competitors. [ 22 ] By way of example, [NAME_8] mentions entries referencing |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| which could, in the hands of external parties, be used to infer sensitive information about negotiations with the |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||| and entries referencing online competitors such as |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| as well as [NAME_1]’s own proprietary marketplace, REALTOR.ca. [ 23 ] [NAME_1] further submits that the compelled nature of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List distinguishes it from ordinary litigation privilege logs. [NAME_1] argues that, unlike a voluntarily produced log crafted with public disclosure in mind, the Privilege Log was created purely for compliance with a judicial production order, issued pursuant to the Competition Act . According to [NAME_1], the Privilege Log therefore contains descriptors and mappings that it would never have prepared or disclosed voluntarily in adversarial proceedings. [ 24 ] The privacy issues raised in [NAME_1]’s evidence focus on the Individuals’ Titles List. [NAME_1] notes that many individuals identified in the document are junior employees, provincial association personnel, or external parties with no expectation that their involvement with [NAME_1] in private or privileged matters would become public. [NAME_1] submits that exposing their identities risks reputational harm, unwanted attention, and a chilling effect on future cooperation with compulsory processes. [ 25 ] [NAME_1] seeks to protect all iterations of this Confidential Information in the Court record. This is not limited only to the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List themselves, but also encompasses the embedded extracts, screenshots, paraphrases, links, and any derivative use of their content in affidavits, written submissions, transcripts, and future filings in this proceeding. B. The Commissioner’s evidence and challenges [ 26 ] The Commissioner disputes [NAME_1]’s characterizations. The Commissioner submits that [NAME_1] has not shown any concrete evidence of commercial harm arising from disclosure and notes that many entries relate to routine or historical matters that lack contemporary sensitivity. The Commissioner argues that references to competitors such as |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| reflect longstanding market realities and are not commercially revealing. The Commissioner further contends that the Privilege Log contains no substantive content, only subject lines, and therefore cannot reasonably be said to reveal strategy. [ 27 ] The Commissioner challenges the evidentiary basis for [NAME_1]’s assertions that stakeholder relationships or governance processes would be harmed. She notes the absence of affidavit evidence from any provincial board or external party and argues that [NAME_1]’s claims in this respect are speculative. The Commissioner also contests the assertion that compelled privilege logs are inherently sensitive, submitting that courts routinely require transparency in privilege disputes to ensure accountability in the administration of justice. [ 28 ] With respect to privacy concerns, the Commissioner accepts that personal contact information could be redacted but argues that this does not justify sealing the Individuals’ Titles List or the Privilege Log as a whole. The Commissioner submits that [NAME_1] has not demonstrated any realistic privacy harms beyond what could be addressed by targeted redactions. C. Cross-examination of [NAME_8] [ 29 ] The Commissioner cross-examined [NAME_8]. [NAME_8]’s testimony supports [NAME_1]’s narrower concerns, it also reveals limitations in [NAME_1]’s broader claims. [NAME_8] acknowledged that many entries are purely administrative. He agreed that certain competitive references are of longstanding and limited contemporary sensitivity. At the same time, he identified specific entries that, in his view, reflect ongoing matters, active negotiations, or internal assessments that could prejudice [NAME_1] if disclosed. [ 30 ] The transcript of this cross-examination therefore supports a nuanced conclusion: certain entries carry genuine, identifiable sensitivity, but others do not. In other words, [NAME_1]’s evidence does not support a categorical sealing order, but does establish certain narrower risks that require protection.

IV. The applicable legal framework [ 31 ] Rule 151(1) authorizes the Court, on motion, to order that any document or part of a document be treated as confidential, be sealed, or be kept confidential for a specified or unspecified period. This discretion, however, is constrained by the constitutional values embedded in the open court principle. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that public access to court proceedings and records is presumptively required, and any departure from that presumption demands a compelling justification (see, for example, [NAME_12] v [NAME_13] , 2024 SCC 21 at paras 1, 4, 27 [ [NAME_14] ]; Sherman Estate at paras 2, 30, 39; [COMPANY_15] v [NAME_16] , 2005 SCC 41 at para 21; Vancouver Sun (Re) , 2004 SCC 43 at para 39; R v [NAME_17] , 2001 SCC 76 at paras 33, 39 [ [NAME_17] ]). [ 32 ] I pause to note that the open court principle also applies to the Competition Tribunal, as an administrative tribunal presiding over adversarial proceedings in which questions of rights and obligations are decided ( Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Parrish & Heimbecker, Limited , 2021 Comp Trib 2 at para 64; see also, a contrario , Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Canada (Parole Board) , 2023 FCA 166 at paras 53–56; [NAME_18] v Canada ([NAME_19]) , 2023 FCA 167 at paras 55–56). [ 33 ] In Sierra Club , the Supreme Court of Canada developed a test for confidentiality orders where commercially sensitive information is at stake. While that case arose in distinct circumstances, its logic still applies: where disclosure in the context of litigation would compromise important and sensitive commercial interests, the Court shall balance these interests against those relating to the proper administration of justice and decide whether it is necessary to protect the information. If that is the case, the confidentiality order should be as limited as possible ( Sierra Club at paras 53–57). [ 34 ] In Sherman Estate , the Supreme Court of Canada refined the Sierra Club test governing restrictions on court openness, including publication bans and sealing orders. The Supreme Court established that a confidentiality order may only be issued where:

1. Court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

2. The order is necessary to prevent that serious risk because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent it; and 3. The proposed order is proportionate, meaning the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects on the open court principle. ( Sherman Estate at para 38) [ 35 ] Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered ( Sherman Estate at para 38). [ 36 ] Sherman Estate emphasizes that “important public interest” is not limited to the privacy of vulnerable individuals; it can include, in appropriate circumstances, commercial confidentiality, law enforcement interests, and the integrity of court and administrative processes. Of relevance for the present matter is that the “important commercial interest” in the context of litigation must be expressed as a public interest. Then, this interest must be of such public significance that it justifies a derogation from openness ( Sherman Estate at para 41). [ 37 ] Read together, Sherman Estate and Sierra Club support a nuanced, context-sensitive approach. Commercial or investigative confidentiality will not automatically trump court openness but may do so where the statutory design and evidentiary record demonstrate a serious risk to the effective functioning of a regulatory regime or to the fairness and integrity of compelled proceedings, like section 11 of the Competition Act . [ 38 ] As stated by Justice Andrew D. Little in Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Google Canada Corporation , 2023 FC 1038 [ Google ]: [44] Therefore, the Court may only issue an order under Rule 151 in exceptional circumstances in which competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principles. In Sherman Estate, the Supreme Court observed that the burden on the moving party constitutes a “high bar” to meet on the specific facts and circumstances established in the evidence: Sherman Estate, at paras 3, 34, 62-63, 84; see also [NAME_20] , at paras 85, 89, 94.

V. Application of the Sherman Estate framework [ 39 ] The application of Sherman Estate to this record requires a careful inspection and understanding of what [NAME_1] asserts to be sensitive, what the Commissioner disputes, and what the evidence actually supports. Neither party’s position captures the complete picture. [NAME_1]’s assertion that the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List as a whole must be sealed cannot be sustained in light of the record. Conversely, the Commissioner’s position that no confidentiality is warranted cannot be accepted either. What emerges instead is a hybrid conclusion: certain portions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List do not satisfy the threshold for sealing, but certain specific categories warrant protection in light of the important commercial interest claimed by [NAME_1]. A. Statutory confidentiality and the open court principle [ 40 ] Before I address the three components of the Sherman Estate test, I pause to make the following observations on the statutory context in which the present motion arises. [ 41 ] In this case, there are statutory provisions expressly providing that information collected pursuant to the Section 11 Order is confidential. More specifically, sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act impose confidentiality obligations on the Commissioner in the conduct of her inquiries and investigations. Investigated entities thus legitimately have the expectation — as confirmed by legislation — that the information they are compelled to provide the Commissioner will be treated in a confidential manner. [ 42 ] However, this confidentiality protection over information obtained under section 11 is not absolute and there are statutory exceptions. [ 43 ] One exception found in the chapeau language of section 29 permits the communication of confidential information for “the purposes of the administration or enforcement” of the Competition Act , which must include motions arising from section 11 orders issued during a formal inquiry under section 10 (see, by analogy, Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v [COMPANY_22] , 2024 FC 239 at para 31 [ [NAME_21] ]). The statute therefore allows the use of section 11 information in the administration and enforcement of the Competition Act , though information that is truly confidential may be protected by a confidentiality order under Rule 151. Another exception is found at subsection 29(2), which provides that the section 29 confidentiality protection does not apply to information obtained under the Competition Act that has been made public or information for which its communication has been authorized by the person who provided it. [ 44 ] That being said, it is important to emphasize that once section 11 materials are filed in court, notably for the enforcement of a section 11 order (like is the case here with the Commissioner’s Motion for Directions), sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act are not the sole elements governing the treatment of such materials. [ 45 ] As the Supreme Court of Canada made clear, the open court principle applies as a constitutional baseline to all judicial proceedings, and departures from it require justification under the court’s framework for confidentiality orders ( Sherman Estate at paras 1–2, 38–39). The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the open court principle is rooted in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 and is foundational to the freedom of expression and of the press ( [NAME_14] at para 27; Sherman Estate at para 39). [ 46 ] The fact that Parliament has deemed certain information confidential in the hands of the executive at an investigation stage does not, without more, displace the open court principle. Rather, statutory confidentiality forms part of the context in which the Sherman Estate and Sierra Club analysis is conducted. It may inform the identification of the public interests engaged, but it does not predetermine the outcome of the analysis or relieve the moving party of its evidentiary burden ( Sierra Club at paras 49–52, 53–57). (1) No categorical exception for statutorily confidential information [ 47 ] Neither Sierra Club nor Sherman Estate recognizes a categorical exception to the open court principle for information that is deemed confidential by statute. On the contrary, Sierra Club expressly contemplated claims of confidentiality arising in complex statutory and commercial regimes and nonetheless required that any confidentiality order impair court openness as little as possible, based on a concrete assessment of harm rather than on the mere application of a statutory label ( Sierra Club at paras 53–57). [ 48 ] Similarly, Sherman Estate confirms that even where important public interests are engaged, a confidentiality order may only be issued where the moving party establishes a serious risk from disclosure, necessity, and proportionality. The Supreme Court of Canada did not carve out an exception for information deemed confidential elsewhere in law ( Sherman Estate at paras 38, 41). [ 49 ] I further underline that, in [NAME_23] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FC 791 [ [NAME_23] ], where the Court recognized that “a statutory recognition that confidentiality is important and that disclosure of certain information risks threatening the purpose of the statute may suffice to establish the existence of an important interest to be protected,” it also immediately added that this was “not enough to support the issuance of a confidentiality order” ( [NAME_23] at para 22). [ADDRESS] remains bound to examine all relevant facts and circumstances to discern whether there is a serious risk, well grounded in evidence, that disclosure in the case before it would harm that interest ( [NAME_23] at paras 16, 17, 22). [ 50 ] In fact, in [NAME_20] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FCA 123 [ [NAME_20] ], the Federal Court of Appeal determined it was an error for this Court to find that the existence of statutory confidentiality measures is sufficient to establish a serious risk of harm ( [NAME_20] at para 91). Similarly, the Court should not subordinate the exercise of its discretion under Rule 151 to what it considers to be the purpose of the legislation in question ( [NAME_20] at para 93). [ 51 ] In other words, statutory provisions providing for confidentiality are not determinative per se , because of the discretion granted to the Court by Rule 151 ( [NAME_20] at paras 91‒93; [NAME_24] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FC 979 at para 36 [ [NAME_24] ]). (2) Investigative confidentiality does not “follow the document” into court proceedings [ 52 ] Recent case law from this Court provides persuasive reasoning that statutory confidentiality governing investigative processes does not “follow the document” once it is placed before a court. [ 53 ] In Google , Justice Little held that once material is before the Court, Rule 151 and the Sherman Estate framework govern, and that generalized claims of investigative or commercial sensitivity are insufficient to justify sealing ( Google at paras 41, 43-44, 77; see also [COMPANY_25] v [NAME_26] , 1997 Can LII 3618 (ONCA) at para 10). [ 54 ] The same approach was adopted in [NAME_21] , where the Court accepted that the Competition Act establishes a confidential investigative regime, but emphasized that the Court must nonetheless conduct an independent balancing exercise under the open court principle when confidentiality is sought in judicial proceedings ( [NAME_21] at paras 7–12). (3) Effect of statutory confidentiality within the Sherman Estate framework [ 55 ] Despite statutory confidentiality not being dispositive of the Sherman Estate test, the objectives and particular provisions of the legislative or regulatory scheme are certainly relevant factors that the Court must weight when sitting on a motion for an order of confidentiality ( [NAME_20] at para 81). [ 56 ] First, the legislative scheme may assist in identifying whether the interest asserted is one of public importance, for example by signalling Parliament’s concern with investigative integrity, cooperation, or privacy. Here, the statutory confidentiality requirements in the Competition Act are a strong indication of the importance Parliament placed on this aspect of investigations, and is relevant to the present analysis (see, by analogy, [NAME_24] at para 35). However, it does not eliminate the requirement to demonstrate a serious risk arising from public disclosure in the judicial context ( Sherman Estate at paras 38, 41; [NAME_21] at paras 9–10). [ 57 ] Second, statutory confidentiality is of limited assistance at the necessity stage. Even where information is confidential by statute, the Court must still consider whether reasonably available alternatives such as targeted redactions, anonymization, or limited disclosure can adequately mitigate the risk. This requirement flows directly from Sierra Club ’s insistence on minimal impairment and from Sherman Estate ’s requirement that sealing be shown to be necessary because alternatives will not suffice ( Sierra Club at paras 53-57; Sherman Estate at paras 38, 60–64). [ 58 ] Third, in the proportionality analysis, statutory confidentiality may inform the assessment of the salutary effects of a confidentiality order, but it cannot justify measures that unduly impair the public understanding of the proceeding. [ADDRESS] must remain attentive to the risk that broad sealing orders could eclipse judicial transparency and accountability ( Sherman Estate at para 84; [NAME_21] at para 12). [ 59 ] Accordingly, while Parliament has imposed confidentiality obligations on the Commissioner in the conduct of investigations under the Competition Act , those provisions do not displace the open court principle once information is placed before the Court. Rather, they form part of the contextual analysis under Sherman Estate and Sierra Club , informing the identification of the public interests at stake but not relieving the moving party of the burden to demonstrate necessity, minimal impairment, and proportionality on a concrete evidentiary record ( Sierra Club at paras 53–57; Sherman Estate at paras 38, 41; Google at paras 44, 77; [NAME_21] at paras 7–12). (4) Enforcement of section 11 orders [ 60 ] I pause again to make the following remark. The circumstances of this case illustrate that the confidentiality protections offered by sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act in the context of section 11 orders can raise important practical considerations when enforcement issues arise. [ 61 ] The Commissioner has, subject to certain exceptions set out in section 29 of the Competition Act , a statutory obligation to protect all materials obtained from [NAME_1] in response to the Section 11 Order. In the present matter, in filing his Motion for Directions, the Commissioner took upon himself to make public the entirety of [NAME_1]’s Privilege Log and Individuals’ Titles List in his motion materials, arguably on the basis of the open court principle and on the ground that he was doing so for the purposes of the administration or enforcement of the Competition Act . This apparently caught [NAME_1] by surprise — notably in light of the statutory regime providing for confidentiality and its legitimate expectations under the section 10 investigative process —, forcing it to urgently apply to the Court to obtain the Interim Sealing Order in order to protect the confidentiality of those materials it had provided to the Commissioner further to the Section 11 Order. [ 62 ] In my view, this is not how the administration or enforcement process for section 11 orders was meant to work, or should work. Sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act clearly provide that respondents to a Commissioner’s inquiry and to section 11 orders are entitled to confidentiality protections at the investigation phase, and such respondents rightly have an expectation that the information and records they provide to the Commissioner as part of an inquiry or section 11 order will be treated as confidential. In this case, the Commissioner’s position and her somewhat unexpected decision to unilaterally make public documents that were provided to her on a confidential basis pursuant to the Section 11 Order could have seriously prejudiced [NAME_1] had it not been alert and able to file urgently for an interim sealing order. True, the Commissioner can, under section 29 of the Competition Act , communicate information obtained pursuant to section 11 “for the purposes of the administration or enforcement” of the Act. But that does not mean that the confidentiality protections provided by the legislation suddenly vanish when the Commissioner moves to an enforcement mode before this Court. [ 63 ] In light of what unfolded in the present matter, I believe that the Court will need to add language, in the template of its section 11 orders, affirming more clearly that all information and records provided in response to a section 11 order are confidential and shall be treated as such by the Commissioner. Section 11 orders should also specify that in the event the Commissioner intends to make certain information or records public as part of a motion or application filed before the courts in relation to the administration or enforcement of a section 11 order, she shall give sufficient notice to the respondents so that they have the time and opportunity to apply to the court for a confidentiality order under Rule 151. [ 64 ] It does not mean that such confidentiality orders will automatically follow, or that confidentiality orders will always be issued on the terms sought by a respondent, but this is a matter that the Court, not the Commissioner, shall determine. In other words, until a court decides otherwise, the confidentiality protections provided by sections 10, 11, and 29 of the Competition Act shall remain in place. B. Is there a serious risk to an important public interest? [ 65 ] Turning now to the substance of the Sherman Estate test, the first element is whether court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest. [ 66 ] [NAME_1] argues that there is an important public interest in protecting all private and confidential information obtained by the Commissioner in the course of section 11 orders, as well as another important public interest in protecting fair competition and competitively sensitive information. [ 67 ] With respect, I only agree with [NAME_1] in part, as such public interests, however important they may be, do not justify the blanket confidentiality protection initially sought by [NAME_1] over the entirety of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List, and related motion materials. [ 68 ] At the outset, it is obvious that the frameworks of those two documents, namely, the columns headings and titles, are not confidential as they refer to generic categories. [NAME_1] acknowledged that at the hearing. Furthermore, the serious risks to the important public interests identified by [NAME_1] are in fact limited to specific elements of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List, such as personal identifiers and a subset of subject lines under the “Document Title” column which refer to commercially or competitively sensitive matters. [ 69 ] I underline that, further to the hearing of its motion, [NAME_1] informed the Court that it no longer required confidentiality protection on the contents of columns 1 to 4 and 12 to 15 of the Privilege Log, dealing respectively with the Bates identification numbers of the listed records, the privilege asserted, description and basis, and the specifications (i.e., the paragraph of Schedules I or II of the Section 11 Order to which, if any, the record relates). [ 70 ] Turning to its remaining claims (i.e., the contents of columns 5 to 11 and of the Individuals’ Titles List), [NAME_1]’s strongest argument in support of its Motion for Confidentiality relates to the privacy interests of individuals identified in the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List. This refers to the contents of columns 8 to 11 of the Privilege Log — namely, the “Author/From,” “To,” “CC,” and “BCC” columns — and the contents of all three columns of the Individuals’ Titles List. Many of these individuals are junior employees, external stakeholders, or persons who played peripheral roles in privileged communications. Their identities, email addresses, and titles or positions are not vital to the public’s ability to understand the privilege dispute or the nature of the proceeding. While openness remains the rule and embarrassment or distress alone will not justify limits on disclosure, privacy interests tied to dignity may warrant protection where disclosure creates a serious risk of reputational harm, unwanted attention, a misunderstanding of their involvement in sensitive matters, and adds little to public understanding ( Sherman Estate at paras 62–64). [ 71 ] In a world of instantaneous digital dissemination, once uploaded to the public record, the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List could be downloaded, analysed, and repurposed by any number of actors, far beyond the original scope of this proceeding ( [NAME_27] v [NAME_28], Inc , 2017 SCC 33 at para 59). Courts have recognized that protecting the privacy of third parties is an important public interest, capable of justifying limited confidentiality measures, particularly in the absence of any countervailing public value in revealing their identities ( [NAME_21] at para 65). [ 72 ] This is the situation here. I therefore agree with [NAME_1] that the contents of columns 8 to 11 of the Privilege Log and the information contained in the three columns in the Individuals’ Titles List deserve to remain confidential. [ 73 ] [NAME_1] has also identified a certain number of entries under the “Document Title” column (column 7 of the Privilege Log) whose subject lines correspond to ongoing negotiations or active strategic initiatives, refer to specific entities, names, or disputes, or identify competitors’ names. These include references made in coded format. Such entries are qualitatively different from several other document titles found in column 7 of the Privilege Log, which solely contain generic references such as “agendas,” “meetings,” “draft communications,” “competitive updates,” “key messages,” “Board speaking points,” “Untitled attachments,” or “speaking notes.” [ 74 ] I am satisfied that the disclosure of the former type of information could prejudice [NAME_1] in ongoing discussions or signal proprietary or competitive considerations that are not otherwise public (see, for instance, paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act , RSC 1985, c A-1, where mirroring legislation prevents disclosure of information under the control of the Government of Canada). [NAME_1]’s document descriptions are not exhaustive, the Commissioner did not meaningfully challenge the existence of at least some of these entries. [ 75 ] In assessing the asserted commercial interests, the Court must distinguish between information that merely references generic issues and information that reveals or may reveal strategic decision-making, specific competitors, ongoing commercial positioning, or competitively sensitive information. The latter category of information engages an important public interest where disclosure would permit competitors or counterparties to infer internal assessments, negotiation posture, or regulatory or competitive strategy. Courts have repeatedly recognized that the protection of confidential commercial information can constitute such an interest where disclosure would undermine legitimate business activities or prejudice competitive standing ( Sierra Club at paras 53–55; see also Google at paras 73–76). Competitively sensitive information includes references to strategic and business plans, prices, profit margins, marketing contacts, market intelligence, sales invoices, the terms and conditions of licensing agreements, and financial information that could allow competitors to have access to a firm’s sales or marketing strategy ( [COMPANY_29] v [COMPANY_30] , 2010 FC 668 at para 32). [ 76 ] [ADDRESS]’s approach in intellectual property litigation is also instructive in this regard. In patent and trade secret disputes, courts routinely confront requests to protect commercially sensitive technical or business information. The jurisprudence confirms that such interests may justify limited confidentiality measures, provided that the restrictions are carefully tailored and preserve public access to the substance of the dispute ( Sierra Club at paras 53–57). Courts also continue to permit the redaction of discrete passages revealing trade secrets, confidential business strategies, or commercially sensitive negotiations while maintaining public access to the broader evidentiary record and legal reasoning (see, for instance, Toronto Star Newspapers Limited v [COMPANY_31] , 2025 ONSC 4685; [NAME_32] v Financial Institutions Commission , 2018 BCSC 601; Imperial Parking Canada Corporation v [NAME_33] , 2015 BCSC 2221). [ 77 ] The same principles apply here. The objective is not to shield an entire evidentiary category from public scrutiny, but to protect specific information that would meaningfully prejudice legitimate commercial interests if disclosed. Applying that reasoning to the present matter reinforces the conclusion that targeted redactions, rather than a categorical sealing order, represent the appropriate response to [NAME_1]’s motion. [ 78 ] In the present case, it is clear that certain subject-line descriptors contained in the Privilege Log go beyond generic references. Certain document titles appear to potentially correspond to ongoing negotiations, policy initiatives, or strategic responses to evolving competitive conditions, considerations, or pressures. Disclosure of those entries could permit external parties to infer [NAME_1]’s internal deliberations or negotiating posture in relation to specific market actors and conditions. In those instances, I am satisfied that, for such information, the disclosure risk is sufficiently concrete and identifiable to meet the first branch of the Sherman Estate test. [ 79 ] I accept, as argued by the Commissioner, that the Court should not speculate on inferences that could perhaps be made from certain entries. However, even though the documents themselves are not released or made public as part of the Privilege Log, the commercially or competitively sensitive nature of certain descriptions of documents in the “Document Title” column of the Privilege Log does create a risk to [NAME_1]’s business and competitive interests, and [NAME_1] has established that it has a right to keep such information confidential. [ 80 ] In these instances, [NAME_1] can establish that disclosure would present a serious risk to commercially significant interests. The problem here is that [NAME_1] has not yet precisely identified, in its motion materials, which of the subject-line descriptions in the “Document Title” column fall in that category and the specific confidential information that should be redacted. [NAME_1] will therefore need to provide, in response to this Order, narrow and targeted redactions limited to those specific elements of the subject-line descriptions in the “Document Title” column. [ 81 ] Beyond these limited situations, [NAME_1]’s evidence does not demonstrate a serious risk to its business and competitive interests. A majority of the Privilege Log’s “Document Title” entries are administrative. Many of the subject lines are generic descriptions that contain no commercially sensitive information nor offer meaningful insight into [NAME_1]’s internal strategy or governance. [NAME_1]’s assertion that the compelled nature of the Privilege Log itself generates a serious risk is not persuasive; compulsion does not convert routine material into sensitive information ( Sierra Club at paras 53–55; [NAME_34] v Canada (Solicitor General) , 2002 SCC 75 at paras 40–44). [ 82 ] As stated above, [NAME_1] acknowledges that the contents of columns 1 to 4 on Bates numbers, columns 12 to 14 on the description of privilege claims, and column 15 on the Section 11 Order specifications in the Privilege Log do not contain confidential information and can be made public. [ 83 ] With respect to the Privilege Log’s columns 5 and 6 on “Parent Date” and “Document Date,” I fail to see how the disclosure of such information, either in itself or coupled with other public information that will be released in the revised Privilege Log, could raise a confidentiality concern, in a context where the commercially or competitively sensitive information contained in the “Document Titles” and all personal identifiers information will have been redacted from the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List. [ 84 ] Finally, I make the following observation. The current descriptions of the “Privilege Basis” (i.e., column 14 of the Privilege Log) contain no confidential information whatsoever and does not need to be protected by a confidentiality order, as they are a boilerplate description of the legal privileges at issue, with no factual underpinning. However, once [NAME_1] will have provided its revised Privilege Log pursuant to the Order on Directions issued simultaneously with this Order — which will require [NAME_1] to provide a sufficient factual basis for the claimed privileges —, it is expected that the descriptors under the “Privilege Basis” column of the revised Privilege Log will contain confidential information that [NAME_1] will be entitled and justified to redact. I am satisfied that the current generic descriptions of the four types of privileges at stake are a sufficient public disclosure of the “Privilege Basis” of [NAME_1]’s claims found in column 14. C. Is a confidentiality order necessary? [ 85 ] The second prong of the Sherman Estate test asks whether the proposed order is necessary to prevent the serious risk identified, in the sense that no reasonably available alternative measure would suffice. [ADDRESS] must be satisfied that the harm cannot be prevented through a less intrusive means, such as targeted redactions, anonymization, or delayed disclosure. The jurisprudence is consistent in that sealing is a remedy of last resort (see, for example, Sierra Club at paras 53–55; Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp , [1994] 3 SCR 835, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) at 878–879; [NAME_17] at para 32). [ 86 ] [NAME_1] argues that the structure of the Privilege Log renders targeted redactions insufficient. [NAME_1] submits that redacting only the most sensitive subject lines would not prevent the inference of sensitive information from the surrounding context. It further submits that masking personal identifiers in the Individuals’ Titles List may not suffice because individuals could still be deduced from the remaining information. [ 87 ] I am not persuaded by [NAME_1]’s arguments. In my view, [NAME_1]’s submissions overstate the limitations of redactions. The record before me does not support the conclusion that meaningful redaction is impossible. True, redacting the “Document Title” column will certainly require [NAME_1] to undertake a fair amount of work, but nothing in the record demonstrates that the more tailored approach discussed above would fail to address the risks [NAME_1] has established. On the contrary, the very nature of the sensitivity asserted, being limited to specific subject lines, commercially or competitively sensitive information, and personal identifiers, demonstrates that the risks are discrete and can be effectively mitigated by proportionate measures ( AB v [COMPANY_35] , 2012 SCC 46 at para 30). [ 88 ] Moreover, I am unconvinced that the combination of masking personal identifiers in the Individuals’ Titles List and the Privilege Log and redacting the specific confidential materials from the “Document Title” column will be insufficient to protect confidentiality and that sensitive materials could still be deduced from the remaining information in the Privilege Log. [NAME_1] has not provided any compelling or convincing evidence to that effect. [ 89 ] Furthermore, [NAME_1]’s generalized concerns that disclosure of a compelled privilege log might deter future cooperation with section 11 orders under the Competition Act is not supported by specific evidence and does not establish that sealing the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List as a whole is necessary. Compelled production regimes routinely coexist with the open court principle, and the Court must presume that parties will comply with judicial orders absent clear evidence to the contrary. Nor does the statutory confidentiality imposed on the Commissioner by sections 10 and 29 of the Competition Act suggest that sealing is necessary in judicial proceedings. Parliament has created a clear distinction between confidential investigative processes and public court processes, and this Court must respect that distinction in exercising its discretion under Rule 151. [ 90 ] I am therefore satisfied that sealing the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List as a whole is not necessary and that the risks established by [NAME_1] can be addressed through targeted measures. Redactions of personal identifiers and of the sensitive subject lines are reasonable and effective alternatives. These measures are consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence, respect the open court principle, and adequately protect the specific public interests at stake. [ 91 ] Protecting specific commercially and competitively sensitive information that is of marginal utility to understand the section 11 application (and the Commissioner’s Motion for Directions) but could well be of real and practical benefit to others who are not directly affected by the Commissioner’s Inquiry — such as competitors and other market participants — will not materially offend the open court principle, or inhibit the objectives and values that support it (see, for example, [NAME_21] at para 55). D. Are the proposed measures proportionate? [ 92 ] The final requirement under the Sherman Estate framework is proportionality. [ADDRESS] must be satisfied that the Order is necessary and that its overall impact on openness is justified. The salutary effects of a confidentiality order must outweigh the deleterious effects on the open court principle. [ 93 ] [NAME_1] argues that sealing the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List in their entirety is proportionate given the sensitivity of the information and the statutory confidentiality applicable to the underlying Inquiry. I do not agree. While these considerations are entitled to weight, they do not overcome the presumption of court openness to the extent [NAME_1] proposes. A blanket sealing order would obscure the structure, chronology, and basis of [NAME_1]’s privilege assertions. It would prevent the public from understanding the issues in dispute in the Commissioner’s Motion for Directions, thereby impeding accountability and transparency. In sum, granting [NAME_1]’s request to seal the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List in their entirety would disproportionately impair court openness. [ 94 ] The Commissioner submits that proportionate measures are those that preserve as much openness as possible while protecting genuinely sensitive material. The Commissioner accepts that redacting personal identifiers may be appropriate but argues that anything more would impair the public’s ability to scrutinize his privilege challenge. [ADDRESS], says the Commissioner, must ensure that any limitation on court openness does not obscure the essential elements required for public understanding of the proceeding. [ 95 ] With respect, I am satisfied that a narrow confidentiality order that protects those categories of information detailed above is proportionate. Redacting personal identifiers preserves individual privacy without impairing public access to the substance of the privilege dispute. Masking those subject lines that reveal commercially or competitively sensitive matters protects [NAME_1] from specific, demonstrated harms without concealing the overall structure of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List. Such limited measures strike the appropriate balance between the competing interests at stake ( Sherman Estate at para 83). [ 96 ] With the tailored confidentiality order to be issued, the impact on the open court principle is negligible because the “bulk of the record would remain available” and “[t]he gist of the issues would remain available to the public” ( [NAME_21] v [COMPANY_36] , 2023 ONSC 5398 at para 115; [NAME_37] v [COMPANY_38] , 2023 ONSC 5134 at para 19). The public will still be able to understand the issues the Commissioner is advancing on his Motion for Directions and its outcome, even with the redactions. This is not a situation where the redacted Privilege Log and Individuals’ Titles List would become an empty, incomprehensible shell that would be difficult to read or understand in light of the magnitude of the redacted information ( [NAME_39] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 693 at para 27). [ 97 ] I must underline that the test is not whether the redacted information would satisfy the public’s curiosity, but whether it can provide a reasonable and sufficient understanding of the proceeding at stake. In this case, the Order will not render the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List unintelligible, nor will it hamper the ability of the public to understand the issues raised by the Commissioner’s Motion for Directions.

VI. Terms of the confidentiality order [ 98 ] Having concluded that only limited categories of information warrant protection and that a tailored approach is appropriate, I must determine the terms of the confidentiality order to be issued. [ 99 ] The confidentiality order will therefore operate as follows. [ 100 ] First, [NAME_1] shall prepare public versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List in which the headlines of all columns in both documents are made public. In the public version of the Privilege Log, the contents of columns 1 to 6 and 12 to 15 shall be entirely public, whereas the contents of columns 8 to 11 shall be entirely confidential. With respect to column 7 on “Document Title,” [NAME_1] may redact those subject line descriptors that reveal ongoing strategic initiatives, negotiations, or commercially or competitively sensitive matters. [ 101 ] Turning to the Individuals’ Titles List, the contents of all three columns, which refer to the names, email addresses, and titles or positions of various individuals, shall remain confidential and be redacted from the public version of this document. [ 102 ] Unredacted versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List shall remain under seal for the purposes of this proceeding. Of course, all public motion materials referring to information that shall remain confidential shall be redacted accordingly. [ 103 ] These measures are sufficient to protect the limited confidential interests identified while preserving meaningful public access to the Court record.

VII. Conclusion [ 104 ] For the reasons detailed above, [NAME_1] has not established that the Privilege Log or the Individuals’ Titles List, when viewed as a whole, give rise to a serious risk to an important public interest. Nor has it demonstrated that a blanket sealing order is necessary or proportionate. However, [NAME_1] has established narrower risks that warrant protection. As such, personal identifiers should be redacted. In the same vein, those subject-line descriptors reflecting commercially or competitively sensitive matters may also be protected. These limited measures are necessary to prevent specific harms and proportionate in their impact on openness. [ 105 ] Accordingly, [NAME_1]’s motion is granted in part. The Interim Sealing Order is vacated and replaced with a tailored confidentiality order directing [NAME_1] to prepare redacted public versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List, in accordance with these reasons, for filing on the public record. [ 106 ] In a letter dated December 19, 2025, the parties informed the Court that both this motion and the Motion for Directions should be on a without-cost basis.

Accordingly, no costs will be awarded. [ 107 ] Counsel for the parties are directed to review this Confidential Order and Reasons and confer to propose any necessary redactions arising from confidentiality claims within three business days of their receipt of this Order and Reasons.

ORDER in file T-2455-24 THIS COURT ORDERS that: [NAME_1]’s motion for confidentiality is granted in part. The Interim Sealing Order dated October 8, 2025 shall remain in place until [NAME_1] serves and files on the public record redacted public versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List consistent with these Reasons. [NAME_1] shall, within 90 days of the date of this Order, prepare and file on the public record redacted versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List as they stand now, consistent with these Reasons. Unredacted versions of those documents shall remain under seal. After the filing of [NAME_1]’s redacted public versions of the Privilege Log and the Individuals’ Titles List consistent with these Reasons, the Interim Sealing Order dated October 8, 2025 shall be vacated. Any motion materials, affidavits, transcripts, other documents, or submissions that disclose the protected categories of information identified in these Reasons shall be filed in both a confidential version and a redacted public version. Any motion materials, affidavits, transcripts, other documents, or submissions that contain confidential information shall be filed in sealed envelopes as part of the motion materials and shall be segregated from the public record, and such material shall be treated as confidential, in accordance with Rule 152 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106. Each sealed envelope and redacted motion materials shall be accompanied by a solicitor’s certificate attesting that the solicitor has read this Order and confirms that the contents of the sealed envelope(s) and redactions comprise confidential information and that such material is filed pursuant to this Order. Any confidential information filed with the Court in accordance with this Order shall be treated as confidential by the Registry of the Court and shall not be made available to anyone other than the Court, the parties, and appropriate Court personnel. [ADDRESS] shall retain its discretion as to the terms and conditions of use of the confidential information and the maintenance of the confidentiality thereof during the course of this matter, subject to the parties being given a reasonable opportunity to speak to and provide evidence supporting the need to maintain its confidentiality. No costs are awarded. Blank "Denis Gascon" Blank Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-2455-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION v THE CANADIAN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION DATE OF HEARING: DECEMBER 15, 2025 PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, [NAME_16]

ORDER AND

REASONS GASCON J. CONFIDENTIAL

ORDER AND

REASONS issued : APRIL 30, 2026 public

ORDER AND

REASONS issued: may 5, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_41] [NAME_43] For The Applicant [NAME_44] [NAME_47] [NAME_50] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Department of Justice Competition Bureau Legal Services Gatineau, Quebec For The Applicant [COMPANY_10], [NAME_16] For The Respondent [1] [NAME_53] ended his term as Commissioner on December 17, 2025. [NAME_56] became the acting Commissioner on December 18, 2025. This explains why, in these reasons, the Commissioner is sometimes referred to as “he/him” or “she/her” depending on the time period being discussed.